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THE<br />

INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

<strong>2009</strong><br />

<strong>Volume</strong> <strong>VI</strong> | <strong>Quarterly</strong> <strong>Issue</strong>: <strong>31st</strong> <strong>May</strong> <strong>2009</strong><br />

www.iipmthinktank.com<br />

www.gidf.org<br />

MANAGEMENT OF<br />

DEVELOPMENT<br />

RETHINK<br />

EDIFY<br />

DELINEATE<br />

INSIDE THIS ISSUE<br />

Winds of Change<br />

Can We Change?<br />

Corruption Concerns<br />

Bourgeois Bohemians<br />

Global Good<br />

Turbulent Times<br />

A N I I P M T H I N K T A N K<br />

&<br />

G R E A T I N D I A N D R E A M F O U N D A T I O N P R E S E N T A T I O N


THE GREAT INDIAN DREAM<br />

“A Society where man is at the centre of all activities,<br />

a society where exploitation of man by man has been<br />

abolished, where he is cared for as an in a family, where<br />

“to each according to his need’ is practised, a society where<br />

non bureaucratic National Economic Planning is given due<br />

importance for sustainable optimum growth, where adequate<br />

social safety net is a reality and yet market’s advantages are<br />

fully taken care of for creativity and entrepreneurship, such<br />

a society can be truly described as humane society and the<br />

vision as “Humanism”.<br />

Dr. M K Chaudhuri<br />

The Great Indian Dream, 2003, Macmillan<br />

India,New Delhi<br />

“Let us together dream of a country where poor are not<br />

just merely reduced to statistics but where there are no poor.<br />

Let there be a day when small children are taken to a poverty<br />

museum like science museum where they shiver at the plight<br />

of the way people used to live in the last millennium. Let this<br />

dream take the form of a revolution and as long as our dreams<br />

keep outweighing our memories, India would remain a young<br />

and dynamic nation on this path to global equality. And for<br />

this let the wait not be for eternity. Let us together achieve this<br />

in the next 25 years.”<br />

Prof. Arindam Chaudhuri<br />

The Great Indian Dream, 2003, Macmillan<br />

India,New Delhi


IIPM: THE FUTURE IS HERE<br />

Since its incorporation (1973), IIPM has been an institution with privileged traditions, in the diversity of its fraternity, its global outlook, its world<br />

class research and its commitment to alternative national economic planning process.<br />

It can be said, without much oversimplification that there are no ‘underdeveloped economies’. There are only ‘under managed’ countries. Japan<br />

140 years was ago was an underdeveloped country by every material measurement. But it very quickly produced management of great competence,<br />

indeed of excellence. The policy inference is that ‘management’ is the prime mover and ‘development’ is the consequence. At IIPM, every one<br />

considers that development is a matter of human energies rather than economic wealth. And the generation and direction of these human energies<br />

is the task of ‘management’. Accordingly, we formed The Great Indian Dream. Unlike any other dream, this is one dream which each one of us<br />

are determined to realise and that too in our own lifetimes. Each bit of cynicism and condemnation from pessimists makes us evolve even stronger<br />

and determined.<br />

All our endeavours and initiative is towards realisation of this dream, where in we produce committed ‘bare foot’ managers and entrepreneurs<br />

who are needed by nation, on an insistent basis. As an educational institute, we aim at initializing a three dimensional personality in IIPMites, viz.<br />

Pursuit of knowledge in economics and management<br />

Commitment to economic, social, political and technological upliftment of masses and<br />

Cultivation of taste for literature, fine arts and etc.<br />

Economists often have limited access to the practical problems facing senior managers, while senior managers often lack the time and motivation<br />

to look beyond their own industry to the larger issues of the global economy. It has set before it the twin tasks: to reorient education and research<br />

towards the needs of both the private and public sectors and to establish the link between the National Economic Planning and the development<br />

of private enterprises in Indian economy. IIPM dares to look beyond, and understands that what we teach today, other adopt tomorrow. IIPM’s<br />

service output (education, research and consulting,) is a unique combination of two distinct disciplines: economics and management. Through<br />

this integration, IIPM helps guide business and policy leaders in shaping the Indian and global economy, bringing together the practical insights of<br />

industry with broader national and global perspectives.<br />

A hall mark of IIPM is that it is armed with the comparative advantage of engaging the committed, passionate and brightest management post<br />

graduates and undergraduates, who pursued the education at IIPM and subsequently joined it, to realise the dream. IIPM alumni, spread across the<br />

globe, holding crucial decision-making positions in the corporate sector, are bonded by the one ideology of making a positive difference, turning<br />

that ideology into a movement itself.<br />

The India Economy Review is another humble initiative towards the realisation of the same and more distinctly, engaging the broader publics<br />

and pertinent stakeholders.<br />

SEARCH, SIEVE, SCHEME...<br />

In economics, like in everyday existence, it is imperative to hear, perceive and consider what others have to say. Each issue of The IER brings<br />

together a selection of important contributions on a particular theme, authored by some of the brightest minds in different areas of Indian economics.<br />

The provocation for publishing these issues arises from the fact that over the years economic journals have become copious, exclusive and expensive.<br />

Most of the journals and a good many of the books have gone beyond the cerebral and financial reach of general students and other scholars. It is<br />

for them that these issues are primarily being raised and debated here.<br />

Much about India is transparent enough. One does not require detailed criteria, cunning calibration or probing analysis to pinpoint India’s<br />

problems and recognise its antecedents. There is in fact much that is perceptible about India. But not everything about India is even if simplistic is<br />

so simple. The learned reader would appreciate the fact that India is like an elephant that looms too large to be grasped within a distinct structure<br />

and paradigm the constituent parts of which would fail to reveal the entirety. Obviously and observably, no suggested solution to any protracted<br />

and complex socio-economic problem will satisfy all sides and stake-holders evenly. Consequently, there exists an enormous diversity in economic<br />

thinking and perspectives, as is also reflected in the viewpoints of different expert contributors in this issue. The intended outcome of this exercise is to<br />

facilitate the invention, improvement, deliberation and dissemination of innovation in economic thinking and national economic planning, insisting<br />

merely on well-grounded, open and unbiased debates, without predetermined outcomes. It is impossible to do justice to the entire field of Indian<br />

economics in a single issue. The topics selected for this issue are those which are of critical and immediate importance to India. Majority of them were<br />

freshly and exclusively written. Encapsulated, it is a constructive attempt aimed at helping India actualise its promises and potential. The editors hope<br />

that this issue of IER proffer the reader a flavour of dynamism and excitement and persuade her/him to participate in the journey towards realising<br />

‘The Great Indian Dream’. At the same time, it illuminates the terrible, practical problems of India and Bharat.<br />

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS<br />

The IIPM Think Tank likes to thank all the internal faculty who have been instrumental in coordinating with<br />

many authors all across India and according their unstinted support. The assistance of Prof. R.Krishnan (IIPM<br />

Lucknow) Prof. Amlan Ray (IIPM Lucknow), Prof. Tareque Laskar (IIPM Bangalore) and Mr. Robin Thomas<br />

(IIPM Ahmedabad) has been more valuable than, perhaps, they realise. Mr. R. Nagendra Prasad, Senior<br />

Manager at SMG, IIPM Hyderabad, particularly did all that it was possible to do for this issue of IER. Lastly,<br />

Prof. Shyam.S.Pujala (Dean, IIPM Hyderabad) deserves a special mention for his eager and energetic support,<br />

without which this issue would not have been possible.


CREDITS<br />

Founder<br />

Dr. M. K. Chaudhuri<br />

Editor-in-Chief<br />

Arindam Chaudhuri<br />

Managing Editor<br />

Prasoon.S. Majumdar<br />

Deputy Editor<br />

M.N.V.V.K. Chaitanya<br />

Consulting Editor<br />

Prashanto Banerji<br />

Research Fellows<br />

Pathikrit Payne<br />

Shweta Shukla<br />

Sray Agarwal<br />

Akram Hoque<br />

Mrinmoy Dey<br />

Mufaddal Poonawala<br />

Group Design Director<br />

Satyajit Datta<br />

Senior Designer<br />

Amit Sharma<br />

Designer<br />

Dinesh Chandelkar, Saurabh Mishra<br />

Parvesh Kumar Swami, Sandeep Sharma<br />

Sujit Singh, Satyakam Banerjee<br />

Senior Illustrator<br />

Shantanu Mitra<br />

Production Manager<br />

Gurudas Mallik Thakur<br />

Production Supervisors<br />

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Chief Marketing Advisor<br />

Amit Saxena<br />

Marketing & Sales<br />

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IER Online<br />

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Principal Offices<br />

Satbari, Chandan Haula, Chattarpur,<br />

Bhatimines Road, New Delhi - 110074<br />

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We are keen to hear from anyone, who would like to<br />

know more about IIPM Publications. You can e-mail on<br />

shweta.shukla@iipm.edu or alternatively call Ms.Shweta<br />

at 9811895267<br />

Additional Thinking<br />

www.iipmthinktank.com<br />

www.iipm.edu<br />

www.iipmpublications.com<br />

www.arindamchaudhuri.com<br />

www.thesundayindian.com<br />

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Printed by:<br />

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Disclaimer :<br />

All efforts have been taken to ensure the veracity of the information<br />

contained in the research, however the IIPM Think Tank expressly<br />

disclaims any and all warranties, express or implied, including<br />

without limitation warranties of merchantability and fitness for a<br />

particular purpose, with respect to any service or material. In no<br />

event shall the IIPM Think Tank be liable for any direct, indirect,<br />

incidental, punitive, or consequential damages of any kind<br />

whatsoever with respect to the and materials, although the reader<br />

may freely use the research and material provided, the IIPM Think<br />

Tank retains all trademark right and copyright on all the text<br />

and graphics.<br />

The First Words And The Last Word<br />

A Hard Look at the Soft Practice of Managing Development<br />

Dear Reader,<br />

Currently, the main focus of all – those who<br />

matter and those who don’t – is on the current<br />

global crisis. But even with optimistic assumptions<br />

about sustained growth in the industrialised<br />

world, limited capital flows and trade<br />

growth are likely to remain serious constraints<br />

to developing economies growth, including<br />

India. Raising living standards and combating<br />

poverty for us will actually depend more than<br />

ever on achieving greater efficiency in the use<br />

of human and material resources. Governments<br />

everywhere must wrestle with difficult<br />

management problems as they seek to fulfill<br />

their heavy and varied responsibilities.<br />

Against this backdrop, Indian economy has<br />

uniquely demonstrated remarkable resilience.<br />

How has the country managed to cope? Is India<br />

finally emerging as an engine of global<br />

demand? Can its economy engender enough<br />

new jobs to maintain social stability? What<br />

will drive future growth, and how should policy<br />

mandarins adapt? In this issue, a panel of<br />

leading Indian and international economists<br />

explores these questions and other pertinent<br />

socio-economic issues.<br />

Should India, the world’s largest democracy,<br />

merely take its seat in the G20? Or, should<br />

India also help the nations of the world take a<br />

more democratic and inclusive governance<br />

direction? Dr. Barry Herman’s paper about<br />

global governance is a brief for how it might<br />

support the latter. Dr. C. Ramachandraiah<br />

argues in his paper that urban transport policies<br />

should be city specific and be designed to<br />

suit is geography, heritage, history and land<br />

use patterns. Manu Sankar Subhagalal’s article<br />

aims to give an overview of the energy sector<br />

in India and advocates for the right kind<br />

Prasoon.S Majumdar<br />

Managing Editor<br />

M.N.V.V.K.Chaitanya<br />

Deputy Editor<br />

of balance to be struck for economic growth<br />

and environmental sustainability. In financial<br />

sector, lack of channelizing existing<br />

recourses, catastrophic policy implementation<br />

and lower technological penetration<br />

and adoption are the main causes of financial<br />

exclusion, as pointed by Ms. Purti<br />

Sharma in her research paper. Prof. Rafiq<br />

Dossani, Executive Director, South Asia<br />

Initiative at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford<br />

University elucidates that, in a growing<br />

economy, the incentives for institutional<br />

corruption are higher because higher<br />

bribes are more affordable than when the<br />

economic pie is small. Mustering the collective<br />

will to tackle these forms of corruption<br />

remains a challenge for India in the<br />

twenty first century. The common thread<br />

running through all these topics is ‘managing<br />

efficiency’ for greater development experience.<br />

Lastly and on a different note, thank you<br />

for inspiring and encouraging our team<br />

every day. Over the coming months, you<br />

will see more exciting changes in IER. The<br />

best is yet to come.<br />

Best<br />

Prasoon.S.Majumdar<br />

M.N.V.V.K. Chaitanya


(F)ACT SHEET<br />

Cover Design: Dinesh Chandelkar<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Bird of Gold<br />

India on Top<br />

David A Andelman 08<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

The Poverty Puzzle<br />

Demographics of Poverty and Economic<br />

Growth<br />

K.R. Shah 14<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

A Growth Paradigm<br />

Road to Rendition<br />

Pathikrit Payne 26<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Golden Drop<br />

Problem of Water Pollution in India: A<br />

Possible Solution<br />

Arpita Khanna 32<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

(Na)No Way Forward<br />

Urban Transport in India: A contested<br />

<strong>Issue</strong><br />

C. Ramachandraiah 40<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Watered Down<br />

Urban Water Supply Sector in India: The<br />

Need for the Management Reforms in<br />

the ULBs<br />

Ramakrishna Nallathiga 46<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Corruption Concerns<br />

Corruption and corporate governance in<br />

India<br />

Rafiq Dossani 56<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

India Insured<br />

A review of the Regulatory and<br />

Developmental Role of IRDA in context to<br />

the Indian Insurance Market<br />

Sanjay Tewari 68<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Innovative Inclusion<br />

Financial Inclusion by Channelizing<br />

Existing Resources in India<br />

Purti Sharma 76<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

India Calling<br />

MVNO: A new Business Paradigm in the<br />

Telecom Industry in India<br />

Hardikkumar Doshi, Gaurav Joshi and Mahim<br />

Sagar 84<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Rise of Renewables<br />

Renewable Energy and Its Policy<br />

Prospects in India<br />

Manu Sankar Subhagalal 88<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Winds of Change<br />

Five “Gs”: Lessons from world Trade For<br />

Governing Global Climate<br />

William Antholis 96<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Good Governance<br />

Globalisation to Global Governance:<br />

Hegemony to Legitimacy?<br />

B. Ramesh Babu 112<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Global Good<br />

We Can Have Better Global Economic<br />

Governance<br />

Barry Herman 114<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

The New Mantra<br />

More Effective Global Financial<br />

Regulation<br />

K. U. Mada 120<br />

MANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT:<br />

Knowledge Without Borders<br />

Internationalization of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights and its Impact on the<br />

Developing Countries: A Review<br />

K.K.Saxena and Ruchi Sharma 124<br />

FINANACIAL ECONOMICS: Paper Money<br />

Just How Much Money is at Stake in<br />

Shares Pledged by Promoters?<br />

Jayesh Kumar 140<br />

ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY:<br />

Bourgeois Bohemians<br />

Consumerism in the Eyes of A Rational<br />

Optimist<br />

Suchismita Mondal Sarkar 146<br />

POLITICAL ECONOMY: In Perspective<br />

A Different Perspective on the US-India<br />

Nuclear Deal<br />

Peter Custers 150<br />

POLITICAL ECONOMY:<br />

The Elephant and the Dragon<br />

What Difference Does a Revolution Make?<br />

A Preliminary Contrast of India & China<br />

Robert Weil 158<br />

USA: Can we Change?<br />

The Obama Crossroads: Neo-Liberal Coup<br />

or Responsible Government<br />

John McMurtry 164<br />

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS:<br />

Turbulent Times<br />

Post- Soviet Central Asia: <strong>Issue</strong>s and<br />

Problems of Security and Cooperation<br />

R.G.Gidadhubli 168<br />

MICRO MACRO: Rice Bowl<br />

The Shrinking Rice Paddies of Kerala<br />

Nikhil Raj and PA Azeez 176


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

“India on Top”<br />

David A. Andelman<br />

Editor, World Policy Journal,<br />

Published by the World Policy Institute<br />

and the MIT Press<br />

Two rivals are contesting for the economic domination<br />

of the Asian mainland in the 21 st century—a<br />

quiet contest that will only intensify in the course<br />

of the next ninety years. Ultimately, it will be won by<br />

India, but not without some considerable frictions en<br />

route and some powerful economic, as well as political<br />

and military forces, that will come to define the process.<br />

But it is the demographic forces, already intense in both<br />

nations, and the responses to such challenges by the<br />

government of each that will truly shape the battlefield.<br />

By mid-century, according to this year’s most recent<br />

United Nations estimates, India’s population will have<br />

passed China’s, assuming the role of the world’s largest<br />

nation. Indeed, the crossover is projected to take place<br />

sometime during the period 2025 to 2030. After India has<br />

achieved this distinction, however, the distance between<br />

the two countries’ populations will remain little changed<br />

for the next century and a half—through at least the year<br />

2300 as their rates of growth slow to a near halt. Indeed in<br />

the last half of this century, India’s population is expected<br />

actually to fall by four million people, though China’s will<br />

grow by more than 50 million as its traditional one-child<br />

per family edict begins to loosen in the face of an increasingly<br />

liberalized market and an accompanying free and<br />

more mobile society.<br />

The rate of change is critical in this case. In the first<br />

half of this century, the population of India will be<br />

expanding nearly five times as fast as China, while for the<br />

second half of the century China’s population will be<br />

contracting at a rate triple that of India’s. Still, India will<br />

remain the more populous.<br />

Size is not the only important element of the demographic<br />

equation, however. The distribution of these<br />

billions of individuals—particularly rural vs. urban—is of<br />

equal, if not greater, significance when it comes to the<br />

quality of life and India’s role in international trade and<br />

finance. Here, the contrast between India and China is<br />

striking as well. By 2050, China, which had just 13 percent<br />

of its population in urban areas a century earlier, is<br />

expected to have 72.9 percent in cities. By contrast, India,<br />

which was marginally more urbanized in 1950 with 17<br />

percent of its people in cities, will have 55.2 percent in<br />

urban areas a century later.<br />

This vast disparity of rural-urban distribution is potentially<br />

the most significant, and most destabilizing factor of<br />

all in this century. For the past decade and more, as<br />

Chinese communism began to give way to some form of<br />

crypto-capitalism, the nation created tens of millions of<br />

8 THE IIPM THINK TANK


B IRD OF GOLD<br />

new jobs. In the late 20 th and early 21 st centuries, entire<br />

new cities sprang from the countryside, pressing into the<br />

China’s vast rural interior. A population equivalent to the<br />

entire United States was lured away from a subsistence<br />

existence scratched from the land for centuries to a new<br />

life of opulence and hope for the future. Suddenly,<br />

though, barely eight years into the new century, these<br />

hopes have to at least a temporary halt. The global<br />

economic meltdown hit China hard, idling thousands of<br />

factories. By the turn of the Chinese New Year in <strong>2009</strong>,<br />

the year of the Ox, as many as 130 million people—onetenth<br />

of the nation— found themselves in a desperate<br />

state of suspended animation, sloshing between their new<br />

jobless existence in big cities like Shanghai not to mention<br />

new factory cities, now virtual ghost towns, and the rural<br />

villages they had left behind less than a decade before.<br />

By contrast, India is already managing to weather the<br />

economic downturn more effectively. While building its<br />

cities, it has left a strong foundation in the countryside—<br />

raising aspirations in place so that a substantial population<br />

will continue to produce food to feed the urban areas<br />

without the kind of unemployment and<br />

urban discontent inevitable in neighboring<br />

China. Again, the shift — when<br />

India’s rural population passes China<br />

— occurs around the year 2025, the gap<br />

continues to widen dramatically. This is<br />

by no means a good thing. In such a<br />

situation, China risks becoming a major<br />

food importer at a time when other<br />

parts of the world are also seeing vast<br />

increases in urban concentrations<br />

competing for the output of rural landscapes.<br />

At the same time, China’s urban areas will be stagnating.<br />

Its cities, having ballooned suddenly at the end of the<br />

20 th century—growing at an astounding annual rate of<br />

nearly five percent in 1985 to 1990—will find their<br />

growth slowing to barely 0.5 percent by the year 2050.<br />

India, meanwhile, will find itself with a strong well-balanced<br />

population, its urban areas growing modestly, but<br />

steadily at an annual rate ranging from 2.13 percent to<br />

2.35 percent for the first four decades of this century,<br />

while China’s generation-long, male-oriented, one-child<br />

policy may have permanently skewed its ability to grow<br />

Each year,<br />

through 2050,<br />

both countries<br />

will be sending<br />

substantial<br />

numbers of their<br />

residents abroad<br />

and prosper. By the end of the century, it is India that<br />

will be the economic, financial, indeed productive engine<br />

of Asia.<br />

Indeed, UN population experts suggest that when<br />

India, particularly urban India, reaches the level of<br />

affluence of urban areas of the developed world, particularly<br />

Western Europe, and with India’s population living<br />

in metro areas that are far larger even than London, Paris<br />

or Berlin, these Indian cities will begin to demonstrate<br />

fertility rates as low as those of the west, further restraining<br />

the growth of the population that must be sustained<br />

by the agricultural output of rural regions.<br />

One key example of this gradual, but steady internal<br />

development is the international migration patterns of<br />

Indians and Chinese. Each year, through 2050, both<br />

countries will be sending substantial numbers of their<br />

residents abroad — between 200,000 and 400,000 per<br />

year. But even as India’s population passes China’s, the<br />

number of its emigrants remains steadily fixed at a lower<br />

rate. Hence, the percentage of China’s population leaving<br />

the country continues to rise, while the percentage of emigration<br />

from India falls — in both cases<br />

without any coercive force.<br />

What all these population trends<br />

mean for both countries — in the<br />

near-term, through the present global<br />

economic contraction, and the longterm<br />

for the rest of this century — is<br />

critical, and not merely for these two<br />

nations.<br />

These trends are also especially<br />

significant for their principal trading<br />

and commercial partners as well, especially for the<br />

United States. India was particularly adept, early on, in<br />

realizing that its future lay in global integration — but<br />

especially in service industries which are less susceptible<br />

to the whims of overseas consumer demand to which<br />

manufacturing, especially consumer-driven manufacturing,<br />

is prone. Installing a substantial telecommunications<br />

infrastructure linked into global information networks,<br />

India early on became a destination of choice for foreign<br />

companies looking to expand their intellectual capital.<br />

Call centers quickly morphed into vast centers of computer<br />

programming, research and technological innovation.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

9


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

The slow, but steady, rise of the nation’s urban population<br />

enabled India’s monetized economy to absorb more<br />

readily the influx from rural regions. By contrast, the<br />

sudden and explosive growth of Chinese urban areas was<br />

based almost entirely on export-oriented, consumer-driven<br />

manufacturing.<br />

So when last year’s global economic meltdown hit, India<br />

was less immediately impacted than China. Moreover,<br />

India’s recovery promises to be more rapid and more<br />

sustainable as well. In the first quarter of this year,<br />

according to government statistics, China posted a 6.1<br />

percent growth in GDP, lower than the 6.8 percent posted<br />

in the fourth quarter, indeed the lowest reading since the<br />

quarterly methodology was implemented<br />

in 1992. That represents quite a dramatic<br />

drop from the 11.4 percent GDP growth<br />

that China posted last year—a 46<br />

percent drop year-over-year. India grew<br />

at a more modest, though by global<br />

standards quite impressive, rate of 7.4<br />

percent last year, and is expected to post<br />

a more modest growth of nearly 4.5<br />

percent this year—a 39 percent drop.<br />

What is of greater significance,<br />

though, is the distribution of India’s<br />

GDP. According to World Bank figures,<br />

agriculture accounts for 18.5 percent of<br />

the nation’s total output, industry 26.4<br />

percent, while the robust services sector<br />

contributes a startling 55.1 per cent.<br />

Indeed, this type of distribution is<br />

remarkably close to that of the United<br />

States and most other leading developed countries.<br />

In China, services accounted for just 40 percent of<br />

value added GDP while manufacturing accounts for 48<br />

percent and agriculture just twelve percent. The fact that<br />

India’s service sector now produces more than half the<br />

nation's GDP is a milestone in the nation's economic<br />

history and takes it closer to the fundamentals of a<br />

developed economy. At the time of independence,<br />

agriculture occupied the major share of GDP while the<br />

contribution of services was relatively far less.<br />

By the end of 2010, most economic projections suggest<br />

that the worst of the global economic contraction will be<br />

By the end of<br />

year 2010,<br />

the worst of<br />

the global<br />

economic<br />

contraction<br />

will be behind us<br />

behind us. Indeed the most rapidly growing nations in the<br />

developing world will likely return to robust growth even<br />

before the largest economies, and especially the United<br />

States. Still what will not change will be the demographic<br />

realities, and it’s here that the South Asian region finds<br />

itself poised on the most difficult, potentially destabilizing<br />

precipice. Much of it has to do with the neighborhood<br />

where India finds itself.<br />

While India will have passed China as the world’s most<br />

populous nation, both Pakistan and Bangladesh will be<br />

moving up dramatically. By the end of this century,<br />

according to the “medium growth” scenario of the United<br />

Nations, Pakistan will have passed the 400 million mark,<br />

ranking just behind the United States as<br />

the world’s fourth most populous nation,<br />

surging from seventh place today.<br />

Bangladesh’s population will have nearly<br />

doubled to 270 million, moving it up to<br />

seventh spot in the world. In both cases,<br />

this surge will have serious consequences—potentially<br />

catastrophic growth in<br />

their population densities. India’s<br />

population density could increase less<br />

than 15 percent to 422 persons<br />

per square kilometer between now and<br />

2050, though it will not peak until the<br />

year 2065 when it tops out at nearly 524<br />

people per square kilometer. Meanwhile,<br />

China’s population density could<br />

actually drop by 8.5 percent between<br />

now and 2050, though it is expected to<br />

top out at 155.5 per square kilometer<br />

in the year 2030. By contrast, Bangladesh’s population<br />

density is projected by UN figures to rise more than 57<br />

percent to 1,799 people per square kilometer in 2050,<br />

while Pakistan’s density will more than double, rising<br />

106 percent to 478 people per square kilometer in the<br />

year 2050.<br />

The situation becomes even more desperate if we look<br />

at the population density with respect to actual cropland<br />

that can be used to feed their people. In Bangladesh, if we<br />

go as far as the year 2100, its paralyzing density of 1,997<br />

persons per square kilometer of total land area surges to<br />

2,793 persons per square kilometer of potential cropland,<br />

10 THE IIPM THINK TANK


B IRD OF GOLD<br />

or 28 persons per hectare, approaching the figure for<br />

Afghanistan which, while overall more sparsely populated,<br />

has a smaller arable area capable of supporting<br />

cultivation and a population that is expected to rise nearly<br />

as rapidly.<br />

Age is another critical factor when we examine population<br />

development and densities, particularly in relation to<br />

the nation’s ability to support, house and feed its people,<br />

not to mention the ability to achieve some degree of<br />

prosperity and move upward and out of the status of a<br />

marginally developing nation.<br />

The central measurement of age as it impacts the ability<br />

of a nation to grow and prosper is known as the demographic<br />

window, defined by the United<br />

Nations as the moment when the number<br />

of children below 15 years of age falls<br />

below 30 percent of the total population<br />

and those over the age of 65 remains<br />

below 15 percent. In this case, those of<br />

functional working age are able to<br />

sustain and feed theoretically non-working<br />

youths and the elderly. By these<br />

criteria, India is projected to go<br />

through that window next year (2010),<br />

while Bangladesh won’t reach that level<br />

until 2020 and Pakistan won’t pass that<br />

threshold until 2035. By contrast, China<br />

reached the window in 1990.<br />

What is of potentially even greater<br />

interest, however, is how long these<br />

nations remain within that window<br />

before exiting on the other side (in<br />

other words, the aging of the population adds a new<br />

burden on those of working age). India stays within that<br />

window for 40 years—or two generations—exiting it in<br />

2050 as the life expectancy of the average Indian is<br />

increasing dramatically and will continue to increase.<br />

While an Indian male born in1950 to 1955 could expect to<br />

live an average of 39.4 years, an Indian male born today<br />

can be expected to live 63.2 years and one born at the end<br />

of this century will live an average of 81.8 years. By the<br />

year 2300, that will figure will have jumped to 94.9 years.<br />

Still, with a decelerating birthrate, the nation will be able<br />

to extend its demographic window. By contrast, China,<br />

There is<br />

considerable<br />

attractiveness to<br />

creating a form of<br />

Asian economic<br />

community, not<br />

dissimilar to EU<br />

with its one-child policy, will be out of the window by the<br />

year 2025, as a shrinking working population must feed a<br />

rapidly aging nation. As for Bangladesh, it will remain<br />

within the demographic window for 40 years, exiting in<br />

2060, while Pakistan will remain in it for the briefest<br />

period—just 30 years, exiting in 2065.<br />

The length of time within the demographic window<br />

is perhaps the single most critical factor when it comes<br />

to understanding the prospects of a nation to grow,<br />

even prosper.<br />

All of these population projections, of course, are based<br />

on several key assumptions—most importantly that<br />

diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS continues to abate<br />

worldwide and that it is not replaced<br />

by any new pandemic or other demographic<br />

catastrophe.<br />

For Bangladesh and Pakistan, in<br />

particular, the question of how to house,<br />

feed and protect their incredibly dense<br />

populations poses all but insurmountable<br />

problems without some attempts to<br />

encroach on neighboring territory.<br />

Clearly, China, with barely 129 people<br />

per square kilometer (and certainly<br />

somewhat lower in the more remote<br />

border areas) would be quite tempting<br />

targets for encroachments. However,<br />

both China and India with their<br />

nuclear arsenals and formidable<br />

conventional military forces are both<br />

well equipped to deter such actions,<br />

certainly by Bangladesh.<br />

The alternative is potentially more palatable. India and<br />

China must become breadbaskets—or rice bowls—exporting<br />

food to their more densely populated neighbors.<br />

At the same time, there is considerable attractiveness to<br />

creating a form of Asian economic community, not<br />

dissimilar to the European Union—an expansion of the<br />

existing Association of Southeast Asian Nations<br />

(ASEAN) to include four of the world’s five most populous<br />

countries—India, China, Pakistan and Indonesia, as<br />

well as Bangladesh. By the end of this century it is quite<br />

reasonable to expect such a regional economic group will<br />

assume its place as one of the four great trading blocks of<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

11


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

the world, alongside the European Union, the Gulf<br />

Cooperation Council (which includes the major economic<br />

powerhouses of the Middle East including the Gulf states<br />

and Saudi Arabia), and Western hemisphere nations<br />

grouped under NAFTA.<br />

Getting there, of course, is the biggest challenge facing<br />

the entire region, but certainly India as a lynchpin in the<br />

process. The immediate, and clearly most pressing task is<br />

to find ways that will turn the current economic contraction<br />

into an opportunity to insure future growth and<br />

accelerating GDP expansion. First and most critical is to<br />

ensure the expansion and effectiveness of public sector,<br />

especially infrastructure spending, which now accounts<br />

for eight percent to 10 percent of GDP, according to<br />

World Bank estimates. New power, especially hydropower,<br />

projects, roads and rail networks are all most urgent,<br />

and the bank has recommended spending at least an<br />

additional three percent to four percent of GDP on such<br />

priority projects.<br />

Additionally, with the rapidly increasing population, it’s<br />

clear that one resource needs particular attention — water.<br />

A recent study by Orville Schell of the Asia Society<br />

in New York and published in World Policy Journal’s<br />

Fall 2008 issue, documented the accelerating melting of<br />

the Tibetan glaciers, which are the primary source of<br />

virtually every important river in Asia, particularly in<br />

India and China.<br />

The melting will cause uneven, eventually substantially<br />

reduced water flows at the very moment when populations<br />

are reaching their peak, even though the rate of growth<br />

may be tapering off.<br />

At the same time, priorities must be given to reducing<br />

potentially destabilizing disparities between the wealthiest<br />

and poorest regions of each country, since many<br />

western economists believe that the current economic<br />

downturn could only broaden existing pockets of poverty<br />

and make recovery a longer and more difficult procedure—not<br />

only in India but in much of the more rapidly<br />

developing world. With this goal in mind, World Bank<br />

projects are assisting across India—improving soil and<br />

water conservation, modernizing irrigation and rain water<br />

capture systems and reclaiming saline lands in a number<br />

of states including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra<br />

and Madhya Pradesh.<br />

All these projects will help keep pace with the demographic<br />

realities as the one apparent constant in this<br />

period of economic uncertainty is the growth of population<br />

in India, and indeed in much of Asia. Moreover, the<br />

continued investment in critical infrastructure will also<br />

help lure foreign investors as capital for such ventures<br />

begins to return in leading global money centers. A recent<br />

visitor from Procter & Gamble’s Pakistan organization<br />

said that her company was investing $100 million in that<br />

country, much of it in a plant producing disposable<br />

diapers. Why? To take advantage of the eleven million<br />

new babies arriving there each year.<br />

Without question, there will be critical issues to be<br />

faced in the nations of South Asia, especially in India,<br />

over the next half century or more as the demographic<br />

realities outlined here begin to take hold. At the same<br />

time, global corporations will eventually emerge from the<br />

investment paralysis that has gripped them in recent<br />

months and search for new opportunities grounded in the<br />

ineluctable realities of population shifts and the parallel<br />

shifts in money and wealth. The key for nations like India<br />

is to position themselves to seize the opportunities<br />

generated by their growing populations, especially as they<br />

move to a more urbanized, more highly engineered<br />

culture of industry and innovation.<br />

Above all, each must retain the values of openness and<br />

transparency, a respect for the rule of law and membership<br />

in the global community of free trade and commerce<br />

without the kinds of barriers that have so often stymied<br />

growth in the past. But certainly, with a birth rate that is<br />

hovering at the replacement level, and an expanding<br />

network of higher education throughout the country,<br />

India is well placed to maintain its role as a leader in<br />

bringing Asia out of the ranks of developing nations into<br />

the forefront of world leadership, where it will hopefully<br />

find itself at the end of this century.<br />

(David A. Andelman is the author of A Shattered Peace:<br />

Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. (Wiley: 2007).<br />

His next book, Future Present: A Portable History of the<br />

Next 100 Years, will deal with the shape of the world at the<br />

end of this century. The views expressed in the write-up are<br />

personal and do not reflect the official policy or position of<br />

the organisation.)<br />

12 THE IIPM THINK TANK


B IRD OF GOLD<br />

AD<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

13


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Demographics of Poverty<br />

and Economic Growth<br />

14 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

K. R. Shah<br />

Former Professor of Business Economics,<br />

The M. S. University of Baroda, Vadodara<br />

Introduction<br />

The dawn of the 21 st century seems to have brought new<br />

hopes for the millions of the Indian poor. The deadlock<br />

between the official poverty ratio (Head Count Ratio-<br />

HCR) and the numerical <strong>size</strong> of the poor- the former<br />

falling without any dent in the latter- observed during<br />

1973-74 to 1994-95 has been broken of late. For the first<br />

time between 1994-95 and 2005-06, the poverty ratio came<br />

down to 20.4% from 39.6% and the number of poor from<br />

365 million to 228 million.<br />

Above poverty pattern attains a new significance in the<br />

light of another deadlock between the literacy rate and the<br />

number of illiterates which has also been broken for the first<br />

time since independence between 1991 and 2001. The<br />

improvement in the literacy rate from 52.2% to 65.38% was<br />

accompanied by the decline in the number of the illiterates<br />

from 328 million to 296 million. The closeness of these<br />

numbers- the poor and the illiterates- implies that poverty<br />

and illiteracy are two sides of the same coin. These two<br />

events thus are mutually reinforcing, i.e. above the poverty<br />

line also means above the illiteracy level and vice versa. The<br />

grip of the vicious circle of poverty and illiteracy appears to<br />

have been loosened.<br />

Further, the gap in the rural-urban poverty ratio of the<br />

magnitude of almost ten percentage points in the year 1983<br />

(45.31% and 35.63% respectively) has been wiped out<br />

completely in the year 2005-06- the respective poverty ratios<br />

being 20.4% and 20.7%. This pattern mainly owes to a<br />

relatively faster rate of decline in the rural poverty.<br />

The main objective of this paper is to study the emergence<br />

of the above three favourable patterns since the mid-1990s<br />

in India.<br />

Relevance of the Official Poverty Line<br />

A paragraph or two on the relevance of the OPL may not be<br />

out of tune. The poverty line laid down by the Planning<br />

Commission in 1973-74 is still in vogue. The consumption<br />

expenditure mainly on food of Rs. 11.88 and Rs. 17.95 per<br />

person per day of rural and urban areas respectively in<br />

1973-74 was adequate enough to achieve the calorie norm of<br />

2400 for rural households and 2100 for urban households.<br />

This is the minimum calorie requirement for subsistence<br />

living. Thus, households not able to meet this norm are<br />

below the poverty line. The poverty line thus fixed is adjusted<br />

from time to time for inflation keeping intact the original<br />

nexus between the calorie norm and the poverty line.<br />

Abraham Maslow, an American behavioural scientist in<br />

his 1943 article “A Theory of Human Motivation” argued<br />

that the people world over are subject to ‘ hierarchy of needs’.<br />

The foremost are the basic physiological needs, namely,<br />

food, shelter, sex and sleep. Every aspect of life of the<br />

billions of the world’s poor undoubtedly is dominated by the<br />

struggle for these needs. Once these basic needs are fulfilled,<br />

they start looking for other things (The Economist, February<br />

14 th -20 th , <strong>2009</strong>). In this context the initial focus on income/<br />

expenditure required to consume food (and other basic<br />

needs items) commensurate with the calorie intake norm was<br />

justified. Once that level of income is attained , the poor<br />

households have crossed the major hurdle of undernourishment<br />

inhibiting their productivity growth. In that case,<br />

assuring that much intake of food partakes of the nature of<br />

‘investment’. They are empowered this way and the consequent<br />

productivity enhancement helps them earn more. Even<br />

after six decades of economic planning the focus on food<br />

security is not altogether unwarranted in ameliorating the<br />

poverty status of the people who spend around two-thirds of<br />

their income on food. Recent double digit inflation caused<br />

mainly by the rise in food prices hints at the vulnerability not<br />

only of the poor but also of the persons brought above the<br />

poverty line but still on its periphery. The Economic Survey<br />

(2007-08) has voiced similar concern when it says “there are<br />

concerns about the vulnerability of people who crossed the<br />

poverty line and are at present above the poverty line”---<br />

“high share of expenditure on food items (most basic of<br />

all basic needs) would be indicative of the vulnerability to<br />

some extent”.<br />

It is our contention that shifting from income poverty to<br />

multidimensional poverty, in all probability, may perpetuate<br />

both. One clue for this contention could be found in a study<br />

on multidimensional poverty and vulnerability. To quote:<br />

“However, at the bottom rankings, the comparison shows<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

15


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

that there is not much difference in the list of states that are<br />

identified as income poor and multidimensional poor”. The<br />

study further states that in almost 50% out of fifteen major<br />

states both in urban and rural areas, income poverty exceeds<br />

the multidimensional poverty (Rosa A. Abraham, and K. S.<br />

Kavi kumar, 2008). The marketization even of basic education<br />

and health care—two main components of multidimensional<br />

poverty which are public goods by nature—has made<br />

these goods above the reach of the so-called non-poor. So,<br />

the continuation of the focus on the removal of income<br />

poverty is logical.<br />

We are fully aware of the fact that to sustain in a knowledge<br />

economy there is no escape from controlling poverty in<br />

its various dimensions. But the removal of income poverty<br />

first and foremost amounts to crossing the critical level of<br />

wellbeing and surpassing the “take-off” stage of poverty.<br />

Thus, crossing the” take-off” stage of poverty seems to be a<br />

precondition for alleviating multidimensional poverty in the<br />

manner similar to the take-off stage of economic growth for<br />

achieving and sustaining the high growth path. Things would<br />

have been different had we achieved cent percent literacy<br />

like Japan and China or accomplished the<br />

constitutional obligation of universal<br />

primary education much earlier in our<br />

development journey.<br />

Questionable Poverty Pattern<br />

Let us peep into the recent poverty<br />

estimates for India brought out by such<br />

international agencies as the World Bank<br />

(WB) and the Asian Development Bank<br />

(ADB). Their estimates contradict the<br />

poverty pattern based on India’s OPL. Not only the poverty<br />

ratios of the order of 41.6% (WB) and 54.8% (ADB) in 2005<br />

are far in excess of 20.4% (OPL) but the fall in these ratios<br />

have been accompanied by the rise in the number of the<br />

poor which varies in the range of 456 million to 622 million<br />

unlike the symmetrical pattern given by the OPL. This is<br />

astonishing when the same agencies regard India as an<br />

emerging super economic power and an important constituent<br />

of the ‘emerging markets’- Brazil, India ,China, and<br />

Russia (BRIC) not giving any credit whatsoever to the<br />

impact of sustained high economic growth of nearly six<br />

percent per annum on poverty implying thereby that our<br />

India’s Poverty<br />

Gap Index (PGI)<br />

has also fallen<br />

from twenty<br />

percent in 1980 to<br />

eleven percent<br />

in 2005<br />

growth strategy is not pro-poor.<br />

On the other hand, considering the value of India’s OPL<br />

exactly equal to one dollar per day cutoff line, Martin<br />

Ravallion (2008) observes that during 1980 to 2005 India’s<br />

poverty ratio fell from 42% to 24% accompanied by the fall<br />

in the number of the poor from 296 million to 267 million.<br />

India’s Poverty Gap Index (PGI) has also fallen from 20<br />

percent in 1980 to 11% in 2005.<br />

Commenting on the WB’s updated estimates of global poverty,<br />

Sanjay G. Reddy writes, “there is no basis to conclude<br />

that the new set of PPP rates (Purchasing Power Parity)<br />

employed to generate the new poverty estimates are closer to<br />

the truth”(2008).<br />

The recently emerged symmetrical poverty pattern of<br />

declining poverty ratio accompanied also by the falling<br />

absolute <strong>size</strong> of the poor itself is beset with challenges. It is<br />

argued that “ the poverty line updated for price alone will<br />

be unable to meet the calorie requirements. The per capita<br />

monthly expenditure which corresponds to the required<br />

calorie norms is much higher than the OP Lines.” (T. K.<br />

Krishna kumar, Jayrama Holde, Puja Guha, 2008). The<br />

authenticity of the current poverty<br />

pattern depends on the matching of the<br />

calorie consumption pattern with the<br />

calorie norms. Unfortunately, 76% of the<br />

population living in households consume<br />

per capita calorie below the ‘norms’<br />

prescribed. Though the real average<br />

household consumption expenditure<br />

during 1983-2004-05 has increased, the<br />

per capita calorie consumption has<br />

decreased. This explains the divergence<br />

between the two poverty measures-one based on real<br />

expenditures and the second on calorie cutoff—21.8 and<br />

76% respectively (Angus Deaton and Jean Dreze, <strong>2009</strong>).<br />

This suggests rather a poor link between the OPL and<br />

calorie requirements due to changes in dietary practices<br />

(Ranjan Ray, 2008). Does it mean the observed poverty<br />

pattern during 1994-95 to 2005-06 is fluke and an eye wash<br />

or simply propagandist? Is this trend worth ignoring? The<br />

answer is firm ‘no’. Reasons given below explain our<br />

assertion.<br />

First, the emergence of the poverty pattern during the<br />

last decade has coincided with the period of sustained high<br />

16 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

economic growth path and low inflation rate unlike the<br />

period 1973-74 to 1993-94 \ 1994-95. Second, the deviation<br />

between the two poverty estimates reported earlier should<br />

not necessarily be interpreted as the fall in the nutritional<br />

status of the population. Deaton and Dreze observe that “<br />

without understanding why per capita calories are falling<br />

despite rising per capita expenditures, it is difficult to<br />

decide what, if anything, these numbers (two-thirds to<br />

four- fifths of rural population in 1983 and 2004-05<br />

respectively and from 65% to 75% in India as a whole) tell<br />

us about poverty.” Moreover, even if the poor engaged in a<br />

globalised economy are becoming a little richer, by<br />

implication, those poor brought above the OPL should<br />

have become relatively better off. Third, according to “A<br />

Special Report on the New Middle Classes” (The Economist,<br />

February 14 th , <strong>2009</strong>) the surge in the middle class<br />

population (population living on $2- $13 a day, 2005 prices<br />

at PPP) by 1.2 billion between 1990 and 2005 is by and<br />

large”attributed to the persons lifted out of poverty. Since<br />

majority of them are dangerously close to the poverty line,<br />

they do not have a good hold on the middle class status<br />

and are likely to slip backwards”. The<br />

Indian middle class grew by 116.9<br />

million from 146.8 million in 1990 to<br />

263.7 million in 2005. As per the classification<br />

of the world middle class into the<br />

upper ($9-$13 a day) and the lower<br />

middle class ($2 -$9 a day) in the ratio of<br />

1: 11 (around), 107.9 million Indian<br />

persons belong to the lower middle class<br />

out of additional 116.9 million. How<br />

many poor persons brought above the<br />

poverty line are a part of the lower middle class? If the<br />

number is good enough, it lends credence to the phenomenon<br />

of growing middle class and the resultant spurt in<br />

domestic demand. Fourth, when the emerging markets’<br />

(BRIC) resilience to the current economic meltdown<br />

(financial crises) is, itself, in question, to sustain and<br />

promote further the emerging Indian poverty pattern<br />

invites a renewed focus on our growth strategy. Which of<br />

the following three—export-led, overseas borrowing and<br />

equity financed and domestic demand- led—either<br />

individually or jointly, will act as a cushion against such<br />

periodic bouts?<br />

Frame Work of Analysis<br />

It is our contention<br />

that shifting from<br />

income poverty to<br />

multidimensional<br />

poverty, in all<br />

probability, may<br />

perpetuate both<br />

At the all India level, we propose to contrast the poverty<br />

pattern during 1994-95 to 2005-06 from the earlier one<br />

between 1973-74 and 1993-94 in terms of three macro<br />

variables--- (1) economic growth, (2) inflation, and (3)<br />

population growth. This is covered in section-1 on poverty<br />

and economic growth. At the state level, we have examined<br />

trends in poverty among the fourteen major states accounting<br />

for around nine-tenth of total population in 2001 classifying<br />

them into demographically and economically more and<br />

less progressive states taking all-India as the cutoff point.<br />

This constitutes section-2 on state level poverty trends.<br />

Section -3 is on concluding observations.<br />

SECTION-1<br />

Poverty and Economic Growth<br />

With regard to the poverty pattern during 1973-74 to 1993-<br />

94, it is appropriate to quote the observation made by the<br />

Economic Survey (2001-02): “ though the poverty rate<br />

declined , the number of poor remained stable at around 320<br />

million for a fairly long period of two decades<br />

(1973-74-1993=94) due to a countervailing<br />

growth in population”. How to explain<br />

this asymmetrical pattern? Can we take<br />

the only explanation offered by the survey<br />

at its face value?<br />

Let us gauge the extent of the impact of<br />

population growth on the poverty pattern<br />

by making two simplistic assumptions.<br />

First, keep the total population in 1951 of<br />

361 million unchanged as it is almost<br />

equal to 320 million poor in 1973- 74 and<br />

1993-94 (365 million in 1994-95). Taking 1951 <strong>size</strong> of<br />

population as the base, the estimated number of the poor in<br />

1993-94 works out to just 130 million with the fall in poverty<br />

ratio from 55% in 1973-74 to 36% in 1993-94. The estimated<br />

number is 41% of the actual number (320 million). Second,<br />

now keep the poverty ratio unchanged and allow for the<br />

growth of population. Taking the poverty ratio of 55% in<br />

1973-74 as the base, the number of the poor so calculated<br />

shoots up to 496 million in 1993-94 from 320 million—an<br />

increase of 1.6 times the actual number. Both the calculations<br />

show a formidable impact of the population <strong>size</strong> on the<br />

numerical <strong>size</strong> of the poor persons.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

17


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table 1-A: Factors Influencing Distinct Poverty Patterns<br />

Year Poverty Ratio (%) Number of<br />

Poor(Million)<br />

Population<br />

Growth (% P.A.)<br />

Economic Growth<br />

GNP (1999-2000<br />

Prices) % P.A.<br />

Inflation<br />

WPI(93-94=100) %<br />

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)<br />

1973-74<br />

54.9<br />

321<br />

2.5<br />

4.8 (3.08) 11.8 (10.9)<br />

1977-78<br />

51.3<br />

329<br />

(1971-81)<br />

1983-84<br />

44.5<br />

323<br />

2.4<br />

5.6 (5.5) 6.8 (8.0)<br />

1989-90<br />

34.3<br />

290<br />

(1981-91)<br />

1990-91 35.6 307 4.8 10.6<br />

1993-94<br />

36<br />

320<br />

2.2<br />

6.6<br />

5.4<br />

1994-95<br />

39.6<br />

365<br />

(1991-2001)<br />

(5.7)<br />

(8.12)<br />

2005-06<br />

20.4<br />

228<br />

1993-94<br />

2004-05 (URP)<br />

36<br />

27.5<br />

320<br />

300<br />

6.3 5.6<br />

1999-2000<br />

2004-05 (MRP)<br />

26.1<br />

21.8<br />

260<br />

239<br />

1.65(2001-08)<br />

(Projected)<br />

6.1<br />

(7.03)<br />

4.98<br />

(4.68)<br />

Sources: (1) Various issues of Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.<br />

(2) K.L Datta. “An Estimate of Poverty Reduction between 2004-05 and 2005-06.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No.47, November 22-28, 2008<br />

(3) Census of India 2001.<br />

(4) Economic Survey 2007-08<br />

(5) (a) Economic Survey 2001- 02, 2007-08<br />

(b) Economic and Political Weekly, April 25 th - <strong>May</strong> 1 st , <strong>2009</strong>.<br />

Notes: (1) Figures in column 4 are decennial average annual rates of population growth.<br />

(2) URP-Uniform Recall Period: MRP-Mixed Recall Period.<br />

(3) Figures in brackets in column 5 are the average annual growth rates for the decades 1970s,1980s, 1990s and for the period 2000-01-2006-07.<br />

(4) Figures in brackets in column 6 are average annual inflation rates for the decades 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and for the period 2000-01 to 2008-09. Inflation rate for the decade 1970s<br />

is the average of 70—71,71-72 to 75-76 (10.8%) and 75-76,76-77 to 80-81 (11%).<br />

(5) Since 1995-96 to 2005-06 the average annual price rise in the range of 5 to 5.5% is almost one-half of during 1970s and1990-91 to 1994-95. “ India’s performance on inflation has<br />

improved significantly since the mid-1990s” (Economic Survey,2001-02).<br />

How have the poverty ratio and the number of the poor<br />

tended to behave during the intervening years of the period<br />

1973-74 to 1993-94 once these assumptions are dropped?<br />

Our contention is that given the rate of population growth,<br />

the fluctuations in the rates of economic growth and inflation<br />

might have influenced the course of poverty pattern. Concentrate<br />

on the quinquennium 1973-74 to 1977-78. Though<br />

the poverty ratio fell from 55% to 51.3%, the absolute<br />

number of the poor increased marginally from 321 to 329<br />

million—an asymmetrical pattern. The increase was caused<br />

jointly by the average annual rate of economic growth (Gross<br />

National Product-GNP) of 4.8% during 1973-74 to 1977-78<br />

and the inflation rate of 11.8% per annum (Table---1-A).<br />

During the decade 1970s, the growth rate was just three<br />

percent and the inflation was almost 11%.<br />

Focusing on the period 1983-84 to 1989-90, the persistent<br />

decline in the poverty ratio was accompanied by the decline<br />

in the number of the poor persons from 323 million to 290<br />

million--- a symmetrical pattern. The emergence of this<br />

much desired pattern owes mainly to the acceleration in the<br />

rate of economic growth to almost six percent(1985-90) as<br />

against the Seventh Plan target of five percent and the<br />

<strong>size</strong>able dip in the rate of inflation to 6.8% (1983-84-1989-<br />

90) when the rate of population growth was 2.4% per<br />

annum(1981-91).Unlike the period 1983-84-1989-90, the<br />

subsequent five year period,1990-91-1994-95, saw a persistent<br />

rise both in the poverty ratio and the number of the poor<br />

persons. The former rose from 35.6% to 39.6% and the latter<br />

from 307 million to 365 million-symmetrical but unfavourable<br />

pattern. Two main culprits of this rather disturbing<br />

outcome were below five percent annual rate of GNP growth<br />

and a relatively higher inflation rate of 10.6% (93-94=100)<br />

18 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

when the rate of population growth was slightly lower(not<br />

higher) at 2.2% during the 1990s. These were the initial<br />

years of economic reforms regime heavily bent upon correcting<br />

the fundamentals-macro economic imbalances. The<br />

decade 1995-96 to 2005-06 - the period of further acceleration<br />

in the rate of economic growth to 6.58%, the inflation<br />

rate of around five percent and the population growth rate<br />

down to less than two percent – has seen the rebirth of the<br />

much adored pattern of declining poverty ratio and the<br />

number of the poor - a favourable symmetrical pattern. The<br />

ratio came down to 20.4% in 2005-06 from 39.6% in 1994-95<br />

and the <strong>size</strong> of the poor fell from 365 million in 1994-95 to<br />

228 million in 2005-06.<br />

Poverty estimates based either on the uniform recall<br />

period (URP) or on the mixed recall period (MRP) also<br />

endorse the earlier observed pattern. In the URP, the<br />

consumption expenditure data for all the items are collected<br />

from a thirty day recall period. These estimates show that<br />

between 1993-94 and 2004-05, the poverty ratio fell from<br />

36% to 27.5% and the absolute number from 320 million to<br />

300 million.<br />

In the MRP, the consumption expenditure<br />

data for five non- food items, namely,<br />

clothing and foot ware, durable goods,<br />

education, and institutional medical<br />

expenses are collected from a 365 day<br />

recall period, and the consumption data<br />

for the remaining items are collected<br />

from a thirty day recall period. Comparable<br />

poverty estimates for the period<br />

1999-2000 to 2004-05 show that the ratio<br />

fell from 26.1% to 21.8% and with that<br />

the number of the poor persons declined from 260 million to<br />

244 million. During the ten year URP period or the shorter<br />

MRP period, the Indian economy had hardly experienced<br />

ups and downs in the average annual rates of economic<br />

growth and inflation. (Table-1-A)<br />

There is no exaggeration when we assert that growth and<br />

inflation are two overriding factors governing the Indian<br />

poverty patterns since 1973-74. A case in point is the poverty<br />

trend in the highly populous country China. India was better<br />

placed than China in the mid seventies (1975) when its<br />

poverty ratio of 55% was lower than China’s 59.5%. The<br />

reversal in the respective countries poverty status in 1995-<br />

One may infer<br />

that persons<br />

brought above the<br />

poverty line have<br />

benefited from<br />

accleration in the<br />

economic growth<br />

India’s poverty ratio of 36% against China’s 22.2 %-owes to a<br />

much higher rate of economic growth of the Chinese economy<br />

from a mere five percent per annum during 1970-1980 to<br />

11.1 % during 1980-1995. Comparatively India’s annual<br />

growth rate of three percent during 1970s rose to 5.6 % per<br />

annum during 1980-95(Economic Survey, 1998-99).Though<br />

the pace of economic growth and poverty reduction in India<br />

is slow compared to China, the inequality (relative poverty)<br />

has increased at a faster rate in China than in India. The<br />

share in national income of poorest 20 % in China is 5.9 %<br />

as against 8.2 % in India. The poorest 20 % receives about<br />

40 % of per capita average income in India as against 30 %<br />

in China (Amit Bhaduri, 2008). Thus, the economic growth<br />

has driven India towards a “new era” of low ‘absolute’ as well<br />

as ‘relative’ poverty. One is tempted to infer that the persons,<br />

numbering in the range of 92 to 137 million brought above<br />

the poverty line have benefited from the acceleration in the<br />

rate of economic growth and are instrumental in controlling<br />

the speed of growing inequality. It would be in our interest to<br />

strengthen the favourable symmetrical pattern by moving<br />

ahead on a high growth path with inflation rate of around<br />

five percent. This seems to be a plausible<br />

way of getting rid of their vulnerability.<br />

Retaining majority of the poor brought<br />

above the poverty line, in itself, will be a<br />

great achievement. Conferring permanent<br />

‘non-poor’ status to these persons lends<br />

substance to both the processes.<br />

The number of poor brought above the<br />

poverty line in the range of 92 to 137<br />

million accounts for 9-12 % of the total<br />

population and for 20 to 30 % of the<br />

addition to the total population during 1993-94 to 2005-06.<br />

If this number is genuinely a part of ‘non-poor, then it is a<br />

source of boosting up the domestic demand making the<br />

Indian economy more resilient.<br />

Poverty and Illiteracy<br />

Poverty and illiteracy are very similar to the proverbial<br />

Siamese Twins. For the first time on the eve of the 21 st<br />

century the number of poor and illiterate persons has fallenthe<br />

former with the decline in the poverty ratio and the latter<br />

with the increase in the literacy rate. At present 228 million<br />

are poor persons and 296 are illiterates-the closeness of<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

19


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

these numbers is significant.<br />

We take the help of two studies on life expectancy to<br />

examine this welcome trend. One study has revealed that for<br />

every extra year of life expectancy in population, there is a<br />

seven percent rise in per capita Gross National Product<br />

(GNP)-(The Economist, <strong>2009</strong>). In the second study, life<br />

expectancy is taken as a factor in explaining the intergenerational<br />

nature of poverty. Life expectancy lower than the<br />

average implies a less than the average per capita GDP<br />

growth rate, low human capital accumulation and poverty<br />

ratio above the average. Low life expectancy deters poor<br />

families from investing in education which in turn percolates<br />

down to their children. Like their parents they also work as<br />

non-educated workers and remain poor. The poverty trap<br />

created by low life expectancy and not enough human capital<br />

accumulation perpetuates intergenerationally (Amparo Castello<br />

Climent and Refel Domenech, 2008). These two types<br />

of deprivations- poverty and illiteracy- are intergenerational<br />

in nature in the same manner as the intergenerational debt<br />

of the Indian farming community.<br />

In the wake of the falling numbers of poor and illiterates,<br />

the question that requires to be probed is: have these persons<br />

succeeded in overcoming the interlinked deprivations of<br />

poverty and illiteracy? If yes, then these deprivations will<br />

cease to be intergenerational over a period of time. Since<br />

both are empowered economically and educationally, to that<br />

extent, they start realizing the virtue of this empowerment<br />

which they would prefer their children to emulate or imbibe.<br />

To know whether this process of poverty and illiteracy<br />

ceasing to be intergenerational has, in fact, commenced,<br />

the newly emerged class of ‘non-poor’ is to be identified to<br />

assess any improvement in the quality of life on account of<br />

improvement in their human development status. This<br />

identification will lend substance to the OPL which the<br />

critics have found propagandist.<br />

Rural-Urban Poverty<br />

Our emphasis on locating the birth of the “non-poor” class<br />

can further be supported on one more count having a<br />

demographic content, namely, the rural-urban divide of poor<br />

persons during 1973-74 to 1993-94 when their number<br />

remained constant at 320 million.<br />

During this twenty year period the number of rural poor<br />

fell from 261.3 million to 244 million whereas the number of<br />

urban poor rose from 60.3 million to 76.3 million. As a<br />

result, the rural poor accounting for a little above four-fifths<br />

came down to three-fourths of the total number of poor. If<br />

the increase in the urban poor is caused by the migration of<br />

Table 1-B : Long Term Rural-Urban Poverty Trends<br />

Year Rural Urban Total<br />

(1) (2) (3) (4)<br />

Ratio(%) Number(Mill.) Ratio(%) Number(Mill.) Ratio(%) Number(Mill.)<br />

1973-74 56.4 261.3 49 60 54-9 321.3<br />

1977-78 53.1 264.3 45.2 64.6 51.3 328.9<br />

1983 45.3 252 35.6 70.9 44.5 322.9<br />

1987-88 39.1 231.9 38.2 75.2 38.9 307.1<br />

1993-94 37.3 244 32.4 76.3 36 320.3<br />

1999-2000 27.1 193.2 23.6 67.1 26.1 260.3<br />

2003 24.03 184.8 22.63 68.8 23.8 253.6<br />

2004-05 21.8 170.3 21.7 68.2 21.8 238.5<br />

2005-06 20.4 161.3 20.7 66.5 20.4 227.8<br />

Source: (1)Various issues of Economic Survey<br />

(2) K. L. Datta: Same as source 2 of Table 1-A<br />

(3) R. Radhakrishnan & Manoj Panda: “Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction-India case Study”(U.N.D.P.),IGIDR,<br />

Mumbai,2006<br />

20 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

the rural poor to urban areas, then it simply amounts to a<br />

locational shift of poor population without any improvement<br />

in their levels of living.<br />

This pattern has altered for good since 1999-2000 when<br />

both these numbers have started falling simultaneously<br />

though the pace of urbanization has slowed down from six<br />

percentage points increase (17.7 % to 23.7%) during 1961-<br />

1981 to four percentage points rise (23.7% to 27.8%) during<br />

1981-2001. In 2005-06, the number of rural poor was further<br />

lower at 70 % of the total. The gap in the rural-urban poverty<br />

ratio of 9.68 percentage points (45 .31 and 35.63 respectively<br />

in 1983) was completely wiped out in 2005-06- the respective<br />

ratios being 20.4 and 20.7 (Table 1.B). This is mainly on<br />

account of the enhanced pace of fall in the number of rural<br />

poor by 83 million during a relatively period of shorter<br />

duration(1993-94 to 2005-06) as against the decline of only<br />

17 million during 1973-74 to 1993-94. The decline in the<br />

number of urban poor by 10 million between 1993-94 and<br />

2005-06 is of much lower magnitude comparatively.<br />

Thus, the rate of reduction in rural poverty has outstripped<br />

that of the urban poverty. The acceleration of the<br />

rate of economic growth appears to have<br />

trickled down and thus inclusive. Especially<br />

between 2004-05 and 2005-06, the<br />

interplay of the following three factors<br />

has played a crucial role in bringing about<br />

this hospitable trend: (a) 8.5 % average<br />

economic growth; (b) almost six percent<br />

growth in the agricultural sector in<br />

2005-06 compared to an average annual<br />

rate of growth of five percent in the<br />

previous two years, and (c) stable inequality<br />

in the distribution of per capita consumption (K. L.<br />

Datta, 2008). Thus, the number of rural poor crossing the<br />

OPL does not appear to be fake.<br />

Hierarchy of the Incidence of Poverty<br />

This much appreciable poverty pattern does not seem to<br />

have made any dent on the hierarchy of the incidence of<br />

poverty as can be seen from the incidence of poverty among<br />

the three broadly classified socio-economic groups—Scheduled<br />

Castes and Scheduled Tribes(SCs\STs), other backward<br />

communities(OBCS), and Others.<br />

According to NSSO Seventh quinquennial consumption<br />

Unless incidence<br />

of poverty of SCs<br />

& STs are brought<br />

down significantly,<br />

the slow pace of<br />

poverty reduction<br />

will continue<br />

expenditure survey (July 2004-June 2005), the incidence of<br />

poverty among rural and urban SCs and STs is disproportionately<br />

higher than their share in population. Their<br />

respective poverty shares of 43.35 % and 31.73 % (rural)<br />

and 29.81 % and 33.12 % (urban) are much above their<br />

share of 16.2 % (SCs) and 8.2 % (STs) in total population.<br />

The corresponding poverty ratios among rural OBCs and<br />

Others are 22.9 % and 13.01 % respectively. The respective<br />

poverty ratios among urban OBCs and Others are 24.22 %<br />

and 12.06 %.<br />

High incidence of poverty among nearly one-fourth of<br />

population might be responsible for the overall slow pace<br />

of poverty reduction. The question deserves to be probed<br />

is: How many persons brought above the OPL belong to<br />

the SCs and STs? Unless their high incidence of poverty<br />

is brought down significantly, the slow pace of poverty<br />

reduction continues despite high economic growth as in<br />

their case cultural causes of poverty namely, indifference,<br />

laziness, and ineptitude might have played the part.<br />

Economic growth to be truly sustainable and inclusive<br />

has to break the stranglehold of the age-old social<br />

stratification.<br />

In nutshell, the decade old poverty<br />

pattern featured by the decline in the<br />

absolute number both of the poor and<br />

illiterates and the relative faster<br />

decline in rural poverty has coincided<br />

with the period of sustained high rate<br />

of economic growth and low inflation.<br />

This gives the impression that the<br />

growth has trickled down and become<br />

inclusive. To be on a more safer ground,<br />

the newly emerged “non-poor’ class in the range of 92-137<br />

million need to be identified and monitored to trace their<br />

chances of vulnerability, to assess the degree of economic<br />

and educational empowerment acquired by them making<br />

inroads on the intergenerational nexus of poverty and<br />

illiteracy, and to understand more intimately the puzzle<br />

between the declining calorie intake below norm in the<br />

face of rising real consumption expenditures. Then, the<br />

OPL and the ongoing symmetrical pattern are expected to<br />

lend credibility to the Indian poverty estimates. Policy<br />

makers have to respect this pattern enabling teeming<br />

millions to be an active agent of the development process.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

21


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

SECTION-2<br />

Poverty Trends among States<br />

Fourteen major states accounting for 87.5 % of total population<br />

in 2001 are undoubtedly heterogeneous demographically<br />

and economically. So the possibility of varying poverty<br />

trends cannot be ruled out.<br />

States are classified into demographically and economically<br />

more and less progressive states taking all-India as<br />

a cutoff point to examine the trends in poverty at the<br />

state level.<br />

A new factor assisting the long term high economic growth<br />

path, namely, “Demographic Dividend” has emerged on the<br />

horizon. Various studies using a panel data of countries from<br />

1960-2000 have established a positive association between<br />

the age structure and economic growth prospects for India<br />

over the next thirty years (K. S. James,2008). In this respect,<br />

India has an advantage over China. China’s dependency<br />

ratio- the percentage of the working population (15-65<br />

age-group) to the rest (0-14 and 65+ age-groups)—is likely<br />

to deteriorate from 2010. In contrast, India’s dependency<br />

ratio is to improve until the 2040s (Edward Luce, 2007). If<br />

demographic dividend, bonus or gift,<br />

implying a smaller dependency ratio, can<br />

speed up the process of economic growth<br />

both from the demand side (higher<br />

domestic demand) and the supply side<br />

(greater propensity to save and invest),<br />

then in turn, it can also propel the pace of<br />

poverty reduction.<br />

There is no need to restate the role of<br />

life expectancy, another demographic<br />

feature, in understanding the association<br />

between growth, human capital accumulation and poverty,<br />

which has already been explained in section-1. It is intended<br />

to test the hypothesis that the demographically progressive<br />

states are economically advanced and hence experience a<br />

faster decline in their poverty ratios versus demographically<br />

less progressive states.<br />

States are progressive or laggard if change (fall or no or<br />

negligible fall) in their dependency ratios (DR) is greater or<br />

smaller than the all-India average between 1961 and 2001.<br />

Or alternatively, if their dependency ratios are below or<br />

above the all-India average.<br />

The DR of each of the following eight states is below the<br />

India has an<br />

advantage over<br />

China. China’s<br />

dependency<br />

ratio is likely to<br />

deteriorate from<br />

year 2010<br />

all-India average. The states are: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,<br />

Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and<br />

West Bengal. Haryana can be added to this list. Taking<br />

Punjab’s DR of 1.00 in 1961 as that of Haryana, then<br />

Haryana’s DR of 0.77 in 2001 shows a 23 percentage points<br />

fall which is faster than the 12 percentage fall in the all- India<br />

average of 0.75 These eight states’ average DR was 0.65<br />

(0.66 including Haryana) in 2001 as against India’s 0.75. In<br />

the four BIMARU states- Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan<br />

and Uttar Pradesh- there was virtually no change in the<br />

said ratio between 1961 and 2001. Their average DR of 0.88<br />

was far above the all-India average. Though Orissa’s ratio of<br />

0.71 is lower than the all-India average, it is not a part of the<br />

eight\nine progressive states on the basis of a much slower<br />

decline by ten percentage points compared to the 24 percentage<br />

points decline in the combined average of eight states.<br />

The average life expectancy of 66.9 years in 2001 of the<br />

progressive nine states was 3.4 years above the all-India<br />

average of 63.5 years. Average life expectancy of 60.4 years<br />

of the four BIMARU states and that of 59.6 years of Orissa<br />

were respectively three to four years lower than the average<br />

for all-India. Even in terms of demographic<br />

features other than the above<br />

two, namely, death rate, infant mortality<br />

rate, and the rank based on Human<br />

Development Index (HDI), these five<br />

states are not even up to the all India<br />

level. Their average death rate of 8.5 is<br />

higher than 7.6 for all-India and also<br />

infant mortality rate of 70.6 as against<br />

all-India’s 58. The respective average<br />

rates for nine states are 6.87 and 43.3.<br />

HDI ranks of states have remained fairly stable between<br />

1961 and 2001. The average HDI rank of five of the progressive<br />

nine states is much superior to that of 11 of the other five<br />

less progressive states (Table-2-A).<br />

How are these states placed economically? Are the<br />

demographically more progressive states more advanced<br />

than the less progressive one?<br />

During 1980-81 to 1991-92, the Indian economy grew at<br />

the annual rate of 3.1 % (Per capita income at 1999-2000<br />

prices) and from 1992-93 to 2002-03, its per capita income<br />

growth rate was higher at 3.7 % per annum (Economic<br />

Survey, 2007-08). Seven states whose growth rates (per<br />

22 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

Table 2-A: Rates of Poverty Reduction at the State Level<br />

Demographically and Economically More Progressive States<br />

State<br />

Dependency<br />

Ratio<br />

Death<br />

Rate<br />

Life<br />

Expectancy<br />

(Years)<br />

Infant<br />

Mortality<br />

Rate<br />

HDI Rank<br />

Economic Growth<br />

(Per Capita GSDP)<br />

%<br />

Rate of Poverty<br />

Decline<br />

(%)<br />

(1970-2003)<br />

1961 2001 2001 2001 2001 1991 2001 1980-81 1993-2004 Rural Urban<br />

1992-93<br />

Andhra Pradesh 0.84 0.66 64.4 7.3 57 9 10 3.41 4.3 4.17 1.67<br />

Gujarat 0.92 0.66 64.1 7.1 54 6 6 2.84 3.55 3.57 3.82<br />

Haryana N.A. 0.77 66.9 6.9 43.3 5 5 3.71 3.25 3.42 3.98<br />

Karnataka 0.92 0.66 65.3 7.1 50 7 7 3.42 5.57 2.73 1.69<br />

Kerala 0.94 0.58 74 6.4 14 1 1 2.26 3.92 4.72 3.37<br />

Maharashtra 0.85 0.69 67.2 6.7 36 4 4 3.81 2.73 1.15 1.3<br />

Punjab 1 0.68 69.4 6.7 44 2 2 3.19 2.29 3.87 4.38<br />

Tamil Nadu 0.76 0.56 66.2 7.4 37 3 2 3.84 3.61 2.98 1.57<br />

West Bengal 0.85 0.67 64.9 6.4 38 8 8 2.43 5.42 1.98 1.49<br />

Average 0.89 0.66 66.9 6.87 43.3 5 5 3.21 3.85 3.18 2.59<br />

Demographically and Economically Less Progress States<br />

Bihar 0.92 0.92 61.6 8.1 61 15 15 1.55 2.19 1.1 1.96<br />

Madhya Pradesh 0.85 0.83 58 9 76 13 12 1.64 1.77 2.44 0.75<br />

Orissa 0.81 0.71 59.6 9.5 75 12 11 1.69 2.33 0.97 1.4<br />

Rajasthan 0.92 0.88 62 7 68 11 9 3.83 2.24 2.84 1.71<br />

Uttar Pradesh 0.88 0.9 60 8.7 73 14 13 2.34 0.89 0.91 1.62<br />

Average 0.89 0.88 60.4 8.2 69.5 13 12 2.34 1.77 1.82 1.51<br />

All India 0.87 0.75 63.5 7.6 58 - - 3.1 3.7 1.69 1.64<br />

Sources: (1) K.S. James “Glorifying Malthus: Current Debate on ‘ Demographic Dividend’ in India”. EPW, June 21,2008.<br />

(2)Ashish Bose: “ Increasing Life Expectancy and the Elderly” EPW,August,9,2008.<br />

(3) Govt. of India : Planning Commission,2002.<br />

(4) R. Radha Krishnan & Manoj Panda : “ Macro economics of Poverty Reduction-India Case Study”. IGIDR, Mumbai, 2006. ( Tables: 2.5, 2.10,2.12, 3.1, and 3.6).<br />

(5) Economic Survey of India, 2007-08.<br />

capita Gross state Domestic Product) were higher than the<br />

all-India between 1980-81 and 1992-93 are Andhra Pradesh,<br />

Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and<br />

Rajasthan. All but Rajasthan are demographically better<br />

placed. States whose growth rates exceeded the Indian<br />

growth rate during 1993-2004 are Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,<br />

Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal.<br />

All the states have retained their demographically progressive<br />

character. Their average annual growth rate (PCGSDP)<br />

accelerated to 4.23 % (1993-2004) from 3.6 % between<br />

1980-81 and 1992-93. Out of the remaining seven states, not<br />

in the above list, five-four BIMARU and Orissa states- are<br />

economically and demographically less advanced. The<br />

notable exceptions are Maharashtra and Punjab. The<br />

average annual growth rate of these seven states fell from<br />

2.33 % to 2.06 % between two periods under consideration.<br />

The average annual growth rate of five demographically less<br />

progressive states was not only lower than Maharashtra and<br />

Punjab but fell relatively faster from 2.21 % to 1.88 %. Thus,<br />

a close association, not necessarily causation, is observed<br />

between demographic and economic levels.<br />

Let us view the rate of poverty reduction during 1970-2003<br />

separately for rural and urban areas of the nine more and<br />

five less progressive states. In the nine states the average<br />

rates of rural and urban poverty reductions of 3.18 % and<br />

2.59 % respectively are above the average rates of 1.82 %<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

23


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

and 1.54 % observed in the rural and urban areas of the four<br />

BIMARU states respectively. The respective rates of 0.97 %<br />

and 1.40 % for the Orissa are the lowest. The average rate of<br />

rural poverty reduction being higher than the urban poverty<br />

can be taken as the sign of inclusive growth. If majority of<br />

the poor who have crossed the OPL belong to the nine states,<br />

it would be better to identify them to verify their non-poor<br />

status. Are they less vulnerable compared to the non-poor in<br />

less progressive states? Also, how many SCs and STs in these<br />

states have crossed the OPL since they bear the brunt of the<br />

incidence of poverty (Table-2A).<br />

The state wise poverty trends suggest the divergence and<br />

not the convergence. The polarization will gather momentum<br />

unless economic growth in less progressive states<br />

catches up with the more advanced states. Since catching up<br />

is time consuming, they may continue to lag behind. Then,<br />

what is the alternative to halt the widening divergence? What<br />

about making poverty alleviation measures more result<br />

oriented if that is the surest way to prevent political strife and<br />

turmoil? (A.K.Sen 2006). On one more ground also the<br />

implementation of these measures is to be strengthened as<br />

these less progressive states together account for a higher<br />

proportion of SCs and STs(28 %) than the all-India average.<br />

Here comes the role of expenditure on social services and<br />

poverty alleviation measures along with role of economic<br />

growth, inflation and population growth to speed up the<br />

poverty reduction rate. During 1990-91 to 2006-07, the per<br />

capita real expenditure (1999-2000 prices) on social services<br />

and poverty alleviation measures both by the central and<br />

state governments as a proportion of per capita GDP has<br />

increased from 5.9 % to 6.2 % (EPW, 2008). But almost all<br />

the studies on the impact of these measures have categorically<br />

concluded that the outcomes of such measures are not<br />

in proportion to outlays as they are not well targeted and<br />

implemented.<br />

SECTION-3<br />

Concluding Observations<br />

Asymmetrical poverty pattern of falling poverty ratio<br />

without any decline in the numerical <strong>size</strong> of the poor during<br />

