jp3_12r

Introduction
(b) Transnational Actor Threat. Transnational actors are formal and
informal organizations that are not bound by national borders. These actors use cyberspace
to raise funds, communicate with target audiences and each other, recruit, plan operations,
destabilize confidence in governments, and conduct direct terrorist actions within
cyberspace.
(c) Criminal Organization Threat. Criminal organizations may be national
or transnational in nature. Criminal organizations steal information for their own use or, in
turn, to sell to raise capital. They also may be used as surrogates by nation states or
transnational actors to conduct attacks or espionage through CO.
(d) Individual Actors or Small Group Threat. Individual actors or small
groups of people can illegally disrupt or gain access to networks or computer systems. Their
intentions are as varied as the number of groups and individuals. These actors gain access
into systems to discover vulnerabilities, sometimes sharing the information with the owners;
however, they also may have malicious intent. Political motivations often drive their
operations, and they use cyberspace to spread their message. They may also create and then
install malware on commercial or government systems. These actors can be exploited by
others, such as criminal organizations or nation states, in order to execute concealed
operations against targets in order to preserve their identity or create plausible deniability.
(2) Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. Perhaps the most challenging
aspect of attributing actions in cyberspace is connecting a cyberspace actor (cyber-persona)
or action to an actual individual, group, or state actor. This effort requires significant
analysis and collaboration with non-cyberspace agencies or organizations. The nature of
cyberspace presents challenges to determining the origin of cyberspace threats.
(3) Additional Challenges. CO may not require physical proximity; many CO can
be executed remotely. Moreover, the effects of CO may extend beyond a target, a joint
operations area (JOA), or even an area of responsibility (AOR). Because of transregional
considerations or the requirement for high-demand, low-density resources, CO may be
coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with centralized execution from a location outside
the AOR of the supported commander. Another challenge facing the JFC is that the use of a
capability may reveal its functionality and compromise future effectiveness. This has
implications for OCO, but it also affects DCO as the same capabilities may have a role in
both OCO and DCO. OCO and DCO are covered in detail in Chapter II, “Cyberspace
Operations.”
b. Cyberspace Integration/Synchronization. CO encompass more than just the
network connections upon which the joint force relies. Cyberspace effects are created
through the integration of cyberspace capabilities with air, land, maritime, and space
capabilities. The boundaries within which CO are executed and the priorities and restrictions
on its use should be identified in coordination between the JFC, non-DOD government
departments and agencies, and national leadership. Effects in cyberspace may have the
potential to impact intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement (LE) efforts and therefore
will often require coordination across the interagency.
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