Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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Naturalistic Ethics: A Logical Positivistic Approach<br />
Sibel Oktar, Istanbul, Turkey<br />
The view that ethical words, such as good, correspond to a<br />
natural object is generally categorised as ethical<br />
naturalism. In a wider perspective, it is a view that<br />
ab<strong>and</strong>ons any l<strong>in</strong>k to <strong>the</strong> supersensible account of ethics.<br />
Alternatively, if we recall some of <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>itions of G.E.<br />
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, like ‘reduction of <strong>the</strong> ethical to<br />
<strong>the</strong> non ethical’ <strong>and</strong> say that this is mostly committed by<br />
<strong>the</strong> naturalists; we arrive at a narrower sense of ethical<br />
naturalism. In this sense of ethical naturalism, ethical<br />
knowledge, if any, needs to be acquired by experience.<br />
Thus, statements of ethical value judgements could be<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same way as empirical propositions. The<br />
logical positivists’ refutation of metaphysics is based on <strong>the</strong><br />
fundamental idea that any mean<strong>in</strong>gful statement should be<br />
capable of be<strong>in</strong>g empirically verified. This <strong>in</strong>cludes value<br />
judgements.<br />
Schlick’s position, no doubt, represents such a view.<br />
He openly states, <strong>in</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>ian sense, that any<br />
ethical question that has mean<strong>in</strong>g can be answered, thus if<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is a mean<strong>in</strong>gful question <strong>the</strong>n “ethics is a science”<br />
(Schlick 1959, p.247). So, before decid<strong>in</strong>g whe<strong>the</strong>r ethics<br />
is a science or not, we need to answer <strong>the</strong> question, ‘are<br />
<strong>the</strong>re ethical questions that have mean<strong>in</strong>g?’<br />
First of all, look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> fundamental nature of<br />
ethics Schlick def<strong>in</strong>es it as ‘<strong>the</strong>ory or knowledge’. He puts<br />
it clearly that ethics ‘seeks knowledge’ <strong>and</strong> it ‘seeks to<br />
underst<strong>and</strong>’ its subject matter. For Schlick, <strong>the</strong> subject<br />
matter of ethics – if we th<strong>in</strong>k that it is a science – must be<br />
known as clearly as <strong>the</strong> subject matter of ‘biology’ or<br />
‘optics.’<br />
Schlick th<strong>in</strong>ks that, as we are talk<strong>in</strong>g about ethics <strong>in</strong><br />
ord<strong>in</strong>ary life without difficulty, as we know <strong>the</strong> word ‘light’<br />
even before <strong>the</strong>re was such a science of optics, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />
we must know <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> names of <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>in</strong><br />
ethics. So restrict<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> subject matter of ethics to <strong>the</strong><br />
def<strong>in</strong>ition of ‘good’ is not reasonable, it might have started<br />
with def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g ‘good,’ but it should not end when we def<strong>in</strong>e<br />
it. Although Schlick allows <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>in</strong>vent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
concept of good ‘quite arbitrarily’, he does not accept<br />
def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> concept ‘completely arbitrarily’; <strong>the</strong> person<br />
who is def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ will be limited by some<br />
norm as a guid<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple (Schlick 1959, p.250). In this<br />
l<strong>in</strong>e of argument, R.M. Hare’s ma<strong>in</strong> criticism of naturalistic<br />
ethics is that def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ arbitrarily becomes<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>gful. Hare po<strong>in</strong>ts out that this is different from a<br />
logician’s arbitrary def<strong>in</strong>ition of ‘his own technical words’ to<br />
provide clarity. Consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> study, this<br />
way of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g concepts is not acceptable for <strong>the</strong> word<br />
‘good’. As <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ has a function <strong>in</strong> language,<br />
while <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g we should let it function as it is. For<br />
Hare, if we change <strong>the</strong> function of <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ by an<br />
‘arbitrary def<strong>in</strong>ition’ <strong>the</strong>n we are no longer study<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
same th<strong>in</strong>g (Hare 2003, p.92). Schlick escapes this<br />
criticism by say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> concept of good is already<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>ed by norms, but whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se norms let <strong>the</strong><br />
language function as it is depends on what he underst<strong>and</strong>s<br />
by <strong>the</strong>se norms.<br />
It is difficult, if not impossible, to po<strong>in</strong>t at ‘good.’ At<br />
this po<strong>in</strong>t, says Schlick, most philosophers develop a false<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>sis that tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fundamental concept of good<br />
