Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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sense of a proposition without first know<strong>in</strong>g how to use<br />
words <strong>in</strong> a mean<strong>in</strong>gful way. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> grounds our<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> use because he realizes no proposition can be<br />
understood without some mastery of language. Baker <strong>and</strong><br />
Hacker claim Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> turned from Frege’s conception<br />
of mean<strong>in</strong>g because <strong>the</strong> various uses a proposition may<br />
have cannot be depicted as a mere function of <strong>the</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>gs of its component parts <strong>and</strong> structure (Baker <strong>and</strong><br />
Hacker, p.281). To underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> truth-value of a<br />
proposition requires that we first know how to use words.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s focus on use challenges Frege’s<br />
formulation of <strong>the</strong> context pr<strong>in</strong>ciple that <strong>in</strong>sists <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
of a word is tied to <strong>the</strong> sense of a proposition. For<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, “<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of a word is its use <strong>in</strong><br />
language” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002, p.18). Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> calls us<br />
to “look <strong>and</strong> see” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002, p.27) how words are<br />
used. When we th<strong>in</strong>k of actual cases <strong>in</strong> which we use<br />
words, <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g disappears; we <strong>the</strong>n<br />
can see how words operate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of propositions<br />
that <strong>in</strong> turn only operate <strong>in</strong> a larger l<strong>in</strong>guistic context.<br />
Frege’s <strong>the</strong>ory of mean<strong>in</strong>g makes it seem as though<br />
propositions are <strong>in</strong>telligible <strong>in</strong> isolation from <strong>the</strong> rest of<br />
language, but Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> argues, “There is no such th<strong>in</strong>g<br />
as an isolated proposition. For what I call a ‘proposition’ is<br />
a position <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> game of language” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 1995,<br />
p.5) The mean<strong>in</strong>g of a proposition is not to be thought of<br />
as someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependent of <strong>the</strong> rest of language; ra<strong>the</strong>r,<br />
propositions can only be understood <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices. Our l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices show how we<br />
use words, <strong>and</strong> word-use is directed by <strong>the</strong> rules of<br />
language. Though rules help us underst<strong>and</strong> how to use<br />
words, words do not have a fixed mean<strong>in</strong>g or application;<br />
words ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> ‘family resemblances.’ The notion of family<br />
resemblances make clear that our application of a word<br />
‘resembles’ o<strong>the</strong>r ways <strong>in</strong> which we use that word<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002, p.27). S<strong>in</strong>ce l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices<br />
operate accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> rules of certa<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistic contexts<br />
guid<strong>in</strong>g us toward <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of words, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
describes our use of language <strong>in</strong> terms of languagegames.<br />
What are language-games? What do languagegames<br />
show us about our l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices?<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s use of ‘language-game’ is not his<br />
attempt to offer a systematic account of language, as<br />
Frege had done. Ra<strong>the</strong>r, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> uses languagegames<br />
to look more carefully at what we do <strong>in</strong> our l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
practices while draw<strong>in</strong>g our attention to <strong>the</strong> limitations of<br />
systematic analyses (Stern, p.21). Language-games<br />
illum<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong> similarities between language <strong>and</strong> games by<br />
call<strong>in</strong>g our attention to <strong>the</strong> role that rules play <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se<br />
practices. Though language-games function as heuristic<br />
tools, <strong>the</strong>y should not be considered only <strong>in</strong> this way;<br />
‘language-game’ employs <strong>the</strong> use of language itself.<br />
Language-games are practices of language, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y<br />
exemplify our use of language <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> contexts. By<br />
compar<strong>in</strong>g language with games, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
underscores <strong>the</strong> importance of rule-follow<strong>in</strong>g. How do rules<br />
function <strong>in</strong> language-games, <strong>and</strong> what impact do <strong>the</strong>y<br />
have on word-mean<strong>in</strong>g?<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> claims, “A rule st<strong>and</strong>s <strong>the</strong>re like a signpost”<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002, p.34) This claim draws our<br />
attention to signs, which help us underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> role that<br />
rules play <strong>in</strong> word-mean<strong>in</strong>g. When deal<strong>in</strong>g with a sign, we<br />
need not <strong>in</strong>terpret <strong>the</strong> rules of that sign <strong>in</strong> order to obey it;<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r, “Obey<strong>in</strong>g a rule is a practice” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002,<br />
p.69). Follow<strong>in</strong>g a rule is not a matter of guess<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>tended mean<strong>in</strong>g of a sign; ra<strong>the</strong>r, our use of a sign that is<br />
<strong>in</strong> accordance with a certa<strong>in</strong> rule <strong>in</strong>volves explicitly<br />
formulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rule one is follow<strong>in</strong>g (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002,<br />
