Family Law Section - Boston Bar Association

Spring 2011 

Family Law Section 

Spring 2011 Newsletter 

a publication of the boston bar association family law section 

Spring 2011 1

Family Law Section Co-chairs 

Frances M. Giordano 

Rubin and Rudman, LLP 

fgiordano@ rubinrudman.com 

Kelly A. Leighton 

Barnes and Leighton 

kelly.a.leighton@gmail.com 

Inside this Issue 

Page 3 

Recent Case Law Summaries 

By Theresa B. Ramos, Esq., Kristine Ann Cummings, Esq., and 

Melinda Markvan, Esq. 

Page 10 

Page 13 

Page 16 

Page 18 

Page 21 

Page 22 

Page 23 

Page 24 

Page 27 

Rule 1:28 Decision Case Summaries 

By Rosanne Klovee, Esq. 

The Sexual Fidelity Clause 

By Kevin M. Corr, Esq. 

Mediation and the Uneducated Consumer 

By Wendy O. Hickey, Esq. 

Family Law Project Empowers Domestic Violence Victims and Provides 

New and Seasoned Attorneys the Opportunity to Engage in Meaningful 

Pro- Bono Service 

By Rachel Biscardi, Esq. 

Gaining Experience Through Giving Back 

By Alexis B. Kaplan, Esq. 

Upcoming Events and Resources 

Editors 

Contributors 

Section Leadership 

Spring 2011

Recent Case Law Summaries 

By Theresa B. Ramos, Esq., Kristine Ann Cummings, Esq., and Melinda Markvan, Esq. 

Hiba CHARARA v. Said YATIM 

Decided November 23, 2010 

78 Mass.App.Ct. 325 (2010) 

The parties in this case are Lebanese citizens and 

Shia Muslims. The husband attended college in 

Massachusetts and earned an undergraduate degree 

in electrical engineering. The husband became 

a U.S. citizen in 1992. The parties were married in 

an Islamic religious ceremony on June 20, 1995, in 

Lebanon. Shortly after the ceremony, the husband 

returned to Massachusetts and the wife joined him 

in May, 1996. The parties’ two sons were both born 

in the Commonwealth (in 1998 and 2002, respectively), 

and are U.S. citizens. The wife became a 

naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. 

In 2004, the husband became disabled from employment, 

and the parties began talks of divorce. 

The trial judge found that the parties’ irretrievable 

breakdown of the marriage occurred and 2004, and 

that they agreed to return to Lebanon to obtain a 

religious divorce and the Wife would have custody of 

the children. Before leaving the Commonwealth, the 

parties sold the marital home and shared equally 

the sale proceeds. On May 24, 2004, the parties 

and their children left Massachusetts and returned 

to Lebanon. Once in Lebanon, the wife and children 

resided with her parents, and the husband 

resided with his parents. However, upon returning 

to Lebanon, the husband refused to obtain a religious 

divorce or give the wife custody of their two 

minor sons. On June 23, 2004, the husband filed 

an action in the Jaafarite Court in Lebanon. On July 

5, 2004, the husband also filed a guardianship to 

obtain custody of the parties’ two sons. He obtained 

an order that awarded custody of the children to the 

father and a travel ban was imposed on the mother 

and the children from traveling outside of Lebanon. 

The wife’s Lebanese attorneys advised her that after 

her sons reached the age of two (2) she would not 

obtain custody of her children without the consent 

of the husband as this was the law of the Jaafarite 

Court. The mother agreed to a visitation schedule. 

On November 14, 2005, the Jaafarite Court issued 

a permanent order awarding sole legal and physical 

custody of the parties’ children (aged 7 and 3 

years old at the time) to the father. There was no 

divorce proceeding initiated in the Jaafarite Court. 

In 2005, the mother’s travel ban was lifted and 

she returned to Massachusetts. She filed a 

complaint for divorce on April 5, 2007. The parties 

were issued a judgment of divorce nisi on October 

1, 2008. After a two-day trial, the parties’ judgment 

granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of 

irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, a division 

of marital property, awarded legal and physical 

custody of the children to the wife with visitation 

to the husband and the husband was ordered to 

pay $184/week in child support. The husband 

appealed on the issues of custody and the child 

support order. The judgment was affirmed. 

The husband makes claim that the trial judge 

erred by failing to give deference to the Jaafarite 

Court’s decree pertaining to the custody of the 

parties’ sons. Before giving deference to a foreign 

order regarding custody, the probate judge must 

determine 1) whether Massachusetts has jurisdiction 

pursuant to G.L. c. 209B, § 2; and 2) whether 

the foreign order is in “substantial conformity” of 

Massachusetts laws. G.L. c. 209B, § 14. 

Pursuant the G.L. c. 209B, § 2, “no other state 

is the home state” of the child unless the child 

has resided in that state for at least six consecutive 

months “immediately preceding the date of 

commencement of the custody proceeding.” According 

to G.L. c. 209B, § 2 , the trial judge found 

that Lebanon was not the “home state” of the 

children because they had not resided in Lebanon 

for at least six months prior to the father initiating 

custody actions on the Jaafarite Court. Six months 

had not yet passed because the parties left Massachusetts 

on May 30, 2004, and the Husband 

filed custody proceedings in Lebanon on July 5, 

Spring 2011

Recent Case Law Summaries By Theresa B. Ramos, Esq., Kristine Ann Cummings, Esq., and Melinda Markvan Esq. 

2004. Thus, the probate judge could exercise 

jurisdiction and make a determination regarding 

the custody of the children because they were in 

Lebanon for less than six months and no other 

state had jurisdiction. 

The “substantial conformity” test has three parts: 

“whether the foreign court (1) had jurisdiction 

over the parties and the subject matter; (2) applied 

procedural and substantive law reasonably 

comparable to ours; and (3) based its order on 

the “best interests of the child.” Based on the 

evidence presented at trial the trial judge found 

that in Lebanon custody of male children over the 

age of two is awarded to the husband unless the 

husband is a criminal or will not or cannot care 

for the children. The parents are not evaluated 

equally when making a determination of the best 

interests of the child and which parent shall have 

physical custody. 

The “best interests of the child” is the standard 

applied to custody disputes in Massachusetts. 

The “best interests of the child” standard is 

fact-specific, focused on the needs of each child 

and gender-neutral. The Massachusetts case 

law is extensive and identifies many factors that 

have been considered by the courts in making 

a determination of what is in the “best interests 

of the child.” The trial judge found that under 

Lebanese law it was in the “best interests of the 

child” that the custody of male children over the 

age of two should be with the husband unless it 

was proven that the husband was a criminal or 

unable to take care of the child. The trial judge 

appropriately used his discretion by not giving 

deference to the Jaafarite Court custody decree 

because the ‘best interest of the child’ standard 

was not in “substantial conformity” with the laws 

of the Commonwealth. 

The husband also challenges the trial judge’s 

finding that the wife was under duress when she 

entered into the custody agreement with the husband 

in Lebanon. The husband claims that the 

wife had alternatives available to her that she did 

not pursue. The trial judge found that the mother 

could not obtain custody of her children under 

Lebanese law and only agreed to the custody 

arrangement with the husband to make sure she 

had visitation with her children. 

With respect to the issue of child support, it was 

a scrivener’s error that the husband pay the wife 

$1,840.00/week. It was the trial judge’s intention 

to order the husband to pay the wife $184/ 

week in child support. The findings stated that 

the wife’s annual income was “approximately 

$60,000 per year” was a harmless error because 

the Child Support Guidelines and the wife’s financial 

statement both reflected the wife’s income 

as being “$45,284.20” per year and evidence 

presented at trial supported same, and the 

support order was based on the Wife’s reported 

income of $45,284.20. 

Stephen D. SMITH, Jr. v. Danielle 

MCDONALD 

Decided December 14, 2010 

458 Mass. 540 (2010) 

This case examines the issue of the removal 

and custody of a child to unmarried parents. 

The child was born on August 29, 2007, and 

father paid voluntary child support and had 

supervised visits (by the mother) with the child 

a few hours every week. By February 2008, 

the father’s visitation deteriorated and when he 

discovered that he was not named on the child’s 

birth certificate he filed a complaint to establish 

paternity on February 21, 2008. On February 

27, 2008, the father visited with the child and 

informed the mother of his complaint on March 

1, 2008. However, the mother had vacated her 

apartment on February 28, 2008, and moved to 

Batavia, New York on March 1, 2008. The father 

because aware of the mother and child’s move 

when he had attempted service of his complaint 

at the mother’s apartment a few days later. The 

child was six months old at the time of the move. 

The father obtained an ex parte temporary 

order for the mother and child to return to 

Massachusetts, which was stayed pending trial. 

Prior to a trial in July 2008, the parties entered 

Spring 2011

Recent Case Law Summaries By Theresa B. Ramos, Esq., Kristine Ann Cummings, Esq., and Melinda Markvan, Esq. 

into a stipulation for voluntary acknowledgment of 

parentage. During trial the father sought joint legal 

and physical custody. The trial judge ordered that 

the child be returned to Massachusetts; awarded 

joint legal custody and visitation to the father 

with sole physical custody to the mother. The 

father was also ordered to pay the mother child 

support in the amount of $260/week. The mother 

appealed the judgment. 

The statutory scheme, G.L. c. 209C, is clear as 

to the protocol in establishing paternity and the 

court’s authority in awarding child support, custody 

and visitation of a child born to unmarried parents. 

Even though there is no statute pertaining to the 

removal of children from the Commonwealth under 

G.L. c.209C, it clear that nonmarital children “shall 

be entitled to the same rights and protections of 

the law as all other children.” G.L. c. 209C, § 1. 

