The opium economy in Afghanistan - United Nations Office on Drugs ...
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THE OPIUM ECONOMY<br />
IN AFGHANISTAN<br />
An Internati<strong>on</strong>al Problem
Acknowledgements<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the preparati<strong>on</strong> of the present book:<br />
Sandeep Chawla, Chief, Research Secti<strong>on</strong><br />
Thomas Pietschmann, Research and Analysis (Research Secti<strong>on</strong>)<br />
Thibault le Pich<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of illicit opiates (Research Secti<strong>on</strong>)<br />
Aruna Nathwani, Maps and graphics (Research Secti<strong>on</strong>)<br />
Johny Thomas, Graphics, maps and desktop publish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (Research Secti<strong>on</strong>)<br />
Melissa Tullis, Publish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (Research Secti<strong>on</strong>)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> preparati<strong>on</strong> of the book would not have been possible without the c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s of several <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals and secti<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime, and particularly the Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Central Asia (Tashkent),<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan<br />
Over the years, many staff of the UN <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime have c<strong>on</strong>tributed to expand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the knowledge base <strong>on</strong> the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and its regi<strong>on</strong>al impact. While it is not possible to acknowledge all of them, the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
deserve particular menti<strong>on</strong>: Nazir Ahmad, Mohammed-Reza Amirkhizi, Roberto Arbitrio, Temur Aziz, Xavier Bouan, Doris<br />
Buddenberg, Ant<strong>on</strong>ella Deledda, Denis Destrebecq, Bernard Frahi, Paul Griffiths, Sayed Hassan, David Mansfield, Ant<strong>on</strong>io<br />
Mazzitelli, David Stewart MacD<strong>on</strong>ald, Kamran Niaz, Barbara Remberg, Howard Stead, and Richard Ian Will.
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME<br />
Vienna<br />
THE OPIUM ECONOMY<br />
IN AFGHANISTAN<br />
An Internati<strong>on</strong>al Problem<br />
UNITED NATIONS<br />
New York, 2003
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol and Crime Preventi<strong>on</strong> (UNODCCP) became the <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime (UNODC) <strong>on</strong> 1 October 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> Internati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Programme (UNDCP).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> Publicati<strong>on</strong><br />
Sales No. E.03.XI.6<br />
ISBN 92-1-148157-0<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> boundaries, names and designati<strong>on</strong>s used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all maps <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book do<br />
not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
This publicati<strong>on</strong> has not been formally edited.
Preface<br />
PREFACE<br />
For more than two millennia, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been at the crossroads of civilizati<strong>on</strong>s and a major<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributor to world culture. In the past quarter century, the country has also found itself at the crossroads of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al terrorist violence and became a major c<strong>on</strong>tributor to world narcotics producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> now faces a historic challenge. Although counter-terrorism is the<br />
key battleground, the enemy has to be c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted <strong>on</strong> other fr<strong>on</strong>ts as well, first and foremost <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the struggle<br />
aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st illicit drugs. This challenge can be faced: Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey (<strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> fr<strong>on</strong>t), Bolivia<br />
and Peru (<strong>on</strong> the coca<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e fr<strong>on</strong>t) have shown that legal and commercially viable crops can replace illicit<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> establishment of democracy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the Government’s measures aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st cultivati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
trade and abuse of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> have been crucial steps towards solv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the drug problem. Yet, other news has<br />
not been good. For example, last year’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy harvest was am<strong>on</strong>g the highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country’s<br />
history.<br />
Not surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly, public op<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>i<strong>on</strong>, both <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and abroad, is perplexed. Nagg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g questi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
are raised. Why is the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al presence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> not able to br<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g under c<strong>on</strong>trol a phenomen<strong>on</strong><br />
c<strong>on</strong>nected to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al terrorism and organized crime? Why is the central Government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul not able<br />
to enforce the ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> as effectively as the Taliban regime did <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000-01?<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are no simple answers to these questi<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensely<br />
complex phenomen<strong>on</strong>. In the past, it reached deeply <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the political structure, civil society and <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> of<br />
the country. Spawned after decades of civil and military strife, it has cha<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed a poor rural populati<strong>on</strong> –<br />
farmers, landless labour, small traders, women and children - to the mercy of domestic warlords and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al crime syndicates that c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ate several areas <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south, north and east of the<br />
country. Dismantl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> will be a l<strong>on</strong>g and complex process. It cannot simply be d<strong>on</strong>e by<br />
military or authoritarian means. That has been tried <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the past, and was unsusta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able. It must be d<strong>on</strong>e<br />
with the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>struments of democracy, the rule of law, and development.<br />
Does <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> face an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>soluble problem? No, if we all play our parts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the soluti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be dismantled if the Government, with the assistance of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community, addresses the roots of the matter and not <strong>on</strong>ly its symptoms. This report exposes<br />
such roots, as a c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> to the comm<strong>on</strong> effort aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st illicit drugs. First, the report de-c<strong>on</strong>structs the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to its ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> comp<strong>on</strong>ents: cultivati<strong>on</strong>, producti<strong>on</strong>, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance, trade and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>. Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, the report re-c<strong>on</strong>structs the country’s development processes piece by piece,<br />
show<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that it is essential: (i) to help poor farmers decide <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of licit crops; (ii) to replace narco-usury<br />
with micro-lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g; (iii) to provide jobs to women and to it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers; (iv) to provide educati<strong>on</strong> to<br />
children, particularly girls; (v) to turn bazaars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to modern commodity markets; and (vi) to neutralize<br />
warlords’ efforts to keep the evil trade alive.<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al efforts will not be enough. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s cultivati<strong>on</strong>, traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
and drug abuse have ramificati<strong>on</strong>s that reach deeply <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the regi<strong>on</strong>’s post-col<strong>on</strong>ial history, and widely <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
the c<strong>on</strong>temporary geo-politics of terrorism and violence. Hence c<strong>on</strong>vergent efforts are needed by countries<br />
through which Afghan opiates are trafficked, and where hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse nourishes the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In<br />
other words, all countries that are part of the Afghan drug problem should be part of its soluti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime, which is the foremost sett<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for multilateral policy<br />
aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st drugs, and a major provider of technical assistance <strong>on</strong> counter-narcotic affairs, hopes that this<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal report will raise public awareness about an issue that deserves world attenti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Ant<strong>on</strong>io Maria Costa<br />
Executive Director<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime<br />
January 2003<br />
1
Table of c<strong>on</strong>tents<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ 5<br />
PART 1: DIMENSIONS<br />
1. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape.................................................................. 19<br />
1.1. Socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>text ...................................................................................................... 21<br />
1.2. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>................................................................................28<br />
1.3. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g............................................................................................................................. 33<br />
1.4. Geography of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.................................................................... 38<br />
1.5. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>al dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. ................................................................ 48<br />
1.6. Opium markets and bazaars................................................................................................54<br />
1.7. Income derived from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>............................................................................ 61<br />
1.7.1. Income from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>................................................................................ 61<br />
1.7.2. Income from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g............................................................................................ 64<br />
1.8. Abuse ................................................................................................................................ 71<br />
PART 2: ORIGINS<br />
2. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.......................................................................................... 81<br />
2.1. State formati<strong>on</strong> ......................................................................................................................... 82<br />
2.2. Opium and the war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>............................................................................................... ….87<br />
3. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s ............................................................................ 99<br />
3.1. An expensive crop produced with cheap labour (women and children) .............................. 99<br />
3.1.1. High profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999........................................................................................ 100<br />
3.1.2. Decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 ............................................................................... 101<br />
3.1.3. Enormous profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and 2002............................................................... 104<br />
3.2. Diffusi<strong>on</strong> of know-how by it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers ....................................................................... 105<br />
4. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers .......................................................................................... 113<br />
4.1. Opium as a source of credit .............................................................................................. 113<br />
4.2. Credit available to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers ...................................................................................... 117<br />
4.2.1. Salaam (advance payments) .................................................................................. 117<br />
4.2.2. Purchase of commodities <strong>on</strong> credit......................................................................... 122<br />
4.2.3. Interest free loans ................................................................................................... 122<br />
4.2.4. Indebtedness and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cidence of default ................................................................... 122<br />
5. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade.......................................................................................... 127<br />
5.1. Socio-political c<strong>on</strong>text ........................................................................................................ 127<br />
5.2. Why traders engage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade............................................................................. 128<br />
5.3. Profitability of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade ........................................................................................... 129<br />
5.4. Profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture ..................................................................................... 132<br />
5.5. Profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g .......................................................................................... 140<br />
3
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
PART 3: REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES<br />
6. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries......................................................................................147<br />
6.1. Socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>text .....................................................................................................147<br />
6.1.1. Populati<strong>on</strong>..............................................................................................................147<br />
6.1.2. Size of ec<strong>on</strong>omies .................................................................................................148<br />
6.1.3. Level of development ............................................................................................149<br />
6.1.4. Ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth...................................................................................................150<br />
6.1.5. Foreign trade .........................................................................................................150<br />
6.2. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g...........................................................................................................................152<br />
6.2.1. Iran ...........................................................................................................................156<br />
6.2.2. Pakistan....................................................................................................................157<br />
6.2.3. Central Asia..............................................................................................................158<br />
6.3. Mega-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come and profits....................................................................................................160<br />
6.3.1. Methodology.............................................................................................................160<br />
6.3.2. Results .....................................................................................................................161<br />
6.3.2.1. Quantities trafficked..................................................................................161<br />
6.3.2.2. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits ......................................................................................165<br />
6.4. Abuse and treatment .........................................................................................................168<br />
6.4.1. Pakistan....................................................................................................................171<br />
6.4.2. Iran ...........................................................................................................................178<br />
6.4.3. Central Asia..............................................................................................................185<br />
6.5. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> spread of HIV/AIDS ....................................................................................................194<br />
6.5.1. Pakistan....................................................................................................................195<br />
6.5.2. Iran ...........................................................................................................................196<br />
6.5.3. Central Asia..............................................................................................................197<br />
6.6. Ec<strong>on</strong>omic vulnerability .......................................................................................................203<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way forward.................................................................................................................209<br />
ANNEXES<br />
Annex 1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, 2002...........................................................211<br />
Annex 2 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, 2002.....................................................................212<br />
Annex 3 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy estimates, 2002 ...........................................................213<br />
Annex 4 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> estimates, 2002 ....................................................216<br />
Annex 5 Dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices from March 1997 to November 2002 ........................................217<br />
Annex 6 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices, 2001-2002...................................................................218<br />
Annex 7 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices per gram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, neigbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
and Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US dollars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001..........................................................................221<br />
Annex 8 Global illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and producti<strong>on</strong>, 1990-2002 .........................222<br />
4
Executive Summary<br />
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<br />
Background<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime has c<strong>on</strong>ducted annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy surveys <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1994. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most recent <strong>on</strong>e was issued <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> October 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> surveys collect <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong> the locati<strong>on</strong> and extent of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, producti<strong>on</strong> and prices. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was the world’s<br />
largest source of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, the surveys are crucial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a problem which is manifestly global<br />
and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> dimensi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> present study goes bey<strong>on</strong>d report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> a s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle year’s producti<strong>on</strong> and value. It exam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to understand its dynamics, the reas<strong>on</strong>s for its success, its<br />
beneficiaries and victims, and the problems it has caused domestically and abroad. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> purpose of the study<br />
is to assist the country and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fulfill<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the objectives of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
General Assembly Special Sessi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> (1998), to elim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ate illicit drugs.<br />
This report is not about <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s dependence <strong>on</strong> illegal drug activity. On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, it shows<br />
that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> is limited to a few prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces that have defied the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban issued by President<br />
Karzai <strong>on</strong> 17 January 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decree asserted that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem was a matter of nati<strong>on</strong>al security,<br />
and called for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support to solve it. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of this report render that call imperative.<br />
PART 1: DIMENSIONS<br />
Chapter 1. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong> and Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (3400 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased more than 15-fold s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1979;<br />
From 1996 to 1999, under the Taliban, producti<strong>on</strong> doubled and peaked at over 4600 t<strong>on</strong>s;<br />
In 2000 the Taliban banned <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, but not trade;<br />
In 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was cultivated by several ethnic groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south (Helmand), east<br />
(Nangarhar) and north (Badakshan);<br />
Cross-border ethnic and tribal l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks facilitate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by several ethnic groups;<br />
Over three-quarters of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, and virtually all of it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russia, orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased more than 15-fold s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1979, the year of the Soviet<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. By 2000 the country was the source of 70% of all the illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
world. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, producti<strong>on</strong> resumed at high levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
world’s largest producer (followed by Myanmar and Laos), account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for almost three-quarters of global<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
5
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
5,000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s (1980-2002)<br />
4,565<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
450<br />
1,570<br />
3,416<br />
2,804<br />
2,693<br />
2,248<br />
2,335<br />
3,276<br />
3,422<br />
0<br />
200<br />
18 5<br />
'Soviet' period 'Warlord' period 'Taliban' period<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 and 2002 and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002.<br />
Traditi<strong>on</strong>ally the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south (Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, 52% of total<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000) and the east (Nangarhar, 24%). In 2001, the Taliban ban pushed the output to the north<br />
