jp3_12r

Chapter IV
through intelligence sources represents an increased level of risk associated with using the
capability. Cyberspace capabilities that have the fewest environmental dependencies and/or
allow the operator to reconfigure the capability on-the-fly are preferred. Department of
Defense Instruction (DODI) O-3600.03, Technical Assurance Standard (TAS) for Computer
Network Attack (CNA) Capabilities, provides detailed requirements for technical assurance
evaluations that document these characteristics.
(3) Cascading and Collateral Effects. Overlaps between military, civil,
government, private, and corporate activities on shared networks in cyberspace make the
evaluation of probable cascading and collateral effects particularly important when planning
for CO. Due to policy concerns, an EXORD or applicable ROE may limit CO to only those
operations that result in no or low levels of collateral effects. A collateral effects analysis to
meet policy limits is separate and apart from the proportionality analysis required by the law
of war. Even if a proposed CO is permissible after a collateral effects analysis, the proposed
CO must also be permissible under a law of war proportionality analysis.
For more information see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
(4) Target Nomination and Synchronization. Component commanders, national
agencies, supporting commands and/or the JFC staff submit target development nominations
to the JFC targeting staff for development and inclusion on the JFC’s joint target list (JTL).
Once identified on the JTL, targets can be selected for engagement by organic assets (if
within a component commander’s assigned area of operations) or nominated for action by
other joint force components and other organizations, usually via a coordinating body (joint
fires element [JFE] of the operations directorate of joint staff) or working group (joint
targeting working group [JTWG]). The JFE normally holds a JTWG for prioritization of the
nominated targets through a draft joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) and
establishment of the “cut line.” The “cut line” simply reflects an estimate of resources
available to take action against targets in priority order and does not guarantee that a specific
target will be attacked. The joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) provides a seniorlevel
forum in which all components can articulate strategies and priorities for future
operations to ensure that they are synchronized and integrated. Although most targeting
issues are worked out at the JTWG, the JTCB normally conducts final coordination of the
JIPTL and submits it for JFC approval. The JFE also maintains the restricted target list and
no-strike list. The no-strike list contains objects or entities that are not legal targets, while,
the restricted target list is constrained by the JFC for other reasons characterized as protected
from the effects of military operations under international law and/or the rules of
engagement.
For additional details on vetting, validation, and JTWGs, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting,
and CJCSI 3370.01, Target Development Standards.
(5) Time-Sensitive Targeting
(a) A time-sensitive target (TST) is a target of such high priority to friendly
forces that the JFC designates it as requiring immediate response because it poses (or will
soon pose) a danger to friendly forces, or it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target. TSTs are
IV-4 JP 3-12