Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoherent, <strong>and</strong> Mislabeled<br />
Doctr<strong>in</strong>e?<br />
Leopold Stubenberg, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA<br />
Neutral monism (NM) is a general metaphysical doctr<strong>in</strong>e<br />
about <strong>the</strong> nature of ultimate reality. It says that ultimate<br />
reality is, <strong>in</strong> an important sense, one—that is <strong>the</strong> monism<br />
of NM; <strong>and</strong> it says that this monistic reality is nei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
mental nor physical—that is <strong>the</strong> neutrality of NM. For <strong>the</strong><br />
most part, <strong>the</strong> advocates of NM have been preoccupied<br />
with <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d-body problem. If m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> matter are<br />
composed of <strong>the</strong> same neutral reality, <strong>the</strong> gulf that<br />
separates <strong>the</strong>m must be more apparent than real.<br />
In <strong>the</strong> late 19 th <strong>and</strong> early 20 th centuries NM enjoyed<br />
a brief period of popularity, hav<strong>in</strong>g been adopted by such<br />
philosophers as Ernst Mach, William James, <strong>and</strong> Bertr<strong>and</strong><br />
Russell. But <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e soon dropped out of view,<br />
possibly because some of <strong>the</strong> criticisms directed aga<strong>in</strong>st it<br />
seemed justified <strong>and</strong> serious. Prom<strong>in</strong>ent among those<br />
criticisms was (<strong>and</strong> is) <strong>the</strong> claim that NM is noth<strong>in</strong>g but a<br />
th<strong>in</strong>ly veiled versions of idealism or panpsychism. In an<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g reversal of th<strong>in</strong>gs, Galen Strawson—one of <strong>the</strong><br />
lead<strong>in</strong>g figures <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> current revival of panpsychism—has<br />
subjected NM to a trenchant critique. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Strawson, NM is ei<strong>the</strong>r miraculous or <strong>in</strong>coherent.<br />
After present<strong>in</strong>g Strawson’s arguments aga<strong>in</strong>st NM,<br />
I argue that Russell’s version of <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e is immune to<br />
Strawson’s powerful objections. But Russell’s way out will,<br />
<strong>in</strong> turn, make it all too obvious why it has seemed to many<br />
philosophers that NM is noth<strong>in</strong>g but idealism or<br />
panpsychism. I shall end <strong>the</strong> paper by expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g why <strong>the</strong><br />
Russellian neutral monist rejects <strong>the</strong> charge that NM is a<br />
version of mentalism. The upshot of all this is twofold.<br />
First, NM (of <strong>the</strong> Russellian variety) is not open to <strong>the</strong><br />
challenge that Strawson tried to raise aga<strong>in</strong>st all versions<br />
of <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Second, this k<strong>in</strong>d of NM must be<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guished from mentalistic doctr<strong>in</strong>es like idealism <strong>and</strong><br />
panpsychism.<br />
The most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>and</strong> most controversial)<br />
premise upon which Strawson’s case for panpsychism<br />
rests is this:<br />
Emergence can’t be brute. It is built <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> heart of<br />
<strong>the</strong> notion of emergence that emergence cannot be<br />
brute <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong>re be<strong>in</strong>g absolutely no reason<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs why <strong>the</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
as it is (so that it is un<strong>in</strong>telligible even to God). For<br />
any feature Y of anyth<strong>in</strong>g that is correctly considered<br />
to be emergent from X, <strong>the</strong>re must be someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
about X <strong>and</strong> X alone <strong>in</strong> virtue of which Y<br />
emerges, <strong>and</strong> which is sufficient for Y.<br />
(Strawson 2006, 18)<br />
The emergence of <strong>the</strong> liquidity of water is unproblematical;<br />
but <strong>the</strong> emergence of experience from nonexperiential<br />
matter is not. If it were to happen, it would be a miracle.<br />
Only <strong>the</strong> adoption of panpsychism makes this miracle go<br />
away. And Strawson argues that <strong>the</strong> same consideration<br />