Thus, when a divorced parent seeks to relocate 

from the Commonwealth with a child(ren), the 

relocation test set forth in Yannas, is applied the 

same way to children of unmarried parents. The 

Yannas test is a two-part analysis that considers 

whether the parent with sole custody has “a good 

sincere reason” to move and that the move has 

a “real advantage” to the parent. If there is a “a 

good sincere reason” to move for the custodial 

parent, the court must then examine the “real 

advantage” for the custodial parent, the impact on 

the child’s life, and the effect it would have on the 

relationship between the child and non-custodial 

parent; all of which is considered to determine 

what would be in the best interests of the child. 

The trial judge found that it would be in the child’s 

best interest to have frequent visitation with the 

father and that the child’s time with the father was 

limited by the mother and child’s relocation to New 

York, and the mother’s insistence that all visits be 

supervised. As such, the trial judge ordered that 

the mother and child return to Massachusetts and 

the mother would have sole physical custody of the 

child and that the parties would have joint legal 

custody with visitation to the father. However, the 

judgment exceeded the trial judge’s authority per 

the statute. 

Per G.L. c. 209C § 10(b), it is clear that the 

mother has sole legal and sole custody of the 

child until further order of the court. Even 

after an adjudication of paternity or a voluntary 

acknowledgment of paternity has been filed, until 

further order of the court, the mother has sole 

custody of the child. In this case, it is important 

to note that at the time the mother moved to New 

York, there was no adjudication of parentage or a 

voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, and thus, 

the mother was the only legal parent of the child. 

As the only legal parent of the children, the mother 

did not need permission to relocate to New York, 

and it was error for the trial judge to apply Yannas 

because the mother had the right to relocate 

without permission of the court or the father. 

The trial judge has broad discretion and there 

was no error in the visitation schedule issued 

by the judge. The judge properly found that the 

mother was interfering with the father’s time 

with the child and it was appropriate to design a 

visitation schedule that would enhance the fatherchild 

relationship. However, while the visitation 

schedule is appropriate, the judgment was based 

on the trial judge’s error to return the child to 

Massachusetts. 

The mother sought back child support because 

the father stopped paying child support from July 

2008 (when the trial began) until December 2008, 

when a judgment was issued. The record was 

absent of the mother seeking retroactive child 

support during trial or in post-judgment motions. 

There was no error by the trial judge because the 

support order was not based on the child’s return 

to Massachusetts. 

Per 209C, § 10(a), the court may only order 

joint custody is there is an agreement between 

the mother and father or if the court finds 

that the parties have “successfully exercised 

joint responsibility for the child prior to the 

commencement of proceedings pursuant to this 

chapter and have the ability to communicate and 

plan with each other concerning the child’s best 

interests.” The judgment lacked positive findings 

Spring 2011


to support an award of joint legal custody to the 

mother and the father. Instead, the trial judge’s 

findings supported the opposite in that the parties 

could not successfully exercise joint responsibility 

or communicate with each other about the child’s 

best interest, and that joint custody was not 

inappropriate in this case. 

This matter was remanded to the trial judge 

for reconsideration. Due to the erroneous 

order that made the mother and child return to 

Massachusetts, a special exception was made 

in this case. The mother was ordered to inform 

the trial judge where she wished to live (i.e. 

Massachusetts or New York). The trial judge must 

accept the mother’s choice and issue a new order 

for custody and visitation based on the mother’s 

decision. 

Nazih Mohamad EL CHAAR vs. Claude 

Mohamad CHEHAB 

Decided on December 31, 2010 

78 Mass.App.Ct 501 (2010) 

The parties in this case are from Lebanon. In 

2001, the parties were married in Lebanon, 

and their daughter was born on September 16, 

2002. In January, 2004, they were divorced and 

the mother was granted custody of the child with 

visitation to the father. Later, mother filed an 

action in Lebanon that reduced the father’s time 

with the child to one day a week. In May, 2006, 

the mother left Lebanon with the child without 

the father’s permission or a court order, and she 

ended up in Massachusetts. The father filed a 

petition in the Sunnite Muslim Court of Beirut to 

modify the parties’ custody arrangement. The 

mother was represented in the Lebanese court. 

In the Lebanese proceedings, the court ruled 

against the mother because her removal of the 

child interfered with the father’s visitation rights 

and without the father’s permission, she could not 

legally travel with the child. The Lebanese court 

ordered the mother to bring the child to the father, 

and the mother’s right to custody was suspended 

so long as she lived outside of Lebanon. The 

mother appealed but the Lebanese appellate court 

affirmed the judgment. 

On February 12, 2007, the father filed a complaint 

for writ of habeas corpus and to enforce the foreign 

custody order in Massachusetts. A trial on the 

merits was heard. During trial, the mother filed a 

motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Dom.P.41 (b)(2), 

which was allowed, and the father appealed. 

The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s 

judgment. 

The G.L. c. 209B § 14 sets forth a “substantial 

conformity” test for a judge to consider when 

making a determination of whether or not to 

enforce a foreign custody order. The three 

requirements of the foreign court are: 1) whether 

it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 

matter; 2) applied procedural and substantive law 

reasonably comparable to our laws and 3) whether 

it based its order on a determination of the “best 

interests of the child.” The court examined the 

Lebanon court order and determined that the 

Lebanon court order did not meet the “substantial 

conformity” test. The trial judge found that even 

though the child’s best interests were considered 

by the Lebanese courts, there was no evidence 

showing that the Lebanese substantive law was 

reasonably comparable to that of Massachusetts. 

The first prong of the “substantial conformity” test 

was unchallenged by the parties. 

Jeffrey Frank WOLCOTT v. Donna Marguerite 

WOLCOTT 

Decided Jan. 6, 2011 

78 Mass. App. Ct. 539 

After a divorce trial which followed an incident for 

which the wife was convicted of 

solicitation to commit murder of the husband, 

the Probate and Family Court Judge awarded 

the husband approximately 90% of the marital 

estate. The decision was upheld on Appeal, the 

Court finding that the trial judge had acted within 

his discretion in taking into consideration the 

fact that the wife had been convicted, in criminal 

court, of soliciting the murder of the husband as a 

“conduct” factor when dividing the marital estate, 

and that the award of approximately 90% of the 

marital assets to the husband was not an abuse of 

Spring 2011


the trial judge’s discretion. 

In this case, the parties were divorced after an 

approximate fourteen year marriage that produced 

two children. At the time of trial, the wife was 

employed earning around $450 per week and the 

husband $1,900 per week. 

In March of 2006, shortly before the parties 

separated, they traveled to Texas for a family 

vacation. During this trip, the husband fell from 

a houseboat rented by the parties and sustained 

severe injuries. The husband testified that he 

was pushed from the boat; however, the judge 

found it was likely he had fallen due to alcohol 

consumption encouraged by the wife. Upon 

his return from Texas, but before his corrective 

surgery, the husband slept on the couch because 

the sound of his breathing bothered the wife. 

Shortly thereafter, the wife asked him to move 

out of the family home altogether. Because the 

husband was still recovering from his injuries and 

on pain medication, he had difficulty transporting 

himself from the family home (where he would 

spend his days) to his mother’s home (where he 

slept). 

At trial, several witnesses testified to conversations 

they had had with the wife in February and March 

of 2006 during which the wife implied that she 

wanted the husband killed. One witness reported 

the conversations to state police and criminal 

charges were eventually brought against the wife. 

On June 29, 2007, a jury convicted the wife of 

solicitation to commit murder, and she served 

three months in a house of correction before being 

released on parole. 

After trial, the judge made numerous findings 

relevant to the parties’ conduct and contribution 

to the marriage, such as the fact that the wife had 

an affair during the marriage, pursued a foolhardy 

landscaping plan for the marital home which 

violated town regulations and cost the parties 

$14,000 to remedy, and incurred around $24,000 

in medical bills for plastic surgery procedures 

during the marriage. The judge found that the wife 

was responsible for the care of the children during 

the day, as well as the majority of the running of 

the household, but that the husband took over 

child care duties at night when he returned from 

work, including caring for the children if they woke 

in the middle of the night. At the time of trial, the 

husband was solely responsible for child care and 

maintenance of the marital home. 

In dividing the marital estate and awarding the 

husband approximately 90% of the marital assets, 

the trial judge addressed each required § 34 

factor within his 114 findings of fact. Although the 

wife argued, on appeal, that the judge abused his 

discretion by giving undue weight to her criminal 

conviction, pointing to both the disproportionate 

distribution of assets as well as to the judge’s 

statement that the “conviction of a spouse of the 

crime of soliciting the murder of the other spouse” 

was “exceptional” conduct that shocked the 

conscience of the court and would “have an impact 

on the ‘conduct’ factor under [§ 34] irrespective 

of ‘economic impact’ ”, the Appeals Court held 

that “it is nonetheless clear from his award and 

findings that he gave appropriate weight to each § 

34 factor, including the wife’s egregious conduct”. 

