jp3_12r

Planning and Coordination
e. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, ALLIED FORCE, and UNIFIED
PROTECTOR highlight that the US military will likely enter into conflict as part of a joint or
multinational force. Planning for the specific C2 elements desired by the JFC will depend on
the type and scale of the operation, the cyberspace presence or sophistication of the
adversary, and the types of cyberspace targets identified. Regardless of what elements are
established, the overlaps between global and theater missions in cyberspace, and the
constraints and restraints on personnel conducting CO necessitate close coordination
between the CCDR, CDRUSSTRATCOM, and other allied and interagency partners for the
effective synchronization of CO.
4. Synchronization of Cyberspace Operations
The pace of CO requires significant pre-operational collaboration, as well as constant
vigilance upon initiation, to ensure that activities in cyberspace and throughout the OE are
coordinated and deconflicted in advance. One key to this is maintaining cyberspace SA and
assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including security
posture, changes in configuration, or observed I&W of adversary activity. Planners and
operators must also understand how operations within the OE may impact the JFC’s CO
efforts, and vice versa. Fire support coordination measures are a method that the joint force
plans and uses in the air, land, and maritime domains which facilitate the rapid engagement
of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Deconfliction and
coordination efforts in or through cyberspace should include similar measures:
a. Deconfliction of the JFC’s intended OCO, their activities, and the techniques planned
to create these effects with other commands and agencies that may have equities in the same
area of cyberspace is required. From a technical and operational perspective, deconfliction
requires detailed analysis of each of the capabilities whose interoperability is being
considered, as well as that of the target environment, to ensure the desired effects are
achieved without unintended consequences. Additionally, the timelines required for analysis
and coordination should be considered and included in the plan.
b. Planners should maintain awareness of the EMS and its impact on mobile devices
and wireless networks, including cellular, wireless local area network, Global Positioning
System, and other commercial and military uses of the EMS. CO and EA, to include
offensive space control, must be deconflicted. Uncoordinated EA may significantly impact
OCO utilizing the EMS. Depending upon power levels, the terrain in which they are used,
and the nature of the system being targeted, unintended effects of EA can also occur outside
of a local commander’s AOR just as second order effects of CO may occur outside the AOR.
c. Minimizing vulnerabilities to the joint force caused by cyberspace applications.
Coordinated joint force operations benefit from the use of various applications, including
Web sites used for public affairs and strategic communication. Forward deployed forces
also use the Internet, mobile phones, and instant messaging for logistics, morale purposes,
and to communicate with friends and families. These DOD classified and unclassified
networks are targeted by myriad actors, from foreign nations to malicious insiders. The
JFC must work with DISA, the Services, and USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM as well as
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