Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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242<br />
quite do what he would like to do” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
1980 §129).<br />
The fact that it is impossible to give philosophical writ<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
completely poetic form perhaps justifies its <strong>in</strong>adequacy.<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> fact acknowledges that he perhaps expresses<br />
only a tenth of what he wants to express, which<br />
make his texts seem like “mumbl<strong>in</strong>g” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980<br />
§§100 & 145). In this sense he ends up admitt<strong>in</strong>g that not<br />
all that one th<strong>in</strong>ks should be written on paper:<br />
“Really all that can be written —that is, without do<strong>in</strong>g<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g stupid <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>appropriate— is that<br />
which emerges <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of writ<strong>in</strong>g. All <strong>the</strong> rest is<br />
comical <strong>and</strong> comparable to rubbish, so to speak”<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1997 27).<br />
Nietzsche also seems to number his words <strong>and</strong> reserves<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to tell of some experiences, warn<strong>in</strong>g that “one should<br />
only speak where one cannot rema<strong>in</strong> silent, <strong>and</strong> only<br />
speak of what one has conquered”. The rest is all “chatter”,<br />
“literature”, bad breed<strong>in</strong>g” (Nietzsche 1999 2-369).<br />
In <strong>the</strong> same way, <strong>the</strong> proposals of Tractatus rule<br />
that “whereof one cannot speak, <strong>the</strong>reof one must be<br />
silent”, draw<strong>in</strong>g a precise l<strong>in</strong>e between <strong>the</strong> sphere of <strong>the</strong><br />
speakable, <strong>the</strong> scientific description of <strong>the</strong> world, <strong>and</strong> that<br />
which can only be shown, <strong>the</strong> mystic (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1961<br />
§7). Decades later, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ues to <strong>in</strong>sist that<br />
“<strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>describable (that which seems mysterious to me <strong>and</strong><br />
which I don’t dare to express)” is <strong>the</strong> background upon<br />
which <strong>the</strong> thoughts that he wants to express acquire <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980 §83). In any case, <strong>the</strong><br />
question which we are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> rais<strong>in</strong>g is that his<br />
literary style favours <strong>the</strong> unspeakable. The laconic<br />
proposals of Tractatus create <strong>the</strong> effect of a certa<strong>in</strong><br />
dogmatism —not <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong> did <strong>the</strong>ir author <strong>in</strong>tend to convey<br />
an untouchable <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>itive truth through <strong>the</strong>m—,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g a road to <strong>the</strong> mystic which suggests, precisely<br />
through <strong>the</strong> obscurity of his writ<strong>in</strong>g, an <strong>in</strong>disputable clarity.<br />
Turn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> very term<strong>in</strong>ology of Philosophical<br />
Investigations, it can be affirmed that <strong>the</strong> aphoristic form<br />
which Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s writ<strong>in</strong>g tends to take on facilitates <strong>the</strong><br />
synoptic vision which provokes underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, an<br />
underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g that consists of “see<strong>in</strong>g connections” <strong>and</strong><br />
depends on “f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>vent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>termediate cases”<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1958 §122). The hermeneutic key to<br />
aphorism is, <strong>in</strong> fact, <strong>the</strong> capacity to provide examples<br />
which forsake an explanation <strong>in</strong> favour of a merely<br />
descriptive illustration 2 . And this, without a doubt, forces<br />
philosophy to adapt its writ<strong>in</strong>g not to a cha<strong>in</strong> of <strong>in</strong>ferences,<br />
but to a collection of images which <strong>in</strong>tends to appeal to <strong>the</strong><br />
personal po<strong>in</strong>t of view.<br />
In this sense, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> warns his reader that he<br />
merely <strong>in</strong>tends to be <strong>the</strong> “mirror” where he can see his own<br />
thoughts with all of <strong>the</strong>ir errors, so help<strong>in</strong>g him to correct<br />
<strong>the</strong>m (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980 §93). In <strong>the</strong> same way, he seems<br />
to ab<strong>and</strong>on discursive reason<strong>in</strong>g when he affirms that<br />
philosophy purely <strong>and</strong> simply places everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> front of<br />
us <strong>and</strong> does not conclude anyth<strong>in</strong>g. For this reason, he<br />
emphasises that:<br />
“Writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> right style is sett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> carriage<br />
straight on <strong>the</strong> rails. [...] All we want to do is<br />
straighten you up on <strong>the</strong> track if your carriage is<br />
crooked on <strong>the</strong> rails. But <strong>the</strong>n we'll let you travel<br />
alone” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980 §§212-213).<br />
2 Cfr. Cavell, Stanley 2004 “The Investigations´ everyday aes<strong>the</strong>tics of itself”,<br />
