Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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The second dimension to be considered is factual<br />
accuracy. An explanation with less idealizations <strong>and</strong><br />
abstractions is usually judged to be better than one with<br />
more. However, factual accuracy is often <strong>in</strong> conflict with<br />
<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r dimensions of explanatory power: it is difficult to<br />
have an explanation that is both factually accurate, nonsensitive,<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrated with o<strong>the</strong>r explanations <strong>and</strong><br />
cognitively salient. The technical precision of RCT<br />
concepts can give rise to an impression of precise<br />
descriptions of psychological phenomena, but <strong>in</strong> reality it<br />
does not score highly <strong>in</strong> terms of factual accuracy. Not only<br />
does RCT significantly abstract away from <strong>the</strong> details of<br />
psychological phenomena, it also quite often factually<br />
distorts <strong>the</strong> descriptions of <strong>the</strong>se phenomena. For<br />
example, <strong>the</strong> RCT reconstruction of psychological process<br />
can give a causally mislead<strong>in</strong>g account of it by describ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as purposive behavior what was habitual or unconscious,<br />
or rationaliz<strong>in</strong>g decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g processes that were<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g but rational.<br />
The f<strong>in</strong>al dimension we want to consider is <strong>the</strong><br />
degree of <strong>in</strong>tegration with exist<strong>in</strong>g knowledge. It<br />
contributes to explanatory underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g by exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
set of explanatory questions that can be answered by<br />
<strong>the</strong>m separately. As RCT is just a formalization of<br />
everyday folk psychology, it is relatively well <strong>in</strong>tegrated<br />
with it. However, it is an open question how much this<br />
exp<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong>ir jo<strong>in</strong>t explanatory reach. RCT fares even<br />
worse with respect to <strong>in</strong>tegration with o<strong>the</strong>r scientific<br />
<strong>the</strong>ories. The difficulties of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g RCT with <strong>the</strong> results<br />
of empirical research <strong>in</strong> psychology <strong>and</strong> social sciences<br />
are well known. When RCT is fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ned with<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalism, <strong>the</strong> problems become even<br />
greater. As suggested above, <strong>the</strong> ideas underly<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalism are not compatible with causal<br />
mechanistic explanatory ideas that motivate o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
sciences. Largely because of <strong>the</strong> very idea of a<br />
fundament, <strong>the</strong> fundamentalist RCT has extremely low<br />
degree of <strong>in</strong>tegration with o<strong>the</strong>r bodies of scientific<br />
knowledge.<br />
Intentional Fundamentalism — Petri Ylikoski / Jaakko Kuorikoski<br />
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