The Appeals Court further found that the trial judge 

did not consider the wife’s misconduct solely for 

its negative emotional impact on the marriage, but 

that “specifically, the judge noted that the wife’s 

effort to have her husband murdered-about which 

the judge heard live testimony, rather than simply 

relying on the fact of her conviction-“caused [the 

husband] to take on total responsibility for the 

children’s care”; “makes [the husband] totally 

responsible for maintaining the parties’ home”; 

and will “always” adversely affect the husband 

as it “diminishes his ability to be totally focused 

on life and work issues.” Along with the wife’s 

responsibility for the misguided $14,000 land 

use expenditure, these were the factors that 

the judge considered “primary.” The Appeals 

Court also held that the trial judge considered 

“[t]he parties’ respective contributions to the 

marital partnership,” including the wife’s role as 

a homemaker during the day and the husband’s 

responsibility for child care after work. The judge 

also considered the wife’s responsibility for the 

Spring 2011


husband’s facial injuries, her callousness during 

his recovery, her plastic surgery expenditures, 

the cost associated with her poor landscaping 

decision, the length of the marriage, and the fact 

that neither spouse had any significant outstanding 

debts. Because the disproportionate award did 

“follow logically from the judge’s findings,” the 

Appeals Court could not say it was an abuse of the 

judge’s broad discretion. 

The wife also claimed that the judge’s failure to 

award her additional attorney’s fees was an abuse 

of his discretion, but the Appeals Court held that 

there is no case law to support an argument that 

the judge’s failure to award attorney’s fees, let 

alone additional attorney’s fees, under G.L. c. 208, 

§ 38, had constituted abuse of discretion. 

Mara L. PELLEGRINO v. Joseph D. 

VILLAPIANO. 

Jan. 4, 2011 

458 Mass. 1020 

An Appeal from a Single Justice’s denial of 

extraordinary general superintendence relief from 

a trial court’s order, entered in connection with 

an application for an abuse prevention order, 

which allowed discovery of the applicant’s medical 

records, became moot, warranting dismissal of the 

appeal, when the trial court denied the application 

for the abuse prevention order and ordered the 

destruction of all of the applicant’s medical 

records. 

In this case, the petitioner sought an abuse 

prevention order, under G.L. c. 209A, against 

the respondent. The respondent sought limited 

discovery regarding portions of the petitioner’s 

medical history; said request was allowed by the 

trial judge. The respondent thereafter subpoenaed 

an array of the petitioner’s medical records from 

various hospitals, which the judge ordered turned 

over to the court for impoundment. 

The petitioner filed in the county court a G.L. c. 

211, § 3 petition seeking orders vacating the 

lower court’s grant of discovery and directing the 

lower court to destroy the medical records in its 

possession. While the petition was pending, her 

application for a G.L. c. 209A order was denied in 

the lower court after a hearing. It was not clear 

from the record whether the medical records 

were discussed or considered by the judge during 

the hearing; however, on the day of the hearing, 

the court ordered all of the medical records in 

its possession destroyed, and the records were 

thereafter destroyed. Approximately two weeks 

later the petitioner’s G.L. c. 211, § 3, petition was 

denied. 

Although the petitioner acknowledged that the 

matter had become moot, she nonetheless sought 

review of the denial of her application for a G.L. 

c. 209A order, requesting that the matter be 

“retroactively returned to the date the [discovery] 

violation occurred.” The Supreme Judicial Court 

found that that claim was not raised before the 

single justice and, in any event, relief on that basis 

was not warranted under G.L. c. 211, § 3 because 

the petitioner could challenge the denial of her 

application for a G.L. c. 209A order on appeal 

to the Appeals Court. The SJC further held that 

in connection with such appeal, the petitioner 

may challenge the propriety of the defendant’s 

discovery of her medical information; and may 

also raise in that appeal her claim that it is not 

appropriate for the appellate court to view any 

portions of the record below that may include 

personal information from her medical records. 

Cosgrove v. Hughes 

February 15, 2011 


Intestate decedent’s nieces and nephews brought 

an action against decedent’s alleged daughter 

individually and as administratrix of decedent’s 

estate seeking declaratory judgment that the 

defendant is not the decedent’s biological 

daughter and that therefore, under the laws of 

intestacy, she is not an heir and may not inherit 

from his sizable estate. 

Plaintiffs testified that in all the years they knew 

their uncle, he never mentioned he was married or 

ever had children. However, unbeknownst to the 

decedent’s family, he was married in 1944, owned 

property and filed tax returns with defendant’s 

Spring 2011


mother until her death in 2006. Furthermore, 

defendant’s amended birth certificate signed 

by the decedent before a notary months after 

their marriage identified himself and defendant’s 

mother as her “natural parents.” Regardless of 

decedent’s sworn affidavit, plaintiffs contend that 

the defendant was born prior to the decedent’s 

marriage and that she may be their uncle’s stepdaughter 

and not his biological child. The probate 

court judge found as a matter of law the amended 

birth certificate was an “acknowledgment” that the 

defendant was decedent’s child and thus granted 

summary judgment for the alleged daughter. 

The plaintiffs appealed and the judgment was 

upheld. The Appeals Court held that under the 

intestacy statute, if a decedent has acknowledged 

paternity of a person born out of wedlock, that 

person is an heir of his/her father, biological 

paternity is not prerequisite to an acknowledgment 

of paternity. In addition, decedent’s sworn 

affidavit was sufficient to demonstrate 

unambiguous acknowledgment of his paternity of 

alleged daughter. 

Adoption of Thea 

February 25, 2011 


A care and protection petition was filed on behalf 

of Thea, a seventeen-year-old child with extremely 

high risk behavior and significant mental health 

problems. Mother appealed from termination of 

parental rights, and Thea contended that parental 

rights should be terminated, but that the trial judge 

erred in not ordering posttermination visitation. 

allegations of neglect, but was unable to 

substantiate the allegations of physical abuse. In 

2008, after Mother repeatedly failed to comply 

with the department’s service plans, Mother 

waived her right to trial via a stipulation and 

permanent custody of Thea was granted to the 

department on a finding of unfitness and Thea’s 

need for care and protection. Currently, Thea is 

placed in a long-term hospitalization unit. 

On appeal, the Appeals Court held that the trial 

judge’s detailed decision showed clear and 

convincing evidence supporting a finding that 

mother was unfit to care for Thea. However, in 

determining whether to dispense with parental 

consent to adoption, the judge must not only 

determine whether the parent is unfit, but it must 

also evaluate “whether dispensing with the need 

for parental consent will be in the best interests 

of the child.” Here, there was almost nothing in 

the record or decision regarding the department’s 

plan post-termination for this almost eighteen-yearold, 

high risk teenager. Therefore, evidence was 

insufficient to support a finding that termination of 

parental rights is or is not in Thea’s best interests. 

The Appeals Court vacated provisions of the 

judgment as to termination of parental rights 

of Thea and remanded to the Juvenile Court for 

further proceedings, including a hearing to elicit 

additional evidence and findings. 

In 2002, after relocating from Missouri to 

Massachusetts, a mandated reporter alleged that 

mother was neglecting Thea, detailing that Thea 

was unkempt, hyper vigilant, possessed poor 

social skills, cried easily and was withdrawn. A 

51B investigation was conducted and mother’s 

case was closed in 2004. Then, in 2006, an 

anonymous reporter alleged physical abuse 

and neglect by mother and the stepfather. A 

subsequent 51B investigation confirmed the 

Spring 2011

Rule 1:28 Decision Case Summaries 

By Roseanne Klovee, Esq. 

Awbrey v. Awbrey, 09-P-1704 (December 9, 

2010) 

Four years after the parties were divorced, the 

Husband sought to modify his alimony and child 

support obligations. The Wife moved to dismiss 

the Husband’s complaint and filed various discovery 

motions. After hearing, the trial judge 

ordered the Husband to produce tax returns by a 

date certain or his complaint would be dismissed. 

Husband failed to appear at the next hearing and 

the Wife reported that he had only provided a 

draft return by the required date and the completed 

return was not produced until two weeks 

passed the deadline. The judge scheduled a further 

hearing limiting testimony to accountants for 

both parties as to the Husband’s current income. 

Appeals Court found that the judge could properly 

sanction the Husband by limiting the evidence 

in this manner. In addition, the Husband did not 

object to the limited testimony at the next hearing. 

The accountants were present but did not 

testify nor did the Husband seek to call any other 

witnesses. After relying solely on the submitted 

exhibits and representations of counsel, the trial 

judge dismissed the Husband’s complaint for 

modification. Judgment upheld. 

Vescera v. Vescera, 09-P-2254 (December 

10, 2010) 

Former Wife appealed modification judgment 

granting ex-husband weekly alimony arguing that 

the parties’ separation agreement provides a 

waiver of future alimony and that the trial judge 

erred in applying G.L. c. 208, §34, as opposed to 

G.L. c. 208, § 37. The separation agreement provided 

that “[t]his Agreement shall be incorporated 

and merged into the Judgment of Divorce with 

regards to issues concerning children and shall 

be subject to future modification on all issues, 

with the exception of issues relating to property 

division and debt payment responsibility which 

shall not merge into the Judgment of Divorce but 

shall survive the same as an independent contract 

with independent legal significance.” The 

agreement clearly stated that only two issues 

were precluded from future modification and 

alimony was not one of them. Unless there is a 

Stansel burden of something more than a material 

change of circumstances it makes no practical 

difference that the judge made the award pursuant 

to §34 rather than §37. Since the Husband’s 

request was postjudgment, the judge in fact 

made both the §37 required material change of 

circumstances and the §34 findings of fact. 

Fields v. Fields, 09-P-1389 (December 21, 

2010) 

Father argued on appeal that the trial judge failed 

to sufficiently consider the son’s wishes and the 

report of the guardian ad litem in denying him 

physical custody. A child’s express wishes are 

factors to be considered but are not determinative 

nor are the recommendations of a guardian 

ad litem. Custody decisions are left to the judge. 