cuts aga<strong>in</strong>st all forms of neutral monism. If basic reality is<br />
neutral, i.e. nonexperiential, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> experiential cannot<br />
emerge out of it, on pa<strong>in</strong> of a miracle. Hence neutral monism<br />
is not an option.<br />
Strawson’s second objection to NM is this:<br />
[NM] is <strong>in</strong>coherent, because experience—<br />
appearance, if you like—cannot itself be only appearance,<br />
i.e. not really real, because <strong>the</strong>re must be<br />
experience for <strong>the</strong>re to be appearance …<br />
(Strawson 2006, 23)<br />
If only <strong>the</strong> neutral (i.e. <strong>the</strong> nonexperiential) is real, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
experiential cannot be fundamentally real, i.e. it must be a<br />
mere appearance. But that is absurd: <strong>the</strong>re cannot be appearance<br />
without experience. x’s appear<strong>in</strong>g F simply consists<br />
<strong>in</strong> someone’s experienc<strong>in</strong>g x as F. One cannot get rid<br />
of experience be declar<strong>in</strong>g it to be a mere appearance.<br />
Because appearance can only exist where <strong>the</strong>re is experience.<br />
These objections are powerful. But a closer<br />
<strong>in</strong>spection of Russell’s NM seems to show that it is<br />
immune to <strong>the</strong>se challenges. Guided by <strong>the</strong> supreme<br />
maxim of scientific philosophiz<strong>in</strong>g—“wherever possible,<br />
substitute constructions out of known entities for<br />
<strong>in</strong>ferences to unknown entities.” (Russell 1924, 326)—<br />
Russell adopted NM <strong>in</strong> 1919, because of <strong>the</strong> “immense<br />
simplification” (Russell 1959, 103-4) it affords. The<br />
unknown entities <strong>in</strong> need of logical construction are, on <strong>the</strong><br />
one h<strong>and</strong>, physical objects, <strong>and</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> self. The<br />
known entities that serve as construction material are<br />
events. And some of <strong>the</strong>se events, <strong>the</strong> data, are<br />
immediately given.<br />
Everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world is composed of events … An<br />
‘event’ … is someth<strong>in</strong>g hav<strong>in</strong>g a small f<strong>in</strong>ite duration<br />
<strong>and</strong> a small f<strong>in</strong>ite extension <strong>in</strong> space … When I<br />
speak of an ‘event’ I do not mean anyth<strong>in</strong>g out of<br />
<strong>the</strong> way. See<strong>in</strong>g a flash of light<strong>in</strong>g is an event, so is<br />
hear<strong>in</strong>g a tire burst, or smell<strong>in</strong>g a rotten egg, or feel<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> coldness of a frog. These are events that are<br />
“data” … we <strong>in</strong>fer that <strong>the</strong>re are events which are<br />
not data <strong>and</strong> happen at a distance from our own<br />
body. Some of <strong>the</strong>se are data to o<strong>the</strong>r people, o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
are data to no one … Particular colours <strong>and</strong> sounds<br />
<strong>and</strong> so on are events; <strong>the</strong>ir causal antecedents <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>animate world are also events.<br />
(Russell 1927b, 222)<br />
The result<strong>in</strong>g view does have an idealist r<strong>in</strong>g to it. Speak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of <strong>the</strong> bra<strong>in</strong>, for example, Russell has this to say:<br />
While its [<strong>the</strong> bra<strong>in</strong>’s] owner was alive, part, at least,<br />
of <strong>the</strong> contents of his bra<strong>in</strong> consisted of his percepts,<br />
thoughts, <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>gs. S<strong>in</strong>ce his bra<strong>in</strong> also<br />
consisted of electrons, we are compelled to conclude<br />
that an electron is a group<strong>in</strong>g of events, <strong>and</strong><br />
that, if <strong>the</strong> electron is <strong>in</strong> a human bra<strong>in</strong>, some of <strong>the</strong><br />
events compos<strong>in</strong>g it are likely to be some of <strong>the</strong><br />
“mental states” of <strong>the</strong> man to whom <strong>the</strong> bra<strong>in</strong> belongs.<br />
(Russell 1927a, 320)<br />
“The bra<strong>in</strong> consists of thoughts” (Russell 1959, 18) is Russell’s<br />
most succ<strong>in</strong>ct expression of this thought. As for <strong>the</strong><br />
rest of <strong>the</strong> physical world, Russell is agnostic. But he does<br />
tell us that<br />
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