p.69). For example, when one po<strong>in</strong>ts a f<strong>in</strong>ger, it operates<br />
Word-Mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Context Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Investigations — Jaime Nester<br />
as a sign show<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>rs to look at whatever it may be<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> not at <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ger itself. This elucidates how<br />
rule-follow<strong>in</strong>g operates without <strong>in</strong>cit<strong>in</strong>g widespread<br />
ambiguity of a sign’s mean<strong>in</strong>g. This is not to say ambiguity<br />
never arises; if it does, one must raise questions <strong>and</strong><br />
provide explanations, but <strong>the</strong>re is no need to expla<strong>in</strong><br />
ambiguity that may arise unless some ambiguity actually<br />
does arise (Stern, p.125). Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> claims: “One may<br />
say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a<br />
misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g – one, that is, that would occur but for<br />
<strong>the</strong> explanation; not every one that I can imag<strong>in</strong>e. The<br />
sign-post is <strong>in</strong> order – if, under normal circumstances, it<br />
fulfills its purpose” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, 2002, p.35). The<br />
importance that I am attribut<strong>in</strong>g to signs is that <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g is unambiguous because of <strong>the</strong> role of rule; this<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t can be made by look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> role rule play <strong>in</strong><br />
games.<br />
When rules of a game are taught, one learns a<br />
practice that assures obedience to those rules. These<br />
practices do not need fur<strong>the</strong>r explanation because rules<br />
guide <strong>the</strong> moves we make. By follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rules of our<br />
language, we can unreflectively underst<strong>and</strong> new<br />
propositions <strong>and</strong> use words without hav<strong>in</strong>g to raise<br />
questions about how we underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mean<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> argues we show that we underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g of words if we can use <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gfully<br />
ways; issues concern<strong>in</strong>g word-mean<strong>in</strong>g do not arise <strong>in</strong> our<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices because rules govern how we use<br />
words <strong>in</strong> context. The contexts of our l<strong>in</strong>guistic practices <strong>in</strong><br />
which our words have mean<strong>in</strong>g are language-games.<br />
Whe<strong>the</strong>r a word is <strong>in</strong> accord with or conflicts with <strong>the</strong> rules<br />
of a language-game stems from <strong>the</strong> more fundamental<br />
concept of obey<strong>in</strong>g a rule. If a word is to have a mean<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
it must be used <strong>in</strong> agreement with <strong>the</strong> rules of a languagegame.<br />
I take rule-follow<strong>in</strong>g to be central to <strong>the</strong> question of<br />
word-mean<strong>in</strong>g for Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> because rules determ<strong>in</strong>e<br />
what count as valid moves <strong>in</strong> language-games. Thus, <strong>the</strong><br />
context of language-games is that which confers mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
upon our various uses of words for Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>. It is clear<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> extends <strong>the</strong> scope of Frege’s context pr<strong>in</strong>ciple<br />
to consider our use of words <strong>in</strong> language-games ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than focus<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> logical role words play <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
propositions. This draws our attention to how l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />
practices are similar to games, which underscore <strong>the</strong><br />
importance attributed to rule-follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>in</strong><br />
which word-mean<strong>in</strong>g is tied to use. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s<br />
transformation of <strong>the</strong> context pr<strong>in</strong>ciple does not open him<br />
to Frege’s problem of circularity. Frege sought to ground<br />
<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of words <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> logic of our grammar, but<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> focuses on our use of language. The move<br />
from propositions to use enables Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> to highlight<br />
<strong>the</strong> conventionality of how our words ga<strong>in</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g. S<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> ties word-mean<strong>in</strong>g to our conventional<br />
practices, he avoids Frege’s problem about how it is that<br />
we can grasp <strong>the</strong> sense of a proposition without first<br />
know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> use of its constituent parts<br />
(words).<br />
Frege’s three guid<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples offer an account of<br />
word-mean<strong>in</strong>g that st<strong>and</strong>s open to <strong>the</strong> objection of<br />
circularity. I have argued Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s mean<strong>in</strong>g-as-use<br />
can best be understood as a transformation of Frege’s<br />
context pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. By focus<strong>in</strong>g on use, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> shows<br />
that words have mean<strong>in</strong>g because our use of <strong>the</strong>m follows<br />
from <strong>the</strong> rules of particular language-games. Frege sought<br />
to establish <strong>the</strong> context pr<strong>in</strong>ciple to protect <strong>the</strong> truth-values<br />
of propositions <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir components parts from <strong>the</strong><br />
psychological. Frege’s focus on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal logical<br />
relations between <strong>the</strong> words of a proposition to fix <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g led him <strong>in</strong>to problems of circularity. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>,<br />
245