1973-74 to 1993-94\ 1994-95 highlighted in the Economic<br />

Survey has given only a partial picture of the pattern as it has<br />

simply focused on population ignoring the impact of fluctuations<br />

in the rates of economic growth and inflation on<br />

poverty. In fact, the prominent feature of the pattern is its<br />

symmetrical nature, i. e. , falling\ rising poverty ratio accompanied<br />

also by the falling \ rising number of the poor brought<br />

about by the higher\ lower rate of economic growth and low\<br />

high inflation rate even when the rate of population growth<br />

has slowed down.<br />

The period, 1993-94 to 2005-06, of sustained high rate of<br />

economic growth and low inflation has lent consistency to<br />

the symmetrical pattern of falling poverty ratio as well as the<br />

number of the poor. During this period persons ranging<br />

from 92-137 million have crossed the Official Poverty Line<br />

(OPL). They are in the possession of the non-poor status<br />

having crossed the “take-off” stage of poverty.<br />

Analysis of the state level poverty trends has shown that<br />

India is poised for the continuation of the high economic<br />

growth path phase accompanied by the falling poverty ratio<br />

and the number of the poor. The two contributory demographic<br />

factors are ‘ demographic dividend’ (lower dependency<br />

ratio) and the improved and still rising life expectancy.<br />

The classification of 14 major states into more and less<br />

progressive states has revealed that in the nine more progressive<br />

states the lower average dependency ratio and the higher<br />

life expectancy than the all-India average have contributed<br />

to the higher average annual rate of economic growth than<br />

the all-India average and the resultant relatively faster rate<br />

of poverty reduction.<br />

The lower average rate of poverty decline in the five less<br />

progressive states, accounting for two-fifth of the total<br />

population, might have pulled down the overall rate of<br />

poverty reduction than the one expected out of rapid growth<br />

of per capita GDP. High incidence of poverty among the SCs<br />

and STs and poor implementation of poverty alleviation<br />

measures, to an extent, may be other factors for the overall<br />

slow rate of poverty decline.<br />

This symmetrical pattern fortunately has found a good<br />

companion in the pattern of falling number of illiterates with<br />

the rise in the literacy rate. These simultaneous appearance<br />

of the above two patterns seems to have initiated the process<br />

of empowerment of the underprivileged. The fillip to this<br />

process will also be provided by the pattern of rural poverty<br />

ratio declining at a rate higher than that of the urban<br />

poverty, where the majority of the poor are concentrated.<br />

Glimpse of economic growth trickling down and becoming<br />

inclusive appears to have arisen on the Indian arena.<br />

24 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE POVERTY PUZZLE<br />

Countering the global economic downturn to sustain our<br />

high economic growth path with tolerable inflation levels<br />

responsible for the emergence of the poverty pattern outlined<br />

in the text requires a policy direction on three counts.<br />

One, understanding fully the significance of domestic<br />

demand-led vs. export-led and overseas borrowing and<br />

equity financed-led growth strategies in such a scenario.<br />

Two, maximizing the gains from demographic dividend and<br />

increasing life expectancy by deploying persons of the<br />

working age group most productively and gainfully. Three,<br />

complete overhauling of poverty alleviating measures<br />

assuring that money spent on different programmes reaches<br />

in full to the intended beneficiaries. The problem is not one<br />

of under spending but of disciplining spending.<br />

While appraising and appreciating this poverty pattern,<br />

throughout the paper rather a strong plea is made to identify,<br />

survey, and monitor the persons who on the basis of the<br />

Official Poverty Line estimates are above the poverty. Who<br />

are these persons and where located? Have they continued to<br />

be above the OPL? Are they the part of the declining poverty<br />

gap index? To which social strata do they belong? How has<br />

their consumption pattern changed? Have they fulfilled the<br />

calorie norm? Where are they employed? Have they overcome<br />

their and their children’s illiteracy? Is there any<br />

improvement in their purchasing power? Are they still<br />

exposed to the risk of vulnerability? Taken in the right spirit,<br />

this plea is intended to serve as a guide to the debatable<br />

issues of the questionable nature of the newly emerged<br />

poverty pattern, whether the growth strategy is pro-poor or<br />

not, and the relevance of calorie norms.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• The Economist: “Special Report on the New Middle<br />

Classes in Emerging Markets”. February,14 th -20 th , <strong>2009</strong>.<br />

• Ministry of Finance,Govt. of India: “ Economic Survey,<br />

2007-08<br />

• Rosa A. Abraham: “Multidimensional Poverty and Vulnerability”.<br />

Economic and Political Weekly, <strong>May</strong> 17 th , 2008.<br />

• World Bank: “ World Bank Survey on Global Poverty”.<br />

2007<br />

• Himansu: “What are these estimates and what do they<br />

imply? Economic and Political Weekly.<br />

• Editorial: Economic and Political Weekly, October,<br />

25 th -31 st , 2008.<br />

• Martin Ravallion : “ A Global Perspective on Poverty in<br />

India”. Economic and Political Weekly, October 25 th -31 st ,<br />

2008.<br />

• Sanjay G. Reddy: “ Differently Distorted :The W. B.<br />

‘updated’ estimates” Economic and Political Weekly,<br />

October 25 th -31 st , 2008.<br />

• T. Krishna Kumar,Jayrama Holle,& Puja Guha: “Engel<br />

Curve Method for Measuring Poverty”. Economic and<br />

Political Weekly, July 26 th , 2008.<br />

• Angus Deaton & Jean Dreze:” Food and Nutrition in India:<br />

facts and Interpretations”.EPW, February 14 th , <strong>2009</strong><br />

• Ranjan Ray: “Diversity in calorie sources and undernourishment<br />

during rapid economic growth” EPW, February<br />

23 rd , 2008.<br />

• Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India: Economic Survey,<br />

2001-02.<br />

• Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India: Economic Survey,<br />

1998-99.<br />

• Amit Bhaduri: “ Predatory Growth”.EPW, April 19 th -26 th ,<br />

2008.<br />

• Adams Roberts: “ Farewell to Youth”, P.81, The World in<br />

<strong>2009</strong>, Special issue of The Economist, <strong>2009</strong>.<br />

• Amparo Castello Climent & Rafael Domenech: “ Human<br />

capital Inequality, Life Expectancy and Economic Growth”<br />

Economic Journal, Vol. 118, issue 528, PP. 653-677, April,<br />

2008.<br />

• K. L. Datta: “ An Estimate of Poverty Reduction between<br />

2004-05 and 2005-06”. EPW, October, 25 th -31 st , 2008.<br />

• K. S. James: “ Glorifying Malthus: Current Debate on<br />

Demographic Dividend”, EPW, June 21 st , 2008.<br />

• Edward Luce: “ Inspite of the Gods- The strange rise of<br />

Modern India, P. 351<br />

• R. Radhakrishnan & Manoj Panda: “ Macro Economics of<br />

Poverty Reduction: India- case study”, U. N.D. P., 2006.<br />

IGIDR, Mumbai, 2006.<br />

• Asish Bose: “ Increasing Life Expectancy and the Elderly”<br />

EPW, August, 2008.<br />

• A. K. Sen “Identity and Violence- The Illusion of Destiny.”<br />

W. W. Norto & Co.. Inc.\ Ltd.,N. Y. 2006.<br />

• EPW:” Budgetary Expenditure on Social Sector”, March<br />

15 th , 2008<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

25


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

The Road to Rendition<br />

Rural India doesn’t need amnesty or alms. A mere intent to bridge<br />

the rural urban divide by doing away with the populist schemes and<br />

replacing them with pragmatic ones can not only bridge all the rural<br />

urban divide but also unleash an economic giant that would never be<br />

in recession.<br />

In most of the European cities packaged mineral<br />

water is often an alien term as even the<br />

four or five star rated hotels would<br />

have water of the sink as the staple<br />

drinking water. But such is the quality<br />

of that water that it can any day beat the<br />

best packaged drinking water<br />

available in this part of the world.<br />

Over here in India, even sixty<br />

years after attaining independence,<br />

forget anywhere<br />

else, municipal corporations<br />

of the political and<br />

the commercial capitals<br />

of this country cannot<br />

even provide water good<br />

enough to drink and stay<br />

healthy. Packaged<br />

drinking water thus is a<br />

norm than an exception.<br />

For those who cannot afford<br />

packaged water, jaundice and<br />

other water borne diseases 1 is<br />

a norm than exception. This is<br />

the tragedy of a country which<br />

is the latest entrant to the trillion<br />

dollar club 2 . One then wonders that if this is the condition of<br />

the cities then the predicament of the villages can easily be<br />

gauged. And the irony is that even then, if there is one<br />

country which can inspire hope of keeping the giant global<br />

economic machine of the future running, it is India, if there is<br />

one country which has demonstrated that pluralism and<br />

democracy can defeat radicalism, it is India. And last but not<br />

the least, if there is one country which has<br />

demonstrated that it is possible for a third world<br />

bankrupt economy to be a trillion dollar<br />

economy in less than seventeen years’<br />

time, it is again this very India 3 .<br />

For ages the concept of India<br />

has mesmerised the world and it<br />

continues to do so even now. If<br />

till a few decades back it was<br />

India’s philosophy, culture, path<br />

of non-violence and poverty that<br />

inspired the west, today, along<br />

with them it is India’s incredible<br />

entrepreneurship, giant<br />

strides in technology,<br />

military prowess, its<br />

consumerism and the sheer<br />

resilience of its economy<br />

that continues to draw<br />

admiration and awe. Two<br />

decades back when the<br />

Indian economy was on the<br />

verge of bankruptcy and could<br />

have gone the Afghanistan’s<br />

way, many in India were reluctant<br />

to open up the economy even<br />

though it was inevitable and of absolute necessity. And many<br />

more were haunted by the ghost of East India Company 4 .<br />

Nobody had imagined then that in less than two decades’<br />

time, this crumbling economy would not just germinate<br />

companies which would eventually turn out to be giant killers<br />

but would also be a torchbearer of the future global economy<br />

along with China. Tata Group’s acquisition of British steel<br />

26 THE IIPM THINK TANK


A GROWTH PARADIGM<br />

Pathikrit Payne<br />

Senior Faculty Member<br />

IIPM, New Delhi<br />

giant Corus, Jaguar and Land Rover (JLR) or the Hindalco’s<br />

takeover of Novelis are just examples of hundreds of relentless<br />

acquisitions having been made by Indian companies<br />

abroad in the recent past. And many more are waiting to<br />

happen. Yet who would believe that in India, it is still a<br />

nightmare to endeavor becoming an entrepreneur? That’s the<br />

irony of this nation.<br />

In the same league, for a trillion dollar economy which is<br />

slated to become the third largest economy of the world by<br />

2050 (according to the predictions by Goldman Sachs in the<br />

BRIC Report) 5 , India continues to be the only nation among<br />

the trillion dollar economies with a Human Development<br />

Index rank 6 which is worse than that of some of the Sub<br />

Saharan impoverished African economies. Thus the irony<br />

unfolds this way that at a time when the American economy is<br />

reeling under the pressure of recession as a consequence of<br />

their near banking collapse 7 and its iconic<br />

companies going bankrupt; and in the<br />

chain effect even Europe and South East<br />

Asia is feeling the heat, the Indian<br />

economy on a whole seem to be completely<br />

oblivion to it. No doubt slowdown is<br />

here too, but if the foot falls in the<br />

shopping malls, the passion around IPL<br />

and the long queues of the middle class<br />

Indians to book the Nano car is anything<br />

to go by, recession is merely superficial<br />

here. That’s the better part though, but recession or no<br />

recession India continues to be the place where more than<br />

400 million people go to bed everyday half nourished or<br />

malnourished while food grains continue to rot in the FCI<br />

godowns 8 . Recession or no recession, India remains the place<br />

where more than 1,50,000 farmers have committed suicide in<br />

the last one decade 9 . And ironically recession or no recession,<br />

India continues to be at the receiving end of the tirade of<br />

mindless mayhem unleashed by terrorism. Thus the question<br />

that remains unanswered is that whether India is succeeding<br />

or failing, where India’s future is doomed or vivid and<br />

whether India is poised or paused.<br />

Recession or no<br />

recession, India is<br />

the place where<br />

1,50,000 farmers<br />

have committed<br />

suicide in the last<br />

one decade<br />

It goes without saying that most of the intellectual debates<br />

in this country would invariably steer once around India’s<br />

apocalyptic rural-urban divide. The usual phrase that would<br />

generally sum up the situation is that while India’s phenomenal<br />

growth story in the last one decade has invariably helped<br />

it in leapfrogging into the league of the trillion dollar economies<br />

and that it has no doubt created a plethora of job<br />

opportunities, the sad part of the same saga is that the<br />

phenomenal growth story of India is often paradoxed by an<br />

equally appalling story of the degeneration of rural India<br />

where even having most of the basic amenities, which are<br />

generally taken for granted in the West and even in urban<br />

India, remains a daydream. Thus, one wonders how far<br />

India’s growth story would be sustainable in the long run if<br />

more than 400 million Indians continue to go to be half fed<br />

and malnourished, if the quality of education imparted by the<br />

state run schools in rural India remains a major question<br />

mark, if availability of quality electricity and roads still<br />

remain a major challenge in major parts of rural India. The<br />

problem is not just about conscience and bridging the rural<br />

-urban divide for the sake of propriety. The real issue is that<br />

India’s urban centric growth story would<br />

stagnate in the long run if it fails to<br />

convert the 600 million plus rural population<br />

into future customers and employees.<br />

Let’s take a simple example to vindicate<br />

this point: In the last one decade time<br />

since the unfolding of India’s incredible<br />

IT story 10 , the industry has charted a<br />

backward journey from cosmopolitan<br />

cities to tier-II cities to tier-III cities and<br />

now even in the townships to reduce cost<br />

without compromising on the quality. But beyond a point<br />

thanks to global competition and the upwardly surge of the<br />

townships (which would invariably push up the real estate<br />

prices and employee cost), if the need arises to move beyond<br />

the townships to say into the heart of rural India for the sake<br />

of reducing cost without compromising on quality, then, is<br />

rural India in a position to welcome the industry with requisite<br />

physical and social infrastructure? The answer is an<br />

invariable no. And that’s where stagnation would not just<br />

come for IT industry but for every industry worth talking<br />

about as there is a limit to how much reduction the prices of<br />

products can attract new customers unless an equal effort is<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

27


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

made to boost the purchasing power of the potential customers.<br />

And that’s where rural India is lacking. Yet the more<br />

pertinent issue is whether it is fair enough to blame globalization<br />

for the increasing rural urban divide, or is it something<br />

else that’s responsible for it and whether there are new ways<br />

to bridge this gap.<br />

In the hindsight one has to look at the way rural is defined<br />

in India to find a suitable answer for the malaises plaguing it.<br />

In generic terms anything that is rural in India is surely a<br />

place devoid of basic education, healthcare, sanitation, roads,<br />

electricity, productivity and a vibrant market for products.<br />

This incidentally was aptly depicted in the film Swadesh in<br />

which the protagonist Mohan Bhargava, a scientist working<br />

with NASA, during his return to native village in India,<br />

preferred to have his journey and sojourn in a caravan. The<br />

reason being that inside the controlled environment of the<br />

caravan he felt more at ease than the external heat, dust,<br />

impure water, threats of water borne and air borne diseases,<br />

lack of electricity and of course the difficult terrains in the<br />

absence of roads. But can the likes of Mohan Bhargava be<br />

blamed for the same? Or say, would they have done the same<br />

while visiting to some hamlet in United<br />

Kingdom or France? Well, probably not<br />

as (ironically) this isn't the way the rural<br />

place is defined in Europe or USA. There<br />

aren't too many differences between their<br />

cosmopolitan cities and villages or say<br />

downtown places. Both would have more<br />

or less the same kind of amenities or at<br />

least the differences in terms of quality of<br />

roads, power availability, education<br />

facilities, hospitals, sanitation and quality<br />

of drinking water would not be as stark as it is in countries<br />

like India. At most the differences would be in terms of<br />

population and the extent of pollution. Villages might have<br />

more trees, less population and pollution than cities.<br />

In fact this is not a new phenomenon. India’s growth story<br />

has always been urban-centric, since independence. And thus<br />

one would find that be it centres of higher education, hospitals,<br />

markets, quality road connectivity and every other<br />

related thing which reflects development, would always be in<br />

the vicinities of the cities. One wonders why for an economy<br />

with a near 1,150 million population, India has only one<br />

AIIMS like hospital and that too in the heart of the political<br />

Political class finds<br />

it convenient to<br />

keep the systemic<br />

problems alive<br />

and treat the mass<br />

with painkillers for<br />

temporary relief<br />

capital with half of it being perennially reserved for the <strong>VI</strong>Ps?<br />

One then wonders that if each of the district hospitals of 625<br />

odd districts 11 of India were to be brought anywhere near the<br />

standard of AIIMS, wouldn’t it then be possible to take care<br />

of the some of the lacunae in the Indian healthcare system?<br />

In fact one should look at the way the giant retail companies<br />

streamline their procurement by putting bulk orders to a<br />

select list of companies. If this can help companies reduce<br />

their cost and thus price through economy of scale, can’t this<br />

process be similarly emulated by the government of India by<br />

going for bulk procurement of all medicines and related<br />

equipments for all the government owned hospitals? And<br />

wouldn’t then it be possible in delivering affordable healthcare,<br />

if not free healthcare, in every district of India? But<br />

unfortunately that’s not to be so thanks to the idiosyncrasies<br />

that govern this country in spite of the fact that in the <strong>2009</strong>-10<br />

interim budget total money allocated for rural health spending<br />

was Rs 120 billion 12 .<br />

The strange case of India is that here populism has more<br />

acceptance than socialism. Thus the political class finds it<br />

much more convenient to keep the systemic problems alive<br />

and then treat the mass with painkillers<br />

for temporary relief. No one in essence is<br />

actually interested in solving the real<br />

issues. And whenever things go out of<br />

hand, there’s always the excuse of stating<br />

that subjects like agriculture, rural<br />

development or say law & order are state<br />

subjects and that the government at the<br />

centre cannot do much beyond advising<br />

and giving financial assistance. On the<br />

other hand the state governments generally<br />

put the ball in the centre’s court by simply stating that the<br />

centre has not done enough and has shown step-motherly attitude<br />

towards the particular state. Take for example two of<br />

much hyped and fan fared schemes of the UPA Government,<br />

i.e. the loan waiver scheme and the National Rural Employment<br />

Guarantee Scheme. No wonder both these schemes did<br />

play crucial roles in catapulting the UPA back into power but<br />

a deeper scrutiny of these two schemes would reveal that<br />

neither of them are as effective as they are made to look. In<br />

case of the first scheme, the government didn’t spare any<br />

opportunity to chest thump its so called pro-poor image by<br />

waiving off Rs 70,000 crore 13 worth of farm loans. Yet the<br />

28 THE IIPM THINK TANK


A GROWTH PARADIGM<br />

irony is that in spite of this, farm suicides continue vindicating<br />

that a one time waiver of loans would at best jeopardize<br />

the stability of the banking system of the nation rather than<br />

boosting the rural economy. At worse, in a country where<br />

nearly 50% of the population don’t have access to banking<br />

and resort to taking loans from the money lenders, has<br />

anybody from the government ever tried to find out as to who<br />

the real beneficiaries of this scheme has been? Certainly the<br />

private money lenders wouldn't care two hoots about what<br />

Indian's Finance Minister or the RBI Governor states. So the<br />

predicament of millions who took debts worth billions from<br />

the money lenders continue. Likewise, would this loan waiver<br />

make sure that there would be no more future need for such<br />

loan waivers? Or for that matter does the government have<br />

any clue as to why the farmers fail to perennially utilize the<br />

loans? And last but not the least, if the real intent is to release<br />

the farmers from the clutches of the farm debt, why is it that<br />

till date no serious efforts have been made or legislations<br />

passed to stringently deal with the private money lenders'<br />

syndicates that have plagued rural India in the absence of<br />

banks? That’s where the difference between populism and<br />

socialism lies. A government with vote<br />

banks in mind would surely resort to quick<br />

fix measures like a loan waiver while a<br />

truly socialistic government would rather<br />

prefer to take care of the systemic flaws<br />

because of which agriculture in India has<br />

become a completely unviable proposition.<br />

Today, rural India is mostly about<br />

disguised unemployment where a majority<br />

of people resort to agriculture simply for<br />

the sake of remaining engaged even<br />

though their engagement hardly have any value addition. In<br />

case of the much trumpeted NREGS or the National Rural<br />

Employment Guarantee Scheme, if there were to be one last<br />

nail in the coffin of rural India, then nothing can be better<br />

than NREGS. It might sound to be too harsh a statement,<br />

especially on something which is often touted as a path breaking<br />

social scheme. But the devil actually lies in the detail.<br />

That there is rampant corruption with respect to implementation<br />

of the scheme and siphoning of fund is something which<br />

is known to all and needs no elaboration. The more intriguing<br />

thing is that when a scheme aims at giving a mere Rs.60 per<br />

day for a maximum of 100 days in a year, can there be any real<br />

Indian policy<br />

makers still believe<br />

that replacing<br />

machines with<br />

manual labour<br />

would increase<br />

employment<br />

improvement in the quality of life of the recipients? If one<br />

were to argue that even this much can bring about substantial<br />

improvement in the quality of life of the rural lot, then this in<br />

itself vindicates the plight of rural India. NREGS wouldn’t<br />

have been a necessity had agriculture been viable. And now<br />

instead of having any long term policy of improving the<br />

productivity or the skill levels of the rural manpower, a<br />

pittance of Rs 60 a day for 100 days at most is just the perfect<br />

recipe to degrade them farther. Is this amount anyway even<br />

worth to take care of a family and then give quality education<br />

to the next generation? Would any able bodied person with<br />

some kind of aspiration (well- unless and otherwise it is<br />

presumed that rural folks cannot have aspirations) can stick<br />

to this and yet make it better in life or have a better future?<br />

Can a scheme like NREGS ever bring the rural folk out of<br />

their subsistence living? The answer is a blatant no. Yet there<br />

is a bigger devil. The NREG Act states, ‘Creation of durable<br />

assets and strengthening of the livelihood resource base of<br />

the rural poor shall be an important objective of the scheme.’<br />

It further states, ‘The cost of material component of projects,<br />

including the wages of skilled and semi skilled workers taken<br />

up under the scheme, shall not exceed<br />

forty percent of the total project cost’ and<br />

that ‘ as far as practicable, task funded<br />

under the scheme shall be performed by<br />

using manual labour and not machines.’<br />

Probably India is the only trillion dollar<br />

economy in the world where its policy<br />

makers still continue with the Jurassic<br />

Age ideology that replacing machines with<br />

human labour would increase employment.<br />

NREGS talks about creation of<br />

durable assets like rural connectivity through all weather<br />

roads and irrigation canals and yet limits the use of machines<br />

and materials for the sake of using more and more manual<br />

labour to increase, what can easily be termed as disguised<br />

unemployment. Now for a country like India, a substantial<br />

part of which is flood prone, does it make sense to make rural<br />

roads and embankments by using mud instead of concrete?<br />

To witness the shocking outcome of the same, one simply has<br />

to visit Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal or even<br />

Gujarat and Maharashtra and Karnataka during the monsoons.<br />

Most of the mud embankments and rural roads simply<br />

get washed away thanks to the fact that most of them have<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

29


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

been made by using mud or earth instead of concrete. And<br />

thus in the following year the same work would be repeated<br />

and the saga continues year after year. No wonder then why<br />

the real developments in rural India don’t happen. One<br />

wonders what would have happened if instead of mud, most of<br />

the work on rural roads and embankments would have been<br />

made of concrete. Much of that, if not all, would have then<br />

been able to withstand the tirade of floods and need not be<br />

reconstructed again the following year. The money in the<br />

following year could then have been more judiciously used for<br />

making more of durable assets in the concerned village, say a<br />

health centre, a school building or a community centre as well<br />

as for setting up of skill enhancement schools for the rural<br />

lot. In fact there are already so many schemes for rural<br />

development that the addition of NREGS to it and allocation<br />

to the extent of Rs 30,000 crore that has been made this time<br />

in the interim budget is too much of a profligacy for the sake<br />

of creating disguised unemployment and assets which<br />

perennially gets washed away by rain.<br />

If archaic laws that govern our agriculture<br />

and competitive populism has kept<br />

development out of bound for the rural<br />

India and made sure that improvement in<br />

purchasing power and quality life would<br />

never be possible by staying in the villages,<br />

it is the quality of education that is<br />

imparted by the state owned primary<br />

schools in rural India that creates the<br />

lasting difference between the quality of a<br />

convent educated kid in urban India and a<br />

state-educated kid of rural India. Doing away with the<br />

pass-fail system and inability to replace it with an appropriate<br />

grading policy tend to create a comfort zone among the rural<br />

lot who are still not aware about the intense competition that<br />

await them in the real world. Thus a student who has never<br />

faced peer pressure is suddenly made to give a secondary<br />

exam and face the same kind of questions for which the urban<br />

lot have been preparing for ages. Conventional education is<br />

just one aspect of the real development of a child. In urban<br />

places it is ably complimented by several other types of<br />

audio-visual methods as well as sports and development of<br />

competitive spirit, out-knowledge and overall personality.<br />

Since these might not be possible in rural India, it becomes all<br />

the more imperative that there is no compromise at least with<br />

Rural India doesn't<br />

need subsidies,<br />

employment<br />

guarantee or<br />

amnesty from<br />

governments at<br />

centre and states<br />

the conventional education being imparted by schools.<br />

Unfortunately, merely for the sake of increasing the percentage<br />

of people who can read or write, India is badly compromising<br />

with what being imparted in the name of education in<br />

the state run primary schooling system. When the rural kids<br />

grow up and head for the cities for further education, it is then<br />

they realise for the first time how unprepared they are to face<br />

the competitive world and their urban counterparts. Most thus<br />

prefer to come back into the cocoon of comfort zone in their<br />

native places. And thus the rural-urban divide prevails. In fact<br />

the irony is that today a substantial portion of the rural lot<br />

generally prefer to spend money, in spite of abject poverty, to<br />

send their children to private schools than to let them rot in<br />

government schools. Rural India doesn’t need subsidies,<br />

employment guarantee or amnesty from the governments at<br />

the centre and the states. It doesn’t even need crocodile tears<br />

from the city based page three type social activists. Sixty years<br />

of all of these didn’t benefit them anyway. What it needs in<br />

contrast is a treatment at par with the cities. If the cities can<br />

have quality education system why can’t<br />

India make sure that the same can be<br />

delivered in villages too? Why can’t the<br />

primary schools in some of the remotest<br />

corners of Jharkhand or Chhattisgarh be<br />

at par with the Kendriya Vidyalayas? Why<br />

can’t each health centre of rural India be<br />

at par with the clinics of Apollo or Max?<br />

Why can’t each cluster of villages or say<br />

each block have its own college imparting<br />

both technical and non-technical courses?<br />

Why can’t the rural roads be at par with that of the cities?<br />

Why can’t the rural folk have access to seamless banking the<br />

way it is available in urban India? Why is it that when prices of<br />

most of the consumer durable and FMCG goods can be<br />

decided by the companies and the market competition , the<br />

prices of the agricultural produce should be so stringently<br />

dictated by the state governments through the archaic Agriculture<br />

Produce Market Committee or the APMC? Unfortunately<br />

much of the rural urban divide can be done away with if<br />

industrialisation carries its march from urban to rural India.<br />

If industrialisation starts in rural India, it would not only help<br />

in adding value to the farm produce but also help in igniting<br />

the much needed rural economy and improve the rural<br />

purchasing power. For long the rural produce have desper-<br />

30 THE IIPM THINK TANK


A GROWTH PARADIGM<br />

ately tried to seek markets in urban India and had no option<br />

but to bypass much of rural India as people there would not be<br />

having the requisite purchasing power. What India needs is a<br />

national market for agricultural produce. What India needs is<br />

to make sure that food grains stop rotting in the Food Corporation<br />

of India godowns (FCI) while 400 million 14 Indian got<br />

to bed malnourished and half fed every night.<br />

Urbanisation of rural India in the form of making all civic<br />

amenities available would not only just improve India’s dismal<br />

ranking in the Human Development Index of UNDP (India<br />

ranked 128 th in 2007-08 report) but would also make sure that<br />

the mass migration of rural folks into urban India in search of<br />

livelihood come to an end. Interestingly most of the urban<br />

poor of India do have land holdings in their own native places<br />

where they would be most willing to go back if economic<br />

activity is ignited there. And thus urban slums might just<br />

vanish one day if urban slum dwellers find that their income<br />

back in their native place reaches somewhere near to their<br />

urban income. In fact Indian governments have this unique<br />

tendency to follow private investments to a place. Wherever<br />

private investments come up, investments by the government<br />

for improving social and physical infrastructure in those<br />

places follow. Gurgaon is a sure case in point. All the more<br />

reason as to why more of private investments are needed in<br />

rural India.<br />

Given the amount of money that is being spent every year<br />

on rural development, fund should essentially not be the<br />

prime obstacle if one were to develop city level amenities in<br />

rural India. What is needed badly is the intent and a better<br />

delivery of the services by the government. So, if a day arrives<br />

when people from urban India go to a not-so-urban place of<br />

India for a higher education course simply because that<br />

particular college in one sub division of rural India has<br />

emerged as a centre of excellence, or if we can trust India with<br />

its glass of water without any apprehension of any water borne<br />

disease, if that day arrives when the likes of Mohan Bhargava<br />

need not travel back to his native place in rural India in a<br />

caravan, that day we can presume that India’s real development<br />

has just begun. And if that day possibly comes, the<br />

incredible Indian consumer market which today (for most of<br />

the products is not anywhere beyond the thousand odd cities<br />

and townships), would be in the threshold of the six lakh odd<br />

villages. And given the exponential demand that it would<br />

generate, India might never get into recession even if the<br />

whole world gets into one. Such would be the power of the<br />

incredible market then that it would take the whole world to<br />

cater to that market. Starvation, deprivation, discrimination<br />

and divides would be a passé then.<br />

If India endeavours to ever realise fairy tale future that<br />

Goldman Sachs has woven for it in their reports on the BRIC<br />

economies, where it has stated that India has the potential to<br />

be among the top three economies of the world (with a GDP<br />

of $38.2 trillion by 2050), then it has to realize that only an all<br />

inclusive growth can give it that firepower to reach that goal.<br />

And with it would come the long awaited dream to create that<br />

ideal state, which would be run by institutions and not by<br />

individuals where true socialism would replace petty populism<br />

and where rural would no more be the place which is devoid of<br />

everything that are taken for granted in cities.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1 7.8 lakh deaths annually - www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.<br />

in<br />

2 Hindu Business Line, 25 th <strong>May</strong> 2007<br />

3 Indian economy became bankrupt in 1991<br />

4 The British Empire came to India and consolidated its<br />

business through the East India Company<br />

5 Reports of Goldman Sachs namely, 'Dreaming with BRICs:<br />

The Path to 2050' and 'BRICs and Beyond'<br />

6 India's rank in UNDP Human Development Report 2008<br />

was a dismal 128<br />

7 As per IMF report, US banks suffered a loss of $2.7 trillion<br />

due to sub prime crisis<br />

8 Over 1 million tonne of food grains damaged in FCI<br />

godowns in last one decade as per PTI<br />

9 Website- indiatogether.org/agriculture/<br />

10 As per NASSCOM Report, India's revenue from software<br />

industry and outsourcing pegged at $71 billion for the<br />

current fiscal<br />

11 As per the National Portal of India,<br />

12 Outlay of the National Rural Health Mission in the interim<br />

Budget of <strong>2009</strong>-10<br />

13 In the Union Budget of 2008-09, Rs 70,000 crore of farm<br />

loan was waived off.<br />

14 Report of International Food Policy Research Institute<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation.)<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

31


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Problem of Water Pollution In<br />

India : A Possible Solution<br />

32 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G OLDEN DROP<br />

Arpita Khanna<br />

Centre for International Trade and<br />

Development, School of International<br />

Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University<br />

I. Introduction<br />

Comprising over 70% of Earth’s surface, water is undoubtedly<br />

the most precious natural resource that exists on our<br />

planet. Without this seemingly invaluable compound<br />

comprised of Hydrogen and Oxygen, life on Earth would<br />

be non existent. Although we as humans recognize the<br />

fact, we disregard it by polluting our rivers, lakes and<br />

oceans. This has many adverse consequences. In order to<br />

combat water pollution, we must understand the sources<br />

and the problems caused.<br />

Water pollution occurs when the body of water is adversely<br />

affected due to the addition of large amounts of<br />

materials to the water. There are two sources of water<br />

pollution: point source and non point source. Point source<br />

of pollution occurs when harmful substances are emitted<br />

directly into a body of water. Example: a pipe from an<br />

industrial facility discharging effluents directly into a river.<br />

Non point source of pollution occurs when pollutants are<br />

delivered indirectly through transport or environmental<br />

change. Example: when fertilizer from a farm field is<br />

carried into a stream by rain. The technology exists for<br />

point sources of pollution to be monitored and regulated.<br />

Non point sources are much more difficult to control.<br />

Pollution arising from non point sources accounts for a<br />

majority of the contaminants in streams and lakes.<br />

Domestic wastes, industrial, effluents, agricultural<br />

wastes, etc are the major pollutants entering our water<br />

bodies. They contain chemicals and organic compounds<br />

which enter the bodies of many aquatic animals. Most of<br />

the problems occur due to the lack of proper sanitation<br />

facilities and waste disposal system.<br />

The water pollutants are responsible for decreasing the<br />

self-purifying ability of the water bodies. Water clarity is<br />

affected and the water bodies become shallower. Also, the<br />

rate of photosynthesis is decreased, killing many aquatic<br />

plants. Water pollution such leads to water borne diseases<br />

like cholera, typhoid, diarrhea, hepatitis, jaundice, dysentery,<br />

etc. It can even render the water unfit for industrial or<br />

agricultural purposes, let alone for drinking.<br />

Therefore, it can be concluded that the problems associated<br />

with water pollution have the capabilities to disrupt<br />

life on the planet to a great extent. If we don’t save our<br />

water resources, then we can soon bid them goodbye.<br />

Therefore, it is very important to arrest the problem before<br />

it gets too late.<br />

II. Water Pollution in India: Facts and Figures<br />

Today India stands as the second fastest growing economy<br />

in the world. During the past few decades Indian industries<br />

have registered a quantum jump, which has contributed<br />

to high economic growth. However, this has given rise<br />

to severe environment pollution. Consequently, water<br />

quality is seriously affected which is far lower in comparison<br />

to the international standards. In India, 1.03 crore<br />

people die annually of which, nearly 7.5 % of deaths (7.8<br />

lakh deaths) are due to water, sanitation and hygiene.<br />

Diarrhoeal diseases make up a chunk of this number.<br />

Intestinal infections and water borne diseases like malaria,<br />

dengue etc together cause nearly 19,000 deaths.<br />

The Environmental sustainability index (ESI) 1 , 2007,<br />

for Indian states indicates that most of the larger and<br />

higher growth states with concentration of industrial and<br />

Table 1: Water Quality Status of Various States in<br />

India<br />

States Desired Class Existing Class<br />

Haryana C D<br />

Himachal Pradesh A C<br />

Karnataka C E<br />

Kerala C E<br />

Madhya Pradesh C E<br />

Manipur C B<br />

Meghalaya C D<br />

Pondicherry C D<br />

Punjab C D<br />

Rajasthan C C<br />

Uttar Pradesh C D<br />

Gujarat C D<br />

Source: Water quality status and statistics 1998, Central Pollution<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

33


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Figure 1: State Wise Habitations Affected by the Quality of Water<br />

States<br />

Arunachal<br />

Uttar Pradesh<br />

Rajasthan<br />

Madhya Pradesh<br />

Haryana<br />

Andhra Pradesh<br />

0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000<br />

Habitations affected<br />

Habitants affected in 2006<br />

Habitants affected in 2004<br />

Source: Indiastat<br />

constant while for some other, it declined considerably.<br />

This shows that the attention has been paid to the<br />

control of pollution, both in the political as well as<br />

academic spheres. However, much remains to be<br />

done to overcome this deadly problem of water<br />

pollution. A study conducted by Brandon and<br />

Hammon(1995) gave a nation wide cost of water<br />

pollution. As per the study, the total cost of pollution<br />

stands at 4.53 %, with surface water pollution<br />

accounting for 59% 2 . Thus, India cannot afford not<br />

to deal with water pollution. But now the question is<br />

how to deal with the problem. Does our literature<br />

suggest any mechanisms that can deal with the<br />

problem, without substantial cost being incurred?<br />

agricultural activities featured at the bottom of ranking.<br />

While, the states which are relatively greener fared better<br />

in the ranking. Industrialization has led to pollution of<br />

water bodies in various areas. There<br />

are sufficient evidences available<br />

related with mismanagement of<br />

industrial wastes. The surface water is<br />

the main source of industries for waste<br />

disposal. It is found that almost all<br />

rivers are polluted in most of the<br />

stretches by some of the industry or<br />

the other. This has resulted in acute<br />

and chronic morbidity among people.<br />

In India, water is classified into five<br />

classes based on the quality: A, B, C,<br />

D, E. Class A is the clean water quality, Class B is the<br />

slightly polluted water quality, Class C is the moderately<br />

polluted water quality, Class D is the heavily polluted<br />

water quality and Class E indicates severe pollution. Table<br />

1 shows state wise water quality status of Lakes, Canals,<br />

Creeks, Ponds, Drains and Tanks.<br />

Table 1 shows that in almost all the states, the existing<br />

class of water quality is below the desired class. Therefore,<br />

it can be concluded that pollution is exceeding the standards<br />

in many places. Also, looking at Figure 1, we see<br />

that Habitations affected with the quality of water is not<br />

only high but has increased over the years, for most states.<br />

However, for some states, the figures have remained<br />

Government has<br />

basically three basic<br />

choices: non market<br />

policy instruments,<br />

market based<br />

instruments and<br />

any combination<br />

of these two<br />

III. Mechanisms to Deal with the Problem<br />

One mechanism available is government intervention. The<br />

government has three basic choices: non market policy<br />

instruments, market based instruments<br />

and combination of two. Non<br />

market policy instruments include<br />

command and control instruments<br />

such as fines, penalties, threats of<br />

legal action for closure etc. These<br />

instruments do not provide any<br />

incentives to polluters to choose cost<br />

minimizing pollution abatement<br />

technologies and hence, are not<br />

efficient.<br />

Market based instruments usually<br />

consists of pollution taxes, marketable pollution permits or<br />

hybrid instruments. These instruments are termed as ‘First<br />

best instruments’ because they guarantee market efficiency<br />

even in the presence of environmental externalities.<br />

The choice between pollution taxes and marketable<br />

permits depends both on the efficacy in achieving target<br />

level of emissions as well as on the relative <strong>size</strong> of welfare<br />

losses they produce ( Baumol and Oates, 1988). There may<br />

however be cases where it is necessary to use a mixture of<br />

both taxes and permits, instead of either one of them<br />

(Roberts and Spence, 1976).<br />

The optimal control of pollution through taxes or<br />

pollution permits requires both the pollution abatement<br />

34 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G OLDEN DROP<br />

cost function for generators and<br />

the damage function of receivers<br />

of pollution to be convex. Given<br />

this condition, tax on generators<br />

equivalent to sum of marginal<br />

damages to receiver, will provide<br />

incentives to generators for<br />

spending on pollution abatement,<br />

until the MC of abatement is<br />

equal to marginal damages<br />

received by affected parties<br />

( Baumol, 1972, Murty and<br />

Nayak, 1982).<br />

However, some empirical<br />

studies about the cost of the<br />

technological processes used for<br />

water pollution abatement<br />

confirm the presence of increasing<br />

returns to scale with respect<br />

to pollution loads, so that abatement<br />

cost functions are non<br />

convex. (Dasgupta and Murty 1985,<br />

Batstone et al, 1989, Mehta, Mundle and<br />

Sankar, 1993, Murty and James, 1996).<br />

In other words, there is decreasing<br />

marginal cost in water pollution<br />

abatement, the presence of which will<br />

make pollution tax or marketable<br />

permits ineffective. They will not<br />

provide any incentive to the pollution<br />

firm to adopt pollution abatement technologies or spend<br />

something on pollution abatement.<br />

Therefore, the incentives based on governmental<br />

instruments like taxes and marketable pollution permits<br />

fail to control water pollution. Hence, despite its inefficiency,<br />

government does not have any alternate but to<br />

adopt command and control mechanisms. This is precisely<br />

why in India, we see command and control mechanisms<br />

instead of market based instruments.<br />

Thus, it can be concluded that market based instruments,<br />

despite their efficiency cannot be adopted. The<br />

command and control mechanisms can be adopted,<br />

however, are inefficient. Therefore, we need to look for<br />

some alternate mechanism.<br />

Incentives based<br />

on governmental<br />

instruments, taxes<br />

and marketable<br />

pollution permits,<br />

will fail to control<br />

water pollution<br />

IV. Alternate Mechanisms<br />

The waste released by these<br />

factories is an externality. It does<br />

not monetarily affect the producer<br />

of goods, however, has a very<br />

strong influence on the standard<br />

of living of the society as a whole.<br />

The notion of externality is linked<br />

with the non existence of markets.<br />

It occurs when a decentralized<br />

economy has insufficient incentives<br />

to create a potential market<br />

in some commodity and where<br />

market equilibrium is pareto<br />

inefficient.<br />

One mechanism to deal with<br />

the problem of externality was<br />

given by Coase in 1960. This<br />

mechanism holds good even with<br />

increasing returns to scale in<br />

pollution abatement, while<br />

pollution tax is ineffective in such a<br />

situation. According to Coase, with<br />

clear property rights and minimal<br />

transaction costs, the parties to an<br />

externality can create the market in an<br />

externality, leading to a pareto efficient<br />

solution. Also, under certain conditions,<br />

the resource allocation result of coasian<br />

bargaining will be same regardless of<br />

which party is given right to the environmental resource.<br />

Coasian bargaining approach looks very attractive. An<br />

economy may be able to move towards pareto efficient<br />

allocation without pervasive government regulation.<br />

However, what remains to be seen is whether we can apply<br />

the coasian approach to the water pollution problems<br />

faced by people in India. For this, let us consider a following<br />

case study.<br />

V. A Case Study<br />

Patancheru in Andhra Pradesh, became a hub for largely<br />

unregulated chemical and drug factories in the 1980s,<br />

creating what is described as an “ecological sacrifice zone”<br />

with its pharmaceutical waste.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

35


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

A recent report by Times of India shows that these drug<br />

factories, have been releasing a mix of powerful antibiotics<br />

into a stream used for drinking water, fishing and as a<br />

water source for cattle. Today, its water is the most drug<br />

polluted in the World. As per the researchers, it is the<br />

highest level of pharmaceuticals ever detected in the<br />

environment. The poor in Andhra are consuming an array<br />

of chemicals that may be harmful and can lead to proliferation<br />

of drug resistant bacteria. Higher incidence of<br />

cancer has already been noticed. Other biological aberrations<br />

are also anticipated.<br />

<strong>VI</strong>. Application of Coase Theorem<br />

The first important condition of the<br />

Coase theorem is the existence of well<br />

defined property rights. Establishment of<br />

enforceable property rights makes good<br />

excludable and thus allow a market<br />

system to operate efficiently. As per<br />

Coase, under some conditions, it makes<br />

no difference to the efficiency whether<br />

polluter has a right or the victim (although<br />

it will make a huge deal of a<br />

difference to each of the two parties).<br />

Since the right to pollute is a property<br />

right that has value, if trade is allowed<br />

in those rights, efficiency would prevail<br />

no matter how they were initially<br />

allocated. If the right is worth more to a<br />

victim than the polluter, the victim will<br />

end up with a right no matter how it is<br />

initially distributed. Therefore, when<br />

there are no impediments to buying and selling property<br />

rights, initial distribution of rights does not matter. However,<br />

when there are impediments, initial distributions<br />

does matter.<br />

Before we move on to discussing whether we would face<br />

any impediments or costs in transacting these rights, the<br />

attention needs to be drawn on the fact that initial distribution<br />

of rights does not matter to efficiency, however, it<br />

does matter to equity. Rights can be valuable. Resting<br />

somebody with rights is like giving them money and<br />

resources. But in this paper, we ignore the distributional<br />

effects and simply concentrate our attention on whether<br />

Establishment<br />

of enforceable<br />

property rights<br />

makes good<br />

excludable and<br />

allow a market to<br />

operate efficiently<br />

efficiency can be attained in the region so badly affected<br />

by water pollution.<br />

Coasian solution assumes minimum transaction cost.<br />

This assumption implies that the damages due to pollution<br />

caused by industry can easily be measured, compensation<br />

costlessly, negotiated with all affected people and payments<br />

can be enforced. In this case, we have 80 drug<br />

factories inflicting uncompensated costs on the large<br />

number of people. Therefore, we don’t expect bargaining<br />

to be easy. A significant transaction cost is likely. Therefore,<br />

it does matter where the rights are initially vested.<br />

If the victims are given the right to environmental<br />

resource, the factories would have to compensate them for<br />

any damage caused. There is a possibility<br />

that the political power of polluters is<br />

such that it is impossible to force them to<br />

reduce pollution and get them to pay for<br />

it, resulting in a stalemate that can last<br />

for years. However, we still can expect<br />

some lump sum compensation.<br />

On the other hand, if the property<br />

rights are given to the polluter, the<br />

victims would have to get together to pay<br />

the factories. The problems of reaching<br />

the agreement among people surrounding<br />

the area are significant. The basic<br />

problem is of free riding. Individuals<br />

will tend to act as free riders in negotiations,<br />

undermining the negotiation<br />

themselves. In such cases, individuals<br />

would treat the outcome of negotiations<br />

as beyond their control and therefore,<br />

would be unwilling to bear transaction cost. Also, we can<br />

face a problem of truthful revelation of demand. This is<br />

because the cost of damage due to pollution is private<br />

information to individuals. Therefore, it might become<br />

very difficult to reach a coasian solution when rights are<br />

vested with the factories.<br />

By the above logic, property rights should be given to the<br />

victims. Now, the factories would have to look at the cost<br />

of damage and see if it exceeds the cost of pollution<br />

control. Once again, factories need to ask citizens what<br />

their damage is, however, there are incentives to overstate<br />

this damage, since compensation may be based on the<br />

36 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G OLDEN DROP<br />

response. In this case, result would be installation of<br />

common effluent treatment plant. However, suppose<br />

damages are more modest and it is optimal to compensate.<br />

Then the tendency to overstate the damage would lead to<br />

excessive compensation or overzealous pollution control<br />

measures. The problem arises because of non rival aspect<br />

of pollution. This leads to free riding and difficulty in<br />

striking bargains.<br />

Now having established the property rights, it is very<br />

important to make bargaining possible between the<br />

polluters and victims to achieve coase like solutions. The<br />

coase theorem is the most effective when two individual<br />

firms or people are bargaining. We do not have any<br />

problem of free riding or negotiating cost.<br />

However, many externalities involve<br />

substantial numbers of participants either<br />

generating the externality or receiving it<br />

or both. Under these conditions, transactions<br />

costs of aggregating the interest of<br />

all affected parties, negotiating an<br />

optimal abatement level and then enforcing<br />

the market agreement will preclude<br />

a purely private bargain, even if allocation<br />

of rights is clear.<br />

Generally, it becomes difficult to<br />

bring the affected parties together as<br />

the impact of water pollution is uniformly<br />

distributed and is not immediate.<br />

Example: Chipko movement, the large<br />

scale movement to resist the destruction<br />

of forest of 1970s and 80s, was possible<br />

only because the impact was immediate.<br />

Also, many externalities are intertemporal, and future<br />

generations are simply not present to make bargains, which<br />

preclude the coasian solution between private parties to<br />

the externality.<br />

However, we do not confront some of the problems<br />

mentioned above like realization of impact in the case of<br />

Patancheru. This area has been so severely impacted, that<br />

people do realize that it is in their interest to get together<br />

and look for possible ways to overcome the problem. This<br />

also becomes easy given the publicity and media attention<br />

this issue has received.<br />

Therefore, high transaction costs of bargaining and<br />

The organization<br />

of affected people<br />

into a community<br />

depends upon<br />

their perception of<br />

damages from the<br />

pollution<br />

paying compensation can be reduced to manageable level,<br />

if the affected parties and the factories can organize<br />

themselves into groups/communities. These groups, within<br />

themselves, can elect representatives who would bargain<br />

with the opposite party. The community of factories would<br />

either pay the compensation or would set up Common<br />

Effluent Treatment Plant themselves. The community of<br />

affected parties may threaten the factories by legal action<br />

or by setting up a treatment plant and collecting the cost<br />

from polluters. The bargaining would result in the adoption<br />

of Common Effluent Treatment plant by either party,<br />

which is clearly what is happening in Andhra Pradesh 3 .<br />

Generally, getting the factories together into a community<br />

would not face as many problems as<br />

getting affected parties together. This is<br />

possible only in the presence of an<br />

intervention by a political party. However,<br />

given the conditions prevailing in<br />

Patancheru, wherein local activists and<br />

environmentalists have started ‘Anti<br />

Pollution Committee’, affected people<br />

have made representation to the government<br />

and industry, threatened factories<br />

with blockages, filed court cases against<br />

the factories, formation of communities<br />

would not be a problem. Also, given the<br />

rising damages from water pollution,<br />

NGOs are playing a very important role<br />

in increasing awareness of households<br />

about these damages. Local politicians<br />

have realized that it is in their interest to<br />

fight against pollution.<br />

<strong>VI</strong>I. Possible Constraints and Policy Implications<br />

What we saw above was the cosean bargaining with<br />

positive transaction cost. The transaction costs include<br />

cost of disseminating information about damages among<br />

the people, forming them into a community, the cost of<br />

public litigation, legal actions against factories etc. The<br />

organization of affected people into a community depends<br />

upon their perception of damages. If damages from the<br />

pollution are fully perceived by the public and they are<br />

substantive enough to justify transaction costs of forming a<br />

coalition and bargaining, collective action follows. Also,<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

37


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

we need to keep in mind that the formation of groups or<br />

community is feasible only if the effects of pollution are<br />

not dispersed geographically, and are confined to local<br />

communities or settlements. Otherwise, transaction costs<br />

or costs of managing a group would be very high.<br />

For efficient bargaining, it is important that the<br />

information is complete. When there are information<br />

asymmetries, the parties will have an incentive to<br />

cheat and reveal false information, thereby making<br />

bargaining inefficient. Therefore, it is important for the<br />

government to induce people to reveal true information<br />

through incentive scheme and render participation to that<br />

scheme compulsory.<br />

All the parties in the coasean framework should be in a<br />

position to negotiate. However, as mentioned before, many<br />

externalities are inter temporal in nature. The future<br />

generation bear the cost of externality and it is not clear<br />

how their interest may be accounted for in the bargaining<br />

process. Therefore, it becomes important for the government<br />

to become an advocate of the missing parties.<br />

A situation of non cooperation can be faced among<br />

affected people. The problem arises for<br />

sharing the transaction cost. Given the<br />

output of collective action is the power<br />

of local communities to deal with<br />

industry through legal action or other<br />

means of controlling water pollution,<br />

each affected people would want to<br />

enjoy the fruit without contributing to<br />

the cost. This stalemate of non cooperation<br />

can be broken by outside<br />

agency like NGO by educating the<br />

people about the damages from water pollution and<br />

benefits that can be obtained from cooperation.<br />

It is in the interest of affected parties, factories and<br />

government to cooperate in management of an environmental<br />

externality, thus making possible contractual<br />

arrangements. However, there are various factors that<br />

constraint the agent’s willingness and the ability to<br />

participate.<br />

Firstly, we have inadequate and ambiguous environmental<br />

law protecting the rights of affected parties to a<br />

clean environment. Secondly, public is generally not<br />

aware about the magnitude of damages to the community<br />

The future<br />

generations<br />

should not be<br />

deprived of<br />

something that<br />

rightly belongs<br />

to them too<br />

from pollution and the existence of environmental law.<br />

Thirdly, resources are not available to local communities<br />

to organize themselves as politically active groups for<br />

taking recourse to legal action against polluters. Fourthly,<br />

we need to have laws in place to enforce cost sharing<br />

agreements among factories for setting up pollution<br />

control plants.<br />

Government can play an important role in removing<br />

some or all of constraints. The legislatures can enact<br />

environmental laws and create legal institutions to<br />

protect the rights of citizens to a clean environment.<br />

Public awareness about the magnitude of damages from<br />

pollution can be promoted by creating institutions for<br />

environmental education. NGOs and civil society organization<br />

can also play a very important role in spreading<br />

awareness. It would be fruitful to give some power to the<br />

local communities like a say in the spheres of licensing,<br />

fixation of local environmental quality, monitoring and<br />

enforcement of environmental regulation. Their participation<br />

should be promoted in the environmental management.<br />

Also, the extent to which these communities can<br />

influence factories to undertake<br />

pollution abatement depends, among<br />

other things, the degree of political<br />

organizations, education and environmental<br />

awareness. As mentioned<br />

above, the desired outcome can be<br />

attained only in the presence of political<br />

intervention. The vested interests of<br />

political parties have a very important<br />

bearing on the policies introduced and<br />

initiatives taken in the country. We can<br />

make politicians accountable for the performance of<br />

community in bargaining with industries.<br />

Like we have environment sustainability index, wherein<br />

we rank states according to their performances in managing<br />

the natural resource stock, we can have an index<br />

wherein we rank the performances of these communities<br />

headed by different political leaders.<br />

This index should be given enough publicity and media<br />

attention, especially at the time of elections. This would<br />

promote competition among political leaders and contribute<br />

to their efficiency in attaining optimal pollution<br />

levels in the country.<br />

38 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G OLDEN DROP<br />

<strong>VI</strong>II. Conclusions<br />

We saw that the Coasean assumption of zero transaction<br />

cost does not hold in real life. The transaction costs of<br />

dealing with the problem of environment pollution<br />

abatement is generally positive. The high transaction cost<br />

can be reduced to manageable levels by forming groups.<br />

The bargaining between a coalition of polluters and a<br />

grand coalition of affected parties can result in optimal<br />

control of environmental pollution. In the cases, like that<br />

of Patancheru, forming people into groups with the help of<br />

intervention by political parties, NGOs, local organizations<br />

etc, can easily be attained. This is because the<br />

impact of the pollution is immediate and alarming. There<br />

are places where the problem prevails, however, people do<br />

not realize as the impact is not immediate and is uniformly<br />

distributed. Therefore, it is very important to spread<br />

awareness among the people about the environmental<br />

problems and the damages caused. We all need to collectively<br />

work to prevent further pollution.<br />

Nature and man must work together. If we won’t care<br />

about nature, nature too won’t bother to nurture us.<br />

As the well known saying goes, “We do not inherit the<br />

world from our parents. We borrow it from our children”.<br />

Thus, the most important reason to save this important<br />

component of the world is that the future generations<br />

should not be deprived of something that rightly belongs<br />

to them too.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1<br />

ESI measures the state of environment along multiple<br />

dimensions, aggregates it into a single index that is<br />

interpretable and comparable across all the states. A<br />

state with higher ESI ranking means it has managed its<br />

natural resource stock judiciously. On the contrary, a<br />

state with lower ESI indicates that it has depleted its<br />

stock of natural resources.<br />

2<br />

The cost provided was deduced from the overall figures<br />

on diarrhoeal diseases occurrence in the country, and<br />

many other significant costs were put aside. Therefore,<br />

the above figure is an underestimation of the actual<br />

cost of pollution.<br />

3<br />

The legal action through the collected efforts of<br />

affected people has ultimately forced the factories in<br />

the industrial estates of Patancheru to have effluent<br />

treatment plant. Also, government is playing a catalytic<br />

role in promoting the use of ETPs in industrial estates.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• M.N. Murty, A.J.James, Smita Misra (1999) “Economies<br />

of Water Pollution: The Indian Experience”,<br />

Oxford University Press.<br />

• Baumol, W.J and W.E. Oates(1988): The Theory of<br />

Environmental Policy, 2 nd Edition, Cambridge University<br />

Press, Cambridge.<br />

• Roberts, M.J. and M. Spence (1976): ‘ Effluent Charges<br />

and Licences under Uncertainity’, Journal of Public<br />

Economics.<br />

• Baumol, W.J. (1972): ‘On taxation and control of<br />

Externalities’, American Economic Review, vol 42,<br />

no.3, pp 307-22.<br />

• Murty, M.N. and P.B.Nayak(1982):’ Externality Abatement<br />

Technologies, Pigouvian Taxes and Property<br />

Rights’, Indian Economic Review, vol. 17, pp 1-26<br />

• Dagupta, A.K. and M.N.Murty(1985): ‘Economic<br />

Evaluation of Water Pollution Abatement’: A case<br />

study of Paper and Pulp Industry in India’, Indian<br />

Economic Review, vol 20, no.2, pp 231-67.<br />

• Batstone et al(1989): ‘ The Safe Disposal of Hazardous<br />

Wastes’, vol II, World Bank technical paper no.90.<br />

• Mehta.S, S.Mundel and U.Sankar(1993): Incentives<br />

and Regulations for Pollution Abatement with an<br />

Application to Waste Water Treatment, NIPFP, New<br />

Delhi.<br />

• Coase, R.H.(1960): ‘ The Problem of Social Cost’, The<br />

Journal of Law and Economics, vol III, pp 1-44.<br />

• Becker, G.S.(1983): ‘A theory of Competition among<br />

Pressure Groups for Political Influence’, <strong>Quarterly</strong><br />

Journal of Economics, vol 98, pp 371-400<br />

• Stigler, G.J.(1989): ‘Two Notes on Coase Theorem’,<br />

Yale Law Journal, vol 99, pp 631-3.<br />

• Murty, M.N. and U.R. Prasad(1977): ‘ Emission<br />

Reduction and Influence of Local Communities in<br />

India, mimeo, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi.<br />

• Charles Kolstad, ‘Environmental Economics’, Oxford<br />

University Press.<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

39


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

C. Ramachandraiah<br />

Associate Professor,<br />

Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad<br />

Introduction<br />

Out of the total population of 1027 million in India as per<br />

the 2001 census, about 742 million (72.2%) live in rural areas<br />

and 285 million (27.8%) in urban areas. The decadal growth<br />

of population in rural and urban areas during the last decade<br />

was 17.9% and 31.2% respectively. The census shows that<br />

there are 4,378 urban centers. The 35 million-plus cities<br />

account for about 39% of total urban population. There are<br />

358 cities with a population in the range of one lakh to one<br />

million, 401 towns in the range of 50,000 to one lakh, and a<br />

large number of small towns (3,574) with below 50,000<br />

population. From 285 million in 2001 the urban population<br />

in India is estimated to grow to 540 million by 2021. The<br />

percentage of urban population is expected to increase to<br />

around 37% by the year 2021. About 60-70 large cities having<br />

a population of one million or more will play a crucial role in<br />

the future demographic and economic growth in the country<br />

(MUD, 2008).<br />

Travel within the city is essential to actualise the economic<br />

and cultural potential of a place. People need to travel for<br />

work, for education, for socialisation and for procuring the<br />

needs of daily life. The choices of work, residence, consumption<br />

and socialization will increase if more areas of the city<br />

are within easy reach of the people. Increase in either the<br />

time or money required for such travel proportionately<br />

reduces the citizens’ ability to participate in civic and<br />

40 THE IIPM THINK TANK


(NA ) NO WAY FORWARD<br />

Urban Transport in India:<br />

A Contested <strong>Issue</strong><br />

economic activities and thus impacts adversely on them<br />

(EPW, <strong>2009</strong>). Ability to travel easily at a low cost and in a<br />

shorter time has several benefits for the citizens and the city<br />

in terms of saving time, energy, money, reduced fuel consumption,<br />

less vehicular pollution, less noise and a overall<br />

better quality of life. Lack of efficient mass public transport<br />

systems and a phenomenal growth of private vehicles in<br />

Indian cities have resulted in congestion, increased travel<br />

times, rising pollution levels, noise, higher stress levels etc.<br />

making commuting in a city a nightmarish experience to<br />

most citizens in everyday life.<br />

In the last decade or so, the governments have responded<br />

only in an ad hoc manner by constructing flyovers or widening<br />

roads that have facilitated only<br />

movement of vehicles rather than masses<br />

of people. Putting comprehensive and<br />

integrated public transport systems in<br />

place has never been on the agenda. As a<br />

result, the people using public transport<br />

buses, pedestrians and cyclists have been<br />

marginalized on the roads of Indian<br />

cities. After Delhi metro rail was inaugurated<br />

in 2002, metro rail projects have<br />

come to the centre stage of urban transport<br />

in several cities. Simultaneously, bus rapid transit<br />

systems (BRTS) have also been planned (and introduced in<br />

some) in several cities. While the metro rail is a highly<br />

capital intensive technocratic model involving construction<br />

of either underground tunnels or elevated corridors, the<br />

BRTS is a low cost option and is a more equitous and<br />

eco-friendly concept. It involves reallocation of the road<br />

space for different users (buses, pedestrians, cyclists, and<br />

others). This system is in operation in over 35 cities in the<br />

world. With the introduction of BRTS in a small corridor in<br />

Delhi, and the massive media campaign against it, the issue<br />

of the options of public transport and the rights of different<br />

As opposed to<br />

Metro Rail, the<br />

BRTS is relatively,<br />

a low cost option<br />

and is a more<br />

equitous and ecofriendly<br />

concept<br />

citizen groups for access to the road has come to the centre<br />

stage of debate in the country. This debate acquires significance<br />

because of the overt preferences shown by different<br />

state governments for the capital intensive metro rail<br />

projects over the BRTS.<br />

Neglect of Public Transport and NMT<br />

The city administrators, state and central governments have<br />

grossly neglected public transport which has impacted the<br />

poor and low-income people the most. Buses are the main<br />

backbone of public transport in Indian cities except in<br />

Mumbai and Chennai where local trains play a crucial role<br />

(Delhi and Kolkata are also served by metro rails to a small<br />

extent). Yet, despite a growing demand<br />

for commuting, the fleet <strong>size</strong>s in most of<br />

the state transport undertakings (STUs)<br />

have declined (Table 1). In terms of<br />

quality of travel comfort, the public<br />

transport system buses are nothing but<br />

“benches and a metal roof stuck on a<br />

truck chassis”. It is no surprise then that<br />

the citizens have increasingly turned<br />

towards private vehicles and increasing<br />

their number phenomenally. While there<br />

were five private vehicles for each bus in India in 1951, today<br />

there are 80 private vehicles for each bus (EPW, <strong>2009</strong>).<br />

For instance, the total number of cars in the 23 metropolitan<br />

cities was 3.6 million as on 31 st March 2004. The number<br />

of two-wheelers was 14.9 million. Delhi had about 1.3 million<br />

cars. During 2003-04, Delhi added about 263 cars and 433<br />

two-wheelers per day (Sivaramkrishnan, <strong>2009</strong>). A study<br />

sponsored by the ministry of urban development predicts a<br />

declining share of public transport from 16% in 2007 to 15%<br />

in 2011, 11% in 2021 and 9% in 2031. The decline may be<br />

even worse in the mega cities from 46% in 2007 to 31% in<br />

2021 along with a decline in the average journey speeds<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

41


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table 1: Growth of Bus Fleet of the State Transport Undertakings<br />

City 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Annual<br />

Average<br />

Growth<br />

Rate(%)<br />

-(2000-07)<br />

Mumbai 3269 3155 3075 3075 3074 3069 3075 3081 -0.8<br />

Delhi 4916 4330 4466 2496 2905 3010 3143 2814 -7.7<br />

Chennai 2353 2314 2211 2270 2251 2187 2176 2087 -1.7<br />

Kolkata 814 821 856 800 769 707 659 635 -3.5<br />

Ahmedabad 752 729 630 410 382 371 545 727 -0.5<br />

Pune 657 664 647 662 697 764 784 752 1.9<br />

Chandigarh 393 395 404 - - - 405 404 0.4<br />

Bangalore 2110 2250 2446 2656 3062 3533 3802 3967 9.4<br />

Source: MUD (2008)<br />

(MUD, 2006).<br />

In cities with better public transport services the transport<br />

indices such as congestion index and safety index have<br />

performed better. With the decline of the environment<br />

friendly non-motorised transport (NMT),<br />

our cities are fast losing sustainability.<br />

About 40% of trips in cities these days are<br />

by NMT and 25% of all fatal accidents<br />

involve this category. Yet, there has been<br />

no focus on the NMT. On a walkability<br />

index, on a scale of four, most Indian<br />

cities scored less than one, with Chandigarh<br />

coming on top with 0.91. Hyderabad’s<br />

score was 0.68 while Bangalore was<br />

still lower at 0.63 whereas the bigger cities<br />

like Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata scored above 0.80 (MUD,<br />

2008). The national urban transport policy (NUTP) admits<br />

that the “use of cheaper non-motorised modes like cycling<br />

and walking has become increasingly risky, since these<br />

modes have to share the same right of way with motorized<br />

modes”. The policy also noted that the number of persons<br />

killed in road accidents has also gone up from 28,400 to over<br />

80,000 during 1981-2001. The poor were more severely<br />

affected as many of those killed or injured tend to be cyclists,<br />

pedestrians or pavement dwellers (GOI, 2006). In recent<br />

years the cities around the world have started to include<br />

walking and cycling as integral parts of the transport modes.<br />

With the decline<br />

of the eco-friendly<br />

non-motorised<br />

transport,<br />

our cities are<br />

fast losing<br />

sustainability<br />

Walking is not only an inherent mode of all other modes but<br />

is by far “the most important means for achieving urbanity in<br />

public spaces” (TOI, 2008).<br />

More on Metro Rails - Less on<br />

BRTS<br />

Since the opening up of Delhi metro rail<br />

in late 2002, similar projects have been<br />

pushed in several other cities. A similar<br />

project is under construction in Bangalore.<br />

Proposals for metro rails are in<br />

different stages in Mumbai (with work in<br />

progress in phase I), Chennai, Hyderabad,<br />

Pune, Ahmedabad etc. Going by the<br />

way these project proposals have been<br />

finalized in some of these cities, it appears very much clear<br />

that big construction companies like Reliance, NCC,<br />

<strong>May</strong>tas, GMR, GVK, Gammon etc., together with international<br />

construction companies and railway coach manufacturers<br />

are behind pushing such projects. Finalisation and<br />

implementation of these projects are characterized by<br />

absence of transparency, lack of public debate, and (in most<br />

cases) non-involvement of local experts whether such<br />

projects are owned by the public sector (as in Delhi and<br />

Bangalore) or are proposed to be taken up under public<br />

private partnership (PPP) as in the case of Hyderabad. In<br />

none of these cities, the project proposals have been made<br />

42 THE IIPM THINK TANK


(NA ) NO WAY FORWARD<br />

available to the public to facilitate a comprehensive debate.<br />

For a detailed account of how the Hyderabad Metro was<br />

pushed without any public debate, how its concession<br />

agreement is much against public interest and is in favour of<br />

the Satyam-linked <strong>May</strong>tas company, and how the whole<br />

project was designed on real estate plans of <strong>May</strong>tas, see<br />

Ramachandraiah (<strong>2009</strong>).<br />

Residents are protesting in Bangalore against taking over<br />

of parts of Lalbagh and Lakshman Rao parks for the metro<br />

rail, and are demanding realignment of the stretch. Though<br />

taken up under public sector, several aspects of the project<br />

are not known to the public. Thousands of people in Janata<br />

Colony, Sanjay Nagar, Ekta nagar, Azad Compund, Gandhi<br />

Nagar & KD Compound areas in Mumbai are protesting<br />

against attempts at forced displacement for the phase II of<br />

the metro. The residents are demanding that the Mumbai<br />

metro should go underground, instead of elevated corridor,<br />

in the congested areas between JVPD and Bandra in the<br />

Charkop-Mankhurd route. A similar demand to go underground<br />

in several colonies in Delhi metro phase-II was made<br />

by residents and they even approached the Delhi High<br />

Court. In all instances, the authorities<br />

have reflected an adamant attitude and<br />

have only one answer – that these aspects<br />

have already been decided and will not be<br />

changed now. Some of the serious<br />

environmental problems being faced by<br />

the people in the congested areas along<br />

the elevated metro corridor in Delhi<br />

(phase-I) are – high noise, vibrations to<br />

buildings and intrusion of privacy of the<br />

residents.<br />

There seem to be a pattern to such mega projects in the<br />

world – pushing without public debate. Based on international<br />

evidence it was noted that “...the project promoters<br />

often avoid and violate established practices of good governance,<br />

transparency and participation in political and administrative<br />

decision-making, either out of ignorance or because<br />

they see such practices as counterproductive to getting<br />

projects started” and “...citizens are kept at a substantial<br />

distance from megaproject decision-making” (Flyvbjerg et<br />

al., 2003). The strategy of inflating the benefits and depressing<br />

the costs employed by the big project promoters to get<br />

the projects sanctioned have been exposed and questioned<br />

Global cities like<br />

Tokyo, New York,<br />

Paris and London<br />

have exceedingly<br />

large CBDs<br />

with more than<br />

7,50,000 jobs<br />

by experts in the transport sector. After analyzing a sample<br />

of 258 transportation infrastructure projects in different<br />

geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found that<br />

the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects<br />

should be built are “highly and systematically misleading.<br />

Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best<br />

explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The<br />

policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators,<br />

investors, media representatives, and members of the public<br />

who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates<br />

and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and<br />

their analysts” (Flyvbjerg et al, 2002).<br />

While the metro rails are very expensive infrastructure<br />

projects and the middle class has tended to like them (as<br />

seems in Delhi) because of the “global image” such projects<br />

bring to the cities, their utility to serve public transport has<br />

not been encouraging and this aspect cannot be ignored<br />

while investing huge sums of public money. The report of the<br />

working group for the 11 th five year plan notes that the metro<br />

in Delhi is operating at about 20% of its projected capacity<br />

for December 2005 (4-5 lakh passengers per day vs. projection<br />

of 21.8 lakh passengers per day) and<br />

the Kolkata metro is operating at 10%<br />

capacity. The report further states that<br />

the cities like Tokyo, New York, Paris and<br />

London have exceedingly large central<br />

business districts (CBDs) with more than<br />

7,50,000 jobs. No other urbanised area in<br />

the developed countries has a CBD of<br />

more than four lakh jobs. Metro rails are<br />

successful in such situations. Indian cities<br />

are developing on the peripheries and are<br />

polynuclear. Thus they cannot feed mass transit systems of<br />

more than 30,000 pphpd (persons per hour per direction)<br />

capacity (GOI, 2007). For a discussion on the mythologies of<br />

metro rails, suitability of BRTS and future of urban transport<br />

in Indian cities, see Mohan (2008).<br />

Plans for BRTS have also been prepared for Delhi, Pune,<br />

Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Indore, Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada<br />

etc. It was launched in Delhi in April 2008 and has generated<br />

a lot of controversy due to some poor logistics and genuine<br />

difficulties as well as virulent criticism of it as “disastrous” by<br />

the upper middle classes. The most successful aspect of the<br />

BRTS in Delhi seems to be its cycle tracks, probably the only<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

43


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

stretch in Delhi where cycling is safe. This is in total contrast<br />

to the elevated metro corridor along which not even a single<br />

stretch of cycling track is developed. The BRTS was<br />

launched in Pune without putting the proper systems in place<br />

and got adverse publicity. Two routes in Ahmedabad are<br />

getting designed for BRTS and the system is likely to be<br />

inaugurated in <strong>2009</strong>. The work is underway in other cities.<br />

Several pronouncements have been made in Hyderabad<br />

about the introduction of BRTS in the last five years but has<br />

been practically shelved in favour of the metro rail. What is<br />

significant about BRTS in Indian cities is the inability of the<br />

car-using middle class to digest the fact that a lane could be<br />

left free for buses on the existing roads.<br />

Taxing the Public - Subsidising the Private<br />

Distortions in motor vehicle taxation abound in the country<br />

sometimes the tax rates themselves being absurdly low. Delhi<br />

only recently revised its tax rates to two percent for vehicle<br />

costing up to rupees four lakh and four percent for those<br />

above. Most of the states also levy a tax on passenger buses.<br />

In Gujarat the rates are Rs. 840 per year on buses with more<br />

than nine passengers, Rs. 72 for every<br />

additional seat and Rs. 36 for every<br />

standing passenger. Maharashtra charges<br />

Rs. 71 per passenger plus 17.5% of the<br />

fare collected. Delhi collects Rs. 1,915 up<br />

to 18 passengers and Rs. 280 for every<br />

additional passenger. Even if it is calculated<br />

on per passenger per km basis, the<br />

tax incidence on a bus passenger in a city<br />

is more than on a private car passenger<br />

(Sivaramakrishnan, <strong>2009</strong>). There are<br />

experiences that taxation has been used as a weapon against<br />

the public sector buses to push the public sector corporation<br />

into losses to make it a justifiable case for privatization as<br />

happened with the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport<br />

Corporation (APSRTC) earlier. Similarly, raising of passenger<br />

tariff steeply has also pushed the travelling public<br />

towards private vehicles. For more discussion on this with<br />

respect to APSRTC, see Ramachandraiah and Patnaik<br />

(2005).<br />

For the much hyped Nano, Sunita Narain argues that the<br />

incentives rolled out by the Gujarat government amount to a<br />

fat write-off - as much as Rs. 50,000-60,000 per this rupees<br />

Since January<br />

<strong>2009</strong>, the<br />

ministry of urban<br />

development has<br />

sanctioned Rs.<br />

4,726 crore for<br />

bus procurement<br />

one lakh car. In other words, its cost is so low only because of<br />

subsidies offered by the government. The cars have been<br />

subsidized in India while taxing the buses. The tax is over 12<br />

times more on buses than on cars in many states. The public<br />

subsidy should go to everybody to exercise their right to<br />

mobility (Narain, <strong>2009</strong>). A comparison of the taxes on public<br />

transport with other modes of personalised transport reveals<br />

that the existing taxation structure is inequitable and not<br />

congenial for growth of bus-based public transport system.<br />

Economic theory would suggest that the taxation on personalized<br />

modes of transport should be commensurately higher<br />

than what exists for the public transport. The taxation policy<br />

should be effectively used to bring in equity (Kharola and<br />

Tiwari, 2008).<br />

Road as a Contested Space<br />

Mobility, more than technology choice, should be the main<br />

concern. Today, the city space for mobility has become a<br />

highly contested issue. The private vehicle has proliferated,<br />

“thanks as much to the uncalled for subsidies for<br />

automobile production and use as well as consistent<br />

lobbying practices of the auto industry”,<br />

perfected over the years in the United<br />

States and the West. Since January this<br />

year, the ministry of urban development<br />

has sanctioned Rs 4,726 crore for<br />

procurement of 14,240 buses in 59 cities.<br />

Given the congestion, will these additional<br />

buses be able to move anywhere?<br />

(Sivaramkrishnan, <strong>2009</strong>). Users of<br />

nonmotorized modes have tended to be<br />

squeezed out of the roads on account of<br />

serious threats to their safety. If the focus of the principles<br />

of road space allocation were to be the people, then much<br />

more space would need to be allocated to public transport<br />

systems than is allocated at present (GOI, 2007).<br />

The neglect of public transport shows itself as a class<br />

issue. The investments in urban mobility – flyovers,<br />

parking lots, wider roads, smaller pavements, etc – are all<br />

focused on easing the mobility of the middle classes in<br />

urban India. The orchestrated media campaign against<br />

faster and safer bus services through the BRT corridors<br />

only indicates the strength of class interests seeking to<br />

mould urban transport systems. The political function of<br />

44 THE IIPM THINK TANK


(NA ) NO WAY FORWARD<br />

the Nano lies in securing firmly the interests of the middle<br />

class on the class-divided road and skew the class divides<br />

which fracture our cities. The central concern should be to<br />

build a more democratic city which provides equal opportunities<br />

of mobility to all its residents (EPW, <strong>2009</strong>). The<br />

dispute about the BRTS in Delhi is probably the first<br />

serious contestation in the country for a city’s road space<br />

between the bus and the car. It is hoped that the majority<br />

of the public, dependent on public transport, will become<br />

more assertive and demand that a city’s road space cannot<br />

be pre-empted by the car-using elite (Sivaramakrishnan,<br />

<strong>2009</strong>).<br />

Conclusion<br />

Urban transport policies should be city specific and be<br />

designed to suit its geography, heritage, history and<br />

landuse patterns. What is happening now is a thrust from<br />

above of uniform technology-centric models pushed by the<br />

big companies. As the number of vehicles is going to<br />

increase unabated in the coming days, the car-owning<br />

middle class will continue to assert its domination in<br />

policy making on urban transport. A combination of<br />

contractors, big construction companies, bureaucracy and<br />

political class may make it easier to push through such<br />

projects as the experience has shown over the last several<br />

years. The large mass of people, should also assert their<br />

right to the road and to the equitable allocation of road<br />

space to different users. Utilisation of the existing railway<br />

network in cities and extension of these lines further,<br />

wherever necessary, to connect more areas is required to<br />

cater to the suburban locations. The PPPs for metro rail<br />

projects, as revealed in the case of the currently uncertain<br />

Hyderabad metro, may end up benefiting the private real<br />

estate companies and cause irreparable damage to the<br />

larger public interests. Provision of public transport should<br />

be the domain of the public sector. The contest for equitable<br />

allocation of road space will spread to several other<br />

cities in the coming days in India. In the ultimate analysis,<br />

rather than huge mega projects, pedestrian friendly roads<br />

with adequate provision for cycling and informal sector<br />

activities (hawkers, street vendors etc) along with highquality<br />

bus transport with dedicated lanes may help make<br />

our cities more inclusive and democratic, and promote<br />

sanity in public spaces.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• EPW (<strong>2009</strong>): “Democracy and the Small Car”, Economic<br />

and Political Weekly, Editorial, April 4 th .<br />

• Flyvbjerg, Bent., Nils Bruzelius and Werner Rothengatter<br />

(2003): Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition,<br />

Cambridge.<br />

• Flyvbjerg, B., Mette Skamris Holm and Soren Buhl<br />

(2002): “Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects:<br />

Error or Lie?”, Journal of the American Planning Association,<br />

68(3), 279-295.<br />

• GOI (2007): “Report of the Working Group for the 11th<br />

Five Year Plan on Urban Transport including MRTS”,<br />

Government of India, New Delhi.<br />

• GOI (2006): “National Urban Transport Policy”, Government<br />

of India, New Delhi.<br />

• Kharola, P.S. and Gitam Tiwari (2008): Urban Public<br />

Transport Systems: Are the Taxation Policies Congenial<br />

for Their Survival and Growth?, Economic and Political<br />

Weekly, 11 th October.<br />

• Mohan, Dinesh (2008): “Mythologies, Metro Rail Systems<br />

and Future Urban Transport”, Economic and Political<br />

Weekly, 26 th January, pp 41-53.<br />

• MUD ( 2008): “Study on Traffic and Transportation<br />

Policies and Strategies in Urban Areas in India”, Final<br />

Report, Wilbur Smith Associates, Ministry of Urban<br />

Development, Government of India.<br />

• Narain, Sunita (<strong>2009</strong>): “The right right”, CSE's Fortnightly<br />

News Bulletin, 8 th April.<br />

• Ramachandraiah, C. (<strong>2009</strong>): “<strong>May</strong>tas, Hyderabad Metro<br />

and the Politics of Real Estate”, Economic and Political<br />

Weekly, 44(3), 17 th January, 36-40.<br />

• Ramachandraiah, C. and Arun Kumar Patnaik (2005):<br />

“State versus Public Sector Profitability: Andhra Pradesh<br />

State Road Transport Corporation”, in Mooij, Jos (ed.)<br />

The Politics of Economic Reforms in India, Sage, New<br />

Delhi.<br />

• Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (<strong>2009</strong>) “A bus to nowhere”, The<br />

Economic Times, 20 th April, Hyderabad.<br />

• TOI (2008) “Walking is crucial to achieving urbanity”,<br />

(Interview with Philip Rode in the Edit Page), The Times<br />

of India, 23 rd June, Hyderabad.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

