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NSS officers helped establish control after incidents, helped wounded Nuer to hospital
and in another incident, released Nuer from a detention site.
The PG forces include a large pro-Kiir force – sometimes known as the “Luri Boys,” named
for the location of a training camp – of at least 1,000 young male Dinka cattle herders who
were recruited in 2012 and 2013, including by the former governor of Northern Bahr el
Ghazal State, Paul Malong. 33 According to SPLA officials the men were trained without the
official approval of SPLA leadership and specifically to shore up protection for President
Salva Kiir. Some Luri Boys, whom witnesses identified by their youth, rough and
unsophisticated approach to civilians and ability to speak only Dinka, may have
participated in attacks on Nuer civilians.
On April 24, 2014, Salva Kiir appointed Malong, who is from Salva Kiir’s Bahr el Ghazal
stronghold, as head of the army, and removed James Hoth Mai, a Nuer. Senior army
officials and many witnesses and victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch believe
Malong played a key role in securing the town for Salva Kiir during the Juba crisis, when the
worst abuses occurred. 34 While Malong was not officially in charge of security forces in the
SPLA, witnesses saw him in military uniform and in military vehicles in several locations in
Juba during the violence in December.
Arrests of Nuer men by government forces began around midnight on December 15. The
following morning Nuer homes in both of the two main areas where fighting took place –
including the Khor William and Lologo neighborhoods around the GHQ and the Manga,
Mangaten, New Site neighborhoods in the northwest of the town – were attacked by
government forces. It is possible that some of the attacks on houses were attempts by
government forces to find Nuer soldiers or armed civilians who had participated in the
fighting, some of whom may have taken off uniforms and hidden in houses. But the scale
and widespread nature of the attacks indicates that the government security crackdown
was targeted much more broadly against the Nuer community. Many of the attacks on
homes took place during and immediately after the fighting on December 16, but shootings,
33 President Kiir has claimed that the “Luri Boys” were a reserve force for the already-bloated army. Sudan Tribune, “South
Sudan President Admits Forming Private Army”, February 17, 2014. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49993
(accessed May 19, 2014)
34 Human Rights Watch independently received reports for example that Malong gave orders at the National Security Service
building during the crisis.
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