Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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Did I Do It? – Yeah, You Did!<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> & Libet On Free Will<br />
René J. Campis C. / Carlos M. Muñoz S., Cali, Colombia<br />
1. Libet<br />
RP is a concept developed by neuroscience to give an<br />
account of <strong>in</strong>tentional action. It is basically ‘bra<strong>in</strong> electrical<br />
activity found to start <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g about 0,8 seconds before<br />
voluntary movement’ (Cf.: Kornhuber <strong>and</strong> Deecke 1965,<br />
Deecke et al. 1969 <strong>and</strong> Libet et al. 1983). Libet <strong>in</strong>volves<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept <strong>in</strong> an experiment (fig. 1) attempt<strong>in</strong>g to establish<br />
a temporal dist<strong>in</strong>ction between <strong>the</strong> onset of RP <strong>and</strong><br />
“conscious wish”.<br />
Libet’s ma<strong>in</strong> presupposition is: “If <strong>the</strong> moment of<br />
conscious <strong>in</strong>tention preceded <strong>the</strong> onset of <strong>the</strong> RP, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
concept of conscious free will would be tenable: <strong>the</strong> early<br />
conscious mental state could <strong>in</strong>itiate <strong>the</strong> subsequent neural<br />
preparation of movement.” (Haggard & Libet 2001, p.<br />
48). S<strong>in</strong>ce motor act is not a direct effect of conscious<br />
<strong>in</strong>tention (CInt), but of an <strong>in</strong>direct one of cerebral potential<br />
for unconscious <strong>in</strong>itiation of <strong>the</strong> action (RP) -he concludes,<br />
free will (FW) should be revised.<br />
On Libet’s viewpo<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>in</strong>tentional actions beg<strong>in</strong> with<br />
RP followed by conscious <strong>in</strong>tention. Libet did not register<br />
electrophysiological evidence of bra<strong>in</strong> states associated<br />
with <strong>the</strong> content of W-judgments (verbal reports just at <strong>the</strong><br />
moment of awareness of a choice –W-j) or, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
his analysis, with <strong>the</strong> “first awareness of wish to act” (Libet,<br />
1999, p. 49) –Libet registered <strong>the</strong> onset of CInt when W-j's<br />
was reported.<br />
Two types of data were used by Libet to arrive to his<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, namely, <strong>in</strong>trospective <strong>and</strong> electrophysiological;<br />
<strong>the</strong> former was constituted by W-j <strong>and</strong> M-judgments (verbal<br />
reports just at <strong>the</strong> moment we th<strong>in</strong>k that our motor act<br />
beg<strong>in</strong>s), <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> latter by EEG <strong>and</strong> EMG evidence (fig. 1).<br />
His conclusions both comb<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> depend on <strong>the</strong>se<br />
sources of evidence.<br />
The study of FW from Libet’'s perspective requires<br />
to track causal estimations between two types of data: ‘if<br />
<strong>the</strong> moment of conscious <strong>in</strong>tention followed <strong>the</strong> onset of<br />
<strong>the</strong> RP, <strong>the</strong>n conscious FW cannot exist: a conscious mental<br />
state must be a consequence of bra<strong>in</strong> activity, ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than <strong>the</strong> cause of it’ (Haggard & Libet 2001, p. 48). We<br />
reject this approach to <strong>the</strong> explanation of human <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />
actions <strong>and</strong> FW.<br />
Libet's f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs have led to a new model (fig. 2) that<br />
emerges from a causal approach <strong>in</strong> opposition to <strong>the</strong> classic<br />
model, where <strong>in</strong>tentional action was supposed to be an<br />
<strong>in</strong>direct effect of CInt.<br />
34<br />
After Libet’s rejection of <strong>the</strong> classic concept of FW,<br />
he posits that <strong>the</strong>re is a “free won´t” (FWN), s<strong>in</strong>ce an<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual can stop <strong>the</strong> motor act before its completion –<br />
overrid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> RP <strong>and</strong> block<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> trigger<strong>in</strong>g of its<br />
associated action (Cf.: Libet 1985 <strong>and</strong> 2003). He claims<br />
that FW still st<strong>and</strong>s s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> subject's <strong>in</strong>tentions are<br />
<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> his act of FWN as an act of <strong>in</strong>tentional control.<br />
2. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
It is hard to state what Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> would say about <strong>the</strong><br />
above mentioned issues – it is difficult enough to summarize<br />
what one could consider to be his actual stance on<br />
FW. The multiple op<strong>in</strong>ions proposed by him <strong>in</strong> different<br />
occasions <strong>in</strong> respect to FW make it virtually impossible to<br />
draw clear conclusions, but <strong>the</strong>re is some previous work <strong>in</strong><br />
relation to this concept (remarkably, Hacker 1996, Vol. 4,<br />
part V). What <strong>the</strong>n, comes out clear about will? Our first<br />
claim is that Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> –though be<strong>in</strong>g obscure on will<br />
himself- wasn´t all that wrong compared to <strong>the</strong> trap <strong>in</strong><br />
which Libet falls <strong>in</strong>to by reject<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> classic concept of FW<br />
based upon <strong>the</strong> temporal precedence of RP over <strong>the</strong> motor<br />
act.