Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

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Wittgenstein’s Externalism – Getting Semantic Externalism through the Private Language Argument and the Rule-Following Considerations — Cristina Borgoni Kripke insists on the skeptical scenario. A scenario that spreads to the P.L.A.: nothing could fix the meaning of the sign “S”, as well as nothing could fix the meaning of the sign “+2” in the pupil’s case. The solution found by Kripke to the supposed skeptical paradox is the communitarism; if there is nothing as a “semantic fact” to determinate the difference between looking right and being right, to decide about this difference is something that belongs to the community. McDowell (1984), however, who disagrees with Kripke’s interpretation, offers us not just an important criticism to that interpretation, he also shows us another way of understanding Wittgenstein’s position. What McDowell does is to stress the conditions to the very perception of the skeptical paradox, insisting on the continuation of the § 201: (…) What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases (Wittgenstein, PI § 201). McDowell maintains that “Kripke’s paradox” occurs only if we keep considering meaning as an interpretation. The necessary step, therefore, would be to change the idea that understanding always supposes offering an interpretation. That would be Wittgenstein’s lesson. If the R.F.A. does not concern the desperation of how to establish the difference between right and wrong, the Kripkean conclusion is not maintained either. If McDowell is right in his diagnosis, it is not the case that the P.L.A. is just another instance where we can verify the skeptical paradox. In the case of the sign “S”, we are not allowed to say that we have established any meaning at all, but this is not the case with the sign “+2”. In a sense, both arguments are connected because they both dismiss the idea of meaning as being the univocal relation between a sign and an object, or between a sign and a mental image. However, they set apart in the sense that, the case of “+2” has a correction criterion, thought not established by a semantic fact, while in the case of “S” it has not. In this sense, we could say that the P.L.A. establishes a specific criticism to the idea of mental entities giving meaning to our language. So, I propose to reformulate the P.L.A. in the following terms: (i) Possessing a correction criterion is a condition of possibility to a language; (ii) A private language lacks correction criteria; (iii) A private language is impossible. There is no such a thing as a private language because it is not a language. “Having a meaning is essentially a matter of possessing a correctness condition” (Boghossian, 1989, p. 515). The first premise seems to be widely accepted. A statement is meaningful if it can be true or false. The second premise appears clearly at the end of § 258. The attempt to point privately to a certain sensation, to a private one, leaves us without a correction criterion. The very sensation can not itself give me such a criterion, as it seems to be supposed by an ostensive definition between the sensation and the name I give to it. Wittgenstein rejects this image, not only here, but in most parts of his work. The R.F.A. is an example of this rejection, but it appears also in the earlier aphorisms of PI, when Wittgenstein criticizes the Augustinian image of the language. Given the two first premises, the immediate conclusion of such an argument is that the “concept of a private language is one that cannot be defended, at best, and is incoherent, at worst” (Preti, 2002, 56). The P.L.A. has a deep externalist character. The notion of private language could indeed be elaborated in opposition to an externalist position: the components of such a “language” are not identified by external factors to the mind, but purely by internal ones. Because of that, to argue for the incoherency of such a notion opens the way to reach externalism through a reductio ad absurdum. And the conclusion is that it becomes unintelligible to talk, at the same time, about instances of language (it does not matter if we are talking about the world or about our subjective experiences) and about private correction criteria. If, by arguing the P.L.A., we show the incoherency of internalism, we could consider this path as a kind of motivation to reach externalism, though a negative one. It is possible, however, to also find a positive motivation in Wittgenstein’s arguments, but taking both P.L.A. and R.F.A. as working together. And this is possible if we think that, more than a criticism, they offer us an alternative option to think about meaning which does not need the idea of semantic facts. Kripke defends that the Wittgensteinian argument leads us to communitarism. We could understand him as saying that the premise (ii) is true because any correction criterion is to be established by a community. In this sense, one could find in Kripke’s interpretation some externalist appearance if we could retain the idea that individuating mental contents belongs to the community and never to oneself privately. However, the Kripkean position is much stronger than that; the community is provided with full powers to the very establishment of meanings. While this position could sound as an externalism, it would also sound as the complete isolation of the community inside itself. At this moment, “[o]ne would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to us is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’” (McDowell, 1984, p. 49, n. 12) As I have tried to defend, not only the Kripkean interpretation does not seem to be the most satisfactory one, but his solution also causes a discomfort to which McDowell calls our attention. If in an internalist position we could be isolated from the community, now we could, all together, be isolated from the world. And this does not seem to be Wittgenstein’s position, as Preti warns: From the fact that our fellows in the community play a constitutive role in determining content it will not follow that content is not the “queer”, inner mental process that Wittgenstein is concerned to deny. (…) Perhaps, that is, it is true that what determines meaning or content must be partly constituted by the minds of others – but it won’t follow from this that the content in other minds in the community isn’t determined by their inner mental processes. Merely being other is not enough to thwart the inner state conception of meaning, and it may be that Wittgenstein appreciated this (Preti, 2002, p. 60). There is, however, another way of making plausible the idea that correction criterion can only belong to the public sphere without the commitment to the communitarism. And that is possible when we realize that the institution and the application of meanings are not distinct activities. If the moments of application of meanings are so important in Wittgenstein approach, this is so because they are not separated from the moments of 27
