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and Bandaranaike became the prime minister. The Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 made Sinhala the sole medium of state affairs. 13 Though the other main political party, the United National Party, had first articulated its support for parity of languages rather than a ‘Sinhala-Only’ policy, it changed its stance after its resounding defeat to the SLFP in the 1956 elections. The Federal Party opposed the ‘Sinhala-Only’ policy of the SLFP and staged a ‘Gandhian’ style non-violent protest at Galle Face Green. However, the protestors were attacked by mobs while the police made no effort to stop them, giving rise to heightened apprehensions by the Tamil minority community that they were being steadily marginalized. The Federal Party resorted to continued protest measures, such as the commencement of Tamil medium schools in the North in opposition to the use of the Sinhala language as a medium of instruction. In an attempt to make amends for the past and also quell the rising tide of communal violence, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike entered into the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B- C) Pact of July 1957 securing the use of the Tamil language as a national minority language and devolving power to regional councils. This sparked massive protests, led in some quarters by the UNP, which had by this time abandoned its earlier stance on parity of languages and was using the B-C Pact as a political weapon to stir up protest against Bandaranaike. Communal riots again took place leading to deaths of Tamils and destruction of their property. The B-C Pact was unilaterally abrogated. Bandaranaike, however, passed the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958, which allowed for the Tamil language to be used for ‘prescribed administrative purposes’ in the North and East without prejudice to Sinhala being the official language and, hence, the language of administration. 14 The Tamil language was declared to be the medium of instruction for students educated in Tamil as well as in public service entrance exams. Administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces was allowed to be conducted in Tamil. 15 Regulations were stipulated to be made for that purpose. 16 In 1959, a Buddhist monk and former supporter assassinated S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. The perpetrator had criticized Bandaranaike’s attempts to push through a political compromise to meet the Tamil demands. The nature and circumstances surrounding the assassination were investigated by the first major commission of inquiry to be appointed under the COI Act of 1948 in respect of an assassination of a political leader. 17 Following, a period of political turmoil consequent to the assassination, S.W.R.D’s widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, assumed power as Prime Minister in the 1960 elections. Thereafter, while the ‘Sinhala-Only’ policy was implemented, the Tamil 13 The Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956 declared by Section 2 that "the Sinhala language shall be the one official language of Ceylon." 14 Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of No. 28 of 1958, Section 5. 15 ibid, Sections 2(1), 2(2), 3 and 4. 16 ibid, Section 6(1). 17 The report of this Commission is not analysed in this report as it relates to a single act of assassination as differentiated from a commission of inquiry into widespread human rights violations. 19
Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958 was bypassed. Regulations under this statute were delayed when their legal validity was contested. 18 In protest, the Federal Party embarked on its ‘satyagraha’ (peaceful protest) campaign that brought the administration of government affairs in the North-East to a halt. The government then declared a state of emergency under the PSO. The purported reason for the declaration was that the activities of the Federal Party and the Satyagraha campaign had resulted in the breaking down of essential services in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, including obstruction to the distribution of the rice ration and delays in the payment of salaries and allowances. A number of Tamil leaders were detained on security grounds pursuant to the emergency regulations. Amidst the uproar that followed, Tamil politicians openly articulated secessionist demands. This period saw the government using emergency powers to an extent far beyond their original rationale; thus, even after the Federal Party leaders were released and the Government had controlled this situation by the end of 1961, emergency rule continued into the beginning of 1962. The continuation of emergency was declared necessary to address the wave of strikes and civil disturbances incited by leftist and trade union leaders. At the start of 1962, the Government began to censor press publication of information concerning the strikes. The aborted coup of 27 January, 1962 – an attempt to overthrow the Bandaranaike government by senior army and police officials – took place in this context. The conspirators were arrested, detained and investigated under PSO emergency regulations and later under the Criminal Justice (Special Provisions) Act, No. 1 of 1962 and Act No. 31 of 1962. 19 In 1965, the UNP returned to power and signed the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, with the political objective of obtaining the assistance of the Federal Party. The Pact paved the way for the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1966 20 and the establishing of district councils. When this Pact, too, was abandoned, the Federal Party left the government. The UNP was overthrown in 1970 by an SLFP led coalition of leftist parties led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. A Constituent Assembly was formed to draft a new Constitution, but a number of Tamil parliamentarians walked out on the basis that their demands for parity of status for languages were not being heeded and that the draft Constitution did not contain any provision, similar to Section 29(2) of the Independence Constitution, aimed at the protection of minorities. The first armed insurrection by the radical leftist Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (People's Liberation Front - JVP) took place in the South in 1971, based largely on the economic marginalisation of Sinhala rural youth. A state of emergency was declared and the provisions of the PSO were brought into force with full effect. The right to conduct public meetings was restricted, press censorship was imposed and rights to 18 Sansoni Commission report, Sessional Paper VII, July 1980, at p. 72. 19 Enacted to try the alleged conspirators, these were determined, as ex post facto laws, to be ultra vires by the Privy Council in Liyanage and others v. the Queen [1965] 68 NLR 265. 20 These Regulations were more satisfactory than the provisions in the 1958 Act in that the Tamil language was allowed to become the language of administration in the North and East rather than the far more limited stipulation that the 1958 Act permitted, of being used only for ‘prescribed administrative purposes.’ 20