45


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Urban Water Supply<br />

Sector in India: The Need<br />

for the Management<br />

Reforms in the ULBs<br />

Ramakrishna Nallathiga<br />

Knowledge Manager (Infrastructure and<br />

Environment), Centre for Good Governance,<br />

Hyderabad<br />

46 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W ATERED DOWN<br />

1. Introduction<br />

Water is an important resource available for humans and<br />

fresh water is much more important given its limited<br />

availability and erratic distribution over space and time.<br />

India roughly accounts for 4.5% of the World’s fresh water<br />

resources, while at the same time it accounts for 2.5% of<br />

total land mass and 16% of total population. However, the<br />

availability of fresh water per capita itself has come down<br />

from about 5,177 cubic meter per head in 1951 to 1,820<br />

cubic meter per head in 2001 and it is expected to further<br />

go down to 1,140 by 2050 AD (Sankarnarayan 2005).<br />

The total water availability in India is 2,301 bcm, of<br />

which surface water source accounts for 1,869 bcm and<br />

ground water source accounts for 432 bcm.<br />

However, not that the entire water can be utilized: only<br />

690 bcm of the surface water can be utilized through<br />

storage structures and ground water can be utilized only to<br />

the extent of its annual recharge. According to assessment<br />

made by the Ministry of Water Resources, the total water<br />

requirement of the country for various sectors was estimated<br />

to grow from 694 km 3 in 2010 to 973 km 3 in 2050.<br />

The utilizable water resources by 2050<br />

were estimated to be 996 km 3 , suggesting<br />

no overall deficit like situation,<br />

which is not correct. The water availability<br />

is highly skewed in the Eastern<br />

part of the country, whereas the population<br />

and economic activities are concentrated<br />

in the Western part of the<br />

country, thereby an accentuating water<br />

availability problems in the West.<br />

Water supply and sanitation is a State<br />

subject according to the provisions of Indian constitution,<br />

and State/Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) are vested with<br />

constitutional right for planning, designing, implementing,<br />

operation and maintenance of water and sanitation<br />

projects. The Union Ministry provides technical assistance<br />

to the states/ULBs in the project formulation. The<br />

National Water Policies provide guidelines to state governments<br />

on the priorities of allocation, methods of management,<br />

resource management and institutional issues,<br />

emerging approaches and trends.<br />

Urban water supply and sanitation sector remained an<br />

important area of concern from First Five-Year Plan. The<br />

Availability of<br />

fresh water per<br />

capita reduced<br />

from 5,177 cubic<br />

meter per head in<br />

1951 to 1,820 cm<br />

per head in 2001<br />

plan outlay has constantly increased from Rs 43 crores<br />

(1.28% of public sector outlay) in the First Five-Year Plan<br />

to Rs 18,624 crores (2.17% of public sector outlay in the<br />

Ninth Five Year Plan; the Tenth Five-Year Plan outlay was<br />

estimated as Rs 44,206.55 crores. The estimates of likely<br />

available funds from various sources were Rs 35,800<br />

crores. Moreover, the millennium development goals<br />

(MDGs) for water supply and sanitation laid down to<br />

reduce half the proportion of population without access to<br />

safe and sustainable water supply and sanitation by 2015.<br />

The Tenth Plan however had laid the target of achieving<br />

100 % drinking water supply and 75% coverage of sewerage<br />

and sanitation facilities and is more comprehensive.<br />

2. Challenges of Urban Water Sector<br />

Fresh water resources are increasingly becoming scarcer<br />

across the country, particularly with respect to catering to<br />

the human activities, due to several reasons: (a) the<br />

existing water resources have already been tapped through<br />

various development projects but have been utilized<br />

inefficiently, leaving little water available for the actual use<br />

(b) water pollution has rendered several<br />

of the water resources – both surface<br />

and ground water – unfit for use by<br />

any sector (c) the rising population and<br />

the trends of rapid urbanization necessitate<br />

a good amount of water devoted<br />

to human consumption, thereby not<br />

only reducing the per capita availability<br />

but also raising competition with other<br />

sectors.<br />

Rapidly rising population and increasing<br />

urbanization are rendering high demands on water in<br />

India. However, the service levels and quality are very<br />

poor, for example the average water supply is just 2-4<br />

hours a day. Moreover, in terms of absolute figures, only<br />

36.86 million of the 53.69 urban households have tap water<br />

supply, of which 26.67 have in their premises, 8.08 million<br />

have outside their premises and 2.09 million have within<br />

100 metres (Sankarnarayan 2005).<br />

Large metropolitan cities, in particular, are becoming<br />

critical areas due to increasing water demand for domestic<br />

consumption, which often competes with other uses of<br />

fresh water. Apart from the challenges of water availabil-<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

47


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

ity, major attention needs to be paid to<br />

From<br />

Towards<br />

their management in the urban<br />

Water resource development Water resource management<br />

context i.e., achieving maximum gains<br />

Supply-oriented approach Demand-driven approach<br />

within the constraints through efficient<br />

use of all resources (Saleth and<br />

Disjoint water management Conjunctive water management<br />

Dinar 1997).<br />

Use maximization and extraction Use efficiency and conservation<br />

In spite of the enormous challenge, Treating water as social good Treating water as economic and social good<br />

water resource management in India, Public sector management Public-private partnerships<br />

in general, in urban areas, particular Public sector monopoly Private sector participation<br />

has heavily focused on the supply Top-down approach<br />

Participatory approach<br />

expansion, whereas a good scope Centralised operations<br />

Decentralised operations<br />

exists for demand management and Government responsibility Stakeholder engagement<br />

improving use efficiency, which means<br />

taking a balanced approach to water management (Maheshwari<br />

and Pillai 2001). Whereas the water scarcity<br />

calls for an efficient utilization of water at all levels in<br />

order to meet with the sustainable development goals of<br />

human society, few cities are gearing up their water<br />

systems towards efficient water management and improved<br />

service delivery. In reality, Indian cities are not fully<br />

geared-up for reforms as (i) they are highly top-driven and<br />

follow the old guiding principle of water<br />

particular, is plagued by several factors contributing to<br />

their poor status. Some of these will be discussed in the<br />

following sub-sections. The current status of water sector<br />

performance – both resource allocation and service<br />

delivery – can be characterized by a vicious circle of<br />

various causative forces. We will examine these underlying<br />

structural and non-structural variables as how they<br />

interact yield such poor outcome in this section (see figure<br />

1) and then embark on the reform<br />

development and supply expansion, (ii)<br />

agenda that is needed to overcome this<br />

they use irrational water pricing methods<br />

and inefficient tariff structures, (iii) organizations<br />

Service delivery problem in the next section.<br />

they persist with ill-adequate organizations<br />

have to reform 3.1 Water Resource Allocation<br />

and systems and are yet to formu-<br />

organizational<br />

and Management<br />

late their agenda in implementable<br />

Policy, Legislative and Regulatory<br />

design to be<br />

terms. Service delivery organizations<br />

Framework<br />

have to reform organizational design to more effective The National Water Policy, 1987<br />

be effective (Rangachari 2003). and efficient proposed several desirable objectives<br />

The World Bank (1999) mentions that<br />

the two critical challenges for urban water sector in India<br />

today are the need to: (a) improve resource allocation<br />

(both inter-sectoral and spatial) and management of water<br />

(both quantity and quality) (b) improve service delivery in<br />

the water sector (towards efficient, equitable and customer<br />

oriented service). To meet these challenges, it suggests the<br />

following major shift in the current approaches towards<br />

water resource management in general and urban water in<br />

particular.<br />

towards better water resources management.<br />

The revised policy in 2002 went further by advocating<br />

community participation, public-private partnerships.<br />

However, the missing element was an enabling framework<br />

for implementing sound water allocation, planning and<br />

management. Moreover, the policy documents do not go<br />

beyond the ‘conventional thinking’ of fi xed allocations<br />

and utilizing administrative mechanisms for achieving<br />

the goal.<br />

The constitutional provisions and water legislation in<br />

India do not provide appropriate framework for tackling<br />

3. Need for Urban Water Sector Reforms<br />

Water sector, in general, and Urban water supply sector, in<br />

water issues across jurisdictions, between sectors as well as<br />

individuals. The current set-up has following short-com-<br />

48 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W ATERED DOWN<br />

Figure 1 : The Vicious Circle of Urban Water Sector<br />

No Customer<br />

Focus<br />

Poor<br />

Service<br />

Customer<br />

Unsatisfied<br />

Poor Revenues<br />

Poor<br />

Finances<br />

Inadequate capital<br />

Inadequate<br />

skills/MIS<br />

Poor<br />

Infrastructure<br />

Poor<br />

Institutions<br />

Inadequate<br />

systems/ MIS<br />

Construction<br />

focus<br />

Inappropriate Governance<br />

& Management<br />

Inappropriate<br />

Policies<br />

( Macro/Micro<br />

Source: The World Bank (1999)<br />

ings: (a) water has been delegated as state subject but<br />

water resource issues cross these boundaries (b) surface<br />

water rights are ill defined, unsecure and non-transferable<br />

leaving little scope for their utilisation, whereas ground<br />

water rights are purely private causing environmental<br />

damages (c) environmental laws have not been comprehensively<br />

operationalised and regulatory standards are<br />

either not enforced or do not exist.<br />

Institutional Arrangements and Mechanisms<br />

The current institutional arrangements for water resource<br />

managements at all levels, central, state and local, and<br />

both formal and informal structures, do not enable<br />

comprehensive water allocation, planning and management.<br />

The main problems that exist are (World Bank<br />

1999):<br />

(i) inadequacies in necessary institutions for comprehensive<br />

water allocation, planning and management at<br />

city, basin and state levels, which are frequently absent<br />

(ii) lack of coordination between the institutions; duplica-<br />

tion of responsibility and accountability gaps<br />

(iii) inadequate fostering of grass root institutions<br />

(iv) lack of involvement of civil society – local community,<br />

NGOs, private sector and academia.<br />

Economic and Financial Incentives and Mechanisms<br />

The current incentive structure of water resource management<br />

leaves little scope for efficient use of water and its<br />

allocation between the sectors and users in an economically<br />

efficient manner. Bagchi (2003) clearly notes that<br />

cost recovery of water supply in major cities is far less<br />

from satisfactory. Inappropriate pricing, lack of well<br />

designed tariffs and absence of metering all lead to<br />

wastage of water and make the water services delivery to<br />

the risks of poor maintenance due to inadequate recovery<br />

of financial costs.<br />

Moreover, there is an absence of institutional, legal,<br />

administrative and technical mechanism for decentralized<br />

management, wherever possible, through development of<br />

formal water markets. However, there are some risks<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

49


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

associated with such markets like unsustainable extraction<br />

of water especially ground water and imposition of barriers<br />

to access water on certain sections of the society.<br />

Information, Technology and Database Systems<br />

There is a great scope for improvement on these fronts,<br />

given the large gaps in these areas of water systems. The<br />

water losses at plants, during conveyance and distribution<br />

are very high to the tune of almost 30-50% in many urban<br />

water systems. Database management and technology<br />

upgradation are not undertaken periodically and any type<br />

of audit is not prevalent. Water use efficiency is poor in all<br />

major uses/sectors – domestic, irrigation and industrial.<br />

Moreover, data and information systems of water availability<br />

and technology for monitoring water pollution are<br />

not given adequate attention. Likewise, metering, billing<br />

and pipeline flow inspection are not well executed and<br />

management structures are largely absent.<br />

3.2 Water Resources Service Delivery<br />

However, apart from improving water allocation and<br />

management efficiency of water sector<br />

through reform process, it is also to<br />

undertake the reforms in the service<br />

delivery, wherein the potential is also<br />

very high due to the much closer<br />

interface with public. The major areas<br />

of reform in service delivery include:<br />

(i) Governance and management<br />

(ii) Organisational design and focus<br />

(iii) Information/ database management<br />

and technology deployment<br />

(iv) Economic incentives and accounting systems<br />

Governance and Management<br />

Urban water governance is highly skewed towards bureaucratic<br />

or departmental functioning without much involvement<br />

of all stakeholders. Even in the current design, the<br />

institutional arrangements are weak and the management<br />

organization lacks incentives for giving better outputs.<br />

Most of the water supply functions are catered by the<br />

public health engineering, municipal water works and<br />

public works departments with little coordination among<br />

them. The organizational structures do not encourage<br />

Urban water<br />

governance is<br />

highly skewed<br />

towards<br />

bureaucratic or<br />

departmental<br />

functioning<br />

efficiency and outputs, but reward positions based on the<br />

tenure and past experience. It is therefore geared towards<br />

serving the needs of public/departmental services rather<br />

than catering to the needs of the customers/citizens.<br />

Organisational Design and Focus<br />

The organizational design is hierarchical, which is mostly<br />

the case of large public organizations, and not suited to a<br />

customer-focused service delivery. The technical staff<br />

members (engineers) are promoted based on their tenure<br />

but not outcomes; the service staff is assigned jurisdictions<br />

but its accountability is often poor.<br />

It is reported that the staffing ratio in water organizations<br />

in India is very high in the range of 40 – 60 persons per<br />

1,000 service connections as compared to around 10 staff<br />

per 1,000 connections in South Asia and international<br />

benchmark of about 2-3 staff per 1,000 connections (The<br />

World Bank 1999). The focus of the organization has also<br />

to shift from that driven by supply expansion and bureaucratic<br />

style of functioning to that driven by customers’<br />

demand and service oriented functioning, which requires<br />

appropriate organizational design<br />

(Rangachari 2003).<br />

Information /Database Management<br />

and Deployment of Technology<br />

For an effective functioning of any<br />

organization, information/database<br />

management is essential, particularly in<br />

the case of customer oriented organization.<br />

However, most of the water supply<br />

entities lack good management information<br />

systems (MIS) of their organization. The data<br />

generation methods and recoring are poor, data formats<br />

are not well designed, record maintenance and retrieval is<br />

done in a haphazard manner.<br />

The result is poor capacity of the organization to understand<br />

its own business and run it in an efficient manner.<br />

Not only that there is potential for automation of operations<br />

but also restructuring the organization and management<br />

structures. For this to be effective and to enhance<br />

the capacity to monitor water resources – both quantity<br />

and quality – deployment of new technologies is very<br />

necessary.<br />

50 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W ATERED DOWN<br />

Table 1: Types of Public-Private Partnerships<br />

PPP Option<br />

Source: The World Bank (2004)<br />

Asset<br />

Ownership<br />

Operation &<br />

Maintenance<br />

Capital<br />

Investment<br />

Commercial<br />

Risk<br />

Management Contract Public Private Public Public 3-5<br />

Lease Contract Public Private Public Shared 8-15<br />

Concession/ BOT Public Private Private Private 25-30<br />

BOOT/BOO Public/ Private Private Private Private 20-30<br />

Duration (years)<br />

Economic Incentives and Accounting Systems<br />

The current structure of water tariffs do not provide any<br />

economic incentives in terms of recovering costs – both<br />

operation and maintenance and depreciation of capital<br />

– in the urban areas; rather, they provide incentives for<br />

over consumption and inefficient use while not reflecting<br />

the scarce conditions of water availability. Further, most<br />

of the water supply organizations face financial constraints<br />

as their business is not completely run on the<br />

revenues, especially when it comes to the capital works<br />

this is a major constraint. It is therefore imperative that<br />

they become more proactive and<br />

borrow finances from private sector<br />

to provide adequate returns. Bonds<br />

have been recently used by urban<br />

local bodies for financing their operations,<br />

which can be extended to water<br />

services exclusively. Water accounting<br />

needs to be separated from general<br />

pool and it should be based on the<br />

double entry or fund based accounting<br />

systems.<br />

4. Reform Agenda for Urban Water Sector<br />

The above discussion clearly implies that the urban water<br />

sector needs to be reformed on several major fronts,<br />

given the inadequacies and shortcomings of the current<br />

status. Even in large metropolitan cities like Mumbai,<br />

there are severe water service delivery and management<br />

issues and the scope for remains large (see Nallathiga<br />

2006 for more details). It becomes evident that the<br />

reforms are required on the fronts of water allocation<br />

and management as well as service delivery. We discuss<br />

the reform agenda for urban water sector hereunder<br />

Water accounting<br />

must be separated<br />

from general pool<br />

and should be<br />

based on double<br />

entry or fund<br />

based accounting<br />

under the broad headings of institutional, governance<br />

and financial reforms.<br />

4.1 Institutional Reforms<br />

The above discussion clearly outlined that the current<br />

urban water management institutions are not well designed<br />

to provide incentives for better performance and<br />

efficient management.<br />

Changing the Priority<br />

The orientation of the water supply agencies has been not<br />

appropriate to the needs as they are<br />

more inclined towards supply expansion<br />

but not demand management in meeting<br />

with the challenges of providing water.<br />

However, this inevitably results in<br />

conflicts and pressures on inter-sectoral<br />

allocation of water; given the scarcity of<br />

water, a favourable shift towards higher<br />

allocation to urban areas requires all<br />

other means are exhausted. Instead of<br />

undertaking new water supply projects,<br />

the options for repair and rehabilitation of water supply<br />

systems, at a low cost, need to be undertaken. This is the<br />

case given that water losses in the conveyance and distribution<br />

are very high and so is the proportion of ‘unaccounted<br />

for water (UFW). The operations and maintenance<br />

of water supply is a gigantic task that can be<br />

done much better with the help of participation of local<br />

community and private NGOs, which can also lead to<br />

savings on costs.<br />

Organisational Restructuring<br />

Water supply system is organized through departmental<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table 2: Various Types of Tariffs and Their Characteristics<br />

Tariff/ Charge Rationale Merits/Demerits Examples<br />

Fixed water charge Water tariff levied as a fixed It is useful when water metering<br />

Canada<br />

is not done and can be<br />

water charge irrespective of<br />

the water use/ consumption used where water available is Norway<br />

(however, it can be made plenty.<br />

variable by discriminating<br />

user groups or classes or locations<br />

It does not provide any incentives<br />

for economic uses of wa-<br />

United Kingdom<br />

with differential fixed ter<br />

charges)<br />

Uniform <strong>Volume</strong>tric charges<br />

Increasing Block Tariffs<br />

(IBT)<br />

Water tariff levied based on<br />

the quantity of water consumption,<br />

while the unit price<br />

of water is fixed but subject to<br />

periodic revision.<br />

Water tariffs are levied in<br />

consumption blocks such that<br />

the price charged increases<br />

with the increase of block.<br />

Consumers pay a uniform<br />

rate until the first block, and<br />

then they pay higher charges<br />

with every additional volume<br />

of water consumed in successively<br />

higher blocks.<br />

It is simple and reflects the<br />

marginal costs of water provision<br />

to the consumer when the<br />

prices are fixed so.<br />

It requires complete water metering<br />

and recording.<br />

It provides for affordability<br />

of the poor through a life line<br />

block; it promotes water conservation;<br />

it can achieve efficiency<br />

by confronting consumers<br />

in higher blocks with the<br />

marginal costs of using water;<br />

it can raise sufficient revenues<br />

to recover costs.<br />

It needs to be designed very<br />

carefully and revised when<br />

required. Bad designs can adversely<br />

affect all consumers.<br />

United States of America<br />

Australia<br />

European Countries<br />

Canada<br />

United States of America<br />

Decreasing Block Tariffs<br />

(DBT)<br />

Increasing Linear Tariff<br />

Water tariffs are levied such<br />

that the charges actually decrease<br />

with the increase in<br />

consumption blocks, in an<br />

opposite direction. The users<br />

of higher blocks pay lesser<br />

and lesser charges with every<br />

additional volume of water<br />

consumed.<br />

Water tariff continuously<br />

changes with the quantity of<br />

water consumed and users<br />

are confronted with the tariff<br />

prevalent at that point of<br />

consumption. The base and<br />

rate of tariff increase are set<br />

to achieve desired goals.<br />

It is primarily useful in the new<br />

townships and new industrial<br />

settlements, where economies<br />

of scale are important in providing<br />

water supply and meeting<br />

the costs.<br />

It discourages conservation and<br />

can be politically unattractive<br />

as it results in high volume users<br />

paying low average water<br />

prices.<br />

It sends powerful signals to the<br />

consumer that increased water<br />

use is costly as the charge<br />

is levied not alone on the last<br />

consumption unit but also on<br />

all preceding units. It is rarely<br />

used as it often confronts users<br />

with rates higher than marginal<br />

costs.<br />

Canada<br />

United States of America<br />

---<br />

Sources: Prepared based on Boland and Whittington (2002)<br />

52 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W ATERED DOWN<br />

apparatus - water production is undertaken by public<br />

(water) works department, its conveyance and distribution<br />

undertaken by hydraulic/water engineering department,<br />

water pollution/quality is checked by either public health<br />

department or pollution control board. Coordination of<br />

these departments is very crucial but no mechanisms for<br />

their coordination are designed other than their function<br />

overseen by the municipal commissioner. It implies that<br />

the current institutional arrangements have little incentives<br />

for efficient functioning and lack a holistic view of<br />

their management. However, this does not mean they need<br />

to be abolished; rather, adequate and appropriate participation<br />

of private sector will certainly help in overcoming<br />

the drawback.<br />

Private Sector Participation<br />

It is also essential that for efficient management of water<br />

sector, the involvement of private sector is an essential<br />

ingredient. However, it needs to be<br />

distinguished from and not understood<br />

as total privatization, which can be<br />

undertaken only after a thorough<br />

analysis of the state of economy and<br />

depth of its institutions. This does not<br />

even mean total ‘roll back’ of State. It<br />

essentially means engaging private<br />

sector in those operations, which it can<br />

perform with better efficiency and<br />

improve the service quality more<br />

effectively. There are several variants of private sector<br />

involvement in the provision of urban water supply<br />

services in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs),<br />

which are described in table 1.<br />

4.2 Financial Reforms<br />

Most of the urban water supply systems have not<br />

been able to perform well because of the inappropriate<br />

design of their finances and their monitoring systems.<br />

The first aspect refers to the design of financial mechanisms<br />

that adequately recover costs and make the service<br />

delivery a viable option, whereas the second one refers<br />

to the design of financial management systems – accounting,<br />

information/database management, financing<br />

capital. We will examine the scope for reforms on these<br />

aspects hereunder.<br />

There is a general<br />

failure in using<br />

water tariff to the<br />

potential because<br />

of the differences<br />

over its objectives<br />

and outcomes<br />

Cost Recovery<br />

An important aspect of the financial performance of the<br />

urban water supply systems is their ability to provide the<br />

service at a price that recovers the cost towards the<br />

production. A wide varying approaches and arguments<br />

exist in this case from full cost recovery to recovery of<br />

operations and maintenance. It is rationally argued that<br />

the water supply pricing should at least recover the costs<br />

incurred in the operation and maintenance of water<br />

supply system and part of the capital costs – especially<br />

either the depreciation cost of the asset or the interest<br />

payment costs on the capital deployed. It has been widely<br />

reported that most of the cities are not able to raise<br />

finances not even equal to operation and maintenance<br />

through the user charges, which led to the sheer neglect of<br />

the assets and inefficient service delivery i.e., high losses<br />

of water (e.g., see Bagchi 2003). An<br />

important part of this process is the<br />

water tariff design, which does not<br />

adequately address the issues of longterm<br />

financial viability of the systems.<br />

Tariff Structure Reform<br />

Water tariff is an important management<br />

tool, yet there is a general failure<br />

in using it to the potential because of<br />

the differences over its objectives and<br />

outcomes. Quite often, apprehensions are made over<br />

consumer choices and responses, and market test for<br />

the same are lacking. The water tariff setting needs to<br />

strike a balance between the following different goads<br />

(Mann 1993):<br />

(a) Economic Efficiency: Economic efficiency requires<br />

that the prices signal to consumer of the full costs<br />

(financial, environmental and social) of their decision<br />

to use water (on the rest of the system and the economy).<br />

The cost of bringing additional water is higher<br />

than the costs of supplying existing water in many<br />

cities, as the cheapest sources are exhausted first.<br />

Therefore, the marginal cost, which reflects the financial<br />

costs of laying down asset and the social cost of<br />

diverting water from other purposes, needs to become<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

53


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

the guiding method according to this criterion of water<br />

pricing.<br />

(b) Cost Recovery: This criterion seeks to achieve the<br />

financial goals – recovering the full financial costs of<br />

water supply service, which includes both capital costs<br />

as well as operations and maintenance costs. The<br />

underlying reason is that urban water supply systems,<br />

like other assets, needs to be created to recover full<br />

cost so that the asset life is longer and its service<br />

delivery efficiency is not compromised.<br />

(c) Equity: This criterion essentially seeks water tariff<br />

treats similar customers equally and that customers in<br />

different situations are not treated the same. Equity<br />

goals are pursued to ensure that the customers in same<br />

class/category are not treated differently and there<br />

should not be any price discrimination.<br />

(d) Affordability: This refers to the aspects of treating<br />

water as a social good and providing it at a price which<br />

the various users can afford to pay. However, it does not<br />

mean uniform low pricing of services, rather it means<br />

designing water tariff such that the (rich) users of large<br />

amounts of water subsidize the<br />

(poor) users of small amounts of<br />

water However, it is practically very<br />

difficult to achieve.<br />

The various types of water tariffs/<br />

charges used in fixing the water price<br />

and their relative merits and demerits<br />

are shown in table 2.<br />

5.3 Governance Reforms<br />

Governance reforms are an important<br />

constituent of the water supply reforms. In fact, the actual<br />

water supply reforms start from it through the changing<br />

conditions conducive to achieving the desirable results.<br />

Although a smaller entity, public utility is a part of<br />

government, either directly if it is publicly owned, or<br />

indirectly if it is privately owned but publicly regulated,<br />

and hence principles of good governance should apply to<br />

their management as is the case of other constituents of<br />

government (Dole and Bartlett 2004).<br />

The public utility – water supply undertaking of the<br />

Urban Local Body – has to primarily reform the way the<br />

business is run while committing itself to the principles of<br />

Three aspects of<br />

good governance<br />

must be considered<br />

in setting tariffs:<br />

Transparency,<br />

Simplicity and<br />

Predictability<br />

good governance. Some of the major reforms (although<br />

not complete) that we discuss include reforming the<br />

process of tariff setting, unbundling of the policy and<br />

regulation from the service delivery and alternate institutional<br />

arrangements.<br />

Tariff Setting<br />

Good governance applies to public utility management in a<br />

variety of ways: one of the important issues is the tariff<br />

setting process described above. Three aspects of good<br />

governance need to be considered in setting tariffs and<br />

tariff structure (ibid):<br />

(i) Transparency: The public should be able to understand<br />

the tariff setting process, how the charges were set for<br />

every type of customer;<br />

(ii) Simplicity: The charges resulting from the tariff should<br />

be clear and understandable, so that the customer can<br />

understand how they modify their use of the service<br />

and reduce their bills;<br />

(iii) Predictability: The tariff should not disrupt otherwise<br />

rational private decisions, especially investment<br />

decisions and others with long-term<br />

implications.<br />

Unbundling<br />

However, apart from the tariff setting,<br />

governance reforms are required on<br />

several other fronts for the sustainability<br />

of water supply systems in the long run.<br />

An important aspect of the governance<br />

reform is how well the organization is<br />

structured and aligned to meet with the<br />

objectives of efficient service delivery. An important<br />

governance issue is the unbundling of pricing and services<br />

of urban water supply systems, which is akin to the unbundling<br />

of regulation and policy functions from the service<br />

delivery achieved in the case of electricity and telecommunication<br />

services. The water tariffs have to be set independently<br />

through a different process requiring social and<br />

economic analysis of the customers and achieving wider<br />

consensus through a variety of processes. Service delivery,<br />

on the other hand has to focus exclusively on the demands<br />

made, current capacity and the methods of handling<br />

customers.<br />

54 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W ATERED DOWN<br />

Alternative Institutional Arrangements<br />

Governance reforms also pertain to how institutions are<br />

arranged and structured while incorporating the principles of<br />

transparency, accountability and participation in the framework.<br />

The current institutional arrangements leave little scope<br />

for the participation of the private sector – both for-profit and<br />

non-profit organizations (NGOs) and community/ neighbourhood<br />

groups, which enjoy much closer rapport with the general<br />

public at local level. The for-profit organizations can potentially<br />

play a good supportive role as ‘Bulk water supply entity’<br />

that can engage in the water production through extraction<br />

from the reserves upon the consent given by the government<br />

and sell it to the retail water suppliers i.e., the urban local<br />

bodies/ panchayats in the nearby and private/community water<br />

supply entities that undertake water supply service to these<br />

areas This will not only improve the efficiency of service<br />

delivery but also make the retail water supply entities much<br />

better aligned towards becoming accountable and participative.<br />

Information Technology and Accounting Systems<br />

As noted earlier, the information systems of the water supply<br />

entities follow archaic methods of information generation,<br />

recording, retrieval and data base management. Most of the<br />

water supply information is not generated in a structured<br />

manner following any standard designs of bills/vouchers and<br />

most of it is not recorded and stored. Data retrieval of any<br />

query requires case to case manual search and poor quality<br />

and reliability of retrieval. The management information<br />

systems (MIS) are not well established and unless they are well<br />

established it is difficult to see some visible progress in database<br />

storage, retrieval and management. Moreover, such data<br />

shall be of immense use for understanding the functioning of<br />

the organization by the human resources division or consultants<br />

to redesign/alter the structure. There is a tremendous<br />

scope for the application of information technology<br />

here, which can help the concerned organizations to organize<br />

more efficiently and use the advantages of speedy data<br />

entry, processing and queries that can be performed on<br />

the computers.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Bagchi, Soumen (2003): ‘Pricing and cost recovery of urban<br />

services: issues in the context of decentralized urban governance<br />

in India’, International Journal of Regulation and<br />

Governance 3(2): 103-134.<br />

• Boland, John and Dale Whittington (2002): ‘The Political<br />

Economy of Water Tariff Design in Developing Countries:<br />

Increasing water tariffs versus uniform Price with Rebate’,<br />

In: Ariel Dinar (Ed), The Political Economy of Water<br />

Pricing Reforms, Oxford University Press, New York (pp<br />

215-235).<br />

• Dole, David and Ian Bartlett (2004): ‘Beyond Cost Recovery:<br />

Setting User Charges for Financial, Economic and<br />

Social Goals’, ERD Technical Note No. 10, Asian Development<br />

Bank, Manila.<br />

• Maheshwari, G. C. and B. R. K. Pillai (2001): ‘The water<br />

crisis in India: need for a balanced management approach’,<br />

International Journal of Regulation and Governance I(2):<br />

159-179<br />

• Mann, Patrick (1993): ‘Water utility regulation: Rates and<br />

cost covery’, Policy Study No. 155, Reason Public Policy<br />

Institute, USA<br />

• Nallathiga, R. (2006): “Reforming Water Sector Governance<br />

and Institutions for improving Efficiency: The Case of<br />

Mumbai”, International Journal of Regulation and Governance<br />

6(1): 99-133<br />

• Rangachari, C. S. (2003): ‘Organisational Design for Service<br />

Delivery’, CGG Working Papers: <strong>Volume</strong> 2: 38-64, Centre<br />

for Good Governance, Hyderabad<br />

• Saleth, R. M. and A. Dinar (1997): ‘Satisfying Urban Thirst:<br />

Water Supply Augmentation and Pricing Policy in Hyderabad<br />

City, India’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 395, The<br />

World Bank, Washington DC.<br />

• Sankarnarayan, K. (2005): ‘Urban Water Supply – Challenges<br />

Ahead’, Presentation made in the XII World Water<br />

Congress of the International Water Resources Association<br />

held on November 25-26, 2005.<br />

• The World Bank (1999): Initiating and Sustaining Water<br />

Sector Reforms: A Synthesis, Published by Allied Publishers<br />

Limited, New Delhi for The World Bank, Washington DC.<br />

• The World Bank (2004): Reforming Infrastructure: Privatisation,<br />

Regulation and Competition, Published by Allied<br />

Publishers Limited, New Delhi for The World Bank,<br />

Washington DC.<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

55


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Corruption and Corporate<br />

Governance in India<br />

Rafiq Dossani<br />

Senior Research Scholar; Executive Director,<br />

South Asia Initiative, Shorenstein APARC,<br />

Stanford University<br />

Introduction<br />

Satyam Computers was nationalized in January <strong>2009</strong> after its<br />

executive Chairman, Ramalinga Raju, confessed to fraudulently<br />

overstating profits. In subsequent investigations, it<br />

emerged that over one and a half billion dollars was illegally<br />

transferred from Satyam to Raju’s personally-owned firms;<br />

these included a property firm, <strong>May</strong>tas, that owned a $3<br />

billion contract to build the Hyderabad Metro Rail system.<br />

The collapse of Satyam, India’s 4 th largest IT firm, challenged<br />

the usefulness of two pillars of Indian corporate<br />

governance laws – that listed firms employ an independent<br />

auditor and that the board should have a majority of independent<br />

directors. Satyam’s auditor was PWC and six of<br />

Satyam’s nine-member board were independent directors.<br />

The debacle was a shock to Satyam’s clients (whose list<br />

included 185 of the Fortune 500 companies), to the IT<br />

industry, and to industry generally.<br />

Satyam’s failure raises several questions about corporate<br />

governance and corruption in India: the scope and effectiveness<br />

of the laws on corporate governance, the scope and<br />

endemism of corporate corruption, the causes and underlying<br />

trends.<br />

Corruption in India is neither new nor limited in scope.<br />

India after independence in 1947 became a byword for<br />

corruption of all kinds, particularly the abuse of political<br />

power for personal and corporate gain, and the illegal<br />

transfer of resources or rights from owners to other parties<br />

through the use of entrusted power for private gain. India<br />

ranks poorly on political corruption, having ranked 85 th out<br />

of 180 countries in a recent study by Transparency International.<br />

1 According to the World Bank’s governance indicators,<br />

India ranks in the 25 th -50 th percentile of countries<br />

ranked by the ability to control corruption. 2 The World Bank<br />

argues that greater individual freedoms, democracy and a<br />

vibrant and free media are critical for reducing corruption.<br />

The latter view is widespread as regards the ingredients for<br />

a corruption-free 3 society. It helps explain why such widespread<br />

corruption has vexed Indians more than anyone else.<br />

They have suffered its consequences for decades, all the<br />

while wondering why a democracy that should allow for the<br />

imposition of collective will has not been able to impose<br />

minimal ethical principles. The conclusion – that the average<br />

Indian tolerates corruption willingly – is probably as untrue<br />

in a natural sense as for citizens of any country, though – per-<br />

56 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

haps thanks to India’s free press – it has been widely proposed<br />

as the logical explanation.<br />

Nevertheless, corruption is endemic in the sense of being a<br />

characteristic of Indian society. How it became that way is<br />

necessary if we are to understand its presence even today<br />

even in those parts of India that are part of the new economy.<br />

The Origins of Corruption<br />

Corporate corruption in India arose in large part due to state<br />

controls of production through licenses and quotas. This led<br />

to shortages of goods and services. In the short-supply<br />

economy that resulted, both public and private producers<br />

became inefficient and produced goods and services of<br />

relatively poor quality. To gain access to goods and services<br />

in short supply, the public had to pay bribes. Thus, in the<br />

public mind, corruption, slow growth, inefficiency and poor<br />

quality became inextricably linked.<br />

For instance, until the mid-1980s, India’s leading automobile<br />

producers were two private firms, the Premier Automobile<br />

Company and Hindustan Motors, both founded prior to<br />

independence. Once licensing was introduced in the 1950s,<br />

no other firm was allowed to produce cars.<br />

The two private firms bribed the government<br />

to ensure this and had side agreements<br />

on market-sharing. The government<br />

controlled the price of their cars in<br />

order to protect the common man. As a<br />

result, both companies’ products were<br />

always in short supply. Between 1964,<br />

when Premier Automobiles produced its<br />

first car, the Premier 1100, based on the<br />

1937-year Fiat 1100, and 1985, when it<br />

introduced an equally outdated second model, the 1100 was<br />

its only model. During this period, it shared the consumer<br />

automobile market about equally with Hindustan Motors’<br />

leading model (and its only model till 1978), the Ambassador,<br />

based on the 1948 Morris Oxford.<br />

Even as of 2006, the Premier Padmini (the 1100’s current<br />

name) is still the mainstay of the Mumbai taxicab system,<br />

while the more royal-looking Ambassador still leads the<br />

Kolkata taxicab market and is even the official government<br />

limousine. Although India proponents may validly claim that,<br />

at least, India produces cars on its own--unlike, say, Singapore<br />

or Indonesia--the distinction of producing a model that<br />

Conglomerates<br />

like the Tatas<br />

survived because<br />

of legacy assets<br />

that went back to<br />

the pre-licensing<br />

reform days<br />

was invented prior to World War II offsets that claim a bit.<br />

Licensing induced private firms to be corrupt: they bribed<br />

to obtain licenses and then bribed again to prevent others<br />

from getting new licenses. Those few corporates that were<br />

clean, such as the Tata group, suffered mightily in the form of<br />

denied licenses – for example, Tata’s project to build cars in<br />

collaboration with Honda was denied a license in the mid-<br />

1980s and its project to build an international airport in<br />

Banglore, jointly with Singapore Airlines was denied permission<br />

in the 1990s. However, conglomerates like the Tatas<br />

survived because of legacy assets that went back to the<br />

pre-licensing days and by leveraging these assets to enter<br />

unprotected sectors such as software services. The rest of the<br />

clean firms that were started during the pre-reform days<br />

largely folded or mended their straightforward ways.<br />

The second source of corruption was the misuse of state<br />

power. This was in several forms. First, the state had the<br />

power to allocate, or at least influence the allocation of<br />

valuable property rights. These included taxation, land<br />

ownership and usage, electricity and telecommunications<br />

generation and distribution, spectrum allocation, water<br />

access and air-traffic. In some cases, the<br />

state chose to be a monopoly provider,<br />

such as in air-traffic, electricity and<br />

telecommunications, and collected<br />

side-payments for privileged access to its<br />

services.<br />

For instance, in Bombay city, even as of<br />

1990, it took five years to be allocated a<br />

telephone line. Side-payments to the local<br />

telephone office were commonly paid to<br />

jump the queue, with additional side-payments<br />

to roll-back the meter down the road. The state was<br />

vexed by this turn of events, it seems. It responded by introducing<br />

a “Tatkal Phone Service” (an official out-of-turn<br />

allocation): by paying an official premium of ten thousand<br />

rupees in 1990 (about $650), a customer got the opportunity<br />

to get an immediate allocation by further paying the “ordinary<br />

price” of phone service. It almost did not feel like a<br />

bribe. 4<br />

The power to tax was misused by setting favorable tax rates<br />

for favored corporates and large agriculturists. In one of the<br />

more egregious cases on record, in 1982, Reliance Industries’<br />

polyester filament yarn plant went on-stream using a particu-<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

57


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

lar imported raw material called PTA (purified terephthalic<br />

acid). A day later, the government sharply raised import<br />

tariffs on a competing raw material, polyester chips, that was<br />

used, via a different production process, by its main competitor,<br />

Orkay Silk Mills. A few years later, in 1985, the then-<br />

Finance Minister, V. P. Singh, decided to investigate whether<br />

corruption had played any role in that process. In 1987, at the<br />

height of the investigation, Singh (who would later become<br />

Prime Minister after campaigning on an anti-corruption<br />

platform), was fired as Finance Minister.<br />

Agriculture has never been taxed, the power to do this<br />

lying with state (provincial governments) rather than New<br />

Delhi. Rich landlords ensured that this would not happen, in<br />

return for patronage payments. Land<br />

reforms were, similarly, thwarted by rich<br />

landlords, with the result that over 50% of<br />

the rural population is landless.<br />

The third source of corruption was<br />

patronage recruitment in the state sector.<br />

State employment was highly sought by a<br />

lawmaker’s constituents, not just because it<br />

paid a good wage (due to the power of<br />

unions, who were established primarily in<br />

the state sector) but because it came with<br />

the power to collect personal side-payments.<br />

Most public services, as a result,<br />

were overstaffed and, partly in consequence,<br />

the staff was underpaid. The<br />

staff, therefore, relied on corruption as a<br />

source of making up the differential in<br />

their salaries. In return, they enforced the<br />

rules differentially.<br />

In consequence, in due course, corruption became a<br />

normal part of obtaining civic services. Civic servants had to<br />

be bribed since one could not escape them--there were just<br />

too many around and they had the authority of the state<br />

behind them. By the late 1970s, without the backhander to all<br />

types of public servants, urban survival would have been<br />

impossible. Some were bribed in order to receive a personal<br />

gain--the electrical meter reader, for example, who, in<br />

exchange for a bribe, would underread the meter; or the<br />

telephone man who levied a personal monthly charge in<br />

return for letting the user make free long-distance calls.<br />

Some were bribed to get one out of trouble, such as the<br />

Most public<br />

services were<br />

overstaffed<br />

and, partly in<br />

consequence,<br />

the staff was<br />

underpaid<br />

policeman who caught the motorist making a wrong turn.<br />

And others were bribed so that they would not hurt the<br />

citizen, such as the taxman who was bribed so that he would<br />

not harass the honest citizen (despite knowing that he had<br />

paid his taxes fairly). Railway-ticket checker, ration-card<br />

issuer, gas-cylinder man, postman—the public had a special,<br />

unethical relationship with each.<br />

A government officer posted to a plum position, such as to<br />

collect octroi (a tax imposed on the entry of goods into a<br />

city), often paid a bribe to a higher officer to get such a<br />

posting. He could collect that back several times over from<br />

the share that truckers paid him for undervaluing goods at<br />

the octroi checkpoint. Interestingly, such an officer, if single,<br />

was prized in the marriage market. If male,<br />

prospective in-laws were willing to pay a<br />

dowry premium for a groom with a guaranteed<br />

income over a run-of-the-mill groom<br />

from the private sector! If female, the<br />

dowry was often waived.<br />

The private sector took advantage of the<br />

state’s lax standards. In Kolkata, adherence<br />

to building codes was abysmal enough so<br />

that some buildings were actually leaning!<br />

One was the nineteen-story Chatterjee<br />

International Centre, once Kolkata’s<br />

tallest building. When I viewed it from a<br />

mile away, it looked as though it tilted<br />

about 18 degrees. It stayed like that for<br />

several years until it was recently renovated.<br />

Another building on Camac Street<br />

was eight floors high and had an even<br />

greater tilt. Once, walking by, I asked a<br />

resident coming out of it if he was not afraid of living in the<br />

house. He said he had been terrified until quite recently.<br />

However, it had finally listed enough that it touched the<br />

building next to it and so was now stable!<br />

The fourth source of corruption was to finance election<br />

campaigns. According to the Center for Media Studies, an<br />

Indian think-tank, the upcoming parliamentary elections will<br />

cost $2 billion, which includes $500 m to be paid illegally to<br />

voters by candidates. 5 As a share of per capita income, the<br />

elections are probably the costliest in the world. The contributions<br />

to finance the elections come from a variety of<br />

national and international sources, many of which are<br />

58 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

legitimate, but the overwhelming majority of the amount is<br />

believed to be illegitimate and to come from corporate<br />

sources.<br />

The fifth source of corruption was inadequate disclosure of<br />

corporate actions, leading to widespread corporate and<br />

securities fraud. With the exception of a few corporates, such<br />

as the Tata group and multinationals, the mass of listed<br />

companies were run as family firms who viewed their firms as<br />

hereditary fiefdoms and who viewed public and institutional<br />

shareholders as a nuisance arising from socialist policies.<br />

They concealed large amounts of income from public<br />

scrutiny, distributing it to themselves.<br />

The Bombay Stock Exchange and other stock exchanges<br />

abetted the process. The BSE was organized<br />

as a club, which regulated itself;<br />

members of the BSE were usually linked to<br />

particular corporates whose interests they<br />

supported. While this is not unusual<br />

globally, the difference in India was that<br />

the brokers’ goal was distorted by the<br />

absence of external regulation. As a result,<br />

the BSE – Asia’s oldest exchange founded<br />

in the mid-nineteenth century – was a den<br />

in which insider trading was rampant,<br />

crises were manufactured to enable<br />

powerful speculators to defer payments<br />

and corporate insiders were part of the<br />

game. Making money was not through<br />

undertaking to complete trade at a fair<br />

price, but through manipulating the share<br />

price with the aid of corporate insiders<br />

and then persuading, for a side-payment,<br />

the state-owned financial institutions to place orders at the<br />

manipulated prices.<br />

As a securities trader on the Bombay Stock Exchange in<br />

the 1980s and 1990s, I discovered that it was commonly<br />

known among my fellow traders that the management of<br />

certain firms were not to be trusted. Corporate announcements<br />

from such firms were always received skeptically. Yet,<br />

such firms persisted in their successful existence for decades.<br />

They raised a minimum of finance from the equity markets<br />

at prices that were laughably low by the standards of the<br />

trusted firms, but their success was driven by licenses and<br />

access to bank loans from state-controlled banks, both<br />

through corruption.<br />

Preponderance of<br />

self-regulation in<br />

important fields<br />

like securities,<br />

law, media and<br />

accounting aided<br />

corruption<br />

As noted earlier, not all firms were like this, only the vast<br />

majority. The exceptions were most of the multinational<br />

firms, such as Unilever, a few clean family-run firms that had<br />

established their credentials over many decades, such as the<br />

Tata group, and no more than a handful of firms established<br />

by professionals that had, against all odds, survived the<br />

onslaught of licensing. By the mid-1980s, when reforms<br />

began, the number of such firms listed on public markets<br />

consisted of about 50 firms out of a total of over 2,000 listed<br />

firms.<br />

Given that corruption was a key component for success,<br />

trust among top management, including at the boardroom,<br />

was critical. Hence, the typical firm’s board<br />

was staffed entirely with relatives and other<br />

trusted cronies; the key functions needed<br />

for control, particularly finance, were<br />

always retained by the chief executive;<br />

auditors, lawyers, consultants and other<br />

professionals were chosen on the basis of<br />

their loyalty to the top management rather<br />

than competence.<br />

The preponderance of self-regulation in<br />

important fields like securities, law, media<br />

and accounting aided such corruption. As<br />

in stockbroking, accountants and lawyers<br />

allied themselves to large corporates and<br />

were reliant on those (largely corrupt)<br />

corporates for their ongoing survival – after<br />

all, who else would hire them? Their<br />

loyalty to their primary client was far<br />

greater than their loyalty to their profession;<br />

corrupt practices were a natural outcome. The lax<br />

self-regulatory framework allowed them to continue such<br />

practices for decades.<br />

In summary, there were many sources of corruption. In<br />

answer to the question as to how corruption could flourish in<br />

a democracy, there is likely more than one answer. One is the<br />

weakness of civil society, itself an outcome of widespread<br />

poverty and the state’s unwillingness, right from the beginnings,<br />

to tolerate opposition. The second is that while the<br />

poor own the vote, the rich own the campaign contributions.<br />

The only way to manage both interests was to legislate<br />

pro-poor policies and subvert them in practice, for a price.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Thus, the state would officially control the price of wheat for<br />

the poor (as the Congress party is promising to do if elected<br />

next month) but would also, with less fanfare, cut the price of<br />

fertilizers and power for rich farmers in order to protect their<br />

profits. The campaign contribution mediates that process.<br />

How Reforms Influenced Corruption<br />

Due to economic reforms since the mid-1980s, the links<br />

between corruption, slow growth and inefficiency have<br />

weakened. This might lead those who are unaware of the<br />

weakened links to look at India’s high growth rate and to conclude<br />

that corruption, too, must have declined. The answer is<br />

more complex: first, the state has made an effort to tackle<br />

various types of corruption. Second, in<br />

practice, corruption has declined in some<br />

cases and risen in others. Overall, it is hard<br />

to argue for a definitive trend.<br />

The end of the quota/licensing system<br />

has had the biggest single, positive impact<br />

on the most important source of corruption,<br />

that of the short supply of goods and<br />

services. The objective of delicensing, to<br />

produce goods and services more efficiently,<br />

has begun to be achieved; along<br />

with greater efficiency, corruption has<br />

declined. For example, cellphone services<br />

recorded an increase of 15 million<br />

subscribers in January <strong>2009</strong>. That is<br />

equivalent to 5.6 new subscribers for every<br />

second of the day.<br />

At the level of the corporation, there<br />

has been a transition from a reliance on<br />

internal savings to external capital, both debt and equity, in<br />

order to finance growth. This necessitated an opening up to<br />

foreign investors and securities firms; the investment laws<br />

were strengthened in the early 1990s to increase the attractiveness<br />

of India as an investment destination. This has<br />

reduced securities fraud.<br />

When quotas were abolished in 1991, the public assumed<br />

that corruption, too, would depart. The consequent arrival of<br />

planeloads of western businesspersons eager to invest in<br />

India was taken as the first positive signal of both growth and<br />

of new standards of business practice as well. But it was to<br />

take longer than most had anticipated.<br />

The objective of<br />

delicensing, to<br />

produce goods<br />

and services<br />

more efficiently,<br />

has begun to<br />

be achieved<br />

When foreign investors returned to India after 1991, they<br />

assumed that in its operating practices India was probably<br />

more like Indonesia than any other country in Asia and that<br />

like the Suharto family in Indonesia, there was the Gandhi<br />

dynasty to be managed. But they also assumed that India was<br />

ready to do business. Thus, the type of foreign firm that<br />

initially came to produce goods in India was the type used to<br />

doing large deals with governments and paying the price: the<br />

utility companies, the big commodity suppliers and the like,<br />

wanting the annuity payments of early access. The “fixers” of<br />

New Delhi, long accustomed to fixing bureaucrats for<br />

domestic businesspeople, were quick to respond, offering<br />

access to the highest levels of decision making for a price.<br />

The foreign businessmen (mostly men,<br />

indeed, with a few important exceptions as<br />

we discuss below) found that the system<br />

was not ready to receive new foreign firms,<br />

especially the mid-<strong>size</strong> and smaller firms<br />

that make up the bulk of the American<br />

economy. India had opened up enough to<br />

make it interesting for domestic enterprise<br />

to dream anew. But the institutional<br />

structure to allow full foreign ownership<br />

in India was not yet there. Many of these<br />

foreign businessmen became disappointed<br />

and left.<br />

The few successful foreign firms in the<br />

1990s were those large ones that could<br />

afford to be carpetbaggers. Certain<br />

American investment banks, for example,<br />

made lucrative deals to list Indian<br />

public-sector giants on the Luxembourg<br />

or London stock exchanges. They would make their pitches<br />

over a week or so with plenty of glamour and sophistication<br />

to policymakers and bureaucrats in Delhi and hope to return<br />

with a contract in hand. They mostly succeeded because it<br />

involved work that Indian firms could not yet handle. And<br />

they succeeded even when they did not see the point of<br />

setting up an office in India given the irregular flow of deals<br />

and slim pickings in the domestic market.<br />

This was a game of glitz, certainly, but corruption was also<br />

an integral part of it. The American banks provided the<br />

glamour and the Indian bureaucrat, perhaps realizing it was<br />

his last time in the spotlight, demanded his price. The Indian<br />

60 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

public--long accustomed to the lordly and corrupt ways of the<br />

bureaucrat--now had the pleasure of seeing him squirming as<br />

he tried to polish his “yes, but what’s in it for me?” response<br />

to someone whose culture he did not understand.<br />

And how were the bureaucrats to respond to the glamorous<br />

likes of Enron International chief Rebecca Mark, who,<br />

according to her own account, explained her wardrobe style<br />

to colleagues in an internal briefing. “Day in and day out,”<br />

she said, she called on a foreign official who typically spent<br />

most of his time with other conservative men, her competitors.<br />

"He will not remember most of them," she said, "but he<br />

will remember me."<br />

Enron epitomized a regrettable phase in Indian reform. It<br />

was remarkable that Enron was successfully<br />

portrayed in the Indian media as an<br />

electricity giant in the U.S., a false image<br />

given that it was a mid-<strong>size</strong> trader of oil and<br />

gas then (this was the early 1990s). The<br />

image buffing, if not worse, helped Enron<br />

sign a $2.5 billion deal for setting up a<br />

power generation plant just north of<br />

Mumbai in Dabhol, Maharashtra. The<br />

deal was unfair to Indian consumers and<br />

privately opposed even by the privatesector-friendly<br />

World Bank for the lack of<br />

transparency in the award process--<br />

though the bank lacked the courage to<br />

speak openly.<br />

I was peripherally involved in the<br />

process. In December 2000, at the<br />

invitation of Maharashtra’s chief minister,<br />

I presented the financial impact of the<br />

Enron project to the Maharashtra Cabinet. It was clear from<br />

the financial information available that the project would<br />

bankrupt the state’s State Electricity Board by the first<br />

quarter of 2001--and I said as much. Indeed, in the second<br />

quarter of 2001, the SEB defaulted on payments to the<br />

project.<br />

The Enron Dabhol project exposed an unexpected, dark<br />

side of western capitalism to Indians long isolated from the<br />

West. Western businesses also began to learn that India was<br />

quite different from Indonesia. It may be corrupt and opaque<br />

like Indonesia, but the press was quite different from other<br />

developing countries where they had worked. In those places<br />

The image<br />

buffing, if not<br />

worse, helped<br />

Enron sign a $2.5<br />

billion deal for<br />

setting up a power<br />

generation plant<br />

the press was more or less a nonentity in influencing business<br />

outcomes. In the Dabhol case, the press followed Ms. Mark’s<br />

every move (often breathlessly) and initially took a sympathetic<br />

view of the high costs. Once the reason for the high<br />

costs was discovered to be unrelated to the cost of inputs, the<br />

press turned against Enron. In the process, westerners also<br />

discovered through the work of anti-Enron activists like the<br />

late P. D. Kaul that civil society in India could sometimes be<br />

a force to be reckoned with.<br />

Another case that exposed the muck on both sides was a<br />

fiasco in telecommunications. In 1994 the Indian government<br />

asked global firms to join with Indian firms and bid for<br />

fixed-line and cellular licenses. An Indian firm, Himachal<br />

Futuristic Communications Limited<br />

(HFCL), in partnership with Israel’s Bezeq<br />

and Thailand’s Shinawatra Corporation,<br />

bid $27 billion--more than five times the<br />

combined market value of these firms at<br />

the time--for nine fixed-line licenses, This<br />

was possible only because the bid terms<br />

had been deliberately and corruptly set,<br />

allowing even small participants entry so<br />

that they could resell the licenses to more<br />

credible providers down the line for a<br />

large profit.<br />

Of course, the winning bidders were<br />

unable to achieve financial closure and<br />

their bid collapsed. Ultimately, the<br />

telecom minister who managed the bid<br />

process was found with Rs.11 million<br />

($300,000) in cash at home and was<br />

prosecuted for corruption. The company<br />

that allegedly bribed him was HFCL.<br />

Surprisingly, even more credible firms--both domestic<br />

firms such as the Birla Group, and their foreign partners such<br />

as AT&T, grossly overbid as they later discovered. The<br />

market was still too small to justify the sums bid. The domestic<br />

partners then used the law to shield them by citing delays<br />

on the part of government. The government fought back in<br />

the courts and would have won--except that it would probably<br />

have bankrupted at least some large Indian business houses<br />

of long standing and close ties to political parties. It was not<br />

until a new government came to power in New Delhi in 1998<br />

that the issue was resolved--through the government’s<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

capitulation.<br />

However patchy the process, as discussed above, the end of<br />

quotas gradually ended corruption in accessing goods and<br />

services. The government shifted to governance by regulation<br />

rather than by quota. The domestic private sector, which had<br />

introduced corruption to the general public in the 1950s, led<br />

the way out by increasing output. By the year 2000, Indian<br />

governance had moved from a controlling stance to a regulatory<br />

stance.<br />

The shift to a regulatory stance has had a beneficial impact<br />

on corruption. Regulators in most cases, including finance,<br />

insurance and telecommunications, have been appropriately<br />

empowered and given independence from other organs of the<br />

state. Thus, another important source of corruption, that of<br />

the inefficient allocation of state-held property rights, has<br />

been partially eliminated.<br />

The remaining areas of corruption in public allocation are<br />

in land and civic infrastructure allocation, due to continuing<br />

short supply of quality urban space. Corruption is a factor in<br />

determining who gets to build what, how much, and where. In<br />

most cases, building permits are given liberally in return for a<br />

bribe, with no consideration of additional<br />

infrastructure needs such as roads and<br />

water. Sadly, it is the poor, who lack<br />

adequate infrastructure to begin with,<br />

who suffer the most.<br />

The United Nations Human Development<br />

Report for 2006 notes that in a<br />

run-down area of Bombay, Dharavi, there<br />

is a slum that houses two million of<br />

Bombay’s population. It says, “It is<br />

estimated that there is one toilet for every<br />

1,440 people. In the rainy season streets, lacking drainage,<br />

become channels for filthy water carrying human excrement.<br />

In a typical case, 15 families share one tap that works for two<br />

hours a day.”<br />

Yet, cities like Bombay and Delhi record one cell phone<br />

per person. In other words, a majority of Dharavi’s residents<br />

probably have one cell phone in the family while sharing a<br />

toilet with over a thousand others. Even in the spiffy Churchgate<br />

district of Bombay, where apartment prices exceed ten<br />

thousand rupees per square foot, water is supplied for two<br />

hours a day, usually in the evenings at around 8 p.m. Residents<br />

keep large tanks in bathrooms and kitchens to store the<br />

Inadequate<br />

disclosure<br />

of corporate<br />

actions has lead<br />

to widespread<br />

corporate and<br />

securities fraud<br />

water for use during the rest of the day, but some appliances<br />

such as washing machines and dishwashers can only be used<br />

with the water at full pressure. So a maid, who will later<br />

return to her slum-dwelling, is sure to be at her employer’s<br />

home at 8 p.m. to operate these essential appliances.<br />

The third source of corruption, patronage in state recruitment<br />

and spending, has been sought to be tackled by introducing<br />

fiscal discipline and paying state employees better<br />

salaries. For instance, a professor at one of the state-owned<br />

Indian Institutes of Technology, whose salary was earlier<br />

capped at $19,700 a year can now earn up to $27,000 a year –<br />

not inconsiderable considering that his student will typically<br />

earn $9,000 as an annual starting salary at an outsourcing<br />

firm, i.e., a ratio of 3 – the comparable ratio at Stanford<br />

University is 1.6.<br />

However, the enforcement of these rules remains weak and<br />

the oversupply of underpaid staff continues and remains a<br />

source of massive corruption.<br />

A famous court case captures this cause of corruption. 6 In<br />

December 2006, the Delhi High Court overturned the lower<br />

court’s verdict acquitting Manu Sharma, the son of prominent<br />

politician Venod Sharma, of killing<br />

bartender Jessica Lall, in the presence of<br />

several witnesses. The defense did all it<br />

could to prevent a fair trial: at the retrial,<br />

it emerged that the defense’s actions<br />

included bribing and threatening witnesses.<br />

The police, by their own admission,<br />

shielded the accused and sought to<br />

derail the case. Over thirty eyewitnesses<br />

initially filed testimony but later retracted<br />

and turned hostile toward the prosecution.<br />

One witness, a prominent Delhi socialite whose testimony<br />

remained unchanged, was the owner of the restaurant<br />

where Jessica was murdered. That made a key difference to<br />

the outcome. Venod Sharma was later exposed in a sting<br />

operation by Tehelka, the famous investigative journal, as<br />

having organized the payment of millions of rupees to some<br />

of the witnesses. The only comment that the erstwhile Delhi<br />

police commissioner made on the final verdict was that the<br />

judgment seemed to be motivated by a judge with an agenda<br />

but that it showed that the police could at least, on occasion,<br />

be critical of themselves!<br />

The speed with which the retrial was held and a verdict<br />

62 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

Table 1: Sources of Corruption<br />

Problem Corruption Reform Objective Ref Achieved? Corruption<br />

controlled?<br />

Short-supply of pub&pvt<br />

consumer and industrial<br />

goods and services<br />

State-owned, inefficiently-used<br />

property rights,<br />

eg., spectrum, water, airtraffic,<br />

power generation<br />

and distribution<br />

Patronage recruitment in<br />

state sector; patronage<br />

spending by MPs<br />

High election costs and<br />

vote buying by corporates<br />

Poor disclosure on corporate<br />

actions<br />

Inefficient land allocations<br />

SROs deny foreign access<br />

(securities, foreign investors,<br />

accounting, media,<br />

law)<br />

Sidepayments;<br />

poor quality<br />

Sidepayments;<br />

monopoly rents<br />

Sidepayments by<br />

recruits and users<br />

Corporate Sidepayments<br />

Corporate and securities<br />

fraud<br />

Sidepayments<br />

Poor quality<br />

End Quotas Efficient Production Yes Yes (7)<br />

Regulation<br />

of allocation<br />

Fiscal discipline;<br />

higher<br />

salaries<br />

Legalize<br />

contribution;<br />

apply<br />

limits and<br />

disclose<br />

Regulation<br />

Eminent<br />

domain<br />

State takes<br />

over regulation<br />

Efficient property rights<br />

allocation<br />

Yes Partial (1)<br />

Efficient state sector Partial No (6)<br />

Reduce Corruption No No (2)<br />

Adequate disclosure<br />

and corporate governance<br />

Efficient land allocations<br />

Improve quality<br />

Yes Partial (4)<br />

Yes No (3)<br />

Finance: Yes;<br />

rest: No<br />

No (5)<br />

delivered (the original verdict was delivered in February<br />

2006, although the murder occurred in April 1999) was<br />

unprecedented and seems to have been a direct outcome of<br />

the public uproar that followed the initial verdict. It is, of<br />

course, too early to tell if this was an isolated occurrence or a<br />

forerunner of positive change. A cautionary note was sounded<br />

by the erstwhile solicitor general, Harish Salve, who<br />

responded to a TV reporter’s question on the verdict with<br />

“Jessica Lall’s case is only one of hundreds such that never<br />

get reported because less prominent people are involved.”<br />

And, it is worth noting that, to date, no one from the police<br />

or those who paid illegal bribes on behalf of the defense has<br />

yet been prosecuted. Even worse, perhaps, is that neither the<br />

media nor other organs of civil society has bothered to follow<br />

up on the case subsequently.<br />

The fourth source of corruption, the cost of elections, was<br />

addressed in the reforms by legalizing political contributions,<br />

applying limits (five percent of net profit) and requiring<br />

disclosure to shareholders of public companies. However, this<br />

has not worked. The last requirement has apparently been a<br />

reason in this rule being evaded, suggesting that the management<br />

of public companies were already corrupt.<br />

The fifth source of corruption, that of the low accountability<br />

of professional self-regulatory organizations has been<br />

addressed only partially. In securities markets, the state tried<br />

to make the BSE more accountable, failed and set up its own,<br />

more successful exchange, the National Stock Exchange.<br />

Similar failures have occurred in the other SROs, but no<br />

successful alternative has been found.<br />

The past and present situations are summarized in table 1.<br />

The table lists the sources of corruption in the author’s<br />

assessment of their order of importance in the pre-reform<br />

period. The numbers in parentheses show a corresponding<br />

rank at the present time.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

63


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Corruption and Corporate Governance<br />

We have already detailed the past and continuing existence<br />

of corporate corruption. However, on January 7 th , <strong>2009</strong>,<br />

corporate India was shaken to its roots when Ramalinga<br />

Raju, the Chairman and CEO of Satyam Computers, India’s<br />

fourth largest IT company admitted, in a letter to the stock<br />

exchanges, that he had falsified accounts for several years in<br />

an effort to present a better picture of Satyam’s operations<br />

than was the truth.<br />

Information later emerged that the accounts were falsified<br />

in connection with a massive transfer of funds to the Rajus’<br />

family-owned property company and other personal accounts<br />

to an amount that is still being determined, but it most likely<br />

ranges between $1.4 bn and $2 bn. The government took over<br />

the company and Raju, his brother and the CFO have been<br />

jailed 7 and remain there, as of March <strong>2009</strong>. Subsequent<br />

investigations have revealed additional fraudulent actions<br />

including undisclosed insider sales.<br />

It also later emerged that the firm’s external auditor, a local<br />

firm – Lovelock & Lewes (which represented PWC in India<br />

Table 2: Current State of Regulation in India and US<br />

India<br />

US (NYSE)<br />

Independent directors Minimum 50% Majority<br />

Remuneration of independent directors Only director’s fees and firm’s equity-linked<br />

Same<br />

securites<br />

Independent directors’ to be unrelated to Yes<br />

Same<br />

firm<br />

Independent directors awareness of firm’s Yes<br />

Yes<br />

compliance status<br />

Meetings of independent and non-executive No<br />

Yes<br />

(I/N-E) directors without executive directors<br />

Compliance certification CEO and CFO Same<br />

Audit Committee<br />

All to be I/N-E, of whom majority Only independent persons (not necessarily<br />

directors) may be audit com-<br />

& Chair to be independent; broad<br />

powers, including code of conduct, mittee members<br />

governance, whistleblower protection<br />

Board nominations & corporate governance<br />

committee, composed of independent directors<br />

Compensation committee, composed of independent<br />

directors<br />

Shareholder rights: voting, share transfer,<br />

pre-emptive rights, disclosure of most material<br />

information (eg., insider trades), internal<br />

and external audit, equal rights for foreign<br />

and minority shareholders<br />

No: Corporate governance is part of<br />

audit committee; nomination is by<br />

the full board<br />

No: Compensation is determined by<br />

the full board<br />

Best practices observed<br />

Yes<br />

Yes<br />

Dual class stock remains an issue<br />

Corporate strategy Management driven Board driven<br />

Related party transactions<br />

Disclosure to shareholders not required;<br />

Disclosure to shareholders required<br />

must be approved by audit<br />

committee<br />

Share pledging by insiders<br />

Disclosure to shareholders not required<br />

Disclosure to shareholders not required<br />

Source: http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_india.html<br />

SEBI documents, various years<br />

64 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

due to the SRO restrictions on PWC’s direct entry into India)<br />

– was an intrinsic part of the fraud.<br />

Satyam, at the time, had six independent directors and<br />

three executive directors. The latter group consisted of Raju,<br />

his brother and a long-time business associate. The independent<br />

directors were an eminent group. They were<br />

K.G.Palepu, a Harvard Business School professor of corporate<br />

governance (ironically, his website says that “In the area<br />

of corporate governance, Professor Palepu's work focuses on<br />

how to make corporate boards more effective, and on<br />

improving corporate disclosure.”); M. Rammohan Rao, a<br />

recent appointee to the board and Dean of the Indian School<br />

of Business; Vinod Dham, a well-known Indian engineer of<br />

Silicon Valley, the founder of many successful startups, a<br />

co-inventor of Intel’s Pentium chip, and a successful<br />

venture capitalist; T.R.Prasad, a former Cabinet Secretary;<br />

V.S.Raju (no relation), a former director of IIT, Delhi; and<br />

Mangalam Srinivasan, a US-based academic, and former<br />

advisor to Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.<br />

It appears clear that the independent directors did not<br />

fulfill their duties. For instance, at a board meeting on<br />

December 16, 2008, to vote on a resolution<br />

to approve the acquisition of the<br />

Rajus’ property firm by Satyam at short<br />

notice, none of the independent directors<br />

(all were present by phone or in person)<br />

questioned why only that firm was being<br />

considered for acquisition rather than any<br />

of the other property firms on the market<br />

(given the depressed state of such firms at<br />

the time, this should have been an obvious<br />

question). 8 Only Mangalam Srinivasan<br />

stated that the board should have been involved in such a<br />

large acquisition from the beginning rather than at that stage;<br />

the response to her statement was provided by one of the<br />

executives of the IT firm, that it was a sound derisking<br />

strategy, given the state of the IT market globally (there was<br />

no discussion of the state of the even-more depressed<br />

property market in Hyderabad). All the directors voted for<br />

the resolution.<br />

Satyam’s failure shocked the Indian corporate world and<br />

policymakers, since India has been seen as a leader among<br />

developing countries in the area of corporate governance.<br />

Starting in 1991, with a focus on improving investors’<br />

Key oversight<br />

functions such<br />

as over finance<br />

must contain<br />

representation<br />

from independent<br />

directors<br />

rights, the regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of<br />

India (SEBI) successfully introduced a range of reforms of<br />

investor disclosure rules. The Company Law Board, working<br />

with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India,<br />

reformed the accounting and auditing standards.<br />

The rules for disclosure are widely considered to be<br />

effective; Indian firms follow these rules that protect shareholder<br />

pre-emptive rights over corporate actions, and have<br />

internal and external auditors. There is only a single class of<br />

stock, with the same rights whether held by institutions,<br />

insiders, the general public or foreigners. The accounting<br />

standards are based on internationally accepted accounting<br />

standards. 9 There remain some significant differences with<br />

US accounting standards, mostly in the area of disclosure of<br />

contingent liabilities and deferred taxation.<br />

Starting in 2000, rules for intra-firm corporate governance<br />

have been enforced, with subsequent modifications to<br />

accommodate the provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley<br />

Act of 2002.<br />

Table 2 summarizes the current state of the regulations.<br />

As Table 2 indicates, there are substantial similarities<br />

between Indian and American rules: in<br />

particular, the definition, percentage and<br />

remuneration of independent directors<br />

and the broad powers of the audit committee<br />

are similar. There are some<br />

significant differences as well. The<br />

nomination of directors is a responsibility<br />

of the board rather than the audit committee<br />

and there is no independent<br />

compensation committee. Given the<br />

Satyam scandal, the issue of how Satyam<br />

treated related-party transactions might have been driven by<br />

the difference in rules. A key driver of the Satyam scandal,<br />

that the insider directors pledged their shares in order to<br />

raise money for their personal property company, was not<br />

required to be revealed – although this is not required in the<br />

US either.<br />

Our discussion above puts a great deal of the onus for good<br />

corporate governance on the independent directors; it is<br />

clear, however, from any corporate environment, that it is<br />

really the behavior of the insider directors that matters; and<br />

that controlling their behavior is, in practice, very difficult.<br />

Satyam’s Raju, for instance, was well-known for his wooing of<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

65


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

local politicians. For instance, several of the most senior<br />

politicians of his home state, Andhra Pradesh, visited Silicon<br />

Valley as his guests, including visits hosted at Stanford<br />

University by this writer. It has been alleged, subsequent to<br />

the Satyam scandal, that a proportion of the fraudulent<br />

transfers were paid to politicians to clear land deals involving<br />

his property firm.<br />

Some of the flouting of the rules indicate that, at<br />

Satyam, the corruption ran deep. For instance, one of the<br />

rules (in India and the US) is that independent directors<br />

are not permitted to obtain any other compensation apart<br />

from director’s fees and unvested equity/options (with a<br />

one year vestment, at least). Yet, Professor Palepu received<br />

over $150,000 in annual fees for providing training<br />

to Satyam’s senior staff (hopefully, not on the subject of<br />

corporate governance). This required Professor Palepu’s<br />

consent; but, obviously, also the consent of the insider<br />

directors, management and external auditors to initiate<br />

the transaction and to sign off on such payments.<br />

Another question that this discussion raises is whether,<br />

given that India is emerging from a controlled environment,<br />

even stricter rules than otherwise<br />

are necessary. For instance, consider<br />

the question of family members on the<br />

board. In the US, given its long history<br />

of professional management, it would be<br />

unusual to find more than one or two<br />

family members of the original promoters<br />

on the firm’s board.<br />

In India, the presence of several<br />

family members is common, even after a<br />

generation has passed. In India’s largest<br />

company, Reliance Industries, the second generation<br />

executive chairperson is Mukesh Ambani. There are three<br />

other executive directors, two of whom are his cousins.<br />

The three cousins jointly constitute the finance committee.<br />

The independent directors on Reliance’s board<br />

include Dipak Jain, the Dean of Northwestern University’s<br />

Kellogg School of Management, and S. Venkitaramanan,<br />

a former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. In the<br />

venerable Birla group, which is among India’s largest and<br />

oldest corporate groups, the founder’s great-grandson,<br />

Kumar Mangalam Birla, and his mother, Rajashree Birla,<br />

sit on the boards of each of their group companies. At<br />

In US, it would<br />

be unusual to<br />

find more than<br />

one or two family<br />

members of the<br />

original promoters<br />

on the board<br />

another successful company, Vedanta Group, which<br />

recently agreed to buy America’s largest copper refiner,<br />

Asarco, for $1.7 billion, the three executive directors<br />

include the executive chairman, Anil Agarwal and his<br />

brother and deputy chairman, Navin Agarwal. India’s largest<br />

telecom company, Bharti Airtel, is headed by Sunil<br />

Mittal, and board members include his two brothers.<br />

As these examples of pre-eminent firms indicate, the<br />

family-run corporation is not something unlikely given<br />

India’s recent emergence and does not, by itself, indicate<br />

suspect practice. A practical reason for family presence is<br />

that, when dealing with a still corrupt government and a<br />

generally corrupt environment, insiders need to have<br />

strong trusted ties to each other. In a non-corrupt organization,<br />

such ties are a strength in the Indian environment.<br />

However, if the organization is corrupt, given the strength<br />

of the tie between the non-independent directors, it is<br />

unlikely that even a simple majority of independent<br />

directors can be effective. What is needed is that key<br />

oversight functions such as over finance contain representation<br />

from independent directors.<br />

The second concern in India is<br />

enforcement. As we saw in the case of<br />

Satyam Computers, the existing laws<br />

were not enforced. The primary regulator,<br />

SEBI, relied on the auditors, who<br />

turned out to be part of the fraud.<br />

In summary, it appears that, while the<br />

Indian laws are better than in most<br />

countries, though still below best<br />

practice, the key issue is that corruption<br />

is enabled by lax enforcement and the<br />

failures engendered by self-regulation; and driven by the<br />

forces of patronage. As a result, corruption remains<br />

widespread enough and may be considered endemic. The<br />

Satyam episode is symptomatic of a wider problem rather<br />

than a one-off.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Resolving corruption is no easy problem. China is an<br />

example of a society that is ranked by the above indices to<br />

be corrupt (in the 25 th -50 th percentile, i.e., similar to India<br />

in the World Bank estimates; and 72 nd on Transparency<br />

International’s Index). Yet, unlike India, the Chinese state<br />

66 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C ORRUPTION CONCERNS<br />

relentlessly pursues corruption. According to a 2005 news<br />

article, the Chinese government executes more officials<br />

for corruption offences than the rest of the world combined.<br />

At least 25 officials were given the death penalty for<br />

accepting bribes or kickbacks in the four years to 2005.<br />

More than 846,000 Communist Party members were<br />

punished for corruption from 1998 to 2002 alone, and<br />

58,000 officials have been punished in recent years at just<br />

two of the state-owned banks. 10<br />

The story can be different. For instance, Hong Kong’s<br />

Independent Commission Against Corruption, formed in<br />

1974, is credited with cleaning up the problem of endemic<br />

corruption in Hong Kong. 11<br />

In India, the Jessica Lall and Satyam cases show that<br />

corruption at the corporation is going to be a difficult<br />

problem to tackle since it is closely related to patronage<br />

corruption and the lack of enforcement. One might expect<br />

less corruption in civic life as an outcome of the improvement<br />

in the wages of public servants and a reduction in<br />

their numbers, but it will take several years to feel the full<br />

impact of these.<br />

Meanwhile, new types of corruption are constantly<br />

invented. Thus, to avoid having to disclose insider sales,<br />

Satyam’s two Rajus pledged their shares, something that<br />

was permitted until after the Satyam scandal, when SEBI<br />

changed the rules. The other new form of corruption is<br />

institutionalized: policies that ignore the rights of the poor<br />

and underprivileged in favor of the rich, as is becoming<br />

evident in the exercise of eminent domain rights by the<br />

state. In a growing economy, the incentives for such<br />

institutional corruption are higher because higher bribes<br />

are more affordable than when the economic pie is small.<br />

Mustering the collective will to tackle these forms of<br />

corruption remains a challenge for India in the twentyfirst<br />

century.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1<br />

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_<br />

indices/cpi/2008, accessed March 19, <strong>2009</strong><br />

2<br />

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp,<br />

accessed March 19, <strong>2009</strong><br />

3<br />

One uses the term corruption-free society, with hesitation,<br />

in the current times. Iceland was ranked 7 th in the<br />

2008 Transparency International survey; it is unlikely to<br />

rank so highly this year.<br />

4<br />

Not wanting to penalize its citizenry to death, however,<br />

the state graciously declared that phone lines were<br />

heritable assets. This meant that, upon the death of a<br />

person, the right to the phone line (including the right<br />

to assume the dead person’s place in the queue in case<br />

the line had not yet come through) was transferable to<br />

the next of kin.<br />

5<br />

http://www.thearynews.com/english/newsdetail.<br />

asp?nid=22810, accessed March 25 th , <strong>2009</strong><br />

6<br />

See Dossani, India Arriving, (New York: AMACOM<br />

Books), 2007, for more detail<br />

7<br />

The three men share a cell with a bootlegger, according<br />

to news reports.<br />

8<br />

This report is based on leaked minutes obtained by the<br />

Economic Times, India’s most reputable business daily.<br />

9<br />

www.pwc.com/Extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/<br />

A9E4E313EFE6F349CA2573F 5003FC982, accessed<br />

March 26 th , <strong>2009</strong><br />

10<br />

http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/<br />

regions/2005/0530china.htm, accessed March 19, <strong>2009</strong><br />

11<br />

Doig, A. Good government and sustainable anti-corruption<br />

strategies: a role for independent anticorruption<br />

agencies? Public Administration and Development, 15,<br />

151-165 (1995)<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat, Allen Lane<br />

- Penguin Books, 2005<br />

• Allen Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence, The Penguin<br />

Press, 2007<br />

• David M. Smick, The World is Curved, Portfolio, 2008<br />

• A special report on the world economy, The Economist,<br />

London, October 11 th , 2008<br />

• Dani Rodrik, The Economist, March 14 th , <strong>2009</strong><br />

• Charles Collyns, The Crisis through the Lens of History,<br />

Fund & Development, IMF, December 2008<br />

• Obama seeks global action : The Economic Times, 25 th<br />

March <strong>2009</strong><br />

• Mada, K.U., "A Journey Through Development Banking",<br />

Kamal Offset Printers, Mumbai, 2005.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