28 Wittgenstein’s Externalism – Getting Semantic Externalism through the Private Language Argument and the Rule-Following Considerations — Cristina Borgoni institution of meanings. The externalism here would follow a more positive way than the one that was reached with the accusation of incoherence of the notion of private language. Here the meanings would be established with relation to external factors to one’s mind, but also, with relation to external factors to any mind. The positive character of Wittgenstein’s argumentation is, without doubt, which brings with itself the dispute about the interpretation of his arguments. The dispute, for example, about which notion of meaning Wittgenstein defends at all. I believe, however, that it is important to point to the sense of “internal” Wittgenstein is rejecting. As Preti points well, one could understand the notion of “private” only as in opposition to “social”, as Kripke does. But such a notion does not exhaust in fact all that is being rejected by Wittgenstein: “the hidden, the inner, the introspectively accessible, the mentalistic (Preti, 2002 p. 60). It seems that the externalism reached through Wittgenstein’s arguments involves the rejection of all this set of notions. Literature Boghossian, Paul 1989 “The Rule-Following Considerations”, Mind 98, 507-549. Gert, Bernard 1986 “Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument”, Synthese 68, 409-439. Kripke, Saul 1982 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. McDowell, John 1984 “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, in: Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright (eds.) 2002, Rule Following & Meaning. Chesham: Acumen, 45-80. Preti, Consuelo 2002 “Normativity and Meaning: Kripke’s Skeptical Paradox Reconsidered”, The Philosophical Forum 33, 39-62. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe 1979) Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1969 On Certainty (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and Denis Paul 1979) Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Page 1 and 2: 31 Alexander Hieke Hannes Leitgeb H
Page 3 and 4: Reduktion und Elimination in Philos
Page 5 and 6: Distributors Die Österreichische L
Page 7 and 8: 6 Inhalt / Contents Wittgenstein me
Page 9 and 10: 8 Inhalt / Contents The Evolution o
Page 12 and 13: Formal Mechanisms for Reduction in
Page 14 and 15: 4. Property language and theoretica
Page 16 and 17: imperatives, or commands in the for
Page 18 and 19: Referential Practice and the Lure o
Page 20 and 21: The Augustinian account confuses mo
Page 22 and 23: hurried to fix it on the page. The
Page 24 and 25: The Essence (?) of Color, According
Page 26 and 27: Literature Austin, James 1980 “Wi
Page 30 and 31: Informal Reduction E.P. Brandon, Ca
Page 32 and 33: An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based
Page 34 and 35: An Anti-Reductionist Argument Based
Page 36 and 37: Did I Do It? -Yeah, You Did! Wittge
Page 38 and 39: Literature Did I Do It? -Yeah, You
Page 40 and 41: tween the two approaches. The task
Page 42 and 43: On Two Recent Defenses of The Simpl
Page 44 and 45: On Two Recent Defenses of The Simpl
Page 46 and 47: Queen Victoria’s Dying Thoughts T
Page 48 and 49: Diagonalization. The Liar Paradox,
Page 50 and 51: Proof: Given a function ƒ from con
Page 52 and 53: that I am sure that it is true that
Page 54 and 55: experiencing something as a red pen
Page 56 and 57: There can be Causal without Ontolog
Page 58 and 59: There can be Causal without Ontolog
Page 60 and 61: objects. But they also leave unansw
Page 62 and 63: The Knower Paradox and the Quantifi
Page 64 and 65: The Knower Paradox and the Quantifi
Page 66 and 67: lent. It also implies that an inven
Page 68 and 69: The Scapegoat Theory of Causality M
Page 70 and 71: We may have evolved a specialized c
Page 72 and 73: easoning have their source in the l
Page 74 and 75: Wittgenstein on Frazer and Explanat
Page 76 and 77: genstein 1993, p. 143). In order to
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an adequate syntactic analysis of o
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Wittgenstein meets ÖGS: Wovon man
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Wittgenstein meets ÖGS: Wovon man
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3. Der Elementarsatz wird als Relat
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Literatur Glock, Hans Johann 2006
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Explaining the Brain: Ruthless Redu
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Occam’s Razor in the Theory of Th
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Literature Campbell, Donald T. 1987
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Die Nichtreduzierbarkeit der klassi
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Literatur Die Nichtreduzierbarkeit
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Let T I be the minimal theory of tr
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Does Bradley’s Regress Support No
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(3) Mutatis mutandis, realism has t
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Zeitliche Ontologie und zeitliche R
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Betrachtung ontologischer Fragen, M
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The decisive consequences of this a
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Benacerraf and Bad Company (An Atta
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offer a solution to the bad company
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Literature Benacerraf, Paul 1965
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"PA" by using "PA* ", at least at t
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Hard Naturalism and its Puzzles Ren
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The Mind-Body-Problem and Score-Kee