Page 2 and 3: In exploring what constitutes a ver
Page 4 and 5: 3
Page 6 and 7: ABBREVIATIONS AC AG AHRC AI A-L ALR
Page 8 and 9: TAB TELO TUF TULF TYL UN UNHRC UNP
Page 10 and 11: government agencies may be unable o
Page 12 and 13: appointed under the Commissions of
Page 14 and 15: communities. Krishanthi Kumaraswamy
Page 16 and 17: investigative function that could m
Page 18 and 19: measures recommended in regard to r
Page 22 and 23: assembly and association of trade u
Page 24 and 25: majority pro-Sinhala political lead
Page 26 and 27: The violence reached a crescendo in
Page 28 and 29: enforced disappearances were report
Page 30 and 31: The Court of Appeal dismissed petit
Page 32 and 33: process and commissions of inquiry
Page 34 and 35: Declaration on Upholding Human Righ
Page 36 and 37: terms, 66 and clear guidelines laid
Page 38 and 39: Though the drafters of second Repub
Page 40 and 41: • Perera v. AG 89 and Wickremeban
Page 42 and 43: was also spared the distinction of
Page 44 and 45: The Court’s reasoning at times ap
Page 46 and 47: however, linked the habeas corpus a
Page 48 and 49: The ineffectiveness of the writ rem
Page 50 and 51: The Court of Appeal when sending th
Page 52 and 53: anything. We have received informat
Page 54 and 55: the findings of guilt against the a
Page 56 and 57: The Embilipitiya case is unique in
Page 58 and 59: police did not carry out the arrest
Page 60 and 61: sexual intercourse […].” 177 He
Page 62 and 63: accused even though the relevant do
Page 64 and 65: confession made to the military pol
Page 66 and 67: Chapter Three - Commissions of Inqu
Page 68 and 69: excesses that had preceded the acti
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property of Sinhalese persons domic
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appear before the Commission was al
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Notwithstanding these consideration
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The Commission’s recommendation t
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Date of Publication of Report: not
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(f) the measures necessary to preve
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were SLFPers. I was told, that area
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The 1994 Western, Southern and Saba
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focused on allowing within its purv
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3.1.3. Reflections on the Procedure
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However, the weak process of re-ref
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ouster) clause ruling out judicial
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(g) The relief if any that should b
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Interdiction from service of allege
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The Batalanda Commission recommende
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3.3.3. The Bindunuwewa Commission D
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ecommendation to this effect by the
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As of 31 December 2000, according t
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much affected by the awareness that
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Chapter Four - Evaluating Sri Lanka
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pattern of harms, to recommend meas
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justified and spelled out in the ma
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against any particular soldier or s
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analysis, these pillars of the judi
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competence. Their findings must be
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Regardless of the amendment however
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It was recorded by at least some of
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6.4. Affording alleged perpetrators
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Chapter Five - Sri Lanka’s Crimin
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to the attention of the Court in an
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2.1. First Information Reports In a
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arrests. In consequence, most of th
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Lengthy delays in filing indictment
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officers who were prepared not only
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prosecutor’s office would be to i
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y the byzantine and unfair burdens
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[…] while those in authority hold
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5.2. Language Issues at Trial Stage
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enforced disappearance; (ii) Exerci
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as to why specific reform of the cr
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6.3. Absence of a Specific Crime of
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camp. Scrutiny of the evidence in t
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any direct or indirect physical or
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have been adjourned by the relevant
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fact, acknowledged. 563 The accused
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The Human Rights Committee affirmed
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Thavaneethan v. Dissanayake [2003]
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Dias v. Abeywardene [1966] 68 NLR 4
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Vadivel Sathasivam and Parathesi Sa
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Criminal Courts Commission, Session
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Keenan, Alan, ‘Making Sense of Bi
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Principles on the Effective Prevent
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United Nations Human Rights Committ
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Pinto-Jayawardena, Kishali, ‘Furt
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