(Badakshan, 83%, though of a far lower total). In 2002 the largest areas under cultivati<strong>on</strong> were aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Helmand (40%), Nangarhar (27%) and Badakshan (11%), followed by Uruzgan (7%), Kandahar (5%), and<br />
Ghor (3%). Thus 93% of the area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> is restricted to six prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces that have not yet<br />
complied with the ban issued by the Government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 2002.<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (N = 74,045 ha)<br />
Western<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
0.1% Badakshan<br />
Other<br />
southern/central<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
4.4%<br />
Other northern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
2.0% Nangarhar<br />
11.1%<br />
(east)<br />
26.7%<br />
Kandahar<br />
5.4%<br />
Uruzgan (south)<br />
6.9%<br />
Other eastern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
3.0%<br />
Helmand<br />
(south)<br />
40.4%<br />
Figure 2<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2002.<br />
6
Executive Summary<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> is a t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>y fracti<strong>on</strong> of the arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (0.9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002).<br />
Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages, <strong>on</strong>ly 8% of the arable land was used for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, though<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and Nangarhar the rates were significantly higher (about <strong>on</strong>e-third of arable land). Today the<br />
bulk of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> takes place <strong>on</strong> irrigated land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south, where productivity can be 3-4 times<br />
higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of the north.<br />
Most ethnic groups are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> though there seems to be a c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong><br />
am<strong>on</strong>g Pashtun and Tajik villages located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of southern, eastern and<br />
northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Opium cultivati<strong>on</strong> spread throughout the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ethnic<br />
distributi<strong>on</strong> of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers who dissem<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated the know-how for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g then<br />
spread to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, facilitated by ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks across borders: Pashtuns <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan; Baluchis <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Pakistan and Iran; Tajiks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan; Uzbeks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan; and Turkmens <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkmenistan.<br />
Trade and Incomes<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade was de-facto legal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> before and throughout the Taliban<br />
period;<br />
In January 2002, the Karzai Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> banned it;<br />
Opium markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were fragmented and competitive, while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
east and north they were oligopolistic. Price levels and structures varied accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly,<br />
but they are now coverg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g;<br />
Opium farmgate prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased almost 10-fold ($300 per kg) at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
compared to a year earlier as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban, and some 20-<br />
fold ($700 kg) prior to September 11. Despite a good harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 – <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices<br />
still amounted to around $350 at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, and were about $540 at the end<br />
of the year;<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Over the 1994-2000 period, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was about $150 milli<strong>on</strong>/year<br />
($750/family). In 2001 follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban ban, prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased 10-fold. In 2002<br />
gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come rose to $1.2 billi<strong>on</strong> ($6,500/family). Part of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come is shared with<br />
traders and/or taxed by warlords;<br />
Income from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries amounted to at<br />
least $720 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. It may have doubled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se are extraord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary revenues <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a country where the average wage does not<br />
exceed $2 per day.<br />
7
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Given their quasi-legal status until the beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 2002, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> operated like<br />
any other commodity market. Farmers sold <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> directly <strong>on</strong> local bazaars or to local traders and<br />
shopkeepers who, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn, provided credit to them.<br />
Over the last twenty years (1980-2000) <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets were somewhat fragmented.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> weakness of the central adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>, the country’s segmentati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to clans and tribes, and the poor<br />
transport <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure spl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tered the trade. Domestic markets were also affected by cross-border traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g:<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (prices, routes and risks) shaped <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s own terms of trade and<br />
trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g structures.<br />
In eastern markets (Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce), prices tended to be higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south due to an<br />
oligopolistic market structure. Southern markets were decentralized, atomistic and highly competitive, with<br />
lower prices. In the north, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices were typically high because of better quality and str<strong>on</strong>gly ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
demand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia and Russia. In recent years (2000-2002) price differentials have, however, decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed:<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s fragmented <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, now <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluenced by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al syndicates and crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al<br />
groups, may be <strong>on</strong> the way to becom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated market.<br />
Prices of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar and Kandahar<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg (March 1997 - December 2002)<br />
700<br />
700<br />
Price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Nangarhar<br />
Kandahar<br />
average<br />
31<br />
-<br />
Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02<br />
Figure 4<br />
Sources: UNODC/ICMP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, derived from farm-gate prices at harvest time, amounted to an<br />
annual average of $95 milli<strong>on</strong> over the 1994-2000 period. However, not all farmers sold their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> at<br />
harvest time, when prices were low. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the average annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices as reported at the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
bazaars over the same period, annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come could have been twice as high, almost $180 milli<strong>on</strong>. This<br />
figure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes, however, profits made by local traders. If this is excluded, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of farmers<br />
was estimated at about $150 milli<strong>on</strong>/year between 1994 and 2000. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> summer<br />
2000, which reduced the 2001 harvest to <strong>on</strong>e tenth of earlier levels, prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased 10-fold to $350-400/kg.<br />
Farmers’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come levels were, therefore, significantly higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account the large output <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
that year (3400 t<strong>on</strong>s), the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> revenue of farmers may have reached $1.2 billi<strong>on</strong>. It may have been<br />
even higher s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce prices c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g till the end of 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<strong>on</strong>g-term susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ability of these prices,<br />
however, is an open questi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries has been<br />
substantial and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. A c<strong>on</strong>servative estimate placed it at $720 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. Less c<strong>on</strong>servative<br />
assumpti<strong>on</strong>s would br<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the figure closer to $1 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to 15% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP or seven<br />
times the country’s 1990-99 average annual exports ($136 milli<strong>on</strong>/year). In 2002 the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come derived from<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was significantly more (about $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong>), due to higher prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
8
Executive Summary<br />
Estimated value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1994-2002<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
1,200<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
-<br />
1,2 0 0<br />
236<br />
251<br />
19 9<br />
152<br />
175<br />
112<br />
12 8<br />
56<br />
102 54 54 95 88 183 91<br />
56<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> annual prices (maximum)<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at harvest time (m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum)<br />
Figure 5<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 and previous years, and<br />
UNODC Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Drug Abuse<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last few years, due to<br />
prol<strong>on</strong>ged human deprivati<strong>on</strong> and suffer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, the breakdown of traditi<strong>on</strong>al social<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trols, the return of refugees who developed a drug problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> refugee camps, and<br />
the almost unlimited availability of opiates with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> war wounded also became addicted as c<strong>on</strong>sequence of primitive first aid and<br />
large-scale use of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> as pa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>killers;<br />
Drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is still low compared to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (Iran,<br />
Pakistan, and Central Asia).<br />
Before the Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong> there was not much of a drug culture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and abuse was<br />
very limited. In the 1990s, drug abuse emerged as a problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both urban and rural areas. It was caused<br />
by prol<strong>on</strong>ged human deprivati<strong>on</strong> and suffer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the populati<strong>on</strong>, the break-down of social and cultural values,<br />
the vulnerability of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> refugee camps, and the virtually unlimited availability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>expensive narcotics.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> medical use of opiates as analgesics and sedatives <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the treatment of wounded combatants and other<br />
war victims also c<strong>on</strong>tributed to ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of addicti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
No nati<strong>on</strong>al survey of drug abuse has been c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. On the basis of surveys <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
some districts of eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, it can be estimated that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is abused by 0.5%, and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> by 0.1%<br />
of the adult populati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se levels exceed opiate abuse levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> western Europe (0.3%), though they are<br />
lower than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (0.9%), Central Asia (0.9%) or Iran (1.7% to 2.8%). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse of hashish (9.1%) and<br />
of psychotropic substances (1.8%) is also widespread.<br />
9
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
PART 2: ORIGINS<br />
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> because of:<br />
lack of effective government adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> until the recent past;<br />
degradati<strong>on</strong> of agriculture and most ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure due to twenty years of war;<br />
a war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> and related black marketeer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Through the 1980s and 1990s several compet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g facti<strong>on</strong>s f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anced their war efforts with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
revenue. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces came under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol after 1996,<br />
the Taliban reaped the largest ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Taliban cultivati<strong>on</strong> ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and revalued stocks by a factor of 10; more<br />
liquidity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the hands of traders thus created further <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Several factors played a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the development of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most<br />
important <strong>on</strong>e was weak government c<strong>on</strong>trol over the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and the 1990s. As elsewhere <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the world the lack, or collapse, of a central adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> gave drug traffickers, crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al syndicates and<br />
terrorist groups the opportunity to develop an illegal <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> for drugs, arms, c<strong>on</strong>traband, and the provisi<strong>on</strong><br />
of acolyte f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for further crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al activity.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic system collapsed. After more than 20 years of war and c<strong>on</strong>flict the degradati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
agricultural and other ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure was total. Irrigati<strong>on</strong> channels, cultivati<strong>on</strong> terraces, roads and<br />
warehous<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, were all destroyed. Agricultural producti<strong>on</strong> of legitimate crops cannot be susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed without<br />
some basic storage, market<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and transportati<strong>on</strong> facilities. Opium does not face these limitati<strong>on</strong>s. It is<br />
durable, easy to store and carry to the market. Opium markets, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any case, operated like spot and futures<br />
markets, with traders provid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g credit for future producti<strong>on</strong>, buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> local bazaars or even at the<br />
farmgate, and traffickers tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g over the market<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. As poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> became a lucrative agricultural<br />
activity, it is no surprise that it took over the best available land. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amount of land available for food<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed and the country’s food deficit became acute.<br />
Much crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al and black market activity was pushed out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
(Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia) by str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement acti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and 1990s. With<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of war and anarchy provided fertile ground for these crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al networks to establish themselves.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is anecdotal evidence of Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and encouragement of, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade as a way to<br />
expand their exchequer at a time when the regime was hurt<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g because of grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g isolati<strong>on</strong> and fund<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
difficulties.<br />
A nexus was c<strong>on</strong>sequently established between war, crime and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong>. For almost a<br />
quarter of a century, weak central government and civil war have, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fact, been two sides of the same co<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> civil war created a lawless climate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> flourished. Opium producti<strong>on</strong> and trade<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly fuelled the civil war, weakened the Kabul government even more, thus perpetuat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a vicious<br />
circle. Later <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the cycle, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al terrorism added an even more pernicious dimensi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Afghan farmers grew <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy because:<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade was de-facto legal until President Karzai’s ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 2002;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is a profitable crop, produced with cheap labor (women, children and refugees);<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy are abundant, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g suitable land, water and know-how from it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labor;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> became a form of sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, a source of liquidity and a collateral for credit;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>surance aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st poverty and hunger: farmers sell future crops to narco-usurers for<br />
subsistence;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> requires no market<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g or storage, as it can be sold easily <strong>on</strong> spot markets.<br />
10
Executive Summary<br />
Over the last two decades, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many Afghan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> became part of the livelihood<br />
of rural households. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipal reas<strong>on</strong> for farmers’ decid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to grow <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was that it was more<br />
profitable and up to 2000 it was de-facto legal to do so. Even after the Taliban ban <strong>on</strong> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed de-facto legal until January 2002, when the Karzai Government banned it.<br />
Legality comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed well with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s high profitability relative to other crops. Poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>’s<br />
comparative cost disadvantage (its labor <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity is high, about 10 times more than that of cereals) was<br />
remedied by cheap labor provided by women, children and return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g refugees.<br />
Farmers’ decisi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favor of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> crops have been facilitated by easy access to other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts for<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, weed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g techniques. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> know-how was dissem<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated<br />
countrywide by a large pool of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of credit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a country where a formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system had virtually<br />
ceased to exist, has also been crucial to farmers’ decisi<strong>on</strong>s. Indeed, some of the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, (the highest ever producti<strong>on</strong> year: 90,000 ha, 4,500 t<strong>on</strong>s) can be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked directly to the<br />
need to repay earlier loans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d (<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>). As loans could not be repaid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 because of drought and<br />
poor yields, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial obligati<strong>on</strong>s to narco-usurers doubled or even tripled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> value. In order to meet these<br />
obligati<strong>on</strong>s, many farmers were forced to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> substantially <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
In 2002, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reas<strong>on</strong> for the expansi<strong>on</strong> was the high profitability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
due to much higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices ($350/kg), themselves the result of shortages created by the Taliban<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> ban (when prices were <strong>on</strong>ly $35/kg). Average annual gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994-1999 was<br />
close to $1500 per hectare. It fell to about $1100 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (and thus close to the revenue from cultivati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
legal crops of around $900 per ha), but it rose to about $16,000 per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (because of higher<br />
prices). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average size of a plot <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas is less than <strong>on</strong>e-third of a hectare, thus<br />
generat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a substantial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of about $4000, compared to the $500 per year that a worker would have<br />
earned.<br />
Average gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (1994-2002)<br />
$18,000<br />
$16,000<br />
$16,100<br />
$14,000<br />
$12,000<br />
$10,000<br />
$8,000<br />
$ 7,363<br />
$6,000<br />
$4,000<br />
$2,000<br />
$1,456<br />
$1,016<br />
$ 1,356<br />
$1,619 $1,649<br />
$2,012<br />
$1,107<br />
$0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*<br />
* Estimate based <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvested w as sold at prices prevalent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July/August 2002.<br />
Figure 6<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 and previous years.<br />
11
