Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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An Anti-<strong>Reduction</strong>ist Argument Based on Sp<strong>in</strong>oza’s Naturalism<br />
Nancy Brenner-Golomb, Bilthoven, The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
In this paper I wish to concentrate on one aspect of an<br />
anti-reductionist view, namely on <strong>the</strong> central idea<br />
underly<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> so called ‘bottom-up’ pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of <strong>the</strong><br />
structure of science. This idea says that although <strong>the</strong><br />
behaviour of any structured entity is governed by laws<br />
which apply to this k<strong>in</strong>d of structure alone, <strong>the</strong>se laws are<br />
<strong>the</strong> result of, or emerge from, <strong>the</strong> properties of its basic<br />
elements. The most important aspect of this view is <strong>the</strong><br />
relationship it establishes between <strong>the</strong> unity of science <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> unity of nature. Feynman, for example, argued that <strong>the</strong><br />
greatest success of <strong>the</strong> quantum <strong>the</strong>ory is <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
unity of science. He claimed that <strong>the</strong> advantage of <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility to expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole of chemistry <strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
quantum mechanics is weighed aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> previously<br />
accepted empirical pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, that <strong>in</strong> order to accept a<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory, a detailed underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g is required of what goes<br />
on <strong>in</strong> every experiment. This advantage of quantum<br />
mechanics, he says, shows that we are on <strong>the</strong> right track.<br />
And he adds that this advantage is accentuated by <strong>the</strong> fact<br />
that if chemistry can be so reduced to physics, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong><br />
whole of life can be reduced to it as well. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to him,<br />
<strong>the</strong> most important hypo<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>in</strong> biology is that <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
noth<strong>in</strong>g that liv<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs do, that cannot be understood by<br />
see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m as made of atoms act<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong><br />
laws of physics [Feynman 1989, 3-3 <strong>and</strong> 3-6].<br />
In o<strong>the</strong>r words, Feynman’s conception of science is<br />
that of physicalism, understood as everyth<strong>in</strong>g that can be<br />
expla<strong>in</strong>ed by physics, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g non-material th<strong>in</strong>gs, like<br />
laws of nature, <strong>the</strong> geometry of space or abstract concepts<br />
like energy. He emphasizes that we do not know what<br />
energy is (<strong>the</strong> emphasis is his). All we know is that this<br />
abstract quantity has many forms; that it can be calculated<br />
<strong>in</strong> each of <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>ir sum total is constant, which<br />
is The Law of Conservation of Energy [Feynman 1989, 4-<br />
1]. And ‘expla<strong>in</strong>ed by physics’ means ‘expla<strong>in</strong>ed by a<br />
hierarchy of natural sciences which are ultimately reducible<br />
to physics.’ The ‘bottom-up’ pr<strong>in</strong>ciple says that this<br />
hierarchy reflects <strong>the</strong> evolution of <strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong><br />
universe.<br />
My first claim <strong>in</strong> this paper is that although Sp<strong>in</strong>oza<br />
argued aga<strong>in</strong>st Descartes’ conception of science, his<br />
arguments apply also to physicalism. This is because <strong>the</strong><br />
unity of science has rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> same as Descartes<br />
claimed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seventeenth century,, namely that all that<br />
science can do is to expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> physical world, <strong>in</strong> spite of<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that most scientists do not accept Cartesian<br />
dualism.<br />
My second claim is that start<strong>in</strong>g from Sp<strong>in</strong>oza’s view<br />
of nature, <strong>the</strong> ‘bottom-up’ pr<strong>in</strong>ciple cannot be susta<strong>in</strong>ed as<br />
a universal law. This is because by <strong>the</strong> ‘bottom-up’<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>the</strong> properties of a structure which emerges from<br />
<strong>the</strong> properties of its basic elements have no effect on <strong>the</strong><br />
structure of its elements. For example, <strong>the</strong> mach<strong>in</strong>ery of a<br />
cell <strong>in</strong>cludes a process for <strong>the</strong> production of prote<strong>in</strong>s. The<br />
first step <strong>in</strong> this process is performed by an RNA molecule<br />
which selects that part of <strong>the</strong> DNA which prescribes its<br />
production. The ‘bottom up’ pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> this case says that,<br />
although this selection depends on <strong>the</strong> shape of this<br />
molecule, its biological function <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cell has no role <strong>in</strong><br />
determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g this shape. Its shape is exclusively determ<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
by <strong>the</strong> laws of chemistry. In order to disprove <strong>the</strong> rival<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>sis, that it was a vital force of <strong>the</strong> cell that was<br />
