Untitled - International Commission of Jurists

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The violence reached a crescendo in the early 1980s when President Jayawardene won a further term at the presidential elections, and postponed general elections for six years through the holding of a referendum. The July riots in 1983 marked a watershed in the country’s political history; widespread international outrage was evoked when thousands of ordinary Tamils were killed in riots in which frontline ministers of the Jayawardene government were involved. Thirty-five Tamil prisoners and later, a further eighteen prisoners were butchered inside the Welikada prisons. President Jayawardene refrained from condemning this violence and later pushed through the 6 th Amendment, which outlawed separatism and resulted in the TULF members forfeiting their seats. The crackdown on legitimate political dissent increased; leftist parties and opposition papers were banned and presses sealed under the emergency regulations. The JVP, Nava Sam Samaja Party (NSSP) and the Ceylon Communist party were proscribed. Initiatives for ending the conflict, including the Thimpu peace talks, were doomed to failure. This period witnessed the LTTE’s massacre of one-hundred and fifty pilgrims and bystanders at Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist pilgrimage site in Anuradhapura; civilian massacres were to become a trademark of the LTTE thereafter. The advance of the Sri Lankan armed forces towards the North was halted at the intervention of the Indian Government, which engaged in its infamous ‘parippu’ (dhal) airdrop wherein essential supplies were parachuted by Indian planes to the Jaffna people. The Indo-Lanka Accord, bringing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the North, was signed on July 29,1987, leading to the 13 th Amendment being passed to Sri Lanka’s Constitution setting up Provincial Councils. Not long thereafter, the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, who signed the accord under protest, reneged on the agreement and launched a military offensive against the Indian troops. The JVP commenced its second insurrection in the South, purportedly in protest against the Indo-Lanka Accord. Government politicians, public servants and media persons working in the state sector were killed, intimidated or abducted by the JVP. Key UNP leaders were among those assassinated. With the PSO and the PTA in force during this period, government and paramilitary forces responded by engaging in a systematic practice of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture. Thousands of ordinary Sinhalese civilians were killed. Regulations were promulgated under the PSO permitting arbitrary arrest and detention either for preventive or investigative purposes, as well as to give authorized officers the authority to bury or cremate dead bodies. Lawyers such as Wijedasa Liyanaaratchi, Kanchana Abeypala and Charitha Lankapura were killed because of their direct involvement with the command structures of the JVP. Other lawyers were killed because they had engaged in the task of filing writs of habeas corpus in respect of disappeared persons. The extent to which the police service became militarized was unprecedented. Presidential elections in late 1988 resulted in a new leader of the UNP, Ranasinghe Premadasa, taking over from President Jayawardene. The presidency was to be held by the UNP from 1978 to 1994. The subsequent general elections of February 1989 ensured the continuing parliamentary authority of the UNP, which held the Prime Minister’s position from 25
1977 to 1994. Violence continued unabated following elections in all parts of the country, with dissenters such as journalist and human rights activist, Richard de Zoysa, being extra-judicially executed. 36 During this period, the LTTE engaged in heightened assassinations of dissenters in the North, including Jaffna academic Rajini Thiranagama and EPRLF MP Sam Thambimuttu as well as senior TULF parliamentarians who were once known as the gurus of the LTTE such as A. Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran. From this point on, the LTTE conducted systematic assassinations of members of rival Tamil militant groups. The Indian peacekeepers were sent out of the country by President R. Premadasa, who attempted to begin peace talks with the LTTE. However, the LTTE intensified its fight against government troops and rival Tamil parties. Hundreds of police officers who had surrendered to the LTTE on 10 June,1990 were massacred. One hundred and forty Muslim civilians were killed during prayers at the Kattankudi mosque on 3 August,1990. The LTTE killed Muslims in other areas and displaced thousands of Muslim villagers from the North. The war then resumed, with both sides committing mass killings. The Sri Lankan Army killed sixty-seven civilians at Kokkadicholai district on 12 June,1991. 37 The LTTE embarking on a string of high profile assassinations including Sri Lanka’s Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, India’s former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Major General (posthumously promoted to Lt. General) Denzil Kobbekaduwa. Assassinations of former Minister of National Security Lalith Athulathmudali on 23 April,1993, and President R. Premadasa on 1 May, 1993 followed. While widely attributed to the LTTE, conspiracy theories abounded of motives being linked to internal party rivalries. The assassination of one of the few remaining senior UNP leaders, Gamini Dissanayaka, then a Presidential election candidate, along with several other senior UNP politicians in 1994, indicated the LTTE’s intention to kill members of the Southern Sinhala political leadership. In 1994, a fresh promise of peace was ushered in with the election of Chandrika Kumaratunge. Contesting from the Peoples’ Alliance, comprising the SLFP as well as a number of other coalition partners, Kumaratunge’s election victory was supported by the majority community as well as the ethnic minorities. After the election, a ceasefire was declared and peace talks began. However, the negotiations broke down and war was resumed by the LTTE with its strategy of striking at civilian targets, including Colombo’s Central Bank. Four years later, the LTTE carried out a blast at the Maradana train station in central Colombo killing hundreds of civilians, and, in a widely condemned attack, targeted the holiest Buddhist shrine known as the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. Government forces retaliated with large-scale military operations, resulting once again in killings and enforced disappearances of Tamils in operational areas. Emergency regulations under the PSO and the PTA were invoked. In 1996, 622 36 ibid. 37 see later analysis of the relevant findings of the Kokkadicholai Commission of Inquiry and critique of the action taken on the findings. 26
