Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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phenomenal concept of experienc<strong>in</strong>g red. This is because<br />
bra<strong>in</strong> state p2, which is my experience of red, was<br />
causally responsible for p1. Ex hypo<strong>the</strong>si, p1 <strong>and</strong> p2 are<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ct physical states. This would make it possible for a<br />
neuroscientist to stimulate p1 while ensur<strong>in</strong>g that p2 is left<br />
<strong>in</strong>ert. But what exactly is happen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this scenario? If it<br />
is anyth<strong>in</strong>g like <strong>the</strong> water case, I will th<strong>in</strong>k that I’m enterta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
a phenomenal concept that refers to p2 but I will<br />
actually be deploy<strong>in</strong>g a nonphenomenal concept of <strong>the</strong><br />
neuroscientist’s electrical stimulation. This means that I<br />
will mistakenly believe that I am th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ‘phenomenally’<br />
about experienc<strong>in</strong>g red when I am actually th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g nonphenomenally<br />
about someth<strong>in</strong>g else.<br />
If we accept Kripke’s observation that <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
reality / appearance dist<strong>in</strong>ction when it comes to our<br />
phenomenology <strong>the</strong>n this seems highly implausible. But<br />
more importantly, it is imperative that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal<br />
concept strategist develop an account of phenomenal<br />
concepts that is genu<strong>in</strong>ely phenomenal <strong>and</strong> Lev<strong>in</strong>, by<br />
keep<strong>in</strong>g her account physically respectable, loses touch<br />
with this crucial feature. She preserves (ii) at <strong>the</strong><br />
expense of (i). This shortcom<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts us to a different<br />
account, one that makes <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal concept <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> object it denotes much<br />
tighter.<br />
David Pap<strong>in</strong>eau’s account of quasi-quotational<br />
phenomenal concepts discharges this duty. His idea is to<br />
analyze phenomenal concepts as a species of<br />
perceptual concepts. Consider my ability to perceptually<br />
identify a flower <strong>and</strong> make judgments about it. I might be<br />
able to th<strong>in</strong>k ‘that flower’ is beautiful when look<strong>in</strong>g at a<br />
tulip. I have, at my disposal, a visual sensory template<br />
that I can use to recognize tulips. This template,<br />
however, is not only useful for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about external<br />
objects like tulips, but it is also useful for th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal objects like my conscious awareness of <strong>the</strong> tulip.<br />
When we attend to our experiences we use <strong>the</strong><br />
experiences <strong>the</strong>mselves to th<strong>in</strong>k about <strong>the</strong>m. The crucial<br />
feature of phenomenal concepts is that <strong>the</strong>y will always<br />
deploy an <strong>in</strong>stance of <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>the</strong>y are about.<br />
That is, <strong>the</strong>y use <strong>the</strong> denoted experiences <strong>in</strong> order to<br />
mention <strong>the</strong>m. Pap<strong>in</strong>eau writes:<br />
“This means that any exercise of a phenomenal<br />
concept to th<strong>in</strong>k about a perceptual experience<br />
will <strong>in</strong>evitably <strong>in</strong>volve ei<strong>the</strong>r that experience itself<br />
or an imag<strong>in</strong>ary recreation of that experience. If<br />
we count imag<strong>in</strong>ary recreations as ‘versions’ of<br />
<strong>the</strong> experience be<strong>in</strong>g imag<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>the</strong>n we can say<br />
that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about a given experience<br />
will always use a version of that experience<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to mention that experience.”<br />
(Pap<strong>in</strong>eau 2007, 124)<br />
The problem with this view is that it seems to leave no<br />
room for any k<strong>in</strong>d of physical explanation. The phenomenal<br />
property that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal concept is about<br />
is literally a part of <strong>the</strong> concept itself; as such <strong>the</strong> traditional<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>ction between representation <strong>and</strong> represented<br />
object that made it possible to specify an explanation<br />
<strong>in</strong> terms of causal / historical correlation between<br />
<strong>the</strong> two has been obliterated. It seems that <strong>the</strong> special<br />
k<strong>in</strong>d of cognitive presence that Pap<strong>in</strong>eau’s account provides<br />
must be expla<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> physical presence of <strong>the</strong><br />
experience alone. But does this really count as an explanation<br />
or is this better characterized as a stipulation?<br />
A Critique of <strong>the</strong> Phenomenal Concept Strategy — Daniel Lim<br />
Dualist Illusion<br />
I believe Chalmers’ dilemma is real <strong>and</strong> must be addressed.<br />
But even if a path can be cut between <strong>the</strong><br />
horns of this dilemma it is far from clear that <strong>the</strong> phenomenal<br />
