Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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argument that explanatory underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g cannot be based<br />
on a local dyadic relation between <strong>the</strong> explan<strong>and</strong>um <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> explanans. Instead, underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g has to be a global<br />
property of <strong>the</strong> whole belief system. (Friedman 1974;<br />
Schurz <strong>and</strong> Lambert 1994)<br />
This global conception of underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is based on<br />
an attribution error. The fact that an explanation fits well<br />
<strong>in</strong>to a systematic web of beliefs usually makes it easier to<br />
underst<strong>and</strong>, but it is not what constitutes underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. A<br />
more natural way to <strong>in</strong>terpret underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is to regard it<br />
as an ability to answer counterfactual what-if-th<strong>in</strong>gs-hadbeen-different-questions.<br />
(Woodward 2003, 191; Ylikoski<br />
2008). Explanations show what made a difference to <strong>the</strong><br />
explan<strong>and</strong>um. Here underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is a local affair:<br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is attributed based on ability make correct<br />
counterfactual <strong>in</strong>ferences about <strong>the</strong> phenomenon. It does<br />
not matter for <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of a particular<br />
phenomenon whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that made a difference to<br />
it are <strong>the</strong>mselves expla<strong>in</strong>ed. That is a different, partially<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent question. There is no need of a fundament.<br />
Most <strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalists are <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
committed to <strong>the</strong> causal-mechanistic conception of<br />
explanation: <strong>the</strong>y are try<strong>in</strong>g to expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> properties of<br />
social wholes by lay<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> causally relevant properties<br />
of <strong>the</strong>ir parts (<strong>in</strong>dividuals) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> pattern of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
<strong>in</strong>teraction. However, <strong>the</strong> causal-mechanistic conception of<br />
explanation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> global, fundamentalist conception of<br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g do not fit toge<strong>the</strong>r: <strong>the</strong>re is no reason to<br />
expect that <strong>the</strong> putative fundament would always pick out<br />
<strong>the</strong> causally relevant factors. First, <strong>in</strong> many cases, <strong>the</strong><br />
causally relevant factors <strong>in</strong> RCT-models are actually<br />
structural or <strong>in</strong>stitutional factors. Individual behavior may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>stitutionally constra<strong>in</strong>ed so as to be rational only <strong>in</strong> an<br />
“as if” –sense, or <strong>the</strong> explan<strong>and</strong>um may be robust with<br />
respect to <strong>the</strong> behavioral assumptions. The details of<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional level can thus be explanatorily irrelevant. (Satz<br />
<strong>and</strong> Ferejohn 1994; Leht<strong>in</strong>en <strong>and</strong> Kuorikoski 2007)<br />
Second, reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> behavior <strong>in</strong> terms of rational<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional action might misdescribe <strong>the</strong> actual causes of<br />
behavior. A grow<strong>in</strong>g body of social psychological research<br />
on behavior prim<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> post-hoc rationalization supports<br />
this claim (Wilson 2004). Hence, <strong>in</strong>tentional description<br />
can be mislead<strong>in</strong>g. This is not <strong>the</strong> age-old argument that,<br />
on purely conceptual grounds, <strong>in</strong>tentional explanation<br />
cannot be causal explanation, but an empirical claim about<br />
<strong>the</strong> relationship between folk-psychology <strong>and</strong> human<br />
behavior.<br />
As Carl Craver (2007, Ch. 4) has po<strong>in</strong>ted out,<br />
although <strong>the</strong> search for mechanistic explanations <strong>in</strong>volves<br />
open<strong>in</strong>g black boxes, complete mechanistic explanations<br />
are not really elim<strong>in</strong>ative, because <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>corporate factors<br />
<strong>in</strong> multiple different levels of mechanisms. The goal of<br />
mechanistic explanation is not to reduce different levels to<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle bedrock, but to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> systematic<br />
dependencies between entities <strong>in</strong> different levels of<br />
organization. Nei<strong>the</strong>r does mechanistic explanation regard<br />
<strong>the</strong> lower levels as somehow sacrosanct: lower level<br />
concepts <strong>and</strong> conceptions may be altered <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> face of<br />
new empirical discoveries or conceptual changes<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g upper (or even lower) level phenomena. These<br />
are bad news for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalist.<br />
406<br />
Intentional Fundamentalism — Petri Ylikoski / Jaakko Kuorikoski<br />
3. The Dimensions of Explanatory Power<br />