It is usually not in a child’s best interest to disrupt 

a satisfactory custody arrangement that is capable 

of preservation. The trial judge found that 

the father did not foster the child’s best interests 

and that the mother was a capable parent. The 

judge was entitled to conclude that a parenting 

coordinator would be futile due to the father’s 

inability to communicate and cooperate with the 

mother and thus an award of sole legal custody to 

the mother was appropriate. 

Tobey v. Tobey, 09-P-2225 (December 28, 

2010) 

Wife had liquidated her 401k account in violation 

of the automatic restraining order on assets. The 

judge opined that if the Wife had asked the Court 

for permission to liquidate the account before 

doing so, the Court would have granted her the 

10 Spring 2011

Rule 1:28 Decision Case Summaries By Roseanne Klovee, Esq. 

permission and then would have left the issue of 

allocation of the asset to the time of trial. The 

Court did not order the return of any of the funds 

to the Husband finding that the Wife needed the 

money to sustain herself and the children at a 

time of great need and that she did not have the 

financial means to return any of the funds to the 

Husband. The judge’s decision was not plainly 

wrong. 

Trapilo v. Trapilo, 10-P-9 (January 14, 2011) 

Husband attempted to vacate a divorce judgment 

alleging that he was mistaken about the value 

of the home he agreed to retain in the divorce. 

When the Husband attempted to remortgage the 

property in order to cover the cash payment to 

the Wife as provided for in the separation agreement, 

he alleges he learned for the first time that 

the property was built at a lower elevation than 

required and that flood insurance was unavailable 

to him at reasonable rates. The Husband 

filed a rule 60(b) motion to set aside the divorce 

arguing that this newly discovered information 

rendered the property division inequitable which 

was denied by the trial court. The Appeals Court 

found that the Husband bore the risk of the 

house’s value problem since he originally requested 

the home as a pre-divorce distribution and 

then effectively owned it for several years before 

the divorce. In general, a unilateral mistake does 

not justify rescission unless the other party was 

aware of the mistake. There was no evidence 

of this on the Wife’s part. In addition, Husband 

merely implied that had he known the true value, 

he would have made a different bargain. This did 

not constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial 

judge nor is it the sort of extraordinary situation 

that rule 60(b)(6) was designed to remedy. 

Simpson v. Bonanni, 09-P-1327 (January 

31, 2011) 

Dispute as to whether the judge exceeded her 

authority by ordering the non-married parents of 

a special needs child to designate the child as 

beneficiary of all their assets upon death and 

by obligating both parents to be equally responsible 

for the future costs of the child’s care. The 

parties anticipated that the child would need 

to be placed in an institution in the future due 

to his special needs. Father argued that under 

G.L. c. 209C, §9, a judge is limited to making 

present needs determinations based on existing 

circumstances and dividing assets and income 

as required to meet those present needs. The 

Appeals Court agreed with the father that the 

statute does not provide authority for the division 

of the parties’ assets upon death. The Appeals 

Court disagreed with the Mother’s assertion that 

the order provides security for the father’s courtordered 

support obligations. The fact that both 

parties have always assumed responsibility for 

the child’s care and father had consistently met 

the child’s financial needs undermined the Mother’s 

claim that the provision was a valid security 

measure. In addition, the provision required the 

unconditional transfer of all assets to a child in 

the event of a parent’s death irrespective of the 

then existing needs. Lastly, even though it was 

almost certain that the child would someday 

need residential care, that fact alone and absent 

any evidence that either parent had avoided their 

financial obligations in the past or intended to do 

so in the future, was not sufficient to warrant the 

obligation for each parent to divide the cost of 

the child’s future care. 

C.S. v. K.G., 09-P-1737 (January 31, 2011) 

This case involved a thirteen-day trial concerning 

support, custody and visitation pursuant to G.L. c. 

209C filed by the mother. The trial judge awarded 

the mother sole legal and physical custody of the 

three year old child and ordered the father to pay 

child support of $210 per week. The custody 

awards were upheld based on the best interest of 

the child. Despite the judge’s finding that the father 

did not sexually abuse the child as reported 

by the mother, the judge had serious concerns 

about the father’s ability to parent the child on 

his own. In addition, the court found that the parties 

had very different parenting styles and that 

their communication was strained rendering them 

unable to agree on major decisions about the reli- 

Spring 2011 11

Rule 1:28 Decision Case Summaries By Roseanne Klovee, Esq. 

gious, educational and health decisions regarding 

the child. The award to the mother of $64,415 

in attorney’s fees was also upheld based on the 

trial court’s finding that the father had attempted 

to dodge discovery causing the mother unnecessary 

legal fees and his finding that the father had 

taken an unrealistic and unreasonable position 

regarding custody which had considerably lengthened 

the trial. 

Williams v. Crehan, 09-P-2243 (March 11, 

2011) 

Pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement, 

the Husband was to pay alimony in the amount of 

$2,000.00 per month subject to increases in the 

cost of living and decreases if the wife’s earnings 

increased. The retirement provision relating to 

alimony stated as follows: “A Retirement Adjustment 

shall occur upon the later of a) January 1, 

2007 or b) the month in which the Husband’s 

employment compensation decreased as a result 

of less than full-time, active employment status. 

At the time of the Retirement Adjustment, 

alimony payments shall be re-determined based 

on the Husband’s earning level as it then exists.” 

On June 7, 2007, the Husband notified the Wife 

of his intent to phase in his retirement by reducing 

his hours at work and his income by approximately 

20%. A little over a year later, the Husband 

claimed he was fully retired and his alimony 

payments were substantially reduced and varied 

as determined solely by the Husband. The trial 

judge found that the retirement provision was 

not properly triggered as the Husband remained 

actively engaged in practice as an actuary and 

his income actually exceed the baseline income 

upon which alimony had originally been predicated. 

The Husband’s failure to pay alimony pursuant 

to the separation agreement was a clear and 

undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal 

order. If the Husband was unclear about his 

obligations, he should have sought clarification 

rather than engage in self-help. Wife received 

an award of appellate counsel fees requested in 

her brief but not an award of double costs as the 

Husband’s appeal was not frivolous. 

12 Spring 2011

The Sexual Fidelity Clause 

By Kevin M. Corr, Esq. 

Might the parents of a bride recover monetary 

damages from their son-in-law after his breach 

of a contract to remain sexually faithful to their 

daughter and to otherwise treat her well? “It’s 

plausible” is the answer, at least according to a 

recent decision out of The United States District 

Court for the District of Maryland. 

In Hanna J Investments, LLC v. Russell Jon Dlin, 

37 Family Law Reporter 1089 (BNA 2010), Judge 

William M. Nickerson denied the husband Dlin’s 

motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s civil action for the 

recovery of $150,000 of “wedding expenses” that 

it - a limited liability company - paid in exchange 

for Dlin’s repeated (pre-wedding) promises that 

“he had not been with another woman since before 

[he] started dating [Stacey, the bride-to-be]” 

and that he would remain “in [a] monogamous 

relationship with [Stacey].” The LLC’s connection 

to the betrothed parties was not explained 

in the Complaint nor in the Court’s decision, but 

one could imagine “the father of the bride” or her 

parents – if they are to foot the bill for the wedding 

– standing in the same shoes. In any event, 

discovery of Dlin’s pre- and post-marital infidelity 

precipitated the LLC’s Complaint sounding in 

breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, 

promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. 

“It would be an understatement to opine that the 

facts in this case, as alleged, are unusual,” wrote 

Judge Nickerson. The bargain between these 

parties, i.e. the groom’s explicit promise of sexual 

fidelity in exchange for the third party entity’s payment 

of the wedding expenses (amounting to contractual 

obligations), “is not a typical ante-nuptial 

arrangement. For that reason, it is not surprising 

that the Court [was] unable to discover a reported 

opinion decided under similar facts.” The Judge 

went on, nevertheless, to conclude that “[w]hile 

these allegations are unusual, the Court cannot 

deem them so implausible that the Complaint 

must be dismissed under [applicable precedent].” 

Dlin’s motion to dismiss was denied. 

Though Judge Nickerson found no case with facts 

similar to the one he was charged with deciding 

(at the dismissal stage), there are a number 

of reported cases involving the enforceability 

of comparable “sexual fidelity” commitments 

between marrying or married parties. In In re 

The Marriage of Cooper, 769 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 

2009), for example, the parties (married in 1972) 

entered into a reconciliation agreement after it 

was discovered that the husband (in 2000) had 

been involved with another woman. Wanting the 

marriage to continue, the husband agreed in the 

document that “if any of my indiscretions lead to 

and/or are cause of a separation or divorce … I 

will accept full responsibility [sic] of my actions.” 

With that the agreement included provisions for 

the husband, in the event of a permanent breakdown 

of the marriage, to pay a certain level of 

household expenses (fluctuating with a rise in his 

income), to maintain life and family health insurance, 

to maintain retirement accounts (paying 

one-half of all future payments to the wife), and 

to provide for the college expenses of the parties’ 

youngest daughter. 

The husband disappeared for a while in 2005, 

and the wife filed for divorce when she found 

him and he admitted a continuation of his prior 

sexual affair. To her motion for support, the wife 

attached the notarized reconciliation agreement, 

and the trial court made an order for temporary 

support in the contract amount of $2,800 per 

month. At trial, the court found that the terms 

of the reconciliation agreement were “generous” 

to the wife, but not unconscionable, and that, 

“despite [the husband’s] denials, the affair likely 

continued and caused the parties’ separation, 

thereby triggering the terms of the reconciliation 

agreement.” The wife was also granted a 

Spring 2011 13

The Sexual Fidelity Clause By Kevin M. Corr, Esq. 