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
<br />
<br />
Opium has become an “ec<strong>on</strong>omic narcotic” for whole segments of Afghan society:<br />
as a commodity, it is an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come generator;<br />
as a source of liquidity, it is a means of exchange;<br />
as a payment mechanism, it is a way to store value and fund transacti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Opium traders frequently act as narco-userers (m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders) because:<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> serves as a means of salaam (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal advance payments);<br />
they have capital to assist farmers. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y regenerate cash-flows via rapid turnover trade (low<br />
profit); or via shipments to border regi<strong>on</strong>s (medium profit); or by smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates across<br />
borders (high profit). Risks vary accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly.<br />
It has been said that the Taliban succeeded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> secur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the transiti<strong>on</strong> from a first phase (up to 1996)<br />
of localised predatory warlordism, to a sec<strong>on</strong>d phase (1996-2001) of a rentier state structure based <strong>on</strong> a<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>alized semi-open <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Ongo<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g efforts to curtail drug cultivati<strong>on</strong> and trade are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tended to prevent<br />
a third phase (from 2002 <strong>on</strong>ward), namely the perpetuati<strong>on</strong> of a large-scale crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
nourish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g domestic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stability and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al terrorism.<br />
M<strong>on</strong>ey-lenders have been part of the deepen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and widen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir enhanced role<br />
as a de-facto <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>al power and as key ec<strong>on</strong>omic agents is due to the deteriorati<strong>on</strong> of the country’s<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the war, and the complete breakdown of the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g system under the<br />
Taliban regime. M<strong>on</strong>ey-lenders thus played a useful role, as there was a need for alternative payment<br />
mechanisms that could provide the services usually fulfilled by the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sector. Opium-based lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
became the medium to fulfill these needs.<br />
Historically <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been also used as a means of sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs and as a collateral for credit. Over time<br />
traders have generated sufficient liquidity to supply <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers with credit before plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (September-<br />
December). Opium farmers could sell their harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> advance (forward) at a fixed price (i.e. us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their future<br />
crop as collateral) and received cash immediately. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> repayment of the loan was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> real per<br />
annum <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest which farmers had to pay for these loans was, however, extremely high. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to a <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> study <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s, the annualized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate charged to poor Afghan farmers by these m<strong>on</strong>eylenders<br />
exceeded 500%, thus mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it appropriate to refer to them as narco-usurers.<br />
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Opium is an ideal commodity for market<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, trade and speculati<strong>on</strong>:<br />
it is compact to transport and durable to store, with high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sic value ($350-400/kg). At<br />
present, <strong>on</strong>ly a few licit agricultural commodities, such as truffles ($800/kg) are more<br />
expensive <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al markets;<br />
given high risk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terdicti<strong>on</strong> at the borders with neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, high profits (five-fold<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases of price) are generated by traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g;<br />
it is a commodity suitable for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, especially <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces c<strong>on</strong>trolled by warlords<br />
who levy a tax <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange for protecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In some regi<strong>on</strong>s, traffickers ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> respect from the local community when they recycle part of their<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the benefit of poor villages.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a clear nexus between drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and warlordism.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> re-emergence of drug cultivati<strong>on</strong> and the recrudescence of violence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces are<br />
well-known phenomena.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade evolved over the last two decades as a de-facto legal activity, to become an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegral<br />
part of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out of the country and arms com<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of<br />
licit goods became another illegal pursuit support<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, chiefly as a result of the earlier<br />
(1950s) Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) that enabled land-locked <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to import goods dutyfree<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the country via Pakistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same goods were then smuggled back to Pakistan to circumvent that<br />
country’s import duties. A World Bank study estimated that this c<strong>on</strong>traband was worth $2.5 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late<br />
12
Executive Summary<br />
1990s, equivalent to nearly half of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s estimated GDP and thus significantly more than the overall<br />
trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates (about $1 bn) at the time.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reas<strong>on</strong> for traders enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> was the large profit, and often simply<br />
greed. Opium revenues enabled traders to pay for th<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs that were bey<strong>on</strong>d the reach of a majority of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by h<strong>on</strong>est means: buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g land or a vehicle, pay<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a bride-price (at times for more than <strong>on</strong>e<br />
wife), or afford<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the haj to Mecca. In additi<strong>on</strong>, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade enabled pers<strong>on</strong>s to ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> respect from the<br />
local community for provid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come to the village.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> progressi<strong>on</strong> from profit to greed is usually a functi<strong>on</strong> of the appetite for risk-tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. In the late<br />
1990s, profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s were relatively small <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased substantially (up to 10-<br />
fold) <strong>on</strong>ce the borders with neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries were crossed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y could become c<strong>on</strong>siderable (up to<br />
100-fold) when the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>ally. (For example, <strong>on</strong>e gram of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, at about 60%<br />
purity, cost $2-$3 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and approximately $70, at 20% purity, <strong>on</strong> the street <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2002).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> mark-up <strong>on</strong> the rapid turnover trade (<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> purchased from farmers and sold quickly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
various bazaars) was 3% to 26%. Approximately two-thirds of the traders traded less than 100 kg per year;<br />
most of the rest traded up to 500 kg and <strong>on</strong>e was sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up to 20 t<strong>on</strong>s a year. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re could have been about<br />
15,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s, i.e. <strong>on</strong>e trader per 13 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers.<br />
A quarter of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to border<br />
areas, with cargoes up to several t<strong>on</strong>s – an activity rendered possible by the tacit support of local warlords.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se traders c<strong>on</strong>firmed ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <strong>on</strong> average, about $11–12.5/kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account<br />
transport costs, their net profits amounted to more than 12% of the value of the merchandise and more than<br />
twice the rate they could reck<strong>on</strong> with from the local rapid-turnover trade. Up to the year 2000 (when <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices were $35-40/kg) a bulk trader could make over $200,000/year. At today’s prices (10 times higher)<br />
these profits can reach extraord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary levels.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest profits are made by smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> across the border. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account all costs (raw<br />
materials, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>termediaries, and transportati<strong>on</strong>), cross-border traders could reck<strong>on</strong> with profits several times the<br />
value of the merchandise at orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the border was, and is, a risky endeavour, and many Pashtun<br />
traders c<strong>on</strong>firm leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the task to specialised Baluchi traffickers with Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani passports.<br />
(In Iran, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, drug deal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g carries the death penalty).<br />
Profits could <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease enormously, al<strong>on</strong>g with the risks, <strong>on</strong>ce opiates were smuggled bey<strong>on</strong>d the<br />
border and moved further. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> smuggled with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan from Quetta (close to southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) to the seaport of Karachi would rise by some 30%. Throughout the 1990s -- and current<br />
seizures levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that the trend c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues -- there were well armed caravans cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan and<br />
then Iran, because opiate prices were still significantly higher there. Opium prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Teheran wholesale<br />
market amounted to a more than six-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease from the prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan’s border regi<strong>on</strong> with<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> or a 10-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease with respect to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s.<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the Taliban ban, profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from a 10-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease to a three-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease by mid<br />
2002. At the same time, however, gross profits per unit trafficked more than tripled, from $360 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
to $1260 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> mid 2002.<br />
Profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s also used to be rather high for the manufacture of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (around 100%), but fell<br />
significantly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years as local hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g capacity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> itself. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
Taliban ban, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased more str<strong>on</strong>gly than hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices. In order to rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitable, illicit<br />
laboratories had to have <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks, ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> direct access to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets abroad, or simply improve<br />
laboratory efficiency. In such circumstances, profit ratios <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the manufacture of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of up to 65% were still<br />
possible. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> across the border to Pakistan or Tajikistan earned around 100% profit <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it to less accessible locati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries could offer five to 10-fold profits.<br />
13
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
PART 3: REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES<br />
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<br />
<br />
More than 60% of global opiate seizures take place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the few countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>;<br />
Most seizures are made by Iran, followed by Pakistan and Tajikistan.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> impact of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (Iran, Pakistan and the<br />
Central Asian states) can be measured <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, abuse and the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2000,<br />
61% of world-wide seizures of opiates (<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area that c<strong>on</strong>stitutes the market for most of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
neighbours, the Near & Middle East and Europe) together seized more than 70% of global opiates.<br />
In 2001, 56% of total opiate seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries were made by Iran,<br />
followed by Pakistan (28%). In recent years the Central Asian countries, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> particular Tajikistan where the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime has developed a special-purpose project, reported the biggest<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is also evidence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
kilogram<br />
300,000<br />
250,000<br />
200,000<br />
150,000<br />
100,000<br />
50,000<br />
0<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
Figure 7<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
Seizures of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia (1980-2001)<br />
Central Asia<br />
Pakistan<br />
Iran<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia (1980-2001)<br />
Central Asia<br />
Pakistan<br />
Iran<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
-<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
Figure 8<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
14
Executive Summary<br />
Mega-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>comes and ec<strong>on</strong>omic vulnerability<br />
Opiate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> amount to some $4<br />
billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, equivalent to 2% of GDP;<br />
Most profits are made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia, followed by Iran and Pakistan;<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was below the global average.<br />
In 2002 the largest gross profits from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g were made by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups from Central Asia<br />
($2.2 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to 7% of the area’s GDP). Gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran were estimated at $1 to<br />
$1.3 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to 1% to 1.3% of GDP. For Pakistan, they were estimated at $400 to $800 milli<strong>on</strong>,<br />
equivalent to 0.7% to 1.3% of GDP.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trary to the popular percepti<strong>on</strong> that an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flow of funds, whatever its orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, is positive for an<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, there is evidence that huge funds <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the hands of crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al organizati<strong>on</strong>s destabilize a country’s<br />
political system, civil society as well as its <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> smaller countries of Central Asia are particularly<br />
vulnerable: corrupti<strong>on</strong>, violence and dirty m<strong>on</strong>ey, which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial support for terrorist organizati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
have negative repercussi<strong>on</strong>s for legitimate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment and thus compromise ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the l<strong>on</strong>g<br />
run.<br />
Abuse<br />
<br />
<br />
Countries neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> suffer from ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of abuse;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest rise, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of Central Asia, which were<br />
also affected by the str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Parallel to ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries are also affected by<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of abuse, result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from a spill-over of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, often a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of remunerati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are 800,000-1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> chr<strong>on</strong>ic opiate abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, 700,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
500,000 addicted to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and more than 300,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia, i.e. together far more than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western<br />
Europe (1.2 milli<strong>on</strong>). Expressed as a percentage of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above, 0.9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia and up to 2.8% of the people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran c<strong>on</strong>sume opiates, a far higher percentage than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Western Europe (0.3%).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest levels of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia have been reported from Kyrgyzstan and<br />
Kazakhstan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s was reported from Tajikistan.<br />
Drug abusers registered per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia*<br />
140.0<br />
129<br />
Registered drug users per 100,000<br />
populati<strong>on</strong><br />
120.0<br />
100.0<br />
80.0<br />
60.0<br />
40.0<br />
20.0<br />
38 40<br />
47<br />
55<br />
67<br />
80<br />
97<br />
113<br />
0.0<br />
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
*Based <strong>on</strong> data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan<br />
Figure 9<br />
Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for<br />
Drug and Drug Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess Preventi<strong>on</strong>, 2000; Agency for Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under<br />
the President of the Republic of Tajikistan; State Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic; Government of<br />
Uzbekistan, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> and Analytical Centre <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
15
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
HIV/AIDS<br />
<br />
<br />
HIV/AIDS is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all countries neighbor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
countries of Central Asia;<br />
Central Asia has <strong>on</strong>e of the highest rates of IDU related HIV/AIDS <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
world.<br />
A particularly serious side-effect of opiate abuse has been the trend towards <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use (IDU)<br />
and the related spread of HIV/AIDS. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest levels of IDU are reported from Central Asia (66% of all<br />
problem drug users). Central Asia is also faced with the str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s (a more than<br />
600 fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease between 1994 and 2001), of which 88% were IDU-related <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. AIDS cases are still<br />
relatively small but, unless drastic measures are taken, it is <strong>on</strong>ly a matter of time before they <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease and<br />
affect the general populati<strong>on</strong>. This is bound to put a heavy burden <strong>on</strong> both the productivity and the health<br />
budgets of these countries.<br />
Central Asia*:<br />
Transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV/AIDS<br />
(N = 1,311 newly identified HIV- cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001)<br />
other<br />
12%<br />
IDU<br />
88%<br />
* Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan<br />
Figure 10<br />
Source: UNODC, Calculati<strong>on</strong>s based <strong>on</strong> Euro-HIV data.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is still a small w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity to c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong> to the community of drug<br />
users. Should other segments of society be exposed to this virus, it would become much more difficult (and<br />
costly) to c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the problem.<br />
CONCLUSION: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way forward<br />
For more than two hundred years, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al geo-political situati<strong>on</strong> has worked aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of an effective central government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul, because it has exacerbated <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s endemic<br />
problems of regi<strong>on</strong>al warlordism and particularistic nati<strong>on</strong>alism. Over the past quarter century, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> grew because of the failure of the state. Today, there is a w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity for the state to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidate because democracy is tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g root and the collective force of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community has<br />
superseded the geo-political <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terests of foreign powers and of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours. That w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow must<br />
be kept open by means of c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>uous <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Government.<br />
Apart from support<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the central <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of the state, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support has to be targeted<br />
at solv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the problems, documented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book, which created the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first place. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
problems can be solved by:<br />
(i)<br />
(ii)<br />
(iii)<br />
alternate crops, seeds, fertilizers and equipment for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers;<br />
