Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences
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Hard Naturalism <strong>and</strong> its Puzzles<br />
Renia Gasparatou, Patras, Greece<br />
1. Introduction<br />
Most analytic philosophers today would call <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />
naturalists. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to B. Stroud, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>imum commitment<br />
necessary is <strong>the</strong> exclusion of <strong>the</strong> supernatural from<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir philosophical system. (B. Stroud, 1996) And s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
today most philosophers seem unwill<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>clude any<br />
supernatural entities such as God or psyche <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir accounts<br />
of reality or <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, all could count as naturalists.<br />
Yet some forms of naturalism are harder that o<strong>the</strong>rs. (P.F.<br />
Strawson, 1985) The hardest probably be<strong>in</strong>g elim<strong>in</strong>ative<br />
naturalism suggest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ation of all mental language<br />
from our everyday vocabulary. This form of naturalism<br />
claims that scientific evolution will prove that mental<br />
terms are just pseudo-entities. I will argue that even<br />
though <strong>the</strong>y strongly depend on science, hard naturalists<br />
can hardly account for <strong>the</strong> evolution of science.<br />
2. Hard naturalism<br />
The term naturalism refers to <strong>the</strong> general view that everyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
is natural. What gives hard naturalism a more specific<br />
touch is how one conceives nature. Hard naturalists<br />
take natural to mean physical, material, scientifically expla<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
The claim that all is natural <strong>the</strong>n implies that all<br />
is to be studied by <strong>the</strong> methods of physical science.<br />
The question is what happens if someth<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong>s<br />
out aga<strong>in</strong>st physical explanation. The most worry<strong>in</strong>g<br />
example comes from consciousness: mental states resist a<br />
purely physical description. To use a crude example, it<br />
seems different to say “I am afraid of dogs” than say<br />
“see<strong>in</strong>g dogs produce adrenal<strong>in</strong> secretion <strong>in</strong> my bra<strong>in</strong>”.<br />
The two sentences have different mean<strong>in</strong>gs: They are<br />
used <strong>in</strong> different contexts to draw attention <strong>in</strong> different<br />
aspects of my experience. One important difference be<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that <strong>the</strong> former describes <strong>the</strong> way Ι feel, provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
phenomenology of <strong>the</strong> experience from <strong>the</strong> first person<br />
perspective, while <strong>the</strong> later is a neutral description form <strong>the</strong><br />
third person perspective.<br />
Now, accord<strong>in</strong>g to hard naturalists, such as P. M.<br />
Churchl<strong>and</strong>, propositions of <strong>the</strong> former type cannot be<br />
translated <strong>in</strong>to propositions of <strong>the</strong> later type just because<br />
<strong>the</strong> way we approach mental phenomena is already<br />
mediated by folk psychology. Folk psychology is,<br />
accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, an implicit <strong>the</strong>ory; a <strong>the</strong>ory which people<br />
use <strong>in</strong> order to underst<strong>and</strong>, expla<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> predict <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />
or o<strong>the</strong>r people’s psychological events <strong>and</strong> behaviour.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g folk psychology, we attribute desires, fears or<br />
beliefs <strong>in</strong> our attempt to expla<strong>in</strong> our behaviour.<br />
Propositional states, such as <strong>the</strong>se, are <strong>the</strong>oretical<br />
constructions <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore should be evaluated with<br />
reference to experience. Like all <strong>the</strong>oretical entities,<br />
desires <strong>and</strong> beliefs are open to revision <strong>and</strong> total<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ation, if proven false.<br />
Lots of o<strong>the</strong>r folk <strong>the</strong>ories have proved wrong <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
past: Folk astronomy claim<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> earth is <strong>the</strong> centre<br />
of <strong>the</strong> universe, or folk physics talk<strong>in</strong>g about phlogiston.<br />
Churchl<strong>and</strong> goes on argu<strong>in</strong>g that folk psychology is such a<br />
false <strong>the</strong>ory, “significantly worse [...] than [...] folk<br />
mechanics, folk biology <strong>and</strong> so forth” (Churchl<strong>and</strong>, 1989,<br />
p.231). He compares it with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of witches, demonic<br />