67


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

A Review of the Regulatory and<br />

Developmental Role of IRDA in Context<br />

to The Indian Insurance Market<br />

68 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NDIA INSURED<br />

Sanjay Tewari<br />

Administrative Officer, Life Insurance<br />

Corporation of India<br />

A<br />

thriving insurance sector is of vital importance to<br />

Whether the<br />

insurer is private<br />

or public,<br />

expanding the<br />

market will<br />

present multitude<br />

of challenges<br />

every modern economy. First because it encourages<br />

the savings habit, second because it provides a<br />

safety net to rural and urban enterprises and productive<br />

individuals. And perhaps most importantly, it generates<br />

long-term investing funds for infrastructure building. The<br />

nature of the business is such that the cash inflow of insurance<br />

companies is constant while the payout is deferred and<br />

contingency related. This characteristic of their business<br />

makes insurance companies the biggest investors in longgestation<br />

infrastructure development projects in all developed<br />

and aspiring nations. This is the most compelling<br />

reason why private sector (and foreign) companies were<br />

required to spread the insurance habit in the societal and<br />

consumer interest. Whether the insurer is private or public,<br />

expanding the market will present multitude of challenges<br />

and opportunities. The passage of the<br />

Insurance Regulatory & Development<br />

Authority Bill on December 2 nd , 1999<br />

heralded an era of cautious optimism<br />

where stakes were high for all the parties<br />

concerned. For the foreign insurers,<br />

investments must start yielding returns,<br />

for domestic insurance industry – their<br />

market penetration should remain intact<br />

and for the Government of India, Foreign<br />

Direct Investment (FDI) must pour in as<br />

anticipated. On the periphery, the customers are thinking<br />

whether all the hype created on liberalization will actually<br />

benefit them. The Bill of Rights 1 , over these years has<br />

extended to a total of eight together forming the basis of any<br />

regulatory framework.<br />

The insurance / penetration in India is poor at two percent<br />

of GDP, we may curse our past but it’s a big potential for our<br />

next generation. Indian economy is 0.16 % of US economy<br />

but insurance density of India is 0.004 % of USA. Purely for<br />

equilibrating with its own economy the insurance sector has<br />

not only got the obligation to grow with the economy but to<br />

bridge the lag factor. This challenge offers the greatest opportunity<br />

to the Insurance Regulator, the Insurers, the Re<br />

insurers and the intermediaries apart from the Statesmen of<br />

the country. This paper discusses that there has to be a<br />

paradigm shift in the role of the IRDA, transforming from<br />

primarily one of developing legal and regulatory frameworks<br />

to increase the awareness levels, product innovation, distribution,<br />

customer service and investments; and perhaps increasing<br />

the penetration of insurance.<br />

Insurance Regulation to Rectify Market Imperfections<br />

The Government’s role in crafting insurance regulation<br />

should be limited to rectifying the deficiencies or imperfections<br />

that can cause significant harm. A pro-competitive<br />

approach, therefore, would witness governmental regulation<br />

of insurance only with respect to matters that meet the<br />

following three conditions:<br />

• an actual or potential market imperfection exists,<br />

• the market imperfection causes or can reasonably be<br />

believed to cause meaningful consumer or public harm,<br />

and<br />

• government action can ameliorate the harm.<br />

Conversely, if any one of the three<br />

conditions is not met, no government<br />

intervention is warranted. In the Indian<br />

context, these conditions do exist, and<br />

hence the IRDA. Justifiable government<br />

intervention should be minimally intrusive<br />

and as efficient as possible. For example,<br />

one way to minimize consumer harm<br />

occasioned by insurer insolvencies is to<br />

allow insurers to plot to set prices so high<br />

that even the most inefficiently operated<br />

insurer is guaranteed a profit and, therefore, survival. Such<br />

an approach, however, results in high priced insurance and<br />

excessive profits for insurers – all at the expense of consumers<br />

and businesses, and therefore, at the expense of the national<br />

interest. The superior approach is to allow price competition<br />

but to establish reasonable capital standards while closely<br />

monitoring the insurers financial condition. This approach<br />

will yield lower priced insurance, thus benefiting the national<br />

economy, while minimizing the possibility of consumer harm<br />

that would otherwise arise form excessive insurer financial<br />

risk and insolvencies. Now, briefly the specific arguments<br />

favoring greater foreign insurer participation is that India<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

69


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

could realize one or more of the following benefits:<br />

• increased domestic savings<br />

• improvements in customer service and value<br />

• additional external financial capital<br />

• transfers of technological and managerial know how<br />

• improvements in the quality of insurance regulation<br />

• creation of beneficial domestic pouring, including the<br />

addition of more and higher quality jobs, quality enhancing<br />

backward and forward linkages, and societal loss<br />

reductions.<br />

However, there are concerns 2 or rather reservations about<br />

the foreign insurer involvement and this is to be looked into<br />

by the IRDA.<br />

First, foreign insurers might dominate the domestic market<br />

and thereby precipitate adverse microeconomic (less consumer<br />

choice and value) or macroeconomic (failure to<br />

contribute adequately to economic development) effects.<br />

The Second reservation class for which factual justification<br />

is lacking or for which more efficient means exist to address<br />

the concern than denial of market access is that foreign<br />

insurers might market insurance selectively (marketing<br />

insurance to only most profitable segments,<br />

to multinational corporations or to<br />

the commercial sector, ignoring the retail<br />

market).<br />

The Third class is that foreign insurers<br />

might fail to make lasting contributions to<br />

the local economy.<br />

The Fourth class of arguments for<br />

limiting foreign insurer market access is<br />

that the domestic market is already served<br />

by locally owned insurers or through<br />

reinsurance.<br />

The Fifth reservation category is that the national industry<br />

should remain locally owned for strategic reasons, such as<br />

national security concerns or because of the desire for<br />

economic diversification.<br />

The Sixth reservation is that foreign insurers may provoke a<br />

greater foreign exchange outflow. More importantly it is to be<br />

noted : “ (any) loss of foreign exchange may not be substantial<br />

enough to justify the opportunity cost involved in running<br />

and upgrading national insurance corporations 3 .”<br />

The Final reservation relates to the belief that the full<br />

market liberalization should await insurance and possible<br />

There are two<br />

opposite ends<br />

of a spectrum of<br />

how regulations<br />

can be developed:<br />

Pluralist Vs.<br />

Corporatist<br />

macroeconomic regulatory reforms so as to minimize the<br />

chances of micro – or macroeconomic disruptions.<br />

Development & Regulation Combine to Build A<br />

Strong Market<br />

By assigning the developer’s role to the regulator the Government<br />

has demonstrated that if the regulator is allowed to act<br />

as the fulcrum between the load of prudent supervision on<br />

one hand and the efforts of development of the insurance<br />

market on the other, perhaps one can strike the right balance<br />

most efficiently. In India, the regulatory legislation has made<br />

a significant departure from the rest of the world by allocating<br />

to the insurance regulator the role of development of the<br />

industry. This change appears to have been carved out with<br />

the intention to ensure that the regulator does not overlook<br />

the need of developing and expanding the insurance market<br />

and the institutions within the system so that the benefits of<br />

liberalization and opening up of the sector trickle down to<br />

the masses 4 .<br />

Moreover, the regulations need to be seen as “drivers for<br />

change to force players to do things in a better way”. However,<br />

it is also recognized that on their<br />

own, mechanisms that attempt to “force”<br />

people to act are difficult to implement.<br />

The process of development and amendment<br />

of regulations is the starting point in<br />

terms of understanding how future regulations<br />

might relate to innovative behavior.<br />

There are two opposite ends/approaches 5<br />

of a spectrum of how regulations can be<br />

developed:<br />

1. Pluralist ( competitive ) Vs.<br />

2. Corporatist ( partnering )<br />

The pluralist / competitive approach assumes that the<br />

government plays a neutral role as arbitrator between groups<br />

of competing interests where those best able to mobilize<br />

support and ‘justify’ their arguments win. The development<br />

of regulations within this framework therefore relies upon<br />

interpretations by interest groups that are most able to exert<br />

pressures to succeed. The Corporatist / partnering, consensual<br />

approach is more inclusive. It may also lead to long<br />

discussions and consultations. Different interests are brought<br />

together within the regulatory developmental process in<br />

which the government plays an active role in order to con-<br />

70 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NDIA INSURED<br />

struct a common way forward. The process is usually slow<br />

and messy and not conducive to rapid innovation, or risk<br />

taking. Whilst this system may not produce the ‘right’<br />

answers (in many cases there are no single best solutions), it<br />

often helps to avoid deeply problematic outcomes.<br />

The form of regulatory policy is important with respect to<br />

firms’ abilities and incentives to innovate. The traditional,<br />

prescriptive approach to regulations is often thought to be<br />

too rigid and inhibits innovation. This is one of the reasons<br />

for the shift towards performance-based regulations, which<br />

often offer greater flexibility to stakeholders in choosing<br />

options to meet overall functional requirements. However,<br />

there are limitations and contradictions in the new performance-based<br />

approach. For example, it is not clear how<br />

timescales within the performance criteria need to be met<br />

relate to implementation of this approach. A flexible performance-based<br />

form of standard could provide firms with the<br />

freedom, market incentive and institutional frameworks<br />

within which to innovate. There will always be tension<br />

between the need for regulations for new technologies and<br />

those covering old versions. This issue requires flexibility on<br />

the part of regulators and those demonstrating<br />

compliance. As bodies of knowledge<br />

grow and become more precise in<br />

new specialist areas it is possible that<br />

organizations which can adapt in a flexible<br />

manner will be able to comply more easily,<br />

through their ability to adapt to the need<br />

to show new evidence. There is therefore<br />

more likely to be a link between organizational<br />

flexibility, competencies to comply<br />

with regulations and innovativeness.<br />

Firms need to develop new skills to succeed in this environment.<br />

This by itself could lead to information sharing and<br />

co-operation, particularly if a portfolio of innovation and<br />

regulatory policies are developed. A system of measuring the<br />

regulator’s performance which is communicated to the public<br />

in a consistent manner will, over passage of time, tend to<br />

enhance the public’s confidence in the regulator and the<br />

regulatory process.<br />

An Ideal Developmental Strategic Plan for IRDA<br />

A proper appreciation of the developmental role of the<br />

There will always<br />

be tension<br />

between the need<br />

for regulations for<br />

new technologies<br />

and those<br />

covering old ones<br />

regulator is not possible without a plan 6 . The planning<br />

process for a modern regulatory body should include the<br />

following elements:<br />

• The plan should be based on the regulator’s mandate and<br />

objectives, and should seek to achieve the objectives within<br />

a realistic timeframe.<br />

• The plan should be based on a thorough assessment of the<br />

challenges faced by the regulator, including areas in which<br />

the regulator is seen to fall short of its mandate and<br />

objectives, deficiencies in compliance with standards of<br />

best practice, and specific tasks such as the development of<br />

the legislation and supervisory methodologies.<br />

• Based on the regulators objectives and self-assessment<br />

described above, the plan should set realistic medium-term<br />

goals. These are goals or targets to be achieved in a three<br />

to five year timeframe but generally not longer. The goals<br />

should also be ambitious enough to stimulate genuine<br />

action but should be few enough in number to permit a<br />

concentration of effort on these goals.<br />

• The plan should then set out the specific actions necessary<br />

to achieve the medium-term goals. Often these actions are<br />

set out in the form of annual business<br />

plans. Reference is often made, however,<br />

to the actions to be taken in the years<br />

immediately following in order to create a<br />

roadmap for achieving the medium-term<br />

goals.<br />

• Where possible the medium-term goals<br />

and short-term actions should be measurable.<br />

At the very least it should be possible<br />

to determine whether the goal has or has<br />

not been met.<br />

The regulation should be adequate 7 , meaning that it should<br />

be sufficient to rectify market failures and, thereby, protect<br />

the public. Several principles should follow, commonly being:<br />

• Competition Law: To establish an adequate system of<br />

regulation, government must, first, have necessary laws<br />

and regulations in place that create the framework for a<br />

competitive market. The first principle, therefore is<br />

“Government should enact and enforce laws that provide<br />

an effective framework for competitive insurance markets.”<br />

• Prudential Regulation: Insurance laws and regulations<br />

also should address all relevant aspects of insurance<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

operations, from creation to liquidation.<br />

“Government should enact and enforce laws that establish<br />

reasonable solvency standards and regulation as the<br />

primary means of protecting the public. As a part of<br />

reasonable solvency regulation, government should<br />

establish, make public, and enforce appropriate and<br />

consistent rules and procedures for identifying and dealing<br />

with financially troubled insurers.”<br />

• Regulatory Effectiveness: The next step to ensure adequate<br />

regulation in a globally competitive market involves<br />

creation of an independent regulatory agency.<br />

“Government should establish an insurance regulatory<br />

agency that operates in society’s interest and has sufficient<br />

resources to efficiently, effectively, and impartially enforce<br />

the nation’s insurance laws and regulations.”<br />

• Impartial Regulation : The principal of impartiality is<br />

fundamental to a competitive market.<br />

“Government should ensure that insurance regulation and<br />

enforcement are applied with consistency and impartiality<br />

between competitors, irrespective of the nationality.”<br />

International Cooperation in Insurance<br />

IRDA has benefited from its association with the International<br />

Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 8 and its<br />

member countries, while formulating the various regulations<br />

and guidelines, from time to time. The members of the IAIS,<br />

being regulators in other jurisdictions with vast experience in<br />

the insurance industry, have always co-operated whenever<br />

reference has been made to them, with respect to insurance<br />

Table 1: IAIS Committees/ Sub-Committees :<br />

S.No.<br />

IAIS / Committees<br />

1 Executive Committee<br />

2 Emerging Markets Committee<br />

3 Technical Committee<br />

4 Task Force on Assessment & Implementation of Insurance Core Principles<br />

5 Working Group on Observer ship & Membership <strong>Issue</strong>s<br />

S.No.<br />

IAIS / Sub-Committees<br />

1 Insurance Fraud Sub-Committee<br />

2 Insurance Laws, Regulations, Practices & Standards Sub-Committee<br />

3 Re insurance Sub-Committee<br />

4 Education Sub-Committee<br />

5 Accounting Sub-Committee<br />

companies and intermediaries licensed in their jurisdictions.<br />

The IRDA has benefited from the learning curve in the<br />

various jurisdictions across the globe. IAIS was associated<br />

with the IRDA in organizing seminars and training programs<br />

for regulators in the Asian region. The IRDA has been<br />

actively associated with the working of the following Committee<br />

/ Sub-Committees with Chairman / Members representing<br />

the Authority on these Committees:<br />

The Initiatives, Challenges and Limitations of IRDA<br />

After elaborating the strategic role of the regulator, it is<br />

time to take a stock after seven years of the formulation of<br />

IRDA, as to how well or otherwise the companies have<br />

adapted themselves to such an atmosphere 9 . Let me run<br />

firstly into the initiatives taken up by the IRDA:<br />

• Established the manner in which business is to be<br />

transacted by its members ;<br />

• Designed rules to ensure that the insurance market<br />

functions for the benefit of policyholders and not solely<br />

for the special benefit or advantage of its members ;<br />

• Established the rights and obligations between members<br />

and their customers including rules for members acting<br />

in fiduciary capacity and for members acting as agents ;<br />

• Established job procedures and requirements and record<br />

keeping to provide an adequate audit trail ;<br />

• Established priority, parity and precedence among<br />

orders designed to ensure proper treatment of all orders ;<br />

• Established the obligations of those acting as premiummakers;<br />

• Established the obligations<br />

safety for any transaction to be a<br />

cash transaction;<br />

• Established procedures to<br />

ensure efficient, prompt and<br />

orderly clearance, settlement and<br />

payment of claims ;<br />

• Provided effective and fair<br />

procedures and standards under<br />

which members and associated<br />

persons shall be appropriately<br />

disciplined, by expulsion, suspension,<br />

limitation of activities and<br />

functions, and other fitting sanctions<br />

in case of violations of its<br />

72 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NDIA INSURED<br />

own rules or of the IRDA regulations ;<br />

• Provided for suspension or cancellation of business ;<br />

• Established the duties of its members to obtain and<br />

disseminate information provided by its clients and<br />

• Established, strengthened and restructured insurance<br />

market institutions (such as regulatory agencies, reinsurance<br />

nets/exchanges, settlement organizations, data<br />

exchanges), intermediaries ( well known), and activities<br />

(such as establishment of internal procedures and<br />

practices, development of appropriate organizational and<br />

staffing structures, formulation of strategic initiatives,<br />

and the design and implementation of customized<br />

management information systems).<br />

Simultaneously, it would be appropriate to measure the<br />

challenges faced by IRDA, specifically with respect to<br />

Research & Development & Risk-Based Capital System.<br />

The R&D costs money but yields high return akin to the<br />

system of venture capital. There is great temptation to enter<br />

into low-end money making enterprises in the name of<br />

R&D standing on high moral ground. Prudence lies in<br />

leveraging on the existing infrastructure. Challenge lies in<br />

thwarting personal agenda in this noble<br />

cause of R&D. Leaving the hint to the<br />

market, let me list the immediate<br />

priorities for the IRDA in R&D and<br />

insurance management in this knowledge<br />

era economics.<br />

a) IRDA scans its regulatory mandate,<br />

market opportunities, existing products<br />

and services, possible products<br />

and services and a shortlist of net<br />

opportunities. After identifying the<br />

net opportunity for insurance industry as an enterprise<br />

and resetting business objectives, design of each existing<br />

and proposed product should be assessed followed by a<br />

capability assessment of existing players.<br />

b) IRDA may understand the working space for propelling<br />

its operations from current data analysis instead of<br />

commonsensical and lobbying oriented reactive action<br />

and reliance on advise-as-you-asked (aaya) services.<br />

c) The insurer may try to optimize its risk while maximizing<br />

product range by use of ride-on and ride-off types of<br />

riders allowed by the IRDA. But IRDA has the onus to<br />

see that this does not bring further chaos to systematic<br />

A look at the<br />

IRDA’s annual<br />

report reveals<br />

that the regulator<br />

is seemingly<br />

nonchalant on<br />

certain issues<br />

risk.<br />

d) IRDA should index insurance companies by what they<br />

know (core competencies) and own (strategic assets) and<br />

not what they do (products or services).<br />

e) Capital, liability reserves and manpower in assorted<br />

insurance skill areas are three critical capacity creators,<br />

which will establish insurance industry’s business virtual<br />

circle IRDA should monitor the aggregate of this<br />

reinforced capacity at macro level.<br />

IRDA is also challenged to speed up the development of<br />

Risk – Based Capital System. The development of expertise<br />

for off-site financial condition analysis and on-site inspections<br />

has to be internalized by the IRDA. Dependence on<br />

outsourcing for such supervision whether through domestic<br />

or international individuals or organizations may create<br />

impression of regulatory weakness as also sprout possibility<br />

of self-serving supervision by such outsiders. The nest step<br />

is development of a sound enforcement infrastructure<br />

within the IRDA, including investigatory ad enforcement<br />

procedures. Development and implementation of a risksensitive<br />

early warning system to identify troubled insurance<br />

companies should be in housed by<br />

the regulator before such requirement<br />

manifests. No prudent regulator can<br />

wish away the law of averages, which<br />

mandate development of troubled<br />

insurance companies soon. A supplementary<br />

requirement is development of<br />

mechanisms for the liquidation of<br />

insolvent insurance companies. The<br />

IRDA may design and develop a policyholder<br />

protection plan in the shape of<br />

insolvency guarantee funds. There is also immediacy to<br />

survey risk management practices and internal control<br />

systems.<br />

As for the limitations, a look at the IRDA’s annual report<br />

reveals that the regulator is seemingly nonchalant on<br />

certain issues. For instance, on the often-talked about issue<br />

of rebating, the IRDA had the following saying;<br />

“The problem of rebating, in both life and the non-life<br />

sectors, has been engaging the attention of the Authority<br />

for quite a while. The Authority, as part of the advertisement<br />

campaign launched by it, has been creating awareness<br />

that rebating is an offence, and insurers need to strengthen<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

their self-regulatory mechanism in this regard. <strong>Issue</strong>s of<br />

market conduct of both the insurers and the intermediaries<br />

are a matter of concern. Insurers would need to evolve<br />

methods of self-regulation, both at the corporate level and<br />

collectively through their councils.”<br />

A problem that needs and requires firm handling cannot<br />

be soft pedaled like this. Again, in another crucial area of<br />

management expenses containment, instead of chiding the<br />

extravagant insurers sternly, the IRDA goes on in an<br />

advisory mode thus;<br />

“The insurers need to chalk out strategies to ensure that<br />

their operating expenses are kept within the prescribed<br />

limits. While in case of the new players, these limits may be<br />

breached in initial years of their operations, managements<br />

have to keep an eye on their expenses and draw up plans to<br />

bring them down. This is particularly pertinent in context of<br />

the opening up of the market to increasing competition and<br />

the investment income continuing to move southwards on<br />

account of the declining interest rate regime. In the case of<br />

the Public Sector Insurers, reducing the existing operating<br />

expenses would also be crucial in their strategy to compete<br />

with the lean private players.”<br />

One of the more limitations has been<br />

the adaptability of International Insurance<br />

Accounting Standards 10 . In Asia,<br />

and specifically in India, the emerging<br />

markets have been slower to adopt the<br />

modern accounting principles. The<br />

IRDA has designed the product and<br />

issued regulations that set forth important<br />

requirements respecting valuation<br />

of assets and liabilities. The Appointed<br />

Actuary regulation is there wherein the have to make a<br />

number of informative disclosures to management and to<br />

the IRDA and gives them a good deal of authority and<br />

independence. However, actuaries are not accountants and<br />

a non-ambiguous set of uniform accounting rules needs to<br />

be adopted.<br />

Analysis and Conclusions<br />

There is a need for continued reforms to ensure an insurance<br />

regulatory system that is more responsive to the needs<br />

of a modern, evolving market place. At a more fundamental<br />

level, it is yet to be demonstrated whether regulatory<br />

In Asia, emerging<br />

markets have<br />

been slower to<br />

adopt the modern<br />

accounting<br />

principles and<br />

practices<br />

networks are capable of addressing some of the fundamental<br />

problems of global capitalism such as widespread<br />

marginalization of whole geographic regions and large<br />

sections of the society. For the regulation to succeed, it will<br />

have to pass the test of legitimacy and accountability.<br />

Development is the process of bringing current values of<br />

the society to bear on current practices of an essential<br />

industry, and hence regulation must seek relevance more<br />

than permanence.<br />

A pool of recommendations may be derived upon, but to<br />

conclude, if we keep in mind, in simplest terms, what our<br />

goals are, we will be best able to pursue those goals relentlessly.<br />

If the limited resources of public attention and<br />

government power are to do the most good in insurance<br />

regulation, they should be directed at helping people get<br />

the most insurance for their money. Some particular<br />

standards can be adopted that create objective guidelines:<br />

i) Increasing Media Understanding & Reporting on<br />

Business Matters: Potential policyholders receive information<br />

from multiple resources. Perhaps the most important<br />

resource in terms of daily impact is the<br />

print media. Sustained efforts should be<br />

made by the regulator to educate the<br />

media personnel to the nature and<br />

delicacies of the insurance market, to<br />

render to the media a basis for appropriate<br />

analysis, and to bring the media into<br />

the overall education public process.<br />

ii) Committing to Public Education as a<br />

primary responsibility 11 : Everyone<br />

connected with the insurance market development agrees<br />

that public education is a crucial factor. There is enormous<br />

uncertainty within the public realm regarding such matters<br />

as the nature of risk coverage for which premium is paid<br />

and the logistics leading to mitigation payment. To enter the<br />

world of contractual savings requires a much different<br />

mental picture of the nature of the investment and the risks<br />

that are involved. A common refrain throughout retail<br />

savers is that much of the public is reluctant to engage in<br />

contractual savings purchases because of fundamental lack<br />

of understanding of the investment or the process. The<br />

question is not whether public education is necessary to<br />

74 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NDIA INSURED<br />

create public confidence in the markets; rather the question<br />

is who will foot the bill for such education. The Public<br />

Sector Undertaking insurers have engaged in education<br />

efforts, but they operate on meager budgets and cannot<br />

afford to finance the large-scale education that is needed.<br />

Nor should the burden be put on the private units. They<br />

are usually tight staffed. Moreover, the public perceives<br />

them as having a vested interest in selling off and begins<br />

with some distrust of the messenger. Brokers also do not<br />

have adequate financial resources or length of contact to<br />

inspire educational confidence in public. What is needed<br />

is (a) much enhanced IRDA funding for education programs<br />

and to be run by qualified Non-Governmental<br />

Organizations that are not seen as having an agenda other<br />

than public interest. Education is an indispensable tool in<br />

generating a more favorable public attitude to the market<br />

process.<br />

iii) Increasing the enforcement authority of IRDA:<br />

Insurance laws work on the carrot and stick basis. The<br />

carrot is providing the ability to raise much needed<br />

premium resource. The stick is the threat of punitive<br />

damages or criminal liability if the process ingrained in<br />

collection of premium to provide desired output is abused.<br />

Unfortunately often the ‘stick’ exists much more as a<br />

matter of theory than practice. That is because the enforcement<br />

agencies are technically under-funded as money<br />

harnessed from levy has agenda uses than the prioritized<br />

purpose and the regulator may not have the personal<br />

necessity to investigate instances of wrongdoings or to<br />

take the time and effort to seek just remedies through<br />

regulatory or judicial means. There must be the political<br />

will to carry through the recommendations, no matter who<br />

the company or its management may be. If the public<br />

perceives that there is activity in the enforcement area that<br />

regulators will act promptly in situations of possible public<br />

abuse, the result will be increased awareness that the<br />

agency is on public’s side, not on the side of the promoters<br />

of insurance offerings. This is an important shift in the<br />

attitude and we can expect the public to have faith in<br />

IRDA overseeing insurance market development.<br />

included the right to: safety, information, choice among<br />

a variety of products and services at competitive prices,<br />

and a fair hearing by governments in the formulation of<br />

consumer policy. These rights are now added by the<br />

right to: redress, consumer education and healthy and<br />

sustainable environment.<br />

2<br />

This section draws from Harold D. Skipper, Jr., Foreign<br />

Insurers in Emerging Markets: <strong>Issue</strong>s and Concerns,<br />

Washington, D.C.; International Insurance Foundation,<br />

1997<br />

3<br />

UNCTAD study<br />

4<br />

Unique Experiment; IRDA Journal, Vol III, No.1, Dec<br />

2004, p 25<br />

5<br />

Approaches to Regulation Making; India Insurance<br />

Report (series I), p 61<br />

6<br />

The Future Regulation of Insurance – A Progress<br />

Report, Financial Services Authority, UK, October,<br />

2002<br />

7<br />

This paper was presented at the Seminar on Insurance<br />

Markets in Transition: Balancing Competition, Fairness,<br />

and Soundness, and was published by Journal of<br />

Insurance & Risk Management, October, 2002<br />

8<br />

Source; IRDA 3 rd Annual Reports 2003<br />

9<br />

Source: Walking the talk-there’s little time for halfhearted<br />

approaches, IRDA Journal<br />

10<br />

Leading issues in Worldwide Insurance Supervision: An<br />

Overview, Thomas E. Power, Senior Manager, Bearing<br />

Point, USA<br />

11<br />

A Critique of the Regulatory and Developmental Role<br />

of IRDA, KC Mishra<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• The Making of an Emerging MARKET, Emerging<br />

Markets <strong>Quarterly</strong>, Spring 1997.<br />

• Tinner, John – Reforming Insurance Regulation, Financial<br />

Services Authority, February, 2002.<br />

• Ray, Debapriya - Growth of Insurance vis-à-vis Role of<br />

Intermediaries, VP, Reliance General Insurance, India.<br />

• Mathur, Suresh – SRO Route to Growth: Insurance<br />

Councils have busy days ahead, IRDA Journal, Vol. III,<br />

No.3, February, 2005, p 21-22.<br />

End Notes<br />

1<br />

The Bill of Rights, propounded by John F. Kennedy<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation)<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF O DEVELOPMENT<br />

Financial Inclusion by Channelizing<br />

Existing Resources in India<br />

Purti Sharma<br />

Economist,<br />

India Development Foundation, Gurgaon<br />

Financial inclusion proceeds towards integration of<br />

people who are economically and socially excluded from<br />

access to easy, safe and affordable credit and other<br />

financial services. Due to lack of financial inclusion among the<br />

lower income households, their protection from external<br />

76 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NNOVATIVE INCLUSION<br />

economic shock becomes miniscule. As a result, income<br />

disparity leads to vicious circle of poverty which continues to<br />

persist in the lower income groups. According to IISS (Invest<br />

India Incomes and Savings Survey, 2007), 55 percent of all<br />

the households do not have bank accounts, 97 percent do<br />

not have any health insurance and 61 percent do not have<br />

life insurance 1 .<br />

These missing financial markets among the lower income<br />

groups could be because of demand and supply side constraints.<br />

From the supply side, operating cost is considered as one of the<br />

major obstacle in promoting financial inclusion. Salaries to staff,<br />

travelling expenses, commissions, expenses on promotion of<br />

groups, staff welfare expenses, amortisation and depreciation,<br />

rent on hired buildings and other overheads - all constitutes the<br />

operating cost. For instance, operating cost in the case of Canara<br />

Bank for opening a new (no-frills 2 ) account was Rs. 48 and cost<br />

of each transaction (deposit/remittance) was Rs. 1012. To reach<br />

break even, the average amount of deposit required depends on<br />

the number of transactions. The break even average deposit<br />

level required was Rs. 1911 (for 12 transactions a year) and Rs.<br />

11,465 (for 72 transactions a year) 3 . These costs are critical for<br />

operating the formal banking system.<br />

By looking at the general profiles of<br />

various banks, it can be examined that the<br />

number of employees has decreased, on the<br />

other hand, business and profit per employee<br />

has increased in the SBI and various<br />

national banks (Table 1). Thus, we can at<br />

least analyse that bank has efficiently<br />

employed their resources. The total factor<br />

productivity (TFP) enables disaggregation<br />

of output change into two major components,<br />

namely, output change due to change in efficiency and<br />

output change attributable to change in technology. And the<br />

combination of both of these components (resource allocation<br />

and technology adoption) should reduce operational cost.<br />

The combination which minimises the cost component is<br />

necessary for the lower level of income bracket because majority<br />

of the population works in un-organised sector and are less<br />

educated.<br />

From the demand side, the higher cost of financial services<br />

(including the transportation cost) discourages inclusion. It is<br />

argued that the operating cost is higher for maintaining large<br />

number of account with lower average deposits. As a result, we<br />

Financial inclusion<br />

by introducing<br />

electronic<br />

payment system<br />

is one of the<br />

solutions to reach<br />

the masses<br />

found the lopsided distribution of banks and lack of availability<br />

of formal institutional credit has occurred. And thus, it is<br />

unviable for the banks to extend banking services to lower<br />

income groups. For example, for the no frills savings account of<br />

the HDFC bank, service charges for collecting an outstation<br />

cheque is roughly around Rs. 50 (varies by banks) for a cheque<br />

value of more than Rs. 500 (Table 2). On the other hand, the<br />

service charges for transferring money using electronic medium<br />

like mobile and net banking is free of cost from the service<br />

provider’s side. But there is lower penetration of cellular phones<br />

and internet in rural India. Along with that, the fixed and the<br />

variable costs for cell phones makes it costlier for owning<br />

cellular phones and thereby availing phone banking facility<br />

would be still a distant dream for most of rural India. While<br />

competitive market forces are increasingly expanding cellular<br />

network to cover rural India, internet penetration will still take<br />

some time. For example, to avail mobile banking services<br />

minimum one time fixed cost would be approx. Rs. 1,000 for<br />

buying a mobile hand set plus telecom operator’s monthly<br />

service charges. The other electronic payment transfer facilities<br />

like electronic bill payment cost around Rs. 25 per quarter per<br />

customer ID, phone banking- non Interactive<br />

voice response (IVR) cost around Rs.<br />

50 per call (agent assisted calls), debit card<br />

cost to Rs. 100 per year as annual fee, visa<br />

money transfer cost to Rs. 20 (plus taxes)<br />

per transaction etc 4 are too costly compared<br />

to small deposit denominations and lack of<br />

critical network of users.<br />

Financial inclusion by introducing<br />

electronic payment system is one of the<br />

solutions to reach the masses. But in India<br />

this solution is not feasible because poor households are out of<br />

the domain of formal banking system and the large number of<br />

lower deposits reduces the bank’s profitability. Secondly, the<br />

concept of virtual money banking, technology usage and trust on<br />

technology is difficult to promote among people who are<br />

financially excluded as well as are financially illiterate. Thirdly,<br />

majority of the population that belongs to poor class are working<br />

in un-organised sector with irregular incomes. And finally, lack<br />

of infrastructure availability (i.e disruptive electricity, low<br />

cellular phones and internet penetration etc) makes it challenging<br />

to initiate electronic payment system.<br />

To mitigate the financial inclusion problem for the poor class<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

77


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table 1: Profile of the Banks<br />

SBI & its Associates<br />

(Amount in rupees crore)<br />

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08<br />

No. of Offices 13782 13921 14190 14611 15512<br />

No. of Employees 280676 277508 270608 255699 248425<br />

Business per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 1810 2270.99 2826.53 3509.87 4314.37<br />

Profit per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 23.68 15.16 16.58 21.78 25.66<br />

Operating Expenses 12117 13410 15759 15988 16994<br />

Nationalised Banks<br />

No. of Offices 34460 34988 35590 37227 38726<br />

No. of Employees 471951 471297 473725 473179 466368<br />

Business per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 4864 7202 8761 10401 13233<br />

Profit per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 47 49 55 65 84<br />

Operating Expenses 20417 23629 25549 27267 29604<br />

Foreign Banks<br />

No. of Offices 209 234 254 264 278<br />

No. of Employees 12654 15750 20344 26444 33114<br />

Business per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 25108.56 25597.32 28632.73 29871.67 36963.72<br />

Profit per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 641.77 330.04 765.29 753.89 1314.63<br />

Operating Expenses 3450 4119 5554 7407 10355<br />

Other Scheduled Commercial Banks<br />

No. of Offices 4988 5539 6129 6984 8265<br />

No. of Employees 72119 82959 103339 136121 166334<br />

Business per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 9324 10402 11226 12018 13327<br />

Profit per Employee (in Rs. lakh) 113 39 71 82 105<br />

Operating Expenses 6547 8161 11639 15176 20268<br />

Sources: RBI<br />

households, solutions need to be devised for redundancy of all<br />

these issues. The electronic payment system for the poor<br />

household is not a perfect solution for promoting banking<br />

activities. The electronic payment system is outstanding proposal<br />

if it follows top to bottom approach. The access to formal<br />

banking system among the rich class is higher in comparison to<br />

the middle and the poor income groups; however usage of<br />

electronic payment system is very low in all the classes at present<br />

in India. The adoption cost as well as the benefit of using<br />

electronic payment system is higher. So, the initial adoption cost<br />

can be incurred by rich income groups. It is also important to do<br />

so because it has been found that the job security increases the<br />

chances of owning the electronic cards. And higher volume of<br />

transactions reduces the transaction cost and the fixed income<br />

reduces the default risk. Over the period of time, the growing<br />

competitive markets are expected to reduce the adoption cost<br />

and the spillover effect which would lead to the mass adoption.<br />

Solutions for Poor Class Households<br />

• Aim is to create smaller networks of people having access to<br />

formal banking system (by offering lower rate of interest<br />

using no frill accounts)<br />

• Integrate smaller networks to themselves and in turn form a<br />

bigger network of households having access to formal<br />

banking system<br />

• Induction of electronic banking payment system should<br />

78 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NNOVATIVE INCLUSION<br />

Table 2: Service Charges for No Frills Savings Account<br />

the habit of thrift and savings among<br />

Phone Banking - IVR<br />

Free<br />

citizens of the country. The emphasis,<br />

as the words “small savings” suggest, is<br />

Phone Banking - Non IVR Rs. 50 per call (Agent assisted calls).<br />

to bring the small depositor into the<br />

ATM Card<br />

Free<br />

fold of the savings movement. Post<br />

ATM Card - Transaction charge for Balance enquiry: Free & Rs.17.80 (plus taxes) Office Savings Banks were opened in<br />

Partner banks- SBI & Andhra Bank per cash withdrawal<br />

1882. Some of the small savings<br />

BillPay<br />

Rs. 25 (plus taxes) per qtr per Customer ID schemes i.e. Public Provident Fund<br />

Mobile Banking<br />

Free<br />

and Senior Citizen's Savings Scheme<br />

Net Banking<br />

Free<br />

are also operated through designated<br />

Visa Money Transfer<br />

Rs. 20 (plus taxes) per transaction<br />

branches of nationalised banks and<br />

Debit Card - Annual Fee - Regular Rs. 100 per year (plus taxes)<br />

four private banks i.e. ICICI, IDBI,<br />

Collection of outstation cheques at 1) Cheque value Rs. 0 to Rs. 500 -No charges HDFC and UTI Bank. The post<br />

HDFC bank's location<br />

2) Cheque value Rs. 501 & above Re. 1 per offices are not meant to replace banks<br />

1000 (Min Rs. 50)<br />

because it can not execute the<br />

* Credit on receipt of clear funds<br />

function of money multiplier. But<br />

*Figures are for HDFC Bank<br />

Source: HDFC website<br />

happen as result of spill over effect from the top of the<br />

pyramid, especially after the cost of service charge for using<br />

electronic payment is reduced<br />

• It is important not to introduce electronic payment system for<br />

poor class because majority of the<br />

nationalised and commercial banks<br />

can use post office’s infrastructure to facilitate various banking<br />

services.<br />

The existing Indian Post Offices are strategically perfect<br />

source available to promote inclusive financial growth especially<br />

for poor population. Its connectivity enables us to reach the<br />

remotest corners of the country. By utilising<br />

population in this category are illiterate<br />

existing Post Office’s infrastructure,<br />

and the cost of deploying electronic The existing Indian developing technology and connecting<br />

payment services for the large number of Post Offices are existing user with technology and expanding<br />

account having lower deposit would not strategically the user base would be one of the solutions for<br />

be profitable<br />

financial inclusion. Since Post offices can<br />

perfect source<br />

• Introduction of formal banking system<br />

not provide credit to its customers, banks<br />

available to<br />

should be encouraged by known faces<br />

and post offices can collaborate together in<br />

and trusted institutions like post offices. promote inclusive offering various financial services by<br />

• All the Government welfare programmes financial growth managing channels/technological strengths.<br />

targeted for the poor should be linked<br />

with banks. All the monetary benefits should be routed<br />

through banks only.<br />

Thus, the solutions for financial inclusion lies in channelizing<br />

existing resources and building up a platform for public –private<br />

partnerships using technology. There are three important<br />

constituents for inclusive growth i.e. infrastructure, advanced<br />

technology and user’s network which are mandatory for providing<br />

easy, safe and affordable financial services.<br />

Encouraging small saving scheme among the poor was<br />

considered a priority concern of the Government. The primary<br />

objectives of the small savings programme have been to promote<br />

The net collections in the small savings<br />

schemes (gross collections minus withdrawals by subscribers)<br />

have increased from Rs. 100 crores in 1948-49 to Rs. 96,788<br />

crore (Net) in 2004-2005. 100 percent of net collections mobilized<br />

in small savings schemes in a State/UT are transferred to<br />

the concerned State/UT Govt. as investment in special securities<br />

issued by that Government. All deposits under small savings<br />

schemes are credited to the 'National Small Savings Fund'<br />

(NSSF). All withdrawals by the depositors are made out of the<br />

accumulations in this fund. The balance in the fund is invested in<br />

special Government securities as per norms decided from time<br />

to time by the Central Government. In nutshell, post offices can<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

79


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Figure 1: Top to Bottom Approach for Introducing Electronic Banking<br />

Large Network of<br />

Electronic Banking<br />

Rich<br />

Introduce e-payments system in banking<br />

CRITICAL MASS<br />

Small Network of<br />

Formal Banking<br />

Middle<br />

Poor<br />

Spill Over Effect of e-payment system<br />

with the critical mass adoption<br />

Introduce Banking by creating local groups using<br />

known faces & trusted institution and later link it<br />

to the larger network of electronic banking system<br />

Total number of post offices in the country 155204<br />

Total number of post offices in rural areas 139046<br />

Total number of post offices in urban areas 16158<br />

Population served by a post office* 7166<br />

Population served by a post office (in rural area) 5687<br />

Population served by a post office (in urban area) 19891<br />

Area served by a post office (sq. km.) 21<br />

Average distance to be travelled for postal facilities (in km.) 3<br />

Sources: Department of Post<br />

act as an important enabler through which various financial transmitting messages. There are various services offered by<br />

services can be extended while the technological spill-over effect Indian Post Offices that are:<br />

is taking place in the banking sector.<br />

Technology<br />

Infrastructure and Facilities of Post Offices<br />

The adoption of technology in payment and settlement systems<br />

Indian post office’s network forms the largest postal system in reduces the cost of providing services with wider adoption of<br />

the world with an array of about 1.55 lakh post offices in India these technological products. It would play a pivotal role in<br />

(Table 3). Out of the total number of the Indian post offices, 90 reducing operating cost and would enable transfer of payments<br />

percent are in the rural areas and 10 percent are in the urban in real time. The technology needs to be inducted in a big to<br />

areas. On an average, a post office covers an area of 21 sq. km make transactions with the Post offices hassle free. At present,<br />

and serves 5,687 and 19,891 people in rural and urban respectively.<br />

The connectivity of the post offices are not only reflected computerised. Computerisation of the Post offices can bring<br />

there are only five percent of the total post offices which are<br />

in sheer <strong>size</strong> and numbers, but also in the average distance transparency and accountability. All payments to the public<br />

travelled for availing postal facilities which is around three km could be uploaded on the network and the public can have<br />

for all India.<br />

option of availing these services through various technological<br />

In the last 150 years, the Post offices have redefined ‘connectivity’<br />

by expanding its wide range of services from mere transportation cost of the consumer). The increasing penetra-<br />

processes, thereby, minimising the physical visits (includes<br />

tion of technology in the Post Offices can also encourage<br />

Table 3: Postal Network in India<br />

partnership deals with financial institutions, insurance companies,<br />

banks and logistics in the remotest corner of<br />

the country. The entire organisational structure can<br />

be linked with the central government and Panchayats<br />

to run various developmental schemes especially<br />

in the rural area.<br />

One of the recent initiatives in this direction was<br />

launch of e-bill post/e-payment. e-Bill Post is a<br />

facility for accepting payment of bills or payments<br />

from many-to-one in post offices. The amount<br />

collected is consolidated electronically in a web<br />

based Central Server on line, and the information is<br />

80 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NNOVATIVE INCLUSION<br />

Table 4: Main Services Offered by Indian Post<br />

Communication services – Letters, Post Cards, etc.<br />

Transportation services – Parcel, Logistics, etc.<br />

Financial services – Savings Bank, Money Order, Insurance, etc.<br />

electronic access of financial services can<br />

affect decision to adopt if and only if cost and<br />

benefits are higher. So the rate of change with<br />

which new technology is adopted will decide<br />

the operational cost and inclusion.<br />

Value added services – Speed Post, Service, Business Post, Direct Post, etc.<br />

Network<br />

The Post offices can be biggest facilitator in<br />

available to the e-Bill Post/e-payment user at any time. The bringing low income groups under the umbrella of saving and<br />

traffic for e- Bill Post service was 25 lakh users through which investment opportunities by including workers from un-organised<br />

sector. The Post office banks are the largest saving banks in<br />

the amount of revenue earned was about Rs. 128.13 lakh in the<br />

year 2006-07 5 .In the span of three years, this facility grew to the country in terms of having more than 17.39 crore accounts<br />

about 38 percent. For increasing network of technology users, and deposits amounting to Rs. 3,51,589.95 crore as on 31 st<br />

educating illiterate population especially in rural locations is March, 2007. The total amount of savings with the post offices<br />

the biggest challenge. However, this can be over come by ‘out has been accounted for about 8.20 percent of India’s GDP at<br />

of home’ (OOH) media service which can be placed at each factor cost (current prices) during the year 2007-08. The<br />

Post Office. This would not only help in educating people about untapped rural market has also shown faster growth in the<br />

how to use technology (both pictorially and verbally), but insurance sector. The rural postal life insurance has grown at the<br />

also advertise various financial options available to them and rate of 34.2 percent in terms of value of business in the year<br />

their benefits.<br />

2005-06 and 2006-07 respectively. In the same year, it has<br />

The larger the technologically driven financial network, increased from Rs 25,229 crore to Rs. 33,865 crore (Table 5).<br />

greater are the benefits for adopting it. For widening the The active number of rural insurance policies till the 2006-07<br />

technologically driven network of financial services, adoption was around 52 lakh which grew at 11.5 percent from the<br />

cost and its benefits would play a key role for the existing users. previous year.<br />

So, building trust on money transactions through technology is a Similarly, one of the oldest and important financial services<br />

key challenge to encourage people for adopting electronic offered by post offices is transfer of money by using money<br />

medium. Initially the adoption has to be ‘top to bottom’ down orders without opening a bank account. This service is popular<br />

approach to build the network effect and the competition for among rural labourers who works in un-organised sector and<br />

reducing the higher service cost. The potential adopters would wants to remit amount for small denominations. There were 991<br />

be encouraged if technology will help them in reducing cost and lakh money order issued in the year 2006-07 (Table 6). The<br />

time spent on it. For example, having a large network of compatible<br />

mobile phone users for instance makes new users more 782.72.<br />

average value of money order in the same year was around Rs.<br />

likely to join.<br />

The post offices are like ‘one stop shop’ for providing a range<br />

The existence of alternatives between physical access and of banking 6 and insurance services like term deposits, mutual<br />

Table 5: Rural Postal Life Insurance<br />

Items 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07<br />

No. of Policies* upto the year 1795070 2666485 3738798 4702776 5246673<br />

Value of Business upto the year (Rs. in Crore) 7464.53 12385.11 18520.93 25229.65 33865.66<br />

Average sum Assured per Policy (in Rs.) 47654.8 54932.09 53958.05 61107 88002<br />

Sources: Department of Post<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

81


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table 6: Inland Money Orders During the Year 2002-2003 to 2006-07<br />

Items 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07<br />

Number issued(in Lakh) 1050.30 1101.47 1015.98 957.90 991.00<br />

Value of M.O. <strong>Issue</strong>d (Rs. in lakh) 865000.40 687502.40 705216.51 718342.93 775670.57<br />

Commission (Rs. in Lakh) 29923.70 31137.50 32031.40 32792.43 34791.64<br />

Average Value of Money Orders (In Rs.) 823.57 624.17 694.12 749.91 782.72<br />

Sources: Department of Post<br />

funds, pension, etc. Various initiatives have been taken by<br />

Department of post to make growth inclusive for economically<br />

exclusive population.<br />

• In collaboration with State Bank of India, an extensive<br />

network of Business Facilitators and Business Correspondents<br />

covering one lakh villages in phase one under the Rural<br />

and Agri Business Group (RABG) has been experimented.<br />

• In partnership with Oriental Company Insurance Limited,<br />

the post offices in the year 2006 launched accidental death<br />

insurance cover for one year of Rs. 1,00,000 at the low annual<br />

premium of Rs. 15 for its account holders.<br />

• The memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed<br />

between Postal Department and Rural Development Department<br />

for payment of the wages to the workers under National<br />

Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).<br />

• The 300 finance marts are planned to provide products like<br />

Insurance, Postal Life Insurance, Rural Postal Life Insurance,<br />

Credit, Saving etc.<br />

• Instant Money Order (iMO) is an online Money transmission<br />

service which was launched in 2006. Presently it is available in<br />

812 centres (till 2008).<br />

• The electronic transmission of money orders (eMO) system<br />

was commissioned in the year 2008.<br />

• ‘Grameen Sanchar Sewak’ project was conceptualised to<br />

provide accessibility to public telephone to the rural population<br />

at their doorsteps by using latest Wireless in Local Loop<br />

(WLL) technology.<br />

Conclusion and Recommendations<br />

All the above initiatives should eventually lead us towards<br />

financial inclusion if collaborative actions are taken together.<br />

Lack of channelizing existing recourses, catastrophic policy<br />

implementation and lower technological penetration and<br />

adoption are the main causes of financial exclusion. So, we<br />

recommend that the facility of opening current account should<br />

be introduced in post offices so that day to day transactions can<br />

be done. Secondly, all the post offices should be computerized,<br />

connected with internet and should have PCO booths. Thirdly,<br />

the telephonic transfer of payments should be encouraged by<br />

developing a technology wherein receipts of transfers of<br />

payments can be obtained. It would be significant achievement<br />

because most of the rural population working in un-organised<br />

sectors are illiterate but can understand number system based<br />

technology. Fourthly, for opening new accounts ‘Know your<br />

customer’ norms should be routed through post offices. Fifth,<br />

the monetary benefits for the poor under various government<br />

schemes should be routed through post office accounts. Finally,<br />

the wage payments in the un-organised sector should also be<br />

routed through formal banking system for encouraging faster<br />

financial inclusion.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

Dataworks ,Invest India Income and Saving Survey, 2007<br />

2<br />

No Frills Savings Account allows maintaining the account<br />

without any minimum or average balance requirement.<br />

Generally, no frills saving account is opened for people who<br />

does not have a bank account & has an annual income of less<br />

than or equal to Rs. 50,000/- or does not have a bank account<br />

& is a beneficiary under a Government Welfare Scheme.<br />

3<br />

Report on currency and finance 2006-08 Vol. II.<br />

4<br />

HDFC bank website ‘Service charges & fees’ applicable to<br />

customers as on July, 2008.<br />

5<br />

India Post ‘Annual Report 2007-08’.<br />

6<br />

Banking services available in Post offices are Saving Account,<br />

Recurring Deposit, Time Deposit, Monthly income Scheme,<br />

Public Provident Fund, Senior Citizens Saving Scheme, Kisan<br />

Vikas Patras and National saving certificates.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not reflect<br />

the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

82 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NNOVATIVE INCLUSION<br />

AD<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

83


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

MVNO – A new Business<br />

Paradigm in the Telecom<br />

Industry in India<br />

84 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I NDIA CALLING<br />

Hardik Kumar Doshi<br />

Researcher, Telecommunication Industry<br />

Gaurav Joshi<br />

Researcher, Telecommunication Industry<br />

Mahim Sagar<br />

Faculty, Department of Management<br />

Studies, IIT Delhi<br />

Radio Spectrum is a valuable resource for a country<br />

and its telecom industry. With the recent hue and<br />

cry about the valuation of new telecom companies<br />

which possess spectrum and the controversy between DoT<br />

and Finance Ministry regarding reserve price for 3G auction<br />

certainly leads us to think what drives<br />

telecom industry. Is it obtaining the scarce<br />

and precious spectrum or the rollout of<br />

services or capturing the market share<br />

through marketing? At present, all the<br />

three are done by a single service provider<br />

which limits market segmentation and<br />

hence personalization of services.<br />

Securing spectrum and developing<br />

infrastructure is a onetime affair. What<br />

Figure - 1 : MVNO Models<br />

Across the world,<br />

it is believed that<br />

Value Added<br />

Services will<br />

be the growth<br />

driver for telecom<br />

companies<br />

differentiates one operator from the other in the long run is<br />

the reach of the network and effective marketing of services<br />

for increased penetration. A new business model in the form<br />

of Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) has evolved in<br />

the western countries which provide services to consumers by<br />

purchasing wholesale airtime from Mobile network operators<br />

(MNOs). In India, recently the Department of Telecommunication<br />

(DoT) had sought recommendations from the Telecom<br />

Regulatory authority of India (TRAI) on the need, timing of<br />

introduction as well as terms and conditions of the license to<br />

be granted to MVNOs in India.<br />

Full MVNOs, which have their own core network including<br />

Mobile Switching Center (MSC); Intermediate MVNOs,<br />

which acquire a switched service, but either provide their own<br />

home location register (HLR) or share a jointly owned HLR<br />

with an MNO; and Thin MVNOs, which may provide access<br />

services with additional applications and content and they are<br />

not much different from pure resellers. These thin MVNOs<br />

are also called Enhanced Service Providers.<br />

Is it prudent for Operators who shell out<br />

crores of rupees to obtain spectrum to<br />

share the spectrum? We believe the<br />

proposal is feasible for two fundamental<br />

reasons. First, there is an inherent value<br />

proposition in the MNO-MVNO relationship.<br />

MVNO services are transparent to<br />

the customers and hence if MVNO<br />

through effective marketing or by differentiation<br />

and customization of the services<br />

Radio<br />

Access<br />

Mobile<br />

switching<br />

centre<br />

Network<br />

Services<br />

Application<br />

Services<br />

Marketing<br />

Billing<br />

Customer<br />

&<br />

Care Distribution Sales<br />

Branding<br />

MNO<br />

Full MVNO<br />

MNO<br />

Intermediate/Hybrid MVNO<br />

MNO<br />

Thin MVNO/<br />

Enhanced Service Provider<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

85


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Figure 2. Projected MVNO Revenues in US$, 2002-2010<br />

Projected MNVO Revenues in US $(in billions)<br />

$35.00<br />

$30.00<br />

$25.00<br />

$20.00<br />

$15.00<br />

$10.00<br />

9.60<br />

14.50<br />

$5.00<br />

4.60<br />

$0.00<br />

0.20 1.00 2.20<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007<br />

Year<br />

Source: ARC Group<br />

18.90<br />

23.90<br />

29.60<br />

2008 <strong>2009</strong> 2010<br />

Table 1. US MVNO Subscribers as Percentage of<br />

Mobile Subscribers, 1999-2010<br />

MVNO Total Mobile Subscribers Percentage<br />

Year Subscriber<br />

1999 344,188 86,047,003 0.40<br />

2000 437,912 109,478,031 0.40<br />

2001 513,498 128,374,512 0.40<br />

2002 2,106,824 140,454,918 1.50<br />

2003 4,285,493 158,721,981 2.70<br />

2004 8,014,176 182,140,362 4.40<br />

2005 12,190,200 184,700,000 6.60<br />

2006 19,286,750 187,250,000 10.30<br />

2007 20,878,000 189,800,000 11.00<br />

2008 21,541,500 192,350,000 11.00<br />

<strong>2009</strong> 23,541,000 196,175,000 12.00<br />

2010 25,000,000 200,000,000 12.50<br />

Source: NERA research<br />

helps in increasing the breadth and depth of the market then it<br />

is beneficial for both parties. In the USA, MVNOs were<br />

primarily responsible for increasing the market penetration by<br />

introducing the pre-paid model. The second reason lies in the<br />

rate of Return on Investments (RoI). Telecom industry is<br />

highly uncertain and the operators are not sure about the<br />

future direction of the market. Also, there is increasing<br />

pressure from the government on the defense to vacate the<br />

spectrum. In such a scenario spectrum might not command a<br />

similar premium it does presently. MVNOs provide a useful<br />

alternative of acquiring wholesale airtime from the operators<br />

at a fixed price. This ensures quicker RoI without worrying<br />

about adding new subscribers and market share.<br />

Table-1 depicts the projected revenue of MVNO players in<br />

United States.<br />

Across the world, it is believed that Value Added Services<br />

(VAS) will be the growth driver for telecom companies. Focus<br />

is shifting from voice based services to content based services.<br />

MVNOs with specialized services can take the lead here.<br />

MVNOs who can provide customized services such as<br />

providing market rates of agricultural products to a village<br />

farmer, live video streaming of cricket matches to a sports fan,<br />

international calls at discount rates for an exporter may<br />

appeal more than the normal service providers with a one-forall<br />

stereotype service package. Also, marketing efforts can be<br />

channeled towards the targeted customers augmenting the<br />

subscriber base and boosting the ARPUs.<br />

Infrastructure sharing is a common phenomenon across<br />

capital intensive industries from petrochemicals to broadcasting.<br />

Now, in broadcasting industry players are interested in<br />

content development instead of developing transmission<br />

networks. They share infrastructure with transmission service<br />

providers. In a similar fashion, telecom industry is also<br />

moving from a voice dominated industry to a content based<br />

industry. As the industry matures, this has been the paradigm<br />

shift across sectors. MVNOs have the potential to offer<br />

personalized services to consumers and also add value to the<br />

entire industry by broadening the subscriber base especially<br />

after the rollout of 3G services.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Dong, Hee, Shin, & Micheal, B. (2005)A study of MVNO<br />

diffusion and market structure in the EU, US, Hong Kong,<br />

and Singapore<br />

• TRAI, (2008). TRAI Recommendation on MVNO<br />

• Yike, L., & Kathik, B., & Yezdan, B. (2007) Helio’ Stategy<br />

for Differentiating the MVNO Market<br />

• Timothy, S., & LOC, H., & Do, Van, T. (2001) why should<br />

you invest in MVNO?<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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AD<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Renewable Energy and Its<br />

Policy Prospects In India<br />

Introduction<br />

Energy plays a very important role in everyday life. In a<br />

developing country like India, the growth of the economy is<br />

largely dependent on adequate availability and supply of<br />

energy. In conventional economic understanding, the prosperity<br />

of a country is measured by looking into per capita consumption<br />

of energy. Per capita primary energy consumption<br />

is still comparatively low in the country (520 kg of oil equivalent—less<br />

than a third of the world average), with large<br />

disparities in the energy consumption pattern (Times of India,<br />

December 2006).<br />

To sustain India’s staggering economic growth and support<br />

the country’s population which is expected to increase to 1.13<br />

billion by 2030, India’s primary energy demand has to multiply<br />

three to four folds (IEA 2007) and in the past thirty years, the<br />

demand for energy has grown at an average of 3.6 per annum.<br />

Table 1, illustrates this demand.<br />

In spite of an ambitious rural electrification program and a<br />

rural electrification policy passed in August, 2006 more than<br />

Table 1: India's Energy Sources<br />

Fuel MW Percentage<br />

Coal 77,648.88 53.3<br />

Gas 14,876.71 10.5<br />

Oil 1,199.74 0.9<br />

Hydro 36,877.76 24.7<br />

Nuclear 4,120.00 2.9<br />

Renewable Energy<br />

13242.41 7.7<br />

Sources<br />

Total 1,47,965.51<br />

Sources: Ministry of power, Govt of India<br />

Manu Sankar Subhagalal<br />

Policy Officer,<br />

World Future Council, New Delhi<br />

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400 million Indians have no access to electricity (Business<br />

India, July 2008). This in no way does show India, which has<br />

ambitions of becoming a Global super power, in a good light.<br />

The Energy Overview<br />

The distribution of primary commercial energy resources in<br />

India is skewed. 70 percent of the total hydro potential is<br />

located in the Northern and North-eastern regions, whereas<br />

the Eastern region accounts for nearly 70 percent of total coal<br />

reserves in the country. The Southern region, which has only<br />

six percent of the total coal reserves and 10 percent of the total<br />

hydro potential, has most of the lignite deposits occurring in<br />

the country. (Planning Commission)<br />

On the consumption front, the industrial sector in India is a<br />

major energy user accounting for about 52 percent of<br />

commercial energy consumption. Per capita energy<br />

consumption in India is one of the lowest in the world<br />

(Raghuraman 2003). But, energy intensity, which is<br />

energy consumption per unit of GDP, is one of the<br />

highest in comparison to other developed and developing<br />

countries. For example, it is 3.7 times that of Japan,<br />

1.55 times that of the United States, 1.47 times that of<br />

Asia and 1.5 times that of the world average. As a result,<br />

there is a huge scope for energy conservation in the<br />

country.<br />

Before the Indian economy was liberalized in<br />

1991, the commercial energy sector was totally<br />

regulated by the government. The economic<br />

reform and liberalization, in the post 90s, has gradually<br />

welcomed private sector participation in the coal, oil, gas<br />

and electricity sectors in India. Energy prices in India<br />

have been under an administrated regime with subsidies<br />

provided to meet certain socio-economic needs of the<br />

public. This has led to distortion and inefficiency in the<br />

use of different sources of energy. The government has<br />

taken serious steps to deregulate the energy price from<br />

an Administered Price Mechanism (APM) regime. The<br />

prices of all grades of coal and petroleum products have<br />

already been deregulated. In the electricity sector, most<br />

of the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) have started<br />

taking reform measures and regulatory commissions<br />

have been set up to determine tariffs based on economic<br />

rational. All these measures were adopted to prepare<br />

India for greater economic growth leading to future<br />

emissions as well.<br />

Renewable Energy Scenario in India<br />

Even though India is a developing country with global<br />

super power ambitions, the fruits of its economic<br />

development are yet to reach to all strata of the society.<br />

In such a scenario India needs to have a space to<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

grow both economically and environmentally and to balance<br />

between economic development and sustainability. The<br />

Government recognizes the fact that global warming will<br />

affect India adversely and the process of adaptation to climate<br />

change must have priority and “the most important adaptation<br />

measure is development itself” (National Five Year Plan, June,<br />

2008). What the government needs to do is to harness cleaner<br />

and renewable energy by exploiting the existing resources of<br />

biomass, wind, solar and tidal. By speeding up the deployment<br />

of renewable energy what the country automatically does is<br />

development of renewable energy not only as an adaptation<br />

measure, but also as mitigation. Therefore greater policy<br />

emphasis and political will need to be demonstrated for the<br />

accelerated switch to renewable energy.<br />

Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is the<br />

nodal Ministry of the Government of India at the National<br />

level for matters relating to new and renewable energy. The<br />

Ministry has been facilitating implementation of broad<br />

spectrum of programmes including harnessing renewable<br />

power, renewable energy to rural areas for lighting and<br />

cooking, use of renewable energy in urban, industrial and<br />

commercial applications and development of alternate fuels<br />

and applications. In addition, it supports research, design and<br />

development of new and renewable energy technologies,<br />

products and services.<br />

In India, the importance of the role of renewable energy in<br />

the transition to a sustainable energy base was recognized as<br />

early as the 1970s. At the Government level, political commitment<br />

to renewable energy manifested itself in the establishment<br />

of the Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources<br />

in 1982, which was subsequently upgraded in 1992 to a fullfledged<br />

Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, now<br />

re-christened as Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, since<br />

October, 2006.<br />

India’s Renewable Energy Potential: Solar & Wind<br />

Solar<br />

India lies in the sunny regions of the world. Most parts of India<br />

receive 4–7 kWh (kilowatt-hour) of solar radiation per square<br />

metre per day with 250–300 sunny days in a year (Majumdar,<br />

August, 2008). The highest annual radiation energy is received<br />

in western Rajasthan while the north-eastern region of the<br />

country receives the lowest annual radiation. Solar energy,<br />

experienced by us as heat and light, can be used through two<br />

Table 2: Renewable Energy Sources In India<br />

Technology<br />

Cumulative Achievements (MW)<br />

GRID INTERACTIVE<br />

Wind 8,757<br />

Small Hydro 2,181<br />

Bagasse CHP 810<br />

Biomass 606<br />

Waste to Energy 56<br />

Solar PV 2<br />

Solar Thermal 0<br />

Geo Thermal 0<br />

Tidal Wave 0<br />

OFF GRID<br />

Biomass 95<br />

Biomass Gasifier 86<br />

Waste to Energy 24<br />

Solar PV 2<br />

Total 12,610<br />

Small Scale Systems Cumulative Achievements<br />

Family Bio-gas Plants 4 million<br />

Solar Street Lights 69,549<br />

Solar Home System 3,63,399<br />

Solar Lantern 5,85,011<br />

Solar Pumps 7,148 no<br />

Solar Water Heating 2.15 million sq km<br />

Solar Cookers 6,20,000<br />

Wind Pumps 1,294 no<br />

Source: Ministry of New & Renewable Energy (MNRE), March 2008<br />

routes: the thermal route uses the heat for water heating,<br />

cooking, drying, water purification, power generation, and<br />

other applications; the photovoltaic route converts the light in<br />

solar energy into electricity, which can then be used for a<br />

number of purposes such as lighting, pumping, communications,<br />

and power supply in non electrified areas. Energy from<br />

the sun has many features, which make it an attractive and<br />

sustainable option: global distribution, pollution free nature,<br />

and the virtually inexhaustible supply.<br />

India due to its geo-physical location receives solar energy<br />

equivalent to nearly 5,000 trillion kWh/year (Roul, <strong>May</strong>,<br />

2007), which is far more than the total energy consumption of<br />

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the country today. But India produces a very negligible amount<br />

of solar energy - a mere 0.2 percent compared to other energy<br />

resources. Power generation from solar thermal energy is still<br />

in experimental stages in India. Up till now, India's energy<br />

base has been more on conventional energy like coal and oil.<br />

However, India has now attained 7 th place worldwide in Solar<br />

Photovoltaic (PV) Cell production and 9 th place in Solar<br />

Thermal Systems. Grid-interactive renewable power installed<br />

capacity as on 31 st October, 2006 aggregated 9,013 MW<br />

corresponding to around seven percent of the total power<br />

installed capacity which equates to over two percent of total<br />

electricity.(MNRE)<br />

The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) has<br />

initiated innovative schemes to accelerate utilization and<br />

exploitation of the solar energy. Number of incentives like<br />

subsidy, soft loan, 80 percent accelerated depreciation,<br />

confessional duty on import of raw materials and certain<br />

products, excise duty exemption on certain devices/systems etc.<br />

are being provided for production and use of solar energy<br />

systems. However the Indian government support is insignificant<br />

compared to support solar energy receives by governments<br />

in Europe and East Asia.<br />

Wind<br />

The Indian wind energy sector has an<br />

installed capacity of 8757.2 MW (as on<br />

March 31 st , 2008) and a potential capacity<br />

of 45,000 MW (MNRE). In terms of wind<br />

power installed capacity, India is ranked 4 th<br />

in the World. Today India is a major player<br />

in the global wind energy market. India is<br />

one of the fastest growing producers of<br />

Wind energy, behind only to Germany, Spain, United States<br />

and Denmark. India currently produces approximately 3,000<br />

MW of wind energy annually (only marginally behind Denmark,<br />

which is at a total installed capacity of 3,117 MW,<br />

according to a recent World Wind Energy Association report),<br />

and had a growth rate last year of over 40 per cent.<br />

Per capita energy<br />

consumption in<br />

India is one of<br />

the lowest in the<br />

world and the<br />

energy intensity is<br />

one of the highest<br />

of renewable energy technologies for supplying power to the<br />

utility grid as well as in stand-alone systems. The Act provides<br />

for the Independent Power Producers (IPP) to set up renewable<br />

power plants for captive use, third party sale, power<br />

trading and distribution. The most important feature and the<br />

highlight of the Act is that it empowers the State Electricity<br />

Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to promote renewable<br />

energy and specify, for purchase of electricity from renewable<br />

energy sources, a percentage of the total consumption of<br />

electricity in the area of a distribution licensee. This is considered<br />

a major boost for promotion of the renewable energy<br />

sector in India. They have also announced Renewable Portfolio<br />

Standards varying from one percent to 10 percent for<br />

reasonable periods. Ministry has initiated a process for linking<br />

incentives on renewable electricity with generation by introducing<br />

a scheme for providing generation linked incentive for<br />

grid interactive solar electricity.<br />

The Electricity Act contains the following provisions<br />

pertaining to non conventional energy sources.<br />

Sections 3(1) and 3(2)<br />

Under Sections 3(1) and 3(2), it has been<br />

stated that the Central Government shall,<br />

from time to time, prepare and publish the<br />

National Electricity Policy and Tariff<br />

Policy, in consultation with the state<br />

governments and authority for the development<br />

of the power system based on optimal<br />

utilization of resources such as coal,<br />

natural gas, nuclear substances or material,<br />

hydro and renewable sources of energy.<br />

Section 4<br />

Section 4 states that the Central Government shall, after<br />

consultation with the state governments, prepare and notify a<br />

national policy, permitting stand-alone systems (including<br />

those based on renewable sources of energy and other nonconventional<br />

sources of energy) for rural areas.<br />

Policy Promulgation for Renewable Energy in India<br />

Legislative support- “Electricity Act 2003”<br />

The most important legislative development, which had<br />

induced the recent growth in renewable power, is the “Electricity<br />

Act 2003’’ notified in June, 2003. It recognizes the role<br />

Section 61<br />

Section 61, 61(h) and 61(i) state that the appropriate commission<br />

shall, subject to the provision of this Act, specify the terms<br />

and conditions for the determination of tariff, and in doing so,<br />

shall be guided by the following, namely, the promotion of<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

cogeneration and generation of electricity from renewable<br />

sources of energy; and the National Electricity Policy and<br />

Tariff Policy<br />

Section 86(1)<br />

Section 86(1) and 86(1)(e) state that the state commissions<br />

shall discharge the following functions, namely, promote<br />

cogeneration and generation of electricity from renewable<br />

sources of energy by providing, suitable measures for connectivity<br />

with the grid and sale of electricity to any person, and<br />

also specify, for purchase of electricity from such sources, a<br />

percentage of the total consumption of electricity in the area of<br />

a distribution license.<br />

Renewable Purchase Obligations<br />

Under the above mentioned sections of the Electricity Act of<br />

2003, fourteen State Electricity Regulatory Commissions have<br />

issued orders/regulations for the purchase of minimum<br />

quantity of energy under Renewable Purchase<br />

Obligation(RPO) or Renewable portfolio Standard(RPS).<br />

According to these specifications, the distribution licensees<br />

are required to purchase specified quantum<br />

of renewable electricity out of their<br />

total electricity portfolio. These minimum<br />

purchase obligations are gradually increasing<br />

year by year varying from 0.5% to 10%<br />

over a period of 10-20 years depending<br />

upon each state. However, only 14 states in<br />

India has declared these purchase obligations<br />

even though the Electricity Act 2003<br />

mandates for all the states in India to have<br />

such purchase obligations.<br />

The Need for a National Renewable Energy Act<br />

India is all set to formulate a Renewable Energy Act with the<br />

target to meet 20 per cent of country’s energy requirements<br />

from this sector by 2020. The centre, in a bid to give a major<br />

push to the renewable sector, has appointed a high-level<br />

committee to prepare the national renewable energy law<br />

(Financial Express, November 2008). Hopefully, the law will<br />

deal with issues relating to providing renewable energy<br />

certificates, strict implementation of renewable purchase<br />

agreement and above all imposition of penalty for breach of<br />

such agreement. Already certain state electricity regulatory<br />

India is all set to<br />

have a Renewable<br />

Energy Act with<br />

the target to meet<br />

20% of energy<br />

requirements by<br />

the year 2020<br />

commissions have passed orders with regard to renewable<br />

purchases, it needs to be spread across the country. Similarly,<br />

the law should enable imposition of penalty for violation of<br />

such purchases as at present some state regulatory commissions<br />

have passed orders in this regard.<br />

The Renewable Energy Act is needed to facilitate the much<br />

needed transition to a sustainable energy system. The barriers<br />

to the development of renewable energy run across a wide<br />

spectrum. A comprehensive legislation aimed at removing<br />

these barriers and accelerating the development of renewable<br />

energy technologies is necessary. Even though the government<br />

has been favourable towards renewables, the efforts so far are<br />

not backed by legislation. Legislation is a proven instrument of<br />

change in this field, as seen in many countries across the world.<br />

What is needed is political will to make it happen.<br />

Besides energy independence, the devastating impact of<br />

climate change has become an issue of critical importance.<br />

Energy production using fossil fuels is the major contributor to<br />

greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, transition to a low-carbon<br />

energy economy is the real solution for mitigating the impact<br />

of climate change.<br />

Feed in Tariffs (FIT)<br />

as a Policy Instrument in India<br />

Feed in Tariff provide a minimum guaranteed<br />

price per unit of electricity produced<br />

to be paid to the producer or as a premium<br />

in addition to the market electricity prices.<br />

In other words they put a legal obligation<br />

on utility companies to buy electricity from<br />

renewable energy producers at a premium<br />

rate, usually over a guaranteed period,<br />

making the installation of renewable energy systems a worth<br />

while and secure investment in the future. Regulatory measures<br />

are usually applied to impose an obligation to electricity<br />

utilities to pay the renewable energy power producer a price as<br />

specified by the government electricity regulatory body. The<br />

level of the tariff is set for some years to give the investors<br />

some security on income.<br />

Feed in Tariffs have been empirically proven to generate the<br />

fastest, lowest-cost deployment of renewable energy, and with<br />

this as a priority for climate protection and security of energy<br />

supply, not to mention job creation and competitiveness. Feed<br />

in Tariffs are the best vehicle for delivering these benefits.<br />

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Some countries have opted for other instruments, such as<br />

government grants schemes for micro generation (wind and<br />

solar) by tax payers. Germany is a good example of how Feed<br />

in Tariff can be used for the promotion of renewable energy in<br />

a country. They introduced Feed in Tariff law in 1990 and Germany<br />

has achieved substantial growth in the jobs created and<br />

investments achieved. 97 million tonnes of carbon dioxide<br />

emissions has been avoided in 2006 through the renewables<br />

(German Federal Environment Ministry, 2006). The demand<br />

for renewable energy systems has increased dramatically and<br />

the installation costs are coming down fast. The Feed in tariff<br />

financial model has now been taken up by many countries<br />

around the world.<br />

India, with big investments lined up for renewable energy<br />

need to adopt this mechanism for the accelerated deployment<br />

of renewable energy for its consumption. The Renewable<br />

purchase Obligations (RPO) that are part of the Electricity<br />

Act 2003 empowers the state regulatory commissions to give<br />

preferential treatment to renewable sources of energy. The<br />

RPOs can be considered much closer to Feed in Tariffs. The<br />

Central and the state Governments need to make optimum<br />

utilization of this innovative legislation of<br />

Feed in Tariff which has been highly<br />

successful in many parts of Europe.<br />

Renewables for Rural Development<br />

Even though India is one of the fastest<br />

developing economies of the world, 400<br />

million of the populations do not have<br />

access to electricity. While advocating for<br />

policy formulations that will help in<br />

massive deployment of grid connected<br />

Renewable energy, we should also be equally concerned about<br />

millions of people in rural India who does not have access to<br />

electricity at all. It is widely acknowledged that key to lifting<br />

millions out of poverty in India is the development of rural<br />

economies and energy is the prime mover in economic<br />

development. Per capita energy consumption is directly<br />

correlated to the overall quality of life of the person. Lack of<br />

energy is among the key retarding forces preventing economic<br />

development and slowing down poverty alleviation and growth<br />

of the rural sector.<br />

Until now, most of the rural energy needs have been met by<br />

biomass burning, of which the preferred fuel is firewood, while<br />

Germany is a very<br />

good example of<br />

how Feed in Tariff<br />

can be used for<br />

the promotion of<br />

renewable energy<br />

in an economy<br />

animal dung and crop residues are also widely used. Commercial<br />

fuels, such as kerosene and Liquid Petroleum Gas, have<br />

not penetrated rural areas due in most part to low purchasing<br />

power of the majority of the rural population and poor rural<br />

infrastructure. Continued dependence on biomass fuels has<br />

resulted in serious environmental problems of resource<br />

degradation and pollution with local as well as global manifestations.<br />

Also, quality of life remains poor, particularly of<br />

women who are prime collectors, processors and users of<br />

biomass.<br />

The main issue that is to be looked into is how to bring about<br />

rural development and bridge the gap between the power<br />

requirements for rural development and the energy policies of<br />

the government. The deployment of renewable energy has<br />

answers to this. The policy makers have to recognize that<br />

development is not equal to economic growth and increasing<br />

energy consumption. They need to increase energy services<br />

with a primary focus on livelihoods and other basic services for<br />

the poor. It also need to be recognized that the cost of energy<br />

produced is paid not just in terms of money but also in terms of<br />

social impacts and environmental degradation. Renewable<br />

energy is environmentally safer and has<br />

the potential to influence the social and<br />

economic life of the villagers in a positive<br />

way.<br />

Conclusion<br />

The official position of the Government of<br />

India has been that its per capita GHG<br />

emissions are much lower than those in<br />

rich developed countries whose GHG<br />

emissions have grown practically unhindered<br />

since the start of the 20 th century. However, because of<br />

the increasing international pressure the Government of India<br />

has come out with a National Action Plan for Climate Change<br />

(NAPCC). The NAPCC does not consider any voluntary<br />

binding emissions reduction target. Given this background, the<br />

only way for Government of India to reduce its GHG emissions,<br />

increase the energy supply and its access to the people<br />

would be by stepping up the use of Renewable energy. Large<br />

scale deployment of renewable energy in India is possible only<br />

with proactive government intervention in the form of legislation,<br />

policies and initiatives. Currently, while there are<br />

National Laws for electricity and energy conservation, there is<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

no national law for renewable energy. The Electricity Act 2003<br />

has specific provisions to promote grid connected renewable<br />

energy sources through the provisions of section 61 and section<br />

86(1). But harnessing renewable energy has been constrained<br />

due to large variation in policies and regulations across all<br />

states and the lack of energy source wise legal mandate. India’s<br />

federal set up and fragmentation of laws impinging on different<br />

renewable sources, the case for a comprehensive integrated<br />

renewable energy act with specific focus to Feed in Tariffs is<br />

very persuasive and is the need of the hour.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Amory Lovins, “Energy surprises for the 21 st century”.<br />

www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E99-16_EnergySurprises<br />