$25,000 fee award. 

The Iowa Supreme Court, however, on the 

husband’s appeal, held that “the reconciliation 

agreement in this case is void.” Distinguishing it 

from the sort of reconciliation agreement found 

to be valid by other jurisdictions, see Flansburg v. 

Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), 

was the fact that the Cooper agreement “has as 

a condition precedent the sexual conduct of the 

parties within the marital relationship.” Relying 

on “relatively old” precedents (cases from the 

1800’s and early 1900’s), the Court rejected the 

idea of “injecting the courts into the complex web 

of interpersonal relationships and the inevitable 

he-said-she-said battles that would arise in contracts 

that can be enforced only through probing 

of the nature of the martial relationship.” The 

Iowa statutory scheme that authorizes the trial 

court’s consideration of “any mutual agreement” 

made by the divorcing parties, the Court concluded, 

does “not extend to agreements … that 

are void … because they intrude on the intimacies 

of the marital relationship and inject fault back 

into divorce proceedings.” (emphasis added) The 

case was remanded for entry of an order equitably 

dividing the parties’ property “without regard 

to the void contract.” 

In Diosado v. Diosado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 

(Cal. App. Ct. 2 nd Dist. 2002), a case relied upon 

in Cooper, the Court affirmed an invalidation 

of a postnuptial contract (“Marital Settlement 

Agreement”) that, inter alia, called for the sexually 

unfaithful spouse to pay the other liquidated 

damages of $50,000 within six months following 

entry of judgment of dissolution of marriage. The 

contract (drafted by the husband’s attorney) was 

made after discovery of the husband’s first affair, 

and his subsequent (post-contract) affair lead to 

the parties’ divorce and the ex-wife’s post-divorce 

breach of contract action whereby she sought 

to recover the $50,000 penalty. “Contrary to 

the public policy underlying California’s no-fault 

divorce laws, the agreement … attempts to impose 

… [a hefty premium for emotional angst] … 

caused by [the husband’s] breach of his promise 

of sexual fidelity.” Such a contract, this Court 

held, is in violation of public policy and, therefore, 

unenforceable. Judgment on the pleadings was 

properly granted by the trial court. 

In Eason v. Eason, 682 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 2009), 

quite a different point of view was expressed (in a 

state with a statutory scheme quite different from 

California’s). After the wife filed a separate support 

action, the parties mediated an agreement 

in which they agreed that neither would seek a 

divorce on the grounds of adultery and “that neither 

party will use adultery as a bar to alimony.” 

The wife was awarded temporary spousal support 

in a later divorce action, and the husband, 

despite the agreement, filed a counterclaim for 

divorce on the grounds of adultery and asserted 

that the adulterous wife should be denied alimony. 

The trial court found that the agreement 

was in contravention of public policy and unenforceable, 

but the South Carolina Supreme Court 

disagreed. “In our opinion, the Agreement was 

a mutual promise to not sue for divorce based 

on adultery, and to not raise adultery as a bar to 

alimony. In other words, the Agreement was not 

against public policy, it simply was a valid waiver.” 

The trial court decision was reversed and the 

case was remanded for a determination of the 

proper type and amount of alimony for the wife. 

See also Hall v. Hall, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 401 

(an unreported Virginia case involving an agreement 

in which the wife relinquished or waived her 

right to spousal support if the husband presented 

proof of her adultery). 

In MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989), 

the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld an 

agreement which, by its express terms, became 

“null and void” if a separate support or divorce 

action resulted from the husband leaving the wife 

for another woman. The case involved a short 

term marriage in which, without the agreement, 

an award of alimony to the wife was not a given 

(according to the trial testimony of the attorney 

who drafted the agreement). That in mind, the 

14 Spring 2011

The Sexual Fidelity Clause By Kevin M. Corr, Esq. 

Husband sought to void the agreement by attempting 

to convince the court that divorce action 

was the result of his leaving the wife for another 

woman (i.e. he sought to advantage himself by 

professing his own misconduct). This strategy 

failed because there was no credible evidence 

that the husband’s new relationship caused the 

breakdown of the marriage; the marriage failed 

due to irreconcilable differences alone. 

engaged couple? While tracking the case to its 

conclusion may give some answers, the issues 

raised by Hanna J Investments, LLC v. Russell Jon 

Dlin are, in the meantime, good food for thoughtful 

consumption. 

More to the point, the agreement in MacFarlane 

was held to be valid and enforceable – the 

husband, if he had been able to show that his 

relationship with another woman caused the 

marriage to fail, could have succeeded in voiding 

the agreement. “[A]lthough the trial court 

condemned [the litigated provision] in the name 

of public policy, the clause in effect causes the 

financial incidents of the parties’ divorce to be 

determined precisely according to the public 

policy of the State, as set forth by the statutory 

law governing marital dissolution. … [I]t is difficult 

to see how public policy is offended” where 

the clause in question “operates to abrogate the 

agreement entirely” when the husband’s infidelity 

is the cause of marriage’s failure. 

Due to inconsistency of outcomes, it is hard 

to say what impact, if any, these precedents 

might have on the likelihood of Hanna J Investments, 

LLC succeeding in its efforts to recover its 

$150,000 outlay from Dlin. In a footnote to his 

decision, Judge Nickerson observed that there 

may be “additional reasons as to why such a 

contract [to remain sexually faithful] is unenforceable, 

but [Dlin] has not raised those arguments or 

defenses.” Might the Judge have been hinting at 

the “illegality” or “contravention of public policy” 

arguments? Would public policy be offended if 

Dlin was adjudged responsible for the $150,000 

upon proof that he misrepresented his pre-marital 

fidelity to Stacey, and proof that he breached 

his promise to remain sexually faithful after the 

marriage? Will the ultimate outcome hinge on 

the fact that the contract was between the groom 

and a third party, and not a contract between the 

Spring 2011 15

Mediation and the Uneducated Consumer 

By Wendy O. Hickey, Esq. 

Last weekend I came to the realization that I need 

to buy a new car. So, I did what every educated 

consumer does, I went to my computer to begin 

researching. I checked with Consumer Reports, 

sought advice from friends and family and reviewed 

various websites to learn what I could 

expect in terms of pricing, and compared different 

models based on what best suited my needs. 

This process got me thinking about some of my 

recent experiences with the mediation process. 

An educational program and some articles I read 

have left me feeling conflicted about what people 

are talking about and what I do in my own practice. 

The only conclusion I can reach is that clients really 

should demand more of us. 

People educate themselves about most things especially 

when they are about to make a large financial 

commitment - so why don’t they demand better 

education about the divorce process? And why, 

as lawyers, do we not feel obligated to educate 

our clients about what to expect - especially when 

they embark on mediation or some other form of 

alternate dispute resolution? We are letting them 

walk into a room with their soon-to-be-ex-spouse 

and a third party who may or may not have a background 

in divorce law and telling them - go ahead 

- see if you can agree on how to divide your assets, 

how much support should be paid and who spends 

what time with your kids and get back to me. And 

yet people write and speak about this process as if 

it is a good idea. 

It is time to have an honest discussion about what 

the lawyers role is or should be when a divorcing 

client chooses mediation. It does not have 

to change just because the client chooses not to 

litigate. We still have an obligation to advocate for 

our client. We still have an obligation to zealously 

represent our client. If we choose to be proactive 

and choose to zealously advocate for our clients by 

arming them with information before they enter the 

mediation process, we are living up to our obligations 

and our clients have the confidence and 

knowledge to work with their spouse to craft a fair 

and equitable agreement. Our clients become the 

educated consumers they deserve to be as they 

enter what can be one of the most expensive, emotionally 

draining and devastating events in life. 

A mediated settlement done right the first time 

can provide a family with a fair road map for the 

future which both parties can live with. Sending 

a client blindly into the mediation process without 

first making sure they understand their rights takes 

away their power to negotiate. Several things can 

happen when an uneducated client mediates - one 

side could have all of the power in the process, 

oftentimes the same person who had all the power 

in the relationship. In some cases, one side could 

have such unrealistic expectations that when their 

terms are not agreed to, the process itself falls 

apart. Other times, it can even go so badly that the 

parties agree to terms so outside the norm that 

they violate public policy resulting in parts of their 

agreement not being approved when presented 

to the court. All of these scenarios are avoidable 

with a little education. Yet I have seen all three of 

these scenarios play out time and again - usually 

by way of future litigation, thus defeating the entire 

cooperative spirit of mediation in the first place. 

Take for example Lucy, a CPA by trade but permanently 

disabled by a rare form of cancer and Pete, 

a high level banker. After a long term marriage 

they each sought advice from well-regarded family 

law practitioners, both of whom recommended the 

parties try mediation, but did not provide much information 

about the process or any information on 

the parties’ rights. They decided they could settle 

their differences through mediation and save money 

on legal fees. They jointly retained a well known 

mediator, had a few sessions and came up with an 

16 Spring 2011

Mediation and the Uneducated Consumer By Wendy O. Hickey, Esq. 

agreement. Lucy, who was the passive voice in the 

marriage was never going to be able to work again. 

Yet she agreed to some very unusual scenarios 

which, if occurred, would cause her alimony to terminate. 

Lucy and Pete had the mediator draft their 

agreement, never went back to discuss the terms 

with the lawyers they originally consulted - after 

all - the mediator was also a divorce lawyer - and 

walked it into court on their own. Upon review of 

the agreement, the judge opined that the alimony 

provision was so against public policy that he could 

not approve it as written. Lucy and Pete agreed to 

strike the offensive language and go forward with 

the divorce. 