alternative sources of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for land-less labour and return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g refugees;<br />
jobs for women and school<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for children, especially girls;<br />
16
Executive Summary<br />
(iv)<br />
(v)<br />
(vi)<br />
macro-ec<strong>on</strong>omic structures with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which commodity markets (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g presently unregulated<br />
bazaars) can grow free from the perverse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives provided by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and other forms of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>traband;<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial structures able to extend harvest-based collateralized loans (even microcredits)<br />
to farmers and return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g refugees, so as to bankrupt the narco-usurers at their game;<br />
effective law enforcement aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country to combat the perverse<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political impact of warlordism, and aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of opiates.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se measures co<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cide with what the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime advocates as part<br />
of a balanced approach: balanc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g measures to reduce the supply of illicit drugs with those to reduce the<br />
demand for them. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, all c<strong>on</strong>sidered, the problems faced by <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are more serious than those<br />
created by the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, drug c<strong>on</strong>trol will have to be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stream of other development<br />
efforts to re-build the country. It is equally clear, and documented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book, that unless the drug problem<br />
is solved, there will be no susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able development for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime<br />
Vienna, January 2003<br />
17
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
PART 1 : DIMENSIONS<br />
Chapter I<br />
AFGHANISTAN’S<br />
ILLICIT OPIUM ECONOMY:<br />
SIZE AND SHAPE<br />
19
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
1.1. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
Two decades of war created much hardship for the people of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> country’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure<br />
was destroyed, its human resource base depleted and its social capital eroded. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> majority of the populati<strong>on</strong><br />
was left extremely poor, lack<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g food, cloth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, hous<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and medical care. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> virtually collapsed:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
A formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector de-facto ceased to exist. Loans and m<strong>on</strong>etary transacti<strong>on</strong>s were organized<br />
through an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector. In the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas, it was largely based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(see Chapter IV below). However, the capital and/or credit thus made available were comm<strong>on</strong>ly used for<br />
basic needs rather than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment. Over two thirds of the loans accessed were for food, cloth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g,<br />
medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, marriage costs, etc, while <strong>on</strong>ly about <strong>on</strong>e third were used for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment purposes. 1<br />
Equally important, the prol<strong>on</strong>ged war virtually destroyed the country’s m<strong>on</strong>etary system. Thus, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many<br />
of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> became both the medium of exchange and the <strong>on</strong>ly form of<br />
sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Basic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure – roads, bridges, irrigati<strong>on</strong> systems, telecommunicati<strong>on</strong>s, electricity, markets – were<br />
either destroyed or oriented towards the war effort and/or towards the producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy as a<br />
strategic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance the war effort (see Chapter 2 below).<br />
State <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s were dysfuncti<strong>on</strong>al and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> and society fragmented. A number of state<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s – central bank, treasury, tax collecti<strong>on</strong> system, customs, police, judiciary – were either<br />
extremely weak, politically corrupted, or simply miss<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Tax<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of farmers and traders<br />
was often the <strong>on</strong>ly reliable source of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for which ever authority prevailed.<br />
A severe drought <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 2001 aggravated the situati<strong>on</strong> further. Prior to the end of the Taliban<br />
regime <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late 2001, some 7 milli<strong>on</strong> people, or a third of the populati<strong>on</strong>, were c<strong>on</strong>sidered by the World<br />
Bank to have been vulnerable to fam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to widespread loss of life, large-scale destructi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure and widespread emigrati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
the prol<strong>on</strong>ged situati<strong>on</strong> of violent c<strong>on</strong>flict and political <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stability repeatedly disrupted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-regi<strong>on</strong>al trade and<br />
brought it at times to almost a standstill, exacerbat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the already dismal situati<strong>on</strong> of the Afghan people. Milli<strong>on</strong>s<br />
were forced to look for refuge <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and other regi<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
People were not <strong>on</strong>ly killed or disabled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> direct military c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>tati<strong>on</strong>s but also from m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es that were<br />
planted throughout <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Some 700 square kilometers of land is still c<strong>on</strong>tam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated by m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es and<br />
unexploded ordnance, mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an extremely hazardous occupati<strong>on</strong>. A study funded by the World Bank<br />
estimated that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years as many as 500 pers<strong>on</strong>s per m<strong>on</strong>th were victims of accidents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es and<br />
unexploded ordnance. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> clearance of these landm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es al<strong>on</strong>e would cost as much as $500 milli<strong>on</strong> 2 . As a result<br />
of twenty years of war, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> also has <strong>on</strong>e of the highest proporti<strong>on</strong>s of disabled pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world. 3 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
survival of those rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their villages was guaranteed by practic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their traditi<strong>on</strong>al subsistence producti<strong>on</strong><br />
of wheat and other cereals and husband<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their livestock, as best as they could, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the c<strong>on</strong>stant risk of<br />
becom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g land-m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e victims. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>ly crop which – under these c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s - promised someth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g like a decent<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, turned out to be <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. It is thus no surprise that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy producti<strong>on</strong> surged <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
over the last two decades.<br />
When the Taliban took Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1996, they imposed a fundamentalist regime <strong>on</strong> the country, marked by<br />
gross violati<strong>on</strong>s of human rights. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrial sector rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed subdued, hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g been destroyed over the<br />
previous decade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> few remnants of the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector disappeared almost entirely and the provisi<strong>on</strong> of social<br />
services deteriorated – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g health services and educati<strong>on</strong> – as a result of Taliban policies which excluded<br />
girls from school and women from work. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the overall ec<strong>on</strong>omic situati<strong>on</strong> at least stopped<br />
deteriorat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first years of the Taliban regime as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-regi<strong>on</strong>al trade resumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> areas c<strong>on</strong>trolled by the<br />
regime. Agriculture recovered as well. Wheat producti<strong>on</strong> rose by 1998 to levels close to those exist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prior to<br />
the outbreak of the war <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1979/1980. Livestock <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g advantage of unutilized graz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g lands, and<br />
horticultural producti<strong>on</strong> grew based <strong>on</strong> the restorati<strong>on</strong> of orchards.<br />
21
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
22
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
3,500,000<br />
Wheat producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(1975-2002)<br />
3,000,000<br />
2,500,000<br />
2,000,000<br />
1,500,000<br />
1,000,000<br />
500,000<br />
0<br />
1975<br />
1976<br />
1977<br />
1978<br />
1979<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: FAO.<br />
Much of the progress made over the 1996-99 period, however, disappeared follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a severe drought<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 2001 which affected most parts of the country, caus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a reducti<strong>on</strong> of close to 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country’s<br />
cereal output from 1998 to 2001. Total livestock is estimated to have decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by about 60% s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1998,<br />
particularly after the massive death and distress sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of animals dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the summer and autumn of 2001. 4 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
dramatic drop <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> food supply, at a time of great disrupti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> domestic and foreign trade - a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of<br />
Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al policy - created a severe food emergency, mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g several milli<strong>on</strong> people dependent <strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al food aid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. 5 FAO estimated <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s cereal requirements at around 5 milli<strong>on</strong> t<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 4 milli<strong>on</strong> t<strong>on</strong>s of wheat. But actual domestic producti<strong>on</strong> of wheat was less than 1.6 milli<strong>on</strong> t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001,<br />
i.e. <strong>on</strong>ly about 40% of domestic requirements. 6<br />
Thus, as of late 2001 all available social and ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ted to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a country<br />
<strong>on</strong> the verge of complete collapse, hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g already been close to social and ec<strong>on</strong>omic breakdown for many years<br />
before.<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the WHO’s World Health Report 2002, average life-expectancy at birth was just 42 years<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> comparis<strong>on</strong> to more than 60 years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and 77 or more years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the developed countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> had the lowest life-expectancy am<strong>on</strong>g all countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Asia. A lower lifeexpectancy<br />
than for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was <strong>on</strong>ly reported for a number of Sub-saharan African countries, suffer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from<br />
civil war, drought or HIV/AIDS. One out of four children born <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> dies before hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g reached the age<br />
of 5, which is the worst situati<strong>on</strong> of any country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Asia. 7<br />
Table 1: Life-expectancy at birth (males and females) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Selected developed countries<br />
Turkmenistastastan<br />
Stan Stan<br />
many<br />
Kazakh-<br />
Tajiki-<br />
Kyrgyz- Uzbeki-<br />
Ger-<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan<br />
Iran USA UK<br />
France Italy Japan<br />
42.3 61.3 62.5 63.0 63.3 64.1 65.5 68.6 77.0 77.5 78.2 79.3 79.3 81.4<br />
Source: WHO, World Health Report 2002, p. 178-185.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> had also am<strong>on</strong>g the highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fant, child and maternal mortality rates and the lowest literacy<br />
rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world 8 :<br />
Nearly <strong>on</strong>e thousand children died <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the measles epidemic dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Every<br />
<strong>on</strong>e of these deaths could have been prevented if the children had been immunized or had access to basic health<br />
services. Many more thousands of children have been dy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of diarrhea and pneum<strong>on</strong>ia each year. In additi<strong>on</strong><br />
an estimated 15,000 women died <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years from pregnancy related causes.<br />
23
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is an average of <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e physician for every 50,000 people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Even these meager<br />
resources are not equally distributed. Fifty of the country's 330 districts have neither a basic health centre nor<br />
access to immunizati<strong>on</strong> services.<br />
Maternal and child health services are lack<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most areas of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Only 11 of the counrty's 31<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces have essential obstetric care services. Health services collapsed, especially <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, due to the<br />
Taliban ban <strong>on</strong> women <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the workplace, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g most hospitals and health cl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ics.<br />
Only an estimated 23% of the total populati<strong>on</strong> has access to safe water, and <strong>on</strong>ly 12% to adequate sanitati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> primary gross enrolment ratio, prior to the establishment of the new transiti<strong>on</strong>al Government, was<br />
calculated as 39% for boys, and 3% for girls, with the assistance community <strong>on</strong>ly be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g able to provide educati<strong>on</strong><br />
to about 7% of 4.4 milli<strong>on</strong> children of primary school age 9 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> literacy rate was <strong>on</strong>ly at 31%, and, for obvious<br />
reas<strong>on</strong>s, significantly biased toward men. 10<br />
About 12 milli<strong>on</strong> Afghans were affected by the drought, three to four milli<strong>on</strong> severely <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. An estimated<br />
3.8 milli<strong>on</strong> Afghans were dependent <strong>on</strong> food aid. Overall, there were an estimated 5.3 milli<strong>on</strong> vulnerable people<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were approximately 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> peopled displaced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternally. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were also 2 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
Afghan refugees <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and 1.5 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-country populati<strong>on</strong> was estimated by the World Bank to have amounted to 18-20 milli<strong>on</strong> or<br />
to about 25 milli<strong>on</strong> people if refugees abroad were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded. 11 A previous populati<strong>on</strong> survey, undertaken dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the Taliban period and published by the Taliban Central Statistics Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>, had put <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> at 23 milli<strong>on</strong> people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. 12 A number of other populati<strong>on</strong> estimates for 2000/2001, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> and UNDP, put the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-country populati<strong>on</strong> at around 21 milli<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> World Bank – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
data profile – showed estimates for the country’s total populati<strong>on</strong> of 26 to 27 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 2001. 13 As these<br />
data show, there is c<strong>on</strong>siderable uncerta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ty about even the most basic statistics for the country.<br />
Hardly any statistics <strong>on</strong> the ec<strong>on</strong>omic situati<strong>on</strong> were collected dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban period. This means that<br />
there is no reliable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> most of the key ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators usually used to describe a country’s<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic performance. What is available are <strong>on</strong>ly a few estimates from different <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. All of<br />
them suggest that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, despite its large-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, is still <strong>on</strong>e of the poorest countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the world.<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GNP per capita was $250.<br />
Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> populati<strong>on</strong> estimate of around 21 milli<strong>on</strong> people, total GNP was equivalent to $5.3<br />
billi<strong>on</strong>. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the World Bank’s estimate of around 26 milli<strong>on</strong> Afghan people, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GNP could have<br />
amounted to $6.5 billi<strong>on</strong>. A reference <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Human Development Report notes, however, that the GNP estimate<br />
of $250 per capita actually referred to the year 1981 and was <strong>on</strong>ly used as a tentative proxy for the level of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 1997. 14<br />
A previous estimate for the year 1991/92 published by UNDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its 1993 rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> acti<strong>on</strong> plan saw<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP at US$1.7bn 15 , equivalent to just $104 per <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant (based <strong>on</strong> a populati<strong>on</strong> estimate of 16.6<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> for that year). This was extremely low by any <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al standard a .<br />
Table 2: <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-dollars 2001 (tentative estimate)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$ as a percentage of GDP<br />
Agriculture and forestry 2,438 53%<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and light <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry 1,288 28%<br />
Trade 368 8%<br />
C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> 276 6%<br />
Other 230 5%<br />
4,600 100%<br />
Source: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002.<br />
a However, calculated <strong>on</strong> the basis of purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g power parities, as d<strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDP’s Human Development Report 1995, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s real<br />
GDP was estimated to be $819 per capita, equivalent to 15% of global average GDP per capita, 32% of the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average,<br />
or 92% of the least developed countries’ average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1992. This was – together with Myanmar – the lowest figure for any Asian country, but<br />
still higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a number of Sub-Saharan African countries. (UNDP, Human Development Report 1995, p. 159)<br />
24
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP per capita for the late 1990s at<br />
around $300 per capita. Given the severe drought and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tense fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last quarter of 2001, the ADB<br />
lowered its estimate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its 2002 report, Asian Development Outlook (April 9, 2002), to $200 per capita for the year<br />
2001, stress<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that “any assessment of recent ec<strong>on</strong>omic performance (of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) is necessarily tentative<br />
s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the underly<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> base is extremely weak”. 16 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ADB, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g its populati<strong>on</strong> estimate of 23 milli<strong>on</strong>,<br />
estimates <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s overall GDP to around $4.6 billi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
More than half of the GDP was estimated to have been generated by the agricultural sector, a far higher<br />
percentage than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most other countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> breakdown of GDP actually dates back to 1989. Given the<br />
destructi<strong>on</strong> of the country’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure and its <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrial sector over the last two decades as well as Taliban<br />
restricti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> many services sector activities (educati<strong>on</strong>, health services, music, enterta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ment etc.), the<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of agriculture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country’s GDP is likely to be even larger today. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e other country<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Asia - Myanmar, the other large producer of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> – which is as heavily dependent <strong>on</strong> agriculture as<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Table 3: Importance of agriculture for GDP<br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Iran<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
(data refer to 2001)<br />
Pakistan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Selected high-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries<br />
