Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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The Place of Theory <strong>Reduction</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Models of Interdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
Relations<br />
Uwe Voigt, Bamberg, Germany<br />
1. Introduction: Why Theory <strong>Reduction</strong> is<br />
Not Yet Considered <strong>in</strong> Connection with<br />
Interdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary Relations – And What can<br />
Be Done About It<br />
In <strong>the</strong> first place, this approach has to deal with <strong>the</strong> question<br />
why <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>arity is not a topic for <strong>the</strong> philosophy<br />
of science. The answer to this question could be, accord<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, that a certa<strong>in</strong> picture has taken hold of<br />
<strong>the</strong> philosophers of science, or even a whole bulk of such<br />
pictures. These pictures obviously are implicit models<br />
about <strong>the</strong> way sciences do relate. The implicitness of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
models prohibits <strong>the</strong>ir philosophical reflection. Hence, <strong>the</strong><br />
best philosophy of science can do <strong>in</strong> this case is to make<br />
<strong>the</strong>m explicit.<br />
One way to make <strong>the</strong>m explicit is demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental decisions which lead to <strong>the</strong> different models.<br />
So it can be shown how <strong>the</strong>y differ from one ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong><br />
how <strong>the</strong>y make up more or less similar “families”. It can<br />
also be shown where <strong>the</strong> place of <strong>the</strong>ory reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g “family tree” can be found <strong>and</strong> which branches<br />
of this tree are cut off if one chooses <strong>the</strong>ory reduction. The<br />
purpose of this paper is not to evaluate <strong>the</strong> different<br />
decisions <strong>in</strong> a conclusive manner but simply to name <strong>the</strong>m<br />
<strong>and</strong> to list <strong>the</strong>ir advantages <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir disadvantages.<br />
2. A Model of <strong>the</strong> Models of<br />
Interdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary Relations<br />
By trac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> basic decisions that br<strong>in</strong>g about models of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary relations, a k<strong>in</strong>d of “model of models” of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se relations is constituted. The most basic decision<br />
with<strong>in</strong> such a model is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re are irreducibly many<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es or not. Only if we answer this question positively,<br />
we face <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary relations <strong>in</strong> a<br />
strict sense, because only <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re are – <strong>and</strong> forever will<br />
be – different discipl<strong>in</strong>es which can relate. But do <strong>the</strong>y<br />
really relate? This is <strong>the</strong> next basic decision to be made.<br />
If we go for a “No”, we reach <strong>the</strong> realm of what can<br />
be called pluralist models. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>se models,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re are many discipl<strong>in</strong>es, at least many types of<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es, but <strong>the</strong>re are no relations between <strong>the</strong>m. This<br />
is <strong>the</strong> classic “solution” to <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>arity<br />
which prevailed until <strong>the</strong> second half of <strong>the</strong> 20 th century,<br />
e.g. as <strong>the</strong> separation between <strong>the</strong> “hard” sciences <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es of <strong>the</strong> humanities. Such models succeed <strong>in</strong><br />
describ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> demarcation between discipl<strong>in</strong>es, but <strong>the</strong>y<br />
do this at <strong>the</strong> price of an equivocal concept of science.<br />
They are also, from <strong>the</strong>ir very foundations, unable to<br />
expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> real cooperation which is go<strong>in</strong>g on between<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es of different types (Fauser 2003).<br />
If we say, yes, <strong>the</strong>re are relations between different<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es, we choose contact models. The next question<br />
is <strong>the</strong>n: What k<strong>in</strong>d of contact is <strong>the</strong>re between <strong>the</strong> different<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es? How is this contact mediated? In <strong>the</strong> literature,<br />
three alternatives can be found: Contact is mediated ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
by common objects or by common methods or by<br />
