jp3_12r
jp3_12r
jp3_12r
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Cyberspace Operations<br />
exempt either command from coordinating response options with affected JFCs prior to<br />
conducting an operation. Regardless of which model is employed for any particular<br />
operation, unless otherwise specified in supplemental orders or directives, effective C2 for<br />
CO will be standardized, integrated, and synchronized IAW the 15 March 2012 Joint Staff<br />
Transitional Cyberspace Operations Command and Control (C2) Concept of Operations<br />
(CONOPS) to ensure effective coordination of joint forces and to provide a common<br />
construct for JFCs to execute their mission within a global context.<br />
(2) Differing C2 structures can provide a unique organization and array of forces<br />
for the JFC. C2 of DOD forces conducting CO activities are defined by the JFC and<br />
enumerated in the concept of operations (CONOPS)/operation order (OPORD).<br />
(a) DODIN operations require centralized coordination because they have the<br />
potential to impact the integrity and operational readiness of the DODIN. Although<br />
execution will generally be decentralized, Commander, United States Strategic Command<br />
(CDRUSSTRATCOM) is the supported commander for CO to secure, operate, and defend<br />
the DODIN, and to defend US critical cyberspace assets, systems, and functions.<br />
(b) Theater-level DODIN operations are those activities occurring within a<br />
theater that have the potential to impact only operations in that theater. The CCMD JCC<br />
should coordinate actions with the USCYBERCOM CSE located on site to ensure effects are<br />
constrained within authorized areas. Examples may include operations on mission networks,<br />
the timing of centrally directed network configuration, establishing MINIMIZE to limit<br />
outbound traffic flow or other prioritization of theater resources. The affected GCC is the<br />
supported command for theater-level DODIN operations with CDRUSSTRATCOM/<br />
Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM) supporting, as<br />
required.<br />
(c) CDRUSSTRATCOM is the supported commander for global CO, and may<br />
delegate authority where appropriate to CDRUSCYBERCOM.<br />
(d) C2 for Theater CO Fires and Maneuver. These CO support JFC<br />
objectives and the JFC is the supported commander, with USCYBERCOM supporting as<br />
necessary. The JFC is responsible for integrating and synchronizing CO fires with other<br />
fires, and may use either assigned or attached assets or supporting USCYBERCOM assets.<br />
JFCs coordinate their requirements with USCYBERCOM to ensure they are accounted for<br />
and prioritized in execution. CO maneuvers will become vital when a JFC’s capabilities are<br />
under attack to the degree that subsets of friendly cyberspace are degraded, compromised, or<br />
lost. In such operations, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is in a supporting<br />
role, as required.<br />
(3) Decision authority for most OCO and some DCO involves careful consideration<br />
of projected effects and geopolitical boundaries. However, some OCO and some DCO<br />
activities have inherent transregional effects, requiring interagency coordination to deconflict<br />
activities in cyberspace and assure appropriate consideration of nonmilitary factors such as<br />
foreign policy implications. For these reasons, OCO and some DCO require careful<br />
planning, in-depth intelligence support, and interagency coordination. The growing reliance<br />
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