Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences

e invoked in response to the question: why does this
lump constitute a statue? This can be done in virtue of the
fact that, necessarily, if a lump of clay is in statuefavourable
conditions it is a statue. These conditions are
such that they confer the status of statue on lumps of clay.
Thus, favourable conditions play an explanatory role in
relation to the instantiation of the constitution relation.
One condition that has to be added, then, is another
modal condition – one that states that in the relevant
favourable conditions a constituter necessarily constitutes
the constituted object (3). In order for it to do any work, this
has to be combined with the condition that the relevant
conditions actually obtain (4). (Whether or not this
condition is satisfied is a contingent matter. In spite of the
second modal condition, then, constitution as such is a
contingent relation.)
The constitution relation is usually taken to be
irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The first modal
condition accommodates the irreflexivity of the constitution
relation. This ‘possibility condition’ amounts to the claim
that, if conditions were not favourable the constituter would
not constitute the constituted object (the lump of clay can
exist without there being a statue). No object can have
such a relation to itself. Asymmetry can be captured by
adding ‘an impossibility condition’, a condition concerning
the impossibility of the existence of the constituted object
without a constituter (5): a (clay) statue cannot exist
without a lump of clay existing at the same time. Note,
however, that statues can also be made of other material
than clay including marble. Such multiple realizability can
be accommodated by specifying the property (properties)
that is (are) characteristic of the constituter in a sufficiently
general way. This could be a characterization in terms of a
disjunction, or in terms of properties that can be satisfied
by several kinds of objects.
Before commenting on transitivity, let me present
the account of constitution implicit in the preceding
discussion: 2
a constitutes b at t if and only if a is F and b is G
and (1) – (5) hold:
1. a and b coincide materially at t.
2. It is possible for a to exist in the absence of an x
that is G and materially coincides with a.
3. Necessarily, if an x that is F is in G-favourable
circumstances, there is a y that is G that coincides
materially with x.
4. a is in G-favourable circumstances at t.
5. It is impossible for b to exist in the absence of an
x that is F and materially coincides with b.
Conditions 1 and 5 account for the unifying character of
the constitution relation. Condition 2 reveals that the relation
is distinct from identity. Finally, conditions 3 and 4
explain why the one object constitutes the other.
2 This account owes a lot to Baker (1997, 2007). Let me comment on some of
the differences. First, I do not require F and G to be what Baker calls ‘primary
kind’ properties, which are properties that the relevant objects have essentially.
Second, I include the impossibility condition in order to account for the
asymmetry of the constitution relation. Baker (2007, 163-65) believes the
necessity condition ensures asymmetry. The idea is that there simply are no
favourable circumstances that account for constitution as a top-down relation.
Rather than appealing to a (supposed) metaphysical fact that is external to the
account, I build asymmetry explicitly into the definition of constitution. Third,
Baker has expanded on the coincidence condition so as to rule out that a
constituter might constitute two objects of the same kind. I do not include such
a condition, because one and the same collection of individuals can constitute
two different organizations. See note 3 for another difference.
The Constitution of Institutions — Frank Hindriks
How does this account apply to organizations? The
first two conditions imply that organizations coincide
materially with their members and that it is possible for
these individual members to exist without an organization
of type G existing that coincides materially with them. 3
What about the other conditions? How should we
conceive, for instance, of favourable conditions of
organizations? What does it take, for instance, for one or
more persons to form a limited liability company (LLC)?
The answer to this question can be found in the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 2006.
The central conditions are the formulation of an
operating agreement that regulates the relations between
the members (which they are ‘deemed to assent to’ as
soon as the company exists), and the drafting of a
certificate of state (which needs to be submitted to the
Secretary of State). Together these constitute what I call
‘the statute’ of a particular LLC. The act in which all this is
specified in very precise terms provides the means for a
non-circular specification of the relevant favourable
conditions (to which I henceforth refer as LLC-favourable
conditions). It is not possible for an LLC to exist without
these conditions being satisfied for a particular (collection
of) individual(s).
The satisfaction of favourable conditions accounts
for the persistence conditions of constituted objects, and
for their causal properties. A collection of individuals can
exist prior to the existence of the LLC they end up
constituting because at the time they did not yet constitute
it they were not in LLC-favourable conditions: they had not
yet formulated an operating agreement, or they had not yet
submitted a certificate of state to the Secretary of State.
Furthermore, it is only because of the LLC-favourable
conditions that their liability is limited. This has real
consequences in any lawsuits in which they might be held
accountable. The upshot is that the LLC-favourable
conditions account for the differences between an LLC and
its members.
Earlier it was noted that the constitution relation is
usually taken to be transitive. In section 1, I dismissed the
part-whole relation as inadequate for capturing the
membership relation because of its transitivity. This seems
to make it problematic for me to invoke another relation
that is transitive in order to characterize the relation
between organizations and their members. This
appearance is deceiving.
It is the aggregate of members that constitutes the
UN, not any of the members themselves, at least not
directly. As a consequence, it is somewhat misleading to
say that the relation between organizations and its
members is one of constitution. Instead, the relation
between an organization and the aggregate of its
members is one of constitution. This in turn implies that the
membership relation should not be cashed out in terms of
constitution, at least not directly.
Consider, for purposes of comparison, a case in
which an organization does consist of single-member
organizations. Suppose a chess player has to incorporate
him or herself in order to participate in a chess tournament,
which only admits single-member foundations. The chess
tournament is organized by a society created for this very
purpose that only has foundations as its members. In this
case, the people who constitute the foundations that
3 In fact, I believe that the condition of material coincidence is problematic for
organizations and their members. In my 2008 I argue it should be replaced by
an enactment condition.
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