given, we possess a special ‘moral sense’ that po<strong>in</strong>t out<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘presence of good.’ So we are able to say that good<br />
has an objective character. But this hypo<strong>the</strong>sis falls short<br />
<strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> variations <strong>in</strong> moral judgement. So how<br />
would ‘ethics’ take its place, if it could, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> realm of<br />
facts?<br />
Schlick’s mention of norms does not presuppose a<br />
normative ethics. His method is somewhat similar to<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s, he <strong>in</strong>troduces ‘normative ethics’ as one of<br />
<strong>the</strong> approaches that draws a connection between facts<br />
<strong>and</strong> values, but it is not what takes ethics to be. Hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
known that Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> has a great <strong>in</strong>fluence on him, it is<br />
not surpris<strong>in</strong>g that he follows Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s steps.<br />
Introduc<strong>in</strong>g ‘norms’ <strong>and</strong>/or ‘st<strong>and</strong>ards’ to def<strong>in</strong>e (to<br />
fix) <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’, rem<strong>in</strong>ds us of<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s relative sense of value. In “A Lecture on<br />
Ethics” (LE), Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> makes a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between<br />
relative <strong>and</strong> absolute senses of value judgements <strong>and</strong> he<br />
says that it is <strong>the</strong> absolute sense of value judgements that<br />
cannot be said. We can express value judgements if <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are relative value judgements, i.e., if <strong>the</strong>y correspond to a<br />
fact or predeterm<strong>in</strong>ed st<strong>and</strong>ards. However, absolute value<br />
judgements do not correspond to facts thus <strong>the</strong>y cannot be<br />
expressed.<br />
Schlick’s emphasis on norms does not suggest that<br />
ethics is a ‘normative science,’ ra<strong>the</strong>r it is <strong>the</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t<br />
of his quest to def<strong>in</strong>e whe<strong>the</strong>r it is a ‘normative science’ or<br />
a ‘factual science’. As <strong>the</strong> characteristics of good must be<br />
able to po<strong>in</strong>t certa<strong>in</strong> facts you could dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
‘formal’ <strong>and</strong> ‘material’ characteristics of ‘good’ (Schlick<br />
1959, p.252). Schlick says that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> external or formal<br />
characteristic of good, “<strong>the</strong> good always appears as<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g that is dem<strong>and</strong>ed, or comm<strong>and</strong>ed” (Schlick<br />
1959, p.252); as seen <strong>in</strong> Kant’s moral philosophy, <strong>in</strong> which<br />
<strong>the</strong> formal characteristic is displayed <strong>in</strong> ‘<strong>the</strong> categorical<br />
imperative’. This formal characteristic of good is not only<br />
seen <strong>in</strong> Kantian ethics, but also <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs, as <strong>the</strong>ological<br />
ethics taken to rest on God’s comm<strong>and</strong>. Schlick<br />
appreciates <strong>the</strong> formal characteristics of good as a<br />
prelim<strong>in</strong>ary step, <strong>the</strong> mistake, he th<strong>in</strong>ks, is consider<strong>in</strong>g it as<br />
<strong>the</strong> only characteristic of good. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are material characteristics of good which, for him, need to<br />
be considered.<br />
The way Schlick formulates his ideas of what could<br />
be <strong>the</strong> material characteristics of good is very similar to<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> where <strong>in</strong> LE he compares substitutes for good<br />
to <strong>the</strong> Galton’s composite photographs method, <strong>in</strong> which I<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k lies <strong>the</strong> germ of <strong>the</strong> idea of family resemblance.<br />
Schlick’s suggested procedure is look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
cases where we used <strong>the</strong> word good <strong>and</strong> search for<br />
common features of each case. For Schlick, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
common features of <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ “must lie <strong>the</strong> reason<br />
why one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same word, “good,” is used for <strong>the</strong><br />
several cases” (Schlick 1959, p.253). This procedure<br />
almost echoes Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> who, <strong>in</strong> Philosophical<br />
Investigations (PI), says that when we are search<strong>in</strong>g for<br />
<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ we must look at <strong>the</strong><br />
language-games where <strong>the</strong> word ‘good’ is used (PI, 77).<br />
The critical question at this po<strong>in</strong>t is, ‘are <strong>the</strong>re any<br />
such common features?’ At first sight it seems that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are more <strong>in</strong>compatibilities than similarities <strong>in</strong> various actual<br />
cases. Here <strong>the</strong> question is <strong>the</strong> universal validity of <strong>the</strong>se<br />
common features. Schlick gives <strong>the</strong> example of polygamy<br />
247