• Bisht & Patra, “Solar Energy, Alternative to combat energy<br />

insecurity in India” Society for the Study of Peace Conflict,<br />

Article No:96, December 12 th , 2006<br />

• CR Bhattacharjee, “Feed in Tariffs and Solar energy”<br />

03-06-08, The Financial Express<br />

• D. Murali, “Subsidies have not helped solar power in India”<br />

Businessline., 26-05-2007<br />

• Majumdar Shoumya (2008) A report on the current scenario<br />

of development in Renewable energy in India,<br />

REEEP publications<br />

• Mendonca Miguel (2007) , Feed in Tariffs, Accelerating the<br />

deployment of Renewable Energy, Earthscan UK<br />

• Raghuraman & Ghosh,(2003) Indo-US cooperation on<br />

Energy-India Perspective, Confederation of Indian Industries<br />

• “Centre plans to frame National Renewable Energy<br />

Law”,25-11-08, Financial Express.<br />

• International Energy Agency(IEA), World Energy Outlook,<br />

2007<br />

• Planning Commission 2006, Report of the Expert Committee<br />

on Integrated Energy Policy, New Delhi, Government of<br />

India<br />

• “Policy regulation for grid connected Solar power projects”,<br />

Green Energy, Vol 3 No 4, July-Aug 2007<br />

• Rural Electrification Policy, Ministry of Power, Government<br />

of India, 23-08-06, New Delhi<br />

• Brook & Gaurav Bhagat, “Solar energy heats up in<br />

India”,Nov 17 th , 2003, ecoworld.com/features/2003/11/17/<br />

solar-energy-heats-up-in-india<br />

• “Development of Solar Power in India”, An NTPC<br />

perspective www.ese.iitb.ac.in/activities/solarpower/ntpc.<br />

pdf<br />

• Electricity Act 2003, Ministry of Power, Government of<br />

India, http://www.powermin.nic.in/acts_notification/<br />

electricity_act2003/preliminary.htm<br />

• Electricity Act 2003, Ministry of Power, Government of<br />

India, powermin.nic.in/acts_notification/electricity_<br />

act2003/pdf/TheElectricityAct_2003.pdf<br />

• “Energy Sector”, www.economywatch.com/business-andeconomy/india-energy.html<br />

• Guidelines of wind Power projects, Government of India,<br />

India,www.windpowerindia.com/govtmnes.html<br />

• India Energy Portal, http://www.indiaenergyportal.org/<br />

overview.php<br />

• “India’s solar power: Greening India’s Future energy<br />

demand”: http://ecoworld.com/features/2007/05/15/indiassolar-power/<br />

• Ministry of New and Renewable energy resources(MNRE),<br />

http://mnes.nic.in/<br />

• MNRE announces incentive for wind energy projects,<br />

Business standard, 28-06-06, www.business-standard.com/<br />

india/storypage.php?tp=on&autono=41043<br />

• National Action Plan for Climate Change(NAPCC), Prime<br />

Minister Office, Government of India, http://pmindia.nic.<br />

in/Pg01-52.pdf<br />

• Renewable energy, http://www.greenbusinesscentre.com/<br />

renenegy.asp<br />

• Renewable energy Policy directives, http://www.newenergyindia.org/Policy%20Page.htm<br />

• Solar Indiaonline.com www.solarindiaonline.com/solarindia.htm`<br />

• “We need major rebranding of renewable in India”- interview<br />

with Malini Mehra, www.financialexpress.com/news/<br />

We-need-major-rebranding-of-the-renewable-industry/341166/<br />

• Wind Energy India, Clean Energy ideas, http://www.<br />

clean-energy ideas.com/articles/wind_energy_india.html<br />

• Wind power programmes, Revised guidelines for wind<br />

power projects, /www.cwet.tn.nic.in/Docu/WIND POWER<br />

PROGRAMME.pdf<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

94 THE IIPM THINK TANK


R ISE OF RENEWABLES<br />

AD<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

William Antholis*<br />

Managing Director, Brookings<br />

Institution, Washington D.C<br />

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W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

FIVE “GS”:<br />

LESSONS FROM WORLD TRADE<br />

FOR GOVERNING GLOBAL CLIMATE<br />

I - Introduction<br />

Reversing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the world’s<br />

$60 trillion economy will be among the most complex international<br />

governance challenges ever – rivaling the forty year<br />

effort to dramatically reduce tariffs and establish a rulesbased<br />

trading system. Given that nearly 15 years have passed<br />

since the completion of the last global trade pact, it is easy to<br />

forget that the World Trade Organization stands tall among<br />

the great successes of global governance, precisely because it<br />

was so difficult to accomplish. A counterpart twin tower – a<br />

global system to address climate change – can mimic the trade<br />

regime’s most successful governance principles, and learn<br />

from its structural weaknesses. Perhaps<br />

more important, as this volume’s theme<br />

suggests, the two regimes need to work<br />

diligently to avoid colliding with one<br />

another. Indeed, it would be both unfortunate<br />

and ironic if a global climate regime<br />

only could succeed at the expense of the<br />

global trade regime – or vice versa. What<br />

lessons should the climate regime learn<br />

from the trade regime? It may be helpful to<br />

break the issue down into five core<br />

questions for any attempt to govern: Who governs? What is<br />

the structure of the basic governing agreement? Where is it<br />

“binding”? When can we expect the agreement to take effect?<br />

How does it bring new nations in? For each question, preliminary<br />

answers can be found in what we might think of as the<br />

five “G’s” that should govern climate change. By looking to the<br />

lessons from the WTO, I try to make the case for a climate<br />

regime that:<br />

1. starts with a group of major emitters, which together<br />

2. forge a general agreement to tackle the issue, one that<br />

3. gears up nations’ domestic action and that<br />

4. organizes itself around a generational goal that<br />

It would be ironic<br />

if a global climate<br />

regime only could<br />

succeed at the<br />

expense of<br />

the global<br />

trade regime<br />

5. allows for the graduation of developing countries into full<br />

commitments.<br />

In a few of these areas, such an approach can provide a<br />

roadmap to resolving potential conflicts between the two<br />

regimes.<br />

II – Who Governs? The Right Group of Nations,<br />

Matched to the Challenge<br />

International regimes need to be designed to their purposes.<br />

Are they debating forums? Are they negotiated agreements<br />

that govern in particular fields? Trade and climate change<br />

have both benefited considerably from both kinds of organizations.<br />

This chapter assumes that concerned<br />

nations are moving toward a<br />

governing regime for GHG emissions, and<br />

that they need mechanisms equipped to<br />

address that challenge.<br />

Since the formation of the UN system,<br />

two bodies have existed along side one<br />

another on the issue of global trade, one<br />

for discourse, the other for governance.<br />

The UN Conference on Trade and<br />

Development (UNCTAD) has largely<br />

functioned as a forum for assessing the twin goals and<br />

accomplishments of trade and development. Alongside it, the<br />

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its<br />

successor the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been<br />

the governing body for global trade. Though some might find<br />

it odd to point to the WTO as a successful model of international<br />

governance (especially given recent difficulties in<br />

completing the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations), it is<br />

easy to forget how significant its contributions have been to<br />

both international cooperation and to economic growth over<br />

the last sixty years. 1 The GATT/WTO system began as both a<br />

smaller (in terms of membership) and more ambitious (in<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

terms of governance) world body than the UNCTAD when a<br />

group of the right countries decided to work together.<br />

Lesson learned: <strong>size</strong> matters. When it comes to global<br />

governance, it was and is easier to get things done with a<br />

smaller number of the right countries. The GATT process was<br />

managed by the biggest and most technically competent trade<br />

players – the co-called “Quad” of the U.S., Japan, Canada and<br />

Europe. Occasionally, when formal negotiations bogged<br />

down, the Group of Seven (and later Group of Eight) would<br />

weigh in to give the talks a boost, such as in 1978 and 2001<br />

when the leaders themselves helped spur breakthroughs<br />

leading, respectively, to the close of the Tokyo Round and the<br />

launch of the Doha Round.<br />

As the WTO’s membership grew in <strong>size</strong><br />

over its first five decades, negotiations<br />

became more unwieldy. The greatest<br />

number of new entrants came from developing<br />

countries. After an initial sorting out,<br />

the lesson of <strong>size</strong> was relearned: a new<br />

Quad was established, where India and<br />

Brazil joined the U.S. and EU as the<br />

principal negotiators.<br />

Further complicating matters, over the<br />

years, a plethora of regional and bilateral<br />

agreements have advanced trade liberalization<br />

world-wide. The EU has led the<br />

pack in depth of integration and effectiveness,<br />

but the last forty years have seen the<br />

rise of a South American commercial<br />

union (MERCOSUR), the North American<br />

Free Trade Agreement, the Southern<br />

African Customs Union (SACU), and the<br />

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area. Of<br />

course, there is considerable debate about whether this<br />

spaghetti soup of different agreements has been good for the<br />

global trading system. Supporters of the three way street (i.e.<br />

global, regional and bilateral), have found “competitive<br />

liberalization” to be a positive force. Regional agreements<br />

help drive reluctant countries to the global negotiations for<br />

fear of missing gains from trade. Opponents see the growing<br />

complexity and difficulty of multiple trade talks to exceed the<br />

negotiating capacity of diplomats and the political will of<br />

elected officials. Complexity is unavoidable, to be sure. That<br />

the complexity has been at all manageable is due, in part, to<br />

Over the years,<br />

a plethora<br />

of regional<br />

and bilateral<br />

agreements have<br />

advanced trade<br />

liberalization<br />

the bedrock of a rules-based system that was established sixty<br />

years ago, and the committed leadership of a relatively small<br />

number of players.<br />

So what does this mean for the climate change regime? The<br />

half-true cliché about climate change is that it is a global<br />

problem that requires a global solution. Still, moving forward<br />

does not require all countries to be part of the solution – at<br />

least not at first. The UN-sponsored Kyoto Protocol process<br />

was slowed down by trying to conduct a global research<br />

initiative on the nature of the challenge (largely led by the<br />

UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or IPCC)<br />

while also debating who was responsible for addressing the<br />

challenge and negotiating an agreement<br />

among 140 nations under the UN’s Framework<br />

Convention on Climate Change<br />

(UNFCCC). Though data, debate and<br />

dialogue were critical to convincing these<br />

nations of the challenge at hand, the<br />

negotiations over what to do about it<br />

became rancorous and left many questions<br />

unanswered. They gave way to several more<br />

years of disputed talks on how to implement<br />

the agreement, a lengthy and<br />

unsuccessful ratification discussion in the<br />

U.S., and uninspiring results on the<br />

ground – even from enthusiastic backers<br />

like the EU and Japan, which face an<br />

uphill battle to in meeting their 2008–12<br />

GHG emission targets. Meanwhile, the<br />

main developing country bloc is an eclectic<br />

group, including nations ranging from<br />

giant powerhouses such as Brazil, China,<br />

and India to small, poor, landlocked nations in Africa to small<br />

island nations. With the exception of these island countries<br />

– who literally could get washed away if there is no progress<br />

– most have been quite comfortable with the UN’s penchant<br />

for discussion, so long as those discussions don’t lead to<br />

binding obligations for their own economies.<br />

In short, we have a potentially large problem coupled with a<br />

complicated, bureaucratic and torpid negotiating mechanism.<br />

If <strong>size</strong> matters when setting up a governing regime, then the<br />

climate system needs to separate the broad and inclusive<br />

dialogue about the challenge from the more narrow and<br />

detailed challenge of negotiating an agreement. The latter<br />

98 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

task is best taken by a smaller group of nations. 2<br />

The great bulk of GHG emissions likely to spew into the<br />

atmosphere over the next three decades – not to mention the<br />

economic and technical capacity to reverse course – can be<br />

found in fewer than two dozen countries. The creation of<br />

smaller groupings – such as a Major Emitters (E-8) – could<br />

help to address these challenges. 3 The United States, European<br />

Union, China, Russia, Japan and India are the top six<br />

emitters of GHGs, and South Africa and Brazil rank 10 th and<br />

13 th , respectively, but their contributions are significant in<br />

representing their regions – especially Brazil, where protecting<br />

the Amazon is a major priority in storing carbon. This<br />

same logic lies behind the major emitters<br />

meeting that President Bush hosted in<br />

September 2007, which adds to my list of<br />

eight and included Canada (7 th ), South<br />

Korea (8 th ), Mexico (9 th ), Indonesia (12 th ),<br />

and Australia (15 th ). Together, these<br />

thirteen countries produce more than 80 %<br />

of all GHGs.<br />

Keeping the core group of negotiating<br />

nations small – and occasionally involving<br />

heads of state in the conversations – has<br />

one other signal virtue. The same set of<br />

players is at the center of WTO negotiations.<br />

As the two regimes begin to bump<br />

into each other on a range of issues – from<br />

border-surcharges to energy subsidies –<br />

resolution can be reached more easily if<br />

the same players from both regimes are<br />

talking. That is especially true if heads of<br />

state themselves are aware of the need to<br />

coordinate, and the perils of the failure to do so.<br />

III - What is the Form of Governance?<br />

A General Agreement<br />

One of the keys to the GATT/WTO’s success is that it did not<br />

start as a global body, but rather as a less formal arrangement.<br />

If this distinction seems unimportant, keep in mind that the<br />

WTO started not as the successful WTO, or even the successful<br />

GATT, but as the failed International Trade Organization<br />

– which was envisioned at Bretton Woods along with the<br />

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and whose<br />

treaty died on the U.S. Senate floor, because two thirds of that<br />

The fear that<br />

nations will lose<br />

their sovereignty<br />

similarly has<br />

plagued the<br />

climate change<br />

discussions<br />

august body was not prepared to hand over highly political<br />

decisions regarding trade policy to an international organization.<br />

The negotiators went back to the drawing board. Only<br />

after the International Trade Organization’s high profile<br />

failure did they come up with the General Agreement on<br />

Tariffs and Trade (GATT).<br />

The core lesson: do not start with an international treaty<br />

organization responsible for data, debate, and enforcing<br />

compliance. And when it comes to enforcement, build<br />

confidence through general agreements, which are “binding”<br />

in that they synchronize and increase the ambition of domestic<br />

action that states see as being in their best interest. For nearly<br />

fifty years, the GATT was able to negotiate<br />

and adjudicate agreements that bound<br />

nations in a way that less directly called<br />

national sovereignty into question. Each<br />

participating nation pledged to cut tariffs<br />

and other trade barriers in a coordinated<br />

way. Countries could choose what counted<br />

as significant reductions, and they would<br />

often trade fast action in one area for slow<br />

action in another. Once commitments<br />

were made, they had to be enforced. An<br />

adjudicative body was established to<br />

resolve trade disputes.<br />

Technically speaking, the adjudicative<br />

trade body did not enforce the treaty.<br />

Member nations did. Countries monitored<br />

one another’s behavior – including the<br />

most economically powerful trading<br />

nations. When a plaintiff country had a<br />

complaint, it brought it to the GATT/<br />

WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism. If a defendant country<br />

lost a dispute, it had a choice: change its domestic law, or allow<br />

a retaliatory tariff or other action by the plaintiff country. In<br />

this way, all countries felt the system to be self-enforcing. All<br />

of this gave negotiators the ability to say convincingly to their<br />

political masters – including general publics – that the agreement<br />

was not a sacrifice of sovereignty.<br />

The fear that nations will lose their sovereignty similarly has<br />

plagued the climate change discussions. If the U.S. had<br />

ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it would have been a “binding<br />

treaty”. Opponents of Kyoto claimed that the U.S. would have<br />

been liable for some set of sanctions that would be adminis-<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

tered and enforced by the mandates of the UN. America’s<br />

sovereignty over its energy future – and by extension, its<br />

national security – would be subject to external intervention.<br />

As a political matter, few American politicians want to be told<br />

that they must do something, or else face sanction by a global<br />

body.<br />

Whether or not those concerns have any factual merit,<br />

“sovereignty hawk” nations around the world (particularly in<br />

the United States and much of the developing world) have<br />

feared Kyoto-style obligations. Political leaders in the U.S.,<br />

China, India and Brazil also have refused to sacrifice their<br />

ability to control their economic destinies to a global energy<br />

regime – at least, not give up that sovereignty<br />

in a way that diverges from national<br />

interest. Only the European Union – whose<br />

members have grown comfortable sharing<br />

or even pooling their sovereignty – seems to<br />

like the idea of using an international<br />

agreement to compel domestic action.<br />

There is another way, of course. Building<br />

on the successful GATT model, negotiators<br />

could seek a General Agreement to<br />

Reduce Emissions (GARE). Like the<br />

GATT, the GARE would effectively link<br />

domestic action with an international<br />

agreement. 4 It would avoid moving too<br />

quickly to a full blown international<br />

institution, such as a World Environment<br />

Organization. If a “treaty” suggests that<br />

nations are tying their fates to one another,<br />

“general agreements” suggest that nations<br />

acknowledge one another’s interdependence,<br />

but also their autonomy. As they build confidence in<br />

their ability to work together under such agreements, they may<br />

become more willing to strengthen the regime.<br />

A GARE system could be built on the E8 or major emitters<br />

group outlined above. A core set of the most important<br />

countries could start the process, and this ultimately would be<br />

compatible with regional and bilateral agreements. On an<br />

annual basis, leaders of this group could meet at the summit<br />

level to evaluate progress and to help give a boost to the<br />

ongoing negotiations.<br />

What then of the UN? An important role remains for the<br />

UN in continuing to sponsor the broader climate talks as a<br />

Building on<br />

the successful<br />

GATT model,<br />

negotiators could<br />

seek a General<br />

Agreement to<br />

Reduce Emissions<br />

forum for helping nations share information and best practices<br />

with one another. The UN also has been path-breaking in<br />

supporting the critical work of the Intergovernmental Panel<br />

on Climate Change -- the scientific body that has helped<br />

establish that climate change is real, and that human action is<br />

contributing dramatically. Both these functions help support<br />

the negotiation and conflict resolution functions of a binding<br />

agreement. Eventually, once confidence is built in a self-enforcing<br />

agreement, the UN can be brought in to maintain the<br />

relationships.<br />

IV - Where Does it Bind Nations? It Gears up<br />

Domestic Steps Nations are Willing<br />

to Take<br />

Ask a State Department lawyer, and she will<br />

tell you that there is no difference between a<br />

Treaty, a Congressional-Executive Agreement,<br />

and a Presidential bilateral statement<br />

with a foreign head of state. The United<br />

States is honor-bound to live up to its<br />

agreements, whatever form they take. If the<br />

agreement includes consequences for<br />

violation, the U.S. is obligated to accept<br />

those. Yet in practice, nations (including<br />

the U.S.) frequently violate or ignore<br />

agreements – and either suffer the consequences<br />

or do not. Though the UN<br />

Charter provides some instances when<br />

states may be physically compelled to act<br />

in accord with violating international<br />

norms, in practice this rarely is the case for<br />

non-military agreements.<br />

What makes some international agreements binding? What<br />

makes some “bindings” succeed and others fail? There are at<br />

least three ways to discuss the success of binding agreements.<br />

First, some pacts succeed because states feel no need to<br />

violate them. These agreements succeed because they create a<br />

structure that allows states to do what they would prefer to do,<br />

but might not do because they fear non-compliance by others.<br />

By giving states confidence that other states will live up to<br />

their end of the bargain, agreements allow states to do what is<br />

in their best interest. This is what de Tocqueville called<br />

“self-interest rightly understood.”<br />

Second, some agreements succeed because nations realize,<br />

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W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

The United<br />

States and China<br />

are particularly<br />

dependent on<br />

carbon intensive<br />

industries<br />

such as coal<br />

upon violating an agreement, that the net costs of doing so are<br />

not worth it. This is usually the case when nations contemplate<br />

sanctions from an agreement – and the political impact those<br />

sanctions could have domestically and internationally – and<br />

choose to get right by the law. Third and last, agreements work<br />

when nations suffer appropriate consequences for their<br />

violations, and both the violating nation and the nation that<br />

applies the sanction feels the consequences to be appropriate<br />

and adequate.<br />

In theory, all three cases do not require an outside enforcing<br />

body. It is governance without government, or what the<br />

great international relations theorist Hedley Bull called “the<br />

efficacy of international law” which<br />

“depend[s] on measures of self-help.” 5 The<br />

GATT/WTO succeeded because, for its first<br />

fifty years, all three forms of self-help<br />

worked. First, the commitments were<br />

sufficiently robust that countries could plan<br />

to cut trade barriers – that is, gear up their<br />

commitment – knowing that counterpart<br />

nations would do the same. GATT/WTO<br />

negotiations helped nations to cut their<br />

own trade barriers further than they<br />

otherwise would. In return, counterpart<br />

nations also lowered their barriers.<br />

Consumers benefited from cheaper<br />

imports, and exporters benefited from<br />

wider markets. Nations understood the<br />

tough domestic challenges other nations<br />

felt in trying to lower trade barriers.<br />

This worked in practice, particularly<br />

when Congress signaled its willingness to<br />

lower barriers in specific product areas in advance of a<br />

negotiation. Making a priority of domestic action is actually<br />

enshrined in the domestic legal architecture of American<br />

trade diplomacy. From an American perspective, one reason<br />

that the United States is more easily bound by trade negotiations<br />

is that it uses Congressional-Executive Agreements,<br />

which require passing relatively detailed trade promotion<br />

authority in advance of negotiations. As a result, the trading<br />

system aspired toward laissez-faire goals as a general matter<br />

across national boundaries, but also accepted that national<br />

legislation was central to moving forward. Though laissezfaire<br />

remained a long-term goal, no single round or negotiation<br />

ever proposed to complete the process and each successive<br />

round depended on national action. The system<br />

recognized the domestic political and economic constraints<br />

that nations face in moving toward a globally integrated goal. 6<br />

Second, the GATT’s enforcement system sustained national<br />

cuts without appearing to undermine sovereignty. When a<br />

nation was found to be in violation of a trade rule, it had a<br />

choice: change its trade practice, or accept reciprocal trade<br />

sanctions on other goods. Even under trying circumstances,<br />

nations were willing to go back and change domestic law in<br />

order to come into compliance. In these instances, countries<br />

have avoided the imposition of sanctions, and they have been<br />

unwilling to sustain extended tit-for-tat<br />

sanctions. Third, in those few cases where<br />

sanctions have been applied, nations have<br />

generally been willing to accept them<br />

without counter-sanctions. Rather than<br />

starting trade wars, the GATT/WTO<br />

system has prevented them.<br />

A similar logic can guide a GARE:<br />

countries can choose domestically to cut<br />

their GHG emissions in the way that<br />

makes most sense, given their domestic<br />

constraints. Rather than prioritize a<br />

“treaty” as a goal in and of itself, a GARE<br />

would start with domestic legislation and<br />

help nations strengthen – that is, gear up<br />

– their ambition.<br />

Nearly all nations recognize that cleaner<br />

energy production and the protection of<br />

forests are a worthwhile goals in themselves,<br />

and that they should act to prevent<br />

irreversible climate change. Almost all nations have taken<br />

some steps in this regard. And a diversity of approaches is<br />

appropriate. Countries use energy and regulate pollution very<br />

differently, and they also differ widely in their capacity to<br />

track emissions and enforce compliance. The United States<br />

and China, for instance, are particularly dependent on carbon<br />

intensive industries such as coal. Brazil, conversely, has huge<br />

sources of renewable resources such as hydropower and<br />

bio-fuels, but also is struggling to save its rain forest – one of<br />

the great carbon reserves and “sinks” in the world. It is clear<br />

that a one-<strong>size</strong> fits all approach will not work.<br />

The threefold challenge for the international negotiations is,<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

first, how to get countries to take reciprocal domestic actions;<br />

second, how to structure compliance so that it reinforces or<br />

returns states to mutual action; and third, how to establish<br />

sanctions that nations can choose to accept as appropriate.<br />

Thus, first, a GARE should begin in domestic action, and use<br />

the negotiating process to gear up the ambition of states.<br />

States are “bound” to follow thru on actions they are likely to<br />

take on their own. 7 One way to make sure that that is the case<br />

is to legislate first and negotiate later. In the American<br />

context, GARE would take advantage of Congressional-Executive<br />

agreements, and avoid the treaty process. In a GARE,<br />

the domestic political hurdle to passage is whether to pass and<br />

implement domestic law. With the framework<br />

of such a domestic law in place, the<br />

international negotiations can focus on the<br />

level of ambition that all countries take, so<br />

as to help ratchet up ambition. The diplomatic<br />

challenge becomes whether that level<br />

of commitment is acceptable to counterpart<br />

nations. 8<br />

This is in slight, but significant, contrast<br />

to the Kyoto Protocol’s approach of<br />

binding a state to an international organization’s<br />

decision-making. 9 For instance, in<br />

the United States, the treaty process not<br />

only requires the supermajority in one<br />

house of Congress, it also requires passage<br />

of implementing legislation in both houses.<br />

Agreements, by contrast, require majorities<br />

in both houses – first for authorization<br />

to negotiate, second for the final agreement<br />

itself. The authorization to negotiate<br />

– so-called “Fast Track” in trade talks – gives negotiators a<br />

road-map for what can be negotiated, and as a result begins to<br />

involve members of congress in the talks themselves. 10 In a<br />

real sense, for the United States a GARE would start with<br />

domestic action, and seek to ratchet it upward, in sync with<br />

other nations.<br />

Second, a GARE would need to be “binding” by addressing<br />

non-compliance. As with the early GATT system, it should<br />

include avenues for self-enforced sanctions by nations. Exactly<br />

how nations will self-enforce an agreement is still being<br />

debated. Some analysts have called for a common global<br />

carbon tax. Others have called for a “pledge and review”<br />

If one country<br />

violates its<br />

emissions limits,<br />

however, the<br />

permits in that<br />

country become<br />

less valuable<br />

process, in which nations pledge to reduce GHGs, and then<br />

review one another’s progress on a regular basis. There may be<br />

merit to both kinds of agreements. Yet neither one, on its face,<br />

appears to encourage the gearing up of domestic commitments,<br />

while also discouraging nations from breaking those<br />

commitments by imposing sanctions that deny nations the<br />

benefits of the agreement. 11<br />

One approach, in theory, does accomplish these goals:<br />

international trading of GHG emissions. As a domestic<br />

matter, the EU has already adopted emissions trading, and the<br />

United States is considering such legislation, having successfully<br />

pioneered a sulfur dioxide system under George Herbert<br />

Walker Bush in the late 1980s. Though<br />

there have been some initial problems with<br />

the EU’s system, it has now done largely<br />

what it intended to do: put a price on carbon<br />

emissions, and create incentives for the<br />

private sector to find emissions cuts where<br />

most efficient to do so.<br />

International emissions trading would<br />

extend these advantages across national<br />

borders. The United States insisted on<br />

GHG emissions trading at Kyoto, and for<br />

nearly two years afterwards haggled with<br />

the European Union over the rules.<br />

Ironically enough, once the United States<br />

walked away from emissions trading<br />

during the George W. Bush presidency, the<br />

EU began to aggressively pursue international<br />

emissions trading. Trading can<br />

happen in two forms – in either a closed or<br />

an open system. In a closed system, two<br />

different national economies agree that total emissions in<br />

both economies will not exceed a fixed amount. As long as<br />

both nations comply in the aggregate, permits would remain of<br />

equal value and freely tradable between countries. If one<br />

country violates its emissions limits, however, the permits in<br />

that country become less valuable. In an open system, nations<br />

are responsible only for their own reductions, though investors<br />

or companies may seek certifiable reductions in other countries,<br />

and simply be free to invest in such reductions. 12<br />

Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses from a<br />

“compliance as self-help” standpoint. The strength of the<br />

closed system is that it raises the stakes for compliance – and<br />

102 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

the penalties for non-compliance. In such a system, it is highly<br />

advantageous for nations to make broad progress on their<br />

GARE reduction commitments, as it would either force<br />

nations to seek permits from firms that have successfully cut<br />

GHG emissions in other nations, or provide incentives for<br />

nations to have the most number of such firms in their own<br />

territory. If it were possible to set up such a system, the<br />

incentives for success should be high. Yet the cost of failure<br />

should also be high, as less successful countries would be<br />

forced to pay dearly for emissions permits across borders. In<br />

contrast an open system would create incentives for investing<br />

across borders. That said, it would provide few downsides if<br />

nations failed to comply with the international<br />

agreement – other than the greater<br />

risk of failing to stabilize the climate.<br />

The joint challenges for a GARE that<br />

relied on trading for compliance would be to<br />

determine whether a member country<br />

seeking to join had proposed a strong<br />

enough target, and whether preexisting<br />

members had come close enough to their<br />

previous commitments in each successive<br />

round of negotiations. The first task would<br />

need to fall to member states. The second<br />

task could fall to a joint review panel<br />

established by GARE countries. If a<br />

country failed to meet its target by reducing<br />

its emissions or buying permits, it<br />

would forfeit the right to continue in the<br />

GARE in future periods. 13<br />

Third, establishing a successful binding<br />

agreement requires addressing how to deal<br />

with those who refuse to join. A growing chorus is raising the<br />

idea of using actual trade protections – such as demanding<br />

that imported goods from countries that have not adopted<br />

sufficient emission reductions would need to purchase<br />

emissions permits equivalent to their carbon footprints. The<br />

idea first arose in countries such as France, directed at the<br />

United States for not joining the Kyoto Protocol. Now that the<br />

United States is contemplating joining a post-Kyoto system,<br />

Americans are considering applying the same approach to<br />

developing countries that do not take binding targets. These<br />

“border permits” would be a way of placing some sanction on<br />

nations that refuse to join or comply with an emissions<br />

The potential<br />

disruptive<br />

element is that<br />

all economies do<br />

not recognize the<br />

public good in the<br />

same way<br />

agreement – and thereby help share the cost of compliance.<br />

This has the potential both to be a constructive way to think<br />

through the problem, but also to undermine the trade regime,<br />

the climate regime, or both. The constructive element of such<br />

an approach would be to provide real leverage for nations to<br />

actually transfer the costs of non-compliance in an effort to<br />

address a global public good – something for which the trade<br />

regime allows exemptions.<br />

The potential disruptive element is that all nations do not<br />

recognize the public good in the same way, let alone the means<br />

to address it. Developing countries, which likely would be the<br />

targets of such a system, are almost certain to claim that a)<br />

this is a violation of the WTO’s rules against<br />

non-discrimination, and b) that it does not<br />

meet the standard for environmental<br />

exemption for those rules. The “global<br />

public good standard”, developing countries<br />

would likely argue, is not met because the<br />

current international climate treaty already<br />

embodies how the international community<br />

defines the climate challenge. That treaty,<br />

they will claim, explicitly demands that<br />

industrial nations act first, and that<br />

developing countries are exempt from<br />

binding targets. Because the standing<br />

global consensus is that industrial nations<br />

must act first, any effort to use the trade<br />

regime to shift that burden would be seen<br />

as illegitimate.<br />

So if industrial countries persist in<br />

imposing such tariffs in order to build a<br />

more effective climate regime, they might<br />

undermine the WTO – regardless of which way the dispute<br />

settlement system determines the merits of the case. If a<br />

developing country claimed that this was a violation of WTO<br />

rules but lost the dispute, the victory for industrial countries<br />

would come as an additional blow to developing nations, on<br />

the heels of the WTO’s long-stalled Doha development round,<br />

which has failed to produce market openings to industrial<br />

markets. Conversely, a victory for developing countries might<br />

further undermine public support for the WTO within<br />

industrial nations – which continues to wane. Likewise, the<br />

effect on the climate regime could be enervating. Emerging<br />

market players such as Brazil, China and India will feel that<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

they are being forced into a climate agreement by being<br />

denied access to an international trading regime that they<br />

have worked hard to enter as full participants. And industrial<br />

countries might be less inclined to join the climate regime if<br />

border adjustments are found to be illegal vis-à-vis the WTO,<br />

because they will feel their competitiveness further eroded.<br />

Avoiding this clash of global governance regimes should be<br />

a priority for not only leading nations but also for the heads of<br />

both global regimes. It is perhaps the best argument for the<br />

world’s leading economies to not treat these issues in isolation<br />

from one another, or from broader global economic developments.<br />

Indeed, one of the ironies of the spread of democracy<br />

has been that those governments have to<br />

work so hard to accomplish domestic<br />

regulation and, as a result, are often the<br />

least inclined to take direction from<br />

international organizations. The relatively<br />

fragile support for international regimes<br />

should not be easily challenged – particularly<br />

in the name of establishing other<br />

regimes.<br />

V - When Can We Expect the New<br />

Climate Regime to Take Effect?<br />

Over A Generation<br />

The idea of extending the enforcement of<br />

commitments over time gets at a central<br />

element of any governance challenge. One<br />

of the great successes of the trade regime<br />

was that it built itself gradually. Only after<br />

forty-five years of operating did it lead to a<br />

treaty organization.<br />

The long-term nature of the climate challenge means that<br />

solutions must also be long-term. Today’s warmer climate is<br />

the result of GHG emissions accumulated over the last half<br />

century. Today’s emissions add to those historic concentrations,<br />

and are already locking in warmer temperatures well<br />

past the middle of this century. Little can be done now to stop<br />

that warming from happening. So the effort to slow emissions<br />

over the next several decades will most affect temperature in<br />

the second half of this century.<br />

What is the appropriate long-term goal? The starting point<br />

for all climate negotiations, the 1992 Rio Treaty (ratified by<br />

the U.S. Senate, and adopted world-wide), included an<br />

The relatively<br />

fragile support<br />

for international<br />

regimes<br />

should not be<br />

easily challenged<br />

at all<br />

abstract long-term goal: “stabilization of greenhouse gas<br />

concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent<br />

dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate<br />

system”. The Kyoto Protocol was a practical attempt to<br />

implement Rio, yet it only set one target – a short term<br />

reduction of GHG emissions by industrial nations. This was<br />

seen as a first step toward the longer-term goal. But because it<br />

lacked any second or third step, it was widely criticized for not<br />

getting at the longer-term challenges.<br />

As with the trade regime, the climate regime should keep<br />

this long-term focus that was part of Rio’s plan and be geared<br />

around a portfolio of long-term targets – including concentration<br />

levels and global temperature change.<br />

As with any law or diplomatic agreement,<br />

those targets could be adjusted later as<br />

scientific and economic evidence is collected.<br />

But the key is to get some agreement<br />

on the long-term goals so that short term<br />

steps can be seen in their broader context.<br />

Right now, many scientists believe that<br />

dangerous interference with the climate<br />

could be avoided if temperature increase is<br />

limited to two degrees centigrade. Consensus<br />

estimates predict that doing so requires<br />

at least stabilizing GHG concentration<br />

levels at 550 parts per million (ppm)<br />

by 2050.<br />

If the E-8 or a major emitters group<br />

adopted two degree centigrade and 550<br />

ppm as global goals – and urged other<br />

nations to do the same – countries could<br />

then target their short-term and long-term<br />

emissions cuts at levels that they felt to be effective and fair<br />

steps toward that goal. When diplomats try to negotiate over<br />

relatively short-term emissions cuts they would be better able<br />

to explain to their political leaders and publics how each<br />

short-term stop contributes to a longer-term effort. (Indeed, in<br />

the recent proposed Lieberman-Warner climate legislation, a<br />

series of emissions cuts are written in, extending out to 2050.)<br />

As nations reach their shorter term benchmarks, they could<br />

assess how they are doing toward that longer-term goal.<br />

Among other things, this will help industrial countries signal<br />

to developing countries what they consider to be fair burdensharing<br />

for all nations over a future term, and that it is<br />

104 THE IIPM THINK TANK


W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

possible to achieve these marks without hurting economic<br />

growth.<br />

Setting targets for temperature increase and gas concentrations<br />

can also help politicians, the media, and the public stay<br />

focused on the purpose of the undertaking: whether emission<br />

cuts are sufficient to slow and eventually stop global warming.<br />

Though scientists now overwhelmingly agree that human<br />

activities are leading to global warming, new evidence is<br />

coming in constantly. The consensus is being affirmed, but<br />

also challenged and updated on a nearly daily basis – mostly in<br />

the direction of sending more dire warning signals. Some<br />

scientists, for instance, now think that stabilization at 450 ppm<br />

is needed to prevent two degrees of warming.<br />

Of greater concern, two degree celsius<br />

of warming may not be so safe. Recent<br />

research, for instance, finds that the current<br />

level of warming is melting the Arctic ice<br />

cap faster than had been anticipated,<br />

potentially weakening the ice cap’s ability to<br />

reflect sunlight and cool the planet. If the<br />

ice cap were to disappear with less than two<br />

degree celsius of warming, it could be a<br />

tipping point that would lead to a more<br />

dramatic and dangerous shock to the<br />

earth’s climate.<br />

<strong>VI</strong> - How Does it Bring New Nations<br />

into the Agreement? It Must Pro-<br />

vide A Path for Graduation<br />

Perhaps the greatest lesson the climate<br />

regime can learn from the trade regime is<br />

something that the latter has failed, so far,<br />

to entirely address: how to bring the developing countries into<br />

the regime in a way that acknowledges their development<br />

challenge, but also allows them to graduate to full responsibility<br />

as their economies grow.<br />

The trading regime is now in the midst of its longest<br />

negotiating round in its sixty year history – the so-called WTO<br />

Doha development round. One of the main reasons why it has<br />

been so difficult to conclude this round is that it is trying to<br />

address the regime’s core weakness: that the two basic groups<br />

– the industrial countries and the developing countries – have<br />

differing sets of obligations. The developing countries enjoy<br />

“special and differential treatment,” which means that they<br />

Most industrial<br />

economies are<br />

now poised to<br />

take near-term<br />

and middle-term<br />

efforts to cut<br />

GHG emissions<br />

are exempt from the more drastic tariff reductions taken by<br />

industrial nations. Not only is the regime asymmetrical, but it<br />

is also unclear how any developing nation would graduate to<br />

taking on an industrial-strength obligation, when the time was<br />

right. Thus, although the addition of these developing countries<br />

has been critical to achieving global scope for the<br />

organization, it also has added to the complexity of the<br />

process – and the current stalemate in negotiations.<br />

As with the global trading system, the developing countries<br />

will ultimately need to graduate and become part of the<br />

post-Kyoto Protocol climate system. Kyoto was problematic in<br />

several regards, but perhaps its biggest drawback was that the<br />

developing countries did not commit to cut<br />

their GHG emissions – in fact, the treaty<br />

actually prevents them from taking a<br />

binding target even if they want to do so.<br />

Argentina, for instance, tried to take on a<br />

binding target in 1998, but it was prevented<br />

from doing so by other developing countries.<br />

It certainly makes sense for the developing<br />

countries to have different obligations,<br />

or obligations that kick in later, given the<br />

industrial world’s historic responsibility<br />

and much greater wealth of the industrialized<br />

world, along with the generational<br />

nature of the problem. But there is simply<br />

no way to solve the climate problem<br />

without the active involvement of the<br />

developing countries – which, according<br />

to current projections, will account for<br />

more than 70% of GHG growth in next<br />

twenty-five years. Yet these countries show no willingness to<br />

accept Kyoto-style targets.<br />

This catch-22 is not just a political problem; it is an economic<br />

one that goes to the heart of getting clean energy markets<br />

up and running. Most industrial countries are now poised to<br />

take near-term and middle-term efforts to cut GHG emissions,<br />

which is already leading to some increased investment<br />

in clean energy. However, if the world economy is going to cut<br />

its carbon emissions by as much as 80%, enormous amounts of<br />

capital investment will be required to find transformative,<br />

carbon-free sources of energy. The more certain investors feel<br />

that the industrial countries will keep seeking ever deeper<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

reductions in GHG emissions, the more likely they will be to<br />

commit that kind of capital up front. The key is for the<br />

industrial countries to signal their long-term cuts. But they are<br />

less likely to do so long as developing country action is not a<br />

sure thing. Right now, the developing countries are saying that<br />

they will not act, and they are refusing to address the longterm<br />

challenge.<br />

How can the international community break out of this box?<br />

The effort must begin with the industrial world, by responding<br />

realistically to developing country concerns about equity. The<br />

developing countries rightfully feel that the rich countries are<br />

largely responsible for the problem to date, and probably for<br />

the global warming that will take place over the next fifty<br />

years. The industrial countries should not dismiss these<br />

concerns, particularly because the developing countries,<br />

particularly China and India, despite their recent economic<br />

gains, still have a nearly unfathomable number of their<br />

citizens living in extreme poverty – well over a billion people<br />

combined in those two countries alone. In addition to taking<br />

seriously efforts to estimate how much the industrial countries<br />

have contributed to current GHG concentration levels, these<br />

nations should also consider very long-term targets on a<br />

per-capita basis.<br />

Second, the industrial countries should appeal to the<br />

developing countries’ own self-interest. Climate change is<br />

most likely to hurt poor countries the worst, accentuating<br />

droughts and severe storms, for which these nations are least<br />

prepared. Moreover, many of these countries are facing the<br />

local air-pollution that comes in the early stages of industrialization,<br />

and the health care challenges of clean air and water<br />

that could be lessened by early adoption of clean energy<br />

technology. Moreover, investing in energy efficiency and clean<br />

energy is ultimately cost-effective.<br />

One possible motive for joining a GARE would be the<br />

potential to earn emissions trading credits on a <strong>size</strong>able scale.<br />

In the near term, this would mean continuing to explore<br />

opportunities to earn emissions reduction credits on a project<br />

by project basis. This could potentially build support within<br />

the developing countries for adopting country-wide emissions<br />

policies, linked to the GARE.<br />

And last, the industrial countries should not be shy about<br />

public diplomacy on climate change. Right now, the developing<br />

countries do not feel any public pressure to respond to<br />

climate change – which is probably not surprising, given the<br />

development challenges many of them are facing. Thus, a<br />

public diplomacy strategy is needed that stresses each topic<br />

noted above – from equity to self-interest to the power of<br />

global markets to help transfer technology and capital to<br />

developing countries. Of course, all of these efforts require<br />

that the real first steps be taken in the industrial world.<br />

<strong>VI</strong>I - Conclusion<br />

The political will has begun to develop in the United States<br />

and even in a few key developing countries for a global effort<br />

to reduce GHG emissions. This public support, however, still<br />

remains far from the dramatic shift in consensus needed to<br />

establish a full-blown global institution to address the climate<br />

challenge. In addition to the costs associated with acting, a<br />

core concern is a familiar one in global governance: loss of<br />

sovereignty. There is some good reason for this. Even for<br />

the most committed nations, the climate change challenge<br />

is of such great economic and environmental complexity<br />

that few politicians are likely to simply turn over the keys<br />

of their national policy-making to an international treaty<br />

organization.<br />

In taking the first steps toward a global climate regime, the<br />

industrial nations can learn from the experience of how the<br />

global trading regime built confidence in a self-regulating<br />

system. The GATT/WTO system built on a small group of<br />

states that, through a general agreement, were able to gear up<br />

domestic action over a generation. The advantages of this<br />

approach are that it does not pose a direct challenge to<br />

national sovereignty. Instead, it coordinates the work of states<br />

in a way that respects the diversity of local governance, and<br />

has a greater chance of getting buy-in from the key players.<br />

The challenge of such an approach is that it does not guarantee<br />

fast domestic action, that many smaller states will feel left<br />

out of the process, and that the transition to the system may<br />

be difficult for many participating states. Last, as with the<br />

trade regime, it must overcome the biggest challenge for<br />

global governance in today’s world: how to graduate nations<br />

when they emerge from the development process into the<br />

industrial world.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

That success was apparent twenty-five years ago, when the<br />

GATT system was held up as the model for global governance<br />

– including among “realist” theorists of international<br />

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W INDS OF CHANGE<br />

relations, who tend to hold a dim view for institutions. See<br />

John Ruggie, “International regimes, transactions, and<br />

change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic<br />

order,” in International Regimes edited by Stephen<br />

Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.<br />

195-231. While Ruggie would not classify himself as a<br />

realist, his general argument was accepted by realists such<br />

as Krasner. In the real world of politics, the GATT and<br />

WTO’s acceptance among American political conservatives<br />

– including their willingness to accept binding<br />

decisions by international tribunals – is striking.<br />

2<br />

One commentator questioned whether the problem of<br />

protecting the earth’s climate is analogous to that of<br />

expanding free trade. As a general matter, most analysts<br />

would agree that protecting the climate is a non-excludable<br />

public good, while free trade has been less so, since only<br />

the participants in a trading regime enjoy the benefits.<br />

Some might even question whether free trade is a public<br />

good, though cf. Charles P. Kindleberger, “International<br />

Public Goods without International Government,” The<br />

American Economic Review 1, no. 76, 1986, p. 2-13.<br />

Indeed, a strong argument can be made that both a climate<br />

regime and a trade regime offer both excludable and<br />

non-excludable public goods. In trade, the excludable<br />

public goods are the lower tariffs and trade barriers offered<br />

to the members of the regime; the non-excludable good is<br />

the stable international economic order that has economic<br />

and political benefits for all countries. In climate change,<br />

the non-excludable good would be climate protection. The<br />

excludable good would be an emissions trading regime.<br />

Many thanks to Lael Brainard for helping clarify this<br />

distinction.<br />

3<br />

Todd Stern and William Antholis, “Creating an E-8”, The<br />

American Interest, vol. 2:3 (January 2007), pg. 43-48.<br />

4<br />

See the first suggestion for such an approach in Todd Stern<br />

and William Antholis, “A Changing Climate: The Road<br />

Ahead for the United States,” The Washington <strong>Quarterly</strong>,<br />

Vol 31:1 (Winter 2007-2008), p. 175-188.<br />

5<br />

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Columbia University<br />

Press, 1977), p. 131, and Ch. 6 generally.<br />

6<br />

See Ruggie, “International regimes, transactions, and<br />

change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic<br />

order.”.<br />

7<br />

For an overview of what a domestic and international<br />

approach for the U.S. might look like, see Stern and<br />

Antholis, “A Changing Climate.”<br />

8<br />

One model example for this would be the EU’s proposal to<br />

unilaterally cut their emissions by 20% below 1990 levels in<br />

the post-Kyoto commitment period, and to extend those<br />

cuts to 30% if an international agreement is reached.<br />

9<br />

One advantage by not being a treaty, the GARE would<br />

avoid another major drawback of Kyoto: it would not need a<br />

two-thirds majority in the United States Senate, a minefield<br />

where countless treaties have gone to die. Indeed, by the<br />

treaty process, internationally agreed emissions targets and<br />

timetables the policies and regulations needed to comply<br />

with them become deeply enshrined in domestic law as they<br />

have been passed by a supermajority in the Senate. By<br />

contrast, the GARE would only require simple majorities<br />

in both the House and the Senate, putting the domestic<br />

legislation horse in front of the global treaty cart – just the<br />

way it should be. See both Stern and Antholis, “The Road<br />

Ahead,” and also Nigel Purvis, “Treat Climate Like Trade:<br />

The Case for Climate Protection Authority” (unpublished<br />

policy brief manuscript).<br />

10<br />

See William Antholis and Strobe Talbott, “Tackling Trade<br />

and Climate Change: Leadership on the Home Front of<br />

Foreign Policy,” in Michael O’Hanlon, ed., Opportunity 08<br />

(Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 63-67.<br />

11<br />

For a useful discussion on this, see Jonathan Wiener,<br />

“Incentives and Meta-Architecture,” in Joseph Aldy and<br />

Robert Stavins, Architectures for Agreement: Addressing<br />

Global Climate Change in a Post-Kyoto World, (Cambridge<br />

University Press, 2007), especially p. 74-76.<br />

12<br />

As mentioned earlier, establishing an emissions trading<br />

system would move from the non-excludable public good<br />

system of climate protection to a system with excludable<br />

benefits: access to trading with other parties, with the<br />

enhanced efficiency and reduced compliance costs this<br />

implies. See endnote. 3, above.<br />

13<br />

See Stern and Antholis, “A Changing Climate,” p. 183.<br />

(* The author is indebted to comments from Scott Barrett, Colin<br />

Bradford, Lael Brainard, Daniel Drezner, Stuart Eizenstat,<br />

Lauren Fine, Warwick McKibbin Carlos Pascual, Nigel Purvis,<br />

David Sandalow, and Strobe Talbott . The views expressed in the<br />

write-up are personal and do not reflect the official policy or<br />

position of the organisation).<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Globalisation<br />

To Global<br />

Governance:<br />

Hegemony To<br />

Legitimacy?<br />

B. Ramesh Babu<br />

Formerly Sir Pherozeshah Mehta Professor<br />

of Civics and Politics, University of Bombay.<br />

Specialist in International Relations, American<br />

politics and public affairs<br />

The contemporary phenomenon of globalisation is<br />

to be seen as the continuation of the historic,<br />

secular, and uneven transition of the world from<br />

INTER-NATIONAL POLITICS (i.e. politics among<br />

nations) to GLOBAL POLITICS. The role and reach of<br />

this transformation have grown during the past three or<br />

four decades on an unprecedented scale in human history.<br />

All major (and many not so major) issues and challenges<br />

confronting each and every nation today have become<br />

global and demand global solutions. Yet, there is no<br />

genuine global response, let alone a globally agreed<br />

framework or approach to deal with global challenges like<br />

the current economic meltdown, climate change, ecological<br />

balance, security of persons, national security, poverty,<br />

destitution, domestic violence and international<br />

terrorism. Sadly, the way our world is constituted today<br />

concerted, comprehensive, and truly global solutions are<br />

not possible, not even conceivable, as will be elucidated as<br />

we proceed further.<br />

There are global MNCs and some of them are bigger,<br />

richer, and more powerful than many sovereign nation<br />

states. However, there are no global unions, nor a world<br />

federation of farmers or agricultural workers. There are<br />

no global citizens either. But, we have a plethora of ‘super’<br />

patriotic leaders of nation states (big and small) masquerading<br />

as global leaders. Some of them harbour even<br />

planetary pretensions. Unfortunately, we do not have<br />

truly global leaders, who are genuinely concerned about<br />

the welfare of all the people all over the world. Even if<br />

some individual leaders dare to stray beyond, the extant<br />

international system (a legacy of the West) will not allow<br />

them to rise above their country’s ‘narrow’ and ‘parochial’<br />

national interests. The leaders are expected and duty<br />

bound to further their national goals and objectives at the<br />

expense of other nations, welfare of the mankind, and<br />

world peace. At the most some grudging concessions are<br />

made in the direction of enlightened self interest, if and<br />

when national interests of the other states involved<br />

converge. Furthermore, in operational terms, even this<br />

narrow and parochial national interests approach does<br />

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G OOD GOVERNANCE<br />

not encompass the welfare of all the citizens of the<br />

country. The rich and the powerful in all the countries<br />

(i.e. ‘the establishment’) utilise the State and the Flag to<br />

advance their own private and personal interests at<br />

expense of the masses, the poor, and the marginalised,<br />

who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population.<br />

It must be added that such inequity and injustice are<br />

pervasive in the rich as well as poor countries. Greed,<br />

graft, corruption (corporate, governmental, and private),<br />

and nepotism, discrimination, and racial prejudice of all<br />

hues, and aggrandisement of the powerful (local, national,<br />

and global) rule the roost. Ironical as it may seem, the<br />

good old question “whose interests are national interests?”<br />

has become doubly pertinent today. Yet, the<br />

juggernaut of the liberal capitalist globalisation rolls on<br />

spewing misery, despair, destitution, resentment, and<br />

terrorism at home and abroad, even as it achieves measurable<br />

economic growth. The recent economic meltdown<br />

worldwide has put the capitalist fundamentalists on the<br />

defensive. Free market and unregulated capitalism have<br />

lost their euphoric edge. The classic ‘growth versus<br />

development’ quarrel is back to the<br />

front burner.<br />

This indeed is the most fundamental<br />

and overarching crisis confronting mankind<br />

in the 21 st century. There is a wide<br />

and cruel gap between the representational<br />

legitimacies and the extant<br />

structures of governance at all levels,<br />

local to global. Our focus in this essay is<br />

on global governance. The UN and the<br />

entire Brettonwood system of the<br />

Second World War era had their innings. They are<br />

inadequate to cope with the greatly transformed world of<br />

today. A paradigm shift is taking place in global affairs<br />

since the mid-1980s. A new web of identities and loyalties<br />

(parallel and hierarchical) is in the making everywhere.<br />

Over time a new architecture of jurisdictions structuring<br />

power and authority in line with the altered framework of<br />

loyalties (and identities) will have to emerge. 1 This will<br />

happen sooner than we think. Whether such a new<br />

equation/engagement between loyalties and jurisdictions<br />

stretching from local to global will be arrived at relatively<br />

peacefully (or not) is the fundamental issue of our times. 2<br />

We will need<br />

new forms of<br />

governance<br />

and newer<br />

combinations of<br />

jurisdictions and<br />

mix of the two<br />

This is the most crucial challenge confronting mankind<br />

today and in the immediate future. It is important that we<br />

build on the emerging global web of governance and keep<br />

it in step with the pace and extent of globalisation taking<br />

place in finance, commerce, communications, culture and<br />

most other spheres of our lives. If the disjunction between<br />

the emerging loyalties and jurisdictions strays beyond the<br />

(retractable range of) elasticity of the governing institutions<br />

in place (at the national and international levels),<br />

there would be violence, disorder and chaos. Reforms will<br />

not be enough. We will need new forms of governance<br />

and newer combinations of jurisdictions (territorial and<br />

functional) and creative mix of the two.<br />

Consumerism and Conflict<br />

The propensity of man to grab what all he wants, whether<br />

he needs it or not, i.e. consumerism, is certainly one of the<br />

most subversive legacies of the West that is threatening<br />

the planet earth with exhaustion and possible extinction.<br />

The liberal capitalist western mindset, which insists on<br />

the rights of the individual and his entitlements against<br />

the State and society without giving<br />

equal importance to his concomitant<br />

obligations and duties to the community<br />

and the nation, is fundamentally<br />

flawed. Such self-centred and essentially<br />

selfish (bordering on the greedy)<br />

and atomistic conceptions of society<br />

became the engines of achievement and<br />

‘progress’ in modern times. In the<br />

globalising world of ours such notions<br />

of progress and modernity are exercising<br />

enormous magnetic influence all over the world. The<br />

revolutionary advances in IT and communications have<br />

greatly magnified “the international demonstration<br />

effect” of consumerism and are raising popular expectations<br />

sky high all over the world. I have called this<br />

phenomenon “imperialism of attraction”, which is popularly<br />

and mistakenly dubbed as the “Americanisation of<br />

the world.” 3<br />

This is not to deny or decry the phenomenal achievements<br />

of man in every walk of life during the last four<br />

centuries under the leadership of the modern West and a<br />

lot more is expected in the future. However, this legacy<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

like so many others in history has overreached itself and is<br />

threatening the very humanity of man. Some perceptive<br />

minds (including in the West) are questioning the very<br />

concept of progress as it is understood and advocated till<br />

now. Mere material advancement without the redeeming<br />

humane values and spirituality do not and cannot lead to<br />

real progress. It is time to curb the excesses of logic/<br />

rationality and return to sanity, common sense and above<br />

all to moderation. ‘To shun too much’ of everything (even<br />

logic and goodness) should become the guiding principle<br />

for mankind at this juncture. An ancient Sanskrit axiom<br />

enjoins man to eschew excess in everything and everywhere,<br />

athi sarvatra varjayet! However, I concede that how<br />

much is too much is not an easy rubric to<br />

cross. But, the ravages of too much are<br />

easy to see, unless we choose to be blind<br />

to the excesses around us.<br />

Terrorism, the New Menace<br />

International terrorism spearheaded by<br />

Islamic fundamentalists is the latest<br />

combustible added to the already<br />

explosive global situation. India has<br />

been the earliest of the victims of cross<br />

border terrorism. But, it is only after<br />

the tragically spectacular attack of 9/11<br />

on the US, international terrorism graduated<br />

into a serious menace of global<br />

dimensions. Instead of going after the<br />

terrorists who attacked their country,<br />

the neocons led by President Bush and<br />

Vice-President Cheney went on a<br />

unilateral rampage. The US launched the so called global<br />

war on terror. By all accounts the war in Iraq degenerated<br />

into a big misadventure, made international terrorism a<br />

bigger threat than before and virtually destabilised the<br />

whole region (from Istanbul to Islamabad and Riyadh to<br />

Rawalpindi). Pakistan, the long standing epicentre of<br />

terrorism, is itself in mortal danger of being over taken by<br />

the Taliban. Ironically, it is Pakistan that nurtured the<br />

Taliban in Afghanistan with the active connivance of the<br />

US and its allies in the West, and above all Saudi Arabia.<br />

In the bargain the Pakistani Army and the ISI worked<br />

closely with the Taliban and other Islamic fundamentalist<br />

elements culminating in the talibanisation of Afghanistan<br />

and Pakistan. History tells us that those who ride the tiger<br />

can dismount the beast only at their own peril, as the<br />

current offensive of the Pak Army against the Taliban<br />

indicates. One need not be surprised if this cracking the<br />

whip turns out to be a drama enacted till the new multibillion<br />

dollar American aid flows in. Pakistan could then<br />

return to business as usual and be back on the fast track of<br />

a failed state!<br />

What is the Way Out?<br />

A return to common sense and fair play is and can be the<br />

only way out of the extant liberal capitalist western<br />

hegemony. I believe that a return to<br />

Gandhi, ‘Gramodaya,’ Green, God, and<br />

Green Peace and above all, to common<br />

sense and fair play is the need of the<br />

hour. My fervent plea for a return to<br />

Gandhi should not be misunderstood. I<br />

am not advocating a return to the<br />

obscurantisms of the past, nor to blind<br />

acceptance of everything the Mahatma<br />

stood for and preached. I am<br />

alluding to the essence of his philosophy<br />

of life: truth, non-violence, peace,<br />

and self-sacrifice. The Mahatma was<br />

an ardent advocate of simple living<br />

and service to fellow human beings.<br />

He declared that ‘Manava Seve’ is<br />

‘Madhava Seva’ (serving man is the<br />

only way to serve God). For example,<br />

the Mahatma urged people to cut<br />

down their needs and wants to the barest minimum. He<br />

practiced what he preached. A loin cloth, two dry rotis<br />

and a cup of goat’s milk was all he ever needed. Nobody<br />

could ask for a more simple living by example – the very<br />

opposite of the consumer culture that is driving the<br />

people mad and the planet earth to exhaustion. Power is<br />

to be seen and used as a trust and the more endowed<br />

among us have a greater obligation to work for the benefit<br />

of the masses, he insisted. He proclaimed that all policies<br />

and actions of the State must pass the ultimate test --<br />

whether they enhance the welfare of the poorest of the<br />

poor (antyodaya) in the remotest villages and hamlets of<br />

Gandhi insisted<br />

that the more<br />

endowed among<br />

us have a greater<br />

obligation to work<br />

for the benefit of<br />

the masses<br />

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G OOD GOVERNANCE<br />

the country (gramodaya). Today’s economic reforms in<br />

India and the world over (i.e. liberalisation, privatisation<br />

and globalisation) are far from meeting the Mahatma’s<br />

test. On the contrary, the rich and powerful are gaining<br />

more and more even as the marginalised millions are left<br />

out, nay, excluded mercilessly. Yet the rich and the upper<br />

classes are demanding and extracting more and more<br />

benefits for themselves, often at the expense of the poor<br />

and the hungry masses. Greed and callousness of the<br />

ruling elite are driving community after community and<br />

country after country around the world to protests, direct<br />

action, insurrection, revolution, and violence in sheer<br />

desperation. A return to Green refers to<br />

the famous philosopher Thomas Hill<br />

Green, who conceived rights of individuals<br />

as arising from obligations fulfilled.<br />

The Mahatma always insisted that all<br />

rights are contingent on and derived<br />

from duties. In fact he was so adamant<br />

on this score that he refused to endorse<br />

the Universal Declaration of Human<br />

Rights because it did not include a<br />

corresponding list of ‘Duties of Man’.<br />

Rights and entitlements should not get<br />

precedence over citizens’ duties and<br />

obligations to the State and Society.<br />

Rights and duties should forever be<br />

‘balanced.’ Obviously, a healthy balance<br />

between them is never static. Each<br />

generation must work for and find its<br />

optimum balance between rights and<br />

duties. It is my contention that this<br />

balance is skewed too much in favour of the individual<br />

and against the community in the modern era, especially<br />

in ‘the advanced’ countries of the West. Anxieties of<br />

freedom in ‘open societies’ (á l Karl Popper) are as<br />

problematic as anxieties of frustration in ‘traditional<br />

societies’, I would like to point out.<br />

A plea for a return to God in the age of ‘secularism’ and<br />

‘knowledge society’ may sound old hat. But, it is my contention<br />

that it is not. The modern western concept of secularism<br />

is sullied by a strong inherited prejudice of being<br />

anti-religion and even anti-God. Separation of the<br />

Church and the State in the West was a historical neces-<br />

Rights and duties<br />

should forever<br />

be ‘balanced.’<br />

Obviously, a<br />

healthy balance<br />

between them is<br />

never static<br />

sity for survival in Europe. The religion of the kings was<br />

forced on their subjects. Religious toleration did not grow<br />

because of faltering convictions or erosion of religious<br />

zeal. It emerged because the very survival of the kingdoms<br />

and the people in Europe was at stake. It may not be<br />

out of place to add that King Henry’s anxiety to add one<br />

more wife ‘sanctioned by the Church’ to his harem had<br />

played not so minor a part in the separation of the State<br />

and Church in England! Over time this practice evolved<br />

into a doctrine of sorts and became one of the cardinal<br />

principles of western society much later.<br />

Be that as it may, the West and the rest of the world<br />

have moved far from the sterile and obsolete<br />

notions of isolating religion from the<br />

other dimensions of people’s lives. Today<br />

it is widely accepted that religion is an<br />

integral part of man’s very being, his life<br />

and culture. In fact, in some western<br />

nations a return to faith is being perceived<br />

as an antidote to anomie, violence,<br />

and declining moral values. What<br />

needs to be done is to emphasise the<br />

spiritual dimension of religion and<br />

de-emphasise its dogmas and rituals.<br />

One of the central doctrines of the<br />

Sanatana Dharma is that reason and<br />

faith are not antithetical to each other.<br />

Reason gradually leads one to faith, the<br />

Hindu scriptures assert and the lives of<br />

sages of ancient India are testament to<br />

the coexistence of the two for mutual<br />

enrichment. In this short essay, I cannot<br />

discuss this phenomenal transformation of the perception<br />

of religion in the post modern society. It is adequate for<br />

our purposes here to recognise the commonalities of all<br />

living religions of man: humanity of man; equality of all<br />

people before God; acceptance of differences in faith as<br />

natural; to be at peace with oneself, one’s own God and<br />

fellow men. These are among the eternal values of life on<br />

earth. The rapidly globalising world of ours urgently<br />

needs the formulation of truly universal norms and values<br />

shared across cultures and continents. Otherwise planet<br />

earth will be engulfed in disorder, chaos, and wars.<br />

My plea for a return to ‘Green Peace’ is an all inclusive<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

term for the restoration of global ecological balance.<br />

Environmental pollution, global warming and all the other<br />

related threats to the future of man on earth are included.<br />

I extend this concern to the well-being of all the other<br />

living beings and non-living things that share the planet<br />

with us. Hinduism asserts that man has no superior claims<br />

or right of precedence over the other living and non-living<br />

inhabitants on the resources of the planet earth. In fact,<br />

being endowed with more intelligence and knowledge, man<br />

has greater responsibility to act as the trustee of the lesser<br />

beings, the Hindu scriptures ordain.<br />

We must advance (or is it return?) to conceptions of<br />

authority as trust, i.e., power with a redeeming (social and<br />

moral) purpose. In short, we must return to idealism.<br />

Rampant consumerism of here and now has to be given up.<br />

Similarly, the ‘presentism’ of modem times must yield place<br />

to a healthy balance between the present and the past, and<br />

also between the present and the future. Parochialisms of<br />

the whites, browns, blacks, and yellows; the rich and the<br />

poor; advocates of human rights (in a planet also inhabited<br />

by other living beings and non-living things) are essentially<br />

non-inclusive and discriminatory. Feminists, champions of<br />

children's rights (and all the other activists on behalf of this<br />

or that good cause) offer, even at their best, only a narrow<br />

and partial vision of mankind. Moderation has to become<br />

the hallmark of human civilisation in the new millennium.<br />

Need, not greed, should be the basis of all human endeavour<br />

on earth! Mother earth has enough for everyone's<br />

need, but not for his greed, as Mahatma Gandhi observed<br />

wisely.<br />

Globalisation and Globalism<br />

It is appropriate at this juncture to distinguish between<br />

globalisation and ‘globalism’. The former is a process of<br />

supra-national integration and sub-national disintegration<br />

occurring simultaneously, especially since the 1990s. This<br />

dual transformation is leading to an inchoate restructuring<br />

of the architecture of global power structure. However, the<br />

extant post Cold War globalisation can be seen as a<br />

phenomenon of integration of the major national economies<br />

into a liberal capitalist global ‘free market’ led by the<br />

US and the West. As such it is hegemonic, exploitative,<br />

unjust and unacceptable, especially to the Third world as<br />

well as the poor and marginalised millions in the advanced<br />

countries of the West. Globalism, on the other hand,<br />

conceptually envisions the whole world as one unit and is<br />

concerned with the welfare of all people everywhere and<br />

the planet earth as a whole.<br />

An effort is made here to conceptually bridge the gap<br />

between the extant institutions of global governance and<br />

their representational legitimacies. There is a huge democratic<br />

deficit, which needs to be acknowledged first. Then<br />

the will to undo the inherent injustice should follow. If<br />

there is a will, there is a way. Then we have to come up with<br />

new forms of governance which are capable of institutionally<br />

steering the globalization underway since the mid-<br />

1980s forward from hegemony to genuine global governance.<br />

This calls for a new philosophy of globalism that is<br />

valid across cultures and continents. I have some ideas on<br />

how to go about such an inter-civilizational intellectual<br />

exercise 4 and also my own notions of what could be the<br />

major constituents of such a philosophy of globalism. But,<br />

this will have to be attempted in my next venture.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

See B. Ramesh Babu ‘Glocalisation’ and the Indian<br />

Nation State: Jurisdictions and Loyalties in Flux, New<br />

Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2004.<br />

2<br />

The current tussles over Telangana, Vidarbha and the<br />

armed the struggles of the Naxalites and other extremist<br />

groups around the country are classic examples of the<br />

ongoing flux in identities and loyalties of people. Similar<br />

mass struggles and passionate demands for justice and<br />

fair play are going on elsewhere in South Asia (Nepal,<br />

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) and around the world (Palestine,<br />

Iraq, Indonesia, Philippines, Spain, Yugoslavia,<br />

Malta, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and sub-Saharan Africa,<br />

etc.)<br />

3<br />

See B. Ramesh Babu ‘Americanisation of the World:<br />

Myth and Reality,’ Freedom First, 422 (July-September<br />

1994), pp. 23-27<br />

4<br />

For an example of the inter-civilisational dialogue<br />

needed see Hu Yeping, ‘Asian Civilisational Dialogue<br />

between India and China,’ Word Affairs, Vo.8 no.4<br />

(October – December 2004), pp. 82-95.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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G OOD GOVERNANCE<br />

AD<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

We Can Have Better Global<br />

Economic Governance<br />

Barry Herman<br />

Visiting Senior Fellow,<br />

Graduate Program in International Affairs,<br />

The New School, New York<br />

Introduction<br />

Opportunities rarely arise for changing global economic<br />

governance. One of those opportunities has been<br />

opened by the current global financial and<br />

economic crisis. Already, the leaders of<br />

the United States and the other<br />

members of the Group of eight<br />

(G8) have invited the leaders of<br />

Australia and some large<br />

developing countries,<br />

including India, to meet with<br />

them as the Group of 20<br />

(G20), first in Washington<br />

on 15 th November, 2008 and<br />

again in London on 2 nd April,<br />

<strong>2009</strong>. 1 While it is good to have<br />

more voices in the G20 than<br />

were heard in the G8, there are a<br />

lot more voices that are not being<br />

heard. Should India, the world’s largest<br />

democracy, merely take its seat in the G20?<br />

Or, should India also help the nations of the world<br />

take a more democratic and inclusive governance direction?<br />

This paper is a brief for how it might support the latter.<br />

The question is who makes the policy decisions that shape<br />

global monetary, financial and trade flows — and on whose<br />

behalf? Some of those decisions are embodied in negotiations<br />

leading to multilateral agreements, as on international trade.<br />

Some are embodied in one-time policy decisions of national<br />

authorities, as in the partially successful effort of some mem-<br />

bers of the G20 to engineer a joint fiscal stimulus in <strong>2009</strong>. Some<br />

are reflected in regulatory norms adopted by specialized bodies<br />

that, by force of example, become the global norm, as in the<br />

capital adequacy standards recommended for commercial<br />

banks by the so-called Basel Committee. Still others become<br />

the policies applied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),<br />

the World Bank and other official financial institutions in<br />

shaping their programs of assistance. Decision-making processes<br />

are distinct in each case. But, as the biggest<br />

powers acting together can wield major<br />

influence in the decisions taken in<br />

each forum, they have sometimes<br />

used the mechanism of their G8<br />

summits to come to common<br />

views, which then are<br />

adopted in the other<br />

forums as global policy.<br />

This process can foster<br />

some limited coherence<br />

among the policy realms.<br />

There are also implicit<br />

commitments not to overwhelm<br />

the interests of smaller<br />

economies, and explicit commitments<br />

to seek international policies<br />

that promote the development of the<br />

developing countries and help eradicate<br />

poverty. These latter, however, are moral imperatives.<br />

They determine policy outcomes only to the degree that<br />

they are not overridden by domestic political needs in the G8<br />

economies.<br />

Today, it seems the G20 may supplant the G8 as the premier<br />

“executive committee” for world economic policy making. If so,<br />

a natural question is will the new members adopt the views and<br />

perspectives of the already established world leaders once in<br />

their charmed circle or will they turn global policy in new<br />

114 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G LOBAL GOOD<br />

directions? The newly included leaders will surely promote and<br />

defend their national interest — and presumably the interests<br />

of developing countries more generally — to the extent they<br />

can influence the debate. Is this good enough?<br />

Before answering this question, we should review in somewhat<br />

more detail how the current global governance system<br />

operates. This paper thus begins with a broad-brush characterization<br />

of official oversight of the world economy as it has been<br />

and how it appears set to operate if the G20 supplants the G8.<br />

This will be contrasted with the “Financing for Development”<br />

process that planted the seed of a new mechanism of global<br />

governance. A seedling sprouted, but it then dried up. Now, a<br />

number of developing country governments are trying to<br />

nurture it back to life. We conclude that India should join<br />

that effort.<br />

Global Economic Governance since the 1970s<br />

Economic oversight within national economies is an inescapable<br />

responsibility of governments. Each country’s authorities<br />

intervene more or less in the workings of their private sector<br />

and directly provide goods and services to varying degrees<br />

depending on national goals and strategies.<br />

Whether or not governments explicitly<br />

think about economic governance, they do<br />

it. One may similarly say that there is a<br />

system of economic governance at the<br />

global level, even though there is no global<br />

government.<br />

The global governance system today<br />

involves a decentralized collection of both<br />

formal international institutions and<br />

agreements and informal relationships<br />

among countries. Each of the specific institutions or forums is<br />

independently governed. There is no formal mechanism for the<br />

overall coordination of their respective policies. Many of them<br />

are “specialized agencies” of the United Nations (UN) and in<br />

principle are coordinated in the UN Economic and Social<br />

Council (ECOSOC). However, ECOSOC has never had the<br />

political stature or technical capacity to undertake such a role. 2<br />

Overview discussions are held in ECOSOC and other UN<br />

bodies (e.g., the General Assembly or the UN Conference on<br />

Trade and Development), but they rarely affect actual policies. 3<br />

Rather, the coordination that does take place, at least since the<br />

1970s, has been by the Group of seven major industrialized<br />

Economic<br />

oversight<br />

within national<br />

economies is<br />

an inescapable<br />

responsibility of<br />

the governments<br />

countries (G7), which brings together the political leaders of<br />

the largest economies in the world on a regular basis to discuss<br />

world economic problems.<br />

Some of the individual institutions in the system enjoy great<br />

power, the IMF being the most powerful throughout most of<br />

this period. Its mandate has been fundamental: oversight of<br />

national balances of payments and exchange rates. The basis<br />

for the mandate is the simple fact that exchange-rate volatility<br />

in one country may well seriously disturb the economies of<br />

other countries. IMF has thus had a strong power in “surveillance,”<br />

policy advice and providing partial funding to help<br />

countries out of unsustainable situations. At first, IMF’s remit<br />

was universal, but this effectively ended when the Bretton<br />

Woods monetary system collapsed following the 1971 decision<br />

of the United States to break the link of its dollar to gold.<br />

Instead, the major economies shifted to a system of floating<br />

exchange rates and whatever effort they made to cooperate on<br />

macroeconomic policy shifted to the newly created G7. IMF<br />

was reduced to being the monetary overseer (and creditor) of<br />

the developing countries and later the formerly centrally<br />

planned economies of Europe and Asia. The Fund’s policy<br />

guidelines, which increasingly reflected the<br />

emerging neoliberal “Washington consensus”<br />

of the G7 countries, were coupled with<br />

a willingness to see far sharper economic<br />

contractions (“corrections”) than the G7<br />

would have tolerated in their own countries.<br />

The speed and depth of the correction of<br />

an unsustainable balance-of-payments<br />

deficit has been a function, not only of how<br />

“distorted” the economy had become, but<br />

also of how much external financing was available to the<br />

country during the adjustment period. IMF has been able to<br />

deploy large funding packages at certain points in time and far<br />

smaller ones at others, using both its own resources and those<br />

made available by the multilateral development banks and<br />

donor governments. The amount of financing needed has also<br />

sometimes been reduced through postponed or cancelled<br />

external debt servicing, as agreed in the informal Paris Club of<br />

major government creditors. In this regard, IMF has played a<br />

coordinating role in calculating the sums that could or would be<br />

made available from the various sources in individual cases.<br />

This notwithstanding, countries that were politically important<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

to the major powers have generally had better financed<br />

programs than others. In other words, while IMF may nominally<br />

have been at the center of the balance-of-payments<br />

adjustment process, the G7 (or certain members) have at times<br />

directed the process for political purposes.<br />

Besides adjustment financing, the World Bank and the<br />

regional development banks (e.g., the Asian Development<br />

Bank for Asia and the Pacific) provide substantial long-term<br />

financing for development projects and programs, complemented<br />

by resources from smaller and more specialized<br />

multilateral lenders, like the International Fund for Agricultural<br />

Development. Each institution has its own executive<br />

board that, like the Board of IMF, has been effectively dominated<br />

by its founders, which is to say, the countries in the G7,<br />

and owing to the growing contributions of new donors, some<br />

emerging economy members of the G20. Not surprisingly, when<br />

new funding plans for the main institutions were recently<br />

agreed, it was at the London G20 meeting. 4<br />

There has long been, however, a potential alternative forum,<br />

the so-called Development Committee. 5 It is a high-level<br />

committee that might have coordinated the different multilateral<br />

financial institutions, as it brings<br />

together primarily development cooperation<br />

ministers from the rich countries and<br />

finance ministers from developing countries<br />

for semi-annual discussions at the World<br />

Bank. Some of the ministers represent their<br />

own countries (e.g., France, United States,<br />

China, Saudi Arabia, Russia) and others<br />

represent constituencies of countries in a<br />

very uneven mixture. For example, India<br />

also represents Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri<br />

Lanka, while Liberia and Mauritius represent 21 and 23<br />

sub-Saharan African countries, respectively. 6 However, the<br />

Committee focuses almost entirely on programs and resources<br />

of the World Bank Group.<br />

There is a parallel and actually more powerful committee at<br />

the IMF that also meets semi-annually, indeed, always a day<br />

before the Development Committee. This is the International<br />

Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), comprised of<br />

finance ministers and central bank governors. It primarily<br />

focuses on policies and funding of the IMF, although it also<br />

takes account of financial regulatory matters, as IMF encourages<br />

and monitors implementation of international financial<br />

With time, it was<br />

realised that the<br />

international<br />

regulatory<br />

committees<br />

needed a way to<br />

talk to each other<br />

standards and codes of good practice (in some cases jointly with<br />

the World Bank).<br />

Most countries actively regulate the bulk of the activities of<br />

their financial sectors, ranging from commercial banking to<br />

insurance to the operation of securities markets. Countries<br />

have traditionally taken different approaches to meet needs<br />

differently defined. However, with increased cross-border<br />

provision of financial services and resources, there has been a<br />

growing global interest that national regulations adopted for<br />

prudential reasons not unfairly tilt a market to one nation’s<br />

firms or another, as well as that the regulations effectively<br />

attenuate inherent volatile tendencies of the financial sector.<br />

Various international committees of regulators have thus<br />

formed since the 1970s to develop generally approved<br />

norms for regulation, such as the Basel Committee on<br />

Banking Supervision, the International Organization of<br />

Securities Commissions, the International Association of<br />

Insurance Supervisors, and so on. Some are broader based than<br />

others, but developed country regulators generally play the<br />

dominant role.<br />

Increasingly, it was realized that the international regulatory<br />

committees needed a way to talk to each<br />

other. Thus, in the wake of the East Asian<br />

and Russian financial crisis in the late<br />

1990s, attributed in part to inadequate<br />

regulation, the G7 convoked a new committee<br />

to bring together the national regulatory<br />

authorities, central banks and finance<br />

ministries of the major financial center<br />

countries, the international norm-setting<br />

committees, the IMF and the World Bank<br />

as the “Financial Stability Forum” (FSF).<br />

In the light of today’s global financial crisis, it is difficult to say<br />

how effective the FSF has been in strengthening regulatory<br />

norms or bringing coherence across the regulations of different<br />

financial industries. The same may be said about IMF efforts to<br />

promote adoption of the international standards in its member<br />

countries, developed as well as developing.<br />

In response, the G20 has recently pledged to tighten regulatory<br />

standards and expand the scope of regulatory oversight to<br />

some previously exempted sectors, such as hedge funds and<br />

credit-rating agencies. 7 The G7 also invited the G20 countries<br />

not already members to join the FSF, now renamed the<br />

Financial Stability Board. It will be most interesting to watch<br />

116 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G LOBAL GOOD<br />

how much of a difference any of this makes. The G7 proponents<br />

of “light touch” regulation have been roundly discredited<br />

by the current crisis, but the financial industry in the major<br />

countries can be expected to seek to escape whatever regulatory<br />

shackles are put on them in the near term. Some of the<br />

emerging market countries in the G20 have shared the “light<br />

touch” approach to regulation, while others, including India,<br />

have been slower to adopt it. At best, the rest of the world gets<br />

to comment from afar on proposals considered within the FSB<br />

and its component parts.<br />

Another major institution is also not at this table. As already<br />

noted, regulatory changes can affect the competitive conditions<br />

of international trade in financial services, which is one focus of<br />

concern of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact, there<br />

are several policy areas in which trade concerns rub up against<br />

financial ones. For example, some countries have responded to<br />

the global recession with new trade-restricting measures,<br />

violating the spirit if not necessarily their formal WTO obligations.<br />

The G20 have committed not to do so, but some have<br />

done it anyway, as have other countries. 8<br />

Policymakers have sought ways to forge better coherence of<br />

trade and financial policies in the Bretton<br />

Woods institutions and WTO, but with little<br />

success. While staffs of the trade and<br />

financial institutions cooperate on technical<br />

issues, no joint forum has been created to<br />

promote trade and financial policy coherence.<br />

The Director-General of WTO may<br />

visit the ministerial committees of the<br />

Washington institutions and WTO may<br />

organize occasional discussions on policy<br />

coherence and invite senior officials of the<br />

Fund and the Bank, but these efforts have not produced policy<br />

coherence.<br />

This could become an active matter for discussion in the G20,<br />

especially as some of its emerging market members have played<br />

a prominent role in the now-stalled trade negotiations at WTO.<br />

But that would not be an appropriate solution to the impasse in<br />

WTO, as many importantly concerned parties are not members<br />

of the G20 and G20 countries do not represent constituencies<br />

but only themselves. Those were the terms of their invitation.<br />

The G8 could not invite their new partners on any other terms,<br />

since they too are an ad hoc, self-appointed group of countries.<br />

We can do better.<br />

It was the first<br />

time in decades<br />

that policy makers<br />

gathered under<br />

a UN banner to<br />

endorse decisions<br />

on few hard issues<br />

A First Step is Possible This Year<br />

In fact, the global community — what the current President of<br />

the UN General Assembly, Father Miguel D’Escoto of Nicaragua<br />

calls the “G192” — has done better, although only temporarily.<br />

Beginning in 1997, government representatives at the<br />

UN developed a discussion process that over five years — and<br />

with many ups and downs — built a new measure of confidence<br />

between countries of the North and South, between finance and<br />

foreign affairs ministries, and between the Bretton Woods<br />

institutions and the United Nations, while also substantively<br />

involving the WTO in a UN policy forum. The practical<br />

question of global governance is can this process be revived?<br />

Yes, it can.<br />

The original process reached fruition in a summit meeting on<br />

“Financing for Development” (FfD) at Monterrey, Mexico in<br />

March 2002 attended by 55 heads of state or government, over<br />

200 ministers of finance, foreign affairs and trade, the heads of<br />

the major international trade and financial institutions (including<br />

the Chair of the FSF), and leading business leaders and civil<br />

society advocates. It was the first time in decades that policy<br />

makers gathered under a UN banner to endorse decisions on<br />

“hard” financial, trade and development<br />

issues.<br />

The “Monterrey Consensus” adopted at<br />

that conference included commitments to<br />

increase the “voice and participation” of<br />

developing countries in decision making at<br />

the Bretton Woods institutions, seek to<br />

devise a comprehensive international<br />

mechanism for workouts from the sovereign<br />

debt crises that developing countries<br />

repeatedly suffer, reverse the decline in<br />

official development assistance, make aid programs more<br />

effective, strengthen international cooperation on tax matters<br />

(as in better combating tax evasion), and in myriad pragmatic<br />

ways accelerate development and reduce poverty. 9 Some of<br />

those promises were delivered, others are still being worked on,<br />

and, alas, still others fell by the wayside.<br />

The five-year discussion leading to Monterrey was far from a<br />

“love in.” Governments and institutions jealously defended<br />

their interests throughout and negotiated very hard to win their<br />

points of view. There were enemies of the process as well as<br />

friends. Governments and institutions had agendas. Monterrey<br />

succeeded because it created a sense in enough people that<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

something more than the routine was possible, something<br />

collective and creative could be achieved that required stretching,<br />

that merited taking political risks.<br />

This is not the place to explain how the “spirit of Monterrey”<br />

was built, nor how that spirit all but evaporated in ensuing<br />

years. 10 By the end of 2008, when an international conference<br />

was held in Doha, Qatar to review implementation of the<br />

Consensus, the diplomatic atmosphere had become quite<br />

strained. To the degree there was any shared goal at that<br />

meeting, it was about not allowing a much weakened Monterrey<br />

process to disappear entirely. It barely succeeded, as an agreed<br />

“Doha Declaration” was not produced until virtually the last<br />

minute of the conference. 11 Most of the text is hortatory when<br />

not descriptive, although it contained two important agreements<br />

relating to global governance. One was to hold a “conference at<br />

the highest level on the world financial and economic crisis and<br />

its impact on development” (para. 79). That conference will<br />

take place on 24 th -26 th June <strong>2009</strong> at the UN in New York. At the<br />

time of writing there is much controversy (and concern) over its<br />

prospective outcome. In this regard, it seems to be replicating<br />

— perhaps intensifying — the strains already evident in Doha.<br />

The other agreement in Doha was to<br />

develop a more effective mechanism for<br />

FFD discussions at the UN, an effort to<br />

revive the “spirit of Monterrey”. The<br />

process as set out in 2002 had two parts. The<br />

first was to hold a one-day meeting every<br />

spring in ECOSOC at which senior officials<br />

of the Bretton Woods institutions and<br />

members of their executive boards would<br />

join with UN delegates, representatives<br />

from WTO and the UN Conference on<br />

Trade and Development, other UN officials, private sector and<br />

civil society organizations to take a holistic view of trade,<br />

financial and development policy, consider inconsistencies, and<br />

seek ways to enhance coherence. In practice, the discussions<br />

were superficial and frustrating to participants all around. The<br />

second part of the Monterrey follow-up was meant to be a<br />

biennial, high-level, two-day discussion in the General Assembly<br />

of the same stakeholder groups, undertaking a fuller review of<br />

the implementation of the Consensus. These meetings were also<br />

disappointments.<br />

The Doha agreement thus proposed developing a different<br />

approach and targeted reaching agreement on it within a year.<br />

A small but<br />

representative FFD<br />

committee under<br />

the UN should<br />

have various<br />

means to develop<br />

its policy positions<br />

The key step is to be taken at the July ECOSOC meeting when a<br />

draft proposal is to be agreed. In fact, the Rio Group of 23 Latin<br />

American countries proposed just such a mechanism during the<br />

preparatory meetings for the Doha conference in 2008 and the<br />

Secretary-General advanced a variant of that approach in a<br />

report to the Council for its annual spring FfD meeting. 12<br />

Details are less important here than the concept, which is to<br />

bring a workable number of governments, international<br />

institutions and other stakeholders together who can effectively<br />

exchange views from different perspectives, take the views of<br />

others back to colleagues in their constituencies and return with<br />

amended views so as to build consensus and the political<br />

momentum for taking the actions required. The objective is to<br />

forge coherent, development-advancing policies.<br />

Consensus views in the new committee would sometimes<br />

need to be adopted as policies in other forums, but one cannot<br />

count on participants in the FfD forum being able to deliver<br />

their institutions. However, we may propose that members of<br />

the FfD forum visit other institutions for informal discussions to<br />

make the case for the proposed changes, bringing to bear<br />

considerations that might not be sufficiently salient. Again, it is<br />

a matter for winning agreement through<br />

dialogue (and oftentimes it will be dialogue<br />

between foreign and finance ministry<br />

representatives of the same countries).<br />

Political momentum around proposals from<br />

the FfD forum could also be generated by<br />

how items are prepared for its discussion. In<br />

particular, the UN committee might request<br />

that multi-stakeholder consultations be<br />

convoked to consider an item of interest<br />

and prepare a recommendation so that it<br />

arrives for discussion with some start to a buy-in by the relevant<br />

parties.<br />

The point, in short, is that a small but representative FFD<br />

committee under the UN should have various means to develop<br />

its policy positions, including multi-stakeholder consultations,<br />

and various means to advocate for those positions, including in<br />

the forums that the international community has specifically<br />

mandated be responsible. Only if the players, large and small,<br />

see a serious effort to regenerate the collaborative global<br />

economic governance process that had been intended in<br />

Monterrey will they take the risks needed to make it work.<br />

Several governments have already shown interest at the UN<br />

118 THE IIPM THINK TANK


G LOBAL GOOD<br />

in developing such a model and no governments have voiced<br />

determined opposition. Governments, such as India’s, that are<br />

emerging economy members of the G20, should encourage<br />

establishing this additional forum which would enjoy formal<br />

legitimacy, which would chose its membership in a transparent<br />

and democratic manner, and which would engage in open<br />

discussion involving civil society and private sector partners as<br />

well as key institutions. This would advance the cause of a more<br />

democratic — and possibly more effective — system of global<br />

economic governance.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

The G8 comprises the Group of seven (Canada, France,<br />

Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States)<br />

plus the Russian Federation on mainly political matters. The<br />

G20 members include these countries and Argentina,<br />

Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi<br />

Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, plus the<br />

European Union.<br />

2<br />

The UN nevertheless plays an important role in specific<br />

aspects of economic governance, including serving as a<br />

forum for the negotiation of treaties on economic issues<br />

(e.g., Law of the Sea, UN Convention against Corruption),<br />

for the elaboration of international policy norms (e.g.,<br />

Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Beijing Declaration<br />

on Women) and for developing legal models for<br />

bilateral negotiation or governmental legislation (e.g., UN<br />

Model Double Taxation Convention, UNCITRAL Model<br />

Law on Cross-Border Insolvency), as well as for launching<br />

multi-country or multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g., Leading<br />

