Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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How Metaphors Alter <strong>the</strong> World-Picture – One Theme <strong>in</strong><br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s On Certa<strong>in</strong>ty<br />
Joose Järvenkylä, Tampere, F<strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong><br />
Metaphor is a topic that is not usually connected with<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s thought. He used many metaphors<br />
throughout his works but he never presented any <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. Of course it is said that his philosophical<br />
method does not consist of <strong>the</strong>oriz<strong>in</strong>g at all, <strong>and</strong> he<br />
explicitly said that “[<strong>in</strong> <strong>Philosophy</strong>] we may not advance<br />
any k<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>the</strong>ory” (PI, § 109). Yet it seems that later<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> had a positive account of metaphor which is<br />
connected to <strong>the</strong> idea that Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> used metaphors<br />
exactly to avoid <strong>the</strong>oriz<strong>in</strong>g. This view of metaphors is<br />
connected to what Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> writes on <strong>the</strong> worldpicture<br />
1 <strong>in</strong> On Certa<strong>in</strong>ty.<br />
In this paper I have tried to reconstruct what might<br />
be called Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s positive view of metaphor on On<br />
Certa<strong>in</strong>ty. In order to do so I have compared Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s<br />
remarks on <strong>the</strong> picture of <strong>the</strong> world with some elements of<br />
Donald Davidson’s <strong>the</strong>ory of metaphors. I believe that both<br />
philosophers would have agreed that metaphor has only<br />
literal mean<strong>in</strong>g. They would have also accepted that <strong>the</strong><br />
impact metaphor has on recipient does not belong <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
analysis of metaphor, But unlike Davidson, Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> is<br />
not <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> analysis. Instead he shows <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />
metaphors have by us<strong>in</strong>g metaphors himself. At first I will<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>e Davidson’s <strong>the</strong>ory of metaphor <strong>and</strong> later on I will<br />
conjo<strong>in</strong> it to views Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> had.<br />
1. Metaphor to Davidson <strong>and</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong><br />
In its most austere sense, “metaphor is a figure of speech,<br />
<strong>in</strong> which a word or phrase that literally denotes one th<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
used to denote ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>reby implicitly compar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
two th<strong>in</strong>gs” (Woltersdorff 1999, 562). From this it follows<br />
that metaphor has <strong>the</strong> propositional form because it states<br />
that someth<strong>in</strong>g is someth<strong>in</strong>g, but it lacks mean<strong>in</strong>g because<br />
it is impossible to apply conceptions of true or false to it.<br />
Hereby it is not an ord<strong>in</strong>ary bipolar proposition. It says that<br />
world is organized <strong>in</strong> particular way, but you cannot compare<br />
world <strong>and</strong> it <strong>in</strong> any eligible way.<br />
It is sometimes said that metaphor has its own<br />
peculiar mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> that only through this mean<strong>in</strong>g an<br />
acceptable <strong>in</strong>terpretation can be provided. Probably <strong>the</strong><br />
most prom<strong>in</strong>ent c<strong>and</strong>idate to challenge this view is Donald<br />
Davidson, whose polemic claim is that metaphor has only<br />
literal mean<strong>in</strong>g. Still metaphors might have an effect on us;<br />
<strong>the</strong>y can make us notice some aspects of th<strong>in</strong>gs we have<br />
not seen before. (cf. Davidson 1979, 43) Thus metaphors<br />
can affect on our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> world. This is an<br />
<strong>in</strong>sight Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> would have approved.<br />
While say<strong>in</strong>g that metaphor has only literal mean<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
Davidson’s <strong>in</strong>tention is to show that even if metaphors can<br />
make us grasp new <strong>in</strong>sights, <strong>the</strong>re is no such <strong>in</strong>sight<br />
connected to <strong>the</strong> content of metaphor. He s<strong>in</strong>gles out <strong>the</strong><br />
way metaphors are used from what <strong>the</strong>y mean, <strong>and</strong> claims<br />
that only latter is of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest of philosophy. (See<br />
Davidson 1979, 29-30)<br />
1 Anscombe <strong>and</strong> Paul translate Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s “Weltbild” <strong>in</strong>to “picture of <strong>the</strong><br />