possession, exorcism <strong>and</strong> trail by ordeal: Demons <strong>and</strong><br />
witches just like desires <strong>and</strong> beliefs are <strong>the</strong>oretical entities.<br />
And just as we got rid of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of witches, we must<br />
now elim<strong>in</strong>ate folk psychology. Folk psychology is false<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce it resists physicalistic explanations. As Churchl<strong>and</strong><br />
writes:<br />
If we approach homo sapiens from <strong>the</strong> perspective<br />
of natural history <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> physical sciences, we can<br />
tell a coherent story of his constitution, development<br />
<strong>and</strong> behavioral capacities which encompasses particle<br />
physics, atomic <strong>and</strong> molecular <strong>the</strong>ory, organic<br />
chemistry, evolutionary <strong>the</strong>ory, biology, physiology,<br />
<strong>and</strong> materialistic neuro<strong>the</strong>ory. That story, though still<br />
radically <strong>in</strong>complete, is already extremely powerful...<br />
And it is deliberately <strong>and</strong> self consciously coherent<br />
with <strong>the</strong> rest of our develop<strong>in</strong>g world picture... But<br />
FP [folk psychology] is no part of this grow<strong>in</strong>g syn<strong>the</strong>sis.<br />
Its <strong>in</strong>tentional categories st<strong>and</strong> alone, without<br />
visible prospect of reduction to that larger corpus.<br />
(Churchl<strong>and</strong>, 1981, p.75.)<br />
Churchl<strong>and</strong> clearly aims for a unify<strong>in</strong>g physical <strong>the</strong>ory that<br />
can account for all <strong>the</strong>re is. Physical science is <strong>the</strong> best<br />
c<strong>and</strong>idate for such an account. In order to save its grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
syn<strong>the</strong>sis, <strong>the</strong>n, we should reduce all mental terms about<br />
desires, beliefs, fears etc <strong>in</strong> physical terms about bra<strong>in</strong><br />
activities. If this is not possible, we should elim<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>the</strong><br />
mental vocabulary from our ord<strong>in</strong>ary language altoge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
Neuroscience talk about bra<strong>in</strong> states is supposed to fill <strong>in</strong><br />
everyday vocabulary about mental states.<br />
It should be clear that when Churchl<strong>and</strong> asks for <strong>the</strong><br />
elim<strong>in</strong>ation of folk psychology, he asks for <strong>the</strong> abolition of a<br />
basic corpus of ord<strong>in</strong>ary dispositions <strong>and</strong> practices. Folk<br />
psychology refers to <strong>the</strong> way we all th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> talk about all<br />
k<strong>in</strong>ds of issues <strong>in</strong> our everyday life. It has to do with descriptions<br />
<strong>and</strong> concepts we all use everyday <strong>in</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary<br />
language. When we say that <strong>the</strong> world is round, for example,<br />
we express a belief, when we take an umbrella before<br />
we leave our house, we aga<strong>in</strong> reveal our belief that it may<br />
ra<strong>in</strong>. So, <strong>the</strong> implications of Churchl<strong>and</strong>’s views thus go<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r than his philosophy of m<strong>in</strong>d: Scientific explanations<br />
about <strong>the</strong> physical world are <strong>the</strong> only k<strong>in</strong>d of explanation<br />
he is will<strong>in</strong>g to admit.<br />
Physical science is <strong>the</strong> only explanatory pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.<br />
Consequently, all k<strong>in</strong>ds of problems people are struggl<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with (psychological, moral, aes<strong>the</strong>tic issues etc) should be<br />
translated <strong>in</strong>to scientific, materialistic, physical language. If<br />
this is not possible, <strong>the</strong>ir resistance is strong evidence that<br />
<strong>the</strong>y are pseudo-problems, which we should ab<strong>and</strong>on by<br />
elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g all relevant terms from our vocabulary. <strong>Philosophy</strong><br />
too is taken <strong>in</strong> as a branch of <strong>the</strong>oretical proto<br />
science that articulates hypo<strong>the</strong>ses for o<strong>the</strong>r sciences to<br />
test. (Churchl<strong>and</strong>, 1986) Churchl<strong>and</strong>’ s views <strong>the</strong>n suggest<br />
a very strong version of scientism: Physical science is <strong>the</strong><br />
norm by which <strong>the</strong> legitimacy of all quests, descriptions<br />
<strong>and</strong> explanations will be measured.<br />
3. Problems with hard naturalism<br />
The question is whe<strong>the</strong>r hard naturalism can provide an<br />
explanation of scientific evolution. Churchl<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>sists that<br />
all questions regard<strong>in</strong>g human consciousness, for example,<br />
will be resolved by physical science. His argument is<br />
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