Later, Lucy ceded to Pete’s demand and returned 

to the mediator to talk about the offensive language. 

The mediator suggested that they revive 

the stricken language by signing a new page at 

which point the provision would again be in place, 

notwithstanding, of course, the obligation in the 

agreement that a modification be approved by the 

court. Pete convinced Lucy that it was only fair 

that she sign as that was what she had originally 

agreed to. So, Lucy signed. 

Fast forward five years and Pete decides to unilaterally 

implement the clause terminating Lucy’s 

alimony. Lucy tries to negotiate with Pete to reinstate 

his payments but he refuses. Going back to 

mediation fails and they end up in litigation which 

lasts over a year culminating in a three day trial. 

Of course, with the single calendar system, they 

end up back before the same judge who appears 

more than a little dumbfounded that they went 

back to mediation and re-signed the very clause 

he said was void when they appeared before him. 

Not surprisingly, after three days of trial, the judge 

remained convinced that the clause was void and 

unenforceable - the end of a very expensive story. 

So who was to blame? The divorce lawyers who 

failed to educate their clients about the laws of 

alimony and what they could reasonably expect 

a court to order given their circumstances? The 

clients who chose not to demand more from their 

lawyers? Or is it the mediator who let the parties 

enter into what she should have know was an unenforceable 

agreement - especially after the judge 

made them strike certain provisions? 

I don’t blame the mediator. When a lawyer acts as 

a mediator, their role changes. They are no longer 

advocating for a client. Their job is to get the 

people to talk with each other and reach an agreement 

period. When there is an agreement, any 

agreement, no matter how far outside the norm, 

the mediator has been successful. 

I don’t blame the parties. Not everyone has the 

personality to demand more. Not everyone knows 

how to ask the right questions. Not everyone going 

through a divorce - especially when they are 

also battling cancer - has the emotional capacity 

to stand up for themselves when something just 

doesn’t seem right. 

But the divorce lawyers who suggested that their 

clients try mediation knew better. They knew the 

laws regarding alimony in a long term marriage. 

They knew if one spouse was a high wage earner 

and the other was fully disabled there would be 

long term alimony. They knew a judge would not 

terminate Lucy’s alimony after a period of years, 

would not order a downward sliding scale, and 

would not make automatic adjustments if Lucy 

needed live in help. If they had only spent a little 

time educating their clients before sending them 

off to try mediation both parties could have saved 

hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees. 

We lawyers need to do better. We cannot be afraid 

to advocate for our clients while they are mediating. 

We cannot be afraid that colleagues will 

consider us to be “not mediation friendly”. Further, 

lawyers who act as mediators should suggest that 

parties speak with lawyers to gain an understanding 

about the basics. In my experience, this only 

helps the process - it doesn’t hurt. Clients should 

know what they are getting and what they are giving 

up. Trust me, they will still mediate and they 

will still make concessions - it is still a far better 

alternative to appearing in a motion session prepared 

for battle. 

Spring 2011 17

Family Law Project Empowers Domestic Violence Victims 

and Provides New and Seasoned Attorneys the Opportunity 

to Engage in Meaningful Pro- Bono Service 

By Rachel Biscardi, Esq. 

“Jane”, a long-term victim of domestic violence, 

has three children with her abusive husband. 

During a violent incident, Jane attempted to call 

the police and her husband ripped the phone 

away from her and hit her with it. This incident 

prompted Jane to obtain a 209A Abuse Prevention 

Order out of District Court and file for divorce 

in the Probate and Family Court pro se. She received 

an order for child support from the court, 

but the opposing party refused to pay it. He 

also filed a motion to have regular, unsupervised 

visitation despite the fact that he was violent and 

had a drinking problem. The parties also owned 

a home together, but without the child support 

payments, the home was about to go into foreclosure. 

Jane contacted the Women’s Bar Foundation 

Family Law Project “FLP” and the FLP helped 

her draft a motion to get a lump sum payment 

from Jane’s husband for the mortgage. The FLP, 

then, referred Jane to an attorney in her county 

who was able to represent her and obtain an order 

for her husband to continue to pay child support 

in addition to making the past due mortgage 

payments. Later, the volunteer attorney obtained 

a divorce for Jane whereby Jane received sole 

legal and physical custody of the children, regular 

child support through the Department of Revenue, 

and an equitable distribution of assets. 

At least one in four women will suffer domestic 

violence in their lifetime. Many of these women 

face significant health problems while they are 

recovering from the abuse including: physical injuries, 

post-traumatic stress disorder, migraines, 

depression, and anxiety. Moreover, women who 

suffer abuse are often disempowered by the legal 

system exacerbating the utter loss of control 

imposed by their abusive husband or partner. 

When abusers obtain legal counsel, domestic 

violence victims are frequently re-victimized by 

the unequal power structure, by the sheer volume 

of court proceedings, and the terrifying possibility 

of disastrous legal consequences. Most 

lawyers profess nervousness during their initial 

court appearances. It is that much worse for an 

FLP client who is pro se and must face the court 

system alone with the compounding issues of 

poverty, abuse, language and cultural barriers. 

Overwhelmingly, women cite the threat of loss 

of custody of their children as one of the major 

reasons they do not leave an abusive home. 

These types of cases, with clients like Jane, are 

the reason why the Women’s Bar Association 

created the Women’s Bar Foundation’s Family 

Law Project in 1995. The FLP continues to be the 

largest pro bono project at the WBF, drawing over 

150 new attorneys and paralegals each year. The 

FLP has two primary missions. The first is to empower 

domestic violence victims by giving them a 

voice in their abuse prevention order and family 

law cases. 

When I visited the law firm, I was treated like 

any one of their other clients. I could not 

believe that I was in such a beautiful office. I 

felt like I had a team of people who were on 

my side for the first time and maybe I could 

fight back. 

-“Rose”, FLP Client 

By helping a client find her voice, the FLP seeks 

to prevent further abuse, homelessness, loss of 

child custody, and to decrease repeated court 

hearings. 

18 Spring 2011

Family Law Project By Rachel Biscardi, Esq. 

The FLP’s second mission is to engage lawyers in 

pro bono service, making them stakeholders on 

issues involving domestic violence and poverty. 

The FLP recruits, trains, and mentors volunteer 

attorneys and collaborates with legal and social 

services to provide high quality representation 

and assistance to low income victims of domestic 

violence. 

While complex issues of abuse, homelessness 

and mental illness can at times make 

the cases I take through the FLP quite challenging, 

it is also what makes them so rewarding. 

At the end of the day, this program is not 

just about helping someone in need during a 

difficult time, but truly empowering women to 

build a new life for themselves. 

-Kristine Ann Cummings, Associate at 

Sally & Fitch, LLP and FLP Volunteer Attorney 

The FLP provides comprehensive training to volunteer 

attorneys. FLP trainers comprise some of 

the most experienced and knowledgeable family 

law practitioners in Massachusetts, including 

partners at large law firms, managing attorneys at 

domestic violence organizations and legal services, 

and long standing practitioners who have 

leadership roles in the Boston Bar Association 

and Massachusetts Bar Association. Additionally, 

the FLP provides each volunteer attorney with a 

manual which answers most of the basic family 

issues presented by these cases. 

It does not matter that you have never set 

foot inside a Probate and Family Court. It 

does not matter that you will need to call your 

FLP mentor twenty times before you file your 

client’s financial statement. It does not matter 

that you have never looked at the Rules of 

Domestic Relations Procedure. What matters 

is that you will give your client a gift, not just 

of your time and not just of your firm’s resources. 

The gift you give to your client is the 

ability to start sentences with “My lawyer…” 

-Amy Egloff, Esquire, Schlesinger & 

Bucnhinder, LLP and FLP Volunteer Attorney, 

Mentor, and Trainer 

The WBF is unique in promulgating the use of 

mentors in its projects. FLP mentors are also 

some of the most seminal practitioners of family 

law in Massachusetts. Mentors do not meet 

with the clients or the opposing party; instead, 

they provide advice and guidance on the cases. 

For an attorney who has never practiced family 

law, having a mentor is crucial. Volunteer attorneys 

often cite their relationship with their 

mentors as a huge benefit of volunteering with 

the FLP. It is also an excellent way for attorneys 

to network, make connections, and develop their 

own practice. Moreover, the FLP offers ongoing 

supplemental trainings to its volunteer attorneys 

and mentors on isolated legal issues that arise 

in family law cases. In September, 2010, the 

FLP hosted a training for mentors on Finding 

Hidden Assets Without Breaking the Bank-Handling 

Difficult Discovery Issues on a Budget. In 

March, 2011, the FLP will co-sponsor a training 

with DOVE Inc. and the Bar Association of Norfolk 

County on family law basics with Judges Ordoñez, 

Case, Register McDermott, and Barbara Barrett 

from Probation participating in the training. 

Mentoring is an easy way to do pro bono work. 

It does not require anything more than an 

ability to talk and share your experience with 

another attorney. 

-Andrew Cornell, Attorney at Law and FLP 

Volunteer Mentor 

We have both really enjoyed being mentors 

for the Family Law Project—it is a great opportunity 

to share our family law expertise with 

an excellent cadre of dedicated attorneys who 

are eager to provide a much needed service 

to both the clients and the family law bar. On 

one particular case we mentored a seasoned 

attorney who was new to family law issues. 

This volunteer attorney had a complicated 

case with a client who had mental health 

Spring 2011 19

Family Law Project By Rachel Biscardi, Esq. 

issues and a substance abuse history. The 

volunteer attorney was extremely hard-working 

and committed to doing the best job that 

he could with a difficult set of facts. It felt like 

a real team effort and really showed how this 

program works to help clients who have limited 

options for quality legal representation. 

