ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - Advocatennet
ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - Advocatennet ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - Advocatennet
III. Exclusionary abuses: recent pricing cases -two post-Discussion Paper cases - • Loyalty rebates: Tomra (2006) – Fidelity-building: the so-called suction effect (challenged by Tomra) – Exclusionary effect: empirical evidence (e.g. stability of Tomra’s market share, no successful market entry, more sales during the period where more exclusionary practices were at play). • Margin squeeze: Telefonica (2007) – The benchmark: the smaller-but-equally-efficient competitor – Exclusionary effect: empirical evidence (e.g. Telefonica’s growth rates surpassing by far that of its competitors) and harm on consumers (e.g. Spanish broadband access costs 20% more than the EU-15 average. 16
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- Page 5 and 6: I. Art. 82 EC: general issues (3) -
- Page 7 and 8: II. Exclusionary abuses: analytical
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III. Exclusionary abuses: recent pricing cases<br />
-two post-Discussion Paper cases -<br />
• Loyalty rebates: Tomra (2006)<br />
– Fidelity-building: the so-called suction effect (challenged by Tomra)<br />
– Exclusionary effect: empirical evidence (e.g. stability of Tomra’s market share, no successful<br />
market entry, more sales during the period where more exclusionary practices were at play).<br />
• Margin squeeze: Telefonica (2007)<br />
– The benchmark: the smaller-but-equally-efficient competitor<br />
– Exclusionary effect: empirical evidence (e.g. Telefonica’s growth rates surpassing by far that<br />
of its competitors) and harm on consumers (e.g. Spanish broadband access costs 20%<br />
more than the EU-15 average.<br />
16
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