Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

16 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE
desire to challenge this hierarchy. Their primary concern was instead to maintain
the separation of the two realms, thus protecting their right to use rational, and
only rational, arguments in philosophical contexts. Just as it was necessary, they
asserted, when discussing matters of faith, to leave behind one’s philosophical
mentality, so when discussing philosophy, one had to set aside one’s Christian
faith. 4
Scholastics read Aristotle in late medieval Latin translations, which were
unclassical in style and terminology. This type of Latin continued to be one of
the hallmarks of scholastic treatises produced during the Renaissance. Another
was their rigidly logical format: works were divided and subdivided into
propositions or questions; arguments for and against were laid out; a solution
was reached; possible objections were raised and appropriate responses supplied.
This structure had the advantage of covering issues from all possible angles and
ensuring that the opinions of a wide variety of ancient and medieval thinkers
were aired, even if Aristotle’s were the most frequently endorsed.
In the judgement of Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca, 1304–74), the founder of
Italian humanism, such treatises were barbaric, tediously pedantic, arid and
incomprehensible. 5 His own style was diametrically opposed to that of the
scholastics. He modelled his Latin prose on that of the best classical authors,
avoiding terms and expressions which were unknown in antiquity. He also
eschewed the methodical rigour and systematic presentation found in scholastic
treatises, favouring instead a loose—almost at times rambling—structure and
adopting genres such as the letter, dialogue and invective which had been used
by the Roman authors he most admired.
Deeply interested in the state of his own soul, Petrarch ridiculed the
scholastics for devoting so much of their energies to natural, rather than moral,
philosophy: ‘What is the use,’ he asked, ‘of knowing the nature of quadrupeds,
fowls, fishes, and serpents and not knowing or even neglecting man’s nature…?’
The secrets of nature were ‘mysteries of God’, which Christians should accept
with ‘humble faith’ rather than attempt to seize ‘in haughty arrogance’. 6 As for
scholastic logicians, Petrarch had nothing but contempt for what he regarded as
their empty loquacity and their addiction to disputation for its own sake: ‘They
get the greatest pleasure out of strife and set out not to find the truth but to
quarrel.’ 7 He especially disliked the logica modernorum, a highly technical and
semantically orientated form of dialectic associated with William of Ockham and
his followers, which had come over to Italy from England in the mid-fourteenth
century. Petrarch believed that it reduced all speculation to problems of formal
terminology, thereby deflecting philosophers from more important matters and
turning theologians into mere dialecticians. 8
Another aspect of scholasticism attacked by Petrarch was the dominance of
Aristotelianism. While there was much of value in Aristotle’s philosophy, there
was also a great deal that from a Christian point of view was harmful, in
particular his failure to give a firm endorsement to the immortality of the soul
and his belief in the eternity of the world. Aristotle was not alone among pagans