Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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<strong>in</strong>tentional states requires functionally def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stead of someth<strong>in</strong>g else. For surely we need<br />
to be able to differentiate <strong>the</strong> contents of <strong>in</strong>tentional states<br />
<strong>in</strong> order to differentiate <strong>the</strong> states <strong>the</strong>mselves. And if a<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ition does not enable us to tell <strong>the</strong> difference between,<br />
say, believ<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>re is a cow <strong>in</strong> front of me <strong>and</strong> believ<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re is a horse <strong>in</strong> front of me, <strong>the</strong>n it is clearly not<br />
adequate to <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> concept of belief. Those<br />
who th<strong>in</strong>k that mental content does not depend on public<br />
language might object that considerations of word mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
do not apply to <strong>in</strong>tentional states. I believe that mental<br />
content does depend on public language. But even if it<br />
does not, <strong>in</strong> order to have reductive explanation, we need<br />
to be able to publicly refer to specific mental contents. So<br />
<strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between different mental contents needs to<br />
be done <strong>in</strong> public language. Thus similar considerations<br />
apply. So let us take a look at Kripke’s argument aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />
dispositional analyses of mean<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Kripke’s ma<strong>in</strong> argument aga<strong>in</strong>st dispositionalism is<br />
<strong>the</strong> normativity argument, which I will now lay out. In order<br />
to make it <strong>the</strong> case that I mean anyth<strong>in</strong>g by a word, <strong>the</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g-determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fact needs to make <strong>the</strong> difference<br />
between right <strong>and</strong> wrong uses of <strong>the</strong> word. It needs to<br />
justify my us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> word <strong>the</strong> way I use it (if I actually am<br />
us<strong>in</strong>g it correctly). But dispositions can not do this. If what I<br />
mean by a word was determ<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> way I am disposed<br />
to use it, <strong>the</strong>n whatever I say would be correct (Kripke<br />
1982, 24). I could not mistake a cow for a horse, for if I<br />
called a cow ‘horse’, <strong>the</strong>n that particular cow would, for<br />
that very reason, be <strong>in</strong>cluded among <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs I mean by<br />
‘horse’. So <strong>the</strong>re would be no dist<strong>in</strong>ction between us<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
word correctly, <strong>in</strong> accordance with its mean<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g it<br />
<strong>in</strong>correctly. From this it follows that <strong>the</strong>re would be no such<br />
th<strong>in</strong>g as mean<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g by a word.<br />
There are, of course, o<strong>the</strong>r c<strong>and</strong>idate solutions for<br />
<strong>the</strong> rule-follow<strong>in</strong>g problem, besides <strong>the</strong> Kripkean<br />
community view <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> simple dispositional view. The<br />
most promis<strong>in</strong>g such solutions will not, however, help <strong>the</strong><br />
case of reductionism, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong>y do not offer causalfunctional<br />
analyses of mean<strong>in</strong>g. I have <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d here<br />
primarily <strong>the</strong> accounts of Crisp<strong>in</strong> Wright <strong>and</strong> Philip Pettit,<br />
which are, <strong>in</strong> essence, versions of <strong>the</strong> community view<br />
(see Kusch 2006, ch. 7). The reductionist needs a solution<br />
close enough to <strong>the</strong> simple dispositional view to yield<br />
functional def<strong>in</strong>itions.<br />
The lesson to be learned from <strong>the</strong> normativity<br />
argument is this: Mean<strong>in</strong>g is normative. In order for a word<br />
to mean someth<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>the</strong>re must be correct <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>correct<br />
ways to use <strong>the</strong> word. Any functional def<strong>in</strong>ition of mean<strong>in</strong>g<br />
must ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> this dist<strong>in</strong>ction between correctness <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>correctness. Similarly, any functional def<strong>in</strong>ition of<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional states must ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between fit<br />
<strong>and</strong> misfit with actual states of affairs (<strong>in</strong> case of belief this<br />
amounts to <strong>the</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>ction between true <strong>and</strong> false beliefs,<br />
<strong>in</strong> case of desires, satisfied <strong>and</strong> not satisfied desires, <strong>and</strong><br />
so on). Next I will take a brief look at some causalfunctional<br />
analyses of <strong>in</strong>tentional states, <strong>and</strong> how <strong>the</strong><br />
normativity argument shows <strong>the</strong>m to be defective.<br />
3. Functional Analyses of Intentional States<br />
The first functional analysis I will consider is W.V.O.<br />
Qu<strong>in</strong>e’s behavioural semantics (Qu<strong>in</strong>e 1960). Qu<strong>in</strong>e, of<br />
course, <strong>in</strong>tended his analysis to be an analysis of <strong>the</strong><br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g of sentences, for he did not believe <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />
states (see Qu<strong>in</strong>e 1960, 221). It is, however, quite straightforward<br />
to extend <strong>the</strong> behavioural account also to mental<br />
content. Qu<strong>in</strong>e’s basic idea was that <strong>the</strong> (stimulus) mean-<br />
