Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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<strong>the</strong>ir relations both to <strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong> to each o<strong>the</strong>r.”<br />
(Bennett unpublished, 15) Now, <strong>the</strong> fundamental<br />
protophenomenal properties can aga<strong>in</strong> be ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
phenomenal or nonphenomenal. If <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
nonphenomenal, it is hard to see how <strong>the</strong>y can generate<br />
<strong>the</strong> phenomenal properties we are familiar with. “[W]e now<br />
need a story about how <strong>the</strong> phenomenal arises from <strong>the</strong><br />
protophenomenal. […] The explanatory gap has not been<br />
closed; it has just been shunted <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> space between<br />
<strong>the</strong> protophenomenal <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal. The hard<br />
problem rearises <strong>the</strong>re.” (Bennett unpublished, 16-17) If,<br />
on <strong>the</strong> contrary, protophenomenal properties are<br />
phenomenal <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>the</strong>n we need to expla<strong>in</strong> how <strong>the</strong><br />
physical can give rise to <strong>the</strong>m. “More precisely, we have<br />
lost out on <strong>the</strong> attempt to systematize <strong>and</strong> unify <strong>the</strong><br />
relationships between <strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> phenomenal.”<br />
(Bennett unpublished, 17) Bennett sums up <strong>the</strong> problem<br />
as follows: “The more similar <strong>the</strong> protophenomenal<br />
properties are to phenomenal ones, <strong>the</strong> less headway can<br />
be made on <strong>the</strong> project of systematiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> macrocorrelations;<br />
we may as well take each <strong>and</strong> every<br />
phenomenal property, each <strong>and</strong> every macro-correlation,<br />
as fundamental. And <strong>the</strong> more removed <strong>the</strong><br />
protophenomenal properties are from phenomenal ones,<br />
<strong>the</strong> less po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>the</strong>re is to postulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m at all. We still<br />
cannot see how human experience – genu<strong>in</strong>e, full blown<br />
consciousness – arises from complicated relations among<br />
such fragmentary shadows of phenomenality.” (Bennett<br />
unpublished, 17) By postulat<strong>in</strong>g a third category of<br />
properties <strong>the</strong> dualist “only answers <strong>the</strong> letter of <strong>the</strong> hard<br />
problem”. (Bennett unpublished, 18) The spirit of <strong>the</strong> hard<br />
problem – <strong>the</strong> question of how <strong>the</strong> phenomenal arises from<br />
<strong>the</strong> nonphenomenal – is as press<strong>in</strong>g as ever. (Bennett<br />
unpublished, 18)<br />
3 The subjectivity of <strong>the</strong> mental<br />
I believe that Bennett is right with her criticism of<br />
Chalmers’s position. I believe that, just like <strong>the</strong> physicalist,<br />
<strong>the</strong> dualist cannot solve <strong>the</strong> hard problem. I disagree,<br />
however, with Bennett’s claim that this amounts to an impeachment<br />
of dualism. Therefore, I will first expla<strong>in</strong> why a<br />
fully satisfy<strong>in</strong>g explanation of how <strong>the</strong> mental arises from<br />
<strong>the</strong> physical is not to be expected <strong>and</strong> second why <strong>the</strong><br />
prospects for dualism are never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>in</strong>tact.<br />
Mental properties 1 can be characterized as<br />
essentially subjective, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense that, while every<br />
physical property is <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple accessible to everyone,<br />
every mental property is pr<strong>in</strong>cipally accessible only from a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> subjective perspective. (Nagel 1974, 442) A tree’s<br />
height can be measured by everyone around. No one is<br />
privileged here. A person’s pa<strong>in</strong>, however, can be<br />
experienced only by <strong>the</strong> person herself. Even though we<br />
can adopt <strong>the</strong> person’s po<strong>in</strong>t of view, we cannot actually<br />
feel her pa<strong>in</strong>. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stantiation of mental<br />
properties br<strong>in</strong>gs with it a change of perspective. It is this<br />
change of perspective that makes <strong>the</strong> occurrence of<br />
mental properties such a mystery. In contrast, <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
big mystery <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how one neural process<br />
generates <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> how one thought follows <strong>the</strong><br />
1 So far, I have restricted <strong>the</strong> discussion to phenomenal properties, follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ology of <strong>the</strong> authors discussed. Phenomenal properties are mostly<br />
seen as one k<strong>in</strong>d of mental properties, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r k<strong>in</strong>d be<strong>in</strong>g psychological<br />
properties such as learn<strong>in</strong>g. Psychological properties, it is assumed, can be<br />
functionalized, whereas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of phenomenal properties this is questioned.<br />
(Chalmers 1996, 11-31) S<strong>in</strong>ce I have doubts about <strong>the</strong> phenomenal/psychological-dist<strong>in</strong>ction<br />
I will from now on be speak<strong>in</strong>g of mental properties<br />
only. On <strong>the</strong> ontological level, of course, this doesn’t have any consequences.<br />
The position discussed rema<strong>in</strong>s dualist all <strong>the</strong> same.<br />
No Bridge with<strong>in</strong> Sight — Daniel Weh<strong>in</strong>ger<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r. Here <strong>the</strong> entities <strong>in</strong>volved are on a par, so to say:<br />
