Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Four Anti-reductionist Dogmas <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Light of Biophysical<br />
Micro-<strong>Reduction</strong> of M<strong>in</strong>d & Body<br />
Theo A. F. Kuipers, Gron<strong>in</strong>gen, The Ne<strong>the</strong>rl<strong>and</strong>s<br />
Introduction<br />
There are at least four anti-reductionist dogmas: 1) reduction<br />
implies elim<strong>in</strong>ation, 2) multiple realizability is an obstacle<br />
to concept <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory reduction, 3) supervenience<br />
implies non-reducibility, <strong>and</strong> 4) m<strong>in</strong>d-body micro-reduction<br />
amounts to neuroreduction, neglect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> embodied <strong>and</strong><br />
embedded character of mental life.<br />
In (Kuipers, Structures <strong>in</strong> Science (henceforth SiS),<br />
2001, Ch. 1), I have described several goals <strong>and</strong> types of<br />
co-operation between research programs. The programs<br />
can deal with different levels of aggregation <strong>and</strong> can even<br />
belong to different discipl<strong>in</strong>es. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> programs can<br />
use different styles of description <strong>and</strong> explanation: causal,<br />
functional or <strong>in</strong>tentional. In <strong>the</strong> present paper, <strong>the</strong>se<br />
<strong>the</strong>mes are discussed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context of m<strong>in</strong>d-body<br />
research. I will focus on <strong>in</strong>terlevel biophysical m<strong>in</strong>d-body<br />
research, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicate several k<strong>in</strong>ds of (micro-)reduction<br />
<strong>and</strong> (micro-)correlation of concepts <strong>and</strong> laws. At <strong>the</strong> end it<br />
will turn out that none of <strong>the</strong> four dogmas is observed by<br />
biophysical micro-reduction of m<strong>in</strong>d&body.<br />
Global characterization<br />
Let us concentrate on <strong>in</strong>terlevel m<strong>in</strong>d-body research <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
form of symmetric co-operation between research programs<br />
or even discipl<strong>in</strong>es, hence boundary-bridg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terlevel<br />
research. More specifically, I will deal with (macromicro)<br />
<strong>in</strong>terlevel reduction <strong>and</strong> correlation of m<strong>in</strong>d-body<br />
concepts <strong>and</strong> with <strong>in</strong>terlevel explanation <strong>and</strong> reduction of<br />
m<strong>in</strong>d-body laws. The guid<strong>in</strong>g perspective is <strong>the</strong> material<br />
(more specifically, biophysical) realization of such concepts<br />
<strong>and</strong> laws <strong>in</strong> micro-states, -events <strong>and</strong> -processes.<br />
The latter not necessarily restricted to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual, let<br />
alone, to its neural states <strong>and</strong> processes.<br />
In what amounts to an <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary dream, I will<br />
apply <strong>the</strong> mixed strategy of moderate reductionism or<br />
moderate holism to <strong>the</strong> non-elim<strong>in</strong>ative reduction that<br />
might result from <strong>the</strong> co-operation between psychology<br />
<strong>and</strong> (neuro) physiology. Just<strong>in</strong> Schwartz (1991) noted<br />
already long ago that <strong>the</strong> anti-reductionist arguments of<br />
many philosophers of psychology are motivated by <strong>the</strong><br />
worry that successful reduction would elim<strong>in</strong>ate ra<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
conserve <strong>the</strong> mental realm. However, as he po<strong>in</strong>ts out <strong>in</strong><br />
his specific terms, but <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same spirit as ours, some<br />
paradigm natural science examples of (micro-)reduction of<br />
concepts, such as water, genes <strong>and</strong> tables, are not at all<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ative. Indeed, “<strong>Philosophy</strong> of psychology needs more<br />
detailed attention to issues <strong>in</strong> natural science which serve<br />
as analogies for reduction of <strong>the</strong> mental” (Schwartz, 1991,<br />
p. 203). I am afraid this still holds to this day.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r general po<strong>in</strong>t is that philosophers seem to<br />
favor discussions <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> reduction of whole<br />
discipl<strong>in</strong>es. From my po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>in</strong> general, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
mixed strategy <strong>in</strong> particular, such discussions are ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
pretentious. The really <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g question is whe<strong>the</strong>r at<br />
least some mental concepts <strong>and</strong> even some mental laws<br />
(or, more cautiously, regularities or quasi-laws) can be<br />
reduced, straightforwardly or approximately, to biophysical<br />
micro-concepts <strong>and</strong> -laws.<br />
To state <strong>the</strong> (micro-)reductionist ambition more<br />