responsible for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> shape of this molecule,<br />
molecular biologists who adhered to <strong>the</strong> ‘bottom-up’<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>ciple removed <strong>the</strong> RNA molecule <strong>in</strong>to a test tube,<br />
heated it so that it lost its shape, <strong>and</strong> allowed it to cool<br />
down outside <strong>the</strong> cell. As a result, <strong>the</strong> molecule rega<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
its 3-dimensional shape, prov<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>re was noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> structure of <strong>the</strong> cell that contributed to its formation<br />
[Cairns 1997. pp. 101<strong>and</strong> 94]. However, accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
Sp<strong>in</strong>oza’s naturalism this <strong>in</strong>dependence cannot be<br />
ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed if <strong>the</strong> scientific hierarchy <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>the</strong> structure<br />
of society emerg<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> properties of <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
people as its elements.<br />
Sp<strong>in</strong>oza’s naturalism does not reject <strong>the</strong> idea that<br />
biology underlies a <strong>the</strong>ory of m<strong>in</strong>d. On <strong>the</strong> contrary. He<br />
expla<strong>in</strong>s that <strong>in</strong> order to recognize Peter <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d must<br />
abstract some essence of his by which he appears to us<br />
as <strong>the</strong> same person every time we see him. Yet, it is only<br />
by reflection on our factual recognition that we know that<br />
this must be <strong>the</strong> case. In fact, our bra<strong>in</strong> derives this<br />
essence while we rema<strong>in</strong> ignorant of it <strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> process<br />
by which it is derived [Sp<strong>in</strong>oza 1979 p.237]. In general, he<br />
says “no one has yet been taught by experience what <strong>the</strong><br />
body can do merely by <strong>the</strong> laws of nature <strong>in</strong> so far as<br />
nature is considered merely as corporeal or extended, <strong>and</strong><br />
what it cannot do save when determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.”And<br />
he expla<strong>in</strong>s fur<strong>the</strong>r that “<strong>the</strong> body can do many th<strong>in</strong>gs by<br />
<strong>the</strong> laws of its nature alone at which <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is amazed...<br />
when men say that this or that action arises from <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d<br />
which has power over <strong>the</strong> body, <strong>the</strong>y know not what <strong>the</strong>y<br />
say..." [Sp<strong>in</strong>oza 1979 p.87].<br />
Sp<strong>in</strong>oza agreed with <strong>the</strong> empirical scientists of his<br />
time that whenever possible we must seek evidence for a<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory of m<strong>in</strong>d as much as we must do so for knowledge of<br />
<strong>the</strong> physical world. An argument to this effect we f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> his<br />
comment on <strong>the</strong> idea that a person cannot judge<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g to be bad for him <strong>and</strong> yet want it. This, he says,<br />
is contrary to experience. As philosophers, we should<br />
acknowledge <strong>the</strong> fact that a person can very well want<br />
what is bad for him, <strong>and</strong> look for a natural explanation for it<br />
[Sp<strong>in</strong>oza 1998, p.138].<br />
I emphasize <strong>the</strong> phrase ‘whenever possible’<br />
because Sp<strong>in</strong>oza agreed with Descartes that we have<br />
some knowledge for which we cannot f<strong>in</strong>d evidence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
sense acceptable to empirical scientists. In fact, his own<br />
claim that <strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g outside nature is not provable <strong>in</strong><br />
this way. But accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, this assumption is essential<br />
for creat<strong>in</strong>g a correct science. It is essential because it<br />
serves <strong>the</strong> best guide for research <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> best st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
of truth for its judgements [Sp<strong>in</strong>oza 1979 p.241]. Of<br />
course, physicalism is also held to be <strong>the</strong> best guide <strong>and</strong> a<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ard of truth for research. The question is whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
biology, which takes <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of evolution as its guide<br />
<strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard of truth can accept <strong>the</strong> ‘bottom-up’ pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
as advocated by physicalism, or whe<strong>the</strong>r its <strong>in</strong>clusion of<br />
humanity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> evolv<strong>in</strong>g animal world is better expla<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
by accept<strong>in</strong>g Sp<strong>in</strong>oza’s conception of <strong>the</strong> human m<strong>in</strong>d as<br />
part of natural evolution.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Sp<strong>in</strong>oza, Descartes’ assumed<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ction between Thought <strong>and</strong> Extension is <strong>in</strong> fact a<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ction between two ways by which <strong>the</strong> world can be<br />
understood. Ei<strong>the</strong>r accord<strong>in</strong>g to its conceived abstract laws<br />
or by its causal relations as <strong>the</strong>y are observed <strong>in</strong><br />
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