Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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354<br />
Objects of Perception, Objects of Science, <strong>and</strong> Identity Statements — Pavla Toráčová<br />
enterprise, <strong>the</strong> so-called “cont<strong>in</strong>gent” properties provide<br />
<strong>the</strong> only available knowledge of <strong>the</strong> object.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r question that comes to one’s m<strong>in</strong>d is<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> scientific term really expresses <strong>the</strong> essential<br />
properties of <strong>the</strong> phenomenon—it can still be replaced by<br />
a better, <strong>and</strong> completely different, description as science<br />
proceeds forward <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> analogical way <strong>the</strong> phenomenal<br />
term was replaced by <strong>the</strong> scientific one. Isn’t, here, <strong>the</strong> role<br />
of <strong>the</strong> essential properties <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> role of <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal properties—i.e., to be regarded as <strong>the</strong><br />
cont<strong>in</strong>gent property? To accept that doesn’t necessarily<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g any unsound relativity about <strong>the</strong> scientific truth—we<br />
can ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that real natural phenomena posses certa<strong>in</strong><br />
essential properties, which after all makes one of our<br />
descriptions to be more adequate or true <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
<strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time to admit that none of our descriptions<br />
of <strong>the</strong> phenomena is perfectly adequate <strong>and</strong> absolutely<br />
true.<br />
Strawson: objects of perception <strong>and</strong><br />
objects of science<br />
Now I would like to turn attention to ideas of P. F. Strawson,<br />
who provides an explanation of <strong>the</strong> identification of<br />
objects as scientists describe <strong>the</strong>m with <strong>the</strong> objects as we<br />
know <strong>the</strong>m by sense perception <strong>in</strong> his article “Perception<br />
<strong>and</strong> Its Objects” (Strawson 2002). Sense perception is, <strong>in</strong><br />
Strawson’s view, <strong>the</strong> way we <strong>in</strong>itially or pre<strong>the</strong>oretically<br />
identify objects <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world—as hav<strong>in</strong>g phenomenal qualities<br />
presented to us by our senses. Later on, when we<br />
achieve scientific descriptions of <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world,<br />
we replace <strong>the</strong> phenomenal properties with <strong>the</strong> scientific<br />
ones. The traditional account of this changeover (i.e., <strong>the</strong><br />
representative <strong>the</strong>ory of perception) considers <strong>the</strong> phenomenal<br />
properties to be merely subjective sensations<br />
caused <strong>in</strong> us by <strong>the</strong> real objects that science truly describes.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this traditional account, science<br />
teaches us that <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>in</strong> fact don’t have <strong>the</strong> phenomenal<br />
qualities, that <strong>the</strong>y, <strong>in</strong> fact, are not of <strong>the</strong> pale<br />
green color as we see <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> rough surface as<br />
we touch <strong>the</strong>m <strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> sweet scent as we smell <strong>the</strong>m<br />
<strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> warm quality as we feel <strong>the</strong>m. It’s true that <strong>in</strong><br />
our sense perception we perceive <strong>the</strong> objects as be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
green <strong>and</strong> fragrant <strong>and</strong> soft <strong>and</strong> tasty, but we are, as it<br />
were, <strong>the</strong> victims of a persistent illusion—<strong>the</strong>se qualities<br />
don’t belong to <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>the</strong>mselves but to our experiences;<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are noth<strong>in</strong>g but our sensations (or sense data)<br />
which are caused by <strong>the</strong> real objects. They can be said to<br />
represent <strong>the</strong> outer objects, but <strong>the</strong> outer objects don’t<br />
posses <strong>the</strong>m as such, <strong>the</strong>y just cause <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> us.<br />
In his article, Strawson argues aga<strong>in</strong>st this<br />
representative approach <strong>and</strong> proposes an alternative<br />
picture of what’s go<strong>in</strong>g on when we perceive objects <strong>and</strong><br />
when we come to know <strong>the</strong> very same objects <strong>in</strong> a<br />
scientific <strong>in</strong>vestigation. First, he po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>the</strong><br />
representative account is unconv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g. We live <strong>in</strong> a world<br />
of objects that are phenomenally propertied, where <strong>the</strong><br />
properties belong to <strong>the</strong> objects, <strong>and</strong> not to my<br />
experiences. The book rema<strong>in</strong>s green even when I put it <strong>in</strong><br />
my bag, <strong>the</strong> heat stays <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> room even when I leave it.<br />
This phenomenal world is <strong>the</strong> public world, accessible to<br />
observation by o<strong>the</strong>rs. Strawson writes:<br />
“Consider <strong>the</strong> character of those ord<strong>in</strong>ary concepts<br />
of objects on <strong>the</strong> employment of which our lives, our<br />
transactions with each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> world, depend:<br />
our concepts of cabbages, roads, tweed coats,<br />