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mental properties, for instance, or
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kommt es zu einem gravierenden Miss
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Reduction Revisited: The Ontologica
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4. Conclusion Reduction Revisited:
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All in all, we have seen that reduc
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Physicalism Without the A Priori Pa
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Literature Cartwright, Nancy 1999:
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Wittgensteins Projektionsmethode al
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Schlussbemerkungen Wittgensteins Pr
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intentional states requires functio
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Relating Theories. Models and Struc
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Literature Relating Theories. Model
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e invoked in response to the questi
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Do Brains Think? Christopher Humphr
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4. Conclusion So do brains think or
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How Metaphors Alter the World-Pictu
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The Modal Supervenience of the Conc
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Literature van der Auwera, Johan an
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3. The Determination of Form by Syn
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Zwischen Humes Gesetz und „Sollen
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Assessing Humean Supervenience Amir
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determination thesis; it fails as a
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Aus der obigen Definition folgt, da
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Ding-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sach
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Ding-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sach
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How do Moral Principles Figure in M
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“Downward Causation”: Emergent,
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“Downward Causation”: Emergent,
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A with distinguished subset Z of te
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A Metaphysically Moderate Version o
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Literature Balashov, Yuri 2002 ''Wh
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“In der Frage liegt ein Fehler”
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Problems with Psychophysical Identi
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identity theory, or as a predecesso
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of the world. It only matters that
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Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in th
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Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas in th
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notion of time and requires that so
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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Ty
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Some Remarks on Wittgenstein and Ty
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concrete particulars can be subject
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phenomenal concept of experiencing
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Metaphorische Bedeutung als virtus
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speaker is then attaching a special
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„Vom Weißdorn und vom Propheten
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„Die Einheit hören“ - Einige
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„Die Einheit hören“ - Einige
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S4) the necessity of arithmetic is
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Getting out from Inside: Why the Cl
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Dispensing with Particulars: Unders
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Literature Dispensing with Particul
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Reichenbach’s Concept of Logical
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Defining Ontological Naturalism Mar
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Literature Jackson, Frank 1986. “
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properties are located. This proces
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‘our conceptual scheme’ “is c
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Properties and Reduction between Me
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Does this mean that metaphysics sho
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do not pick out pain in a system by
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The Writing of Nietzsche and Wittge
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his teachings. He coincides with hi
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sense of a proposition without firs
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Naturalistic Ethics: A Logical Posi
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Literature Kant, Immanuel 2006 Crit
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What we now require is a bridge the
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Species, Variability, and Integrati
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could mention the many sorts of iso
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to work this way. Classic examples
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The Key Problems of KC Matteo Pleba
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have embraced the myth of prose: it
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5. Prior’s Problem As Patrick Bla
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Reductionism in Axiology: the Case
