jp3_12r

Planning and Coordination
normally executed dynamically; however, to be successful, they require considerable
deliberate planning and preparation within the joint targeting cycle. TSTs that are engaged
through CO require detailed joint, cross-CCMD, interagency, and likely multinational
planning and coordination of OPE, engagement, assessment, and intelligence efforts.
(b) The actual prosecution of a TST through cyberspace requires that
cyberspace planners and operators coordinate with the supported commander early in the
planning phase to ensure access to the target is available when the fleeting opportunity
arises. In addition, JFCs should establish procedures to quickly promulgate execution orders
for CO-engaged TSTs, which due to their unique cyberspace interagency
deconfliction/coordination requirements may involve coordinating pre-approval for specific
actions conducted under specific circumstances. Likewise, successful prosecution of TSTs
requires a well-organized and well-rehearsed process for sharing sensor data and targeting
information, identifying suitable strike assets, obtaining mission approval, and rapidly
deconflicting weapon employment. The key for success is performing as much coordination
and decision making as possible in advance.
For more information on attacking TSTs, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
d. Target nomination processes remain unchanged when addressing CO and should be
leveraged appropriately by planners. Development of target folders must include
characteristics of the target as it relates to cyberspace. Development of this data is
imperative to understand and characterize the cyberspace element and its relevancy. Also,
this data allows the planner to develop and match an appropriate effect to be created against
a particular target through cyberspace fires.
e. DOD Information Network Operations. The US military’s reliance on cyberspace
is well understood by our adversaries. DODIN operations underlie nearly every aspect of the
JFC’s operations, throughout the OE, however, it is often overlooked as a planning
consideration. JFC planning to ensure DODIN resiliency in the face of cyberspace threats is
essential. Besides physical protection of key cyberspace infrastructure, the JFC’s primary
defense-in-depth in cyberspace is DODIN operations which includes IA, configuration
control and secure architectures, intrusion detection, bandwidth management/spectrum
management, data encryption, and operating and maintaining the associated hardware
(routers, receivers, switches, etc.). The GCC’s JCCs must coordinate and deconflict these
activities with USSTRATCOM via the USCYBERCOM CSE, where their effects transcend
the AOR.
(1) Situational Awareness. Cyberspace SA is the requisite current and predictive
knowledge of cyberspace and the OE upon which CO depend, including all factors affecting
friendly and adversary cyberspace forces. DODIN operations activities are the foundation of
cyberspace SA, therefore, DODIN operations are fundamental to the commander’s SA of the
OE. A commander continually assesses the OE through a combination of staff element and
other reporting; personal observation; intelligence, to include threat I&W; and
representations of various activities occurring in the JOA through a COP. Sustainment of
these communication channels, data feeds, and user interfaces is one of the key functions of
DODIN operations. Accurate and comprehensive SA is critical for rapid decision making in
IV-5