-Miriam H. Ruttenberg & Katherine S. Nemens, 

Mental Health Legal Advisors and 

FLP Volunteer Mentors 

“Helen”, a twenty-five year old native of Morocco, 

met her husband when she was sixteen and 

was married to him by age eighteen. They were 

married for six years, during which time Helen’s 

husband would split his time living with Helen in 

Morocco and living alone in the United States. He 

obtained a Visa for Helen telling her that it was 

her duty as a wife to move to the United States 

to be with him. Once she arrived, he treated her 

like his maid and hit her when she attempted 

to talk to her mother in Morocco. After a month 

had passed, he left the apartment they shared, 

serving her with a Complaint for Annulment alleging 

that Helen had married him fraudulently; 

solely to obtain legal status in the U.S. Helen 

did not understand the paperwork and she had 

no means of support, not even a telephone. By 

the time Helen was referred to the FLP, Helen’s 

husband had already obtained the annulment 

because Helen did not appear in court to contest 

it. According to Helen’s religious customs, she 

was now neither divorced nor married, but unmarriageable 

in the future because she had lost her 

virginity in a non-marriage. She could not stay in 

the United States because her Visa was tied to 

her husband and she could not return home for 

fear of shame and family embarrassment. The 

FLP Staff Attorney worked with the client on a motion 

to vacate the annulment judgment citing the 

Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure 

60(b). An FLP volunteer attorney drafted 

the memorandum of law in support of that motion. 

Based on the pleadings, the Court vacated 

the judgment for annulment, stating that “the 

relief available for the wife in a divorce action is 

much greater than in an annulment and that may 

explain why the husband chose that course of 

action.” Helen is now able to obtain a divorce, 

without the stigma of annulment, and can return 

to Morocco without family shame. 

The FLP is proud of its achievements. In 1995, 

the FLP won the R.O.S.E. Fund’s Distinguished 

Service Award. In 2003, the Women’s Bar Foundation 

received a Supreme Judicial Court Adams 

Pro Bono Publico Award for distinguished service 

and outstanding commitment. In 2004, the FLP 

received the Public Service Award from the National 

Conference of Women’s Bar Associations. 

If you are interested in either being a mentor or 

a volunteer attorney with the Family Law Project, 

please contact Rachel Biscardi at rbiscardi@ 

womensbar.org 

20 Spring 2011

Gaining Experience Through Giving Back 

By Alexis B. Kaplan, Esq. 

I began volunteering my time at my local children’s 

science museum when I was just 13 years 

old, and I continued doing so until I left for college. 

I have always believed in giving back to my 

community, which is one of the reasons I became 

a lawyer. 

So, while I was waiting for my bar results, I decided 

to volunteer with the Volunteer Lawyers Project 

(“VLP”), and to again give back to my community. 

Through VLP, I have found both a great learning 

experience as well as a meaningful way to spend 

my time assisting people. Instead of law school 

courses focusing on theory, I attended VLP skills 

training courses on Guardianship of Minors and 

Adults in pursuit of a different kind of learning 

- learning to use my years of law school in order 

to help people. 

I have since attended many VLP guardianship 

clinics at Suffolk Probate and Family Court and 

have learned not just how to petition for guardianship, 

but also that what I do is truly helpful to the 

people who show up needing assistance. I have 

learned the significance of pro bono work and 

how important doing pro bono work is in benefiting 

those in our community who cannot afford 

legal help. I know that I have helped many more 

people than just those whom I have assisted 

with their guardianship petitions--I have also, and 

more importantly, helped children and incapacitated 

adults have better opportunities for housing, 

medical treatment, and schooling. 

offer vouchers for free CLE courses, they provide 

mentors for cases taken on by their newer panel 

attorneys, and they provide malpractice insurance 

coverage for the volunteer attorney’s work on any 

of their pro bono cases. 

In addition to guardianship petitions, the volunteer 

lawyers also assist clients in family law situations. 

I have already accepted my first pro bono 

domestic relations case. VLP provides training 

courses for family law matters, which has been 

helpful to me, since that is the area in which I am 

now practicing. 

Whether you are looking for experience in a new 

area of law, or want to use some of your legal 

expertise assisting low income clients, I strongly 

recommend getting involved in Volunteer Lawyers 

Project and giving back to our community. 

VLP has also provided me with an opportunity 

that, as a new lawyer, I am very grateful to have. I 

have met many other lawyers who also are donating 

their time and experience for this pro bono 

work, and I have had the ability to ask questions 

of and learn from the VLP staff. VLP provides 

resources and support to new lawyers in addition 

to their basic training programs. They also 

Spring 2011 21

Upcoming Events 

Social Media and the First Amendment in Family Law Cases 

Tuesday, April 12, 2011 5:30 PM 

As more and more people use different forms of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, individual 

blogs, MySpace, etc., more and more venues are created in which parties to contested family law 

cases can air their grievances. But at what point is a parent’s blogging about their divorce become 

the purview of the Court? Can and should judges make orders restricting the scope of a parent’s 

speech on their blog when it is about the party? About the litigation? If it is accessible to the minor 

children? If judges are making orders based on what they believe is in the child’s best interests, how 

is that weighed against the parent’s right to free speech in the age of social media when anyone can 

post just about anything on-line for people to read? 

Join us for a dynamic program on the balancing act between the best interests of a child and a 

parent’s right to free speech in the age of social media. Hear from Mary-Rose Papandrea, Associate 

Professor, Boston College School of Law, Hon. Spencer M. Kagan, Associate Justice, Middlesex 

Probate and Family Court, and Jeff Soilson, Burns & Levinson, LLP, on this delicate legal balance. 

Divorce Issues in Elder Law Practices 

Tuesday, May 17, 2011 12:30 PM 

Elder law attorneys are called on to advise clients in protecting assets from the cost of long-term care. 

Part of this planning requires an understanding of divorce issues that effect elders and their children. 

Speaker Doris F. Tennant, Tennant Lubell, LLC, will focus on how irrevocable trusts, QDRO’s, and the 

division of marital assets are effected by a divorcing client or child of a client. 

Resources 

Legal Advocacy & Resource Center, Inc. (LARC) a special project of the Boston Bar Foundation with 

additional financial support provided by the Massachusetts Bar Foundation. 

The LARC Intake Update is a monthly newsletter that lists current intake information for major legal 

services programs throughout the state of Massachusetts. The first section lists general civil legal 

programs, and the second section lists programs that handle specific legal topics. 

A link to this newsletter can be found here: http://www.bostonbar.org/sc/fl/Intake_Update_May_ 

2010.pdf. 

22 Spring 2011

Editors 

Wendy O. Hickey 

Theresa B. Ramos 

Wendy O. Hickey is a graduate of Suffolk 

University School of Law (2003 cum laude), 

Suffolk University (1998) and Fisher College 

(1994). Ms. Hickey has been working at Nissenbaum 

Law Offices since 1994 first as a 

paralegal and, since 2003, as an associate 

handling all aspects of family law cases. She 

has a particular interest in matters involving 

international parental kidnapping cases 

and has been involved in many cases dealing 

with the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of 

International Child Abduction. 

Ms. Hickey is admitted to practice in Massachusetts 

(2003), the U.S. District Court 

(Massachusetts 2004), and the U.S. Court of 

Appeals (1st Circuit 2007). She is active in 

the Boston Bar Association (Member of the 

Family Law Section Steering Committee and 

Co-Chair of the Family Law Section Newsletter 

Sub-Committee) and is also a member of the 

Massachusetts Bar Association, the Women’s 

Bar Association and the American Bar Association. 

Theresa B. Ramos, Esq. is an associate at 

Rosenberg, Freedman & Goldstein LLP, concentrating 

in family law, since 2005. Prior to 

joining RF&G LLP, Ms. Ramos was an associate 

at Partridge, Ankner & Horstmann, LLP and Of 

Counsel to Lisa A. Greenberg, where 

she focused on family law. In addition, Ms. 

Ramos served as a Law Clerk to the Justices of 

the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court. 

She is a member of the Massachusetts Bar 

Association and the Boston Bar Association. 

Additionally, Ms. Ramos is the current cochair 

of the BBA Family Law Newsletter, past 

co-chair of the New Lawyers sub-committee 

of the Family Law Steering Committee, and a 

past member of the MBA Family Law Section 

Council. She also participates in the Limited Assistance 

Representation program through the 

Suffolk Probate Court. Ms. Ramos graduated 

from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 

(B.A., 1994/ Political Science & Sociology) 

and Suffolk University Law School (J.D., 2001). 

Ms. Ramos has been named a “Rising Star” in 

Boston Magazine and Law & Politics, Massachusetts 

Super Lawyers, 2009 and 2010. 

Spring 2011 23

Contributors 

Rachel Biscardi 

Rachel Biscardi is the Director of the Women’s 

Bar Foundation’s Family Law Project (WBF- 

FLP) where she recruits, trains, and mentors 

attorneys to represent victims of domestic 

violence, pro bono, in the Probate and Family 

Court. Before joining the WBF, Ms. Biscardi 

worked at Legal Assistance Corporation of Central 

Massachusetts, the Essex County District 

Attorney’s Office, and clerked in the Probate 

and Family Court. Ms. Biscardi is a member of 

the Boston Bar Association’s Family Law Steering 

Committee and is the Co-Chair of the BBA 

Continuing Legal Education committee. Ms. 

