jp3_12r

Chapter I
data, e-mail and IP address(es), Web pages, phone numbers, etc. However, one individual
may have multiple cyber-persona, which may vary in the degree to which they are factually
accurate. A single cyber-persona can have multiple users. Consequently, attributing
responsibility and targeting in cyberspace is difficult. Because cyber-personas can be
complex, with elements in many virtual locations, but normally not linked to a single
physical location or form, significant intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are
required for the joint forces to gain sufficient insight and situational awareness (SA) of a
cyber-persona to enable effective targeting and creation of the JFC’s desired effect.
d. The Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) are a globally
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and
support personnel. The DODIN includes owned and leased communications and computing
systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other
associated services, and national security systems.
Department of Defense information networks (DODIN) replace Global
Information Grid (GIG) terminology, which remains in legacy Department of
Defense (DOD) policy and doctrinal publications. Likewise, DODIN
operations replace the previous use of DGO [DOD GIG operations].
e. The Operational Environment. The OE is a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the commander. The continuing advancement of communications and computer
technology has significantly reduced acquisition costs leading to the rapid proliferation of
cyberspace capabilities, considerably complicating the OE. The OE factors affecting CO
vary in importance according to mission. Fully understanding cyberspace and its
relationship to the physical domains is the first step in planning military operations in
cyberspace.
(1) Information and communications technology (ICT) is rapidly evolving, forcing
governments and militaries to rethink the context in which they operate. From around-theclock
news to blogs, social networking, and text messaging, the rapid flow of information
has changed the social fabric of the world. The ability of social networks in cyberspace to
incite popular support and to spread ideology is not geographically limited, and the
continued proliferation of ICT will have profound implications for US national security and
that of our partners.
(2) ICT and other advanced technologies are used by a wide range of state and nonstate
actors, and represent an inexpensive way for a small and/or materially disadvantaged
adversary to pose a significant threat to the US. The application of low-cost cyberspace
capabilities can result in disproportionate effects against a technology-dependent nation or
organization. This provides actors who could not otherwise effectively oppose the US using
traditional military forces with an asymmetric alternative. Potential adversaries see these
technology options as much cheaper alternatives to building expensive weapons, such as
stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat to US national security.
I-4 JP 3-12