concept strategy has adequately accounted for<br />
(iii). For ease of exposition I will use <strong>the</strong> ‘explanatory<br />
gap’ (Lev<strong>in</strong>e 2001) as an <strong>in</strong>stance of <strong>the</strong> dualist <strong>in</strong>tuition.<br />
The existence of this gap is someth<strong>in</strong>g defenders of <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenal concept strategy readily admit. Their claim<br />
is not that <strong>the</strong> gap can be bridged but that its existence<br />
can be expla<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />
Let’s beg<strong>in</strong> by th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g about a classic optical<br />
illusion based on human color constancy known as <strong>the</strong><br />
‘checker shadow illusion’. A subject is shown what<br />
appears to be a black <strong>and</strong> white checkerboard with a<br />
cyl<strong>in</strong>der on it that is cast<strong>in</strong>g a diagonal shadow across<br />
<strong>the</strong> middle of <strong>the</strong> board. The squares are actually<br />
different shades of gray <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> image is constructed so<br />
that <strong>the</strong> ‘white’ squares <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadow are <strong>the</strong> same<br />
shade as <strong>the</strong> ‘black’ squares outside <strong>the</strong> shadow.<br />
Despite be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> same shade <strong>the</strong> squares appear to be<br />
very different. The st<strong>and</strong>ard explanation for this illusion<br />
has two parts. The first is that our visual system keys <strong>in</strong><br />
on local contrasts – a square that is lighter than its<br />
immediate neighbors is considered ‘lighter than<br />
average’. So <strong>the</strong> mere fact that <strong>the</strong> square <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shadow<br />
is surrounded by darker squares <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> square outside<br />
<strong>the</strong> shadow is surrounded by lighter squares contributes<br />
to <strong>the</strong> illusion. The second part is that shadows often<br />
have soft edges while pa<strong>in</strong>ted boundaries have hard<br />
edges. Our visual system tends to ignore gradual<br />
changes <strong>in</strong> light<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> color of <strong>the</strong><br />
surfaces <strong>in</strong>volved without be<strong>in</strong>g misled by shadows. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> image, <strong>the</strong> cyl<strong>in</strong>der’s shadow is deliberately made<br />
fuzzy to add to this effect.<br />
What we have here is a satisfy<strong>in</strong>g explanation for<br />
<strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> checker shadow illusion. A vital<br />
feature of this explanation is that it does not presuppose<br />
<strong>the</strong> illusion <strong>in</strong> order to expla<strong>in</strong> it. By expos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
tendencies of our visual system to key <strong>in</strong> on local<br />
contrasts <strong>and</strong> import generic <strong>in</strong>formation concern<strong>in</strong>g<br />
boundaries, a non-circular explanation of <strong>the</strong> illusion is<br />
provided. The question is whe<strong>the</strong>r phenomenal concepts<br />
provide such an explanation for <strong>the</strong> explanatory gap.<br />
David Pap<strong>in</strong>eau claims that it does. He locates <strong>the</strong><br />
source of <strong>the</strong> explanatory gap <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence of a use /<br />
mention dist<strong>in</strong>ction regard<strong>in</strong>g phenomenal concepts. The<br />
use / mention dist<strong>in</strong>ction is present <strong>in</strong> a majority of our<br />
nonphenomenal concepts but it is peculiarly absent<br />
when we th<strong>in</strong>k phenomenally. As already gestured at<br />
above, it is <strong>the</strong> way we th<strong>in</strong>k about phenomenal<br />
properties that makes it seem as though we are<br />
apprehend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir essences <strong>and</strong> consequently <strong>in</strong>tuit<strong>in</strong>g<br />
phenomenal properties as ontologically dist<strong>in</strong>ct from<br />
anyth<strong>in</strong>g physical. Phenomenal concepts literally conta<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> properties that <strong>the</strong>y conceptualize so it is no wonder<br />
why we can disassociate <strong>the</strong> physical descriptions of <strong>the</strong><br />
properties from <strong>the</strong> first h<strong>and</strong> experiences of <strong>the</strong><br />
properties <strong>the</strong>mselves. Pap<strong>in</strong>eau writes:<br />
“There is a sense <strong>in</strong> which material concepts do<br />
‘leave out’ <strong>the</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>gs. Uses of <strong>the</strong>m do not <strong>in</strong><br />
any way activate <strong>the</strong> experiences <strong>in</strong> question, by<br />
contrast with uses of phenomenal concepts …<br />
After all, most concepts don’t use or <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>the</strong><br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong>y refer to. When I th<strong>in</strong>k of be<strong>in</strong>g rich,<br />
say, or hav<strong>in</strong>g measles, this doesn’t <strong>in</strong> any sense<br />
make me rich or give me measles.”<br />
(Pap<strong>in</strong>eau 2007, 136)<br />
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