Untitled - International Commission of Jurists

property of Sinhalese persons domiciled in the North during the violence (though no
Sinhalese person lost his or her life). 220
However, despite a general condemnation of ‘unruly’ behaviour of the police, his
disposition to accept police versions of particular incidents solely on the basis that no
complaint had been made to the police, 221 and to dismiss eye-witness accounts of ‘a
reign of police terror’ during the 1977 communal violence, 222 raises unresolved
questions about the Sansoni Report.
In a few instances, specific police officials were named as originators of the violent
action as was the case in respect of the violence that took place in Anuradhapura
when a number of Tamil passengers in trains arriving at the station were assaulted and
some were killed. 223 A senior police officer, Superintendent of Police, Anuradhapura
G.W. Liyanage, was particularly implicated along with several of his subordinates. 224
In this instance, the unequivocal evidence that was placed on record by Sinhalese
government officers attached to the Railways Department confirming the culpability
of these police officers was a distinguishing factor.
Undoubtedly, the Sansoni Commission Report remains an important reference point
for the events of that period. However, the political context in which it was delivered
as well as the manner of its functioning are relevant issues for the purpose of this
analysis. There is no doubt that there was tremendous political pressure on
Commissioner Sansoni to avoid giving a prejudicial impression of the actions of the
Sinhalese political leadership in bringing about the outbreak of communal violence.
One commentary points to obstacles faced by the Commission in its functioning as
when the Police Information Books in Kandy were not furnished to it, purportedly on
grounds of national security, 225 and the Commission faced threats during its
sittings. 226 Unsurprisingly, these obstacles are not publicly recorded and were denied
in later years.
The interaction of the officers of the Attorney General’s Department with the
Commission was also not without controversy. At the inception, Deputy Solicitor
General G.P.S. de Silva (who became Sri Lanka’s Chief Justice on 14th October
1991) had been assisting the Commission, only later to withdraw.
Those who defend Sansoni point out that the Commission and Sansoni himself
were handicapped in many ways. The powerful team of Tamil lawyers led by
Sam Kadirgamar QC and P. Navaratnarajah QC who appeared at the
beginning of the sittings in Jaffna then dropped off, leaving the Tamil side
weak on cross examination. The State decided to intervene when it thought
stating that government buses were being set on fire and that crowds had gathered to attack incoming
passengers. Though a second message was sent fifteen minutes later, canceling the first message as a
false message, the damage had been done and communal attacks had started on Tamils in other parts of
the country.
220 The Sansoni Commission report, Sessional Paper No. VII, July 1980, at p. 100.
221 ibid, at p. 93.
222 ibid, at pp. 97 and 98.
223 ibid, at p. 145.
224 See later analysis for the impact of these findings in regard to prosecutions.
225 Hoole, Rajan, op. cit, at p. 35.
226 ibid, at p. 37.
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