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developing of cancer tissue in huma
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(2) One-way Nagelian bridge princip
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Rethinking the Modal Argument again
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Rethinking the Modal Argument again
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that we are to find the features we
Page 278 and 279:
Atypical Rational Agency Paul Raymo
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Literature Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957
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situation bieten sich keine Kriteri
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Two Reductions of ‘rule’ Dana R
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one that could take place, but does
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physics is not able to make, since
Page 290 and 291:
Wittgenstein’s Attitudes Fabien S
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view of logic, in accordance with h
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Warum man auf transzendentalphiloso
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Making the Mind Higher-Level Elizab
Page 298 and 299:
Literature Churchland, P. M. (1995)
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Page 302 and 303:
Mental Causation: A Lesson from Act
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Again, this is mistaken. Non-reduct
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auf alle Arten von kontingenten Pro
Page 308 and 309:
Reduction, Sets, and Properties Ben
Page 310 and 311:
Literature Egan, Andy (2004): ‘Se
Page 312 and 313:
there is a tension between evaluati
Page 314 and 315:
The Elimination of Meaning in Compu
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sufficient to explain all of the em
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that 'A' and 'A' could never be tok
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the necktie sense) can differ in wh
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Supervenience and ‘Should’ Arto
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word 'norm' can be thought to expre
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Rule-following as Coordination: A G
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vast majority are bent: gruesome, g
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human life, the violent condition o
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A Division in Mind. The Misconceive
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A Division in Mind. The Misconceive
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could then deduce (1c) and conclude
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Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoh
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Neutral Monism. A Miraculous, Incoh
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A somewhat Eliminativist Proposal a
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Impliziert der intentionale Redukti
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Impliziert der intentionale Redukti
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Structure of the Paradoxes, Structu
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Structure of the Paradoxes, Structu
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that he was working on a translatio
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Objects of Perception, Objects of S
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Objects of Perception, Objects of S
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Let us take the example of the hypo
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Reducing Sets to Modalities Rafał
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variables ai that (under an interpr
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Are Lamarckian Explanations Fully R
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A Note on Tractatus 5.521 Nuno Vent
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And he goes on saying, referring to
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The Place of Theory Reduction in th
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Ethik als irreduzibles Supervenienz
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unabhängig von denen ihrer Mitglie
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Das ‘schwierige Problem’ des Be
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The Supervenience Argument, Levels,
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The Supervenience Argument, Levels,
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their relations both to the physica
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On the Characterization of Objects
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On the Characterization of Objects
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The Functional Unity of Special Sci
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size, location, temporal characteri
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Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-
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From Topology to Logic. The Neural
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From Topology to Logic. The Neural
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The Calculus of Inductive Construct
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The Four-Color Theorem, Testimony a
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experience. Of course, a detailed a
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Clearly x = y → x = ext y holds,
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Intentional Fundamentalism Petri Yl
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The second dimension to be consider
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The very existence of the special s
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Heil, J. (1999), “Multiple Realiz
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independent of what is the fact, fa
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415
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Publications of the Austrian Ludwig
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