jp3_12r
jp3_12r
jp3_12r
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Introduction<br />
(b) Transnational Actor Threat. Transnational actors are formal and<br />
informal organizations that are not bound by national borders. These actors use cyberspace<br />
to raise funds, communicate with target audiences and each other, recruit, plan operations,<br />
destabilize confidence in governments, and conduct direct terrorist actions within<br />
cyberspace.<br />
(c) Criminal Organization Threat. Criminal organizations may be national<br />
or transnational in nature. Criminal organizations steal information for their own use or, in<br />
turn, to sell to raise capital. They also may be used as surrogates by nation states or<br />
transnational actors to conduct attacks or espionage through CO.<br />
(d) Individual Actors or Small Group Threat. Individual actors or small<br />
groups of people can illegally disrupt or gain access to networks or computer systems. Their<br />
intentions are as varied as the number of groups and individuals. These actors gain access<br />
into systems to discover vulnerabilities, sometimes sharing the information with the owners;<br />
however, they also may have malicious intent. Political motivations often drive their<br />
operations, and they use cyberspace to spread their message. They may also create and then<br />
install malware on commercial or government systems. These actors can be exploited by<br />
others, such as criminal organizations or nation states, in order to execute concealed<br />
operations against targets in order to preserve their identity or create plausible deniability.<br />
(2) Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. Perhaps the most challenging<br />
aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor (cyber-persona)<br />
or action to an actual individual, group, or state actor. This effort requires significant<br />
analysis and collaboration with non-cyberspace agencies or organizations. The nature of<br />
cyberspace presents challenges to determining the origin of cyberspace threats.<br />
(3) Additional Challenges. CO may not require physical proximity; many CO can<br />
be executed remotely. Moreover, the effects of CO may extend beyond a target, a joint<br />
operations area (JOA), or even an area of responsibility (AOR). Because of transregional<br />
considerations or the requirement for high-demand, low-density resources, CO may be<br />
coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with centralized execution from a location outside<br />
the AOR of the supported commander. Another challenge facing the JFC is that the use of a<br />
capability may reveal its functionality and compromise future effectiveness. This has<br />
implications for OCO, but it also affects DCO as the same capabilities may have a role in<br />
both OCO and DCO. OCO and DCO are covered in detail in Chapter II, “Cyberspace<br />
Operations.”<br />
b. Cyberspace Integration/Synchronization. CO encompass more than just the<br />
network connections upon which the joint force relies. Cyberspace effects are created<br />
through the integration of cyberspace capabilities with air, land, maritime, and space<br />
capabilities. The boundaries within which CO are executed and the priorities and restrictions<br />
on its use should be identified in coordination between the JFC, non-DOD government<br />
departments and agencies, and national leadership. Effects in cyberspace may have the<br />
potential to impact intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement (LE) efforts and therefore<br />
will often require coordination across the interagency.<br />
I-7