cooperation. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, we can dist<strong>in</strong>guish between<br />
368<br />
object-contact models, method-contact models <strong>and</strong><br />
cooperation-contact models.<br />
Object-contact models are <strong>the</strong> “classical” model of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary relations. It implies that different<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es are l<strong>in</strong>ked by identical objects to which every<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle discipl<strong>in</strong>e has its own access, mediated by its own<br />
method. The contact which is supposed to be mediated<br />
this way can come about <strong>in</strong> two different forms: a<br />
hierarchical form <strong>in</strong> which one central discipl<strong>in</strong>e has a<br />
privileged access to <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>in</strong> question, as physics<br />
does <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> model of a non-reductive naturalism (Schurz<br />
2006, 38); or a non-hierarchical form <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> several<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es form a cluster around <strong>the</strong>ir objects (Mc Cormick<br />
2003). In both cases, object-contact models are hard to<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to a post-Kuhnian philosophy of science which<br />
takes it for granted that science, at last <strong>in</strong> some cases,<br />
does not access but create its objects so that objects are<br />
not prior to discipl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore cannot guarantee<br />
<strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary contact.<br />
Method-contact models have been popular <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
second half of <strong>the</strong> 20 th century when <strong>the</strong>re was hope for<br />
one method to br<strong>in</strong>g toge<strong>the</strong>r all discipl<strong>in</strong>es. This method<br />
was conceived of as a formal one describ<strong>in</strong>g dynamic<br />
structures; it was (<strong>and</strong> still is) called “cybernetics”, “<strong>the</strong>ory<br />
of systems” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like. Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re is a hierarchical<br />
(Schneider 1966) <strong>and</strong> a non-hierarchical (Meister/<br />
Lettkemann 2004) variation of such models, depend<strong>in</strong>g on<br />
<strong>the</strong> decision whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re is one central discipl<strong>in</strong>e<br />
provid<strong>in</strong>g all o<strong>the</strong>rs with its method or whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
<strong>in</strong>dependent but coord<strong>in</strong>ated developments of <strong>the</strong> same<br />
method <strong>in</strong> different discipl<strong>in</strong>es. Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>se models run<br />
contrary to an <strong>in</strong>sight of current philosophy of science:<br />
Feyerabend’s remark that methods are not of huge<br />
importance for science <strong>and</strong> that it would not be desirable<br />
to give <strong>the</strong>m such an importance (Feyerabend 1983).<br />
Cooperation-contact models are a very young – <strong>and</strong><br />
promis<strong>in</strong>g – br<strong>and</strong> of contact-models. They even have<br />
been developed as an alternative to models of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>arity as such (Gläser et al. 2004), but only<br />
because of <strong>the</strong> – unnecessary – assumption that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
models are limited to <strong>the</strong> types discussed above.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to cooperation-contact models, <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
relations are brought about just by <strong>the</strong> cooperation<br />
between scientists from different discipl<strong>in</strong>es. This<br />
cooperation is not based on common objects or common<br />
methods but precedes <strong>the</strong>ir discovery or creation <strong>and</strong><br />
development. S<strong>in</strong>ce cooperation does not start with<br />
common criteria, it cannot be conceived of as hierarchical.<br />
Ra<strong>the</strong>r, it is an action which implies mutual recognition –<br />
notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fact that, as a human action, it is also<br />
co<strong>in</strong>ed by political, social <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r conditions (Bordieu<br />
1988; Münch 2007). Cooperation-contact models have <strong>the</strong><br />
advantage of work<strong>in</strong>g without <strong>the</strong> presuppositions found <strong>in</strong><br />
object- <strong>and</strong> method-contact models. They also fit <strong>in</strong> with<br />
<strong>the</strong> trend to underst<strong>and</strong> science as action (Gläser et al.<br />
2004). Obviously, <strong>the</strong>y have little normative power. In<br />
contrast to <strong>the</strong>ir “object” <strong>and</strong> “method” colleagues, <strong>the</strong>y do<br />
not say how discipl<strong>in</strong>es are supposed to relate, but this<br />
can turn out to be a strenghth ra<strong>the</strong>r than a weakness.