Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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D<strong>in</strong>g-Ontology of Aristotle vs. Sachverhalt-Ontology of<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
Serguei L. Katrechko, Moscow, Russia<br />
In <strong>the</strong> history of philosophy, we can dist<strong>in</strong>guish three<br />
possible types of ontology 1 . The first claims that <strong>the</strong> world<br />
‘is made up’ of th<strong>in</strong>gs that are considered its <strong>in</strong>itial<br />
elements. In <strong>the</strong> Antiquity, <strong>the</strong> ontology of th<strong>in</strong>gs tender<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to nom<strong>in</strong>alism was presented by Aristotle <strong>and</strong> Democritus,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir concepts, despite <strong>the</strong> differences, belong to <strong>the</strong><br />
same type of ontology. They differ only on a scale of<br />
‘th<strong>in</strong>g-ism’, <strong>the</strong> former postulat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> world consists of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>the</strong> latter consider<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> world is built up of<br />
atomic ‘bricks’, or particles, regarded as micro–th<strong>in</strong>gs, that,<br />
<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir term, make up ord<strong>in</strong>ary th<strong>in</strong>gs that we are used to.<br />
And it is <strong>the</strong> ontology of th<strong>in</strong>gs that has been an<br />
overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g ontology of contemporary natural science.<br />
The second <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> third types of ontology are<br />
based on predicate <strong>in</strong>terpretation of be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> postulate a<br />
non-object character of <strong>the</strong> world. If we take <strong>the</strong> classical<br />
approach to structure a sentence (resp. <strong>the</strong> world) as 'S is<br />
P’ <strong>the</strong> ontology of th<strong>in</strong>gs is accented on ’S is— ’, with ‘S is’<br />
represent<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>separably l<strong>in</strong>ked complex, <strong>and</strong> S — <strong>the</strong><br />
essence of <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g which acts as a substance for<br />
predicates of <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g (resp. grammatically S acts as <strong>the</strong><br />
subject of <strong>the</strong> sentence). Predicate ontology is <strong>the</strong> one of<br />
<strong>the</strong> ‘— is Pх’ type where ‘th<strong>in</strong>gs’ (resp. subjects of <strong>the</strong><br />
sentence) become secondary formations, <strong>and</strong> are<br />
determ<strong>in</strong>ed not by <strong>the</strong> essence but by <strong>the</strong>ir predicates.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, esse is be<strong>in</strong>g related here not with <strong>the</strong> subject<br />
but with <strong>the</strong> prior–predicate ‘is’ (resp. l<strong>in</strong>k–verb of <strong>the</strong><br />
sentence), <strong>and</strong> produces as transcendental condition for<br />
<strong>the</strong> rest ‘real’ predicates of <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g (P1, P2, P3…).<br />
We can also mark out two subtypes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> predicate<br />
ontology. The first one presents be<strong>in</strong>g as property (resp.<br />
unary P 1<br />
n predicate), with property <strong>in</strong>terpreted as ‘— is P 1<br />
n’<br />
<strong>in</strong>separably l<strong>in</strong>ked predicative complex. It is <strong>the</strong> property of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs that is considered prior <strong>in</strong> ontology while th<strong>in</strong>gs,<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g secondary, act as ‘<strong>in</strong>tersections’ of properties<br />
(bundle <strong>the</strong>ory of substance). For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> table is<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g that is made of wood, right–angled, yellow, <strong>and</strong><br />
used for writ<strong>in</strong>g. Here, someth<strong>in</strong>g is predeterm<strong>in</strong>ed by its<br />
properties (as unary predicates). Plato’s ontology has<br />
been <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> form<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> type so, this type of<br />
ontology can be named Platonic ontology. It’s possible to<br />
demonstrate that such <strong>in</strong>terpretation of Plato’s idealism<br />
does not sound like idealism at all. Priority of Plato’s ‘world<br />
of ideas’ might be understood as a mere acceptance of<br />
priority of properties (predicative complex ’is P 1<br />
n’) <strong>in</strong><br />
respect of th<strong>in</strong>g (S–subject). Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, similar concepts<br />
are more realistic as compared to both, Aristotelian<br />
ontology <strong>and</strong> natural ontology of contemporary natural<br />
science presum<strong>in</strong>g virtual existence of matter (as<br />
universal), for we experience not ‘disguised’ (latent)<br />
Aristotelian essence <strong>and</strong> not hypo<strong>the</strong>tic matter postulated<br />
by up-to-date physics (e.g. dark matter <strong>in</strong> astronomy) but<br />
1 The term ‘ontology’ will be used here <strong>in</strong> two related but a bit different mean<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>itial mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> word is concerned with <strong>the</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e (teach<strong>in</strong>g)<br />
