jp3_12r

Cyberspace Operations
cyberspace facilitates necessary rapid adaptation and changes in tactics, defensive measures,
and other available response options.
(4) In order to minimize the effects of threats that exploit previously unknown
vulnerabilities, joint forces should develop mitigation and recovery measures, to include
exercising the capability to operate in a denied or compromised portion of cyberspace.
(5) Analysis and Attribution. Due to the characteristics of the physical network,
logical network, and cyber-persona layers in CO, attribution of adversary OCO to people,
criminal organization, non-state actors, or even responsible nation states is difficult.
(6) Intelligence Gain/Loss (IGL). Another concern is that CO could potentially
compromise intelligence collection activities. An IGL assessment is required prior to
executing a CO to the maximum extent practicable. The IGL assessment could be further
complicated by the array of non-DOD USG and multinational partners operating in
cyberspace. See Chapter IV, “Planning and Coordination,” for further information regarding
targeting in CO.
(7) Indications and Warning (I&W). Cyberspace intelligence on nation-state
threats should include all-source analysis in order to factor in traditional political/military
I&W. Adversary cyberspace actions will often occur outside, and often well in advance of,
traditional adversary military activities. Additionally, cyberspace I&W may recognize
adversary CO triggers with only a relatively short time available to respond. These factors
make the inclusion of all-source intelligence analysis very important for the effective
analysis of our adversaries’ intentions in cyberspace.
d. Fires. Depending on the objective, cyberspace fires can be offensive or defensive,
supporting or supported. Like all forms of power projection, fires in and through cyberspace
should be included in the joint planning and execution processes from inception in order to
facilitate synchronization and unity of effort. Fires in and through cyberspace encompass a
number of tasks, actions, and processes, including:
(1) Joint Targeting, Coordination, and Deconfliction. The purpose of targeting
is to integrate and synchronize fires into joint operations. Targeting is the process of
selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering
operational requirements and capabilities. Integrating and synchronizing planning,
execution, and assessment is pivotal to the success of targeting. Understanding the
objectives, intentions, capabilities, and limitations of all actors within the OE enables the use
of joint, interagency, and multinational means to create effects. Target development and
selection are based on what the commander wants to achieve rather than on the available
ways and means to achieve them. In other words, the focus should be on creating the desired
target effects that accomplish targeting-related tasks and objectives. Deconfliction is the act
of coordinating those targets with applicable DOD, interagency, and multinational partners.
Therefore, cyberspace targets should be nominated, vetted, and validated within the
established targeting process. The targeting process for CO requires close coordination
within DOD, with interagency and multinational partners, and with key allies. Deconfliction
of CO has both an operational and a technical component. If two USG entities have
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