Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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scientific status <strong>in</strong> that <strong>the</strong> sub-concepts are coextensive<br />
with physical concepts, even though all of <strong>the</strong>m may not<br />
be of any particular biological <strong>in</strong>terest. Let me thus call this<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir possible scientific status. By this means, we can<br />
bootstrap upwards to establish <strong>the</strong> scientific status of <strong>the</strong><br />
more abstract concept B. To put it <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r terms, s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
any token com<strong>in</strong>g under <strong>the</strong> abstract biological functional<br />
concept B also comes under a functional sub-concept<br />
whose scientific quality would prima facie not be opaque,<br />
B cannot be opaque ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> as much as <strong>the</strong> only difference<br />
between B <strong>and</strong> one of its sub-concepts (B1, B2, B3,<br />
etc.) is <strong>the</strong> degree of abstraction with<strong>in</strong> a purely functional<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory. A sub-concept br<strong>in</strong>gs out <strong>the</strong> same salient similarity<br />
as does its more abstract concept (its relevance here be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of selection under normal conditions)<br />
while also add<strong>in</strong>g a functional detail (side effect that<br />
is salient for selection under special conditions) that is<br />
l<strong>in</strong>ked to this outl<strong>in</strong>ed salient similarity (B1 = “B + Bm<strong>in</strong>or”).<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> matter is so crucial, let me stress here that both<br />
<strong>the</strong> abstract concept <strong>and</strong> its sub-concepts are constructed<br />
<strong>in</strong> terms of one s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>the</strong>ory, such that <strong>the</strong> abstraction<br />
from side effects is a purely <strong>the</strong>ory-immanent matter with a<br />
conceptual l<strong>in</strong>kage. Thus, under this schema, we clarify<br />
<strong>the</strong> assumed scientificity of <strong>the</strong> abstract unify<strong>in</strong>g concepts<br />
of biology (for <strong>in</strong>stance, a certa<strong>in</strong> gene concept that accommodates<br />
<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> gene tokens are physically<br />
different), as we cannot do <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r reductionist approaches.<br />
There are now bridge-pr<strong>in</strong>ciples sufficient to<br />
make <strong>the</strong> abstraction step <strong>in</strong>telligible.<br />
This philosophical foundation will help to normalize<br />
<strong>the</strong> undoubted pragmatic advantage of biology as a<br />
special science with<strong>in</strong> a unified conceptual schema that<br />
reta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> completeness of physics <strong>and</strong> ontological<br />
reductionism. Biology is scientific because of <strong>the</strong><br />
systematic l<strong>in</strong>k to physics, <strong>and</strong> objective because <strong>the</strong><br />
outl<strong>in</strong>ed biological salient similarities are those that exist <strong>in</strong><br />
our world as <strong>the</strong>y depend on biological evolution by means<br />
of natural selection. Its abstract functional concepts,<br />
<strong>in</strong>tegrated with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed reductionist framework of<br />
construct<strong>in</strong>g functional sub-concepts, counter <strong>the</strong> tw<strong>in</strong><br />
threats of epiphenomenalism <strong>and</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ativism. Abstract<br />
biological concepts can be systematically l<strong>in</strong>ked with<br />
physics. This does not ratify <strong>the</strong> claim of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dispensable<br />
character of biology, s<strong>in</strong>ce that does not seem to be<br />
compatible with <strong>the</strong> completeness of physics <strong>and</strong><br />
ontological reductionism, but it does give us pragmatic<br />
wiggle room – one can now argue that <strong>the</strong> pragmatic value<br />
of biology is scientific <strong>and</strong> objective. Biological concepts<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> abstract law-like generalizations govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m<br />
br<strong>in</strong>g out salient similarities among entities that are<br />
physically different. This is <strong>the</strong> epistemological power<br />
belong<strong>in</strong>g to biology alone: its ability to expla<strong>in</strong> biological<br />
evolution <strong>in</strong> homogeneous terms that can’t be selected<br />
from a wholly physics-based po<strong>in</strong>t of view. Hence, <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
no positive argument left for <strong>the</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ativist approach to<br />
biology. Which gives us what we want: biology is <strong>the</strong> more<br />
unify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ory about a certa<strong>in</strong> ensemble of entities (<strong>the</strong><br />
liv<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs) while physics is <strong>the</strong> more unify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>in</strong><br />
general but not as concerns <strong>the</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
To sum up <strong>and</strong> conclude: <strong>the</strong>re is a strong causal<br />
argument <strong>in</strong> favour of ontological reduction. Based on this<br />
argument <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> completeness of physics, <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
anti-reductionist argument of multiple realization faces <strong>the</strong><br />
dilemma that it apparently leads to ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />
epiphenomenalism or elim<strong>in</strong>ativism with regard to biology,<br />
that is, <strong>in</strong> respective to its status as a science. In order to<br />
avoid <strong>the</strong>se consequences, we show that a systematic l<strong>in</strong>k<br />
between biology (<strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r special sciences) <strong>and</strong> physics<br />
is philosophically <strong>and</strong> empirically possible by means of <strong>the</strong><br />
288<br />
Scientific Pragmatic Abstractions — Christian Sachse<br />
construction of functional sub-concepts that are<br />
coextensive with (<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last resort) constructed physical<br />
concepts. Based on this systematic l<strong>in</strong>k to physics, <strong>the</strong><br />
scientific quality of biology <strong>and</strong> its abstract concepts is no<br />
longer opaque. This should not be taken as a warrant to<br />
regard biology as <strong>in</strong>dispensable, given <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of <strong>the</strong><br />
completeness of physics <strong>and</strong> ontological reductionism, but<br />
it does show that, with<strong>in</strong> our proposed reductionist<br />
framework, biology accrues st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g as a objective,<br />
pragmatic science, which conceptualizes parts of <strong>the</strong> world<br />
(liv<strong>in</strong>g systems) with abstract unificationary concepts that<br />
have no equivalent <strong>in</strong> physics.<br />
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