horses, <strong>the</strong> lips <strong>and</strong> heir of <strong>the</strong> beloved. In us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>se terms we certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>tend to be talk<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>-<br />
dependent existences <strong>and</strong> we certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>tend to be<br />
talk<strong>in</strong>g of immediately perceptible th<strong>in</strong>gs, bearers of<br />
phenomenal (visuo-tactile) properties. /.../ Surely we<br />
mean by a cabbage a k<strong>in</strong>d of th<strong>in</strong>g of which most of<br />
<strong>the</strong> specimens we have encountered have a characteristic<br />
range of colours <strong>and</strong> visual shapes <strong>and</strong> felt<br />
textures; <strong>and</strong> not someth<strong>in</strong>g unobservable, mentally<br />
represented by a complex of sensible experiences<br />
which it causes.” (Strawson 2002, 103–104)<br />
Strawson <strong>the</strong>reby presents a common-sense realistic view<br />
with which we all pre<strong>the</strong>oretically live. In this view, phenomenal<br />
qualities belong to <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>and</strong> are considered<br />
to be <strong>the</strong> real properties exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependently of our<br />
experience of <strong>the</strong>m. Its only later, when we are to expla<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> identity of <strong>the</strong> phenomenally propertied object <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
scientific object, that we are will<strong>in</strong>g to accept <strong>the</strong> illusory<br />
character of <strong>the</strong> phenomenal world: only <strong>the</strong>n we can have<br />
a reason to say that <strong>the</strong> scientific description matches <strong>the</strong><br />
real object whereas <strong>the</strong> phenomenal properties are mere<br />
subjective appearances of it, mere cont<strong>in</strong>gent effects of<br />
<strong>the</strong> real object. For if we don’t accept <strong>the</strong> illusory character<br />
of phenomenal properties, how could we expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> question<br />
of identity?<br />
Strawson doesn’t accept this “illusionary” step <strong>and</strong><br />
suggests his own explanation of <strong>the</strong> identity question: he<br />
uses <strong>the</strong> relativity of po<strong>in</strong>ts of view that is present <strong>in</strong> our<br />
perception <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> our ord<strong>in</strong>ary ascription of <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal properties to th<strong>in</strong>gs:<br />
“The mounta<strong>in</strong>s are red-look<strong>in</strong>g at this distance <strong>in</strong><br />
this light; blue-look<strong>in</strong>g at that distance at that light;<br />
<strong>and</strong>, when we are clamber<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>the</strong>m, perhaps nei<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Such-<strong>and</strong>-such a surface looks p<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong><br />
smooth from a distance; mottled <strong>and</strong> gra<strong>in</strong>y when<br />
closely exam<strong>in</strong>ed; different aga<strong>in</strong>, perhaps, under<br />
<strong>the</strong> microscope.” (Strawson 2002, 107)<br />
We are used to shift<strong>in</strong>g our po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>and</strong> so <strong>the</strong> different<br />
quality ascriptions are not seen as conflict<strong>in</strong>g. Strawson<br />
suggests see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> scientific descriptions as one of<br />
those shifts of po<strong>in</strong>t of view, though a more radical one.<br />
Scientists <strong>the</strong>n can be seen as carry<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>the</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al<br />
pursuit but by different means.<br />
The pragmatic approach to identity<br />
statements<br />
We can underst<strong>and</strong> Strawson’s view as <strong>the</strong> view that, <strong>in</strong><br />
us<strong>in</strong>g phenomenal terms, we ord<strong>in</strong>arily mean objects as<br />
essentially phenomenally propertied, because we mean<br />
<strong>the</strong>m as exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependently of us <strong>and</strong> our perception.<br />
In perceiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> object, we make <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between<br />
<strong>the</strong> object exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependently of us <strong>and</strong> our perceiv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of it, for example between <strong>the</strong> seen object <strong>and</strong> our see<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it; this dist<strong>in</strong>ction is, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Strawson, essentially<br />
embedded <strong>in</strong> our sense perception.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Kripke, however, terms that express<br />
phenomenal qualities designate objects that posses <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal properties only cont<strong>in</strong>gently, as <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>in</strong><br />
sensitive be<strong>in</strong>gs like us. The essential properties of <strong>the</strong><br />
objects are, <strong>in</strong> Kripke’s view, expressed only by <strong>the</strong><br />
scientific descriptions.<br />
The views of both philosophers are quite conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
but, at <strong>the</strong> same time, both could also be challenged.<br />
Strawson’s view can be challenged from <strong>the</strong> scientific po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
of view: We have scientifically discovered that <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal properties are not <strong>the</strong> properties of <strong>the</strong> real<br />
objects, but <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong> properties that <strong>the</strong> real objects