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Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

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Aga<strong>in</strong>, this is mistaken. Non-reductive physicalism is<br />

motivated by <strong>the</strong> thought that rationality has “no echo” <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> physical doma<strong>in</strong>. What makes <strong>the</strong> A-<strong>in</strong>g an action is<br />

<strong>the</strong> fact that it is caused <strong>and</strong> rationalized by <strong>the</strong> right<br />

events. P does not rationalize P*. P cannot possibly<br />

rationalize P*, as P does not have <strong>in</strong>tentional content. Only<br />

mental properties can possibly rationalize actions. And<br />

mental properties are, we assume, not reducible to<br />

physical properties. The reply fails. The occurrence of P*<br />

realizes an A-<strong>in</strong>g because <strong>and</strong> only because it is caused<br />

by M. Only <strong>the</strong> occurrence of a mental event can<br />

rationalize behaviour.<br />

Mental Causation: A Lesson from Action Theory — Markus Schlosser<br />

Literature<br />

Davidson, Donald 1970 “Mental Events”, repr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> Donald<br />

Davidson 1980 Essays on Actions <strong>and</strong> Events, Oxford: Clarendon<br />

Press, 207-227.<br />

Kim, Jaegwon 2005 Physicalism, or Someth<strong>in</strong>g Near Enough,<br />

Pr<strong>in</strong>ceton: Pr<strong>in</strong>ceton University Press.<br />

303

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