Group on Solidarity Levies, UNAIDS).<br />

3<br />

One important exception was the “Monterrey Process” in<br />

the early years of this decade, which we will argue should be<br />

rebuilt.<br />

4<br />

See Group of 20, “Declaration on Delivering Resources<br />

through the International Financial Institutions” London,<br />

2 nd April <strong>2009</strong> (see http://www.g20.org/pub_communiques.<br />

aspx).<br />

5<br />

The committee’s formal name is the “Joint Ministerial<br />

Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the<br />

Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing<br />

Countries”, which is sufficient explanation for why it is just<br />

called the “Development Committee”.<br />

6<br />

Information as of 1 st February <strong>2009</strong>; three additional African<br />

countries did not participate in the 2008 voting (as per http://<br />

siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/BankExecutiveDirectors.pdf).<br />

7<br />

See Group of 20, “Leaders Statement: The Global Plan for<br />

Recovery and Reform” and “Declaration on Strengthening<br />

the Financial System,” London, 2 nd April <strong>2009</strong> (http://www.<br />

g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx).<br />

8<br />

For details, see WTO, “Report to the TPRB from the<br />

Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and<br />

Trade-Related Developments,” 26 th March <strong>2009</strong> (http://www.<br />

wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/trdev_dg_<br />

report_14apr09_e.doc)<br />

9<br />

See United Nations, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for<br />

Development: The final text and agreements adopted at the<br />

International Conference on Financing for Development,<br />

Monterrey, Mexico, 18 th -22 nd March 2002 (http://www.un.<br />

org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf).<br />

10<br />

See Barry Herman, “The Politics of Inclusion in the Monterrey<br />

Process,” available online as United Nations, Department<br />

of Economic and Social Affairs, Working Paper No.<br />

23, April 2006 (http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/<br />

wp23_2006.pdf).<br />

11<br />

See United Nations, Doha Declaration on Financing for<br />

Development: Outcome Document of the Follow-up<br />

International Conference on Financing for Development to<br />

Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus,<br />

Doha, Qatar, 29 th November -2 nd December 2008 (http://<br />

www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_<br />

FFD.pdf).<br />

12<br />

See United Nations, “Coherence, Coordination and<br />

Cooperation in the Context of the Implementation of the<br />

Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration on<br />

Financing for Development” Report of the Secretary-General<br />

(E/<strong>2009</strong>/48), paragraphs 58-60.<br />

(This paper builds on a presentation at a seminar organized by the<br />

member governments of the Association of South-East Asian<br />

Nations and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) at the United<br />

Nations on 1 st <strong>May</strong>, <strong>2009</strong> and at the discussion held by the UN<br />

Economic and Social Council on 20 th April, <strong>2009</strong>. The author is<br />

grateful for the opportunity to have made those presentations and<br />

for the comments on them, which have improved this paper. The<br />

views expressed in the paper are personal and do not reflect the<br />

official policy or position of the organisations.)<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

More Effective Global Financial<br />

Regulation<br />

K. U. Mada<br />

Economist and former Executive Director,<br />

erstwhile Industrial Development Bank of<br />

India, Mumbai<br />

Well-accepted it is, global financial regulation<br />

should be integral to the process of globalization.<br />

Operating in national or international<br />

context, unfettered freedom of operations is tantamount to<br />

virtually allowing unrestricted freedom to operatives to do<br />

whatever they intend to do without their realizing that they<br />

are restricting the freedom of people across nations<br />

or the world. It is devil care what happens to others<br />

attitude, creating messy chaos all around with far<br />

and deep effects, often adverse. It is not merely<br />

beggar-thy-neighbour policy but beggar-thy-humanity<br />

policy. The call for global arrangements<br />

for financial regulation on a world-wide basis is the<br />

realization of the sensible inner call that in the<br />

currently wired world, none could save himself if he<br />

operates as if he is the only one who has the right to<br />

survive even at the cost of the humanity at large.<br />

That is, interpreting freedom of action in a<br />

vacuum. The world-wide clamour of world leaders itself<br />

proves beyond an iota of doubt the utility and inevitability<br />

of a set of globally agreed rules and regulations of the<br />

economic game even from a purely commonsense standpoint.<br />

All the more, it is so when it is being asked “regardless<br />

of political complexion” ”in the light of the convulsions<br />

the world economy is going through”, whether “we need<br />

much stronger global regulation as well” with a set of<br />

international regulators enforcing an international code,<br />

notes Dr. Dani Rodrik(vide, the Economist, March 14 th ,<br />

<strong>2009</strong>), while arguing the logic of such global financial<br />

regulation as flawed.<br />

Financial sovereignty is a misnomer as much as a myth.<br />

Be it said, restricting sovereignty for mutually agreed<br />

purposes for overall good does not mean surrendering<br />

sovereignty. If you want to play the game fairly, frankly,<br />

fully and transparently, be it banking or sport, follow the<br />

pre-set rules and retain your cherished sovereignty. International<br />

game means international rules; that’s it. Even in<br />

American hegemonic heydays, its dependence on savings<br />

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T HE NEW MANTRA<br />

from the rest of the world for meeting its deficit financing is<br />

an accepted fact. It is not convincing when Dr. Dani<br />

Rodrik argues that a thin veneer of “international co-operation<br />

superimposed on strong national regulations” should<br />

be enough for a “far more stable and prosperous” world<br />

economy. Despite the recent excesses exposed externally in<br />

the banking field, Dr. Dani Rodrik is not convinced that<br />

operatives do not perform on highest ethical standards.<br />

The question of surrendering sovereignty does not arise<br />

here. There would not be intensive oversight over domestic<br />

operational practices. What will be put in place are issues<br />

like consensus in the creation of uniquely new financial<br />

instruments, mortgage practices where securitization is<br />

integrated, proof of their base while introducing newer<br />

instruments, a mechanism to supervise the modus operandi<br />

of supervision envisaged, accounting practices and standards<br />

that could adequately reveal transparency, and goalsetting<br />

based on good of all the international level participants.<br />

Knowing the performance of the International<br />

Monetary Fund over the years, it is felt, it cannot be made a<br />

global lender of last resort. Global participants should join<br />

in any rescue efforts. Cooperation and<br />

coordination of central banks and the<br />

issues they discussed be made known to<br />

all the global participants and that their<br />

suggestions should be followed up. The<br />

weaknesses of Basel I and Basel II be<br />

rectified based on reviews and continuous<br />

action taken reports and actions. It is<br />

precisely for preventing the neglect of<br />

the macro-prudential aspect of regulation<br />

that all countries have to keep<br />

adhering to rules of the game set at international level. It is<br />

not a question of sovereignty but accepting certain principles<br />

for safety. When credit ratings are downgraded, at<br />

present, they are often neglected or not taken seriously. The<br />

system should accept that such firms or institutions should<br />

be put under rigorous surveillance for remedial action and<br />

their merger or rehabilitation should be set into motion.<br />

The stage and state of development and the preferences<br />

and priority goals of nations form the basis for providing for<br />

their diversity through the global regulators. Global<br />

regulators could comprise personalities representing the<br />

four major clusters of nations viz. America, Europe, Asia<br />

For preventing<br />

the neglect<br />

of the macroprudential<br />

aspect<br />

of regulation, all<br />

must adhere to<br />

international rules<br />

and Emerging Economies. In fact, the fundamentally<br />

differing nature of each of these clusters could be evened<br />

out through concerted efforts at coordinating board levels,<br />

for, the financial regulations entail trade-offs to accommodate<br />

conflicting and competing objectives, practices and<br />

priorities. Dani Rodik says, “The more you value financial<br />

stability, the more you have to sacrifice financial innovation”.<br />

The recent financial innovations as collateral debt<br />

obligations/credit-default swaps/securitizations/mortgagebacked<br />

assets have been the sources of creative complexities<br />

which landed the world economy in the current mess.<br />

Innovations by themselves have no place in normal way of<br />

life unless they are likely to benefit very significantly. Few<br />

understood some of the recent financial innovations and yet<br />

few had the capacity and honesty to operate them. Regulators<br />

tend to become ignorant of the complexity of financial<br />

innovations and being regulators develop a tendency to take<br />

for granted that they are all-knowledgeable and capable of<br />

handling them. In actual practice, they remain in askance<br />

always and instruments were all-pervasive at country-level,<br />

state-level, prefectural level and the smallest of smallest<br />

geography and more so, thanks to recent<br />

highly innovative transport and communications<br />

technologies, move to different<br />

parts of America, Europe, Asia and the<br />

rest of the world. Ignorance of the<br />

ramifications of the financial instruments<br />

was regarded as an insult and<br />

hence all pretended and acted as if they<br />

are an inherent part of the newly created<br />

innovative financial world in which<br />

money just grows. Result, the world<br />

economy collapsed. One side may not fit all but the basic<br />

rules are universally applicable and of scientific value which<br />

should be respected by international participants.<br />

The recent international meltdown holds pointed lessons.<br />

That unless we act with intensity and in electric quickness<br />

with imaginative responses on an all-comprehensive basis,<br />

the broken inter-link between the real economy and<br />

financial sector cannot be reestablished in normal course<br />

as, for instance, banks may be coaxed to lend to borrowers<br />

but they do it at their own pace and tactics. Further, a<br />

cautious approach in Japan in the 1990s towards its housing<br />

and stock markets problems contributed to its ‘lost decade’.<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

On the other hand, the Nordic banking crisis in the 1990s<br />

was handled with alacrity to reverse the downturn. Again,<br />

macro-economic policies towards boosting the financing of<br />

infrastructure projects for sustaining creative consumption<br />

demand, on the lines John <strong>May</strong>nard Keynes had envisaged,<br />

could pave the way for accelerating the pace of reversing<br />

their slowdown. In these endeavours, coordinated efforts<br />

at global level are sine qua non for ensuring that the<br />

countries do not adopt beggar-thy-neighbour policies and<br />

take, in unison, steps to minimize damage, to extend<br />

support on all fronts and to have access to external funding.<br />

What is more, already in a globalised world, it is a fait<br />

accompli that no country could be “sovereign” in the<br />

traditional kingly way, (especially when<br />

every country swears to treat every other<br />

country as a sovereign independent<br />

nation) though it takes time to its realization<br />

(Charles Collyns: The Crisis through<br />

the Lens of History, Fund & Development,<br />

IMF, December 2008).<br />

Dr. Dani Rodrik maintains that different<br />

countries could have their own<br />

frontiers with some like France preferring<br />

to have more stability in reference to<br />

financial innovations or Brazil preferring<br />

to treat development banks on a different<br />

footing. In fact, however, within the<br />

broad consensus at global participatory<br />

agreement levels, broader issues are to<br />

be dealt with; each country depending on<br />

its economic, social and political structures<br />

continue to retain the functional<br />

independence. This is but obvious. This would mean that<br />

only rules are set as in GATT and the individual governments<br />

are liberty to implement as it suits them but only<br />

whether the ground rules agreed are followed be kept track<br />

for follow-up discussions from time to time and remind the<br />

governments of the expectations based on the pre-set<br />

consensus.<br />

The Rodrik prescription to fortify the home front first is<br />

irrefutable. Nonetheless, stricter international guidelines<br />

on setting limits on offshore centres to prevent transmission<br />

of financial instability and introduction of new financial<br />

instruments and such other contagion-generating practices<br />

The international<br />

architecture<br />

which is six<br />

and half<br />

decades old<br />

requires drastic<br />

reorganization<br />

and “products”, safety standards for new instruments,<br />

discipline to be ensured, would have to be monitored.<br />

Schemes for funds flow and cross-border transactions are<br />

central to the discussion. Financial segmentation is inevitable<br />

but decoupling would have to be ensured in matters<br />

contagious. Transparency is the essential core need for the<br />

system.<br />

The Bretton Woods experience reveal that instead of<br />

recognizing the diversity in socio-economic structures, the<br />

IMF and the World Bank prescribe “Washington consensus”<br />

and limit the operational freedom of countries in<br />

difficulty. Apart from prima facie national diversity in ways<br />

of living, prescriptions for a globalised world require much<br />

more deeper understanding of the<br />

economic lives within even the clusters of<br />

people living.<br />

Frequent interactions are essential at<br />

chief executives’ level to pinpoint aberrations<br />

observed in each other country’s<br />

supervisory work for monitoring follow-up<br />

work. While the leverage regulating,<br />

prescribing capital adequacy standards<br />

and keeping track of capital markets<br />

would be done by domestic authorities,<br />

the limits prescribed at mutually accepted<br />

global standards should be adhered to<br />

over a staggered periods by different<br />

countries depending on their level of<br />

development in their economies. But the<br />

time-frame set mutually be supervised at<br />

international levels.<br />

Whereas we may give credit to Bretton<br />

Woods institutions for achieving part of the agenda and<br />

objectives envisaged, the fact remains that the world<br />

economy would have grown in any case by their own efforts<br />

of several individual countries like Japan, Germany, China,<br />

India, and the rest of Asia leading to large quantum jumps<br />

in international trade, tie-ups, technological and financial<br />

collaborations and investments. The international architecture<br />

which is six and half decades old requires drastic<br />

reorganization in the light of newer economic and political<br />

powers with tectonic changes in widening and deepening<br />

relationships among the participants in globalization<br />

process. Progress cannot emerge on a near-automatic basis.<br />

122 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE NEW MANTRA<br />

Hot money flows, stock markets internationalization,<br />

capital flows of long-term nature, legal, diplomatic and<br />

economic advisories on a global scale, commercial and<br />

investment banks operating on cross-border spectrum and<br />

news flows through hyperactive media are some of the<br />

pointers to urgency for change in mindsets. The entire<br />

frame-work for operational groundwork has undergone a<br />

sea change. Virtually this situation leads to central banks<br />

becoming heavily dependent on their counterparts in the<br />

rest of the world more in some cases but not so much in<br />

others. Recent initiatives in policy-making amply prove<br />

this point. Perforce, one takes cognizance of the rest.<br />

Hence, they need jointly approve new financial instruments<br />

at a joint forum after weighing, in advance, the pros and<br />

cons of their short-term and long-term impacts bearing in<br />

mind that their world-wide impacts cannot be negated as<br />

fast and as easily as domestic impact could be done. After<br />

all, they are to be implemented in the highly and intensively<br />

linked global banking structures. Such mechanisms would<br />

throw up scope to react or reject hyperactivity in any one<br />

sector of industry, region, business area, geography, or<br />

service providers. Also, even excessive progress in one<br />

specific area be subject to questioning at the level of<br />

international forum for ensuring suitable balancing act.<br />

Events have proved that volatility in progress is as dangerous<br />

as volatility in sluggishness. Question success as much<br />

as failure. Danger is also embedded in success.<br />

In banking, which is the nerve centre of modern economic<br />

activity, the executives remunerations cannot be linked to<br />

higher figures of sanctions, disbursements, deposit raisings<br />

or in spreading any other banking and related activities,<br />

especially because extremely high figures would mean<br />

efficiency in processing is diluted. Loans could be without<br />

rigorous evaluation of credit proposals, deposit-raising at<br />

extra-hidden costs, disbursements by sacrificing compliances<br />

by the borrowers or without requisite progress in<br />

implementation of the assisted projects, or spread of<br />

banking habits etc. by creating paper records without any<br />

lasting impact, now or later, on the beneficiaries. In any<br />

case, extra payments be restricted to a minimum and be<br />

confined to extra human efforts - manual or intellectual -<br />

put in for specific purposes. Moreover, institutional success<br />

is a team effort of several executives/operatives and therefore<br />

one section, especially the higher ones, should not be<br />

liberally rewarded ignoring the rest of the team members.<br />

By now, it has emerged that for better world order the<br />

major objectives include boosting global demand; regulating<br />

hedge funds, global banks, and tax havens; reforms in<br />

bank regulating mechanisms, in supervising structures, and<br />

in accounting standards; bankers’ remunerations; effective<br />

trading in derivatives; role of rating agencies; preventing<br />

disunity among global players; information sharing among<br />

the top international banks; dynamic provisioning standards<br />

with variations in good and bad times; and globally<br />

acceptable coordination and cooperating standards. In<br />

November 2008 and in April <strong>2009</strong>, international efforts<br />

being made, it is hoped, will bear fruit. Viewed against this<br />

background, in a globalised world, intensity in monitoring<br />

should be raised to a higher level. We cannot say that a<br />

“global” village is not some sort of a loosely-knit political<br />

and economic entity. Coupling of the world has proved<br />

itself despite reluctance on the part of thinkers. Apart from<br />

trade and capital flows, several human activities that have<br />

ample bearing, crave for overall treatment, for which it is<br />

sine qua non to have international supervisory arrangements,<br />

agreed in advance, for adoption of innovative<br />

operative mechanisms and their products and for monitoring<br />

the activities for smoother functioning of the world<br />

economy.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat, Allen Lane -<br />

Penguin Books, 2005<br />

• Allen Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence, The Penguin<br />

Press, 2007<br />

• David M. Smick, The World is Curved, Portfolio, 2008<br />

• A special report on the world economy, The Economist,<br />

London, October 11 th , 2008<br />

• Dani Rodrik, The Economist, March 14 th , <strong>2009</strong><br />

• Charles Collyns, The Crisis through the Lens of History,<br />

Fund & Development, IMF, December 2008<br />

• Obama seeks global action : The Economic Times, 25 th<br />

March, <strong>2009</strong><br />

• Mada, K.U., "A Journey Through Development Banking",<br />

Kamal Offset Printers, Mumbai, 2005.<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Internationalization of<br />

Intellectual Property Rights and<br />

its Impact on the Developing<br />

Countries: A Review<br />

Ruchi Sharma<br />

Department of Economics<br />

and Statistics, Tata Services<br />

Limited, Mumbai<br />

K.K.Saxena<br />

Director, Pacific Institute of<br />

Management and Technology,<br />

Udaipur<br />

Intellectual property (IP) refers to<br />

creations of the mind: inventions,<br />

literary and artistic works, and<br />

symbols, names, images, and designs used<br />

in commerce. Intellectual property rights<br />

(IPRs) are legal and institutional devices to<br />

protect IP as these rights bestow the status of<br />

property on inventions and expression (Sherwood<br />

1997). These rights give right holder an exclusive<br />

control over the commercial use of a creation for a<br />

limited time period. IPRs are territorial in<br />

nature, that is, the level and conditions<br />

of protection are determined<br />

by the national laws<br />

and enforcement institutions.<br />

1<br />

124 THE IIPM THINK TANK


K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

Internationalization has entered the arena of IPRs that<br />

has been traditionally regarded to be in the purview of<br />

domestic regulations with Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual<br />

Property Rights (TRIPs) under the aegis of World<br />

Trade Organization (WTO). This agreement has triggered<br />

the debate on the implications of the internationalization of<br />

IPRs for the countries with varying level of economic and<br />

technological development. The theoretical models have<br />

extended competing hypotheses on the impact of stronger<br />

IPRs on the developing countries. The empirical literature<br />

has not helped much in removing the ambiguity over the<br />

potential impact of TRIPs. This paper reviews the concerned<br />

theoretical as well as the empirical literature<br />

mapping the process of internationalization<br />

of IPRs and its impact on the developing<br />

countries. 2<br />

The organization of the paper is as<br />

follows: Section 1 discusses the concept<br />

and the quantification of internationalization<br />

of IPRs. It further delineates the<br />

evolution in the academic argument for<br />

the introduction of these rights at<br />

international level. Section 2 discusses<br />

the theoretical and empirical literature<br />

on internationalization of the IPRs<br />

across the globe. In subsection 2.1 we<br />

have discussed the literature arguing a<br />

case against the internationalization of<br />

IPRs. In subsection 2.2 we have built a<br />

case for the internationalization of IPRs.<br />

Section 3 concludes the paper and<br />

identifies gaps in the literature for future<br />

research.<br />

1. Internationalization of IPRs<br />

1.1 The Concept<br />

The need for international protection of IP became evident<br />

when foreign exhibitors refused to attend the International<br />

Exhibition of Inventions in Vienna in 1873 because they<br />

were afraid that their ideas would be stolen and exploited<br />

commercially in other countries (WIPO 2005). These rights<br />

entered the arena of multilateral agreements with the<br />

introduction of TRIPs under the aegis of WTO.<br />

The protection of IP at international level comprises of<br />

The empirical<br />

literature has<br />

not helped much<br />

in removing the<br />

ambiguity over the<br />

potential impact<br />

of TRIPs<br />

national treatment, reciprocity, and harmonization of legal<br />

stipulations and enforcement procedures. National treatment<br />

and reciprocity have been formalized in international<br />

treaties since the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne<br />

Convention of 1886. TRIPs agreement has introduced<br />

further stipulations on IPRs legislation by referring to<br />

previous international treaties. National treatment, according<br />

to Article 3 of the TRIPs agreement, implies that “each<br />

Member accord to the nationals of other Members treatment<br />

no less favourable than that it accords to its own<br />

nationals with regard to protection of intellectual property”.<br />

In addition to these provisions TRIPs agreement has<br />

extended the basic principle of WTO that is most favored<br />

nation (MFN) to IPRs. MFN requires,<br />

according to Article 4 of TRIPs, that<br />

“with regard to the protection of intellectual<br />

property, any advantage, favour,<br />

privilege or immunity granted by a<br />

Member to the nationals of any other<br />

country shall be accorded immediately<br />

and unconditionally to the nationals of all<br />

other Members”. TRIPs agreement<br />

covers seven types of IP. These are: (i)<br />

copyrights, (ii) trademarks, (iii) geographical<br />

indications, (iv) patents, (v)<br />

industrial designs, (vi) layout-designs<br />

(topographies) of integrated circuits and,<br />

(viii) trade secrets. This agreement lays<br />

down minimum substantive standards of<br />

protection for formulating domestic<br />

legislation on IPRs. It has specific<br />

provisions for the subject matter of the<br />

coverage, rights covered, exceptions granted, and duration<br />

of the coverage. The agreement prescribes remedies which<br />

should be available in member states to enforce these rights.<br />

Disputes under TRIPs are brought before the WTO which<br />

is authorized to carry very specific enforcement actions.<br />

Thus TRIPs as an umbrella agreement for various types of<br />

IP has internationalized the IPRs regime of every signatory<br />

country of WTO that will essentially result in the increase<br />

in the strength of IPRs of these countries. 3<br />

The empirical analysis of the implications of the growing<br />

strength of IPRs as under TRIPs requires indices to gauge<br />

the strength of IPRs across nations. A few studies have been<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

conducted to formulate such an index. The existing indices<br />

to quantify IPRs strength across countries are distinguished<br />

on the basis of the construction approach adopted by these<br />

indices. First category of these indices is based on survey of<br />

practitioners’ opinions, survey data, interview studies and<br />

statistical analysis of the data thus collected. Mansfield<br />

(1995), Seyoum (1996), and Ostergard (2000) have used this<br />

technique to calculate the difference in IPRs protection<br />

across different countries. The second sect of indices is<br />

constructed on the basis of legislative provisions of the<br />

domestic laws and among these indices Ginarte and Park<br />

(1997) index (hereinafter GPI) is widely used. They have<br />

calculated index of patent rights for 110 countries for the<br />

period 1960-1990. 4 Index is calculated as unweighted<br />

average of the five values measuring extent of the coverage,<br />

membership in the international agreement, provision for<br />

the loss of protection, enforcement mechanism, and duration<br />

of the protection. Lesser (2002) have further updated<br />

the GPI as developing countries abide by the TRIPs stipulations.<br />

The revised index includes protectable subject matter,<br />

convention membership, enforcement, administration and<br />

the duration of protection as different<br />

components. The protectable subject<br />

matter is accepted to be compliant with<br />

the TRIPs agreement if countries<br />

certify their compliance with WTO as<br />

mandated by Article 63.2 of the TRIPs<br />

agreement. However, it does not reflect<br />

on the change in the coverage followed<br />

by the compliance. The membership of<br />

countries to UPOV and the PCT are<br />

mandated though TRIPs does not<br />

require compulsory membership to<br />

these treaties. It is evident that none of the above mentioned<br />

studies has minimum standards based on specifications of<br />

the TRIPs. An index based on such standards will show the<br />

change in the protection enjoyed by the right holders in<br />

respective countries after complying with the agreement.<br />

1.2 The Background<br />

During 19 th century, the proponents of free trade opposed<br />

the patent rights provision as an institution for restriction of<br />

competition. The antipatent movement disappeared after<br />

1873 with simultaneous weakening of the free trade movement<br />

in Europe (Machulp and Penrose 1954). In the 20 th<br />

century, proponents of the free trade have argued for<br />

building strong and similar IPRs across the globe as evident<br />

from the passage of TRIPs. The agreement has been<br />

incorporated to remove uncertainty in the international<br />

trade of knowledge sensitive goods by internationalizing<br />

IPRs across the globe. This ideological shift calls for<br />

attention and the analysis of probable reasons for the same.<br />

This requires observation of the key economic phenomenon<br />

of the mid and late 20 th century vis-à-vis the theoretical<br />

developments in the economic literature.<br />

The growth in the institutional economics, following<br />

seminal work of Coase (1960) in identifying the market<br />

failure in case of goods with externalities, has contributed<br />

to the shift in the trade theorists’ perspective from antipatent<br />

protection to pro-patent protection. The market<br />

failure in knowledge sensitive goods as discussed by Arrow<br />

(1962) is due to the economic characteristics of information<br />

as a commodity and, in particular, of invention as a process<br />

for the production of information. According to him, the<br />

basic characteristics of information, indivisibilities, inappropriability,<br />

and uncertainty, are the<br />

classic reasons for the failure of<br />

perfect competition to achieve<br />

optimality in resource allocation and<br />

utilization. Non rivalry and partial<br />

excludability have been identified as<br />

the defining characteristics of<br />

knowledge by Romer (1990). These<br />

characteristics render knowledge<br />

goods - goods that have market value<br />

derived from the knowledge contained-<br />

as impure public goods.<br />

Owing to these features, the marginal cost of providing<br />

additional unit of knowledge good is zero or minimal once<br />

fixed costs have been incurred to produce these goods.<br />

Therefore, according to the marginalistic principle of<br />

optimization the price of the knowledge good must be zero.<br />

The initial costs of generating these knowledge goods,<br />

however, are quite extensive. Consequently, market fails in<br />

providing efficient output of knowledge goods and necessitates<br />

state intervention. The state intervention by means of<br />

IPRs makes knowledge based products or processes<br />

excludable 5 . Thus approbability of knowledge 6 depends<br />

The basic<br />

characteristics<br />

of information,<br />

inappropriability and<br />

uncertainty are the<br />

classic reasons for<br />

the failure of perfect<br />

competition<br />

126 THE IIPM THINK TANK


K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

upon the IPRs regime of a country for that defines the<br />

Table 1: Share of Counterfeit Goods<br />

Industry<br />

Source: OECD (1998)<br />

In recent times,<br />

knowledge is<br />

identified as a<br />

'Global Public<br />

Good' with<br />

wide spread<br />

externalities<br />

Share of Counterfeit Goods as a<br />

Percentage of Turnover<br />

Watches 5<br />

Medicine 6<br />

Perfumes 5<br />

Aircraft spare parts 10<br />

Toys 12<br />

Music 33<br />

Video 50<br />

Software 43<br />

extent to which innovators are able to recoup their investment<br />

in research and development (R&D hereinafter). In<br />

the recent times, knowledge is identified as a “Global Public<br />

Good” with wide spread externalities that do not respect<br />

national boundaries (Maskus and Reichman 2004). Specifically,<br />

countries that do not undertake significant amount of<br />

R&D have strong free riding incentives and patent protection<br />

is not necessarily welfare enhancing for these countries.<br />

Intervention by an international organization is thus<br />

required to deal with the consequential market failure by<br />

providing adequate IPRs protection at global level. The<br />

recognition of these aspects has not only brought the issue<br />

of IPRs on the front of multilateral agreements but also<br />

blended it with the trade talks under WTO. Stiglitz (1989)<br />

and Stewart and Ghani (1991) have furthered the argument<br />

for constructing appropriate IPRs as they consider the<br />

positive impact of economic institutions, shielding goods<br />

with strong positive externalities like knowledge, on the<br />

economic growth of the developing countries.<br />

Krugman (1979) in his seminal paper discussed issues of<br />

technological development and transfer<br />

in the North-South framework and<br />

concluded that technology transfer from<br />

North to South will increase the welfare<br />

of South. He foresaw that “… the income<br />

of Northern resident depends in part on<br />

the rents from their monopoly of newly<br />

developed products. This monopoly is<br />

continually eroded by technological<br />

borrowings and must be maintained by<br />

constant innovation of new products.<br />

Like Alice and the Red Queen, the developed region must<br />

keep running to stay in the same place”, (Krugman 1979, p.<br />

262). The key economic phenomena of the last three<br />

decades of the 20 th century corroborated Krugman’s insight.<br />

Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan<br />

witnessed unparalleled economic growth after 1970’s.<br />

These newly industrialized countries absorbed substantial<br />

amount of technological learning under their respective<br />

weak IPRs protection regime during the early years of their<br />

development 7 . Secondly, knowledge goods entering the<br />

international trade increased considerably as shown by<br />

Braga et al. (2000, p. 16) “…that share of knowledge-intensive<br />

or high technology products in total world goods trade<br />

has doubled between 1980 and 1994 from 12 to 24 percent.”<br />

Thirdly, there has been considerable increase in the imitation<br />

of these knowledge goods. The estimates of the counterfeit<br />

and pirated goods as a percentage of turnover of the<br />

different industry are collected from various sources by<br />

OECD (1998) are shown in Table 1. It is evident that huge<br />

economic losses are suffered by firms on<br />

account of counterfeiting and pirating.<br />

During the later part of 1970’s and early<br />

1980’s the developing countries afforded<br />

very little or no protection for IPRs 8 .<br />

Therefore, TRIPs agreement could be<br />

perceived as a panic reaction by the<br />

developed countries to the fear of losing<br />

their comparative advantage in knowledge<br />

goods in the global market. The<br />

developed countries needed to freeze<br />

their monopoly rents by increasing the strength of IPRs in<br />

the developing countries 9 .<br />

1.3 The Debate<br />

The study of history of patent laws in developed nations<br />

shows that they have chosen IPRs regime according to the<br />

need of their industries; e.g. Switzerland introduced mechanical<br />

invention patent to protect its watch industry, but<br />

initially withheld patent protection on chemical substances<br />

and processes because its infant chemical industry relied<br />

upon imitating other’s technology (Kaufer 1989, p.10).<br />

Ginarte and Park (1997) shows that more developed<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Table: 2 GPI of the South and North from 1985-2000<br />

1985 1990 1995 2000<br />

South<br />

Mean 2.11 2.12 2.43 2.86<br />

Standard Deviation 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75<br />

Count 50 50 50 50<br />

North<br />

Mean 3.40 3.45 3.80 4.08<br />

Standard Deviation 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.59<br />

Count 23 23 23 23<br />

countries provide stronger protection. However, IPRs<br />

protection does not depend upon level of economic development<br />

per se; it varies with R&D, market freedom and<br />

openness. Maskus (2000b) has extended this work through<br />

an extensive regression analysis of the determinants of<br />

patent index in 1985 and 1990 for 72 countries. Results show<br />

that market <strong>size</strong> has no significant impact on IPRs. There is<br />

an inverted U shape relationship between patent strength<br />

and real per capita income. The results suggest that the per<br />

capita real capita real income at which patent protection<br />

become weakest is approximately $2000 in 1985 international<br />

dollars. Chen and Puttitanun (2002) have shown that<br />

country’s IPRs depend upon the level of development<br />

(technological ability) in a non monotonic way, first decreasing<br />

and then increasing, that is the presence of U-shaped<br />

relationship between IPRs and levels of economic development<br />

10 . This questions the validity of the internationalization<br />

of the IPRs regime of the developing country (referred<br />

to as South hereinafter) 11 at varying level of economic<br />

development under TRIPs that essentially results in the<br />

increase in the strength of IPRs. Table 2, shows the GPI for<br />

the South and the developed countries (referred to as North<br />

hereinafter) 12 . There is difference between the North and<br />

South mean value with no sign of convergence that is<br />

antithesis to the internationalization of IPRs. However, the<br />

difference between two averages that was increasing until<br />

1995 decline considerably in 2000. Since, GPI is not based<br />

on TRIPs stipulation it cannot capture the convergence<br />

between the North’s and South’s IPRs regime. The important<br />

issue is the growth in the mean value of the South IPRs<br />

strength and reduction in its standard deviation over the<br />

past 15 years for the South. It is evident that the strength of<br />

IPRs has increased in the South.<br />

The economic differences between the North and the<br />

South are captured by per capita gross domestic product<br />

(GDPPC) and the growth rate of per capita gross domestic<br />

product (GGDPPC). The existing level of technological<br />

activity in both regions is captured by a technological index<br />

(TI) that is a simple average of four variables. These<br />

variables are: (i) R&D expenditure as a percentage of gross<br />

domestic product (GDP) 13 (Lall 2003), (ii) Researchers per<br />

million inhabitants, (iii) total number of patents granted<br />

(Kumar 2002; Lall 2003), and (iv) scientific and technical<br />

journal articles (Kumar 2002). The last two measures are<br />

deflated by GDP to adjust for the economic <strong>size</strong> of individual<br />

country. The R&D expenditure and researchers are<br />

inputs in the R&D production function where as patents<br />

and scientific and technical journal articles capture the<br />

output produced 14 . The value of each variable for every<br />

country is standardized to calculate an index for every<br />

country (Lall 2003) 15 . Further, simple average of index value<br />

of countries stratified as North and South is calculated for<br />

each variable to get a collective index for the North and the<br />

South. The results are given in the Table 3. It is evident that<br />

the level of economic growth is very high for North as<br />

compare to South. The growth index is almost similar that<br />

makes the convergence further difficult for the countries<br />

starting with low base. TI shows that North is more involved<br />

in the technological activity for all the years covered. It is<br />

evident that North is technological leader with extensive<br />

Table 3: Economic and Technological Differences<br />

between North and South<br />

GDPPC 1985 1990 1995 2000<br />

North 0.732 0.730 0.695 0.734<br />

South 0.163 0.163 0.171 0.179<br />

GGDPPC<br />

North 0.529 0.480 0.178 0.622<br />

South 0.469 0.469 0.181 0.585<br />

TI<br />

North 0.462 0.375 0.460 0.405<br />

South 0.111 0.133 0.145 0.118<br />

Note that the data set for each year may not consist of all the countries contained in the<br />

previous years thus inter-temporal comparison based on this table are not reliable.<br />

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K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

research activity. These differences are at the root of the<br />

debate on the validity of harmonization of IPRs for the<br />

South on the lines of the North. It has been argued that<br />

TRIPs has taken away the flexibility of South to design their<br />

IPRs regime as per their developmental needs. On the<br />

contrary, some researchers have argued that there are many<br />

in built flexibilities with in the TRIPs that can be exploited<br />

by South to their advantage (Watal 2001). In the wake of<br />

growing discontent with the TRIPs flexibilities are given to<br />

developing and least developed countries in Doha declaration<br />

on the TRIPs and public health. There is, however, no<br />

empirical evidence to check whether South has used the in<br />

built flexibilities in the TRIPs.<br />

2. Impact of Internationalization of IPRs on South<br />

The subsection 2.1 discusses theoretical literature on the<br />

case against internationalization of IPRs and the empirical<br />

findings of a few studies conducted for the same. Section 2.2<br />

makes a case for internationalization of IPRs.<br />

2.1 Case against Internationalization of IPRs<br />

IPRs involve trade off between static<br />

losses due to dead weight losses generated<br />

as supplier monopolized and gains<br />

as innovations are stimulated in the long<br />

run. The impact of important innovations<br />

(in the form of dynamic gains),<br />

however, is not restricted to national<br />

boundaries. Thus the international<br />

attitude regarding the protection of IPRs<br />

provides incentive to innovators to<br />

conduct R&D. Theoretical literature on<br />

the international protection of the IPRs is very limited and<br />

most of it originated during and after TRIPs negotiations.<br />

This literature has focused on the issue of strengthening of<br />

the IPRs in the South as the reduction of imitation of<br />

knowledge goods. The analysis of internationalization of<br />

IPRs in North-South framework has predominantly inferred<br />

that developing countries tend to lose from protecting<br />

IPRs.<br />

In partial equilibrium model, Chin and Grossman (1988)<br />

have considered a case of an innovating firm in North (process<br />

innovation) and the imitating firm in South and the<br />

strategic interactions between these firms competing in an<br />

The impact of<br />

innovations,<br />

in the form of<br />

dynamic gains,<br />

is not restricted<br />

to national<br />

boundaries<br />

oligopolistic market. The welfare of the South, sum of<br />

producers’ and consumers’ surplus depends upon the<br />

market <strong>size</strong> of South and the productiveness of R&D<br />

expenditure of North (that determines the extent of cost<br />

reduction). As provision for IPRs protection is provided in<br />

South the outcome of strategic interactions between firms<br />

can result in either strategic predation or monopoly by<br />

Northern firm when cost reductions are extensive. In both<br />

situations producers’ in South gain nothing. The welfare of<br />

South thus increases only if the consumers’ surplus is high<br />

due to major cost reductions. Deardroff (1990) argued that<br />

there are diminishing returns to inventive activity, i.e., as<br />

more countries provide IPRs coverage extra stimulation<br />

provided to innovation becomes smaller. Therefore, at some<br />

point costs of extending monopoly outweigh the benefits of<br />

generating inventions.<br />

Helpman (1993) uses a dynamic general equilibrium<br />

North-South model to study IPRs, growth and welfare. It is<br />

assumed that North innovates and South imitates. Innovation<br />

is modeled as an ongoing process and the strength of<br />

the IPRs regime is associated with the flow probability that<br />

a given product protected by a patent in<br />

North will be imitated in South.<br />

Thus this study evaluates the welfare<br />

consequences of marginal changes in the<br />

rate of imitation. The regional welfare<br />

levels are influenced through two<br />

channels as IPRs protection gets stronger<br />

in South. Firstly, the reduction of imitation<br />

shifts production to North. Secondly,<br />

this inter regional shift improves terms<br />

of trade of North (as wages increases)<br />

and deteriorates terms of trade of South (as wages decline).<br />

These factors lead to welfare losses for South. Moreover, by<br />

lowering the rate of imitation and prolonging the expected<br />

duration of monopoly of each Northern innovator innovation<br />

increases in North. As firms now produce longer in<br />

North, the demand for Northern labor and Northern wage<br />

increase and hence raise the cost of innovation. Thus the<br />

rate of innovation decreases in steady state. The study<br />

concludes: “Who benefits from tight intellectual property<br />

rights in less developed countries? My analysis suggests that<br />

if anyone benefits, it is not the South”, (Helpman 1993, p.<br />

1274). The empirical study by Kanwar and Evenson (2003)<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

has refuted these claims of non linear relationship between<br />

the rate of innovation and IPRs. The results of above<br />

mentioned studies depend on assumptions of similar tastes<br />

in both regions, no innovative capacity of South and imitation<br />

as the only mode for technology transfer. The results<br />

change as these assumptions are relaxed.<br />

2.2 Case for Internationalization of IPRs<br />

The issue pertinent for South as its IPRs regime is internationalized<br />

is the impact of IPRs on the economic growth.<br />

Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2004) employing panel of 80<br />

countries for four sub-periods: 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89<br />

and 1990-94 using GPI have analyzed the impact of IPRs on<br />

the economic growth. Their results<br />

indicate that countries with high per<br />

capita incomes are likely to grow more<br />

rapidly the stronger their IPR protection.<br />

By allowing for more than one threshold<br />

however, they revealed that among the<br />

lower-income countries there are differences<br />

in the relationship between IPR<br />

protection and growth. IPR protection<br />

has significantly positive impact on<br />

growth in the very poor countries,<br />

however, for the middle-income countries<br />

no significant relationship is found.<br />

Falvey, Foster and Memedovic (2006)<br />

have further confirmed the results.<br />

IPRs influence economic growth<br />

through increase in total factor productivity<br />

by stimulating innovation. Technical<br />

change in Solow (1957) sense implies<br />

shift in the production possibility curve that occurs due to<br />

the positive dynamic externalities of innovations (Stewart<br />

and Ghani 1991). Deolalikar and Roller (1989) using panel<br />

firm level data for the period 1975-79 for 145 firms in<br />

chemical and engineering sectors for India has shown that<br />

despite the limited protection of IPRs in India, patenting is<br />

positively and significantly associated with total factor<br />

productivity growth at firm level. Lach (1995) has used data<br />

of 20 manufacturing industries from 1959-86 and has shown<br />

that output elasticity of knowledge is 0.30. Now I will<br />

discuss the impact of IPRs on spurring domestic as well as<br />

international innovations to ascertain two broad channels of<br />

IPRs influence<br />

economic growth<br />

through increase<br />

in total factor<br />

productivity<br />

by stimulating<br />

innovation<br />

gain for the South. International innovations are further<br />

transferred by means of imports, foreign direct investment<br />

(FDI), and licensing which are influenced by IPRs.<br />

2.2.1 Domestic Innovation<br />

The impact of IPRs on innovation is much debated upon.<br />

The empirical literature considers the issue employing<br />

either firm/industry or cross country data. IPRs gain<br />

importance as imitation threat is faced by producers of<br />

knowledge goods. Mansfield (1985) in a study of 100 firms<br />

from 13 manufacturing industries shows that for products<br />

and process, odds are better than 50-50 that a development<br />

decision leaks out in less than 18 months. Personnel turnover,<br />

informal communication networks<br />

among engineers and scientists working at<br />

various firms, professional meetings, input<br />

suppliers, and customs are different<br />

channels through which information leaks<br />

out. The extent of imitation is determined<br />

by industry specific characteristics (Mansfield<br />

1985). These characteristics include<br />

R&D undertaken by competitors that<br />

affects the absorptive capacity of firms<br />

(Cohen and Levinthal 1989), tacitness of<br />

the technology, and circumstantial<br />

sensitivity of industry technology (Evenson<br />

and Westphal 1995). The benefits of<br />

the original producers from the commercialization<br />

of new knowledge good fall<br />

considerably due to imitation.<br />

Machlup and Penrose (1950) have<br />

propounded exchange for secret thesis<br />

(apart from the abovementioned monopoly-profit-incentive<br />

thesis) for making provision for IPRs. Disclosure requirements<br />

of the patent application ensure that ample information<br />

is made available to researchers for furthering R&D<br />

process. Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) have elaborated that<br />

disclosure requirements are important as the inventor<br />

cannot exploit all the possible uses of an invention. IPRs by<br />

facilitating contractual agreements between the original<br />

right holder and other innovators help in wider dissemination<br />

and use of intellectual creations.<br />

In the cross country analysis, Chen and Puttitanun (2002)<br />

have focused on the issue of innovativeness of the develop-<br />

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K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

ing countries as their strength of IPRs increases. They have<br />

a one country two sector model (domestic and importing<br />

sector). The basic trade-off that is faced by the government<br />

for making an optimal choice of IPRs policy is as follows. In<br />

the importing sector, less imitation (strong IPRs) means<br />

lower product quality of the domestic firm and less competition<br />

for the foreign firm. Thus consumers pay high prices for<br />

goods. It not only reduces consumer surplus but also shifts<br />

income to the foreign firm and further reduces domestic<br />

social surplus. In the local sector, less imitation provides<br />

incentive to the domestic firm for innovation and efficient<br />

investment in higher quality technology (product) leading to<br />

higher social surplus. The optimal choice varies with the<br />

technological capability of a country that<br />

is determined by the level of her economic<br />

development. The study concludes that<br />

with low level of technological capability a<br />

country is likely to have greater benefits<br />

from imitation of foreign technology as<br />

compare to innovation. However, after<br />

reaching a certain level of technological<br />

capability domestic innovation responds<br />

to IPRs and innovation effect dominates.<br />

Chen and Puttitanun (2002) empirically<br />

verified their thesis in a panel of 64 developing<br />

countries over the time period<br />

1975-95 using GPI for measuring IPRs<br />

strength. The results show that innovation<br />

in a developing country (measured<br />

by number of patent applications filed by<br />

residents of a country) increases in its<br />

IPRs protection. Kanwar and Evenson<br />

(2003) estimate a panel model for two time periods for 32<br />

countries using GPI. They measured the impact of IPRs<br />

protection on innovation using R&D investment as a<br />

proportion of GNP. The study concludes that stronger IPRs<br />

protection can help spur innovation and technological<br />

progress which in turn should positively affect growth. In a<br />

related paper, Schneider (2005) examines the importance of<br />

IPR protection, high-tech imports and FDI on innovation<br />

and on per capita GDP growth. Innovation is measured<br />

using the number of U.S. patent applications made by<br />

residents of a given country. The model is estimated on<br />

panel data for 47 developed and developing countries over<br />

The research<br />

undertaken by<br />

Schneider suggest<br />

that innovation<br />

responds<br />

positively to IPR<br />

protection<br />

the period 1970-1990. The results suggest that innovation<br />

responds positively to IPR protection. Splitting the sample<br />

into developed and developing countries, Schneider finds<br />

that while IPRs have a positive impact on innovation in<br />

developed countries, the impact in developing countries is<br />

negative, and often significant. Falvey, Foster and Memedovic<br />

(2006) have further confirmed the impact of IPRs on<br />

domestic patenting as well as nonlinearities involved using<br />

threshold analysis.<br />

2.2.2 International Innovation and Technology<br />

Transfer<br />

Theoretical model shows that increase in the strength of<br />

South’s IPRs increases the innovativeness<br />

of the North. The North, with comparative<br />

advantage in technology production,<br />

responds to the increase in the market <strong>size</strong><br />

of the South as the trade in the counterfeit<br />

and pirated goods is restricted by stronger<br />

IPRs stipulation (Chin and Grossman<br />

1988). This increase can be a potential<br />

source of gain for the developing countries<br />

if the R&D productivity is high.<br />

Diwan and Rodrik (1991) argue that<br />

Northern and Southern countries have<br />

different technological needs. For<br />

example, North would like to develop<br />

drugs against cancer and heart disease,<br />

where as South benefits more from drugs<br />

against tropical diseases. In their model,<br />

innovation takes place in North and<br />

different degrees of IPRs protection is<br />

granted in North and South. Owing to the scarcity of R&D<br />

resources, two regions compete with each other to encourage<br />

the development of technologies suited to their needs.<br />

Innovators in North face a market that is a weighted average<br />

of North and South’s market with weights being the relative<br />

market <strong>size</strong> and patent protection. Increase in any of these<br />

factors increase the weights assigned to South and more<br />

resources are diverted to innovations catering to needs of<br />

the South. Thus they have concluded that but for strong<br />

Southern protection of IPRs Northern countries will not<br />

develop technologies largely needed by the South 16 . Sharma<br />

and Saxena (2007) have provided empirical evidence to<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

support the hypothesis by using cross country data of 39<br />

developing countries for the year 1995.<br />

The current literature extensively analyzes channels of<br />

transmission for the R&D conducted in North to flow to<br />

South. South is a net importer of technology for its developmental<br />

needs. Technology transfer is, therefore, an important<br />

issue in the internationalization of IPRs for South.<br />

“Technology transfer” is the process by which commercial<br />

technology is disseminated (UNCTAD 2001). It refers to<br />

the spread of technology from one industry to another, or<br />

among different economies (Rosegger 1996, p.198). The<br />

market for technology transfer is susceptible to market<br />

failure from small number bargaining, appropriability<br />

problem, uncertainty, transaction costs,<br />

and impacted information coupled with<br />

opportunism (Caves, Crookell, and<br />

Killing 1983). With respect to market<br />

failure in technology goods IPRs play<br />

different role, against the traditional role<br />

of providing exclusive commercial rights<br />

to creators, of facilitating market transactions.<br />

“Rather, by protecting property<br />

rights, patent here open the market for<br />

trade in technological information”<br />

(Gallini and Winter 1985, p. 238). The<br />

market facilitating aspect of IPRs was<br />

identified in the 14 th century as noted by<br />

David and Olsen (1992, p. 518) “in the<br />

fourteenth century such (patent) grants<br />

were employed to encourage the introduction<br />

of foreign technologies through<br />

the transfer of skilled craftsmen from<br />

abroad”. Penrose (1973) identified MNEs as the “chief<br />

international investors” and an important source of technology<br />

transfer. The means for technology transfer include<br />

trade in capital and intermediate goods, FDI and licensing<br />

(Saggi 2003; Falvey, Foster, and Memedovic 2006). The<br />

impact of IPRs on these three modes is discussed below.<br />

Trade, FDI, and Licensing<br />

Grossman and Helpman (1991) have modeled an endogenous<br />

technological progress that results from the profit<br />

maximizing behavior of far-sighted entrepreneur. They have<br />

shown that as the resident of the small country interact with<br />

The research<br />

results of Fink<br />

and Braga show<br />

significant positive<br />

impact of IPRs on<br />

bilateral flows of<br />

non fuel trade<br />

agents of the outside world they gain access to a body of<br />

accumulated wisdom as well as some of the new discoveries.<br />

The foreign contribution to local knowledge capital stock<br />

increases with the number of commercial interactions<br />

between domestic and foreign agents and the extent of<br />

spillovers increase between two countries with increase in<br />

the bilateral trade.<br />

Maskus and Penubarti (1995) address whether the<br />

distribution of bilateral trade across nations depends on the<br />

importing country’s IPRs regime. The reason for ambiguity<br />

is the trade off between the enhanced market power for the<br />

firm created by strong IPRs and the larger effective market<br />

<strong>size</strong> generated by reduced abilities of local firm to imitate<br />

the product. The market power effect<br />

would reduce the elasticity of demand for<br />

the foreign firm and would ordinarily<br />

induce the firm to export less of its<br />

patentable product. The market expansion<br />

effect would, however, increase the<br />

demand. The market expansion effect<br />

tends to be more dominant in larger<br />

countries with highly competitive local<br />

imitative firms while the market power<br />

tends to be stronger in smaller countries<br />

with limited capacity for imitation.<br />

The empirical results strongly suggest<br />

that exporters discriminate in their<br />

sales decision across export markets,<br />

taking account of local patent laws.<br />

Fink and Braga (1999) have analyzed<br />

bilateral trade flow for countries during<br />

1989 for non fuel and technology trade<br />

flows (knowledge sensitive goods) using GPI. Their results<br />

show significant positive impact of IPRs on bilateral flows of<br />

non fuel trade. This result is, however, not confirmed in case<br />

of high technology goods. Authors have argued that this<br />

results show that the market power impact of IPRs may be<br />

stronger than the market expansion or knowledge sensitive<br />

goods have other legal means that are more important for<br />

appropriating investment in R&D.<br />

In general equilibrium framework, Lai (1998) has considered<br />

a case whereby production is transferred internationally<br />

by FDI. Northern firms move production to South to<br />

take advantage of the lower wages in the South; they<br />

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K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

balance these gains against the probability that they will<br />

loose their monopoly to imitators after investing in South. A<br />

strong IPRs regime in South increases the rate of innovation<br />

in two stages. Firstly, it increases the expected lives of<br />

monopolies and the resulting increase in demand for labor<br />

falls entirely on South. Thus the return to innovation rises<br />

without a rise in cost. Secondly, with increase in returns for<br />

Northern firms more firms move to South that increase the<br />

return on innovation further as the pressure on the Northern<br />

resources eases off. This result has made R&D of North<br />

an endogenous variable as not only R&D determines FDI<br />

but also is influenced by it. Therefore, where FDI is an<br />

option, the resource competition effect noted by Helpman<br />

(1993) is moderated. Helpman (1993) and<br />

Lai (1996) have treated stronger IPR as<br />

exogenous reduction in the intensity of<br />

imitation. Alternatively, Glass and Saggi<br />

(2002) have treated strong IPRs as the<br />

increase in the cost of imitation. In this<br />

case, Southern firms find themselves<br />

devoting greater resources to imitation,<br />

but lower available for production,<br />

causing FDI to shrink. In response FDI<br />

is shifted back to North that leaves fewer<br />

resources for innovation, and thus<br />

reduction in the overall innovation.<br />

Theoretical relationship between FDI<br />

and IPRs at micro level can be traced<br />

through the eclectic approach to FDI by<br />

Dunning (1979). According to this<br />

approach activities of MNEs can be<br />

explained by ownership, localization and<br />

internalization (OLI) advantages. The ownership advantages<br />

accrue to firms from the possession of tangible and<br />

intangible knowledge based assets. These assets can take<br />

the form of new product, superior production technology,<br />

management skills, trademarks, availability of human<br />

capital, marketing system, organizational skills, R&D<br />

capacity etc. The control over such assets and joint-input<br />

property of knowledge based assets support the MNEs<br />

structure and give an edge to MNEs vis-à-vis domestic<br />

firms. It presents series of options of different modes to<br />

MNEs to choose for serving a foreign market (Either and<br />

Markusen 1991). Having such an advantage is no guarantee<br />

The results of<br />

empirical studies<br />

exploring the<br />

impact of IPRs<br />

protection on<br />

FDI yield<br />

ambiguous results<br />

that MNEs will decide to undertake production activities in<br />

the host country as they will always have the option to serve<br />

the foreign market by exporting. Such decision is based on<br />

the localization advantages which a host country can offer<br />

over and above the home country of MNEs. There are<br />

numerous factors that affect such advantage e.g. factors of<br />

production (their prices, quality, and productivity), transport<br />

and communication costs, governmental intervention,<br />

infrastructure (commercial, legal and transport), economic<br />

and cultural distance etc. These advantages affect the<br />

decision of MNEs whether to indulge in production activities<br />

in host country or to export. Given that MNEs posses<br />

both ownership and localization advantage, they can either<br />

internalize their advantages through an<br />

extension of their own activities or<br />

externalize through licensing or some<br />

other similar contract with independent<br />

firm. Such a decision is affected by<br />

internalizing factor like transaction costs<br />

which include negotiation costs, costs of<br />

enforcing contracts etc.<br />

Numerous variables play important<br />

and intricate role in determining MNEs<br />

decision of mode choice. IPRs become<br />

important in MNEs decision making as<br />

the exploitation of ownership advantages<br />

is affected by the strength of IPRs regime<br />

of the host country. If IPRs protection is<br />

weak imitators can swarm the market<br />

with similar products and MNEs will<br />

lose their position of a single supplier.<br />

Furthermore, decision regarding whether<br />

to externalize or internalize will be affected by the strength<br />

of IPRs regime. The strength of IPRs protection reduces<br />

costs of licensing considerably 17 and shifts MNEs choice to<br />

licensing from FDI. An inadequate IPRs regime, therefore,<br />

deters FDI and encourages exports. A strong IPRs system<br />

has a negative impact on FDI by making licensing more<br />

viable alternative to direct investment 18 .<br />

The results of empirical studies exploring the impact of<br />

IPRs protection on FDI yield ambiguous results. Ferrantino<br />

(1993) has empirically tested the policy variables determining<br />

the decisions of MNEs to sell the goods (export),<br />

technology (licensing), or establish factories (FDI) in the<br />

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M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

Research studies<br />

show that when<br />

IPRs are weak<br />

firms rely on<br />

non-market<br />

transactions, i.e.,<br />

fewer licensing<br />

host countries. The results show that the U.S. MNEs move<br />

goods to its affiliates in countries with low IPRs so as to<br />

keep the technology with them. IPRs protection reduces the<br />

costs of enforcing contracts among MNEs and their partners<br />

(affiliates or non affiliates) for buying and selling<br />

technology. Seyoum (1996) has studied the level of IPRs<br />

protection provided in 27 countries from five geographical<br />

clusters for the time period 1975-90. Study shows that 13%,<br />

43% and 35% of variations in FDI is explained by IPRs with<br />

respect to least developed, newly industrializing and<br />

developed countries. On the other hand, other economic<br />

variables (market <strong>size</strong>, public investment, external debt and<br />

exchange rate) explained 21%, 28%, and 20% of variations<br />

in FDI for least developed, newly industrializing and<br />

developed countries respectively. Lesser (2002) has used<br />

two models to study the determinants of FDI flows and<br />

imports. Using cross section regression analysis, he has<br />

concluded that stronger IPRs increase both FDI and<br />

imports. The results indicate that a one point increase in the<br />

IPRs score will increase a country FDI by $1.5 billion and<br />

imports by $ 8.9 billion. The FDI effect is substantially<br />

greater than the $200 million as found by<br />

Mansfield (1994), but this study considered<br />

only sources from the U.S.<br />

Lee and Mansfield (1996) have used<br />

index of weakness of IP protection as<br />

developed by Mansfield (1994). They<br />

found that weak IPRs have significant<br />

negative impact on the flow of U.S. FDI<br />

in manufacturing. Further, in a sample of<br />

chemical firms the proportion of FDI to<br />

final production or R&D facilities is<br />

significantly and negatively associated with weak IPRs.<br />

From these results, it appears that both the volume and<br />

quality of FDI diminishes in countries with limited property<br />

rights. Mansfield (1995) also conducted the survey on the<br />

same lines for German and Japan affiliates and his results<br />

supported the results found in his earlier survey of U.S.<br />

affiliates. Javorick (2004) has further empirically verified<br />

the issue of composition of FDI vis-à-vis IPRs by using firm<br />

level data set from Eastern Europe and former Soviet<br />

Union. Results have shown that investment decisions in<br />

IPRs sensitive sectors like drugs, cosmetics, health care<br />

products, chemicals, machinery and equipment and electrical<br />

equipment are affected by the IPRs regime of a country.<br />

Moreover, weak IPRs keep FDI in areas of distribution<br />

activities rather than local production. Kumar (2002) shows,<br />

that R&D by MNEs is insensitive to the strength of IPRs<br />

protection of the host country. Indeed the coefficient of<br />

IPRs strength on R&D activity is negative though statistically<br />

insignificant in case of U.S. affiliates. In the case of<br />

Japanese affiliates the sign of coefficient is positive but<br />

statistically insignificant. Therefore, the relationship<br />

between R&D activities carried out by MNEs and the<br />

strength of IPRs is not very clear. Moreover, there is<br />

tendency of MNEs to conduct R&D activities in their home<br />

countries or to concentrate in a few industrialized countries.<br />

EU accounts for nearly 70% of R&D expenditure by<br />

U.S. MNEs and in case of Japanese MNEs over 90% of<br />

their overseas R&D is conducted in EU or U.S. (Kumar<br />

2002).<br />

Horstmann and Markusen (1987) discuss host of variables<br />

that affect the decision of MNEs on the mode selection for<br />

serving different international markets. Anand and Khana<br />

(2000) have empirically shown, in case of Indian firms with<br />

imported technology for the time period<br />

1950-75, that when IPRs are weak firms<br />

rely on non-market transactions, i.e.,<br />

fewer licensing. Smith (2001) empirically<br />

link IPRs of South on bilateral exchange<br />

via the ownership, location, and internalization<br />

concepts that are central to<br />

the multinational literature. Her analysis<br />

of location and internalization of knowledge<br />

allows assessment of the relative<br />

magnitudes of the effects of IPRs of<br />

South on the three forms of bilateral exchange. The study<br />

has used cross-sections of 50 countries on U.S. outward<br />

bilateral exchange, including exports, affiliate sale, and<br />

licenses to 8 unaffiliated foreign firms and GPI for IPRs<br />

strength of South. The study found that the enhanced<br />

ownership advantage from strong IPRs increases bilateral<br />

exchange across all countries. Secondly, strong IPRs of host<br />

country confer a location advantage which increases<br />

affiliate sales and licenses relative to exports. Third, strong<br />

IPRs of host country confer an internalization effect which<br />

increases licenses relative to affiliate sales and exports.<br />

McCalman (2004) in his empirical study of the behavior of<br />

134 THE IIPM THINK TANK


K NOWLEDGE WITHOUT BORDERS<br />

Hollywood studios in feature films and video market in the<br />

foreign markets did not find any support for the hypothesis<br />

that as IPRs strength increases there is a shift from FDI to<br />

licensing. In his analysis moderate IPRs are associated with<br />

high degree of licensing and both high and low standards of<br />

IPRs encourage more integrated governance. Over all the<br />

impact of IPRs on FDI, quality of FDI, licensing, exports as<br />

evident from empirical studies is ambiguous.<br />

Following UNCTAD (2001) technology transfer should<br />

be distinguished from technology diffusion. The latter is<br />

seen as another benefit that the transfer of technology may<br />

bring to the host economy. Grossman and Helpman (1991)<br />

define technological spillovers occurring when firm acquire<br />

information created by others without paying for it in a<br />

market transaction, and creators (or current owners) have<br />

no effective recourse under prevailing laws to prevent other<br />

firms from utilizing information so acquired. The technology<br />

diffuses through demonstration effect, labor mobility,<br />

linkages between buyers and suppliers, reverse engineering,<br />

defection by employees, emigration of highly skilled<br />

workers, creating awareness of that technology and this<br />

awareness spills over the whole economy 19 .<br />

Aitken and Harrison (1999) in their study of FDI benefits<br />

in Venezuela found that increases in foreign equity participation<br />

are correlated with increases in productivity for<br />

recipient plants suggesting that these plants benefit from the<br />

productive advantages of foreign owner. However, increases<br />

in foreign ownership negatively affect the productivity of<br />

wholly owned firms in the same industry. This could be due<br />

to the competition effects of FDI that causes the inefficient<br />

firms to leave in the long run. However, the empirical<br />

analysis could not capture this aspect of the FDI. Blomström<br />

and Kokko (1996) have concluded that MNCs may<br />

play an important role for productivity and export growth in<br />

their host countries, but that the exact nature of the impact<br />

of FDI varies between industries and countries, depending<br />

on country characteristics and the policy environment. Liu<br />

and Wang (2003) have shown the positive and significant<br />

impact of the FDI on industry productivity in China. The<br />

impact increases if the firms are performing their own R&D<br />

that is have some absorptive capacity. Hu, Jefferson and<br />

Jinchang (2006) show that technology transfers has positive<br />

impact on the productivity of Chinese firms. However, these<br />

positive results depend upon the absorptive capacity of the<br />

firm captured by domestic R&D.<br />

3. Conclusion<br />

The objective of TRIPs as laid down by Article 7 of the<br />

TRIPs reads as “The protection and enforcement of<br />

intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion<br />

of technological innovation and to the transfer and<br />

dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of<br />

producers and users of technological knowledge and in a<br />

manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a<br />

balance of rights and obligation”. The current theoretical<br />

literature analyzes the impact of strengthening of IPRs in<br />

the South to comply with TRIPs in general as well as partial<br />

equilibrium models with the empirical literature focusing<br />

on validating competing hypotheses. The strengthening of<br />

IPRs affects the economic growth of the South. The two<br />

channels have been explored extensively. Firstly, the promotion<br />

channel whereby, the IPRs affect the innovativeness of<br />

the South and concomitantly the productivity that per se is<br />

related to the economic growth. Secondly, the transfer<br />

channel whereby the new technology generated in the North<br />

is transferred by means of trade, FDI and licensing. The<br />

dissemination aspect of the transferred technology is not<br />

directly related to IPRs and is expected to be captured by<br />

studying the impact of trade, FDI and licensing on the<br />

productivity of the host country in the South. The empirical<br />

studies lend very little support to theoretical models as<br />

results obtained are not consistent. IPRs strength is among<br />

the innumerable variables that affect the economic agents’<br />

decision of knowledge creation and its dissemination<br />

though different modes. It is therefore, not very surprising<br />

that most of the results are not replicated as the sample<br />

changes for the individual country and industry specific<br />

effects are very difficult to capture. Grossman and Helpman<br />

(1990) noted that international economic environment<br />

affects the incentive that firm in specific country have to<br />

invest in the creation of knowledge. These features of global<br />

set up include comparative advantage, market <strong>size</strong>, appropriability<br />

conditions and finance. Does IPRs of the South<br />

have any role in determining the innovativeness of the<br />

North? What determines R&D is typically not modeled<br />

though many studies have already shown the spillover effect<br />

of international R&D. There is need to study whether the<br />

IPRs are in any way directly related to the spillovers of the<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

135


M ANAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT<br />

technology transferred.<br />

Endnotes<br />

1 IPRs in this paper refer largely to patent as copyrights<br />

and trademarks raise different set of issues<br />

2 We will primarily concentrate on the theoretical litera-<br />

ture that analyzes issues in the North (developed coun-<br />

tries or technological leaders) and South (developing<br />

countries or technological followers) framework. The<br />

multilateral character of TRIPs agreement has clubbed<br />

different countries (in terms of economic development)<br />

together and has imposed same stipulations regarding<br />

IPRs regime. This warrants the study of issues at aggre-<br />

gate level.<br />

3 See, Braga (1995) and Adolf (2001) for discussion on<br />

changes introduced by the developing countries for<br />

complying with the TRIPs.<br />

4 GPI has been updated by authors for years 1995 and 2000<br />

and is available upon request.<br />

5 This excludability is limited to the commercial use of the<br />

products that is for making, using, offering for sale,<br />

selling, or importing of these products. Disclosure<br />

requirements in patent laws ensure that knowledge is<br />

available to other researchers for research purpose.<br />

6 Scherer (1980) has argued that existence of non patent<br />

barriers, substantial natural imitation lags, first mover<br />

advantage, oligopolistic market structure are important<br />

factors that reduces the importance of IPRs as the<br />

mechanism to appropriate returns from R&D invest-<br />

ments. Moreover, state can reward innovators to recog-<br />

nize their contribution to the society and make the<br />

innovations available to public. Shavell and Ypersele<br />

(2001) have shown that IPRs do not posses a fundamental<br />

social advantage over reward system and that an optional<br />

reward system under which innovator chooses between<br />

rewards and IPRs is superior to IPRs. However, the<br />

principle difficulty with rewards is the information<br />

required for its determination.<br />

7 See, Kim (2002) for the analysis of Korea and Kumar<br />

(2003) for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.<br />

8 India revised its patent law in 1970 and made it more lax.<br />

Kaufer (1989) noted that this is the reaction against what<br />

was perceived during 1960’s and 1970’s to be a persisting<br />

condition of technological dependence on foreigners<br />

including supplies of inappropriate technologies.<br />

9 See, Watal (2001) for further discussion on how develop-<br />

ing countries yielded to the developed countries during<br />

the Uruguay round of talk of WTO.<br />

10 One must note that the empirical relationship between<br />

IPRs and economic growth is marred with the problem of<br />

endogenity.<br />

11 The South for the study is defined as 72 member states of<br />

the WTO that are required to change the domestic<br />

legislations on IP with in the time frame of five years of<br />

the passage of the TRIPs according to the Article 65 of<br />

the agreement. GPI is, however, available for only 50<br />

countries.<br />

12 The North for the study comprises of 23 countries that<br />

are defined as industrial countries by International<br />

Monetary Fund (IMF) for the Direction of Trade<br />

Statistic (DOTS) as WTO also follow the similar defini-<br />

tion.<br />

13 R&D financed by the business enterprises would have<br />

been preferable to the total R&D as a percentage of the<br />

GDP as the latter includes expenditure on defense,<br />

agriculture and so on that are not directly relevant to<br />

innovation by the private agents. However, due to non<br />

availability of data we have used total R&D. Lall (2003)<br />

has reported that both measures yield similar results.<br />

14 Patents are frequently viewed as an output indicator.<br />

Patent could, however, be viewed as an input indicator<br />

since these are used as a source of information by<br />

subsequent inventors (Griliches 1990).<br />

15 Index = , where the highest country in the rank scores 1<br />

and the lowest scores 0.<br />

16 Both the above mentioned causes allude to demand pull<br />

factors determining R&D. See, for instance, Scherer<br />

(1982), Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985), and Geroski<br />

and Walters (1995).<br />

17 See, for instance, Yang and Maskus (2001).<br />

18 See, for instance, Vishwasrao (1993), Markusen (1995),<br />

Saggi (1999), Maskus (2000a), and Markusen (2001) for<br />

the relationship among IPRs, FDI, and licensing.<br />

19 See, Görg and Greenaway (2004) for the review of<br />

empirical literature on spillovers from FDI.<br />

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(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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F INANCIAL ECONOMICS<br />

