jp3_12r

Chapter II
b. Security of Non-DOD Information Networks. While DCO are generally focused
on the DODIN, which includes all networks owned or leased by DOD, DOD relies on many
other networks, including private sector networks, to support DOD operations.
Responsibility for these non-DOD information networks and systems falls to the network
owners, which include other USG departments and agencies and private sector entities.
Since all DOD-associated networks are known targets for our adversaries, protection of these
non-DOD information networks and systems is just as important as protection of the
DODIN. Unfortunately, DOD cannot guarantee the level of security of non-DOD
information networks or the robustness of the security standards governing such networks.
The JFC’s mission risk analysis should account for this uncertainty in security of non-DOD
networks. It is essential that planners and those supporting CO coordinate with non-DOD
essential network owners to better secure those networks. USCYBERCOM liaises with
other USG departments and agencies that can facilitate necessary planning.
c. Routine Uses of Cyberspace. Most military CO are routine uses of cyberspace.
Routine uses of cyberspace, such as operating C2 or logistics systems, sending an e-mail,
using the Internet to complete an on-line training course, and developing a briefing or
document, employ cyberspace capabilities and complete tasks in cyberspace, but they do not
amount to OCO, DCO, or DODIN operations. Other than being an authorized user of the
network, DOD members need no special authorities to conduct these activities. However, it
is through these routine uses of cyberspace where a majority of the vulnerabilities on our
networks are exposed to, and exploited by, our adversaries. As such, the importance of
cultivating a culture of cyber security among all DODIN users cannot be overstated. The
challenge is to train DODIN users to recognize the trade craft of adversaries so that routine
cyberspace uses do not continue to represent a source of unnecessary risk to the mission.
DODIN operations functions, particularly interagency policies and training, are critical to the
success of all types of DOD CO.
d. Intelligence Operations. See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to
Military Operations, for a more complete discussion of activities that fall under intelligence
operations.
e. Cyberspace Actions. While the JFC’s military missions in cyberspace (OCO, DCO,
and DODIN operations) are categorized by intent, as described above, these missions will
require the employment of various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace. To
plan for, authorize, and assess these actions, it is important the JFC and staff understand how
they are distinguished from one another.
(1) Cyberspace Defense. Actions normally created within DOD cyberspace for
securing, operating, and defending the DODIN. Specific actions include protect, detect,
characterize, counter, and mitigate. Such defensive actions are usually created by the JFC or
Service that owns or operates the network, except in such cases where these defensive
actions would impact the operations of networks outside the responsibility of the respective
JFC or Service.
(2) Cyberspace ISR. An intelligence action conducted by the JFC authorized by
an EXORD or conducted by attached SIGNT units under temporary delegated SIGINT
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