Biscardi is also Co-Chair of the Domestic and 

Sexual Violence Coalition which is comprised 

of law firms, district attorney’s offices, legal 

service agencies, and batterer’s intervention 

programs. Ms. Biscardi serves as the Women’s 

Bar Association’s representative on the Legislative 

Task Force on Alimony convened by the 

Judiciary Committee. Ms. Biscardi is also an 

active member of the Family Law Task Force 

which is comprised of legal service attorneys 

from across the state that practice family law 

for low-income victims of domestic violence. 

Ms. Biscardi is a graduate of Boston University 

School of Law with a specialization in litigation 

and dispute resolution. 

Kevin Corr 

Kevin M. Corr is a cum laude graduate of Suffolk 

University Law School (1992) and Syracuse 

University (1988). A member of the Massachusetts, 

New York and Connecticut State bars, 

he has been engaged in the practice of Family 

Law for more than nineteen years, and was 

recently appointed to the MBA’s Family Law 

Section Council (2010-2011). Mr. Corr is a Fellow 

of the American Academy of Matrimonial 

Lawyers (AAML), currently serving on the local 

Chapter’s Board of Managers. 

Mr. Corr’s practice covers all areas of Family 

Law with a focus on divorce, property division 

and support issues. He has been recognized 

as one of Massachusetts’ “Super Lawyers” 

(2008-2010) by Boston Magazine, and as a 

“Rising Star Super Lawyer” in 2005. 

Mr. Corr and David H. Lee successfully co-counseled 

the trial (2008) and appeal (2009-2010) 

that led to the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision 

in Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 457 Mass. 283 

(July 2010), a case of first impression in which 

the SJC approved the use of mid-marriage 

(post-nuptial) agreements between spouses. 

For his work in that case, Mr. Corr was recognized 

by Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly as 

one of the 2010 “Lawyers of the Year.” 

24 Spring 2011

Contributors 

Kristine Ann Cummings 

Alexis B. Kaplan 

Kristine is an associate with the law firm of 

Sally & Fitch LLP. Her practice encompasses all 

aspects of family law and probate litigation, including 

divorce, custody, modification, removal, 

domestic violence and paternity issues, as well 

as equity actions, guardianship and fiduciary 

litigation of trust and estate matters. Kristine 

regularly handles cases that involve complex 

financial and tax issues such as business and 

asset valuation, alimony and child support 

structured payments for tax deductibility and 

capital gains tax issues. 

Alexis B. Kaplan is an associate at McCaig Law 

Offices, a family law firm in Boston. A 2010 

graduate of Suffolk University Law School, Ms. 

Kaplan has been active with VLP since August 

2010. She also serves as a member on the 

BBA New Lawyers Section Pro Bono Subcommittee 

and the BBA Family Law Section Newsletter 

Subcommittee. 

Kristine presently serves on the Steering Committee 

of the Family Law Section of the Boston 

Bar Association, and holds the position of Pro- 

Bono Committee Co-Chair. She has lectured 

on general issues raised by military service in 

the context of domestic relations matters in 

connection with pre-deployment seminars for 

service members. Kristine is steadfastly committed 

to pro bono work and regularly represents 

victims of domestic violence through the 

Women’s Bar Foundation. Kristine also provides 

legal assistance to low-income residents 

of Greater Boston through the Volunteer Lawyers 

Project of the BBA. 

Spring 2011 25

Contributors 

Roseanne Klovee 

Rosanne Klovee is a partner in the law firm of 

Carney & Bassil focusing her practice on family 

law, including divorce, modifications, paternity, 

and custody disputes. She is also a trained 

family law mediator. 

Rosanne graduated cum laude from Suffolk 

University Law School in 2001. She has been 

recognized as a Rising Star by Boston Magazine 

and Super Lawyers Magazine for the past 

several years. She is an active member of the 

Boston Bar Association, the Massachusetts 

Probate and Family Inns of Court and serves 

on the Advisory Committee for the Family Law 

Section of MCLE. 

26 Spring 2011

Section Leadership 2010-2011 

Section Co-Chairs 

Frances Giordano 

Rubin and Rudman LLP 

50 Rowes Wharf 

Boston, MA 02110 

(617) 330-7008 

fgiordano@rubinrudman.com 

Kelly A. Leighton 

Barnes and Leighton 

70 Washington St., Suite 402 

Salem, MA 01970 

(978) 744-2002 

kelly.a.leighton@gmail.com 

CLE 

Rachel B. Biscardi 

Women’s Bar Foundation 

27 School Street, Suite 500 


(617)973-6666 

rbiscardi@womensbar.org 

Jennifer Sevigney Durand 

Schmidt & Federico PC 

10 St. James Avenue, 16th Floor 


(617) 695-0021 

jennifer.durand@schmidt-federico.com 

Pro Bono 

Amy Egloff 

Schlesinger & Buchbinder 

1200 Walnut Street 

Newton, MA 02461 

(617) 965-3500 

aegloff@sab-law.com 

Kristine Ann Cummings 

One Beacon Street, 16th Floor 


(617) 542-5542 

kac@sally-fitch.com 

Newsletter 

Wendy Overbaugh Hickey 

Nissenbaum Law Offices 

160 Federal Street, 24th Floor 


(617) 330-9090 

wendy@nissenbaumlaw.com 

Theresa B. Ramos 

Rosenberg, Freedman & Goldstein 

246 Walnut Street, Suite 201 


(617) 964-7000 

tramos@rfglawyers.com 

Legislation 

Lee M. Peterson 

McCarter & English, LLP 

265 Franklin Street 


(617) 449-6553 

jpeterson@mccarter.com 

Gayle Stone-Turesky 

Stone, Stone & Creem 

One Washington Mall 


(617) 523-4567 

gstone-turesky@sscattorneys.com 

Brown Bag 

Francine Gardikas 

Burns & Levinson LLP 

125 Summer Street 


(617) 345-3000 

fgardikas@burnslev.com 

Katherine Sonia Nemens 

Clubhouse Family Legal Support Project 

Mental Health Legal Advisors 

399 Washington Street, 4th Floor 


(617) 338-2345 

knemens@mhlac.org 

Members 

Aimee Bonacorsi 

Law Office of Amy Bonacorsi, LLC 

134 Main Street 

Watertown, MA 02472 

(617) 924-8800 

bonacorsi.law@gmail.com 

Krishna Butaney 

Assistant Judicial Case Manager 

Middlesex Probate & Family Court 

208 Cambridge Street 

P.O. Box 410-480 

East Cambridge, MA 02141 

Krishna.butaney@jud.state.ma.us 

Peter G. Coulombe 

Massachusetts Department of Revenue 

100 Cambridge Street 

P.O. Box 9561 


coulombep@dor.state.ma.us 

Jinanne S. Elder 

Bowman, Moos, Elder & Noe 

222 Third Street, Suite 3220 

Cambridge, MA 02142 

(617) 494-8808 

elder@bmenlaw.com 

John Adams Fiske 

Healy, Fiske, Richmond & Matthew 

189 Cambridge St 

Cambridge, MA 02141 

(617) 354-7133 

jadamsfiske@yahoo.com 

Steven Gurdin 

Sally & Fitch LLP 

One Beacon Street, 16th Floor 


(617) 830-1221 

seg@sally-fitch.com 

Spring 2011 27

Roseanne Klovee 

Carney & Bassil, PC 

20 Park Plaza, Suite 1405 


(617) 338-5566 

rklovee@carneybassil.com 

Abbe L. Hershberg 

Greater Boston Legal Services 

197 Friend Street 


(617) 371-1234 

ahershberg@gbls.org 

Peter Jamieson 

Perocchi Family Group 

859 Turnpike Street, Suite 232 

North Andover, MA 01845 

pjj@nalegal.com 

Alexander David Jones 

Looney & Grossman, LLP 

101 Arch Street, 9th Floor 


(617) 951-2800 

ajones@lgllp.com 

Ellen S. Kief 

Law Office of Ellen S. Kief 

99 Summer Street 

Suite 1600 


ekief@kieflaw.com 

Melinda Markvan 

Nissenbaum Law Offices 

160 Federal Street, 24th Floor 


melinda_markvan@hotmail.com 

Linda Ouellette 

Denner Pellegrino, LLP 

4 Longfellow Place, 35th Floor 


(617) 227-2800 

louelette@dennerpellegrino.com 

Katherine M. Potter 

Suffolk Probate and Family Court 

24 New Chardon Street 


(617) 788-8300 

katherine.potter@jud.state.ma.us 

Thomas Ritter 

Atwood & Cherny, PC 

101 Huntington Avenue, 25th Floor 


(617) 262-6400 

tritter@atwoodcherny.com 

Joanne E. Romanow 

Casner & Edwards, LLP 

303 Congress Street 


(617) 426-5900 

romanow@casneredwards.com 

Joshua S. Tracey 

Tracey & Associates, LLP 

535 Boylston Street, 8th Floor 


(617) 236-1800 

jst@joshtraceylaw.com 

Jocelynne Welsh 

Probate and Family Court 

John Adams Courthouse 

One Pemberton Square 


(617) 788-6600 

jocelynne.welsh@jud.state.ma.us 

Lisa Wilson 

Wilson, Marino & Bonnevie, P.C. 

288 Walnut Street 


(617) 964-8090 

wilson@wmblawfirm.com 

ARTICLES WANTED 

You are all invited and encouraged to contribute an article on any subject of interest. Please 

contact, Wendy Hickey, wendy@nissenbaumlaw.com, to pursue this further. 

28 Spring 2011

Family Law Section - Boston Bar Association

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