(data refer to 2000)<br />
France Italy USA Japan Germany UK<br />
53% 37.9% 34.5% 25.8% 25.0% 24.4% 19.4% 8.7% 2.9% 2.9% 1.8% 1.5% 1.2% 1.0%<br />
Sources: Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s estimated GDP per capita is not <strong>on</strong>ly significantly lower than the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’<br />
average, but also as compared to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
Table 4: GDP per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (tentative estimates), <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and OECD countries (data refer to 2000)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan Central Asia Iran Develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries<br />
OECD<br />
countries<br />
GDP per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ 250 436 574 1,492 1,315 22,710<br />
GDP per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> PPP- $ 819 a 1,928 3,213 5,884 3,783 23,569<br />
a/ estimate refers to 1992 as provided <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDP Human Development Report 1995.<br />
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002 and 1995.<br />
Average daily wages of unskilled casual labour amounted to just $0.95 per day <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Even<br />
lower rates were reported from other parts of the country (Herat and Mazar $0.85, Kandahar $0.68). Average<br />
daily wages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Northern Alliance c<strong>on</strong>trolled town of Faizabad were $1.22 per day <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, but the cost-of-liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
was also higher. 17 With an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of about $1 per day, gross annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per worker did not exceed<br />
$360 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
More significant than nom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al wages are real wages, measured <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g power, for they<br />
reflect the relati<strong>on</strong> of wages to the price of necessities. Systematic data <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumer prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are<br />
not available. Data <strong>on</strong> bread prices, however, are available. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce food accounts for a large part of total<br />
expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any poor country, the price of bread is a reas<strong>on</strong>ably good <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicator for measur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the overall<br />
purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g power of wage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Calculat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g real wages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of such bread equivalents, the daily wage of a casual worker <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul<br />
was sufficient to buy 4.2 kg of bread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. This was already an above-average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come by Afghan standards.<br />
For <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a whole, the average daily wage – based <strong>on</strong> these calculati<strong>on</strong>s – was sufficient to buy just<br />
3.2 kg of bread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (Jalalabad 4.1 kg, Herat 3.2 kg, Kandahar 2.9 kg, Mazar 2.7 kg and Faizabad 1.9 kg). 18<br />
For comparis<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 a worker <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Germany earned, net of all taxes and c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s, an amount equivalent<br />
to 5 kg of bread per hour 19 which meant that he/she could earn, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> less than 40 m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>utes, what an Afghan worker<br />
would earn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a whole day.<br />
25
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
800<br />
700<br />
670<br />
729<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: legal exports (1980-2001)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US dollars<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
567<br />
235<br />
13 0<br />
111<br />
26<br />
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000<br />
Figure 2<br />
Sources: Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF), Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit (EIU), UNDP.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s foreign trade, notably its exports, seems to have been even more<br />
pr<strong>on</strong>ounced than the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of GDP. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s legal exports, expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> current US-$, fell by 83% over<br />
the 1980-1999 period, and aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed drastically <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s foreign trade has also been characterized by a severe imbalance. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> latest directly<br />
comparable trade statistics, dat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g back to 1999, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that total imports were about three times larger than<br />
legal exports. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trade deficit was equivalent – depend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> the source – to between 5% and 10%<br />
of GDP. Based <strong>on</strong> trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g partner countries’ statistics, collected by the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund, and<br />
compiled by the Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, exports amounted to $111 milli<strong>on</strong>. Based <strong>on</strong> ADB estimates, exports<br />
amounted to $235 milli<strong>on</strong>. Such exports comprised ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly fruits and nuts, carpets, wood, sheepsk<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (‘karakul’),<br />
cott<strong>on</strong> as well as some m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g products.<br />
Table 5: Foreign trade of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 and 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
1999 2000<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
EIU (based <strong>on</strong><br />
IMF)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of<br />
GDP<br />
m US-$<br />
ADB<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of<br />
GDP<br />
m US-$<br />
UNDP<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
of GDP<br />
Export 111 1.6% 235 3.4% 130 2.3%<br />
Imports 468 6.8% 900 13.0% 396 6.9%<br />
Trade balancet -357 -5.2% -665 -9.6% -266 -4.6%<br />
GDP estimate 6,900 5,750<br />
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Report, August<br />
2002, UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Internati<strong>on</strong>al Trade Relati<strong>on</strong>s with Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Countries, January 2001, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope<br />
for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002.<br />
In the 1980s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g partner was the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>. In recent years, Pakistan has<br />
been the most important trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g partner, account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for 19% of imports and 32% of legal exports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. 20 In<br />
2000, the importance of Pakistan as a trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g partner seems to have <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased further.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>digenous exports, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was for years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> re-exports, based <strong>on</strong> the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) with Pakistan (see Chapter V below). From an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come generat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view, the transit trade was even more important than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
26
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
to a World Bank study, such illegal re-exports of legal goods amounted to about $2.5 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1997. A UNDP<br />
estimate suggests that follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troducti<strong>on</strong> of UN Security Council sancti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late 1999, such re-exports<br />
fell to $1.1 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. Re-exports accounted for about 90% of overall Afghan exports ($ 1.2 billi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
see Table 6). Of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s unofficial trade, exclud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exports, 87% went to Pakistan and<br />
13% was estimated to have g<strong>on</strong>e to Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (see Table 7). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> legal transit trade accounted for 4% of all<br />
Afghan exports, and another 4% was accounted for by exports as part of bilateral trade.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s foreign trade fell massively <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 as the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al sancti<strong>on</strong>s aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the Taliban<br />
regime were strengthened, and notably after 11 September when the borders between Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
were closed and the transit trade agreement between Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was suspended (September 18).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> suspensi<strong>on</strong> lasted until 13 May 2002.<br />
Table 6: <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> export estimates for the year 2000<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of all exports<br />
Indigenous exports 130 10.6%<br />
Re-Exports 1,097 89.4%<br />
Total Exports 1,227 100.0%<br />
Source: UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Internati<strong>on</strong>al Trade Relati<strong>on</strong>s with Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Countries, January 2001, quoted<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector<br />
by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002.<br />
Table 7: Estimates of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s transit, bilateral and unofficial trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> percent of total cross-border trade)<br />
Imports<br />
Exports<br />
Official transit<br />
50.1% 3.9%<br />
trade<br />
Of which:<br />
Via Pakistan<br />
Via Iran<br />
13.8%<br />
86.2%<br />
13.3%<br />
86.7%<br />
Official bilateral<br />
29.9% 3.9%<br />
trade<br />
Of which:<br />
With Pakistan<br />
With Iran<br />
With Turkmenistan<br />
84.4%<br />
14.8%<br />
0.8%<br />
98.9%<br />
0.9%<br />
0.2%<br />
Unofficial Trade of<br />
legal products<br />
20.1% 92.3%<br />
Of which:<br />
With Pakistan<br />
With Iran<br />
With Turkmenistan<br />
Total Trade of legal<br />
products<br />
46.4%<br />
53.4%<br />
0%<br />
87.1%<br />
12.9%<br />
0%<br />
100% 100%<br />
Source: UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Internati<strong>on</strong>al Trade Relati<strong>on</strong>s with Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Countries, January 2001, quoted<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector<br />
by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002.<br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g September 11, the Taliban regime was ousted and a new transiti<strong>on</strong>al government was<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stalled. At the Internati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>ference <strong>on</strong> Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> Assistance to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, held <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tokyo (January<br />
21-22), the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community pledged a cumulative total of more than $4.5 billi<strong>on</strong> (equivalent to the<br />
country’s GDP) over the next few years, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g $1.8 billi<strong>on</strong> for the year 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are positive signs of progress. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> food supply situati<strong>on</strong> has improved and salaries, though still<br />
very low, show a clear upward trend. In parallel, large-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al food aid meant that wheat prices<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> bread equivalents, the average daily wages of casual labour improved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
27
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Kabul by 74% over the first 9 m<strong>on</strong>ths of 2002 as compared to a year earlier (from 4.2 kg of bread per day <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
to 7.3 kg of bread per day <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a whole by 69% (from 3.2 kg to 5.4 kg of bread per day<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002).<br />
US$ per day<br />
1.6<br />
1.4<br />
1.2<br />
1.0<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
0.2<br />
0.0<br />
Jan<br />
2000<br />
Average daily wage of unskilled casual<br />
labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul (US$ per day)<br />
Jun Nov Apr Sep Feb Jul<br />
Taliban<br />
Interim Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
Figure 3<br />
Source: Hector Maletta, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Wages of War: Food prices and labour pay<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 1996-2002, Kabul, Oct. 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> security situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country is now better than it has ever been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last 20 years. N<strong>on</strong>etheless,<br />
the new government still has to carry the burden of govern<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a destroyed country and is hampered by the<br />
existence of several powerful regi<strong>on</strong>al warlords who do not accept its authority. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to suffer<br />
from the scourge of large-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> which, c<strong>on</strong>trary to popular belief, does not act as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive<br />
but rather as an impediment to susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able ec<strong>on</strong>omic development.<br />
1.2. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the 1990s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> firmly established itself as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> source of the illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the world. UNDCP began to c<strong>on</strong>duct annual surveys of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994. Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the period 1994-2000, UNDCP estimates that a cumulative total of 34,000 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were<br />
produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world. Of that total, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s share represented almost two-thirds, with 21,300 mt, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st<br />
12,700 mt for the rest of the world. For the year 2000, with a producti<strong>on</strong> of about 3,300 metric t<strong>on</strong>s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
was the source of 70% of the 4,700 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvested <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world, ahead of Myanmar (23%),<br />
Laos (4%) and Colombia (2%) 21 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> year before, as a result of an excepti<strong>on</strong>al harvest of almost 4,600 mt,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s share had reached an all-time high of 79% of global illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. In 2001, as a result<br />
of the Taliban ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, producti<strong>on</strong> fell to 185 t<strong>on</strong>s but with the power vacuum created<br />
follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the demise of the Taliban regime <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late 2001, farmers started grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g poppy aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
28
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shap<br />
29
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 8: Illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> (hectares harvestable after eradicati<strong>on</strong>)<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 71,470 53,759 56,824 58,416 63,674 90,583 82,171 7,606 74,045<br />
Rest of the world 201,009 196,160 200,791 193,432 174,145 125,621 139,581 136,688 108,955*<br />
of which:<br />
Myanmar 146,600 154,070 163,000 155,150 130,300 89,500 108,700 105,000 81,400<br />
Laos 18,520 19,650 21,601 24,082 26,837 22,543 19,052 17,255 14,052<br />
Colombia 15,091 5,226 4,916 6,584 7,350 6,500 6,500 6,500 n.a.<br />
Mexico 5,795 5,050 5,100 4,000 5,500 3,600 1,900 4,400 n.a.<br />
Thailand 478 168 368 352 716 702 890 820 n.a.<br />
Pakistan 5,759 5,091 873 874 950 284 260 213 n.a.<br />
Others 5,700 5,025 3,190 2,050 2,050 2,050 2,479 2,500 n.a.<br />
WORLD 272,479 249,919 257,615 251,848 237,819 216,204 221,752 144,294 183,000*<br />
*prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary estimates<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
Compared to the other significant source countries, illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has a very high yield.<br />
While South-East Asian and Andean growers typically harvested around 7 kg/ha (Laos), to 11 kg/ha (Myanmar),<br />
to 13kg/ha (Colombia), Afghans, with an average of 45 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per hectare, collected about four times more<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their fields dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the period 1994-2000. Bey<strong>on</strong>d differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> varieties of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> factor<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the productivity gap between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> field’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rest of the world appears to<br />
be differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g methods. Opium poppy is grown extensively <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South East Asia, but <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensively <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. To produce the equivalent of <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e-quarter of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> output <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, Myanmar<br />
farmers devoted about 81,000 hectares to poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st about 74,000 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Table 9: Illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (potential metric t<strong>on</strong>s)<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3,416 2,335 2,248 2,804 2,693 4,565 3,276 185 3,422<br />
Rest of the world 2,204 2,117 2,108 2,019 1,653 1,199 1,415 1,441 1,178*<br />
of which:<br />
Myanmar 1,583 1,664 1,760 1,676 1,303 895 1,087 1,097 829<br />
Laos 120 128 140 147 124 124 167 134 124<br />
Colombia 205 71 67 90 100 88 88 88 n.a.<br />
Mexico 60 53 54 46 60 43 21 71 n.a.<br />
Thailand 3 2 5 4 8 8 6 6 n.a.<br />
Pakistan 128 112 24 24 26 9 8 5 n.a.<br />
Others 103 87 57 33 32 32 38 40 n.a.<br />
WORLD 5,620 4,452 4,356 4,823 4,346 5,764 4,691 1,626 4,600*<br />
*prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary estimates<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002<br />
Opium poppy fields are normally ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Myanmar and Laos, while most of them are irrigated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Also, unlike their South East Asian counterparts, Afghan growers tend to use fertilizers. South East<br />
Asian <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy fields are located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> remote, rugged and forested areas of the countries where they are<br />
cultivated by ethnic m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities, while the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> takes place <strong>on</strong> the best<br />
agricultural land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the irrigated valleys of the country. It is therefore not surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the crop calendar of<br />
the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> overlaps with wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong>, the<br />
predom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant legal crop. In South East Asia, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy has been traditi<strong>on</strong>ally grown as a dry<br />
seas<strong>on</strong> (w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter) crop, alternat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the crop calendar with rice, the predom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant legal crop, which is cultivated<br />
dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>y (summer) seas<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se differences highlight the fact that massive <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is not an ancestral traditi<strong>on</strong>, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> has <strong>on</strong>ly relatively recently expanded at the<br />
expense of legal crops, and that this phenomena is clearly the result of a choice made by a number of Afghan<br />
farmers to modify their agricultural practice based <strong>on</strong> the prevail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g market c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. This po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t will be exam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more detail <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a subsequent secti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
30
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> a c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> ratio of 10%, the potential hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> would have amounted<br />
to about 330 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (or 340 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002), and the world total to about 470 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(or 360 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002). For comparis<strong>on</strong> purposes, it is estimated that Western Europe, not the largest but<br />
certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly the most lucrative illicit opiate market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world, c<strong>on</strong>sumes between 80 and 120 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
per year. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are however uncerta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ties regard<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the exact morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e b c<strong>on</strong>tent of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the efficiency of the transformati<strong>on</strong> process <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories. (See chapter V). Also,<br />
a significant proporti<strong>on</strong> of the harvest is trafficked and c<strong>on</strong>sumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>. F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally, a<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trafficked is seized by law enforcement authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transit and dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong><br />
countries. Based <strong>on</strong> seizure data compiled by UNDCP, 97 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalent, or 21 %, of global<br />
illicit opiate producti<strong>on</strong> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tercepted throughout the world <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a potential of about 370 metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalent available for c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background, the total prohibiti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> by the Taliban regime a few m<strong>on</strong>ths<br />
after the 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest <strong>on</strong> the territory under their c<strong>on</strong>trol – which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded all the high density <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas of the country and represented more than 80% of the nati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> – came as an<br />
unexpected event of potentially far-reach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g c<strong>on</strong>sequences for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al drug c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decree bann<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was issued <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July 2000, well before the poppy plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