world”, but to avoid confusions with o<strong>the</strong>r philosophical usage of <strong>the</strong> concept I<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r use world-picture.<br />
150<br />
Davidson’s views are near to Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s, but one<br />
clear difference rema<strong>in</strong>s. For Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>, ask<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g of metaphor is not as <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g as how <strong>the</strong>y are<br />
actually used. While Davidson seems to take<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s famous remark “[For a large class of cases]<br />
<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of a word is its use <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language” (PI, § 43)<br />
as a basis of his <strong>the</strong>ory of mean<strong>in</strong>g, I ra<strong>the</strong>r believe that<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> just wants us to grasp that <strong>in</strong>stead of ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />
what is <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of a word we just have to look how<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are actually used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> language. (See PI, § 130) For<br />
Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g a metaphor is precisely throw<strong>in</strong>g<br />
light <strong>in</strong>to those language-games where metaphors are<br />
used.<br />
For Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> proposition is a mean<strong>in</strong>gful<br />
sentence, someth<strong>in</strong>g which can be legitimately called to be<br />
true or false. Therefore metaphors, for one th<strong>in</strong>g, cannot<br />
be called propositions. Similarly <strong>the</strong>re are sentences that<br />
function only as a norm of description <strong>and</strong> whose use is<br />
not regulated by o<strong>the</strong>r sentences. These sentences are<br />
not bipolar so <strong>the</strong>y are not propositions <strong>in</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>ian<br />
sense. Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s famous metaphor states that <strong>the</strong>se<br />
sentences are like h<strong>in</strong>ges on which questions we raise <strong>and</strong><br />
our doubts depend on (OC 341).<br />
Now <strong>the</strong>re is a certa<strong>in</strong> analogy between <strong>the</strong>se<br />
h<strong>in</strong>ges <strong>and</strong> metaphor. They both look like propositions but<br />
lack a mean<strong>in</strong>g. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock says, stress<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> nonsensicality of h<strong>in</strong>ges, that <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>in</strong>effable but<br />
have a propositional doppelgänger which can be<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>gfully mediated <strong>in</strong>side language game. (Moyal-<br />
Sharrock 2005, 94-97)<br />
I would like to say that <strong>the</strong>re are similarities between<br />
h<strong>in</strong>ges <strong>and</strong> metaphors <strong>and</strong> sometimes metaphor can work<br />
as a h<strong>in</strong>ge or at least as its doppelgänger. The uttered<br />
metaphor is like doppelgänger of h<strong>in</strong>ge which has a<br />
propositional form but which does not refer on any fact on<br />
<strong>the</strong> world. But to fully underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> content of metaphor<br />
it must be <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> this process of<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretation those <strong>in</strong>effable h<strong>in</strong>ges taken to be certa<strong>in</strong><br />
may change.<br />
Avrum Stroll has said Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s late realization<br />
to be that by creat<strong>in</strong>g mental pictures metaphorical<br />
language can break with <strong>the</strong> logical model thus open<strong>in</strong>g<br />
important new dimensions of communication (Stroll 2004,<br />
23). Metaphors can replace one logical model on ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
<strong>in</strong> a sense that <strong>the</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ties are like axioms which<br />
regulate our use of language. By chang<strong>in</strong>g model new<br />
axioms arises. The metaphor creates mental picture which<br />
challenges earlier pictures we lean on <strong>and</strong> this is just <strong>the</strong><br />
sense how metaphors can enlarge our underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of<br />
<strong>the</strong> world.<br />
2. World-picture<br />
World <strong>and</strong> picture are constant <strong>the</strong>me <strong>in</strong> Wittgenste<strong>in</strong>’s<br />
philosophy. Early Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> said that language is <strong>the</strong><br />
picture of <strong>the</strong> world <strong>and</strong> later Wittgenste<strong>in</strong> rejected this<br />
idea as misguid<strong>in</strong>g. In his latest philosophy he realised that<br />
world as a picture is also illum<strong>in</strong>ative metaphor which can<br />
be used to illustrate how <strong>in</strong>sights are mediated <strong>in</strong> philoso-