jp3_12r

Chapter IV
headquarters network could very well reverberate through the entire JOA. A CO option
may be preferable in some cases.
(4) Assessments in cyberspace may be unique in that the normal assessment cell
will not typically have the capabilities or expertise to assess CO; CO will typically involve
multiple commands, such as the supported JFC, CDRUSCYBERCOM, and possibly other
functional supporting JFCs. Additionally, with CO typically being conducted as part of a
larger operation, assessment of CO will need to be conducted in the context of supporting the
overarching JFC objectives. Therefore, CO assessments will require close coordination
within each staff and across multiple commands. Coordination and federation of the
assessment efforts will often require arrangements that need to be in place prior to execution.
c. Navigation Warfare Considerations in CO Planning. CO produces NAVWAR
effects by assuring friendly access and/or denying enemy access to positioning, navigation,
and timing information transmitted by global navigation satellite system (GNSS) or other
radio navigation aid signals. Creation of global and theater NAVWAR effects is attained
through the coordinated employment of CO, EW, and space operations.
6. Interorganizational Considerations
a. JFCs begin to coordinate and, when appropriate, integrate their activities with other
agencies before and during joint operation planning. Integrating the interagency community
effectively is vital to successful military operations, especially during theater shaping,
stability, and transition to civil authority phases of an operation. Just as JFCs and their staffs
must consider how the capabilities of other USG and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing military missions and broader national
strategic objectives, JFCs should also consider the capabilities and priorities of interagency
partners in planning and executing CO. Through JS and USCYBERCOM, JFCs should
coordinate with interagency representatives during planning to ensure appropriate
agreements exist to support their plans.
b. At the national level, the National Security Council, with its policy coordination
committees and interagency working groups, advises and assists the President on all aspects
of national security policy. OSD and JS, in consultation with the Services and CCMDs, must
ensure any interagency support required outside the AOR is fully coordinated to support the
JFC’s plans and orders. While supported CCDRs are the focal points for interagency
coordination in support of operations in their AORs, interagency coordination with
supporting commanders is also important. At the operational level, commanders should
consider and integrate interagency capabilities into their estimates, plans, and operations that
interagency partners can realistically commit to the effort.
c. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team to
promote unified action. A number of factors can complicate the coordination process,
including the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles
and responsibilities, procedures, and decision-making processes. The JFC must ensure that
interagency planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational
limitations, liaison, and legal considerations. Additionally, planners should understand the
IV-12 JP 3-12