Page 2 and 3: In exploring what constitutes a ver
Page 4 and 5: 3
Page 6 and 7: ABBREVIATIONS AC AG AHRC AI A-L ALR
Page 8 and 9: TAB TELO TUF TULF TYL UN UNHRC UNP
Page 10 and 11: government agencies may be unable o
Page 12 and 13: appointed under the Commissions of
Page 14 and 15: communities. Krishanthi Kumaraswamy
Page 16 and 17: investigative function that could m
Page 18 and 19: measures recommended in regard to r
Page 20 and 21: and Bandaranaike became the prime m
Page 22 and 23: assembly and association of trade u
Page 24 and 25: majority pro-Sinhala political lead
Page 28 and 29: enforced disappearances were report
Page 30 and 31: The Court of Appeal dismissed petit
Page 32 and 33: process and commissions of inquiry
Page 34 and 35: Declaration on Upholding Human Righ
Page 36 and 37: terms, 66 and clear guidelines laid
Page 38 and 39: Though the drafters of second Repub
Page 40 and 41: • Perera v. AG 89 and Wickremeban
Page 42 and 43: was also spared the distinction of
Page 44 and 45: The Court’s reasoning at times ap
Page 46 and 47: however, linked the habeas corpus a
Page 48 and 49: The ineffectiveness of the writ rem
Page 50 and 51: The Court of Appeal when sending th
Page 52 and 53: anything. We have received informat
Page 54 and 55: the findings of guilt against the a
Page 56 and 57: The Embilipitiya case is unique in
Page 58 and 59: police did not carry out the arrest
Page 60 and 61: sexual intercourse […].” 177 He
Page 62 and 63: accused even though the relevant do
Page 64 and 65: confession made to the military pol
Page 66 and 67: Chapter Three - Commissions of Inqu
Page 68 and 69: excesses that had preceded the acti
Page 70 and 71: property of Sinhalese persons domic
Page 72 and 73: appear before the Commission was al
Page 74 and 75: Notwithstanding these consideration
Page 76 and 77:
The Commission’s recommendation t
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Date of Publication of Report: not
Page 80 and 81:
(f) the measures necessary to preve
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were SLFPers. I was told, that area
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The 1994 Western, Southern and Saba
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focused on allowing within its purv
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3.1.3. Reflections on the Procedure
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However, the weak process of re-ref
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ouster) clause ruling out judicial
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(g) The relief if any that should b
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Interdiction from service of allege
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The Batalanda Commission recommende
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3.3.3. The Bindunuwewa Commission D
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ecommendation to this effect by the
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As of 31 December 2000, according t
Page 106 and 107:
much affected by the awareness that
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Chapter Four - Evaluating Sri Lanka
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pattern of harms, to recommend meas
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justified and spelled out in the ma
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against any particular soldier or s
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analysis, these pillars of the judi
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competence. Their findings must be
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Regardless of the amendment however
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It was recorded by at least some of
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6.4. Affording alleged perpetrators
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Chapter Five - Sri Lanka’s Crimin
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to the attention of the Court in an
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2.1. First Information Reports In a
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arrests. In consequence, most of th
Page 134 and 135:
Lengthy delays in filing indictment
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officers who were prepared not only
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prosecutor’s office would be to i
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y the byzantine and unfair burdens
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[…] while those in authority hold
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5.2. Language Issues at Trial Stage
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enforced disappearance; (ii) Exerci
Page 148 and 149:
as to why specific reform of the cr
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6.3. Absence of a Specific Crime of
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camp. Scrutiny of the evidence in t
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any direct or indirect physical or
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have been adjourned by the relevant
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fact, acknowledged. 563 The accused
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The Human Rights Committee affirmed
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Thavaneethan v. Dissanayake [2003]
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Dias v. Abeywardene [1966] 68 NLR 4
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Vadivel Sathasivam and Parathesi Sa
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Criminal Courts Commission, Session
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Keenan, Alan, ‘Making Sense of Bi
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Principles on the Effective Prevent
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United Nations Human Rights Committ
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Pinto-Jayawardena, Kishali, ‘Furt
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