seas<strong>on</strong>, which starts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> October. Surveys c<strong>on</strong>ducted by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated a high degree of compliance<br />
with the ban. F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al results showed that 7,606 hectares of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy were cultivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
2001 seas<strong>on</strong>, down by 91 % from the previous year’s estimate of 82,171 ha. Most major former <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces had become totally, or nearly, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> free. No <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand,<br />
the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce with the largest cultivati<strong>on</strong> area <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (42,853 ha), and <strong>on</strong>ly 218 ha were recorded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar,<br />
the sec<strong>on</strong>d rank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (19,747 ha). In the northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Badakhshan, however, cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased from 2,458 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to 6,342 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. With weighted average yields of 31 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per<br />
hectare <strong>on</strong> irrigated land, and 18 kg/ha <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land, potential <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> amounted to 185 metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, a reducti<strong>on</strong> of 3,100 mt, or 94%, from the 2000 total of 3,276 mt.<br />
Global illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> 1979-2002<br />
6,000<br />
5,674<br />
5,000<br />
REST OF THE WORLD<br />
4,600*<br />
metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
-<br />
* prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary estimates<br />
Figure 4<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
3,395<br />
1979<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
b Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e is extracted from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and then transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
MYANMAR<br />
AFGHANISTAN<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
2002<br />
31
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was not offset by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other countries.<br />
While Myanmar became the largest source of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (followed by <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Laos), the<br />
area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed relatively stable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that country.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> global pattern of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was therefore deeply modified <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 91 % reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> translated to a 35 % reducti<strong>on</strong> at the global level,<br />
from about 222,000 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to about 144,000 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g potential producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> at the<br />
global level went down by 65%, from about 4,700 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, to about 1,600 metric t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.This<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> was c<strong>on</strong>sidered by UNDCP to be well below the po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of equilibrium for the world demand and supply<br />
of illicit opiates.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> m<strong>on</strong>itor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators by UNDCP showed however that the shortage anticipated <strong>on</strong> the markets<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>ally supplied with hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of Afghan orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was delayed or limited throughout 2001 22 . Earlier speculati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
about the existence of large opiate stocks were thus c<strong>on</strong>firmed by the of seizures and prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the source regi<strong>on</strong><br />
and further al<strong>on</strong>g the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g routes dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 2001.<br />
Despite the delayed reacti<strong>on</strong> of markets attributed to the existence of stocks, the elim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of more than<br />
two-thirds of the global annual illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed a fact of c<strong>on</strong>siderable significance. First<br />
signs of the depleti<strong>on</strong> of opiate stocks started to appear both around <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe at the end of<br />
2001. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce those regi<strong>on</strong>s have been almost exclusively supplied with opiates of Afghan orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> represented 70% of the world producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, a severe and sudden shortage would have had<br />
the potential to break their illegal hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets, especially if it was susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g year.<br />
But another turn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the troubled history of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> reversed the situati<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> post September 11 war<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the fall of the Taliban regime co<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cided with the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seas<strong>on</strong>. Afghan peasants<br />
reacted to the vacuum <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> central government authority and sowed their fields. Results of the pre-assessment<br />
survey of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ducted by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> early February 2002 showed that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> resumed at a high level. 23 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs were c<strong>on</strong>firmed by UNDCP’s annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
survey of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> that took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the m<strong>on</strong>ths that followed.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan Interim Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> banned <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> 17 January 2002. At that time,<br />
however, most <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy fields had already been sown. Although most farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the preassessment<br />
survey said they were uncerta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> about be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g able to harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> later <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g because of the<br />
ban, the high prices offered by local traders created a powerful <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive. Despite an eradicati<strong>on</strong> campaign<br />
launched by the Afghan Interim Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April 2002, it became clear that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> rega<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed its positi<strong>on</strong><br />
as the world’s primary illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producer <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world.<br />
UNODC’s survey found <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to have taken place <strong>on</strong> 74,000 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. This was<br />
more than the 8000 hectares under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 but still slightly less than the 82,000 hectares under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 or the 91,000 hectares under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> yield <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, however, was rather high:<br />
46 kg per hectare, <strong>on</strong> average. As a result, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> amounted to about 3,400 t<strong>on</strong>s and was thus not<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 but also marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (3,300 t<strong>on</strong>s). <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> thus<br />
accounted for about three quarters of global illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. Opium poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 24 out<br />
of 32 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Almost 95% of the cultivati<strong>on</strong>, however, was c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> just five<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces: Helmand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the South came first, with nearly 30,000 ha, followed by Nangarhar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the East (about<br />
20,000 ha), Badakshan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the North (about 8,000 ha), Uruzgan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the South/Center (about 5000 ha) and<br />
Kandahar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the South (about 4000 ha).<br />
32
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
1.3. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
From a purely commercial po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view, the success of illicit Afghan opiates as a global commodity is<br />
remarkable. After two decades of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g producti<strong>on</strong>, at the end of the 1990s, they represented :<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
almost 100% of the illicit opiates c<strong>on</strong>sumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, notably the ECO countries (the<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,<br />
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>); the number of opiate users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that area can be very<br />
roughly estimated at 4 milli<strong>on</strong> (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 2 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russia, 0.8 to 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the I.R. of Iran, 0.7 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and 0.3 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia);<br />
80 % to 90 % of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> European markets (both western and eastern Europe), which has<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>ally been trafficked al<strong>on</strong>g the so-called “Balkan” route (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> - the I.R. of Iran -Turkey -<br />
Balkan countries - West Europe) with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years of the development of an alternative<br />
route through Central Asia and Russia; the number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe can be estimated<br />
at 1 milli<strong>on</strong> to 1.5 milli<strong>on</strong>;<br />
most of the opiates found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of the Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Africa (notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and<br />
southern Africa);<br />
significant amounts of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South Asia (notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> India and Sri Lanka).<br />
Afghan opiates have been largely absent from Lat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> America, South-East Asia and Ch<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>a which are supplied<br />
by other sources. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y have been marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally present <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> North America (Canada and USA), Australia and Japan.<br />
It is however worth not<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that, if South West Asian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> represented <strong>on</strong>ly 6% of US hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999,<br />
it was <strong>on</strong>ce dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant <strong>on</strong> the US market (from 1980 to 1985), and markets c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to shift quickly, react<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> supply. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s bumper <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvests of 1999 and 2000, which had been partly<br />
stock-piled, research undertaken <strong>on</strong> behalf of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> States <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Policy (ONDCP) suggest<br />
that the share of South-West Asian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the US market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to around 15% by the year 2001,<br />
represent<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g two thirds of all Asian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> imports, up from just <strong>on</strong>e third of Asian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> imports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g map provides an overview of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g routes from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Europe and the<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the various countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> size of the spheres reflects<br />
the amounts seized. A colour code is used to identify the trends between 1996 and the year 2000. Blue <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates<br />
a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures, grey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates stable seizures (+/-10%) while shades of red <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease. Insofar<br />
as seizures are a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of underly<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities, the general pattern is <strong>on</strong>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease. However,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe the trend was towards a stabilizati<strong>on</strong> or decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e (Germany, Italy, Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, France, Swizterland<br />
and all of the Nordic countries), although there were also excepti<strong>on</strong>s (notably the UK, but also the Benelux<br />
countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Austria). Almost all East European countries, by<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trast, reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases were reported by the countries of Central Asia, which<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly emerged, as of the late 1990s, as an important transit z<strong>on</strong>e for opiates produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
highest seizures still take place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, though <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures of<br />
Tajikistan were <strong>on</strong>ly slightly less than those reported from Turkey.<br />
While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1980s a number of European countries still identified the countries of the so-called<br />
Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand) as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> source of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> for their markets, opiates from<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated the European market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the late 1990s, most West-<br />
European countries report that between 80% and 90% of their illicit opiates were either manufactured from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and/or that seized opiates could be traced back to countries al<strong>on</strong>g the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
routes from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Europe. In countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of the former<br />
Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> virtually all illegally imported opiates orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
33
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
34
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Table 10: Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transit/dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> countries of opiates produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g country<br />
Year<br />
Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> source of (imported) opiates<br />
In % of opiates<br />
trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the country<br />
Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
source of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong><br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Pakistan 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
100% of imported<br />
opiates<br />
ARQ<br />
Iran 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (directly or via Pakistan) 100% Govt. Rep.<br />
India 2000<br />
South-West Asia (rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>der: domestic<br />
orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (54%) and from South-East Asia<br />
(7%))<br />
39% ARQ<br />
Tajikistan 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 100% ARQ<br />
Uzbekistan 2000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, directly from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> or via<br />
Tajikistan<br />
100% of imported<br />
opiates<br />
Kyrgyzstan 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, via Tajikistan 100% ARQ<br />
INCSR<br />
Kazakhstan 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, via Tajikistan or via Kirgyzstan close to 100% INCSR<br />
Turkmenistan 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, directly or via Uzbekistan close to 100% INCSR<br />
Balkan-route countries<br />
Turkey 2000/01 South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Iran 100% ARQ<br />
Bulgaria 2001<br />
Golden Crescent (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via<br />
Balkanroute (Turkey)<br />
100% ARQ<br />
Romania 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (via Iran and Turkey) close to 100% ARQ<br />
Yugoslavia 2001<br />
South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), via<br />
Balkanroute<br />
100% ARQ<br />
Croatia 2001 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Balkan route 90% ARQ<br />
Slovenia 2000<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Turkey and via other<br />
countries al<strong>on</strong>g the Balkan route<br />
close to 100% ARQ<br />
Hungary 2001<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania<br />
(or Yugoslavia)<br />
95% ARQ<br />
Slovak Rep. 2001<br />
South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), via Hungary<br />
and via the Ukra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
close to 100% INCSR<br />
Czech Rep. 2000<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Balkan route (80%); via<br />
Central Asia (20%)<br />
close to 100% ARQ<br />
Poland 2001<br />
Golden Crescent (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) mostly via<br />
the Balkanroute (50%) and to a lesser extent close to 100% ARQ<br />
via Russia (25%); rest unknown.<br />
Other East European<br />
countries<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> 2001<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly via Tajikistan, Kyrgystan<br />
and other Central Asian countries<br />
99.5% ARQ<br />
Ukra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e 2001 South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Central<br />
close to 100%<br />
Asia and Russia; via Turkey (Black Sea) and<br />
(of imported<br />
via the Balkanroute (i.e. via Romania and<br />
opiates)<br />
Moldova)<br />
INCSR<br />
Moldova 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (via Russia and Ukra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e) close to 100% ARQ<br />
Belarus 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Tajikistan and Russia > 80% ARQ<br />
Lithuania 2000/01<br />
Latvia 2000/01<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Tajikistan, Russia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cl. via<br />
Kal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>grad) and via Belarus<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (90% via Russia,<br />
10% from South-West Asia via the Balkan<br />
route and Western Europe)<br />
100% ARQ<br />
100% ARQ<br />
Est<strong>on</strong>ia 2001 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Central Asia and Russia close to 100% ARQ<br />
West European<br />
countries<br />
Italy 2000/01<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Albania (43%), Turkey<br />
(43%), Greece and other countries al<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
Balkanroute<br />
close to 99%<br />
Austria 2001 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Turkey and Balkan route close to 100%<br />
Germany 2000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, mostly via Pakistan, Iran,<br />
Turkey and al<strong>on</strong>g the Balkanroute<br />
ARQ<br />
ARQ,<br />
Report<br />
80%-90% ARQ<br />
Govt.<br />
35
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 10: Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transit/dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> countries of opiates produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g country<br />
Year<br />
Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> source of (imported) opiates<br />
In % of opiates<br />
trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the country<br />
Switzerland 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via the Balkan route 80% ARQ<br />
Belgium 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via the Balkan route 95% ARQ<br />
France 2001<br />
Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly via<br />
Balkanr route<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) via Turkey and the Balkan<br />
route (66%) and via France, Italy and UK<br />
(6%)<br />
close to 100%<br />
Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
source of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong><br />
ARQ<br />
72% ARQ<br />
Portugal 2001 Via Turkey, Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the Netherlands n/a ARQ<br />
Greece 2001<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Albania (66%) and Turkey<br />
(31%)<br />
close to 100%<br />
Cyprus 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Turkey, Iran and Greece 90% ARQ<br />
Malta 2000<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 70% via Turkey; rest via North<br />
African and South European countries<br />
close to 100% ARQ<br />
UK 2001<br />
South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), via Turkey,<br />
ARQ,Govt.<br />
via Balkanroute, via Pakistan, via India, via >95%<br />
Report<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> Arab Emirates, via Russia etc.<br />
Norway 2000 South-West Asia (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 90% ARQ<br />
Sweden 2001<br />
Golden Crescent (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), mostly via<br />
Turkey and Germany<br />
80% ARQ<br />
Denmark 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Turkey 75% ARQ<br />
F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>land 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Russia and/or via Est<strong>on</strong>ia close to 100% ARQ<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire Data (ARQ) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> States Department of State, Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol Strategy Report, March 2002.<br />
ARQ<br />
Given the str<strong>on</strong>g and ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g importance of opiates of Afghan orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> for supply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-<br />
West Asia, Central Asia, and Europe, it is also not surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d a rather str<strong>on</strong>g correlati<strong>on</strong> between Afghan<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and seizures of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these regi<strong>on</strong>s. Over the 1980-2000 period that correlati<strong>on</strong> amounted<br />
to R = 0.92, which is very high (a hundred percent fit would have resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a correlati<strong>on</strong> coefficient of 1.00).<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-West Asia & Near and Middle East,<br />
Central Asia and Europe<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures still likely to be reported for 2001<br />
100000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures (1980-2000)**<br />
Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents)<br />
5000<br />
Opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
80000<br />
60000<br />
40000<br />
20000<br />
Opium seizures (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (Bars)<br />
Correlati<strong>on</strong> between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
and opiates seizures 1980-2000: R =<br />
0<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1883<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001*<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
0<br />
* prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary estimates of opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
