Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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assumptions. Loewer argues that notion of <strong>the</strong> natural law<br />
<strong>in</strong> scientific practice does not require <strong>the</strong> governist idea<br />
that laws have to govern events so it is right to ab<strong>and</strong>on<br />
governism. However, Balashov (2002) as a non-humean<br />
can also appeal to scientific practice <strong>in</strong> order to show that<br />
humean solutions are untenable. He argues that laws can<br />
be strongly supported by empirical evidence <strong>and</strong> have<br />
explanatory power only if <strong>the</strong>y are necessary. It is clear<br />
that what Balashov has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d is <strong>the</strong> concept of m<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
natural laws which can be discovered with <strong>the</strong><br />
help of our science.<br />
I th<strong>in</strong>k that without a sharp dist<strong>in</strong>ction between notions<br />
of natural laws <strong>and</strong> scientific laws, it is impossible to<br />
see <strong>the</strong> problem as clearly as we need. The concept of<br />
natural laws <strong>in</strong>volves universality, so “laws of nature without<br />
universality” is a contradiction while <strong>the</strong>re is no such a<br />
contradiction <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sentence that “<strong>the</strong> laws of <strong>the</strong>rmal expansion<br />
is not universal”. This can be demonstrated easily:<br />
if ΔL = k.L0 .ΔT were an universal truth it should be impossible<br />
to cite situations where <strong>the</strong> relation between L0, ΔT<br />
<strong>and</strong> ΔL falls, but <strong>the</strong>re is an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite number of provisos<br />
implicit <strong>in</strong> a statement like “without hammer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> heated<br />
iron rod <strong>in</strong>ward at one end ...”, so it is impossible to state a<br />
genu<strong>in</strong>e law-statement. Thus scientific laws cannot be<br />
universal, while implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> concept of natural laws we<br />
presuppose universality. scientific laws – at least most of<br />
<strong>the</strong>m – certa<strong>in</strong>ly fail to be<strong>in</strong>g equal to natural laws.<br />
A metaphysically moderate version of<br />
Humean Supervenience<br />
I am agnostic about <strong>the</strong> feasibility of metaphysical approaches<br />
so I will focus on <strong>the</strong> question of scientific laws<br />
<strong>in</strong>stead. As I said scientific laws – or at least lots of <strong>the</strong>m –<br />
fail to be universal. What more can we say about scientific<br />
laws? Earman <strong>and</strong> Roberts (2005) identify laws with<br />
ma<strong>the</strong>matical treatments of certa<strong>in</strong> problems. They wrote:<br />
“In modern physics (by which we mean, at least, physics<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce Newton), <strong>the</strong> typical form of a problem is that of solv<strong>in</strong>g<br />
a differential equation (or a system of such equations)<br />
subject to certa<strong>in</strong> boundary conditions, which typically<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>itial conditions.” (Earman & Roberts 2005, 13).<br />
The difference between nomic <strong>and</strong> non-nomic facts is<br />
merely a methodological one. We have to dist<strong>in</strong>guish<br />
boundary <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>itial conditions <strong>and</strong> equations while we try<br />
to solve a problem, but this difference is not ontological.<br />
This def<strong>in</strong>ition restricts <strong>the</strong> field of scientific laws to laws<br />
which can be formulated ma<strong>the</strong>matically. Thus if we hold<br />
this view as an appropriate account of scientific laws, we<br />
cannot count many of scientific generalizations as laws;<br />
e.g. laws of biology will be non-laws accord<strong>in</strong>g to this<br />
analysis. I do not th<strong>in</strong>k that this would be <strong>the</strong> right move.<br />
However, implicit <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> view presented by Earman <strong>and</strong><br />
Roberts (2005) <strong>the</strong>re is someth<strong>in</strong>g resembl<strong>in</strong>g to Hume's<br />
orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>sight, that nomic relations among events is not<br />
observable. They def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>the</strong> Humean base as follows: “The<br />
Humean base at a given world is <strong>the</strong> set of non-nomic<br />
facts at that world that can be <strong>the</strong> output of a reliable, spatiotemporally<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ite observation or measurment procedure.”<br />
(Earman & Roberts 2005,17).<br />
182<br />
A Metaphysically Moderate Version of Humean Supervenience — Szilárd Koczka<br />
Earman <strong>and</strong> Roberts suggest a modal<br />
characterization of HB. In <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong>ir analysis a fact<br />
belongs to <strong>the</strong> HB if <strong>and</strong> only if <strong>the</strong>re is a nomologically<br />
possible observaiton or measurement procedure to detect<br />
it. The explanation will be circular only if we <strong>in</strong>terpret<br />
nomological possibility as a m<strong>in</strong>d-<strong>and</strong>-<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>in</strong>dependent<br />
feature of our world. I prefer <strong>the</strong> alternative – ontologically<br />
less committed – <strong>in</strong>terpretation that someth<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
nomologically possible if it is compatible with our scientific<br />
laws. It is an epistemological characterization of<br />
nomological possibility <strong>and</strong> it has its own problems, but I<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k this is <strong>the</strong> best we can offer. There is a bit obscure<br />
notion with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition presented by Earman <strong>and</strong><br />
Roberts, namely reliability. To disperse this obscurity I<br />
def<strong>in</strong>e reliability as follows: An observation or<br />
measurement procedure can be reliable, if it is consistent<br />
with our already accepted <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>and</strong> all observable fact.<br />
In addition, reliability has a normative feature: what is <strong>and</strong><br />
what is not reliable depends on our current <strong>the</strong>ories. This<br />
normative feature can be understood with <strong>the</strong> help of<br />
Kuhn's (1996) term<strong>in</strong>ology. Even if it is <strong>in</strong>correct to talk<br />
about “Scientific revolution”, <strong>the</strong> core idea that scientific<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ards can change with paradigms seems plausible<br />
enough. Thus I ref<strong>in</strong>e my def<strong>in</strong>ition: A measurement<br />
process is reliable, if it is consistent with our already<br />
accepted <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>and</strong> directly observed facts, <strong>and</strong> it fits to<br />
our current scientific st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />
A moderate version of Humean supervenience as a<br />
m<strong>in</strong>imalist <strong>the</strong>ory states that we can develop predictable<br />
useful scientific laws as <strong>in</strong>ference rules that belongs to<br />
certa<strong>in</strong> models or systems. The models we develop are<br />
useful <strong>in</strong>struments of explanation <strong>and</strong> prediction, but we<br />
can never be <strong>in</strong> an epistemological position that enables<br />
us to declare that <strong>in</strong> scientific research we can discover <strong>the</strong><br />
m<strong>in</strong>d-<strong>and</strong>-<strong>the</strong>ory <strong>in</strong>dependent natural laws. We have an<br />
ability to perceive relevant patterns of non-nomic facts,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re by creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>strumentally useful models or systems,<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> very natural laws. The Humean Base<br />
consists of facts that we can acquire directly or with <strong>the</strong><br />
help of any reliable observational or measurement<br />
procedure. One can argue, that <strong>the</strong> moderate version of<br />
HS is not <strong>the</strong> same as that of Lewis elaborated, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />
obviously true. Why call this <strong>the</strong>sis Humean<br />
Supervenience after all? Lewis dedicated his <strong>the</strong>sis as “<strong>in</strong><br />
honor of <strong>the</strong> greater denier of necessary connection”(Lewis<br />
1986,ix), however it is possible to come up with a<br />
supervenience <strong>the</strong>sis about laws which can express<br />
Hume's orig<strong>in</strong>al – epistemological – motivations about<br />
nomic relations.