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Untitled - International Commission of Jurists

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application <strong>of</strong> the doctrine <strong>of</strong> vicarious liability to hold <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> higher rank<br />

responsible for the actions <strong>of</strong> their subordinates who commit gross human rights<br />

abuses. 116 The responsibility and liability <strong>of</strong> these <strong>of</strong>ficers were declared not to be<br />

restricted to participation, authorization, complicity and/or knowledge. On the<br />

contrary, such <strong>of</strong>ficers were under a duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that<br />

persons held in custody were treated humanely and in accordance with the law. That<br />

included monitoring the activities <strong>of</strong> subordinates, particularly those who had contacts<br />

with detainees. While this liability was applied by the Court primarily to police<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficers and prisons <strong>of</strong>ficers, some decisions applied this rule to commanding <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />

in respect <strong>of</strong> detainees governed by emergency regulations.<br />

In Banda v. Gajanayake, 117 the Court considered a case in which several persons were<br />

detained under the Emergency Regulations and subsequently killed by a mob. The<br />

petitioner was one <strong>of</strong> the Officers-in-Charge. The Court accepted the principle that the<br />

inaction <strong>of</strong> the police constituted an illegal omission. In Deshapriya v. Weerakoon, 118<br />

the commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> a naval establishment was held liable for the torture <strong>of</strong> a<br />

person in custody even though there was no record <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s participation in the<br />

act <strong>of</strong> torture. These decisions provided a salutary expansion <strong>of</strong> the law from an<br />

earlier judgment <strong>of</strong> the Court in which a commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer in charge <strong>of</strong> an army<br />

camp where several children were imprisoned and tortured by his subordinates was<br />

declared not to have been responsible for any violation <strong>of</strong> human rights. His<br />

subsequent promotion had been deemed legal. 119<br />

Further, the implicit right to life recognised by the Court was expanded to an explicit<br />

recognition <strong>of</strong> the right not to be ‘disappeared.” 120 The fact that this latter<br />

development occurred in the context <strong>of</strong> an ordinary appeal from a dismissal by the<br />

Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal <strong>of</strong> a habeas corpus application 121 was particularly significant. In this<br />

instance, a father had complained that his sons had been involuntarily removed in<br />

1990 by soldiers attached to the Plantain Point Army camp. The dismissal in the<br />

Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal was on the basis that the petitioner had not succeeded in discharging<br />

the requisite burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> to establish that the army <strong>of</strong>ficer named as respondent in<br />

the petition had, in fact, been responsible for the abduction. The Supreme Court<br />

express right to life) an implied right logically stemmed from the constitutional right not to be punished<br />

with death or imprisonment except by court order (Article 13(4). Also (in the context <strong>of</strong> a habeas<br />

corpus application), these same principles were reiterated in Kanapathipillai Matchavallavan v. OIC,<br />

Army Camp, Plantain Point, Trincomalee and others S.C. Appeal No. 90/2003, S.C. (Spl) L.A. No.<br />

177/2003, SCM 31.03.2005, per judgment <strong>of</strong> Justice Shirani Bandaranayake.<br />

115 In Thavaneethan v Dissanayake, [2003] 1 Sri LR 75, (per Justice Mark Fernando) it was judicially<br />

opined that unlike regulations issued in terms <strong>of</strong> the PSO, regulations made under the PTA cannot be<br />

justified in restricting constitutional rights as they are not encompassed within the ambit <strong>of</strong> ‘regulations<br />

made under the law for the time being relating to public security’ as declared by Article 15(7) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Constitution which is the definitive constitutional article by which such restrictions can be imposed.<br />

116 Sanjeewa v. Suraweera [2003] 1 Sri LR 317; Sriyani Silva v. Iddamalgoda [ibid] and the Wewalage<br />

Rani Fernando case,[ibid].<br />

117 [2002] 1 Sri LR 365.<br />

118 [2003] 2 Sri LR 99.<br />

119 Liyanage v. de Silva [2000] 1 Sri LR 21.<br />

120 Kanapathipillai Matchavallavan v. OIC, Army Camp, Plantain Point, Trincomalee and others S.C.<br />

Appeal No. 90/2003, S.C. (Spl) L.A. No. 177/2003, SCM 31.03.2005.<br />

121 Generally, the writ remedy <strong>of</strong> habeas corpus available in the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal (and from 1987, in the<br />

Provincial High Courts) has proved to be an ineffective remedy primarily due to the extended delay in<br />

these cases being finally determined as would be discussed later.<br />

44

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