Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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anyone specifically, <strong>and</strong> portions of his Nachlaß from<br />
around this time, which might have shed some light on <strong>the</strong><br />
issue, were later destroyed per Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>structions.<br />
That hav<strong>in</strong>g been said, I would like to elaborate fur<strong>the</strong>r my<br />
contribution to this speculative endeavor.<br />
When one considers <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of th<strong>in</strong>ker Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
was, I would contend that <strong>the</strong> notion of any specific<br />
<strong>in</strong>fluence quickly evaporates. As Spiegelberg writes,<br />
“‘<strong>in</strong>fluence’ [is] a very complicated affair… [<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s case] could hardly ever amount to anyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
more than a stimulant <strong>and</strong> a trigger for his own th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g”<br />
(Spiegelberg 1981) With <strong>the</strong> notable exceptions of<br />
Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell <strong>and</strong> possibly Mauthner, talk<br />
of traceable <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>gs would be,<br />
at best, an uphill fight.<br />
Here, <strong>the</strong> problem of orig<strong>in</strong> is analogous.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s thought is so tightly wound around or with<strong>in</strong><br />
itself that to speak of an orig<strong>in</strong> for his use of<br />
“phenomenology,” more likely than not, only mislead<strong>in</strong>gly<br />
complicates <strong>the</strong> issue. By this, I am not propos<strong>in</strong>g that<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s thought developed sealed up <strong>in</strong> some<br />
hermetic chamber; for obviously, he had been “<strong>in</strong>fluenced”<br />
by different th<strong>in</strong>kers <strong>and</strong> writers, even by his own<br />
admission. On several occasions, he even characterizes<br />
his own thought derogatorily as “reproductive” ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
creative or orig<strong>in</strong>al (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1977). However, <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
is not whe<strong>the</strong>r Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> has been <strong>in</strong>fluenced by o<strong>the</strong>rs,<br />
but ra<strong>the</strong>r how do <strong>the</strong>se <strong>in</strong>fluences manifest <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong><br />
his work, or concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> question of orig<strong>in</strong>, to what<br />
extent can someth<strong>in</strong>g be regarded as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> source?<br />
A characteristic of Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s work is <strong>the</strong> degree<br />
to which he has <strong>in</strong>ternalized <strong>the</strong> various voices presented.<br />
This is most apparent <strong>in</strong> his later works, but is actually<br />
present at every stage of his development. What this<br />
means is that Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> rarely engages <strong>in</strong> a discussion<br />
with ano<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>ker; ra<strong>the</strong>r he has ei<strong>the</strong>r so thoroughly<br />
taken over a particular viewpo<strong>in</strong>t or abstracted <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong><br />
tenets of a position (<strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ued <strong>the</strong>ir development) that<br />
notions of authorship beg<strong>in</strong> to blur. The various positions<br />
352<br />
The Orig<strong>in</strong>s of Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s Phenomenology — James M. Thompson<br />
encountered <strong>in</strong> his texts <strong>and</strong> notes are usually his own. In<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r words, he has personalized <strong>the</strong>m to such a degree<br />
that it is not Descartes’ dualism aga<strong>in</strong>st which Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
is argu<strong>in</strong>g, but Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> himself represent<strong>in</strong>g this<br />
dualism – Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> contra Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>. An example of<br />
this aspect of his thought can be seen <strong>in</strong> his later critique<br />
of philosophy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Investigations. While <strong>the</strong> critique is<br />
directed towards <strong>the</strong> philosophic tradition, <strong>in</strong> go<strong>in</strong>g about<br />
his task, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> actually criticizes his own earlier<br />
views (mostly those conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tractatus). Here, <strong>the</strong><br />
faults <strong>and</strong> weakness of philosophy, he believes to be<br />
embodied <strong>in</strong> his earlier thought. Thus, by critiqu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
Tractatus, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s himself to be affect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a critique of philosophy as a whole.<br />
In clos<strong>in</strong>g, I would po<strong>in</strong>t out that even if he acquired<br />
<strong>the</strong> term “phenomenology” <strong>in</strong> a more open <strong>and</strong> nonspecific<br />
way, similar to what I have suggested above, it<br />
would be <strong>in</strong>correct to conclude or simply <strong>in</strong>s<strong>in</strong>uate that <strong>the</strong><br />
term held no special significance for him. Quite to <strong>the</strong><br />
contrary, had he been neutral with respect to call<strong>in</strong>g his<br />
project “phenomenology,” it would never have survived <strong>the</strong><br />
open <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous hostility by certa<strong>in</strong> members of <strong>the</strong><br />
Vienna Circle, nor Moore’s repeated criticism of <strong>the</strong> term<br />
dur<strong>in</strong>g Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s lectures.<br />
Literature<br />
Spiegelberg, Herbert 1981 The Puzzle of Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>'s Phänomenologie<br />
(1929-?) repr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong>: The Context of <strong>the</strong> Phenomenological<br />
Movement, The Hague: Nijhoff.<br />
Waismann, Friedrich 1980 Ludwig Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> und der Wiener<br />
Kreis (ed) B. F. McGu<strong>in</strong>ness, Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Suhrkamp.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, Ludwig 1998 The Bergen Electronic Edition: Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s<br />
Nachlaß (eds) Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> Archives at <strong>the</strong> University of<br />
Bergen, Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, Ludwig 1977 Vermischte Bemerkungen (ed) G. H.<br />
von Wright, Frankfurt am Ma<strong>in</strong>: Suhrkamp.