Rule-Follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Irreducibility of Intentional States — Antti Heik<strong>in</strong>heimo<br />
<strong>in</strong>g of a sentence is <strong>the</strong> set of stimuli, presented with which<br />
a language user would, if queried, affirm <strong>the</strong> sentence <strong>in</strong><br />
question (Qu<strong>in</strong>e 1960, 32). So it is natural to say that <strong>the</strong><br />
same set of stimuli constitutes <strong>the</strong> content of a belief of <strong>the</strong><br />
language user. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, that he/she believes <strong>the</strong><br />
sentence to be true. Functional def<strong>in</strong>itions of o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>tentional<br />
states along <strong>the</strong>se l<strong>in</strong>es may be more complicated,<br />
but it does not matter to my argument. If <strong>the</strong> behavioural<br />
account fails <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of belief, which is <strong>the</strong> simplest<br />
case, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is not much hope for it <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cases<br />
ei<strong>the</strong>r. Now it is easily seen that <strong>the</strong> normativity argument<br />
refutes <strong>the</strong> behavioural account. For <strong>the</strong> behavioural account<br />
is really noth<strong>in</strong>g more than <strong>the</strong> simple dispositional<br />
account already discussed. If whatever stimulus that<br />
prompts me to affirm a sentence is counted as partly determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> sentence, <strong>the</strong>n it is not possible<br />
for me to make a mistake by affirm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> sentence.<br />
So <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of belief, all my beliefs will be true, for <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
contents are determ<strong>in</strong>ed by whatever <strong>the</strong> facts happen to<br />
be when I express <strong>the</strong> beliefs. Qu<strong>in</strong>e, of course, tried to<br />
make room for mistakes, but even he had to acknowledge<br />
that from <strong>the</strong> behavioural account follow all k<strong>in</strong>ds of <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>acy<br />
<strong>in</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g, so that it would often have to be<br />
more or less arbitrarily decided whe<strong>the</strong>r someone is mistaken<br />
or uses a word <strong>in</strong> an unusual way.<br />
Ano<strong>the</strong>r possible source for functional def<strong>in</strong>itions is<br />
a sentences-<strong>in</strong>-<strong>the</strong>-head view. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to such a view,<br />
<strong>in</strong>tentional states are bra<strong>in</strong> states that somehow resemble<br />
public language sentences. The most important example<br />
of such a view is Jerry Fodor’s language of thought -<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>sis (Fodor 1976). There are at least two possible<br />
ways to conceive of sentences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> head. They could<br />
have content <strong>in</strong> virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir non-causal properties, such<br />
as some k<strong>in</strong>d of isomorphism with public language<br />
sentences. Or <strong>the</strong>y could have content <strong>in</strong> virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
role <strong>in</strong> controll<strong>in</strong>g behaviour. If content of bra<strong>in</strong> states is<br />
due to non-causal properties, this will not help <strong>the</strong><br />
reductionist, for <strong>the</strong> reductionist needs causal-functional<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itions. If, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, content is due to causal<br />
role <strong>in</strong> controll<strong>in</strong>g behaviour, <strong>the</strong> reductionist still faces <strong>the</strong><br />
problem of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tentional states <strong>in</strong> terms of<br />
behaviour. And as we just saw, because of <strong>the</strong> normativity<br />
condition, that problem seems hard to solve. So it seems<br />
that sentences <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> head will not be of much help to <strong>the</strong><br />
reductionist. This, of course, is not a problem for Fodor,<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce he is not a reductionist.<br />
Still ano<strong>the</strong>r reductionist <strong>the</strong>ory of mental content is<br />
teleosemantics, which purports to account for content <strong>in</strong><br />
terms of evolutionary selection history (see e.g. Millikan<br />
1984). But teleosemantics is a historical, not a causalfunctional<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory. This means that, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> teleosemantic<br />
view, content does not supervene on <strong>the</strong> totality of<br />
causally relevant facts about <strong>the</strong> present (see Dretske<br />
2006, 75). And this rules out <strong>the</strong> possibility of causalfunctional<br />
def<strong>in</strong>itions of <strong>in</strong>tentional states. So<br />
teleosemantics is not an option for a Kim-style reductionist.<br />
Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, teleosemantics does not aim at reduction<br />
through functional def<strong>in</strong>ition, but reduction through identity.<br />
4. Conclusion<br />
I hope my discussion this far to have shown that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
some a priori, philosophical grounds to doubt <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
of m<strong>in</strong>d-body reduction through functional def<strong>in</strong>ition. I<br />
believe, though limitations of space prevent me from<br />
elaborat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t, that similar considerations apply<br />
aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong>ory reduction – <strong>the</strong> view that a correct <strong>the</strong>ory of<br />
<strong>the</strong> mental could <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple be derived from an allencompass<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> physical – s<strong>in</strong>ce I see no o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
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