<strong>in</strong>: The Literary Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, New York-London: Routledge.<br />
The Writ<strong>in</strong>g of Nietzsche <strong>and</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> — Elena Nájera<br />
So, <strong>the</strong> literary way of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> itself significant from a<br />
philosophical po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>and</strong> reveals someth<strong>in</strong>g which<br />
words cannot say. “Style” is <strong>the</strong> “expression of a general<br />
human necessity [...] seen sub specie aeterni” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
1997 28). With this it is acknowledged that an author’s<br />
way of writ<strong>in</strong>g allows for <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own particular circumstances <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir aspirations to be<br />
placed <strong>in</strong> perspective, seen from outside <strong>the</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary logic<br />
of words, reach<strong>in</strong>g a compromise with <strong>the</strong> undescribable:<br />
with <strong>the</strong> sphere of values, with <strong>the</strong> mystic.<br />
In accordance with this idea, Nietzsche <strong>and</strong><br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s works may well be an attempt to show a<br />
cultural situation from a critical po<strong>in</strong>t of view, <strong>the</strong>ir styles<br />
suggest<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g more than that which <strong>the</strong> language<br />
of <strong>the</strong> time —an egalitarian <strong>and</strong> scientistic era— allows,<br />
because that which has been said up to now leads us to<br />
suspect that our two th<strong>in</strong>kers did not have too much faith <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir present nor <strong>in</strong> what <strong>the</strong>ir present had to offer, <strong>in</strong> short,<br />
good readers.<br />
3. Where are <strong>the</strong> good readers?<br />
In <strong>the</strong> case of Nietzsche, he would actually be contradict<strong>in</strong>g<br />
himself if he was to expect to f<strong>in</strong>d “ears <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s“ for<br />
his truths <strong>in</strong> life: “that today one doesn’t hear me <strong>and</strong><br />
doesn’t accept my ideas is not only underst<strong>and</strong>able, it<br />
even seems right to me” (Nietzsche 1999 6-298). In <strong>the</strong><br />
same sense, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> correspondence surround<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> publication of Tractatus, proves to be equally<br />
resigned to <strong>the</strong> idea that “nobody will underst<strong>and</strong> it” 3 . And<br />
with regard to <strong>the</strong> “spirit” of Philosophical Investigations he<br />
regrets <strong>the</strong> same lack of underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g that era:<br />
“This book is written for those who are <strong>in</strong> sympathy<br />
with <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>in</strong> which it is written. This is not, I believe,<br />
<strong>the</strong> spirit of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> current of European <strong>and</strong><br />
American civilization”<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980 §§29 & 34).<br />
As we <strong>in</strong>s<strong>in</strong>uated a few l<strong>in</strong>es ago, <strong>the</strong> philosophies of our<br />
two writers conta<strong>in</strong>, more or less explicitly, a criticism of<br />
civilisation which br<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>m toge<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y<br />
collaborate <strong>and</strong> converge <strong>the</strong>ir styles. In a text from 1930,<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>the</strong>re are “problems <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
western <strong>in</strong>tellectual world” which he has not come up<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>and</strong> which no philosopher has ever confronted,<br />
although he specifies <strong>in</strong> brackets that “perhaps Nietzsche<br />
passed <strong>the</strong>m by”. To have done so would mean hav<strong>in</strong>g<br />
known how to predict <strong>and</strong> describe <strong>the</strong> “odyssey” of <strong>the</strong><br />
west before its end, someth<strong>in</strong>g reserved for certa<strong>in</strong> poets,<br />
for which reason it should not seem strange that it is written<br />
“<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> obscure knowledge of premonition <strong>and</strong> it may<br />
only be underst<strong>and</strong>able to a few” (Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1980 §41).<br />
That same year, confirm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> wisdom of <strong>the</strong> Nietzschean<br />
cultural diagnosis, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> wrote about <strong>the</strong> decadence<br />
of <strong>the</strong> contemporary world:<br />
“Our age is really an age of <strong>the</strong> transvaluation of all<br />
values. (The procession of humank<strong>in</strong>d turns a corner<br />
& what used to be <strong>the</strong> way up is now <strong>the</strong> way<br />
down, etc.) Did Nietzsche have <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d what now is<br />
happen<strong>in</strong>g & does his achievement consist <strong>in</strong> anticipat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it & f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a word for it?”<br />
(Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> 1997 53).<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong>se passages, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> seems certa<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
to have read Nietzsche <strong>and</strong> to have made use of some of<br />
3 Letter to Russell, 13.03.1919.