precisely, let us start from <strong>the</strong> common sense division of<br />
properties (events, states, dispositions, etc.) of human<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong>to bodily <strong>and</strong> mental properties. That is, some<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividual properties are purely or largely bodily, e.g.,<br />
weight, temperature, strength etc. Some o<strong>the</strong>rs are<br />
typically mental, e.g., hav<strong>in</strong>g memories, beliefs <strong>and</strong><br />
desires. And <strong>the</strong>re are many mixed properties <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like<br />
<strong>in</strong> between: pa<strong>in</strong>s, actions, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g speech acts, etc. In<br />
common sense terms all <strong>the</strong>se properties are causally<br />
active (or at least causally reactive) <strong>and</strong> not only with<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ir own sphere (m<strong>in</strong>d/m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> body/body <strong>in</strong>teractions)<br />
but also between <strong>the</strong> spheres (m<strong>in</strong>d/body <strong>in</strong>teractions).<br />
Many of <strong>the</strong>se properties can be described <strong>in</strong> functional<br />
<strong>and</strong> several of <strong>the</strong>m <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional terms, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>se ways of<br />
description may well go toge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
To describe <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>se common sense<br />
ideas, classical m<strong>in</strong>d-body dualism postulated two k<strong>in</strong>ds of<br />
substances, which can also <strong>in</strong>teract. The modern,<br />
prevail<strong>in</strong>g biophysical po<strong>in</strong>t of view is quite different. On<br />
lower levels of aggregation or organization everyth<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
supposed to be of a biophysical (<strong>and</strong> partly functional)<br />
nature, such that all <strong>in</strong>dividual properties supervene as<br />
mental <strong>and</strong>/or bodily macro-properties of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
conceived as an (organized) aggregate of a biophysical<br />
nature. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong> macro-properties are supposed<br />
to be (materially) realized by biophysical micro-states.<br />
Hence, <strong>and</strong> this is <strong>the</strong> core idea of my approach, mental,<br />
bodily <strong>and</strong> mixed terms can be treated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> same way,<br />
<strong>and</strong> that way is such that <strong>the</strong>ir be<strong>in</strong>g causally <strong>in</strong>teractive is<br />
unproblematic.<br />
It is important to note that actual biophysical (micro-<br />
)states of human be<strong>in</strong>gs have (distributed) traces of earlier<br />
states <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>puts of one k<strong>in</strong>d or ano<strong>the</strong>r. This fact is not<br />
only relevant for many bodily properties, e.g., specific<br />
muscular features of sportsmen, but also for many mental<br />
properties, e.g., what one believes <strong>and</strong>, very important,<br />
how that is realized. More specifically, it is plausible to<br />
assume that <strong>the</strong> specific learn<strong>in</strong>g history of an <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />
has left its biophysical traces <strong>in</strong> such a way that <strong>the</strong><br />
biophysical realization of <strong>the</strong> same belief may be different<br />
between different people. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> precise<br />
biophysical realization of (psychologically) <strong>the</strong> same belief<br />
of one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same <strong>in</strong>dividual may change <strong>in</strong> time, with<br />
<strong>the</strong> consequence, for <strong>in</strong>stance, that <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong><br />
belief changes. The reason is that long-term learn<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
nowadays conceived not only as a matter of electrical <strong>and</strong><br />
chemical processes, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> between neurons, but also<br />
as a matter of morphological changes of <strong>the</strong> neurons<br />
(K<strong>and</strong>el et al., 2000; K<strong>and</strong>el, 2006).<br />
The (biophysical micro-)reduction ambition can now<br />
be stated more clearly. I dist<strong>in</strong>guish B(ody)-properties/concepts/-terms,<br />
such as weight, M(ental)-properties, such<br />
as hav<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> belief, <strong>and</strong> MB-properties, such as<br />
sexual arousal, without suppos<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> division is<br />
always clear. The potential ambiguity will turn out to be of<br />
no importance. I will talk about B-laws (-regularities/quasilaws)<br />
<strong>and</strong> M-laws, depend<strong>in</strong>g on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y relate only<br />
B-properties or only M-properties, respectively. However, it<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>s a matter of dispute whe<strong>the</strong>r (pure) M-laws exist at<br />
193