jp3_12r

Chapter II
requirements to create effects on the same target in cyberspace, their uncoordinated actions
could expose or interfere with the actions of one or both. Assuming both effects can be
created independently and are sufficiently well-justified, a technical analysis will still need to
be conducted to determine if the proposed capabilities can operate in the same target
environment without interference or increasing the chances of unwanted detection.
For more information on joint targeting, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.
(2) Integration of Cyberspace Fires. CO capabilities, though they may be used in
a stand-alone context, are generally most effective when integrated with other capabilities to
create the JFC’s desired effects. Cyberspace capabilities can be used to manipulate
adversary cyberspace targets through MILDEC, redirection, systems conditioning, etc., to
assist with friendly mission objectives, or deny adversary functional use of cyberspace assets.
These effects can be created at the strategic, operational, or tactical level.
(3) Assessment. The assessment process includes measuring the appropriate
performance and effectiveness of fires, as well as their contribution to the larger operation or
objective. Although traditional assessment of military operations has been in terms of firstorder
battle damage, ongoing and recent military operations suggest that physical damage is
often not the most operationally or strategically important. BDA is composed of physical
damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment, typically
taking a three-phased approach to proceed from a micro-level examination of the damage or
effect inflicted on a specific target, to ultimately arriving at macro-level conclusions
regarding the functional outcomes created in the target system. Likewise, first-order effects
of CO are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult.
Thus assessment of fires in and through cyberspace frequently requires significant
intelligence capabilities and collection efforts. Prediction and assessment for CO must be
incorporated into existing joint force staff processes to ensure that JFC objectives are met.
e. Movement and Maneuver
(1) Movement and maneuver involves deploying forces into an operational area and
moving within that area to gain operational advantage in support of operational objectives.
An essential component of planning is the concept of key terrain, which is any locality or
area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.
These might include major lines of communications; key access points for the defense,
observation, and launch points for the offense; or opportunities to create bottlenecks. In
cyberspace, key terrain involves network links and nodes that are essential to a particular
friendly or adversary capability. The ubiquitous nature of cyberspace creates another major
consideration in CO, because it enables an adversary to establish key points of presence
outside the physical operating area.
(2) Another component of maneuver in cyberspace is the movement of data. In this
context, bandwidth (wired or wireless), the available data throughput that can be physically
accommodated by the supporting infrastructure, can be considered as roughly analogous to
lines of communications in the physical domains. The ability to maneuver the flow of data
from one physical line to another, for example from terrestrial cables to satellite
II-10 JP 3-12