of "be<strong>in</strong>g qua be<strong>in</strong>g" (Aristotle, metaphysica generalis). The second one<br />
studies how <strong>the</strong> universe is made up, i.e. what ontological commitments we<br />
accept (metaphysica specialis). Fur<strong>the</strong>r on, we’ll speak of concrete ontology<br />
(<strong>the</strong> second mean<strong>in</strong>g) which depends on <strong>the</strong> general underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of existence.<br />
real properties of objects that we can discover objectively,<br />
through perception or by means of <strong>in</strong>struments.<br />
It’s worth not<strong>in</strong>g, that Aristotelian <strong>and</strong> Platonic<br />
ontology do not reject but, ra<strong>the</strong>r, enrich each o<strong>the</strong>r. These<br />
are two different approaches to <strong>the</strong> world def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its<br />
diverse sections, <strong>and</strong> each of two has <strong>the</strong> right to be<br />
(similar to corpuscular wave dualism <strong>in</strong> physics). They<br />
produce two necessary (transcendental) conditions of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g of objects. The first one postulates <strong>the</strong> presence of<br />
s<strong>in</strong>gle self-identical essence as an <strong>in</strong>dispensable ‘sublayer’<br />
(sub–stance) for property of th<strong>in</strong>g, while <strong>the</strong> second one<br />
dictates <strong>the</strong> necessity ‘to partake’ th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> world of<br />
ideas which term<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>the</strong> possibility to take <strong>in</strong>to<br />
possession this or that set of properties.<br />
Explication of <strong>the</strong> second predicate ontology was<br />
made much later on. It <strong>in</strong>terprets be<strong>in</strong>g as relation (n–ary<br />
predicate P k<br />
n.), with Tractatus be<strong>in</strong>g one of its variations<br />
pronounc<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> world is <strong>the</strong> totality of facts, not of<br />
th<strong>in</strong>gs (prop. 1.1). Here, facts act as someth<strong>in</strong>g different<br />
from th<strong>in</strong>gs, as a sort of relation between th<strong>in</strong>gs or<br />
‘comb<strong>in</strong>ations of th<strong>in</strong>gs’ (prop. 2.01). Hence, under<br />
Tractatus, it is relation that is believed to be prior while<br />
object is def<strong>in</strong>ed through a set of relations it could become<br />
a constituent part of, <strong>and</strong>, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of that must be already written <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> object<br />
itself (prop. 2.011–2.0121).<br />
This proposition differs from Aristotelian ontology<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g essence prior to relation that may be added to<br />
it as r<strong>and</strong>om (accidental) characteristic: ‘that which is per<br />
se, i.e. substance, is prior <strong>in</strong> nature to <strong>the</strong> relative for <strong>the</strong><br />
latter is like an off-shoot <strong>and</strong> accident of be<strong>in</strong>g’ (Aristotle,<br />
Nicomachean Ethics, 1096а20; Boethius, On <strong>the</strong> Tr<strong>in</strong>ity,<br />
§ 5). Challeng<strong>in</strong>g such an underestimation of ‘relation’<br />
category Plato, <strong>in</strong> anticipation to Tractatus speculations,<br />
could have argued that ‘anyth<strong>in</strong>g which possesses any<br />
sort of power to affect ano<strong>the</strong>r, or to be affected by<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r… had real existence’ (Plato, Sophist, 247e), i.e.<br />
really exists only that which is able to <strong>in</strong>teract. Then, one<br />
more transcendental condition is be<strong>in</strong>g revealed, that is<br />
relations (<strong>in</strong>teractions) deprived of which not a th<strong>in</strong>g could<br />
exist (resp. esse acts here as grounds for any ‘real’<br />
relations) 2 . We can register th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>to ontology status of<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g provided that all three transcendental condition are<br />
observed.<br />
Thus, we can separate three types of ontology: <strong>the</strong><br />
ontology of th<strong>in</strong>gs, attributes <strong>and</strong> relations. Each of <strong>the</strong>m is<br />
correlated with a particular type of language. In <strong>the</strong><br />
ontology of th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> key structure belongs to <strong>the</strong> noun.<br />
Esse <strong>in</strong>terpreted as property, <strong>the</strong> key position goes to <strong>the</strong><br />
adjective. With esse conceived as relations, separate<br />
words (nours, verbs or adjective) give way to <strong>the</strong> whole<br />
sentence structure, express<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> facts of relationship<br />
between objects. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>the</strong> sentence ‘The stone is<br />
fall<strong>in</strong>g’ which purportedly postulates existence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> world<br />
of Aristotelian ‘<strong>in</strong>itial entities’ (here: stones) able to act, will<br />
2 To put it more precisely, had an object ever existed, s<strong>in</strong>ce it never becomes<br />
a constituent part of any relation, we couldn’t have learnt about it s<strong>in</strong>ce learn<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is also a relation between an object <strong>and</strong> a subject.<br />
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