They are both objective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first case <strong>and</strong> both<br />
subjective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second case. Therefore, all we need to do<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to achieve a fully satisfy<strong>in</strong>g explanation is to keep<br />
track of every turn <strong>the</strong>y take. When try<strong>in</strong>g to expla<strong>in</strong>, on <strong>the</strong><br />
contrary, how neural processes give rise to mental<br />
properties <strong>and</strong> how thoughts yield neural changes we have<br />
a much harder time. Here <strong>the</strong> entities <strong>in</strong>volved are tied to<br />
different perspectives. A fully satisfy<strong>in</strong>g explanation,<br />
however, would have to lead us all <strong>the</strong> way from <strong>the</strong><br />
physical to <strong>the</strong> mental, or conversely from <strong>the</strong> mental to<br />
<strong>the</strong> physical without chang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> perspective. In view of<br />
<strong>the</strong> subjectivity of <strong>the</strong> mental <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> objectivity of <strong>the</strong><br />
physical such an explanation is not to be expected. Add<strong>in</strong>g<br />
up objective facts doesn’t seem to get us any nearer to<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g essentially subjective. It is only by chang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
perspective that we come to know <strong>the</strong>re are mental, <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>refore subjective, properties. Hence, a bridge between<br />
<strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> mental is not with<strong>in</strong> sight: Such a<br />
bridge would aga<strong>in</strong> have to be ei<strong>the</strong>r subjective or<br />
objective <strong>and</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>the</strong> hard problem, which can by<br />
now be reformulated as <strong>the</strong> question of how you get<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g essentially subjective out of someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
essentially objective, rearises.<br />
Many physicalists concede that mental properties<br />
<strong>in</strong>deed appear to be subjective <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense described<br />
above. If, however, <strong>the</strong>y really are subjective <strong>in</strong> that sense,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y cannot be physical, for <strong>the</strong> physical is certa<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
objective. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> physicalist is confronted with <strong>the</strong><br />
difficult task of hav<strong>in</strong>g to po<strong>in</strong>t out how <strong>the</strong> mental, contrary<br />
to appearance, can be objective without <strong>the</strong>reby turn<strong>in</strong>g it<br />
<strong>in</strong>to someth<strong>in</strong>g it is not. Admittedly, it is not quite clear by<br />
now how this could be done <strong>and</strong>, thus, how <strong>the</strong> physicalist<br />
claim that everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>re is, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g mental properties,<br />
is physical could be made true. But this, it is argued, does<br />
not ultimately rule out <strong>the</strong> possibility of its truth. The<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g quote from Thomas Nagel is reveal<strong>in</strong>g here: “If<br />
we acknowledge that a physical <strong>the</strong>ory of m<strong>in</strong>d must<br />
account for <strong>the</strong> subjective character of experience, we<br />
must admit that no presently available conception gives us<br />
a clue how this could be done.” But, as Nagel goes on,<br />
“[n]oth<strong>in</strong>g is provided by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>adequacy of physicalist<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>ses that assume a faulty objective analysis of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>d. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position<br />
we cannot underst<strong>and</strong> because we do not at present have<br />
any conception of how it might be true.” (Nagel 1974, 445-<br />
446) Such a l<strong>in</strong>e of argument, however, puts physicalism<br />
at risk of becom<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g close to an article of faith.<br />
Dualists, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, claim that mental<br />
properties are <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y appear to be, i.e.<br />
subjective, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore nonphysical. This claim, of<br />
course, does not solve <strong>the</strong> hard problem. But this must not<br />
be seen as a lack of <strong>the</strong> dualist position. The dualist is not<br />
committed to solv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> hard problem. All she is<br />
committed to is <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that, <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>the</strong> lots <strong>and</strong><br />
lots of physical properties, <strong>the</strong>re are at least some mental<br />
properties that are not physical. In fact, I believe that, if <strong>the</strong><br />
mental is essentially subjective, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>solubleness of <strong>the</strong><br />
hard problem follows: A fully satisfy<strong>in</strong>g explanation of <strong>the</strong><br />
arisal of mental properties from physical processes does<br />
not allow for a change of perspective. We are not satisfied,<br />
if <strong>the</strong> explanans does not lead us straightly to <strong>the</strong><br />
explanadum. If, however, <strong>the</strong> mental is essentially tied to a<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> subjective perspective, objective facts won’t guide<br />
us <strong>the</strong>re. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>surmountability of <strong>the</strong> gap<br />
between <strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> mental is part of <strong>the</strong> dualist<br />
claim.<br />
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