We have argued elsewhere (Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2008)<br />
that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuitive notion of explanatory power is related to<br />
five dist<strong>in</strong>ct dimensions that can be <strong>in</strong> conflict with each<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r. The five dimensions of explanatory goodness are<br />
non-sensitivity, precision, factual accuracy, degree of <strong>in</strong>tegration,<br />
<strong>and</strong> cognitive salience. All o<strong>the</strong>r often cited criteria<br />
for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g explanations, like simplicity, unification or<br />
mechanistic detail, are derivate of <strong>the</strong>se basic dimensions.<br />
Could some of <strong>the</strong> appeal of <strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalism be<br />
expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>the</strong>se dimensions?<br />
The appeal of <strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalism derives<br />
from <strong>the</strong> cognitive salience of our folk psychological<br />
practice. Cognitive salience refers to <strong>the</strong> ease with which<br />
<strong>the</strong> reason<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong> explanation can be followed, how<br />
easily <strong>the</strong> implications of <strong>the</strong> explanation can be seen <strong>and</strong><br />
how easy it is to evaluate <strong>the</strong> scope of <strong>the</strong> explanation <strong>and</strong><br />
identify possible defeaters or caveats. To <strong>the</strong> extent that<br />
RCT belongs to <strong>the</strong> family of folk psychological <strong>the</strong>ories,<br />
<strong>and</strong> once its technical concepts are <strong>in</strong>ternalized, people<br />
can be extremely fluent <strong>in</strong> its use. It only requires <strong>the</strong><br />
translation of everyday folk psychological accounts to <strong>the</strong><br />
more abstract language of beliefs <strong>and</strong> preferences. The<br />
ease of use <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> broad scope of application of<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional vocabulary give rise to <strong>the</strong> impression of a<br />
strong <strong>the</strong>ory. If RCT is a formalization of our everyday<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional explanatory practice, <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />
explanations are f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>and</strong> do not give rise to additional<br />
question is easily expla<strong>in</strong>ed: <strong>in</strong> our everyday explanatory<br />
practice we do not usually attempt to go beyond <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional scheme of explanation. In fact, people have<br />
difficulties <strong>in</strong> figur<strong>in</strong>g out what <strong>the</strong>se explanations would<br />
look like. The mistake here is to assume that cognitive<br />
salience is a reliable <strong>in</strong>dicator of overall explanatory power.<br />
What <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional fundamentalist does not recognize is<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of RCT <strong>the</strong>re are important tradeoffs<br />
between <strong>the</strong> dimensions of explanatory power. To<br />
show this, we will next consider how well <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />
rational explanations measure up aga<strong>in</strong>st some o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
dimensions.<br />
Let us start with <strong>the</strong> non-sensitivity. It refers to <strong>the</strong><br />
sensitivity of <strong>the</strong> explanatory relationship to <strong>the</strong> changes <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> background conditions. The less sensitive <strong>the</strong><br />
explanation is to <strong>the</strong>se changes, more robust <strong>and</strong> powerful<br />
it is. A robust explanation can answer a wider set of whatif-th<strong>in</strong>gs-had-been-different<br />
-questions. If we focus on<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual explanations, rational choice explanations can<br />
be extremely sensitive <strong>in</strong> that sometimes a small change <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> beliefs or desires of <strong>the</strong> agent can br<strong>in</strong>g about a drastic<br />
change <strong>in</strong> behavior. However, sometimes <strong>the</strong>se<br />
explanations can also be robust, so everyth<strong>in</strong>g depends on<br />
<strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>ds of changes <strong>in</strong> background assumptions we are<br />
talk<strong>in</strong>g about. Therefore it does not make sense to make<br />
generalizations about <strong>the</strong> sensitivity of rational choice<br />
explanations. However, one might be tempted to make<br />
such generalizations if one considers <strong>the</strong> robustness of<br />
RCT as an explanatory scheme. Like folk psychology <strong>in</strong><br />
general, RCT provides extremely flexible vocabulary for<br />
describ<strong>in</strong>g behavior <strong>and</strong> for revis<strong>in</strong>g explanatory accounts.<br />
If one <strong>in</strong>tentional description of behavior is shown to be<br />
false, it can always be replaced with a new one that<br />
<strong>in</strong>corporates <strong>the</strong> problematic observations. This flexibility<br />
gives an impression of a general <strong>and</strong> strong explanatory<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory, although <strong>the</strong>se are really properties of <strong>the</strong><br />
explanatory vocabulary, not of <strong>the</strong> substantial <strong>the</strong>ory.<br />
Explanatory power, understood as non-sensitivity, is <strong>in</strong> this<br />
case illusory.