Just How Much Money is at<br />

Stake in Shares Pledged by<br />

Promoters?<br />

Jayesh Kumar<br />

Associate Vice President,<br />

Industry Research Group,<br />

Kotak Mahindra Bank<br />

SEBI in its recent directive in January mandated<br />

disclosures regarding pledge of shares by the pro-<br />

moter and persons forming part of the promoter<br />

group to the company and by the company to the stock<br />

exchanges where shares of the company are listed, post<br />

Satyam fiasco.<br />

Ever since the companies started disclosing this information,<br />

market learned the degree of this financial engineer-<br />

140 THE IIPM THINK TANK


P APER MONEY<br />

Why do firms<br />

need to take six<br />

months to disclose<br />

their financial<br />

results? Are firms<br />

capitalized well to<br />

survive?<br />

ing, which looks like an Indian version of western word’s<br />

sub-prime CDO/MBS.<br />

Majority of Indian companies have been pledging shares<br />

for more than two decades, if not longer. Promoters of 467<br />

companies have pledged with lenders an average 23% of their<br />

holdings so far. There are 114 companies whose promoters<br />

have pledged more than 50% of their own stake, and promoters<br />

of 22 companies (about five percent of disclosing companies)<br />

have pledged more than 50% of paid up shares. At<br />

current market prices, the total value of pledged stocks is<br />

over Rs 62,000 crore. This is over two percent of Indian stock<br />

market’s market-cap of Rs 30.33 lakh crore.<br />

As per the data available for 3,483 listed companies, Indian<br />

promoters hold 49.85% of paid-up shares of<br />

these companies as on December 2008.<br />

Promoter’s pledged shares on average<br />

17.07% of paid up shares. Generalization of<br />

this to all listed entities, suggests whopping<br />

258,107 crore 1 . Assuming 50% margin, the<br />

bank credit to these promoters could be<br />

pegged at Rs. 129,000 crore (about five<br />

percent of credit by entire banking system<br />

in the economy)!<br />

What would happen if the equity prices<br />

continue in its downward trend, eventually<br />

forcing promoters (those who have pledged<br />

their almost entire stake in the company)<br />

to default leaving financial institutions no<br />

other choice than to off-load all the equity<br />

in the market? And if they choose to<br />

off-load these pledged shares in the<br />

market, its bound to cause havoc on the<br />

equity prices, set to crash by at least 20-30%, and eventually<br />

the losses financial institutions may have to bear could be well<br />

about 100,000 crore (about 25% of Scheduled commercial<br />

banks capital, reserves and surplus as on March 2008).<br />

Promoter’s pledging of shares pose a corporate governance<br />

challenge in view of the indirect reduction in shareholding.<br />

Besides impacting share prices, in cases where promoter's<br />

holding is small, such sales can destabilize companies as<br />

they would become vulnerable to takeovers. SEBI introduced<br />

this new requirement because pledged shares are subject to<br />

material risks or contingencies that do not apply to other<br />

shares owned by the promoters. Moreover, these circumstances<br />

could influence the policies and decisions of the pledgor.<br />

The concern with companies, whose promoters have already<br />

pledged their entire stake, is that they now have little leeway.<br />

Any further fall in share prices may lead to margin calls by<br />

lenders and with no more shares left to be pledged, lenders<br />

could start off-loading the pledged shares in the market to<br />

recover their funds. Such off-loads highlight the potential for<br />

insider trading resulting from such involuntary sales of shares.<br />

In addition to the potential insider trading, this could also lead<br />

to violation of the insider trading policy if such off-load<br />

occurred during a blackout period.<br />

As far as, enhanced disclosures are concerned it makes more<br />

sense to also disclose other indirect pledging or shorting the<br />

direct holding, say through OTC derivatives<br />

contracts like swap agreement with overseas<br />

funds. Exclusive disclosure of pledged shares<br />

only, provides incentives financial engineering<br />

to come up with alternative ways of<br />

raising fund against equity without exclusively<br />

pledging them.<br />

Taking some more liberty, I would rather<br />

argue about increased disclosure of<br />

financials as well, if we can have quarterly<br />

reporting of P&L (un-audited) why<br />

shouldn’t we have quarterly reporting of<br />

B&S (un-audited) as well. Why do companies<br />

need to take six months to disclose<br />

their financial results when shareholders<br />

are subjected to high price volatility on<br />

daily basis?<br />

The question in every investor’s mind is<br />

whether it is just a corporate governance<br />

issue or a much deeper financial problem looming its head? Is<br />

our banking system strong enough, as argued by almost<br />

everyone in past, to weather out such blow on their balance<br />

sheets? Are they capitalized well to survive?<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

SEBI directive doesn’t ask mutual funds to disclose their<br />

pledged shareholding. Mutual funds are also expected to<br />

have pledged shares to the tune of Rs. 3,000 crore.<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation)<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

141


F INANCIAL ECONOMICS<br />

Table 1: CASH COUNTER: Pledging as a percentage of Paid-up Capital<br />

Source: Company Data, Author’s calculations<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

India Cements Capital 85.58% Anjani Portland Cement 35.98% Pitti Laminations 25.91%<br />

Satra Properties India 73.54% Kitply 35.19% Suzlon Energy 25.85%<br />

Micro Inks 70.50% Sakthi Sugars 35.12% Excel Glasses 25.62%<br />

Falcon Tyres 68.00% Brushman India 35.07% Glory Polyfilms 25.27%<br />

Jaiprakash Hydro Power 67.52% Sudal Industries 34.91% Grabal Alok Impex 25.23%<br />

Vinay Cements 66.38% Shetron 34.71% Sona Koyo Steering 25.12%<br />

Parsvnath Developers 63.88% Dhanus Technologies 34.39% Adani Enterprises 24.98%<br />

Carol Info Services 62.82% BPL Ltd. 34.21% Super Forgings 24.92%<br />

Shaw Wallace & Co. 62.50% Birla Precision Tech 34.19% Rain Commodities 24.90%<br />

Kerala Ayurveda 61.52% Temptation Foods 34.11% Prithvi Information 24.84%<br />

JHS Svendgaard 60.00% Vanasthali Textile I. 33.87% Max India 24.81%<br />

Tata Coffee 57.48% Steel Strips Wheels 33.50% Dharani Sugars & Chem. 24.79%<br />

Era Infra Eng. 56.60% United Spirits 33.22% Nagarjuna Fertilizers 24.56%<br />

Sri Ramakrishna Mills 54.11% Shoppers Stop 33.10% CCAP 24.48%<br />

Gem Spinners 54.03% Shree Ram Mills 33.00% Medicamen Biotech 24.11%<br />

Gayatri Projects 53.73% Lloyds Metals 32.94% Genus Power Infra. 23.72%<br />

Financial Eyes India 53.33% SRF 32.83% Uttam Sugar Mills 23.28%<br />

Refnol Resins & Chem. 52.57% Uttam Galva Steels 32.19% Radaan Mediaworks 23.08%<br />

Millennium Beer 51.75% JSW Steel 31.87% Media Video 22.98%<br />

Hathway Bhawani Cable 51.00% Rama Phosphates 31.86% SAL Steel 22.95%<br />

Zandu Pharmaceutical 50.76% Lokesh Machines 31.59% LN Polyesters 22.80%<br />

Arvind Products 50.12% Essel Propack 31.16% UTV Software 22.76%<br />

Tata Teleservices Maha. 49.70% Emmsons International 30.83% Clutch Auto 22.75%<br />

Kirloskar Electric Co. 48.48% Tulip Star Hotels 30.42% South Asian Petrochem 22.75%<br />

Kamat Hotels India 47.09% JD Orgochem 30.40% Balasore Alloys 22.72%<br />

Plethico Pharma 46.97% Dolphin Offshore Ent. 30.07% Tulip Telecom 22.57%<br />

Star Paper Mills 46.54% Bhuwalka Steel 30.00% India Cements Ltd 22.43%<br />

JK Cement 45.58% Dr Agarwals Eye 30.00% Amar Remedies 22.37%<br />

Hatsun Agro Product 45.46% Ganesh Housing Corp. 30.00% Kilburn Engineering 22.23%<br />

Tuticorin Alkali 45.15% Ispat Industries 29.98% MIC Electronics 22.07%<br />

Spentex Industries 44.52% IMP Powers 29.86% Omaxe 21.95%<br />

Kingfisher Airlines 43.80% Ansal Housing & Const. 29.70% Alcobex Metals 21.88%<br />

Euro Ceramics 43.68% Polar Pharma 29.57% STL Global 21.85%<br />

Raasi Refractories 43.52% APW President Systems 29.17% Pyramid Saimira 21.72%<br />

Wockhardt 43.11% Ansal Properties 29.11% Zensar Technologies 21.55%<br />

Suryalata Spinning 41.95% Indokem 29.09% Ganesh Benzoplast 21.45%<br />

Todays Writing Products 41.46% Panchmahal Steel 29.00% Pasupati Acrylon 21.26%<br />

Haldyn Glass Gujarat 40.16% Sobha Developers 28.39% Expo Gas Containers 21.21%<br />

HFCL Infotel 39.39% Time Technoplast 28.18% Alok Industries 21.06%<br />

142 THE IIPM THINK TANK


P APER MONEY<br />

Source: Company Data, Author’s calculations<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

Supreme Holdings 39.29% Solix Technologies 28.11% Kalpataru Power Trans. 20.92%<br />

Aurobindo Pharma 38.97% Emami 27.89% Hotel Leelaventure 20.87%<br />

Manali Petrochemical 38.29% Broadcast Initiatives 27.28% Fortis Healthcare 20.75%<br />

Dharamsi Morarji Chem. 38.00% Indage Vintners 27.16% ETC Networks 20.33%<br />

UB Engineering 37.81% Cranes Software Int. 27.00% Rajratan Global Wire 20.13%<br />

ORG Informatics 37.27% Entegra 26.89% Murudeshwar Ceramics 20.08%<br />

Oricon Enterprises 36.93% Jindal Drilling & Ind. 26.86% Tata Chemicals 20.02%<br />

Mirc Electronics 36.82% Mukand 26.67% Amit Spinning 20.00%<br />

Bell Ceramics 36.80% Refex Refrigerants 26.60% Srinivasa Shipping 20.00%<br />

GEI Industrial Sys. 36.78% Photoquip India 26.21% SSPDL 20.00%<br />

Videocon Industries 36.41% Sri Adhikari Brothers 26.04% Kriti Industries 19.95%<br />

S.Kumars Nationwide 36.21% Regency Ceramics 26.03% Balaji Amines 19.85%<br />

Bihar Sponge Iron 36.06% Simbhaoli Sugars 25.95% Blue Coast Hotels 19.81%<br />

Shyam Telecom 19.52% Prime Focus 14.93% Lyka Labs 11.82%<br />

Pantaloon Retail 19.49% Escorts Finance 14.91% Usha Martin 11.82%<br />

Winsome Yarns 19.48% Suryachakra Power Corp. 14.91% Raj Rayon 11.75%<br />

Shrenuj & Company 19.47% Sintex Industries 14.90% Prajay Engineers 11.66%<br />

Ahlcon Parenterals 19.44% Great Offshore 14.88% Zee Entertainment 11.53%<br />

Quintegra Solutions 19.42% Fluidomat 14.83% Ess Dee Aluminium 11.49%<br />

Jyoti 19.37% Polar Industries 14.78% Tata Tea 11.32%<br />

Deepak Spinners 19.33% Nikhil Adhesives 14.71% Gemini Communication 11.28%<br />

Innocorp 18.98% Tata Power 14.59% Visaka Industries 11.24%<br />

Raunaq Automotive 18.91% Vikash Metal & Power 14.54% Arvind International 11.22%<br />

Karuturi Global 18.77% Kreb Biochemicals 14.53% Tata Consultancy Serv. 11.14%<br />

Ahluwalia Contracts 18.76% Richa Industries 14.53% Bihar Tubes 11.09%<br />

Gallantt Metal 18.64% Khandwala Securities 14.52% Torrent Power 11.07%<br />

Software Technology Grps 18.59% LGS Global 14.49% Bilpower 11.05%<br />

Mcleod Russel 18.47% Peninsula Land 14.36% Ritesh Properties 10.92%<br />

Bombay Rayon 18.43% Gati 14.34% Gammon India 10.85%<br />

Riga Sugar Company 18.36% Wintac 14.29% Diana Tea Co. 10.72%<br />

Arvind Ltd 18.18% Dagger Forst Tools 14.28% Shreyas Intermediates 10.69%<br />

Well Pack Papers 18.04% Elecon Engineering 14.27% Apollo Tyres 10.62%<br />

Jasch Industries 17.65% Kale Consultants 13.82% Rajapalayam Mills 10.59%<br />

Heritage Foods India 17.35% Wanbury 13.71% Premier Explosives 10.57%<br />

Zee News 17.17% Jubilant Organosys 13.66% Tata Communications 10.53%<br />

Bhushan Steel 17.01% Williamson Magor 13.56% Granules India 10.43%<br />

ASM Technologies 17.00% Zicom Electronic S S 13.54% Value Industries 10.40%<br />

PBA Infrastructure 16.99% Tata Steel 13.53% Nijjer Agro Foods 10.39%<br />

Tamilnadu Petro. 16.93% Akruti City 13.34% Alps Industries 10.14%<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

143


F INANCIAL ECONOMICS<br />

Source: Company Data, Author’s calculations<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

Reliance Chemotex Inds. 16.91% Integra Capital Manag. 13.34% Accentia Technologies 10.00%<br />

Aurionpro Solutions 16.85% Sterling Biotech 13.32% Onward Technologies 9.83%<br />

Wire & Wireless 16.84% McDowell Holdings 13.22% J Kumar Infraprojects 9.76%<br />

Strides Arcolab 16.83% Reliance Communications 13.19% Supreme Industries 9.72%<br />

Pioneer Embroideries 16.75% Lloyds Steel Inds. 13.13% Shree Ashtavinayaka CV 9.71%<br />

Sky Industries 16.68% IG Petrochemicals 13.11% Spanco 9.69%<br />

GI Engineering 16.64% Provogue India 12.98% DCM Shriram Inds. 9.53%<br />

Ipca Laboratories 16.41% Rama Petrochemicals 12.98% Nirlon 9.51%<br />

NOCIL 16.41% Rajvir Industries 12.95% Rainbow Denim 9.51%<br />

BGIL Films 16.35% Marg Ltd. 12.78% Orient Press 9.50%<br />

Reliance Infra 16.35% Cupid 12.72% HEG 9.47%<br />

Transformers & Rectif. 16.33% C&C Construction 12.60% Dabur India 9.24%<br />

Hindustan Motors 16.30% Lupin 12.60% Nagarjuna Construction 9.20%<br />

Amrit Banaspati 16.28% Schrader Duncan 12.58% Bartronics India 9.17%<br />

Alembic 16.10% Arshiya International 12.55% Eimco Elecon India 8.67%<br />

Sutlej Textiles & Inds. 16.10% Sankhya Infotech 12.43% Ruchi Strips & Alloys 8.64%<br />

Gujarat NRE Coke 15.96% Futura Polyesters 12.40% Lanco Infratech 8.53%<br />

Saurashtra Cement 15.63% Motilal Oswal Fin 12.38% Shree Renuka Sugars 8.45%<br />

Amforge Industries 15.60% Resurgere Mines 12.26% Raymond 8.31%<br />

Helios & Matheson 15.58% Adhunik Metaliks 12.16% CHD Developers 8.25%<br />

Vipul 15.48% Alchemist 12.07% Damodar Threads 8.22%<br />

Jindal Worldwide 15.44% XL Telecom 12.05% Tata Motors 8.15%<br />

Network 18 Media & I. 15.20% Godawari Power & Ispat 12.04% Aban Offshore 8.14%<br />

<strong>May</strong>tas Infra 15.14% Genesys International 12.01% Indage Restaurants 8.12%<br />

Nova Petrochemicals 15.00% Thiru Arooran Sugars 11.97% Mahindra & Mahindra 8.09%<br />

Asian Paints 14.98% Kemrock Inds. & Exports 11.89% Chowgule Steamships 7.99%<br />

Nachmo Knitex 7.88% Bajaj Finserv 4.41% Pennar Industries 1.98%<br />

Pradeep Metals 7.86% GVK Power & Infra. 4.37% Modison Metals 1.90%<br />

Chambal Fert. & Chem. 7.72% LG Balakrishnan & Bros 4.28% CCL Products 1.87%<br />

Mold Tek Technologies 7.60% Birla Ericsson Optical 4.17% Khaitan Electricals 1.84%<br />

Simplex Infra 7.60% Gangotri Iron & Steel 4.15% Shree Bhawani Paper 1.73%<br />

Godrej Consumer Products 7.58% Elpro International 4.05% IOL Netcom 1.72%<br />

United Breweries Holdings 7.48% ISMT 4.03% ICSA India 1.71%<br />

Jindal Saw 7.32% Reliance Capital 4.03% Aksh Optifibre 1.69%<br />

Accel Transmatic 7.25% Mangalam Drugs 3.98% Jindal Steel & Power 1.65%<br />

Premier Ltd. 7.24% Indian Metals 3.90% Kopran 1.64%<br />

Subex 7.20% Bajaj Holdings & Inv. 3.82% Moser Baer India 1.56%<br />

Dish TV India 7.17% Everonn Systems India 3.81% Television Eighteen 1.52%<br />

Sahara One Media & Ent. 6.97% Taneja Aerospace 3.81% Sarda Energy & Minrls. 1.47%<br />

144 THE IIPM THINK TANK


P APER MONEY<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

COMPANIES<br />

%Paid-up<br />

Shares<br />

Zuari Industries 6.90% Andhra Pradesh Paper M. 3.77% Vardhman Polytex 1.46%<br />

Gammon India Ltd. 6.86% Natco Pharma 3.74% Bajaj Electricals 1.45%<br />

Sujana Metal Products 6.79% EIH 3.64% Goldstone Infratech 1.39%<br />

Balaji Telefilms 6.59% Panoramic Universal 3.61% Pioneer Investcorp 1.25%<br />

Vamshi Rubber 6.59% Multi Arc India 3.60% Punj Lloyd 1.20%<br />

Silktex 6.56% Vishal Retail 3.51% Nakoda Textile Inds. 1.18%<br />

Nicco Corpporation 6.52% Indian Hotels Company 3.46% Camlin Fine Chemicals 1.03%<br />

Suryajyoti Spng. Mills 6.48% Logix Microsystems 3.44% Khaitan Chemicals 1.03%<br />

Dishman Pharmaceuticals 6.44% Ballarpur Industries 3.38% Camlin Ltd. 1.00%<br />

Nava Bharat Ventures 6.44% LGB Forge 3.36% Marsons Ltd. 0.93%<br />

B.L. Kashyap & Sons 6.40% Shasun Chemicals 3.23% Crest Animation Studios 0.89%<br />

PI Industries 6.37% PVP Ventures 3.22% Ramco Systems 0.85%<br />

Crompton Greaves 6.22% Paramount Comm 3.20% Geodesic 0.82%<br />

Ashapura Minechem 6.20% KLG Systel 3.18% HBL Power Systems 0.78%<br />

Facor Alloys 6.20% Cambridge Technology 3.13% HCL Infosystems 0.77%<br />

Ontrack Systems 6.20% Sujana Towers 3.12% Religare Enterprises 0.58%<br />

Dr Reddys Laboratories 6.19% Neuland Labs. 3.10% Astra Microwave Prod. 0.56%<br />

Oxford Industries 5.98% Ashima 3.00% Gillette India 0.49%<br />

Navin Fluorine 5.83% Golden Tobacco 3.00% Sree Rayalaseema Alkl. 0.44%<br />

CESC 5.74% Jai Balaji Industries 2.96% Priyadarshini Spinning 0.42%<br />

Ramsarup Industries 5.70% Sanghvi Movers 2.95% Sun Pharmaceutical 0.42%<br />

Upper Ganges Sugar1 5.69% Filatex India 2.91% Asian Electronics 0.40%<br />

Four Soft 5.52% McNally Bharat 2.89% Maxwell Industries 0.40%<br />

United Phosphorus 5.52% Oriental Carbon & Chem. 2.87% Kpit Cummins 0.38%<br />

Setco Automotive 5.48% Mascon Global 2.73% First Leasing Co. 0.37%<br />

Bharati Shipyard 5.44% Electrotherm India 2.62% Forbes & Company 0.37%<br />

Hind Syntex 5.33% Rolta 2.58% Phoenix Mills 0.35%<br />

MSK Projects India 5.33% Bajaj Auto 2.57% Ruchi Soya 0.29%<br />

Walchandnagar Inds. 5.25% Marsons 2.57% MindTree 0.27%<br />

Digjam 5.24% Ruchi Infrastructure 2.46% Astra Microwave Prod 0.24%<br />

Jain Irrigation Systems 5.13% Emco 2.36% Century Textiles & Ind. 0.21%<br />

Kavveri Telecom 5.09% Uflex 2.28% Comfort Intech 0.19%<br />

Usher Agro 5.04% Upper Ganges Sugar2 2.25% DCW 0.16%<br />

Godawari Power 4.92% PVR 2.17% JIK Industries 0.13%<br />

Zylog Systems 4.86% Jaiprakash Associates 2.15% OCL India 0.09%<br />

Hikal 4.72% Madras Cements 2.11% India Infoline Ltd. 0.05%<br />

KEI Industries 4.59% Atlanta 2.05% JB Chemicals 0.04%<br />

Kirloskar Oil Engines 4.55% Kajaria Ceramics 2.04% Kotak Mahindra Bank 0.01%<br />

Mundra Port 4.51% Upper Ganges Sugar3 2.03% Great Eastern Shipping 0.01%<br />

Source: Company Data, Author’s calculations<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

145


E CONOMIC SOCIOLOGY<br />

Consumerism in the Eyes of a<br />

Rational Optimist<br />

Suchismita Mondal Sarkar<br />

Assistant Professor,<br />

University of Burdwan,<br />

West Bengal, India<br />

146 THE IIPM THINK TANK


B OURGEOIS BOHEMIANS<br />

“Earth provides enough to satisfy everyman’s need but not<br />

everyman’s greed.” -Mahatma Gandhi<br />

When the global economic players are cheering<br />

on India’s fostering economic growth with<br />

increasing shopping mall as the symbol of this<br />

growth, consumerism and consumer culture have become<br />

central to ethical discussions of identity, post modernity<br />

and culture as never before.<br />

Economic expansion takes place through mass production<br />

of more goods in a efficient manner. This increased<br />

production needs to be consumed. When market comes to<br />

the picture, country like India tops the list. Goods from<br />

the western world has a ready market in India. When<br />

different countries are having discussions over the core<br />

issue of climate change and environmental pollution, our<br />

focus is to the rapidly growing consumer class that appears<br />

to enthusiastically welcoming the western way of<br />

living.<br />

This has unleashed the demons of pollution economy<br />

wide. Pollution created in this process<br />

can be of two types– one is the environmental<br />

pollution resulting from the<br />

manufacturing process, dumping of<br />

consumer goods etc and the other is the<br />

pollution of culture and mind. Here the<br />

latter is the central point of discussion.<br />

It results as the proliferation of consumer<br />

goods- the culture and meanings<br />

being ascribed to these goods by their<br />

marketing agencies are injected (impinges)<br />

into the consumer. A culture thus being created is<br />

transformed that gradually occupies the mental space of<br />

the consumer. Marketing agencies thus became an industry<br />

producing culture.<br />

Environmental pollution is a problem that can be<br />

addressed by technical solutions and social restructuring<br />

but pollution of mind and erosion of culture is rather<br />

difficult to address. The problem has no technical fixes<br />

nor any discourse of thinking about solutions.<br />

Culture and Consumer Culture<br />

A culture is a set of rules, people use to function in a<br />

Pollution of mind<br />

and erosion of<br />

culture is rather<br />

difficult to address<br />

rather than the<br />

environmental<br />

pollution<br />

society. A society is dominated and identified by its<br />

culture – tangible and intangible or material and symbolic,<br />

resources available to the members living in it.<br />

Consumer culture therefore can be defined as a social<br />

arrangement between culture and the resources that<br />

members of the society have at their disposal are distributed.<br />

Individual transforms into consumer and whatever<br />

material resources she or he needs to function in a society<br />

– status, prestige, esteem, love and salvation are all<br />

available in the marketplace. Cultural meanings and<br />

values get imbibed in material possession and eventually it<br />

becomes easier to communicate information about<br />

oneself through possessions and through deeds.<br />

In consumer culture everything that we want from basic<br />

needs (food, shelter) to entertainment, gossip etc. are<br />

available through market. Culture continues to be produced<br />

and reproduced through market.<br />

From a Marxist perspective, it is a wage relation – the<br />

consumer’s access to consumption is structured by distribution<br />

of material and cultural resources (money and<br />

taste), that is, it is determined by crucial ways of market<br />

relations – wage relation and social<br />

class. It is capitalist relations of production<br />

that produces the consumer.<br />

Capitalism requires a constantly<br />

expanding consumer class for the mass<br />

production of consumer goods to get<br />

distributed in an efficient way. Consumer<br />

culture is incompatible with political<br />

regulation of consumption that suppresses<br />

the market. So it does not arise<br />

in a non-capitalist society.<br />

Features of Consumer Culture<br />

It is inherent in consumer culture that :<br />

1) Consumption becomes the central focus of social life.<br />

Values are dominated by a culture that encourages<br />

consumption practices, more commodified and as a<br />

society of choice and consumer sovereignty.<br />

2) The culture is dictated by market relations of consumers<br />

having resources at their disposal, who are free to<br />

make choices and mindless consumption, which is<br />

ideologically declared out of bounds to public intervention,<br />

social and political authority.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

147


E CONOMIC SOCIOLOGY<br />

Globally, the 20% of the world’s people in the highestincome<br />

countries account for 86% of total private<br />

consumption expenditures — the poorest 20% a<br />

minuscule 1.3%.<br />

More specifically, the richest fifth:<br />

Consume 45% of all meat and fish, the poorest fifth 5%<br />

Consume 58% of total energy, the poorest fifth less<br />

than 4%<br />

Have 74% of all telephone lines, the poorest fifth 1.5%<br />

Consume 84% of all paper, the poorest fifth 1.1%<br />

Own 87% of the world’s vehicle fleet, the poorest fifth<br />

less than 1%<br />

Runaway growth in consumption in the past 50 years is<br />

putting strains on the environment never before seen.<br />

-Human Development Report 1998 (UNDP)<br />

belief that economic growth advances the development of<br />

mind, spirit and culture. Values are being redefined<br />

according to the purpose they serve.<br />

Today’s consumption is undermining the environmental<br />

resource base. It is exacerbating inequalities. And the<br />

dynamics of the consumption-poverty-inequality-environment<br />

nexus are accelerating. If the trends continue<br />

without change — not redistributing from high-income to<br />

low-income consumers, not shifting from polluting to<br />

cleaner goods and production technologies, not promoting<br />

goods that empower poor producers, not shifting priority<br />

from consumption for conspicuous display to meeting<br />

basic needs — today’s problems of consumption and<br />

human development will worsen. The real issue is not<br />

consumption itself but its patterns and effects. Inequalities<br />

in consumption are stark.<br />

3) In consumer culture, possessions and goods signify<br />

status, social identity and dictate the ways to make<br />

social appearance, networks and social values.<br />

Consumerism – An Iron Cage<br />

In thinking about modernity and<br />

modern capitalism, Max Weber spoke a<br />

century ago about an iron cage.<br />

Consumerism brings to mind a<br />

different cage.<br />

The ethos of limitless consumption<br />

encourages us to regress, privatization<br />

compels us to withdraw from our public<br />

selves and force ourselves to get confined<br />

to small enclaves where we deploy private resources<br />

to turn what were once public goods such as garbage<br />

collection, police protection, and schooling into private<br />

commodities. To protect a few in midst of general insecurity,<br />

to educate a few in the midst of societal ignorance<br />

becomes increasingly difficult.<br />

According to some psychologist by embracing this<br />

freedom of market place in every aspects of our lives, the<br />

things we value most – the relations that are core to<br />

human existence are being threatened and becoming<br />

increasingly difficult to achieve. The ‘consumption<br />

maximum’ attitude strictly contrast the long standing<br />

In wealthy<br />

countries,<br />

economic growth<br />

rather than culture<br />

advancement<br />

continues to be a<br />

central policy goal<br />

The Paradox of Growth<br />

Modern affluent societies are characterized by an increasing<br />

hectic pace of living, growth oriented economic<br />

policies and wasteful service economies. Economic<br />

growth leads people to optimize the use<br />

of time they spend, by increasing the<br />

amount of goods consumed and decreasing<br />

the amount of time spent on<br />

with each.<br />

In wealthy countries, economic<br />

growth rather than culture advancement<br />

continues to be a central policy<br />

goal even though general welfare has<br />

advanced to the point where most<br />

people can satisfy their basic material<br />

needs. This is paradoxical since the historical image of a<br />

affluent society is one in which the satisfaction of basic<br />

needs leads to individual and cultural development. The<br />

increasing scarcity of time is probably the root cause of<br />

this paradox. The scarcity of time is reflected in every<br />

sphere of life from our food habits to entertainment.<br />

People are more indulged towards fast food at restaurant<br />

than cooking at home. Night clubs, Pizza huts and cafes<br />

now resembles an affluent society.<br />

Again a growing economy is defined by its consumption<br />

pattern and expenditure. Expanding market implies<br />

growing economy. But the question that arises is if this<br />

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B OURGEOIS BOHEMIANS<br />

growth is driven by market orientation rooted in the<br />

culture of mindless consumption, with people doing well<br />

enough to have discretionary income to spend, with<br />

personal problems turning towards market for solutions,<br />

then in the long run larger social problems may arise,<br />

which may threaten our integrity.<br />

In times of recession, people restrain from spending.<br />

When people buy less, businesses need to produce less, so<br />

they need fewer employees. So people lose their jobs and<br />

then they too spend less and eventually more people lose<br />

their jobs in this process. Some social scientists believe<br />

that an economy based on consumerism is somehow an<br />

offense against virtue. But what else, actually, could any<br />

economy be based on? The “economy” means that the<br />

goods and services are produced and consumed which<br />

makes everyone better off. That production of things<br />

people want is the source of all wealth and income and<br />

our entire standard of living. It doesn’t come from heaven,<br />

or “society,” or government.<br />

We are employed to produce these goods. And if all<br />

consumerism is stopped, we’d all be out of jobs. The<br />

paradox lies here. This paradox is based on the proposition,<br />

put forth in Keynesian economics, that many economic<br />

downturns are demand based. Excess of anything,<br />

including consumerism can be bad. But people have to<br />

consume. It’s a question of balance.<br />

Higher Education Engulfed in Consumerism<br />

Recent trends have produced a job oriented consumer of<br />

higher education. This ‘consumerist attitude’ has been a<br />

great concern for many academics and non-academics.<br />

The increasing reach of ideologies of consumerism and<br />

commodification worries some. People experience<br />

freedom by choosing what to consumer, at the same time,<br />

consumerism forces everything to become a commodity<br />

that must work to attract consumers so it can be judged<br />

and then either purchased or rejected.<br />

Faculty worry that the whole of the market logic is transferred<br />

to the educational arena, resulting in constrained<br />

freedom of expression and challenges to academic freedom.<br />

The academic world is the only place where the<br />

consumers eventually becomes the product and literally<br />

does sell themselves.<br />

The expanding attitude of consumerism has reached out<br />

from the shopping malls and stock markets into the very<br />

heart of the academy. It unchecked, this capitalist society<br />

will consume the heart of knowledge and learning and<br />

have in its place – memorization and passionless lectures.<br />

Higher education was a service to society and society<br />

sought to serve the academy in return. The senses of civic<br />

duty, democracy and spirituality were the components of<br />

education which were further considered as moral backbone<br />

of society. But from its noble beginnings as instruction,<br />

higher education has transformed into a training<br />

ground for professions. Thus we are approaching towards<br />

an era of educational consumerism.<br />

Conclusion<br />

India is changing rapidly with the world and we have no<br />

idea about the changing scenario that will engulf our<br />

culture and tradition. Light cannot be seen at the end of<br />

the tunnel but the only hope is that some people are<br />

asking questions against full-fledged consumerism and<br />

are thinking of a reasonable approach to combine tradition,<br />

culture with it and make consumerism unique in<br />

India.<br />

Thus, India should endeavour to evolve its own unique<br />

consumer cultures that will not only produce thriving<br />

economies but also offer people more meaningful and less<br />

market based ways to develop a sense of self. It must adopt<br />

the technologies and practices that will create a new<br />

standard of consumerism so that the potential impact of<br />

businesses would help to address climate and poverty<br />

related problems as well as those that support traditional<br />

consumerism in a more efficient, eco-friendly manner.<br />

So we must believe to be optimistic about what can be<br />

changed and not what can be eliminated or subtracted.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Zavestosky Dr Stephen; 2007: “Consumerism in<br />

India:A Faustian Bargain?”in ‘<strong>Issue</strong>s in development<br />

Management’ UGC DRS Publications of University of<br />

Calcutta.<br />

• Kaplan Jeffrey;2008: “The Gospel of Consumption”<br />

published in “Orion” Magazine.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE<br />

ON THE US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL<br />

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Peter Custers<br />

Affiliated Researcher, International<br />

Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden,<br />

Netherlands<br />

Introduction<br />

This essay discusses the hazardous and wasteful implications<br />

of the US-India nuclear deal beyond its implications<br />

for the nuclear arms’ race in the subcontinent. Most of the<br />

key objections against the deal that have been put forward<br />

by progressive opponents of the deal in India and internationally,<br />

have addressed the fact that it legitimizes India’s<br />

status as a nuclear weapons’ state, and that it will enable<br />

India to expand its production of weapons’ grade plutonium.<br />

Already, India is estimated to possess a sufficient<br />

amount of plutonium for the manufacturing of at least a<br />

hundred atomic bombs. Since India reportedly has agreed<br />

to place only 14 out of its 22 civilian reactors under the<br />

IAEA’s inspection regime, it is free to produce in the<br />

remaining 8 reactors another 200<br />

kilograms of weapons’ grade plutonium<br />

per year 1 . Thus, fears that the controversial<br />

deal will enhance the danger of a<br />

nuclear conflagration in South Asia<br />

appear to be well grounded, - even if we<br />

leave aside all other interrelated objections<br />

that have been raised.<br />

In this essay, the spotlights will not be<br />

put on India’s past and future plans for<br />

production of weapons’ grade plutonium<br />

and nuclear bombs, but on two other major questions.<br />

For the US-India nuclear deal needs to be also and<br />

fiercely questioned with regard to its ostensible aims, i.e.<br />

the vast expansion in the production of nuclear energy.<br />

Whereas a more than 10-fold increase in generation of<br />

nuclear energy, as foreseen, may help to overcome India’s<br />

rapidly growing energy needs, - the side-effects in terms of<br />

generation of nuclear waste are so ponderous, that from<br />

this perspective too, implementation of the deal needs to<br />

be pre-empted. Moreover, as reported briefly in India’s<br />

national press in September last, when the signing of the<br />

deal was being debated, - there is a little discussed ‘reverse<br />

The N-deal is<br />

bound to result in<br />

huge quantities<br />

and extremely<br />

dangerous waste<br />

that can't be sold<br />

on the market<br />

side’ to the nuclear deal, being the US’s additional commercial<br />

objectives relating to its arms’ exports. For the US<br />

is poised to lobby aggressively, so as to capture a larger<br />

share of India’s arms’ imports than it has held up until<br />

now.<br />

The conceptual approach proposed so as to address<br />

these combined issues, is a holistic view on waste. In this<br />

view, processes of manufacturing that result in military<br />

commodities, i.e. in weaponry, basically need to be<br />

analyzed as processes that result in wastage of economic<br />

resources. This, for instance, is the case where economic<br />

policymakers deciding to purchase armament systems do<br />

not primarily have in mind security considerations, but<br />

macro-economic stimulation of domestic demand for<br />

goods. However, this, the production of ‘social waste’,<br />

generally does not stand alone, but needs to be juxtaposed<br />

with the generation of ‘non-commodity waste’ during the<br />

same industrial processes. Whereas conventional economics<br />

discusses these side-effects of industrial manufacturing<br />

under the heading of ‘externalities’, - in this essay the term<br />

non-commodity waste will be used, whenever reference<br />

will be made to the ecologically harmful<br />

by-products of industrial manufacturing<br />

2 .<br />

Whereas ‘social’ waste and ‘non-commodity’<br />

waste are rarely juxtaposed in<br />

public debate, - the US India nuclear<br />

deal and its reverse side offer an occasion<br />

to do precisely this. As the below<br />

cited data on the generation of waste in<br />

the nuclear production chain show, - the<br />

US-India nuclear deal is bound to result<br />

in huge quantities and extremely dangerous waste that<br />

cannot be sold on the market, but needs to be put aside, at<br />

great risks to humans and to our natural environment.<br />

Again, the importation of expensive armament systems<br />

entails the waste of vast economic resources that could be<br />

used towards relieving India’s persistent mass poverty,<br />

hence should be considered importation of social waste.<br />

Moreover, the issues of ‘social’ and ‘non-commodity’<br />

waste can also be posed in relation to the manufacturing<br />

of weapons’ grade plutonium and atomic weapons, where<br />

generation of the two given forms of waste occurs simultaneously<br />

3 .<br />

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P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

The Nuclear Deal: Importation of Nuclear Tech-<br />

nology and and Importation of US Armament<br />

Systems<br />

As starting point for my discussion I will take two newspaper<br />

articles published in the Times of India on September<br />

11 th last. One of these highlighted the business prospects<br />

of the US-India nuclear deal via the sale of nuclear<br />

production technology, and via the importation and the<br />

construction of nuclear reactors in India. The second<br />

article discussed the aspiration of the US in terms of<br />

expanded exports of armament systems to India. To take<br />

the article on plans for expansion of nuclear energy<br />

production first, - it spoke very glowingly about the <strong>size</strong> of<br />

business that will be generated, mentioning<br />

a figure of 40 Billion US Dollars<br />

worth of orders Indian and foreign<br />

enterprises stand to receive, and hailing<br />

the deal as a ‘project’ having a financial<br />

<strong>size</strong> of Rupees 2.4 lakh crore. Under the<br />

deal, a reported 24 light-water reactors<br />

will be imported from abroad and<br />

installed along India’s coasts (!). India<br />

plans to build a further 12 indigenous<br />

nuclear plants, consisting of pressurized<br />

heavy water reactors. At no point in the<br />

article are the implications of the<br />

nuclear deal in terms of generation of<br />

additional nuclear waste discussed 4 !<br />

In another article published in the<br />

Times of India on the very same day, the<br />

secondary objectives of the US, which<br />

traditionally is not a major seller of<br />

military hardware to India, are described. The article<br />

delineates the huge <strong>size</strong> of India’s overall arms’ imports. It<br />

states that since the Kargil conflict, India has spent a<br />

‘whopping’ $ 25 Billion on imports of weaponry. The<br />

country is ‘poised’ to spend another $ 30 Billion on such<br />

purchases over the next 5-6 years (!). Thus, the US is vying<br />

to capture a whole series of arms’ orders which India<br />

intends to place on the world market for arms. Indian<br />

import plans reportedly include a $ 170 million plan for<br />

the buying of anti-ship Harpoon missiles, a Rs 42,000<br />

Crore project for the purchase of multi-role combat<br />

aircraft, and purchases of 197 light utility and observation<br />

India plans to<br />

build a further<br />

12 indigenous<br />

nuclear plants,<br />

consisting of<br />

pressurized heavy<br />

water reactors<br />

helicopters worth another Rs 3,000 Crore. A deal mentioned<br />

that has already been clinched, and has been sent<br />

for approval to the US Congress, is the arms’ deal – described<br />

as India’s ‘biggest ever’ with the US – for the<br />

purchase of 8 Boeing reconnaissance aircraft, estimated<br />

to cost no less than Rs 8,500 Crore. At no point in the<br />

article is it explained that such lavish spending on arms’<br />

imports represents a form of social waste, and that the<br />

same financial resources could well be spent on alleviating<br />

the massive poverty that still exists in India 5 .<br />

Officially, of course, the US- India nuclear deal and the<br />

listed plans to import armaments are no interconnected<br />

issues. The arms’ purchases do not directly form part of<br />

the agreement surrounding importation<br />

of nuclear technology. And yet it is<br />

probably correct to see the US’s hopes to<br />

overtake other foreign suppliers of arms<br />

to India as a reverse side of the nuclear<br />

deal, as was indeed hinted at in the<br />

article of the Times of India. In any case,<br />

juxtaposition of the two issues enables us<br />

to look more holistically at the wasteful<br />

implications of the Indian government’s<br />

behavior, than a focus on the US-India<br />

nuclear deal alone would allow us to do.<br />

Hence, below I am going to address<br />

both the generation of nuclear waste<br />

that will occur in consequence of the<br />

nuclear deal, and India’s arms’ imports,<br />

in order to show the full extent of waste<br />

creation that is involved.<br />

The Generation of Hazardous Waste in the<br />

Nuclear Production Chain<br />

Let’s take the issue of nuclear waste generation first. I do<br />

not possess comprehensive data on the nuclear waste that<br />

has been generated by nuclear production in India so far.<br />

Nor am I in a position to give a precise assessment regarding<br />

the waste that importation and construction of new<br />

reactors will result in. However, the experience of nuclear<br />

production worldwide is unequivocal: nuclear waste<br />

emerges at each and every link in the nuclear production<br />

chain, starting from the very first stage, i.e. that of uranium<br />

mining and milling, and lasting up to the stage where<br />

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I N PERSPECTIVE<br />

nuclear fuel elements are treated in reprocessing facilities.<br />

An important source for my own understanding of these<br />

issues is the book ‘Nuclear Wastelands’, written by a group<br />

of scientists led by the US-based Indian academician<br />

Arjun Makhijani, which book primarily reviews waste<br />

generation by nuclear-military production facilities 6 . From<br />

this and other sources, I have selected three cases of waste<br />

generation, namely: the waste tailings that emerge when<br />

uranium is mined and milled; depreciated fuel elements<br />

which themselves are a form of nuclear waste; and the<br />

high-level waste that needs to be put aside when former<br />

nuclear fuel elements are reprocessed.<br />

Uranium mining is, of course, the very first stage in the<br />

whole nuclear production chain. As<br />

known, such mining is also undertaken in<br />

India, and would likely be intensified in<br />

consequence of the US-India nuclear<br />

deal. When uranium ore is mined and<br />

uranium is prepared and enriched,<br />

towards employment as raw material for<br />

making nuclear fuel elements, a truly<br />

huge amount of hazardous material in<br />

the form of mill tailings is left behind, -<br />

tailings which do contain radioactive<br />

substances and are therefore hazardous<br />

for humans and for nature. Speaking in<br />

volume terms, these tailings reportedly<br />

constitute 95% of all the nuclear waste<br />

that is generated in the nuclear production<br />

chain. Among the radioactive<br />

substances found in mill tailings are for<br />

instance radium-226 and thorium-230,<br />

which latter radioactive element has a half-life of 76<br />

thousand years, meaning that it will take that many years<br />

before half of the radioactivity contained in the thorium<br />

will have decayed. In mining uranium and in creating the<br />

tailings, capitalist entrepreneurs are not just burdening<br />

our children and grand children with the consequences of<br />

uranium extraction, but entire future generations, and<br />

such for an almost indefinite period of time. The damaging<br />

consequences of uranium mining have been recorded<br />

well in the US, where nuclear production was historically<br />

started. Here, tailing dams have turned into slurry after<br />

downpours of rain. Between 1955 and 1977 a total of<br />

Even microgram<br />

quantities<br />

of plutonium,<br />

when inhaled<br />

by humans, are<br />

known to result in<br />

fatal cancers<br />

fifteen tailing dams have broken. In one such case, the<br />

river Rio Puerco was flooded with 94 million gallons of<br />

tailing liquids, resulting in contamination of a long stretch<br />

of the river 7 .<br />

Another stage in the nuclear production chain known to<br />

generate dangerous waste, is the stage where nuclear<br />

energy is generated in reactors. Surely, the production of<br />

nuclear energy can be seen as a contribution to human<br />

welfare, if purely looked at from the perspective of energy<br />

generation. Yet the hazardous implications from employment<br />

of the nuclear fuel rods in the reactors are multifarious.<br />

A section of the rods needs to be taken out regularly,<br />

as the nuclear fuel elements can be utilized for only three<br />

years. Now in the parlance of economic<br />

theory the fuel elements once taken out<br />

are considered 'depreciated means of<br />

production'. They are presumed to have<br />

lost all the value that has been transferred<br />

to the new commodity, the nuclear<br />

energy. Yet the fuel elements undoubtedly<br />

are a form of hazardous waste.<br />

Speaking in quantitative terms, the <strong>size</strong><br />

of this waste seems small. Yet the<br />

radioactivity contained in the spent fuel<br />

elements is truly intense. The radioactive<br />

elements present in this nuclear<br />

waste include uranium, strontium-90,<br />

caesium-137 and plutonium. Of these,<br />

plutonium is entirely the outcome of<br />

human production; as such it does not<br />

exist in nature. It is known to be the very<br />

most toxic substance on earth, its<br />

half-life being exceedingly long. The half-life of plutonium-239<br />

is 24,400 years, that of plutonium-242 as much as<br />

380,000 years. Even micro-gram quantities of plutonium,<br />

when inhaled by humans, are known to result in fatal<br />

cancers 8 . Hence, the expansion in construction and<br />

utilization of nuclear reactors worldwide is a reason for<br />

grave concerns. Each additional nuclear reactor generates<br />

spent nuclear fuel rods containing different forms of<br />

high-level waste.<br />

The third distinct stage in the chain of nuclear production<br />

I wish to refer to, is the stage of reprocessing. For<br />

decades, policymakers in the West have tried to make the<br />

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P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

It is worth<br />

recalling the<br />

fact that India<br />

today heads the<br />

list of Southern<br />

importers of<br />

armament systems<br />

public believe that they had solved the above-sketched<br />

issue of dangerous waste, i.e. the issue of spent fuel<br />

elements. They did so by arguing that these fuel rods can<br />

well be reprocessed, i.e. they may be treated chemically in<br />

reprocessing facilities so as to allow for re-use of the<br />

uranium and to pave the way for use of the fresh plutonium<br />

for ´productive´ ends, towards the manufacturing of<br />

new fuel elements. Yet it is at the stage of reprocessing<br />

that problems really pile up. First, it is at this stage that<br />

high-level waste comes into being as a distinct category of<br />

waste, since the chemical treatment of the fuel rods does<br />

not only help to separate out uranium and plutonium, but<br />

also results in high-level waste that needs to be put aside.<br />

This counts for uranium-236, to be<br />

distinguished from uranium-235, incorporated<br />

in the fuel elements. Uranium-236,<br />

mind you, has a half-life of 24.2<br />

million years. Again, there is the radioactive<br />

element jodium-129 which has a<br />

half-life of 15.7 million years. These are<br />

time-scales which as humans we are<br />

hardly able to imagine, but which make<br />

the consequences of nuclear production<br />

that much graver. The high-level waste<br />

in liquid form put aside after chemical<br />

treatment of the fuel rods is commonly<br />

stored in tanks.<br />

Now, the risks involved in such<br />

storage can be visualized through the<br />

accidents that have taken place in<br />

nuclear-military production facilities in<br />

both the US and the former Soviet<br />

Union. The Hanford nuclear complex in the US is the<br />

complex where the US used to manufacture its military<br />

plutonium. Here, high-level waste in liquid form was<br />

stored in 117 stainless steel tanks, each containing half a<br />

million gallons of waste. In 1973, a leak was discovered<br />

which had caused massive dissipation of radioactivity into<br />

Hanford’s subsoil 9 . But the most dramatic example of an<br />

accident with high level radioactive waste has been reported<br />

from the former Soviet Union. In the Cheliabinsk<br />

complex, a military-nuclear complex located in the Ural<br />

mountains, a tank explosion occurred in 1957. The government<br />

of the then USSR suppressed the news of the accident<br />

in name of guarding ‘state secrets’, but Soviet scientists<br />

unraveled the accident long before the Gorbachev<br />

government instituted an enquiry. Just as in Hanford, the<br />

high-level waste from the reprocessing in Cheliabinsk was<br />

stored in stainless steel tanks, located in a canyon-shaped<br />

area 8 meters under the soil´s surface. Yet the explosion in<br />

Cheliabinsk‘s tanks resulted in a massive leakage of<br />

radioactivity. A reported 22 million curies of radio-activity<br />

were released, two million curies in the form of a plume<br />

that reached a height of one kilometer above the Cheliabinsk<br />

complex. The explosion and the releases of radioactivity<br />

destroyed entire eco-systems in the surrounding<br />

region. Villages had to be evacuated, rivers and lakes were<br />

polluted, and the government had to take<br />

draconian measures to contain the<br />

danger of the accident for the region’s<br />

ecology 10 .<br />

Above I have simply summarized data<br />

on selected aspects of nuclear waste<br />

generation, focusing on waste tailings<br />

from uranium mining and milling, on the<br />

waste represented by spent nuclear fuel<br />

elements, and on the high-level waste<br />

that is put aside whenever nuclear fuel<br />

rods are reprocessed. Surely, given the<br />

risks they represent for humans and for<br />

nature surrounding us, there is no way<br />

one can belittle the occurrence of<br />

multiple waste in the nuclear production<br />

chain. Nor can one deny the validity of<br />

posing the consequences of the US-<br />

India nuclear deal in these terms.<br />

India as Importer of Weapons Systems - The<br />

Question of Disparate Exchange<br />

I will now turn to the second form of waste I have spoken<br />

of in the introduction to this essay, namely waste in the<br />

social sense of the term. As said, here I will focus on the<br />

reverse side of the US-India nuclear deal which is the US’s<br />

eagerness to expand its arms’ sales to India. In this context<br />

it is worth recalling the fact that India today heads the list<br />

of Southern importers of armament systems. Whereas in<br />

the past this position was held by the Middle Eastern oil<br />

giant Saudi Arabia, - India has meanwhile displaced the<br />

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latter country as leading Southern importer, along with<br />

China. This may be illustrated with concrete figures.<br />

According to a report brought out by the US–based<br />

Congressional Research Service (CRS), in 2005 India<br />

ranked first among developing nations weapons’ purchasers,<br />

in terms of the market value of agreements signed to<br />

import weaponry. Further, whereas the total value of<br />

Southern arms’ imports in this year was $ 30 Billion, the<br />

value of the agreements concluded by India alone was $ 5.4<br />

Billion, meaning that India was set to swallow fully one<br />

sixth of the total! 11 While these data could be biased, they<br />

are in fact corroborated by data which have been compiled<br />

by the respectable Stockholm based peace research<br />

institute SIPRI. In its 2007 annual<br />

report, SIPRI offers comprehensive<br />

figures for the value of arms’ imports by<br />

individual Southern states over a period<br />

of 30 years. Again, India heads the list of<br />

these totals. This of course does not<br />

imply that India has been the leading<br />

Southern importer in each and every<br />

year. But it does signify that the accumulated<br />

arms’ imports of India have<br />

been so big over the last decade as to<br />

make up for the comparatively ‘smaller’<br />

<strong>size</strong> of arms’ imports in earlier decades<br />

12 .<br />

Now, the role which arms’ transfers<br />

between North and South hold in the<br />

world economy can be assessed from<br />

either a Southern or a Northern perspective.<br />

If looked at from a Southern<br />

perspective, one has to reflect on India’s arms’ imports in<br />

terms of disparate exchange. The term disparate exchange<br />

expresses the fact that Southern economies, when importing<br />

armament systems from the North, are losers. Whereas<br />

they import military commodities which from a social<br />

point of view should be considered waste, - the Northern<br />

states which export the armaments are benefactors, for<br />

they directly or indirectly transfer the arms in exchange<br />

for raw materials, semi-finished goods and labor- intensive<br />

commodities representing wealth. This is indeed a form of<br />

international exchange which may be characterized as<br />

disparate (as opposed to unequal) exchange, since there is<br />

Today, when India<br />

has emerged as a<br />

leading Southern<br />

arms’ importer,<br />

the US is eager to<br />

expand its arms’<br />

sales to India<br />

a qualitative difference between the commodities flowing<br />

in parallel between Northern and Southern trade ‘partners’.<br />

Although in certain cases the inter-linkages between<br />

exported and imported goods are explicit (notably in case<br />

of barter agreements where crude oil is exchanged against<br />

weaponry), - more generally processes of disparate<br />

exchange are less easy to pinpoint, i.e. are indirectly<br />

interlinked 13 .<br />

To highlight the imperialist nature of this trading<br />

mechanism, it needs to be stated that the given trading<br />

mechanism was historically instituted by the United<br />

States. For when OPEC’s oil-exporting countries in the<br />

1970s decided to take their fate in their own hands, by<br />

insisting on the right to fix the international<br />

price of crude oil, the US immediately<br />

tried to take advantage of the<br />

changing situation. It knew of course<br />

that increased prices of oil would inter<br />

alia result in additional dollar incomes<br />

for members of OPEC 14 . Hence it<br />

feverishly worked to channel such<br />

Southern income towards additional<br />

Southern imports of weapon systems<br />

from the US and other Northern arms’<br />

exporters, and with success 15 . Leading<br />

oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and<br />

Iran, in the seventies were easily<br />

deluded into buying fighter planes and<br />

other expensive weaponry. These<br />

Middle Eastern countries right then<br />

headed the list of Southern importers of<br />

weapons’ systems. Today, when India<br />

has emerged as a leading Southern arms’ importer, the<br />

US is eager to expand its arms’ sales to India, at the<br />

expense of the country’s traditional suppliers of arms 16 .<br />

And whereas it needs to be assessed whether the exports<br />

of social waste from the US towards India will be undertaken<br />

at the expense of wealth belonging to India’s own<br />

population, or rather at the expense of wealth belonging<br />

to the people of India and other Southern states combined,<br />

- the arms’ transfers are bound to represent further<br />

cases of disparate exchange.<br />

India’s massive imports of armament systems can,<br />

however, also be analyzed from a Northern perspective.<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

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P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

Here we need to highlight the fact that the hegemonic<br />

power in the world system, ever since the days of British<br />

imperialism, has used its leverage as dominant power to<br />

export weaponry as a part of macro-economic policymaking.<br />

This is true in particular for the presently tottering<br />

hegemonic power, the US. Ever since the sixties of the<br />

previous century, the US has used its exports of armament<br />

systems as replacement mechanism, as supplement to<br />

ensure that American armament corporations at all times<br />

are supplied with orders sufficient in amount to protect<br />

their production capacity and guarantee accumulation.<br />

For instance, when the US government at the end of the<br />

1980s needed to partly scale down the <strong>size</strong> of its orders<br />

towards monopoly corporations based in the US military<br />

sector, - it heavily pushed military corporations into<br />

expanding their exports. It even employed the second<br />

Gulf war staged in 1991 towards this end. Moreover, the<br />

US’s Ministry of Defense, the Pentagon, itself embraces<br />

the economic logic behind armament exports. This is<br />

evident, for instance, from statements contained in its<br />

2006 report to the US Congress, the Annual Industrial<br />

Capability Report (AICR). As the<br />

report states, ´Defense exports play an<br />

important economic role in strengthening<br />

the US defense industrial base’;<br />

‘about 20% (sic) of US weapons systems<br />

items are exported…’; and ’sales to<br />

foreign customers have frequently been<br />

critical to keeping entire production<br />

lines open…’ 17 . Hence, it is difficult to<br />

interpret these sales as necessitated by<br />

the US’s ‘security’, when the US Pentagon<br />

itself admits to the US Congress that the exports of<br />

armament systems represent a leverage for macro-economic<br />

policymaking. The combined historical evidence<br />

for the past several decades indicates that exports play an<br />

active role towards solving dilemmas in connection with<br />

the US’s business cycle, driven as it largely is by military<br />

allocations.<br />

Conclusions: Juxtaposing Social Waste and<br />

Non-Commodity Waste<br />

Let me state my conclusions in brief. As suggested, the<br />

US-India nuclear deal should be analyzed in terms of<br />

In assessing the<br />

implications of the<br />

US-India nuclear<br />

deal, the issue<br />

of nuclear waste<br />

surely needs to be<br />

taken on board<br />

wasteful implications which the deal is set to have in two<br />

ways. If strictly looked at from a perspective of expanded<br />

production of nuclear energy in India, as is the official<br />

line of the Indian government, - the deal already needs to<br />

be severely criticized. For it will undoubtedly result in<br />

vastly increased generation of nuclear waste, which from<br />

the standpoint of critical economic theory is to be considered<br />

non-commodity waste. Above I have not presented<br />

specific data on the waste which India’s own production of<br />

nuclear energy has generated in the past, but have concentrated<br />

on international data regarding the generation of<br />

waste at three stages in the nuclear production chain, i.e.<br />

the stage of uranium mining and milling, the stage of<br />

production in nuclear reactors, and the stage of reprocessing<br />

of nuclear fuel elements. These data unequivocally<br />

bring out that in assessing the implications of the US-<br />

India nuclear deal, the issue of nuclear waste needs to be<br />

taken on board.<br />

Yet if we are to assess the full extent of waste generation<br />

implied by the US-India nuclear deal, we also need to<br />

reflect on the reverse side of the deal. There needs to be,<br />

it seems, greater awareness of the fact<br />

that the US does not just intend to use<br />

the deal to promote the export of<br />

nuclear production technology towards<br />

India. The US also is keenly interested<br />

in greatly expanding its sales of armaments<br />

to India, in view of the fact that<br />

India is one of the global South’s<br />

leading arms’ importers, along with<br />

China. Here again, my data regarding<br />

the loss of wealth implied by these deals<br />

for India and the South are incomplete. Thus, further<br />

research on Indian armament imports should bring out<br />

how they express disparate exchange. They may lead to<br />

loss of wealth for the people of India alone - or ultimate<br />

lead to replication of disparate exchange via parallel<br />

exports of conventional arms by India to other countries<br />

of the global South. In any case, such research would have<br />

to focus on the precise way in which foreign currency<br />

towards payment of these imports is generated. In order<br />

to make a holistic assessment of the US-India nuclear<br />

deal and the mentioned arms’ deals, we need to juxtapose<br />

‘non-commodity’ waste and ‘social’ waste.<br />

156 THE IIPM THINK TANK


I N PERSPECTIVE<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

See e.g. Praful Bidwai, ‘Manmohan’s False Nuclear<br />

Move’ (19 July, 2008 – www.cndp.org/; also Zia Mian<br />

and M.V.Ramana, ‘Going MAD: Ten Years of the<br />

Bomb in South Asia’’ (July 29, 2008 – www.cndp.org/;<br />

2<br />

A precursor of the concept of non-commodity waste is<br />

the term ‘discommodities’ coined by the Marginalist<br />

Jevons, but largely ignored by other economists of his<br />

time and subsequently – see W.Stanley Jevons, The<br />

Theory of Political Economy (Macmillan and Co.,<br />

London, United Kingdom, 1879, p.62);<br />

3<br />

For a full discussion, see Peter Custers, Questioning<br />

Globalized Militarism. Nuclear and Military Production<br />

and Critical Economic Theory (Tulika Publishers,<br />

New Delhi, India, 2007);<br />

4<br />

Srinivas Laxman, ‘N-Trade: It’s a $ 40 Billion Opportunity’<br />

(Times of India, New Delhi, September 11, 2008,<br />

p.15); for other estimates regarding the business prospects<br />

of the deal, see J.Sri Raman, ‘How India’s ‘Waiver’<br />

Has Won’ (September 9, 2008 – www.cndp.org/ );<br />

5<br />

Rajat Pandit, ‘In Defence, US Wants to be India’s<br />

Partner No.1’ (Times of India, New Delhi,<br />

September 11, 2008, p.13);<br />

6<br />

Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu and Katherine Yih (eds.),<br />

Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear<br />

Weapons Production and its Health and Environmental<br />

Effects (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA,<br />

1995);<br />

7<br />

Katherine Yih, Albert Donnay, Annalee Yassi, A.James<br />

Ruttenber and Scott Saleska,<br />

'Úranium Mining and Milling for Military Purposes' , in<br />

Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu and Katherine Yih<br />

(1995), op.cit., p.121;<br />

8<br />

For details on the health and environmental hazards of<br />

plutonium production and use, see notably Frank<br />

Barnaby, Nuclear Legacy: Democracy in a Plutonium<br />

Economy (Cornerhouse Briefing Paper No.2, Sturminster,<br />

Newton, United Kingdom, November 1997);<br />

9<br />

See on the leakages of nuclear waste at the Hanford<br />

complex, see for instance Arjun Makhijani and Scott<br />

Saleska, 'The Production of Nuclear Weapons and<br />

Environmental Hazards' (in Arjun Makhijani, Howard<br />

Hu and Katherine Yih (1995), op.cit., p.44);<br />

10<br />

On the Cheliabinsk catastrophe, see for instance Zhores<br />

Medvedev, Nuclear Disaster in the Urals (Vintage<br />

Books, London, United Kingdom, 1980); also Arjun<br />

Makhijani, Howard Hu and Katherine Yih (1995), op.<br />

cit., p.335;<br />

11<br />

Richard Grimmett, ‘Conventional Arms Transfers to<br />

Developing Nations, 1998-2005’ (Congressional<br />

Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress,<br />

Washington, USA, October 23, 2006);<br />

12<br />

For Sipri´s most recent data, see Paul Holtom, Mark<br />

Bromley and Pieter D.Wezeman, ´International Arms<br />

Transfers´ (Chapter 7 of the SIPRI Yearbook 2008:<br />

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,<br />

Stockholm, Sweden, 2008, p.293);<br />

13<br />

An exposition regarding the trading mechanism of<br />

disparate exchange between North and South is stated<br />

in Peter Custers (2007), op.cit., Part Three, Chapter<br />

Nineteen: ´Unequal Exchange versus Disparate Exchange.<br />

A Theoretical Comparison. Succession and<br />

Coexistence of Two Imperialist Trading Mechanisms´<br />

(p.309);<br />

14<br />

For the views of US State Department officials regarding<br />

the implications of the historical price increases<br />

decided upon by OPEC in 1973, see Pierre Terzian,<br />

OPEC: The Inside Story (Zed Books, London, 1985);<br />

15<br />

See e.g. Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (Hodder<br />

& Stoughton, London, 1977); and Russell Warren<br />

Howe, Weapons. The Shattering Truth About the<br />

International Game of Power, Money and Arms (Abacus,<br />

London, 1980);<br />

16<br />

For India´s primary dependence on arms´ supplies from<br />

Russia, see e.g. Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley and Pieter<br />

D.Wezeman (2008), op.cit., p.300;<br />

17<br />

Office of the Undersecretary of Defence, Annual Industrial<br />

Capability Report (A.I.C.R. - (US Pentagon,<br />

Washington D.C., USA, February, 2006).<br />

(This is the revised text of a lecture given at the Jawaharlal<br />

Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, on September the 17 th ,<br />

2008. Peter Custers is the author of ‘Questioning Globalized<br />

Militarism. Nuclear and Military Production and<br />

Critical Economic Theory’ (Tulika Publishers, New Delhi,<br />

India, 2007). The views expressed in the write-up are<br />

personal and do not reflect the official policy or position of<br />

the organisation)<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

157


P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

What Difference Does A<br />

Revolution Make?<br />

A Preliminary Contrast of<br />

India And China<br />

I. Commonalities<br />

At the time of their casting off of colonialism—India gaining<br />

independence from Britain in 1947, China putting an end to a<br />

century of imperialist domination in 1949—the two largest<br />

countries in Asia shared many common characteristics. Each<br />

possessed an enormous continental landmass with a population<br />

in the hundreds of millions, the most populous in the<br />

world. In both the anti-colonial struggle extended over many<br />

decades, with the forces that led to eventual victory having consolidated<br />

by the 1920s. Each inherited a fractured territory,<br />

with imperialist backed enemies forcing the diversion of<br />

limited resources into military preparations and conflicts—<br />

India with Pakistan, in three wars, and ongoing clashes<br />

over Kashmir, China still colonized in Hong Kong<br />

and Macao, divided from Taiwan, with open<br />

warfare in Korea, and threatened spillover from<br />

Vietnam. Both experienced extreme birthpains,<br />

in the Chinese case the aftermath of<br />

occupation and civil war, in the Indian-Pakistani,<br />

death and dislocation in the population<br />

exchange across their new border, and the<br />

assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Despite<br />

their many obvious differences—China lacked<br />

the communal and caste divisions of India, had<br />

never been fully colonized, and could rely initially on assistance<br />

from the Soviet Union—the two countries began their<br />

new national stage in roughly similar shape.<br />

It is in their economic and social profiles, especially, that the<br />

two newly emerged nations most closely resembled each other.<br />

Before the colonial era, they had been among the richest<br />

societies in the world, but under the impact of occupation and<br />

exploitation, had rapidly declined. Both had seen their traditional<br />

economies undermined by cheap imported goods, and<br />

their old system of classes restructured to fit the new global<br />

order. In each country, a “feudal”<br />

class prevailed in the<br />

Robert Weil*<br />

Robert Weil, Retired Lecturer<br />

and Trade Union Organizer,<br />

The University of California in<br />

Santa Cruz, USA<br />

158 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON<br />

countryside, allied not only to the urban elites, but to comprador<br />

elements tied to the imperialists. The majority of the<br />

population in both was either poor peasants or landless<br />

laborers. Each faced deep rural poverty, with a small and<br />

oppressed urban working class. Demographics were abysmal.<br />

Illiteracy and lack of medical care were the norm for the<br />

working classes. In the 1940s, life expectancy in India was only<br />

around 32, and in China barely three years longer. The<br />

situation of women was especially dire, emerging from centuries<br />

old traditional oppression, including such barbaric practices<br />

as Indian sati and Chinese footbinding. Each faced<br />

similar difficulties, therefore, in entering a newly independent<br />

national stage.<br />

II. Divergence<br />

Yet within just a little over a quarter of a century, these two<br />

nations had diverged onto sharply different paths, resulting in a<br />

wide and lingering economic and social gap. This divergence<br />

had begun even before liberation, in their differing methods of<br />

struggle for national power. It would be easy, but simplistic, to<br />

attribute these distinct approaches to the non-violence of<br />

Mahatma Gandhi, and the revolutionary<br />

violence of Mao Zedong. Certainly, the<br />

Indian movement was unique in its utilization<br />

of civil disobedience. But while<br />

Gandhi also stressed the need for economic<br />

and societal changes, notably in his<br />

adoption of homespun and salt marches to<br />

challenge the British monopoly, and his call<br />

for an end to the oppression of untouchables<br />

or dalits, nevertheless, in the last<br />

analysis, the movement he led was a<br />

struggle primarily for national independence, not social<br />

revolution. Its outcome was the transfer of power to a rising<br />

class of Indian bourgeoisie, under Jawaharlal Nehru. Though<br />

there were quasi-socialistic aspects to the new India—national<br />

planning, state enterprises, social equality as a major goal,<br />

and recognition of socialism in the 1976 constitution—the<br />

economy was from the beginning a mixed one, and capitalist<br />

families such as the Tatas and Birlas, some of whom had been<br />

prominent in the fight for independence, rose to dominant<br />

economic positions.<br />

Even more significantly, though the feudal role of princely<br />

estates was ended by the Nehru government, the stranglehold<br />

The struggle<br />

led by Mao had<br />

united movements<br />

for national<br />

liberation and<br />

revolutionary<br />

transformation<br />

of large landlords over the rural areas was only partially and<br />

unevenly reformed. It was recognized early on that land reform<br />

was critical to an independent India, and measures were<br />

introduced to stabilize and ameliorate the conditions of<br />

tenantry, cap rents, limit the acreage that any one person could<br />

own, and eliminate the intermediaries who often brutally<br />

enforced the landholding system. These policies did bring<br />

relief to some poorer tenants, but mainly benefited the rising<br />

class of independent farmers, who had the resources to fully<br />

utilize their holdings. Even these measures were only partly<br />

successful due to wide variation from state to state, spotty<br />

enforcement and rampant corruption, the ability to employ<br />

“hidden tenancy” and bypass landholding limitations, and lack<br />

of credit, forcing many to turn to moneylenders—often large<br />

landholders—at exhorbitant interest. As a consequence,<br />

though advances were made, especially in West Bengal, Punjab<br />

and Kerala, in large parts of the country the system of tenantry<br />

and landlessness continued with only partial—if any—significant<br />

modification. In the nation as a whole, there was no<br />

consistent land reform, or end to the sharp division of rural<br />

classes, and hundreds of millions remained heavily exploited<br />

and impoverished, especially among the<br />

land poor, landless laborers, dalits and<br />

adivasis. As a result, though segments of<br />

the population gained new opportunities in<br />

postcolonial India, and took advantage of<br />

its democratic processes to advance their<br />

interests, the independence movement was<br />

not accompanied by revolutionary social<br />

transformation—either before or after<br />

1947. While gradual change brought<br />

improvement for some, it did not put an<br />

end to the institutional aspects of class exploitation and caste<br />

oppression.<br />

It is only against this background that the profoundly<br />

different experience of the Chinese socialist revolution can be<br />

understood. From the beginning, the struggle led by Mao had<br />

united movements for national liberation and revolutionary<br />

transformation. The Communist Party had an ideological<br />

commitment to the fundamental alteration of class relationships.<br />

But the specific form that this took was driven by<br />

objective conditions. As shown since immemorial times, and as<br />

failure of early efforts at urban based Communist revolution<br />

had once again demonstrated, political change in China, in the<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

159


P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

final analysis, almost always rested on mobilization of the<br />

peasantry as its mass base. Under conditions of semi-colonialism,<br />

Chinese liberation from imperial domination could only<br />

be achieved by again finding a means to tap this latent peasant<br />

power. But this required addressing the primary demand of the<br />

poor rural population, for land reform and an end to the<br />

rule—political and social, as well as economic—of the landlords.<br />

It was the recognition by Mao of this relationship of<br />

national liberation to revolutionary transformation of the countryside,<br />

and his linking of the Communist Party to uprisings<br />

already beginning among the peasantry, that laid the basis for<br />

eventual victory in 1949. From its earliest stages, therefore,<br />

unlike in India, the struggle for independence in China was<br />

tied to social revolution, to overthrow the class structure in the<br />

rural areas, and by extension, the entire feudal, national<br />

bourgeois and comprador alliance.<br />

This transformation began as far back as the 1920s, in<br />

regions under Communist control. But it was only after the<br />

triumph of the revolution that land reform began to be implemented<br />

nationwide, and gradually deepened until it had<br />

completely remade the rural areas. Beginning with reduction<br />

in rents and simple measures of cooperation,<br />

during the Great Leap Forward at the<br />

end of the 1950s, it advanced to the<br />

creation of the communes, each of which<br />

brought together many villages and tens of<br />

thousands of peasants under a single<br />

administrative authority. The commune<br />

was first and foremost a unit of collective<br />

agricultural production. But it was much<br />

more. For it provided a comprehensive set<br />

of benefits, including medical care—which<br />

during the Cultural Revolution took the form of “barefoot<br />

doctors,” who came from and served the rural population—<br />

free schooling for all children, support in old age, and social<br />

activities. Largescale collective organization allowed extensive<br />

infrastructure and environmental projects, such as irrigation<br />

works, fish ponds, opening of new land, and forestry. It also laid<br />

the basis for small “sideline industries,” which provided<br />

agricultural and consumer goods, and work in slow seasons.<br />

Above all, the communes completely eliminated the old<br />

landlord system, took the “sink or swim” pressure off individual<br />

families, and allowed all peasants—men and women—a<br />

high degree of equality in deciding the distribution of their<br />

From its earliest<br />

stages, therefore,<br />

unlike in India,<br />

the struggle for<br />

independence in<br />

China was tied to<br />

social revolution<br />

collective production, while providing an opportunity to share<br />

in village level governance.<br />

Much the same system was applied to the industrial working<br />

class and to urban professionals. Each large danwei or work<br />

unit provided not only guaranteed jobs, but medical clinics,<br />

schools, old age pensions, recreational facilities and housing<br />

for their employees, the so-called “iron rice bowl.” Workers<br />

had a role in the governance of their factories, regarding<br />

production policies and working conditions, rights that were<br />

further strengthened during the Cultural Revolution, when<br />

abusive use of power by many state and party officials, and<br />

managers, was challenged. The outcome of these transformations<br />

was that income distribution and provision of services<br />

became much more equal, and this in turn resulted in a rapid<br />

and dramatic improvement in demographics. While Indian life<br />

expectancy in 1951 was 32.1, virtually unchanged since<br />

independence, the rate in China rose to 40.3 by 1953, and such<br />

gains continued. “’It is probable that the pre-1949 crude death<br />

and infant mortality rate were approximately halved by 1957’”<br />

(Judith Banister, China’s Changing Population, 63, in Robert<br />

Weil, Red Cat, White Cat: China and the Contradictions of<br />

“Market Socialism,” New York: Monthly<br />

Review Press, 1996, 236). In the mid-1970s,<br />

life expectancy in China reached 63.6 for<br />

men and 66.3 for women, compared to an<br />

average of only 49.4 in India. By 1980-81,<br />

Chinese infant mortality fell to 56 per<br />

1,000 live births, while the Indian level<br />

remained at a high 122, and “while India<br />

reduced its IMR from 160 before Independence<br />

to 85 by 1989-90, China starting<br />

from a higher initial level had already<br />

reached this point two decades earlier, by 1970”<br />

(Utsa Patnaik, “On Famine and Measuring ‘Famine Deaths,’”<br />

in Sujata Patel, Jasodhara Bagchi, and Krishna Raj eds.,<br />

Thinking Social Science in India: Essays in Honour of Alice<br />

Thorner, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002) When literacy is<br />

added in, China in 1981 had a “physical quality of life index” of<br />

67 out of 100, with India at 44. In several categories,<br />

the Chinese were equal to or above the “middle” countries<br />

globally, escaping from “Third World” status. Though China<br />

remained among the poorer nations, the level of wellbeing<br />

of its working classes had been transformed by revolutionary<br />

socialism.<br />

160 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON<br />

These gains came at a very high cost. A combination of<br />

severe natural disasters, overly rigid implementation of<br />

policies, exaggerated reporting of grain production and<br />

excessive procurement during the Great Leap Forward led to<br />

famine conditions in many parts of the country. While debate<br />

continues over the scale of the losses and primary responsibility<br />

for them, estimates run from several to 30 million “excess<br />

deaths.” The loss of life during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution<br />

was much smaller, but the social disruption and violence<br />

even more severe. The heavy cost of these and other campaigns<br />

led by Mao must be weighed against the gains that they<br />

achieved, and especially when compared with other countries,<br />

such as India. The deaths that accompanied the Chinese<br />

efforts to build a socialist society occurred mainly during a few<br />

years of intense struggle. But they led to improvements—especially<br />

in life expectancy and infant mortality—for hundreds of<br />

millions. Similarly, while the movement of the rural population<br />

to the cities was restricted, among the more striking results was<br />

a virtually total absence of sprawling urban slums that are<br />

ubiquitous across much of the global South. During the same<br />

period, India avoided famine and the social turmoil found in<br />

China. Amartya Sen has argued that<br />

Indian democracy and a less collectivized<br />

economy helped protect against such<br />

losses. But he also noted “that compared<br />

with China’s rapid increase in life expectancy<br />

in the Mao era, the capitalist experiment<br />

in India could be said to have caused<br />

an extra four million deaths a year since<br />

India’s independence.” As Sen put it,<br />

“‘India seems to manage to fill its cupboard<br />

with more skeletons every eight years than<br />

China put there in its years of shame, 1958-61’” (Mobo Gao,<br />

The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution,<br />

London: Pluto Press, 2008, 139, Sen quote from Antony C.<br />

Black, “Black propaganda,” Guardian<br />

Weekly, 2/24/00.) Indian democracy blunted class conflict, and<br />

allowed for a flourishing of civil society and movements for<br />

social change. But it left in place a system of rigid divisions of<br />

class and caste, deep impoverishment and widespread malnutrition,<br />

a chronic semi-famine in some areas. As a result, from<br />

the 1940s-1970s, loss of life from the social conditions of<br />

Indian capitalism exceeded several times over those of Chinese<br />

socialism.<br />

III. Convergence<br />

Amartya Sen has<br />

argued that Indian<br />

democracy and a<br />

less collectivized<br />

economy<br />

helped protect<br />

against famines<br />

Beginning around the 1970s, and especially from the 1990s on,<br />

the paths of China and India began once again to converge, a<br />

process continuing down to today. Despite the gains made for<br />

the working classes by the time Mao died in 1976, the struggles<br />

that had accompanied them left many Chinese weary of social<br />

conflict and violence. There were also limits to what had been<br />

achieved. Though the national GDP had expanded greatly,<br />

average per capita income remained at a quite low level, only<br />

$290 per year—even if still above the $240 in India—in part<br />

due to a rapid rise in population, in turn promoted by the<br />

improved health conditions. In the rural areas, some one-third<br />

of communes were said to be flourishing, another third<br />

managing at a moderate level, and the final third facing more<br />

serious difficulties. The combination of these factors opened<br />

the door once again to those members of the Chinese leadership<br />

who had for years opposed the more radical policies of<br />

Mao, and had used every period of setback to promote a very<br />

different alternative path. After his death, these forces coalesced<br />

behind Deng Xiaoping, who began a dismantling of the<br />

collective socialist securities for the working classes, and<br />

initiated a policy of ever more capitalistic<br />

“reforms” and “opening up to the world.”<br />

The attack began with the forced dismantling<br />

of the communes—regardless of their<br />

economic condition—and their replacement<br />

by a system of individual “family<br />

responsibility contracts” for the land. For a<br />

few years, this led to improved incomes in<br />

the countryside, as government subsidized<br />

crop prices, new agricultural methods were<br />

introduced, and farmers cannibalized the<br />

former communal socialist accumulation. But these gains were<br />

only temporary, and in the process, the collective basis for<br />

rural life was shattered, with the rapid collapse of virtually free<br />

health care, schools, old age security and other benefits, and<br />

the dismantling of infrastructure and environmental projects.<br />

As individual farmers increasingly faced the global market,<br />

and a “scissors” opened up between costs of production and<br />

prices for crops, their relative position declined, and today<br />

much of the countryside is in crisis.<br />

In the cities, a “market economy” was also introduced,<br />

allowing small businesses to develop, while the door was<br />

opened to foreign investment, especially in new Special<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

