ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - Advocatennet

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II. Exclusionary abuses: analytical framework (8) - Microsoft - • Foreclosure: market distorting effect? – Refusal to deal: diluting the Magill and IMS conditions? • The degree of lessening competition • The degree of novelty of the products whose emergence is prevented – Tying: diluting the Hilti and Tetrapak conditions? • Foreclosure is not the primary issue • Foreclosure depends on behavior of third parties (content providers) 14
II. Exclusionary abuses: analytical framework (9) - Microsoft - • Justifications: “special responsibility” of the dominant company – Refusal to deal: weighing the incentives for innovation (paragraphs 697 – 710) • those for Microsoft not chilled? • those for competitors taken for granted? – Tying: integrating new functionalities into existing product (paragraph 1150) • adding functionalities is fine, but tying product must also be offered on stand-alone basis, even if there is only limited demand for it. 15
Page 1 and 2: Brussels Bar, Flemish Section 3rd I
Page 3 and 4: • Continental Can I. Art. 82 EC:
Page 5 and 6: I. Art. 82 EC: general issues (3) -
Page 7 and 8: II. Exclusionary abuses: analytical
Page 13: II. Exclusionary abuses: analytical

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - Advocatennet

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