161


P OLITICAL ECONOMY<br />

Economic Zones in the southern and eastern coastal regions.<br />

Once these forces were sufficiently developed, an assault was<br />

made on the main stronghold of the working class in the urban<br />

areas, State Owned Enterprises. Most of these were privatized<br />

outright or semi-privatized by putting them in the hands of<br />

managers, and party and state authorities, who treated them as<br />

their personal property. All corporations were required to<br />

operate on a profit basis, and tens of millions of workers were<br />

dismissed, losing their right to social securities, and in many<br />

cases even their housing. In their place, peasant migrants—<br />

now numbering some 130 million—were drawn into the cities,<br />

to labor under often brutal working conditions in construction<br />

or export factories. These policies laid the basis for an explosive<br />

expansion of the Chinese economy, which became “factory<br />

to the world.” But in the process, China was transformed from<br />

one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, into among<br />

the most polarized. Today, a growing number of billionaires<br />

live in extreme luxury, while a “new middle class” resemble<br />

their peers in rich nations. For workers and peasants there have<br />

been certain general gains—a wider variety of food and<br />

clothing, and greater access to consumer goods, if they can<br />

afford them. But the<br />

cost has been exceedingly high, in the<br />

loss of jobs and social securities, and<br />

tens of millions now form an impoverished<br />

“reserve army of labor.” After initially<br />

narrowing, the urban/rural gap is widening,<br />

and class polarization growing, reviving the<br />

prerevolutionary alliance<br />

of rich farmers, urban capitalists,<br />

and compradors.<br />

In India the changes during this period<br />

were in a similar direction, if less dramatic. The Green<br />

Revolution, which began in the 1960s, helped improve the<br />

conditions of some at first, especially in Punjab, but this only<br />

increased the uneven regional development and polarizing of<br />

classes, as those who could afford the needed inputs gained the<br />

main benefit. Today, the negative ecological and economic<br />

effects of a high cost “greening” of farming have led to<br />

increasingly nonviable consequences, with falling water tables<br />

and rising debt. In much of the rest of the country, the historic<br />

lack of adequate land reform continues, a main cause of vast<br />

rural impoverishment. Despite some recent state efforts to<br />

address it, the situation remains dire. “The number of utterly<br />

poor people in India at present is about the same as the entire<br />

population of the country in 1947 when India became independent<br />

from Britain. The absolute landless and the near<br />

landless (those with less than half an acre of land) make up<br />

43% of rural households in India”—unlike in China, where<br />

farmers still have a guaranteed right to land (Patralekha<br />

Chatterjee, “Land Reform in India: Necessary but not Sufficient<br />

to Fight Poverty,” Development and Cooperation, No. 2,<br />

March/April 2002, 21-22). But as in the Chinese case, individual<br />

Indian farmers now face the global economy on their own,<br />

defenseless against the rising cost of inputs, competition from<br />

cheap imports, and a lack of credit.<br />

Like China, India saw an economic explosion as it discarded<br />

many of its quasi-socialist remnants and turned toward “free<br />

market” neoliberalism. But it is primarily those at the top who<br />

have benefited the most, together with a new large middle class<br />

of educated elite. In addition to developing industries and<br />

natural resources—often driving the poor or indigenous off<br />

their land—India has been able to exploit a huge stratum of<br />

university graduates in high tech centers such as Bangalore,<br />

and its English speakers as the outsourcing capital for U.S. and<br />

Anglo service sectors. As in China,<br />

however, this has led to highly uneven<br />

development. Pockets of the rich and<br />

well off, primarily in a few large<br />

metropolises, are surrounded by vast<br />

urban slums, and a countryside that in<br />

many areas remains in deepest poverty,<br />

driving tens of millions into the cities,<br />

where they swell the ranks of the<br />

informal sector and temporary hires<br />

used to undercut and replace permanent<br />

workers. This sharpening contradiction is starkly revealed<br />

in Andhra Pradesh, where despite the rise of Bangalore,<br />

agricultural conditions deteriorated so drastically that the state<br />

is an epicenter of the suicides of farmers—though they have<br />

their counterpart in Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Kerala<br />

and elsewhere. As the number of billionaires grows, so do the<br />

ranks of the desperately impoverished, under an alliance of<br />

rural rich, urban capitalists and compradors, similar to the<br />

Chinese.<br />

As the 21 st century opens, both China and India are reemerging<br />

as global powers. The Chinese have taken the early lead.<br />

World Bank figures for 2007 put GDP for China at some $3.28<br />

Negative ecological<br />

and economic<br />

effects of a high<br />

cost “greening” of<br />

farming have led to<br />

increasingly nonviable<br />

reactions<br />

162 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T HE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON<br />

trillion, almost three times that of India at $1.17 trillion. The<br />

gap in per capita income is only slightly less, $2,360 and $950,<br />

respectively. Life expectancy in China is 72, that in India just<br />

64. The Chinese literacy rate is around 91, the Indian only in<br />

the 60s. Yet the uncontrolled growth in China has left it worse<br />

off than India in other respects. The Chinese Gini index, a<br />

measure of inequality, is now around 47—above the “danger<br />

level”—while the Indian rate is more than ten points lower.<br />

Terrible as the high incidence of farmer suicides in India<br />

is—some 200,000 over the past decade or more—in China<br />

about the same number of mainly rural residents have killed<br />

themselves each year recently, with women in the majority.<br />

This is a consequence not only of the desperation of many<br />

Chinese farmers in the face of the global “free market,” but of<br />

how much they have lost with elimination of former social<br />

securities, and the return of a high degree of gender inequality.<br />

The demand for greater transparency and democratic rights—<br />

though not necessarily following Western or Indian patterns—<br />

is widespread in China. These contrasts produce contradictory<br />

attitudes toward the Chinese “model” in India—generally<br />

divided along class lines. Some Indians, especially in the upper<br />

and middle classes, look to the current<br />

policies in China, with unrestrained<br />

capitalist development tied to a still fairly<br />

high degree of state control, as an<br />

example to be followed. What they in<br />

most cases forget, however, is that though<br />

the rapid Chinese rise in recent years<br />

results from many causes, it was the<br />

“head start” provided by the socialist<br />

revolution—in better health, education,<br />

infrastructure development and social<br />

egalitarianism—that laid the basis for this later advance.<br />

Lacking a similar revolutionary transformation, Indian<br />

economy lagged in most key economic and demographic<br />

indicators already by the late 1970s, and this difference has<br />

remained down to the present day.<br />

Many in the Indian working classes and among oppressed<br />

communities have not forgotten this lesson. For them, the<br />

Chinese “model” is not its current capitalist market system, but<br />

the socialist revolution that preceded it under the leadership of<br />

Mao. In India today—as well as in Nepal, the Philippines, and<br />

elsewhere—Maoist revolutionaries are a growing force, as they<br />

try to carry out the social transformation that was never<br />

Though Chinese<br />

and Indian<br />

economies have<br />

little contact at<br />

present, the future<br />

may bring a<br />

new unity<br />

completed after 1947. But they are still active largely in more<br />

remote regions, with their main base among the rural poor,<br />

dalits and adivasis. Ironically, the current government of China<br />

has no use for such revolutionaries, and rejects their claims to<br />

“Maoism,” as if it were a copyrighted national brand. While<br />

Chinese with a Maoist orientation are again growing in<br />

strength, they are limited in their activism, unity, organization<br />

and ties to the working classes—and they too have made little<br />

efforts to develop links to the Indian followers of Mao. Whether<br />

India and China further converge or diverge in the coming<br />

period remains to be seen. Many political forces—Gandhian,<br />

social democratic, “new left,” as well as Marxist and Maoist—<br />

are competing for influence. In both nations the desperation of<br />

hundreds of millions in the face of “globalization” is growing,<br />

now heightened by the worldwide capitalist crisis. Though each<br />

government has shown an ability to buffer some of the worst<br />

effects of this collapse, and taken recent measures to ameliorate<br />

the burdens on the working classes, in the longer run they<br />

will not be able to escape the growing contradictions of world<br />

capitalism. Already, in both China and India, protests against<br />

ever widening polarization, impoverishment, corruption, land<br />

thievery and ecological devastation are<br />

growing in number, <strong>size</strong> and violence. For<br />

the Chinese, who had a revolution and<br />

then turned back to the capitalist road, it<br />

would take a major reversal to once again<br />

move toward socialism. India never had a<br />

similar revolutionary socialist transformation,<br />

but the forces to carry it out are<br />

stronger now than ever. The Indian and<br />

Chinese working classes and leftist forces<br />

today increasingly face parallel conditions<br />

under global capitalism led by an imperial U.S. Though they<br />

have little contact at present, the future may bring a new unity,<br />

as the contradictions of the world capitalist system deepen and<br />

drive them more closely together.<br />

(*He is the author of Red Cat, White Cat: China and the Contradictions<br />

of "Market Socialism," and many articles and papers on<br />

Chinese political economy, social conditions, and class relations.<br />

He has been a lifelong activist in labor, civil rights, international<br />

solidarity, environmental and peace movements. The views<br />

expressed in the write-up are personal and do not reflect the<br />

official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

163


U SA<br />

The Obama Crossroads: Neo-Liberal<br />

Coup or Responsible Government<br />

When the U.S. Treasury gave away<br />

$700 billion to Wall Street banks<br />

with no strings attached in October<br />

of 2008, the Obama team gave a green light. A<br />

popular insurgence was soon silenced, with<br />

public wrath directed instead at the U.S. auto<br />

producers (and unions) who followed with a<br />

request for $25 billion. The auto companies<br />

ended up with a loan of about 1/50 th the amount<br />

that went to Wall Street as a gift. The subtext<br />

message was disturbing. Wall Street firms<br />

produce nothing, no-one is required to explain<br />

what they are doing with all the public money<br />

they received, and no criteria of public benefit<br />

are applied.<br />

With the Obama team onside, rule by the<br />

fast-money men is set to continue. The neartrillion<br />

quick hand-out of citizen debt to the<br />

bankers with no conditions has remained a<br />

non-issue. Even the shift from buying Wall<br />

Street assets to direct capital infusion has<br />

raised no questions. Obama’s subsequent<br />

appointments of his economic and financial<br />

directors follow in line. Those now in charge of<br />

the U.S. money-printing machine (alias the<br />

world’s reserve currency) and of the financially<br />

hollowed-out system that was once the U.S.<br />

economy have not really changed. Even the<br />

education cabinet post has been filled by what<br />

his Bush predecessor says is “a kindred spirit”.<br />

He (Arne Duncan) has enthusiastically<br />

implemented the Bush school program in<br />

Chicago - testing children instead of teaching<br />

them, firing lots of teachers, pressuring<br />

test-failures out of school, and degrading public<br />

education with corporate-quiz mechanisms in<br />

place of sound learning methods.<br />

John McMurtry<br />

University Professor Emeritus,<br />

University of Guelph, Canada<br />

Illustration : Shantanu Mitra<br />

164 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C AN WE CHANGE?<br />

The Number One <strong>Issue</strong>: Who Now Runs The Economy<br />

and Finance<br />

Obama’s new U.S. Treasury Secretary is Tim Geithner, a former<br />

chief deputy of his Democrat predecessors at Treasury - Robert<br />

Rubin (who presided in the first Clinton government and later<br />

Citigroup over the “new financial instruments” that have<br />

subsequently wrecked the U.S. and world economy), and Larry<br />

Summers (who as Secretary of the Treasury in 1999 tore down<br />

barriers between commercial and investment banks in the<br />

deregulation frenzy that set up the Wall Street crash). Geithner<br />

originally came from Kissinger and Associates - “a bipartisan<br />

man” - before moving on from deputy at Treasury to head of the<br />

New York Federal Bank Reserve. His main qualifying distinction<br />

- not mentioned in press releases - has been as chair of a<br />

central committee of the BIS (Bank of International Settlements),<br />

a body of chief-executive international bankers which<br />

has been the unseen point-man of neoliberalism over the last 25<br />

years. The BIS first cut its teeth on collecting debt reparations<br />

from Germany which seeded the Nazi Party - for which the BIS<br />

later also stored stolen gold. In between these assignments,<br />

Geithner served the then-collapsing IMF as director of Policy<br />

Development and Review.<br />

In short, Geithner is an international<br />

money-man following in the tracks of what<br />

has preceded him. Behind all the hoopla of<br />

“Change We Need” and “The People’s<br />

President” lies the same monetocracy.<br />

Geithner assisted in the massive bank<br />

giveaway and its sequel of another further 25<br />

billion plus 300-billion credit to Citigroup, a<br />

Rockefeller bank led by Rubin. Neither he<br />

nor Summers, the new economic czar, lent<br />

anything but support when the flood of public money into the<br />

Wall Street hole more than doubled before Christmas from the<br />

original $700 billion to $1.5 trillion with no more conditions than<br />

before.<br />

The biggest heist ever from the public treasury, some might<br />

say an extortionate swindle, has been backed by the threat of<br />

“give it over, or Americans won’t get credit”. No-one appears to<br />

notice the fraudulent pretext on which it is based. Who needs<br />

credit from the private banks when the public and government<br />

already back them for any credit they have got? Why pour public<br />

money into private-bank hands to lend money they do not have<br />

and are not lending when they get it?<br />

“Banking<br />

institutions are<br />

more dangerous<br />

to our liberties<br />

than standing<br />

armies”, Jefferson<br />

pragmatically said<br />

More Dangerous to Our Liberties than Standing<br />

Armies<br />

Former Federal Reserve chief, Allen Greenspan, observes that<br />

“sovereign credit and guarantees put in place during the crisis<br />

[i.e., new government money to private banks] is now estimated<br />

at seven trillion”. Yet after 1.5 trillion U.S. public dollars thrown<br />

at the Wall Street hole, not one homeowner has been relieved of<br />

bankruptcy proceedings, the banks do not lend to productive<br />

enterprises or even themselves, and no-one tells anyone in<br />

America what’s been done with all the public money.<br />

The idea of a central public bank system controlling the<br />

currency and credit constitutionally held by governments and<br />

lending it for purposes that serve the public interest (e.g., social<br />

infrastructure, housing, environment and education) is as old as<br />

the modern state. But it has been dinned out of citizens’ minds.<br />

In fact, the only democratically accountable and efficient<br />

banking system is one in which skyrocketing non-productive<br />

costs, unaccountable debt creations and pyramid schemes are<br />

made impossible inside the law. Yet most are enslaved to a false<br />

double dogma - first, that unaccountable big banks creating<br />

compound-interest debts for everyone including governments<br />

are economically necessary; and, second,<br />

that they must be left free to leverage, mix<br />

and repackage debt assets as they please<br />

without the money to back the credit or<br />

capital they allocate. Statesmen since<br />

Thomas Jefferson have not been so foolish.<br />

“Banking institutions are more dangerous to<br />

our liberties than standing armies”, Jefferson<br />

pragmatically observed. “Already they<br />

have raised up a monied aristocracy that has<br />

set the Government at defiance. The issuing<br />

power [of credit] should be taken from the banks and restored to<br />

the people to whom it properly belongs”.<br />

Instead, the “monied aristocracy” and its servants are now<br />

loaded with public cash even as their vast global pyramid<br />

schemes have cratered. The consistent policy to prevent what<br />

bankers themselves call “moral hazard” is to leave them to their<br />

market fate where their plundering of the world with toxic<br />

financial products has poisoned them. The responsible public<br />

solution to “keep credit flowing” is for government to keep its<br />

control over currency and credit issue to direct loans to public<br />

and productive purposes. Let the banks lend money they can<br />

back with 100% reserves, and manage as their private depositors<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

165


USA<br />

allow them to - what in fact the best economists have recommended<br />

since the 1929 Crash.<br />

Yet even conditions of public service by the banks loaded with<br />

public cash have not surfaced to debate. Instead a Bush-Obama<br />

transition has handed over the keys of the U.S. Treasury to the<br />

very coterie of neoliberal money manipulators who have<br />

hollowed out the country’s wealth and much of the world. As<br />

long as they run the show, the people and the real economy<br />

continue down the hole.<br />

Eco-Economy and Social Justice in Reverse<br />

Obama claims that he is bringing “fresh thinking” with Larry<br />

Summers as chief of economic policy formation. If you think he<br />

can lead a new program of productive economics, employment,<br />

non-oil energy, and environmentally friendly manufacture - what<br />

every sane person wants and what Obama hope promises - consider<br />

the track record of his economics czar. Before becoming<br />

Clinton’s second-term Secretary of the Treasury where he<br />

mentored Geithner, Larry Summers had distinguished himself<br />

as an outspoken neoliberal advocating the loot-and-pollute<br />

globalization that has brought cumulative ecological as well as<br />

financial catastrophe. In a leaked Memorandum<br />

as Chief Economist of the World Bank,<br />

Summers urged “more migration of the<br />

dirty industries to the LDCs [Less Developed<br />

Countries]” for three reasons (all his<br />

words):<br />

1) The measurements of the costs of health<br />

impairing pollution depends on the<br />

foregone earnings from increased<br />

morbidity and mortality. - - - I think the<br />

economic logic behind dumping a load of<br />

toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we<br />

should face up to that.<br />

2) I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa<br />

are vastly UNDER-polluted, their air quality is probably<br />

vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico<br />

City. - - [We should prefer] world welfare enhancing trade in<br />

air pollution and waste.<br />

3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health<br />

reasons is likely to have very high income elasticity. - - - While<br />

production is mobile the consumption of pretty air is a<br />

non-tradable.<br />

Summers then explains where he stands on “deregulation”<br />

When banks failed<br />

and credit dried<br />

up, Roosevelt’s<br />

administration<br />

ploughed all the<br />

public money into<br />

public works<br />

versus “moral and social concerns” in an epitome of neoliberal<br />

life blindness: “The problem with the arguments against all of<br />

these proposals for more pollution in LDCs (intrinsic rights to<br />

certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, lack of adequate<br />

markets, etc.) is that it could be turned around and used against<br />

every Bank proposal for liberalization.” Summers here lets the<br />

cat out of the bag on what “liberalization” demands to be<br />

sacrificed to it - “goods”, “moral reasons” and “social concerns”,<br />

all the values Obama says he stands for.<br />

After the memo became public, Brazil’s Secretary of the<br />

Environment Jose Lutzenburger wrote back to Summers: “Your<br />

reasoning is perfectly logical but totally insane...” Mr. Lutzenburger<br />

was fired. Summers has become President Obama’s chief<br />

economic adviser.<br />

No Roots in Adam Smith or the New Deal<br />

Adam Smith’s vision of the free market did not envisage exporting<br />

toxic wastes to the poor to save rich polluters from cleaning<br />

up their act. When the market’s “invisible hand” was briefly<br />

annunciated by Smith, he was clear that the free market was only<br />

in “tangible goods useful to mankind”. The neoliberal school<br />

invokes Smith, but simply erases the<br />

productive economy from its models where<br />

only money coordinates count.<br />

For them, the New Deal is an enemy.<br />

When banks failed and credit dried up,<br />

Roosevelt’s administration ploughed all the<br />

public money into public works and productive<br />

employment, not into banks’ coffers .<br />

One New Deal program, the Works<br />

Progress Administration (WPA), became<br />

the largest employer in the nation financing<br />

the arts as well as public infrastructures. The New Deal also<br />

started old-age and unemployment insurance, loans to local<br />

authorities for slum clearance, and guaranteed income to the<br />

indigent - the latter program scrapped by Summers under<br />

Clinton. Even now with promises of new major spending on<br />

“infrastructures”, we may observe it is targeted to upgrade<br />

highways, computers and airports rather than to build and<br />

protect social and ecological life support systems.<br />

The Turn to Responsible Government<br />

The imperatives are clear. Return constitutional powers over<br />

currency and credit to accountable public authority, and away<br />

166 THE IIPM THINK TANK


C AN WE CHANGE?<br />

from private banks free-riding on public cash and guarantees for<br />

no productive or public goal. Let credit and the allocation of<br />

capital flow in correspondence to productive function for what is<br />

needed - that without which the life capacity of citizens is<br />

reduced. Allocate new capital and interest charges to meet the<br />

greatest economic chall enge in history - the conversion from<br />

fossil to clean renewable fuels, and the re-tooling of manufacture<br />

towards ecologically coherent industry, both of which massively<br />

create jobs.<br />

The eco-energy rescue of the economy with the money for it to<br />

come from a responsible central public bank system is a conjuncture<br />

made in heaven. It has become politically possible with Wall<br />

Street’s corrupt collapse, and economically imperative with<br />

America and the world facing a life-and-death policy crossroads.<br />

Canada’s long-serving Prime Minister, MacKenzie King, was<br />

no radical. But he realized that “once a nation parts with control<br />

of its credit, it matters not who makes the laws - - -Privatized<br />

money control is the single greatest threat to democratic<br />

freedom”. Thus was born the public Bank of Canada in 1935<br />

with statutory public functions of “regulating credit and currency”<br />

and of “making loans and advances” to governments.<br />

Since the Reagan-Mulroney turn, however, public banks and<br />

government have been bent into service to the deregulating,<br />

money-leveraging and casino speculations of the borderless<br />

money party - all on the back of Canada’s social programs, its<br />

manufacturing base, its integrity of ecology and resource<br />

bases, and secure employment of citizens in good jobs and<br />

life-serving vocations.<br />

Presidential Brand Change in Place of Economic<br />

Reform<br />

Is Obama’s administration only a presidential brand change? Is<br />

the same rule of money, waste, toxic commodities and foreign<br />

occupations to continue? Observe closely Obama’s building of a<br />

“new job-creating energy-efficient economy”. The image has<br />

certainly changed, but the reality remains that a Washington-led<br />

carcinogenic capitalism continues to cumulatively strip the earth<br />

of its species and resources, impoverish life vocations and the<br />

poor, and allocate public policy and wealth for decoupled money<br />

multiplication, industrial agribusiness and armed forces with no<br />

committed life function.<br />

America’s President is where the buck stops, but the buck has<br />

been passed on to the people who helped end the New Deal,<br />

deregulated the financial sector, and broke the wheels of the<br />

productive economy. Neoliberal religion still rules. In a lecture<br />

at the University of Toronto a few years ago as Harvard’s<br />

President, Larry Summers, the new chief of economic planning<br />

for Obama, proclaimed his credo as “the essential truth” that all<br />

“basic value including “literacy is linked to market growth”. This<br />

is the ultimate neo-liberal equation - More Money-Value<br />

Exchanges = More Market Growth = More Basic Values. The<br />

social and ecological goods and resources on which every life<br />

depends, the most basic values that exist, are simply blinkered<br />

out. Since fresh air to breathe, stable climate cycles and life<br />

spaces to live and work securely do not compute to this life-blind<br />

economics, money-sequence and commodity growth continue to<br />

depredate and destabilize human and ecological life systems<br />

with no accountability to their requirements. Perpetually turning<br />

leveraged money into more money for private money possessors<br />

with no life standards is, in the end, the logic of a global cancer.<br />

Obama’s First Crisis: Forgetting the Past<br />

The most instructive moments in America’s history have been<br />

forgotten - for example, the 1776 American Revolution itself<br />

which Benjamin Franklin said was most of all to wrest back<br />

control over the issuing of money from the private Bank of<br />

England; Abraham Lincoln’s issue of “greenbacks” to go over<br />

the head of the New York bankers’ demand of 17% compound<br />

interest to fund the war for the Union; and FDR’s historic New<br />

Deal which guaranteed minimum economic security and put<br />

people back to work in rebuilding the real economy. Yet not even<br />

the Depression has demanded the economic reset now required<br />

to resolve the coinciding energy, environmental, employment<br />

and financial crises confronting America and the world.<br />

As with soaps, so with Presidents. Sales pitches metamorphize<br />

reality into miracles with nothing in fact changed. We are<br />

conditioned to the magical thinking - the pervasive images and<br />

parables of super cleansers and cosmetics, new vehicles of<br />

transfiguring power, aphrodisiac doorways to paradise,<br />

redeeming graces for the rejected, and people who pretend to<br />

care for us. Is the Obama presidency merely a macro variation<br />

on the theme? Already many believe that Obama will save the<br />

day without policies to do so, even Europeans gushing over his<br />

hope of a climate solution. A deeper turn is required, as events<br />

will show.<br />

(The views expressed in the article are personal and do not reflect<br />

the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

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POST- SO<strong>VI</strong>ET CENTRAL ASIA:<br />

<strong>Issue</strong>s and Problems of<br />

Security and Cooperation<br />

Illustration : Shantanu Mitra<br />

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T URBULENT TIMES<br />

R.G.Gidadhubli<br />

Adjunct Professor and Former Director<br />

Center for Central Eurasian Studies,<br />

University of Mumbai, Mumbai<br />

Five Central Asian States (CAS) –Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz<br />

Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—became<br />

sovereign and independent<br />

countries in 1991 after the disintegration of the former Soviet<br />

Union. Even though nearly two decades have passed since<br />

their independence, they continue to face several problems of<br />

security relating to social, political and economic developments,<br />

which have been of great concern for their leaders.<br />

This is in sharp contrast to the past when being part of the<br />

superpower, the people of the Central Asian republics<br />

enjoyed high degree of socio-economic and political security.<br />

Hence when the Referendum was carried out in March 1991,<br />

95 % of the electorate of these Central Asian republics voted<br />

in favor of the preservation of the USSR. This was in contrast<br />

to the people of the Baltic republics who<br />

spearheaded the movement for autonomy<br />

and ultimately separation from the USSR.<br />

The Soviet Union did break-up and<br />

Commonwealth of Independent States<br />

(CIS) was formed excluding the three<br />

Baltic States.<br />

In the chaotic period that followed for<br />

several years, each of the CAS had to find<br />

its own security and path of development.<br />

Even as independence was thrust on them,<br />

protecting sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity<br />

became the primary concern of the leaders of these states.<br />

Turkmenistan was in favor of keeping its distance from the<br />

CIS and favored neutrality status as its foreign policy.<br />

Uzbekistan tried for several years to distance itself form<br />

Russia moving closer to the USA for political and economic<br />

gains. Tajikistan which experienced the worst fears of the<br />

Soviet dissolution, was facing problems of security as it was<br />

threatened by the civil war triggered by divisive elements of<br />

regionalism, factionalism of various ethnic groups that got<br />

support from external forces. Moreover, the spillover effects<br />

of the developments in the neighboring state of Afghanistan<br />

The CAS which<br />

are richly<br />

endowed with<br />

energy & mineral<br />

resources have<br />

unique geographic<br />

location<br />

further aggravated security scenario in Tajikistan, which<br />

sought the help of Russia to overcome it and retain its<br />

independence and territorial integrity. The magnitude of the<br />

problem was relatively less for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz<br />

Republic. A major part of the first decade of independence<br />

was marked by economic crisis of unprecedented magnitude<br />

marked by steep decline of over 40-50 % in the first decade in<br />

Gross Domestic Product, industrial and agricultural production,<br />

hyper inflation, unemployment and so on. Thus as<br />

opined by some analysts in the 1990’s the impact of political<br />

instability and economic crisis was felt by all the CAS even as<br />

it varied from country to country, which covered all aspects<br />

of life of the people affecting their security 1 . With improvement<br />

in political and economic developments during the last<br />

about a decade the magnitude of the problems has somewhat<br />

reduced.<br />

The CAS which are richly endowed with energy and<br />

mineral resources have unique geographic location situated<br />

in the southern underbelly of Russia and flanked by China on<br />

the East. Hence the region has assumed geopolitical and<br />

geo-economic dimension during the last two decades. Yet the<br />

CAS felt a sudden ‘vacuum’ partly<br />

because of the fact that these states were<br />

by and large isolated from the rest of the<br />

world during the Soviet era, Hence an<br />

effort has been made in this paper to<br />

analyze some of the security concerns and<br />

to what extent the CAS have succeeded to<br />

overcome them.<br />

Political Security<br />

In the post-Soviet era, the Central Asian<br />

region has witnessed security threats caused by certain<br />

socio-political forces and extremist organizations. The<br />

former Russian president Vladimir Putin was candid in his<br />

statement that Russia’s withdrawal from Central Asia after<br />

the Soviet break-up created a socio-political vacuum, which<br />

religious and terrorist organizations were trying to fill. Since<br />

the communist ideology had lost its relevance for the newly<br />

independent CAS, extremist elements took advantage of this<br />

situation to push religious elements in these predominantly<br />

Islamic countries. This was particularly evident in the<br />

Fergana valley, which is being straddled by three states<br />

namely, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic has<br />

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witnessed offensives from Islamic rebels in the 1990’s 2 . There<br />

were clashes between secular and extremist forces in Uzbekistan<br />

and hence the Uzbek president Islam Karimov<br />

sought the help of international forces including the support<br />

from Russia to deal with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan<br />

(IMU) and Hizb-ul-Tahrir (HT), which are extremist<br />

organizations. As opined by analysts their goal has been to<br />

set up a caliphate that rejects the modern state. IMU has<br />

merged with Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). Russia<br />

was also aware of the fact that the IMU had links with<br />

Islamic extremist groups which had escalated conflicts in<br />

Russia’s southern region of Chechnya.<br />

Some analysts including Graham Fuller have attributed the<br />

cause of extremism in Central Asia to political deprivation,<br />

economic deterioration, corruption etc. Analyzing the bloody<br />

clashes that engulfed Andijan city of Uzbekistan in 2005, S.<br />

Akiner has argued that they were driven not by socio-economic<br />

but by strong religious and political motivations<br />

revealing the power struggle with secular forces in the<br />

region 3 . Ramakant Dwivedi, on the basis of his detail study of<br />

political developments in Central Asia has argued that<br />

threats of extremism in Uzbekistan and<br />

other CAS are due to religious extremism.<br />

They have caused a major threat to<br />

security and stability in Central Asia 4 .<br />

While elements of religious extremism in<br />

Central Asia can be traced to the 1950’s<br />

and 1960’s, they were unable to pose a<br />

threat to the mighty Soviet power. But a<br />

large number of groups emerged in<br />

Central Asia particularly in the 1990’s<br />

with Islamic moorings with external<br />

financial and political support affecting socio-political fabric<br />

of the region. The leadership of the CAS and a major section<br />

of intelligentsia educated with secular outlook have succeeded<br />

to some extent in overcoming the security threats posed by<br />

extremist groups 5 . In this regard they have received strong<br />

support by Russia and China at a bilateral level and at<br />

multilateral level through their association in regional organization<br />

such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thus<br />

while Islam per se is not a threat to the CAS but Islamisation<br />

of politics on the line of IMT and HT are serious threats to<br />

stability and development and modernization of Central<br />

Asia. The security concerns do persist in the Central Asian<br />

Between<br />

Uzbekistan and<br />

Tajik republic 86 %<br />

of the border was<br />

delimited by 2002<br />

and disputes are<br />

yet to be resolved<br />

region and hence a comprehensive and sustained regional<br />

cooperation of all the CAS is needed to counter these<br />

threats.<br />

Border Security<br />

After the Soviet break-up, borders between the CAS have<br />

often become sources of conflict and contention. In fact<br />

under Stalin’s regime these Central Asian States came into<br />

existence on the basis of his ‘Policy of Nationality’ but<br />

borders were drawn rather artificially in the 1920’s when the<br />

Soviet Union was formed and they were meant mainly for<br />

administrative purposes. This is evident from the fact that in<br />

many cases people of same ethnic community had to live on<br />

either side of the border. For instance, Samarkand Oblast is<br />

in Uzbekistan but people in Samarkand are mainly of Tajik<br />

nationality. Similarly, Fergana Valley, where people of three<br />

nationalities namely, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajik and Uzbek have<br />

been living for generations but the valley has been spread<br />

over these three states. Although in the aftermath of the<br />

Soviet break-up, the leaders of the CAS decided not to<br />

redraw the borders there has been a felt need by the CAS for<br />

the delimitation and demarcation of<br />

borders in the interest of border security.<br />

Hence in 1999 Kyrgyz republic and<br />

Uzbekistan undertook the task of demarcation<br />

and over the next five years out of<br />

1,400 km border only 290 km had been<br />

fixed. Even now major part of the border<br />

is yet to be demarcated. There are<br />

contentions over 39 sections of the border<br />

in the Batken Oblast which is a sensitive<br />

area. Similarly, disagreements have<br />

persisted in few other sections. Similarly, between Uzbekistan<br />

and Tajik republic 86 % of the border was delimited by 2002<br />

and disputes are yet to be resolved over four areas. Similarly,<br />

Kazakhstan and Russia initiated the process of delimitation<br />

work of the border in 2000.<br />

Differences among the CAS on border issues could be<br />

potential sources of conflict causing security threat for the<br />

concerned states. In fact, conflicts have been occurring from<br />

time to time due to illegal movement of population, drug<br />

trafficking and so on. For instance, in April <strong>2009</strong> the Uzbek<br />

authorities have erected a border signpost on disputed<br />

territory near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek village of Chek, which has<br />

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T URBULENT TIMES<br />

alarmed residents caught up in a long-running dispute over<br />

which the Kyrgyz Republic possesses the concerned territory.<br />

Hence this may create tension between Uzbekistan and<br />

Kyrgyz Republic. The agriculturally rich Fergana Valley has<br />

been witnessing such migration, leading to interethnic<br />

conflicts affecting the relations among the CAS. 6 While<br />

efforts have been to intensify vigilance at border control<br />

posts, infiltration and illegal migration has been going on by<br />

mafia elements dealing with drug trafficking which has been<br />

carried out on a large scale involving millions of dollars.<br />

Hence cooperation at the regional and bilateral levels is<br />

needed to overcome these conflicts.<br />

Environmental Security<br />

Environmental security has assumed importance in the<br />

desert and semi-desert region of Central Asia and the life of<br />

millions of people has been threatened due to deteriorating<br />

conditions in some parts of this region. A major source of<br />

security concern affecting the environment has been the<br />

degradation of the Aral Sea. This is the fourth largest inland<br />

sea in the world bordering Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The<br />

two major rivers of the Central Asian<br />

region namely Syr Darya and Amu Darya<br />

are tributaries of the Aral Sea. For the<br />

desert and semi-desert region of Central<br />

Asia, these two rivers are the main source<br />

of supply of water for sustaining the life of<br />

millions of people including agriculture.<br />

During the Soviet era these two rivers<br />

were used for intensive irrigation for<br />

cotton cultivation which was a major<br />

source of income for the backward<br />

republics of Central Asia. With the exploitation of these two<br />

rivers for irrigation, the Aral Sea has been shrinking during<br />

the last several decades. This is evident from the fact that<br />

while in 1960 55 billion cubic meters of water was flowing into<br />

the Aral Sea annually, but by the year 2000 only about 1-5<br />

billion cubic meters of water was reaching the Sea. This<br />

decline in water flowing into the Aral Sea, has caused drying<br />

up of the sea by thousands of square kms. As pointed out by<br />

Rama Sampathkumar, the Aral Sea has been shrinking<br />

rapidly and turning into a ‘dry, contaminated, toxic slat pan.<br />

The seriousness of the degradation can be visualized from<br />

the fact that ecologists warned a few years back that it was<br />

A major source of<br />

security concern<br />

affecting the<br />

environment<br />

has been the<br />

degradation of<br />

the Aral Sea<br />

only about a quarter of its original <strong>size</strong> and at this rate of<br />

shrinkage, it may cease to exist by 2020. The problem of<br />

drying up was known and realized even during the Soviet era.<br />

There was a bold proposal in the 1970’s to divert a Siberian<br />

river and linking it up with the Central Asian rivers to help<br />

irrigation and save the degradation of the Aral Sea. But apart<br />

from technical complications, high economic cost involved<br />

and likely adverse impact on the Siberian region might have<br />

been responsible for not pursuing this Grand Project.<br />

The process of drying up of the Aral Sea has resulted in<br />

major climate changes and has caused several ecological<br />

problems in the region. For instance, due to drying up of sea,<br />

hundreds of tons of salt and sand are carried away by winds<br />

over long distances affecting the ecological balance and<br />

specifically flora and fauna. The Kara Kalpak region of<br />

Uzbekistan is severely affected causing various ailments<br />

including kidney trouble, gastric problems and respiratory<br />

diseases for the inhabitants of the region reducing the life<br />

expectancy as a whole 7 . Infant morality in the Kara Kalpak<br />

oblast is very high. The incidence of esophageal cancer in this<br />

region is reported to be seven times higher than in other<br />

areas. The Uzbek president Islam Karimov<br />

has opined that the Aral Sea shrinkage<br />

has been a ‘global Disaster’ and hence<br />

he has been seeking global help.<br />

At the same time neglect of environment<br />

by the authorities has been causing<br />

health hazards in Central Asia not only by<br />

the degradation of the Aral Sea, but also<br />

due to pollution of the water of the two<br />

main rivers Syr Darya and Amu Darya.<br />

On this issue the United Nations Development<br />

Program had carried out a detailed study and a report<br />

was released in 2004 highlighting poor quality of water of the<br />

two rivers which would lead to the deterioration of the health<br />

of the people in the region. It was stated by the UNDP<br />

specialist Sagimbayeava that about 50 % of the population in<br />

Kazakhstan uses drinking water which did not meet the<br />

international standard of salinity and hardness 8 . It appears<br />

not much effort has been made by the Central Asian authorities<br />

to improve the situation. In March <strong>2009</strong>, Bruce Panner<br />

reported the findings of studies carried out recently by some<br />

Central Asian research institutes according to which the<br />

situation has worsened. For instance, as observed by the<br />

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deputy director of Kazakhstan's agency for Applied Ecology,<br />

Malik Burlibaev, "the Syr Darya was so polluted that water<br />

from it should not be used for drinking or for irrigation." and<br />

that rice harvested in Kyzyl-Orda was so loaded with cancercausing<br />

agents that it should not be eaten. The water of Syr<br />

Darya contained high levels of copper, cadmium, and zinc.<br />

Apart from the garbage, detergents and effluents thrown by<br />

urban population, factories, plants, and mining operations<br />

along the river present formidable environmental hazards to<br />

the pollution of the Syr Darya. On the basis of an independent<br />

study, Burlibaev has claimed that intestinal-cancer rates<br />

of residents in Kyzyl-Orda region were the highest in Kazakhstan,<br />

and that 90 % of nursing mothers in the province<br />

were passing pesticides to their babies through their breast<br />

milk. Further adding to the credibility of this study, Orazgul<br />

Zhunusova, the head of the state's department for expertise<br />

and control of the Aral-Syr Darya ecology has confirmed<br />

Burlibaev's findings. In the UNDP report of 2004, there was<br />

also a warning bell by experts that Lake Balkash the second<br />

largest lake in Central Asia was also in danger of drying out if<br />

the Kazakh authorities did not adopt better water-management<br />

practices.<br />

There is realization of this ecological<br />

problem at the regional level as well as at<br />

global level. For instance, at the meeting<br />

of Central Asian Cooperation Organization<br />

(CACO) held in 2002 in Tajikistan,<br />

the matter was discussed by the heads of<br />

the CAS for taking urgent steps to tackle<br />

the problem. A declaration was passed to<br />

appeal to the UN Commission on Sea for<br />

help, since these states could not mobilize<br />

resources on their own. In fact in the early 1990’s the World<br />

Bank has carried out a detail study of the problem of Aral<br />

Sea calling the attention of the CAS to conserve the sea and<br />

prevent ecological disaster. But according to some analysts<br />

political will and genuine cooperative spirit has been lacking<br />

among the CAS to tackle this vital issue. The main solution<br />

has been to reduce the use of water of the two rivers for<br />

irrigation. But the agricultural lobby in Central Asia is<br />

against such a proposal as it would affect their cotton production,<br />

which has been one of the major sources of income for<br />

farmers and hard currency earning of Uzbekistan.<br />

The issue has remained highly sensitive and controversial<br />

World Bank has<br />

got the attention<br />

of the CAS to<br />

conserve the<br />

sea and prevent<br />

ecological disaster<br />

in the region<br />

which is evident from the fact that the summit meeting of the<br />

heads of the five CAS members of the International Fund for<br />

Saving the Aral Sea held in April <strong>2009</strong> ended in bitter<br />

disagreements. The ‘Upstream States’ of Kyrgyz Republic<br />

and Tajikistan facing energy shortage insist that they want to<br />

go ahead in constructing dams and store and conserve water<br />

for new hydropower projects. But this reduces water flowing<br />

downstream affecting ‘Downstream States’ of both Kazakhstan<br />

and Uzbekistan. There were strong differences among<br />

the heads of CAS which was evident from angry reaction of<br />

Uzbek president Islam Karimov. As reported by Anton Blua<br />

there is a new dimension to the issue. Due to decline in water<br />

levels the Aral Sea is split into two separate parts -- the<br />

Northern and the Southern Aral Seas. While there was no<br />

consensus among the leaders, the Kazakh government is keen<br />

to initiate measures on its part and thus in 2005 a 13-km dike<br />

was opened which has been replenishing water to the northern<br />

part of the Aral Sea. This has helped in reducing the<br />

drying up of Aral Sea and increasing surface of the Sea to<br />

some extent. This is a positive development and with wider<br />

regional cooperation and technical and financial support by<br />

international institutions, the degradation<br />

of the Aral Sea might be checked in the<br />

near future. Hence lack of resources,<br />

neglect by the authorities have contributed<br />

to the environmental problems<br />

created over the last few decades.<br />

Besides the problems mentioned above<br />

some parts of the Kyrgyz Republic have<br />

been affected by hazardous nuclear<br />

‘tailings’. During the Soviet era this<br />

republic was an important producer of<br />

uranium, which was used for defense needs also for industrial<br />

purposes. As opined by Jyldyz Sydygalieva huge quantities of<br />

nuclear waste had been buried in several places including in<br />

the region of Mailu- Suu where there are 18 uranium ore<br />

dumps, and at Kaji-Sai village, and also near Issuk Kul lake.<br />

These nuclear tailings have polluted ground water and<br />

atmosphere in these regions affecting flora and fauna. Some<br />

efforts have been made by the Kyrgyz government by adopting<br />

a national plan for preserving the environment building<br />

storehouses for radioactive waste products. There is unanimity<br />

among the experts in Central Asia that to prevent any<br />

major catastrophic events, there is need for regional coopera-<br />

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tion among the CAS which should evolve a regional policy for<br />

creating a ‘Nuclear Free Zone’.<br />

Energy Security<br />

The sharing of river water of Syr Darya and Amu Darya is also<br />

linked to energy security. Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic are<br />

the ‘Up Stream’ countries, which have abundance of water but<br />

they are deficit in hydrocarbon resources. On the other hand,<br />

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are ‘Down Stream’ countries,<br />

which are rich in oil and natural gas and are major producers<br />

and exporters of energy to global markets but face acute water<br />

shortage. During the Soviet era this problem did not exist since<br />

all decisions were made in Moscow with regard to the sharing<br />

of water and energy by the CAS. In fact this is an ideal case<br />

calling for interdependence and cooperation among these four<br />

states for mutual benefit for sharing water and hydrocarbon<br />

resources. In fact this interdependence has continued to some<br />

extent by virtue of the fact that both Tajikistan and Kyrgyz<br />

Republics have been importing oil and natural gas from<br />

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. But they are economically less<br />

developed as compared to other three CAS and have been<br />

facing acute financial problems due to<br />

which they are often been defaulter states.<br />

For instance, in October 2001 when the<br />

Kyrgyz government was unable to pay to<br />

Uzbekistan the outstanding debt of about $<br />

1.5 million for the supply of natural gas,<br />

the Uzbek government suspended natural<br />

gas deliveries which severely affected<br />

several industrial enterprises in Chu Oblast<br />

of Kyrgyz Republic In turn Kyrgyz government<br />

threatened to cut down water supply<br />

to Uzbekistan. With the intervention at the highest levels of<br />

the presidents of the two states matter was temporarily<br />

resolved. Similar problems have arisen between Kazakhstan<br />

and Kyrgyz Republic. In 2002, Kazakhstan paid its water debt<br />

to Kyrgyz Republic by supplying four lakh tons of coal and<br />

power generating equipments worth $ 5.8 million. Thus during<br />

the last about two decades there are on going conflicts of<br />

interests among them. Both Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan<br />

have proposed to solve their problem of energy security by<br />

increasing the production of hydel power by utilizing the rivers<br />

in their territory and reduce their dependence upon imported<br />

energy. The Kyrgyz government has taken steps to privatize<br />

CAS have the<br />

benefit of the<br />

Caspian Sea,<br />

which is even<br />

more important<br />

for the energy<br />

security of region<br />

energy sector to attract private investment from abroad and<br />

reduce dependence on Uzbekistan for energy supplies.<br />

Similarly, Tajikistan proposed in 2005 to build the 4 th dam on<br />

the Vaksh cascade to produce more electricity.<br />

The problem of energy security persists even now which is<br />

evident from the fact that at the April <strong>2009</strong> summit meeting of<br />

the heads of the CAS, the Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek<br />

Bakiev raised the issue of energy shortages in his state and his<br />

decision to built new hydropower stations. As stated earlier<br />

there was strong reaction on this by the Uzbek president, since<br />

this will reduce water availability and will adversely affect<br />

Uzbek agriculture 9 . Bruce Panner has opined that Uzbekistan<br />

has been waging a campaign against the construction of large<br />

hydropower stations in Kyrgyzstan (Kambar-Ata) and<br />

Tajikistan (Roghun), where Soviet-era projects that were left<br />

incomplete when the USSR was dissolved. Similarly disagreeing<br />

with the contention of the Uzbek president, the president<br />

of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon has asserted in his address at<br />

the summit meeting in April <strong>2009</strong> that water-energy projects<br />

being built in Tajikistan will not harm the neighboring countries.<br />

The World Bank and UNDP experts have time and again<br />

contended during the last two decades that<br />

solution to the energy and water problems<br />

of Central Asia depended upon the<br />

agreements and cooperation among the<br />

concerned states. In full support to the<br />

opinion of international experts, the<br />

Kyrgyz president Bakiev has proposed<br />

"The strategic issue that requires resolution<br />

is the coordination of our timetables<br />

of water release for irrigation and energy<br />

needs and compensatory fuel supplies [to<br />

Kyrgyzstan], and this is what should be the subject of international<br />

cooperation among parties interested in using watersaving<br />

technologies".<br />

In addition to the hydel source of energy, the CAS have the<br />

benefit of the Caspian Sea, which is even more important for<br />

the energy security of the Central Asian region. The Caspian<br />

Sea which borders two CAS namely Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan<br />

apart from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran has hydrocarbon<br />

reserves estimated at about 300 billion barrels of oil.<br />

During the last two decades the Caspian has emerged as one<br />

of the major sources of hydrocarbon resources in the world.<br />

Moreover, it has gained considerable geopolitical and geo-<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

173


I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS<br />

economic significance by virtue of the fact that it has attracted<br />

the interest and involvement of major powers including the<br />

USA, European Union, Russia, and China. India has also<br />

been taking active interest but is not a major player. Both<br />

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have immensely benefited with<br />

huge inflow of petrodollars by the increasing demand for oil<br />

and natural gas and unprecedented rise in international price<br />

for oil during the last few years before the present global<br />

financial crisis. At the same time the CAS have become the<br />

victims of the on-going conflicts among the littoral states of<br />

the Caspian Sea due to several issues involved. The member<br />

states are unable to arrive at a consensus over several issues--<br />

the legal status of the Caspian Sea; sharing of energy resources;<br />

disputes over the ownership of oil-natural fields lying on<br />

the borders of national sectors and so on. Due to on-going<br />

differences there were threats of military conflict during the<br />

1990’s. Moreover, there are also differences between Russia on<br />

the one hand and the USA and the European Union countries<br />

on the other, which have made huge investment in the energy<br />

sector of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the Caspian region<br />

over the issue of multiple-pipeline policy for the transportation<br />

of oil to global markets. Apart from Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan<br />

pipeline, the Western countries are interested in getting oil<br />

and natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through<br />

the trans-Caspian pipeline 10 . While these multiple pipelines<br />

will bring in huge petrodollars to the CAS, the Great Game<br />

which is being replayed in Central Asia will also cause security<br />

concerns for the region.<br />

Thus in lieu of conclusion it may be stated that during the last<br />

two decades the CAS have substantially achieved political<br />

stability and economic progress and have overcome the vacuum<br />

and economic crisis after the Soviet disintegration. However,<br />

they face many problems affecting their security such as<br />

religious extremism, border disputes which have caused<br />

concern for the leaders of the CAS. The rapid rate at which the<br />

Aral Sea has been drying up causes serious environmental<br />

threats affecting the lives of millions of people in Central Asia.<br />

Similarly, conflicts with regard to the sharing of river waters for<br />

irrigation and energy are often becoming acute with the<br />

passage of time. While regional cooperation is urgently needed<br />

to solve problems of security facing the CAS, efforts being<br />

made by the leaders to arrive at agreements at bilateral and<br />

regional levels have achieved limited success and have often<br />

ended up on paper. It appears that often there is lack of<br />

political will to implement major decisions due to vested<br />

interests. Hence there is urgent need for effective regional<br />

cooperation among the CAS to overcome security threats<br />

facing the region as a whole.<br />

Endnotes and Additional Thinking<br />

1<br />

Murat Shaikhutudinov “Regional and Global Security in the<br />

21 st Century: Conceptual Approaches and Reality” in the<br />

Journal Kazakhstan in Global Processes (In Russian)<br />

Almaty . No 3 2008.<br />

2<br />

Tim Helelniak “The Changing Composition of Nationality<br />

of the Central Asian Transcaucasian States” Post-Soviet<br />

Geography and Economics. UK. Vol 38 no 6- 1997<br />

3<br />

Akiner S “Violence in Andijon” 13 th <strong>May</strong> 2005 “An Independent<br />

Analysis”<br />

4<br />

Ramakant Dwivedi ‘ Threats of Religious Extremism in<br />

Uzbekistan: An Analysis in the book Edited by K. Santhanam,<br />

Abdusamant Khaydarov and Ramakant Dwivedi<br />

“Contemporary Indo-Uzbek Perspectives on Bilateral and<br />

Regional <strong>Issue</strong>s. Published by India-Central Asia Foundation.<br />

New Delhi <strong>2009</strong>.<br />

5<br />

Kosichenko A. G “ Kazakhstan Model of Interethnic and<br />

Inter-religious Cooperation” (In Russian) in the book<br />

Modern Kazakhstan Strategy of Success Almaty 2008<br />

6<br />

Fredrick Starr “ Historical Perspectives of Cooperation in<br />

Central Asia” in the Journal Kazakhstan in Global Processes.<br />

(In Russian) Almaty No 3 2008<br />

7<br />

Antoine Blua “Kazakhstan: UN Report Highlights Poor<br />

State of Water Resources”<br />

Prague, 20 th January 2004 (RFE/RL)<br />

8<br />

Antoine Blua “Central Asian Leaders Fail to Overcome<br />

Difference at Water Summit” 28 th April <strong>2009</strong> RFE/RL --<br />

Central Asia<br />

9<br />

R.G.Gidadhubli “Uzbek Economic Development model: An<br />

Appraisal” Dialogue <strong>Quarterly</strong>- A Journal of Astha Bharati<br />

April –June 2002. New Delhi<br />

10<br />

R.G.Gidadhubli “Caspian Region:The Unending Conflicts”<br />

In the book ‘Central Asia Since Independence’ Edited by K.<br />

Warikoo and Mahavir Singh Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad<br />

Institute of Asian Studies Kolkata. SHIPRA New Delhi<br />

2004<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not reflect<br />

the official policy or position of the organisation)<br />

174 THE IIPM THINK TANK


T URBULENT TIMES<br />

AD<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

175


M ICRO MACRO<br />

The Shrinking<br />

Rice Paddies<br />

Of Kerala<br />

Nikhil Raj and PA Azeez<br />

Environmental Impact Assessment Division,<br />

Sálim Ali Centre for Ornithology and Natural<br />

History (SACON), Coimbatore<br />

Kerala the southern most state of India is unique<br />

in several aspects; the demography of the state,<br />

especially in death rate and birth rate, apparently<br />

follow a trend similar to some developed countries (www.<br />

planningcommission.nic.in). The state is first in the<br />

country in human development index (Pillai 2008),<br />

literacy rate (90.9%) and sex ratio (1058 female: 1000<br />

male, www.ibef.org). In the recent years the state is going<br />

ahead in show casing its potentials as a destination for<br />

(eco)tourism, information technology (IT), information<br />

technology enabled services (ITES) and the like. However,<br />

the predominantly agro based rural economy drags<br />

back the financial system of the state. The state’s agriculture<br />

sector contributes only 13.5% of the total state’s GDP<br />

176 THE IIPM THINK TANK


R ICE BOWL<br />

compared 54.4% for Punjab. Traditionally rice paddy has<br />

been the prime crop in the rural Kerala and the customs<br />

and culture of the state were intimately woven around rice<br />

paddy cultivation. Other cash crops such as rubber, which<br />

currently plays much greater economic role, came to Kerala<br />

much later perhaps in the late eighteen century. However,<br />

recent years have seen drastic changes in the rice<br />

paddies in the state, both in quality and quantity. In this<br />

paper we examine the issues related with declining rice<br />

paddies of the state.<br />

Rice Paddies of Kerala<br />

Kerala is a narrow stretch of 38,864 Square Kilometer,<br />

lying along the south western aspect of<br />

the Western Ghats of Indian peninsula.<br />

Its topography of undulating terrain<br />

ranging in altitude from below sea level<br />

to above 2000m set apart the state with<br />

almost distinct three elevation zones (the<br />

high ranges, the midlands and the costal<br />

gradients) with varying agro ecological<br />

settings. Comparing to other states of<br />

India, the state of Kerala is endowed<br />

with largest proportion of land area<br />

under wetlands (Nayar and Nayar,<br />

1997). The paddy cultivating wetlands<br />

of the state are mainly located in the<br />

costal plains and the midlands (Varghese<br />

1970). Extensive rice fields, growing<br />

specific cultivars (more than 600 in the<br />

state), are seen in the costal region of<br />

Kerala, along the coastal marshes and<br />

the backwaters, lying almost at the sea level. The midland<br />

region, with altitudes ranging up to 75 meters above mean<br />

sea level, are made up primarily of flat-bottomed valleys<br />

and undulating terrain with net work of streams, rivulets<br />

and rivers. The highly fertile wetlands in this area make<br />

good locations for rice paddies. The major paddy producing<br />

areas of the state are Palakkad, Kuttanad and Kole<br />

wetlands.<br />

There are economical, socio-cultural and political<br />

grounds to the rapid transformation of the ‘rice culture’ of<br />

the sate. The factors at different levels during the mid 19 th<br />

century and afterwards were persuaded the social set up<br />

The major paddy<br />

producing areas<br />

of the Kerala<br />

state are<br />

Palakkad,<br />

Kuttanad and<br />

Kole wetlands<br />

of the state hugely. The stage, during and immediately<br />

after the formation of the Kerala state, was the period in<br />

which left and socialist ideologies were getting deep<br />

rooted in the state. This was accompanied by the “gulf<br />

boom” arising from the export of human resources in the<br />

seventies to the oil rich Middle East. In nineties, India was<br />

liberalizing the trade and globalizing economy. The effect<br />

of globalization was wide and pervasive forcing the<br />

paradigm of development advocating the primacy of<br />

market forces, further and further. All these developments<br />

and their underlying ideological ramifications<br />

brought drastic changes in the Kerala state that are<br />

reflected in its social settings, environment, economy, and<br />

culture.<br />

Kerala had the world’s first democratically<br />

elected communist government in<br />

power in 1957. The communist government<br />

conceived several new programs for<br />

welfare of the state especially the under<br />

privileged segments of the state, underdogs<br />

of the erstwhile feudal landlords.<br />

The land laws initiated or enacted in the<br />

state during this period brought in<br />

radical changes in the social structure<br />

of the state. The Kerala Land Reform<br />

Act (1971) abolished the feudal landholding<br />

system leading to more equitable<br />

distribution of arable land in the<br />

state and disposition of higher equality<br />

among the public at large. The redistribution<br />

of land owner ship had revolutionised<br />

the social setup of the state.<br />

Nevertheless, it in turn split agricultural land to smaller<br />

holdings, which in turn during the seventies reduced the<br />

agricultural income (Mahesh 2000, Gopikuttan and<br />

Kurup 2004). The seventies also experienced the ‘oil<br />

boom’ in the Middle East countries and consequent high<br />

demand of workforce in those nations. The decline in the<br />

agriculture yield and the demand for workforce in the oil<br />

economies attracted large scale migration of people from<br />

Kerala. The ‘blue collar migration’ and the consequent<br />

availability of surplus income again jeopardised the state’s<br />

rice fields by ushering people towards ‘white collar’ jobs.<br />

Globalisation and the exposure of the farmers to the<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

177


M ICRO MACRO<br />

global volatility of prices also<br />

were happening next. These<br />

changes placed the rice culture<br />

of Kerala on an irreversible<br />

momentum towards decline.<br />

Rice Statistics<br />

Since the middle of the last<br />

century, the rice statistics of<br />

the state shows a steep fall in<br />

500<br />

400<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

the annual production; during<br />

0<br />

1960s the state had a share of<br />

2.5 % of the total rice produced<br />

nationally, which<br />

towards the late nineties came<br />

to a low 0.79% (Thomas, 2002). The area under rice<br />

cultivation of the state decreased drastically over the past<br />

several decades (fig.1.). The decrement in the area under<br />

rice paddy began during the late 70s, picked a faster pace<br />

and it still continues further. The farmers of Kerala have<br />

almost discarded rice cultivation for cash crops or left<br />

their land fallow for years, for lack of justifiable economic<br />

returns. In the state, the area under cash crops expanded<br />

lakhs tonnes of rice per annum to feed 31,948,619 people.<br />

However, it hardly produces 7.7 lakhs tonnes (Nair, 2004).<br />

The major factors jeopardizing the rice culture are<br />

apparently the changes in the socio cultural settings of the<br />

state, urbanization and infrastructure development,<br />

economic empowerment due to foreign remittance,<br />

inadequate wetland conservation laws, and boom in the<br />

real estate ventures.<br />

during the last 20 years, while that of food crops plummeted<br />

to just nine percent of the total cultivated area<br />

(www.keralabiodiversity.org). Rice remains the staple<br />

food in the state. Although radical changes have happened<br />

in the state’s food habit, the primacy of rice (Agarwal,<br />

2008) remains unchallenged. The state needs about 40<br />

Lack of Interest in Agriculture<br />

In general, during the last few decades people entering<br />

agriculture as an occupation in rural Kerala has reduced<br />

drastically. Only around 26% of the total rural population<br />

in the state now goes for agriculture as a line of work (Raj<br />

2003). Labor shortage, in-<br />

Fig.2. Status of Rice and Other Cash Crop Cultivation in Kerala<br />

creased labor charges, and<br />

hikes in the cost of input are<br />

900000<br />

800000<br />

direct detractive factors. The<br />

growing apathy to cultivation of<br />

700000<br />

rice is an important thrust for<br />

600000<br />

farmers to gradually divert the<br />

500000<br />

paddy<br />

coconut water logged rice fields to drier<br />

400000<br />

Rubber and perennial crops such as<br />

300000<br />

200000<br />

coconut, areca nut or rubber.<br />

100000<br />

0<br />

The state’s agriculture scenario<br />

has under gone a drastic shift in<br />

1985-86 2007-08<br />

various aspects giving more<br />

importance to the cash crops<br />

Source: www.ecostatkerala.org<br />

than the cultivation of cereals.<br />

Area in hectare<br />

Fig.1. Rice Statistics Of The State<br />

Area in '000hectare<br />

1000<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

1960-61<br />

1963-64<br />

1966-67<br />

1969-70<br />

1972-73<br />

1975-76<br />

1978-79<br />

1981-82<br />

1985-86<br />

1988-89<br />

1991-92<br />

1994-95<br />

1997-98<br />

2000-01<br />

2003-04<br />

2006-07<br />

178 THE IIPM THINK TANK


R ICE BOWL<br />

The area under coconut<br />

Fig.3. Production and Productivity of Rice<br />

plantation and rubber along<br />

with cashew, areca nut has<br />

increased rapidly; the land<br />

under rubber alone has been<br />

increased to 45% during the<br />

period (www.ecostatkerala.<br />

org, Fig.2). During the<br />

beginning of the new millennia<br />

crops such as vanilla<br />

diverted much of the farmer’s<br />

attention from rice cultivation.<br />

Keeping the wetland fallow<br />

for a while, as a prelude to<br />

3000<br />

2500<br />

2000<br />

1500<br />

1000<br />

500<br />

0<br />

Production ('000 tonnes) Productivity (in kg)<br />

diverting it for real estate ventures is also become a<br />

common trend in the state. Thus annual production of rice<br />

in the state shows a trend of decrease, although there is a<br />

comparative hike in the productivity thanks to perhaps<br />

new fertilizers, high yielding varieties and cropping<br />

procedures (fig. 3).<br />

It is reported that the agriculture<br />

crops. The disparity in minimum support price (MSP) for<br />

rice and other cereals is also obvious; MSP for wheat is<br />

almost double the MSP for rice (www.ers.usda.gov). Rice<br />

paddy provides several ecological services, to a great that<br />

are derived from a wetland ecosystem. Recognizing such<br />

monetized ecological services derived from rice paddy<br />

system government need to offer more<br />

laborers have also decreased in the state<br />

or less satisfactory level of incentives. In<br />

from 25.6% to 16.1% of the total during The agriculture approximate and crude monitory terms<br />

1991-2001. There is also a fall of 12.2 to laborers have the value for the services for wetlands is<br />

7.1 in the percentage of cultivators to decreased in the about US$ 15,000/- per hectare per<br />

main workers during the same period<br />

annum.<br />

state from 25.6%<br />

(Kerala state planning board 2004).<br />

to 16.1% of the<br />

However, still about 60 lakhs of people<br />

Urbanization and Infrastructure<br />

in the state directly depend on rice total between Development<br />

cultivation (Harigovindan, 2007) 1991 and 2001 Urbanization in Kerala resembles that<br />

including about three lakhs rice cultivators<br />

(Suchitra, 2008).<br />

Agriculture provides maximum opportunity to the local<br />

labors especially women and it offers job consistency for<br />

most part of the year. About 600 labor days are expected<br />

for cropping one hectare of land (Rajendran, 2007). It is<br />

also noted that Kerala’s agriculture workers are privileged<br />

to have highest real wage rate compared to other states of<br />

India, although this is a major reason for low return from<br />

agriculture. The lack of government support for rice<br />

cultivation also seems to be a factor for the loss of interest;<br />

the incentive for rice production in the state is only Rs.<br />

350/- per hectare, which is negligible compared to other<br />

of some Asian countries, in that the<br />

urban growths here always coexist with rural attributes.<br />

The state’s major urban centres, Trivandrum, Cochin and<br />

Calicut were growing with the small rural centres, of trade<br />

and other related activities, skirting and associated with<br />

these cities budding rapidly resulting in the state as a<br />

whole blending more or less a single town ship. Agglomerations<br />

or out growths were rarer in Kerala till 1981 while<br />

later their number have been almost doubling every<br />

decade (Eapen, 1999). The transformation of rural to<br />

urban in Kerala usually happens by conversion of the rural<br />

agriculture lands particularly the rice growing wetlands,<br />

primarily because of the low market price for such water<br />

1960-61<br />

1963-64<br />

1966-67<br />

1969-70<br />

1972-73<br />

1975-76<br />

1978-79<br />

1981-82<br />

1985-86<br />

1988-89<br />

1991-92<br />

1994-95<br />

1997-98<br />

2000-01<br />

2003-04<br />

2006-07<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

179


M ICRO MACRO<br />

Fig .4. Population Density of the State<br />

boardkerala.nic).<br />

Road development is<br />

900<br />

800<br />

700<br />

600<br />

500<br />

400<br />

single most critical<br />

factor that opens up<br />

any ecosystem or<br />

traditional practices<br />

for rapid changes.<br />

Infrastructure<br />

development demands<br />

300<br />

200<br />

100<br />

0<br />

considerable<br />

lands to be divested<br />

from its former /<br />

original use. The<br />

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 high demand of<br />

independent houses<br />

Source: www.planningboardkerala.nic<br />

logged lands and the prevailing market forces do not<br />

appreciate the value of ecological services that such lands<br />

provide the community.<br />

Kerala has shown a consistent growth in population<br />

density (Fig.4.). However in recent years it is showing a<br />

trend of flattening and it has become<br />

due to the breakdown of the erstwhile joint family system<br />

also has lead considerable demand in diversion of lands,<br />

and the first victim is the wetlands or rice paddy, because<br />

of their low market price.<br />

Growth of real estate business in the state was rapid<br />

since late nineties. The declaration of the 8 th five year plan<br />

during 1998 by the central government<br />

lowest (9.1%) among the Indian states<br />

that assured private support for ‘national<br />

housing and habitat development<br />

during the 1991-2001 periods. During The Kerala Land<br />

this period, the average number of Reform Act acted policy’ gave it a further push. Significant<br />

persons in each household in the State changes in the laws and regula-<br />

towards abolishing<br />

also has declined from 5.3 in 1991 to 4.7<br />

tions, including the urban land (Ceiling<br />

matrilineal system<br />

in 2001 and the state has almost<br />

and Regulation) act by the central<br />

of joint family and<br />

achieved a sub-replacement fertility<br />

government and amendment to the<br />

rate. Nevertheless, the population development of National Housing Bank (NHB) act<br />

density of the state (819 people per nuclear families provided an attractive climate for<br />

square kilometers) remains almost<br />

three times the national average. The recent census shows<br />

that 25% of the total population of the state comes under<br />

urban category, much closer to the national statistics<br />

(27.8%).<br />

Urbanization always involve growth of infrastructure;<br />

buildings, roads, communication facilities etc. In the case<br />

of Kerala the road network particularly is growing in rapid<br />

pace, although not much in its quality. The road density of<br />

the state is 374.9 /100 Sq. Km; far ahead of the national<br />

average of 74.9 Km/100 Sq. Km. The length of road per<br />

one lakh population is also much higher than the national<br />

average (462.6 Km against 259.2 Km, www.planning-<br />

foreign investments further pushing up<br />

the real estate growth (Joshi 2006). The rapid development<br />

in retail, entertainment sectors, financial institutions,<br />

information technology centers and the boom in the<br />

tourism sector all enhanced the growth rate. More over<br />

the Kerala Land Reform Act (1971) acted towards abolishing<br />

matrilineal system of joint family and development<br />

of nuclear families (Sushma, 1996). This resulted in the<br />

growth of housing units without keeping pace with population<br />

growth in the state. The statistics shows the state is<br />

still having a high demand for houses; demand is always<br />

doubling as the year passes (fig.5). Since the real estate<br />

sector is believed to provide much higher annual return on<br />

Density (per sq.km)<br />

180 THE IIPM THINK TANK


R ICE BOWL<br />

Fig.5. House Construction Trend in the State<br />

Number in lakhs<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

investment, ranging 10-12%, compared to other investments<br />

(Mahurkar and Senthil 2004), it attracts the resident<br />

and non resident Keralites equally. It is also believed<br />

to be a safe long term investment among all sections of the<br />

society who has additional surplus income to save. Moreover,<br />

it is highly lucrative for the middle<br />

men and the promoters of real estate<br />

ventures.<br />

Foreign Remittance<br />

The gulf boom happened in the later<br />

half of the seventies paving way for the<br />

flow of foreign remittances, essentially<br />

for the purpose of expenditure of the<br />

family members, of the migrants, left in<br />

the sate. This brought in considerable<br />

economical empowerment, especially of the lower middle<br />

class. Currently it is reported that in the state about 27<br />

persons per hundred households work abroad, making<br />

Kerala one of the states in India having very high remittance<br />

rate from abroad (Zachariah et al., 2000; Kannan &<br />

Hari, 2002). Zachariah and Rajan (2004) has reported<br />

35% rise in the total annual foreign remittance to Kerala<br />

during the period 1999-2004. Recently it has been reported<br />

that the total bank deposits in Kerala has crossed Rs<br />

122000/- crores of which more than Rs 34000/- crores are<br />

of non-resident Keralites. However the deposit to lending<br />

ratio has declined by aboutfive percent during the period.<br />

The funds flowing in<br />

from the migrant<br />

workers are not put<br />

into any sustaining<br />

productive ventures<br />

and it largely goes to<br />

constructing residential<br />

buildings. The<br />

high remittance from<br />

abroad (more than<br />

Rs. 24000 crores /<br />

year) along with<br />

rising disregard<br />

towards environment,<br />

ecology,<br />

agriculture or<br />

agriculture-based industries pushed the state to change its<br />

physical terrain and setup, not to talk about its social and<br />

value systems, as a whole. The state is increasingly becoming<br />

a consumer state and in terms of food crops it is totally<br />

dependent on imports. Pushapangadan (2003) observes<br />

that the leading sources of growth in the<br />

state are the services sector rather than<br />

the conventional commodity producing<br />

sectors.<br />

The larger flow of foreign money is<br />

promoting high degradation of ‘rice<br />

culture’ in Kerala, and along with the<br />

valuable wetland ecosystems, which<br />

provides ample scenic beauty if nothing<br />

else, and several invaluable ecological<br />

services. As the remittance rate grows<br />

up it pushes up the craze for more globalized life style, the<br />

number of houses, consumer shops and vehicles on the<br />

road increases, and every road junction grows like a<br />

miniature city. Moreover as the surplus money is not put<br />

into productive uses, it promote an incessantly consumer<br />

society that relies exclusively on imports for its needs. The<br />

rising demands for buildable lands detract the public to go<br />

for an efficient use of their local resources, ecological<br />

setup or agriculture, and instead they adopt the much<br />

more lucrative step of selling out their holding to real<br />

estate ventures or build hosing colonies or big shopping<br />

plazas. Large shopping malls and auditorium are becom-<br />

0<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008<br />

The gulf boom<br />

happened in the<br />

later half of the<br />

seventies paving<br />

way for the<br />

flow of foreign<br />

remittances<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

181


M ICRO MACRO<br />

ing quintessential trade marks of Keralites rural<br />

centers recently.<br />

Wetland Conservation Laws<br />

The Kerala state practically lacks an effective act to<br />

conserve the wetlands and its rice paddies from the<br />

apocalyptic conversions. The Ramsar convention (International<br />

convention on wetlands) had prioritized four<br />

wetlands of the state, for conservation actions. However,<br />

illegal transformation is not news even in such areas (Raj<br />

and Azeez <strong>2009</strong>). The Kerala Land Reform Act (1971)<br />

had a direct negative impact on the rice culture of the<br />

state (Mahesh 2000, Gopikuttan and Kurup 2004). It<br />

enforced the ownership of the land<br />

holdings to the tenants and had notable<br />

advancement in socioeconomic empowerment<br />

of the less privileged people.<br />

However, as it promoted small land<br />

holding, the huge gap between the investment<br />

and return, most of the small land<br />

holders stopped cropping rice. There<br />

were laws and regulations for protecting<br />

rice paddies of the state particularly<br />

those in the Kuttanad region of Alappuzha<br />

District right from 1952. At least<br />

12 committees were formed to look into<br />

the issues plaguing rice cultivation in<br />

the state. Vaidyanathan committee<br />

(1950), Central-State engineers committee<br />

(1952), Mangalabhanu committee<br />

(1965), M S Swaminathan committee<br />

(2005) are some such committees.<br />

However these committees are yet to make notable impact<br />

on the state’s rice culture crisis.<br />

Conversion of wetlands to house hold is a usual practice<br />

in Kerala. Most of the agriculture belts of Palakkad have<br />

got legally converted as housing plots prior to the Land<br />

acquisition (amendment) bill, (2007). The new ‘Regulatory<br />

Framework for Conservation of Wetlands (2008)’ by<br />

the central government also does not affirm the future of<br />

rice paddies, as it do deter filling up wetlands for other<br />

uses. Aquaculture is considered as a sustainable proposition<br />

in many costal rice paddies of the state. However,<br />

recent trend of aquaculture in the midland rice paddies<br />

For the last several<br />

decades in Kerala<br />

the area under<br />

rice cultivation and<br />

rice production<br />

has shown a<br />

consistent fall<br />

have to be considered as threat for several obvious reasons.<br />

The Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland<br />

Bill (2007) is a recent attempt to prevent paddy and other<br />

wetland encroachment. The bill stress upon conservation<br />

of rice paddies and dissuade fallowing cultivable lands in<br />

the state. However, the bill apparently is not farmer<br />

friendly for various reasons and most of the rice paddies<br />

in the Malabar region are not covered by the bill. Moreover,<br />

recent trend of growing political interference in<br />

enforcement of the rules is also going to be a challenge to<br />

rice paddies. It is claimed that the bill would prevent<br />

conversion of Kerala’s agriculture wetland, about 22,000<br />

hectares per annum. The states new farm<br />

policies promoting organic farming, and<br />

campaigns such as “every one to the<br />

paddy fields” and “organic Kerala” are<br />

optimistic endeavour to sustain the<br />

fading rice culture and to relieve the<br />

environment of many unsafe agrochemicals<br />

and pesticides.<br />

Conclusion<br />

For the last several decades in Kerala<br />

the area under rice cultivation and rice<br />

production has shown more or less a<br />

consistent fall. Framers divert their<br />

arable land for cash crops, despite rice<br />

being the staple food in the state and<br />

the state almost fully depends upon its<br />

import. The major factors that cause<br />

depletion in the rice culture are related<br />

with the socio cultural and economic changes in the state.<br />

The disregard of the ecological services from the rice<br />

paddies is another reason for the mass conversion of the<br />

rice paddies. The gap between investment and production<br />

made the cultivators away from rice cultivation, while the<br />

high job opportunity and attractive wages shifted the<br />

workforce to other lucrative construction works. The high<br />

remittance from abroad boosted the real estate / construction<br />

sector in the state weaning away the lands under rice<br />

paddy and the labor force involved in cultivation and the<br />

small land owners to real estate sector. Most of the<br />

wetlands in the state are under threat from being trans-<br />

182 THE IIPM THINK TANK


R ICE BOWL<br />

formed in to built-up areas since the late 90s. No effective<br />

and appropriate legal or administrative measures are<br />

taken to protect the rice paddy in the state, or to protect<br />

the wetland ecosystems. Rice paddy which is close to<br />

wetland ecosystem serves the community and the environment<br />

in the form of several ecological goods and services.<br />

However these ecological services remains consistently<br />

sidelined mainly because of the lack of appreciation by the<br />

prevailing market forces. It is time that the authorities<br />

give ample attention to pay for such services to the<br />

farmers and those who maintain their rice paddy or<br />

wetland under their ownership.<br />

References and Additional Thinking<br />

• Pillai, NV (2008) Infrastructure, growth and human development<br />

in Kerala. Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA<br />

Paper No. 7017<br />

• Nayar, S and Nayar, N.M (1997). Wetlands In: The Natural<br />

resources of Kerala. K.B. Thampi, N.M. Nayar and C.S.<br />

Nayar (Ed.). WWF State office, Trivandrum.<br />

• Varghese (1970) Agrarian change and economic consequences<br />

land tenures in Kerala 1850-1960. Allied publishers<br />

Bombay.<br />

• Mahesh, R. 2000. Farm <strong>size</strong> – Productivity relation ship:<br />

Some evidence from Kerala; KIED working paper, Kerala<br />

Institute for Environment and Development, Thiruvananthapuram.<br />

• Gopikuttan,G &Kurup, K.N.P. 2004. Paddy land conversion<br />

in Kerala An inquiry into Ecological and Economic aspects<br />

in a Midland Watershed Region. Centre for Development<br />

Studies, Thiruvananthapuram<br />

• Kannan, K P., &Hari, KS. 2002. Kerala’s gulf connection:<br />

emigration, remittances and their macroeconomic impact<br />

1972-2000 Centre for Development Studies Thiruvananthapuram.<br />

• Thomas, PM (2002) Problems and prospects of paddy cultivation<br />

in Kuttanad region: A Case Study of Ramankari<br />

Village in Kuttanad Taluk. A Project of Kerala Research<br />

Programme on Local Level Development (KRPLLD),<br />

Thiruvananthapuram<br />

• Agarwal, A (2008) Dissecting the Food Consumption Pattern<br />

of Households in India. IDBI Gilts Limited<br />

• Nair, 2004 Sharp fall in area under paddy The Hindu Business<br />

line Kochi February 3 rd , 2004<br />

• Raj, RM (2003). Patterns of social change among the migrant<br />

farmers of Kannur district- a case study. Project report<br />

submitted to Kerala Research Programme on Local<br />

Development, Centre for Developmental Studies, Thiruvanandapuram<br />

• Harigovindan (2007)‘Tharisakunna padangal durithamozhiyatha<br />

karshakar’(in Malayalam) Mathrubhoomi Daily 28 th<br />

November, 2005.<br />

• Suchitra, M (2008) Who will grow food? Down to Earth,<br />

September 2008<br />

• Rajendran, K P (2007)The Law for Conserving Wetlandand<br />

Agricultural Fields (Malayalam),Mathrubhoomi Daily, 22 nd<br />

September, 2004.<br />

• Eapen, M.(1999) Economic diversification in Kerala: A spatial<br />

analysis Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.<br />

• Joshi, H (2006) Identifying Asset Price Bubbles in the Housing<br />

Market in India- Preliminary Evidence. Reserve Bank<br />

of India Occasional Papers, 27(1&2).<br />

• Sushama, P N (1996) Transition from high to replacementlevel<br />

fertility in a Kerala<br />

• Village, Health Transition Review 6, 1996, 115–136, Office<br />

of Population Health and Nutrition, New Delhi.<br />

• Mahurkar P,G Senthil (2004). Final Paper on Real estate<br />

fund management Indian Perspective, Asian Real estate<br />

Society AsRES conference.<br />

• Zachariah, KC., Mathew, ET., Rajan, SI. (2000) Socio economic<br />

and demographic consequences of migration in Kerala,<br />

Centre for Development Studies Thiruvananthapuram<br />

• Zachariah, KC, and I Rajan (2004).Gulf revisited economic<br />

consequences of emigration from Kerala, emigration and<br />

unemployment. Centre for Development Studies Thiruvananthapuram<br />

• Raj, PPN and Azeez, PA (<strong>2009</strong>) Real Estate and Agricultural<br />

Wetlands in Kerala Economic & Political Weekly,<br />

XLIV:5, Pp. 63-66.<br />

• K. Pushpangadan K (2003) Remittances, consumption and<br />

economic growth in Kerala: 1980-2000. Centre for Development<br />

Studies, Thiruvanathapuram<br />

• Nair, 2004 Sharp fall in area under paddy The Hindu Business<br />

line Kochi, February 3 rd , 2004<br />

(The views expressed in the write-up are personal and do not<br />

reflect the official policy or position of the organisation).<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY RE<strong>VI</strong>EW<br />

183


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that you have many new names from new institutions.”<br />

Dr. PadmaPrakash, Editor, eSocialSciences

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