** <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures reported sofar for 2001<br />
Figure 5<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP, DELTA<br />
36
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, there are also some differences with regard to the specific opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved.<br />
While <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and partly also morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures tend to react to changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the very same year <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which<br />
shifts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> have been recorded, the impact <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures is usually observable over a two<br />
year period, with the change <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> mostly felt <strong>on</strong>e year later. Thus, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 was not so much reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year but <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995; the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995 was not really seen <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure data but <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> data for 1996. Similarly, the<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 was <strong>on</strong>ly partially reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999<br />
but was clearly seen <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rapidly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the subsequent year. Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary seizure data for<br />
opiates for 2001, the year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban, show a significant decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e-base<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-West Asia & Near and Middle East,<br />
Central Asia and Europe<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures still likely to be reported for 2001<br />
50,000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures (1980-2000)**<br />
5000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
45,000<br />
40,000<br />
35,000<br />
30,000<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (Bars)<br />
Correlati<strong>on</strong> between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures 1980-2000: R = 0.83;<br />
Correlati<strong>on</strong> with <strong>on</strong>e-year delay: R = 0.93<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
5,000<br />
-<br />
0<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1883<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
* prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary estimates of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, ** <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures reported sofar for 2001<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001*<br />
Figure 6<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
seizures, but <strong>on</strong>ly moderate decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe are<br />
largely supplied with hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufactured out of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced a year earlier. Expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> statistical<br />
terms, the correlati<strong>on</strong> coefficient between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures over the 1980-2000 period was<br />
0.83; if the correlati<strong>on</strong>, however, is made between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
subsequent year, the correlati<strong>on</strong> coefficient <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases to 0.93.<br />
In any case, the supply push result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s record <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvests of the late 1990s was<br />
already reced<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, the year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ban.<br />
Except for Tajikistan, which is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly faced with grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
through its territory and has improved its enforcement capabilities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, practically all other countries<br />
around <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> reported fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seizures of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (see Map 5 and Map 6).<br />
In Pakistan, seizures of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> fell by more than 40% and seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e) by almost<br />
10%.<br />
In Iran seizures of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e fell by more than half, and seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by a third.<br />
In Turkey seizures of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e fell by two thirds, seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by a third.<br />
In Russia <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures fell by more than 50% while hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease slightly.<br />
37
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Map 5<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Map 6<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Available hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity data of seized hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> showed a clear downward trend <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, revers<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
upward trend observed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous years.<br />
Average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkey fell from 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first quarter of 2001 to 41% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the fourth quarter of<br />
2001;<br />
Similarly average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK – after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased from 37% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> early 1997 to 53%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first quarter of 2001, fell to 43% by the fourth quarter of 2001 and to about 30% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> mid 2002.<br />
A general reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the supply push was also observed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Germany. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of newly registered<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed slightly, the number of reported hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure cases fell by 6% and the number<br />
of drug related deaths (which are largely related to abuse of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Germany) fell by about 10% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2001 after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased by 35% over the 1997-2000 period, at the time when Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> expanded.<br />
Given the resumpti<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at high levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, it is likely, however, that traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
will aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d part of 2002, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2003.<br />
1.4. Geography of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
In the 19 th century and early 20 th century, <strong>on</strong>e of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> centres of the country was<br />
apparently Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), known for its high-quality <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. However, the subsequent<br />
expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, notably the expansi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and the 1990s took place ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east<br />
and, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south of the country. By the year 2000, before the Taliban ban, the two prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces,<br />
Helmand (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) accounted for slightly more than 75% of<br />
the total area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> (51.9% and 23.9% respectively). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan<br />
was 3% of the country’s total poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most strik<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g phenomen<strong>on</strong> of the last decade of the 20 th century was the spread of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> across the country. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1930s was reported from just 3 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, this<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to 8 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces by the year 1994 and 22 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. This meant that close to 80% of<br />
all prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of the country (28 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> total) were reported to have been cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year<br />
2000.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy over the 1995-99 period was 70% 24 .<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease from<br />
1994 - the year of a bumper harvest and the first year <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which a detailed country-wide UNDCP ground survey<br />
took place - to 2000, the first year of Taliban efforts to curtail cultivati<strong>on</strong>, was still 15%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute terms – over the 1994-2000 period was reported for the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of<br />
Helmand, cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 45% more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994. Cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan rose by 43% over the 1994-2000<br />
38
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
period, though ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from low levels. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute terms over the same period was reported<br />
from the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Nangarhar (-32% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> relative terms). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> basic regi<strong>on</strong>al trends over the 1994-2000 period<br />
were thus a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the East of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, but str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the South as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
North of the country.<br />
It is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trends, as reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures, went largely parallel to producti<strong>on</strong><br />
trends with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest seizures of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s and the str<strong>on</strong>gest<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute terms – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates seizures from the mid 1990s to the late 1990s took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran,<br />
reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia, the growth of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, while the str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases –<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> relative terms – were reported from Central Asia, notably Tajikistan, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia, the growth of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. By c<strong>on</strong>trast, opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan fell <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e with less producti<strong>on</strong> reported from eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. With<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan by far the largest seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
were reported from the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Baluchistan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> while opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and the Tribal Areas, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Nangarhar became less significant. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se patterns<br />
have much to do with the destroyed transport <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and years of high transportati<strong>on</strong><br />
risks created by local warlords kidnapp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g whole c<strong>on</strong>voys or demand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g high tolls for allow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g them a safe<br />
passage through their territory. Though these risks decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed markedly s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the mid 1990s when many of the<br />
warlords had to hand over their arms to the Taliban 25 , the trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued through the late 1990s and the beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the 21 st century.<br />
Table 11. Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 1994-2000,<br />
sorted by results <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (hectares)*<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000<br />
% of total<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
change<br />
1994-2000<br />
Helmand 29,579 29,753 24,909 29,400 30,673 44,552 42,853 52.2% 13,274<br />
Nangarhar 29,081 15,722 15,643 14,567 17,822 22,990 19,747 24.0% -9,334<br />
Oruzgan 6,211 2,573 7,777 4,587 4,288 4,479 4,331 5.3% -1,880<br />
Qandahar 4,034 2,461 3,160 4,521 5,602 6,032 3,427 4.2% -607<br />
Balkh 1,065 710 1,044 4,057 2,669 3.2% 2,669<br />
Badakhshan 1,714 2,970 3,230 2,902 2,817 2,684 2,458 3.0% 744<br />
Farah 9 630 568 171 787 1,509 1.8% 1,509<br />
Kunar 115 152 19 75 288 786 1.0% 671<br />
Jawzjan 2,593 746 0.9% 746<br />
Zabul 54 255 154 161 611 725 0.9% 671<br />
Laghman 77 297 707 0.9% 707<br />
Takhar 201 647 0.8% 647<br />
Kunduz 38 489 0.6% 489<br />
Kabul 132 340 0.4% 340<br />
Nimroz 682 119 136 642 11 203 219 0.3% -463<br />
Baghlan 328 929 1,005 199 0.2% 199<br />
Kapisa 5 104 0.1% 104<br />
Samangan 54 0.1% 54<br />
Logar 4 29 46 0.1% 46<br />
Badghis 41 0.0% 41<br />
Herat 38 38 0.0% 38<br />
Faryab 36 0.0% 36<br />
Total 71,470 53,759 56,824 58,416 63,674 90,983 82,171 100.00% 11,045<br />
* blank = prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce not surveyed<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000, Islamabad 2000.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ban decreed by the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July 2000 led to massive decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es of between 90% and<br />
100% of cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces c<strong>on</strong>trolled by them <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand ceased entirely and<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar fell by 99%. Increases were <strong>on</strong>ly reported from two northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, Badakshan<br />
(+158%) and Samangan (+1,037%). In the other northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces cultivati<strong>on</strong> fell as well: a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of two thirds<br />
was reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Takhar, which neighbours Badakshan, as well as an almost complete elim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kunduz and<br />
Balkh, the two prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Samangan.<br />
39
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 was also reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of villages cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy. In 2000, UNDCP’s ground survey identified 6,645 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages of out of 7,541 villages<br />
surveyed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts. In 2001, this number fell to 914 villages out of 10,030 villages surveyed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts.<br />
Overall, Badakshan accounted for 83% and Samangan for 8% of all cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces (Badakshan, Samangan, Takhar, Balkh), were resp<strong>on</strong>sible for almost 95% of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Most of the rest – close to 5% - was produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Nangarhar, Kunar, Kabul, Laghman, Paktia). Southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> virtually ceased to be an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> area. c<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> changed aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> resumed, a similar pattern to that of<br />
the year 2000 was observed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> five prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Helmand (40%), Nangarhar (27%), Badakshan (11%),<br />
Uruzgan (7%) and Kandahar (5%) accounted for 90% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s total area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, almost<br />
the same percentage as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000.<br />
Table 12: Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> a <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares, 1999-2002,<br />
sorted by results <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (hectares)*<br />
1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
2002<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of total<br />
Helmand 44,552 42,853 - 29,950 40.4%<br />
Nangarhar 22,990 19,747 218 19,780 26.7%<br />
Badakshan 2,684 2,458 6,342 8,250 11.1%<br />
Uruzgan 4,989 4,725 1 5,100 6.9%<br />
Kandahar 5,522 3,034 - 3,970 5.4%<br />
Ghor - - - 2,200 3.0%<br />
Kunar 288 786 82 972 1.3%<br />
Laghman 297 707 15 950 1.3%<br />
Takhar 201 647 211 788 1.1%<br />
Farah 787 1,364 - 500 0.7%<br />
Nimroz 203 219 - 300 0.4%<br />
Balkh 4,057 2,669 4 217 0.3%<br />
Kapisa 5 104 - 207 0.3%<br />
Zabul 611 725 1 200 0.3%<br />
Baghlan 1,005 199 82 152 0.2%<br />
Jawzan 2,593 600 - 137 0.2%<br />
Samangan n.a. 54 614 100 0.1%<br />
Kabul 132 340 29 58 0.1%<br />
Sari Pul n.a. 146 - 57 0.1%<br />
Herat - 184 - 50 0.1%<br />
Paktya 29 46 1 38 0.1%<br />
Faryab - 36 - 28 0.04%<br />
Badghis - 41 - 26 0.04%<br />
Kunduz 38 489 - 16 0.02%<br />
Khost - - 6 - 0.00%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 90,983 82,173 7,606 74,045 100.0%<br />
a/ Some of the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cial boundaries changed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002.<br />
c Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trends, as reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure statistics, went parallel to these producti<strong>on</strong> patterns. Opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased str<strong>on</strong>gly<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan and they fell str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. Pakistan reported a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, though a less significant <strong>on</strong>e than was reported by Iran.<br />
40
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
41
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Other southern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
1.0%<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 (N = 71,470 ha)<br />
Badakhshan<br />
(north)<br />
2.4%<br />
Kandahar (south)<br />
6% Nangarhar<br />
Uruzgan (south)<br />
8.7%<br />
(east)<br />
40.7%<br />
Western<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
0.1%<br />
Other southern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
3.0%<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (N = 82,172 ha)<br />
Kandahar<br />
(south)<br />
4.2%<br />
Badakhshan<br />
(north)<br />
3.0%<br />
Uruzgan (south)<br />
5.3%<br />
Other northern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
5.8%<br />
Nangarhar<br />
(east)<br />
24.0%<br />
Other eastern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
2.4%<br />
Helmand<br />
(south)<br />
41.4%<br />
Other eastern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
0.2%<br />
Helmand<br />
(south)<br />
52.2%<br />
Figure 7<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 1994.<br />
Figure 8<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (N = 7,606 ha)<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (N = 74,045 ha)<br />
Badakhshan<br />
83.4%<br />
Samangan<br />
8.1%<br />
Nangarhar (east)<br />
2.9%<br />
Other eastern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
1.7%<br />
Southern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
0.04%<br />
Western<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
0.1% Badakshan<br />
Other<br />
southern/central<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
4.4%<br />
Other northern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
2.0% Nangarhar<br />
11.1%<br />
(east)<br />
26.7%<br />
Kandahar<br />
5.4%<br />
Uruzgan (south)<br />
6.9%<br />
Helmand<br />
(south)<br />
40.4%<br />
Other eastern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
3.0%<br />
Figure 9<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2001.<br />
Figure 10<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2002.<br />
For security reas<strong>on</strong>s the 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy survey could <strong>on</strong>ly be accomplished through remote sens<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
(i.e. high-resoluti<strong>on</strong> satellite images complemented by ground truth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several parts of the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>refore,<br />
the work of field surveyors was more limited as compared to previous years when UNDCP was runn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g censustype<br />
ground surveys <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas of the country. Given the overall similarity of results of<br />
the 2000 and the 2002 surveys, several additi<strong>on</strong>al f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of the 2000 survey, presented below, are likely to be<br />
valid for 2002 as well.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, was equivalent to <strong>on</strong>ly 1% of total<br />
arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (0.9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002), or just 8% of all cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
year 2000. Despite the importance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> global <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, it would be thus mislead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to see<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a locati<strong>on</strong> where noth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g else but <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was grown. Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the peak year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (1999), the area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was equivalent to just 1.2% of total arable<br />
land or 4.5% of the land under wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was also less than the areas<br />
dedicated for barley, maize or rice cultivati<strong>on</strong> as well as for the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of oil crops.<br />
42
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> compared<br />
to arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (total arable land: 7,910,000 ha)<br />
Area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> compared<br />
to arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 (arable land: 1,013,000 ha)<br />
Other<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
99%<br />
Opium poppy<br />
(82,172 ha)<br />
1%<br />
Other<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
92%<br />
Opium<br />
poppy<br />
(82,172 ha)<br />
8%<br />
Figure 11<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
Figure 12<br />
UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
Opium poppy<br />
<strong>on</strong> irrigated<br />
land<br />
97%<br />
Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (82,200 hectares)<br />
Opium poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> irrigated land<br />
compared to all irrigated land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(irrigated land: 629,000 ha)<br />
Opium poppy<br />
(80,357 ha)<br />
13%<br />
Ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
3%<br />
Other<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
87%<br />
Figure 13<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
Figure 14<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
In 2002, the area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was equivalent to 0.9% of arable land, 3.3% of the land<br />
under producti<strong>on</strong> of cereals or 4.2% of the land dedicated to wheat producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, and c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to<br />
be less than the land used for barley, rice or maize producti<strong>on</strong>. In other words, these data clearly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that<br />
the large majority of Afghan peasants did not live <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> but <strong>on</strong> the producti<strong>on</strong> of other crops. N<strong>on</strong>etheless,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some of the key <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> reached significant proporti<strong>on</strong>s. In<br />
Nangarhar more than a fifth of arable land (22%) was used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, and around 17% of<br />
arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uruzgan and Helmand (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) were used for such cultivati<strong>on</strong>. In Badakshan<br />
(northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) the respective proporti<strong>on</strong> was 8% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Kunar and Laghman <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
East and Kandahar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the South were also clearly above the overall average of 0.9%.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> become even more apparent when cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is compared to the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> agricultural crop - wheat. In Nangarhar the<br />
area under poppy was equivalent to almost 60% of the land under wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. In Helmand the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ratio was 48%. In Badakshan and Uruzgan the area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was equivalent<br />
to 15% of the area under wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Proporti<strong>on</strong>s rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from 1% to 10% were reported from Kunar, Ghor,<br />
Kandahar, Laghman, Kapisa and Nimroz. Overall the highest c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy as compared to<br />
wheat producti<strong>on</strong> were found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, followed by southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
43
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 13: Agricultural land use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares<br />
TOTAL LAND<br />
65,209,000<br />
of which<br />
Pasture 30,000,000<br />
Potentially arable land<br />
7,910,000<br />
of which used for:<br />
Cereals, total 2,534,000<br />
Wheat 2,027,000<br />
Coarse gra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, total 367,000<br />
Barley 180,000<br />
Maize 160,000<br />
Oil-crops 146,800<br />
Rice, Paddy 140,000<br />
Opium poppy 91,000<br />
Seed Cott<strong>on</strong> 60,000<br />
Vegetables 57,000<br />
Grapes 52,000<br />
L<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>seed 39,000<br />
Pulses, total 37,000<br />
Sesame Seed 35,000<br />
Millet 27,000<br />
Roots and tubers, total 14,000<br />
Potatoes 14,000<br />
Sunflower Seed 11,500<br />
Tree nuts, total 11,500<br />
Watermel<strong>on</strong>s 7,800<br />
Berries 6,600<br />
Alm<strong>on</strong>ds 5,500<br />
Apricots 5,150<br />
Anise, Badian, Fennel 4,500<br />
Plums 4,500<br />
Figs 3,300<br />
St<strong>on</strong>e fruits 3,000<br />
Pistachios 3,000<br />
Apples 2,350<br />
Walnuts 2,300<br />
Citrus fruits, total 2,270<br />
Cantaloupes & other mel<strong>on</strong>s 2,100<br />
Sugar cane 2,000<br />
Peaches and nectar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es 1,920<br />
Oranges 1,500<br />
Olives 1,300<br />
Nuts 700<br />
Pears 320<br />
Sugar Beets 70<br />
Sources: FAO Database and UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 1999.<br />
44
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Table 14: Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy and of arable land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares)–<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces ranked accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to total arable land<br />
Opium Arable land<br />
Nangarhar East 19,780 89,000 22.2%<br />
Uruzgan Centre/south 5,100 29,000 17.6%<br />
Helmand South 29,950 181,000 16.5%<br />
Badakshan North 8,250 103,000 8.0%<br />
Kunar East 972 16,000 6.1%<br />
Laghman East 950 21,000 4.5%<br />
Kandahar South 3,970 137,000 2.9%<br />
Other 5,073 7,334,000 0.1%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 74,045 7,910,000 0.9%<br />
Table 15: Agricultural land use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares<br />
Cereals<br />
of which: Wheat Barley Rice Maize Opium poppy<br />
Hectares 2,213,000 1,742,000 236,000 135,000 100,000 74,000<br />
Sources: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment, Missi<strong>on</strong> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 15 August 2002. ,<br />
Table 16: Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy and of wheat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares)–<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces ranked accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce Locati<strong>on</strong> Opium poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
hectares<br />
Wheat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares<br />
Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy as a percentage<br />
of wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
Nangarhar East 19,780 33,000 59.9%<br />
Helmand South 29,950 63,000 47.5%<br />
Badakshan North 8,250 54,000 15.3%<br />
Uruzgan Centre/south 5,100 35,000 14.6%<br />
Kunar East 972 10,000 9.7%<br />
Ghor Centre 2,200 31,000 7.1%<br />
Kandahar South 3,970 58,000 6.8%<br />
Laghman East 950 14,000 6.8%<br />
Kapisa East 207 5,000 4.1%<br />
Nimroz South 300 30,000 1.0%<br />
Farah South 500 65,000 0.8%<br />
Zabul South 200 30,000 0.7%<br />
Paktya East 38 6,000 0.6%<br />
Takhar North 788 130,000 0.6%<br />
Jawzan North 137 47,000 0.3%<br />
Kabul East 58 21,000 0.3%<br />
Balkh North 217 120,000 0.2%<br />
Baghlan North 152 95,000 0.2%<br />
Sari Pul North 57 40,000 0.1%<br />
Samangan North 100 155,000 0.1%<br />
Heart West 50 155,000 0.0%<br />
Badghis West 26 130,000 0.0%<br />
Faryab West 28 167,000 0.0%<br />
Kunduz North 16 105,000 0.0%<br />
45
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 16: Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy and of wheat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hectares)–<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces ranked accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to wheat cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
Other - 143,000 0.0%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 74,045 1,742,000 4.3%<br />
East 22,005 89,000 24.7%<br />
South 40,020 281,000 14.2%<br />
Centre 2,200 31,000 7.1%<br />
North 9,717 746,000 1.3%<br />
West 104 452,000 0.0%<br />
Sources: UNDC/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002, October 2002, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment, Missi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 15 August 2002<br />
It is also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that prior to the ban by the Taliban and aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy was cultivated <strong>on</strong> irrigated land. In 2000, this proporti<strong>on</strong> reached 97%. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ban it dropped<br />
temporarily to 52% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 26 but recovered to around 93% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002.<br />
Yields <strong>on</strong> irrigated land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, are substantially higher than <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land. In 2002, a year of good<br />
weather c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> yields per hectare <strong>on</strong> irrigated land were 48 kg per hectare and thus 50%<br />
higher than yields <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land (32 kg per ha). In 2000, the first year of a severe drought, yields per hectare<br />
<strong>on</strong> irrigated land averaged 35.7 kg and were twice as high as yields <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed poppy fields (18.5 kg/hectare).<br />
In regi<strong>on</strong>al terms, most of the irrigated land used for poppy producti<strong>on</strong> is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south. In 2000, the<br />
highest proporti<strong>on</strong>s of irrigated land out of total land dedicated to poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, approach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 100%, were<br />
reported from Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and Kandahar (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) as well as from a number of less<br />
important <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> alphabetical order - Badghis, Farah, Faryab, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul,<br />
Kapisa, Logar, Nimroz, Oruzgan, Samangan and Zabul. In Nangarhar, 99% of the land used for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
was irrigated. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest proporti<strong>on</strong>s of ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed cultivati<strong>on</strong> were reported from northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: Badakshan<br />
(50%), Takhar (45%) and Balkh (16%).<br />
Similarly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 almost all producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> took place <strong>on</strong> irrigated land.<br />
Significant proporti<strong>on</strong>s of ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed cultivati<strong>on</strong>, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, were still reported from northern and north-western<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <strong>on</strong> average 56%. Proporti<strong>on</strong>s differ str<strong>on</strong>gly, however, from prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce to prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce. In Badakshan,<br />
border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan (60%), as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faryab, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan (87%) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Baghlan,<br />
located to the north of Kabul (89%) ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> proporti<strong>on</strong>s of ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Takhar, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan (34%) and Badghis, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan (32%) are still important though most<br />
of the cultivati<strong>on</strong> there already takes place <strong>on</strong> irrigated land. By c<strong>on</strong>trast, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the two northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Jawzjan<br />
(border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan) and Kunduz (border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan) poppy producti<strong>on</strong> was reported to have taken place<br />
exclusively <strong>on</strong> irrigated land, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Balkh, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Uzbekistan, almost all producti<strong>on</strong> (99%) shifted to irrigated<br />
land <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. 27<br />
hectares<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
Area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(N = 6645 poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages)<br />
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000<br />
Number of villages<br />
Figure 15<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
percent of arable land under<br />
poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> village<br />
100%<br />
50%<br />
Relative importance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(6645 poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages out of 7541 villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts)<br />
0%<br />
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000<br />
number of villages<br />
Figure 16<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
46
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
In <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> irrigated land accounted for 13% of all cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong> irrigated land while poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general accounted for ‘just’ 8% of all agricultural activity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. All of this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates that farmers, whenever possible, used their irrigated land rather<br />
than their ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g village was found to have been, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, 12 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, out of a total area of cultivati<strong>on</strong> averag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 150 hectares per village. However, this<br />
figure c<strong>on</strong>ceals significant variati<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g villages and thus c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of producti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> smallest poppy<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages cultivated poppy <strong>on</strong> as little as 0.02 hectares; by c<strong>on</strong>trast, 91 villages, i.e.1.4% of all poppy<br />
cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages, had areas under cultivati<strong>on</strong> of more than 100 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. One village reported poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> of more than 600 hectares. All of the 10 largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 were located<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Out of the 91 villages with more than 100 hectares of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong>, 68 villages were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and 15 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se were, over<br />
the last decade, the two ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> every year except 2000.<br />
Similarly, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of relative importance of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> at the village level, UNDCP’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
survey data for the year 2000 show that there was substantial variati<strong>on</strong> around the average ratio of 8% of land<br />
be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. In 15% of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages more than half and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 10% of the<br />
villages more than 60% of the land was dedicated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. In five villages basically all land was<br />
used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Four of these villages were located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Kandahar (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Overall, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> half of all poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages the land dedicated to poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> was less than 13%.<br />
Area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> as a percentage of<br />
total land cultivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas, 2000<br />
AFGHANISTAN<br />
Helmand<br />
Nangarhar<br />
Kabul<br />
Oruzgan<br />
Farah<br />
Nimroz<br />
Laghman<br />
Kandahar<br />
Logar<br />
Zabul<br />
Kunar<br />
Samangan<br />
Kapisa<br />
Badakhshan<br />
Baghlan<br />
Kunduz<br />
Balkh<br />
Jawzjan<br />
Badghis<br />
Herat<br />
Takhar<br />
Faryab<br />
8.1%<br />
11.7%<br />
10.3%<br />
9.2%<br />
8.2%<br />
6.7%<br />
6.7%<br />
5.9%<br />
5.6%<br />
3.6%<br />
3.1%<br />
2.3%<br />
1.9%<br />
1.7%<br />
1.4%<br />
0.5%<br />
0.5%<br />
0.4%<br />
0.4%<br />
0.2%<br />
16.8%<br />
29.4%<br />
Eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Western<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Southern<br />
35.8%<br />
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%<br />
Figure 17<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
47
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
All of these data suggest that the impact of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> – as well as the impact of a poppy ban –<br />
would be quite different from village to village, even with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Once the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages are re-grouped accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, it can be seen that Helmand<br />
and Nangarhar, the two ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, also had the highest proporti<strong>on</strong>s of available land<br />
dedicated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, 36% and 29% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 respectively. This was significantly above the overall<br />
average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages (8%).<br />
By c<strong>on</strong>trast the proporti<strong>on</strong>s of land used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> western and northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are<br />
rather small. In Badakshan, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s sixth largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and third largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, <strong>on</strong>ly 2% of the overall arable land was dedicated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. As the area<br />
under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan rose str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (+158%) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (+30%) 28 the proporti<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
cultivated land used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to 6% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and 8% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. But even these proporti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
are rather modest compared to those reported from Helmand or Nangarhar.<br />
1.5. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>al dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> also has important ethnic dimensi<strong>on</strong>s. This is the case with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> as well as traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and the l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
Estimates of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s populati<strong>on</strong> range from less than 21 milli<strong>on</strong> to more than 26 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants. d <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> two most widespread languages spoken across the country are Dari (Persian, close to 50%)<br />
and Pashtu (40-50%). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtuns are the dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant ethnic community, account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for 40%-50% of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y are c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east and the south. Dari-speak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajiks from the eastern and northern<br />
valleys c<strong>on</strong>stitute a further 20%-25%. Some 15% of the populati<strong>on</strong> are Hazaras, liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the centre of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Some 10% of the populati<strong>on</strong> are Turkic, mostly Uzbeks (5%) and Turkmens who live <strong>on</strong> the northern<br />
pla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are some 20 other dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct ethnic groups-of which the Baluch <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the desert south and the Nuristanis<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mounta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ous east are the largest <strong>on</strong>es. Other groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude the Aimaks and the Kyrgyz. In total, some<br />
30 languages are spoken. 29 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> geographical distributi<strong>on</strong> of these ethnic groups is shown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> map 12.<br />
In UNDCP’s first <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy survey, c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994, data <strong>on</strong> the ethnic compositi<strong>on</strong><br />
of villages produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were collected. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey found that 84% of the poppy cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages were<br />
Pashtun, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the importance of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly Pashtun populated prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Helmand and Nangarhar for<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. N<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e percent of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages were ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habited by Tajiks, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan and 2% were Uzbek villages. Other ethnic groups liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> hardly played<br />
a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. Hazara and Baluchi villages accounted for just 0.1% each of all poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
villages. Even if ethnically mixed villages with a populati<strong>on</strong> of Hazaras and Baluchis are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded, the share of<br />
Hazara villages <strong>on</strong>ly amounted to 1.3% and the share of Baluchi villages was <strong>on</strong>ly 0.5% of all the villages<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
In terms of output, 88% of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun villages. Most of the rest of the producti<strong>on</strong><br />
(10%) took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnically mixed villages, the majority of which had both a Pashtun and a Tajik populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
(see Table 17). It is also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that the importance of ethnically mixed villages for producti<strong>on</strong> was<br />
twice as large as the proporti<strong>on</strong> of such villages am<strong>on</strong>g all poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages.<br />
d<br />
UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its electr<strong>on</strong>ic publicati<strong>on</strong> UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Recovery, Some Basic Facts, put the populati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> at 18 milli<strong>on</strong> people.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> Populati<strong>on</strong> Divisi<strong>on</strong> estimates <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s populati<strong>on</strong> at 21.2 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 and 21. 8 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. A survey<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999/2000 arrived at a populati<strong>on</strong> figure of 23 milli<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, based <strong>on</strong> another UNDP<br />
report, put the figure ‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> excess of ‘ 25 milli<strong>on</strong> people. Similarly, the Fischer Weltalmanach 2002, based <strong>on</strong> World Bank data, put the figure<br />
at 25.9 milli<strong>on</strong> for 1999. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> World Bank, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its World Development Indicators 2002 estimated the figure at 26.6 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000.<br />
48
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages<br />
by ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994<br />
(N = 2008 villages)<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> by<br />
ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic group of villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994<br />
(N = 3,415 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
Tajik<br />
1.4%<br />
Uzbek<br />
0.1%<br />
Pashtun<br />
84%<br />
Tajik<br />
9%<br />
ethnically mixed<br />
5%<br />
Uzbek<br />
2%<br />
Baluch<br />
0.1%<br />
Hazara<br />
0.1%<br />
Pashtun<br />
88.4%<br />
Baluch<br />
0.01%<br />
Hazara<br />
0.01%<br />
Ethnically<br />
mixed<br />
10.0%<br />
Figure 18<br />
Source: UNDCP, Opium Poppy Survey 1994 data.<br />
Figure 19<br />
Source: UNDCP, Opium Poppy Survey 1994 data.<br />
49
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 17: Producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to ethnic distributi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994,<br />
sorted accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to producti<strong>on</strong><br />
Ethnic group /<br />
comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of ethnic<br />
groups<br />
Number<br />
of villages<br />
Populati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> villages<br />
Cultivated<br />
area <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ha<br />
Opium<br />
poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ha<br />
%<br />
poppy<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
metric<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of total<br />
producti<strong>on</strong><br />
PASHTUN 1,679 1,863,265 273,043 62,595 23% 3,019.61 88.4%<br />
PASHTUN, TAJIK 50 116,937 17,345 4,192 24% 217.24 6.4%<br />
PASHTUN, HAZARA 8 8,067 4,390 1,214 28% 74.59 2.2%<br />
TAJIK 180 174,166 13,555 1,822 13% 47.37 1.4%<br />
PASHTUN, UZBEK,<br />
TAJIK<br />
3 4,060 1,220 380 31% 21.19 0.6%<br />
PASHTUN, UZBEK 1 2,000 480 178 37% 11.21 0.3%<br />
UZBEK 40 19,467 3,358 277 8% 4.83 0.1%<br />
FARS, PASHTUN,<br />
BALUCH<br />
2 1,295 6,180 117 2% 4.10 0.1%<br />
TAJIK, PASHTUN 2 10,320 300 100 33% 3.50 0.1%<br />
PASHTUN, SAYEED,<br />
TAJIK<br />
1 560 300 60 20% 1.68 0.05%<br />
PASHTUN, BALUCH 2 763 320 32 10% 1.63 0.05%<br />
HAZARA, TAJIK 13 4,450 1,507 192 13% 1.42 0.04%<br />
PASHTUN, TAJIK,<br />
HAZARA<br />
3 2,260 296 27 9% 1.38 0.04%<br />
UZBEK, TAJIK 1 1,350 360 36 10% 0.69 0.02%<br />
SAIDAN 4 1,570 486 79 16% 0.66 0.02%<br />
FARS, PASHTUN 1 476 250 18 7% 0.63 0.02%<br />
PASHTUN, HAZARA,<br />
UZBEK<br />
1 490 1,140 17 1% 0.60 0.02%<br />
FARS, BALUCH 2 1,015 1,200 15 1% 0.54 0.02%<br />
BALUCH 2 554 284 18 6% 0.51 0.01%<br />
TAJIK, UZBEK 1 400 240 24 10% 0.42 0.01%<br />
HAZARA 2 510 276 8 3% 0.26 0.01%<br />
HAZARA, UZBEK 1 300 120 20 17% 0.21 0.01%<br />
SADAAT 1 480 130 4 3% 0.20 0.01%<br />
PASHTUN, SHEYAH 2 424 574 9 2% 0.22 0.006%<br />
GOJURI 2 1,120 76 18 24% 0.13 0.004%<br />
PASHTUN, TAJIK,<br />
SAYEED<br />
1 350 20 4 20% 0.11 0.003%<br />
BALUCH, FARS 2 240 404 2 0% 0.08 0.002%<br />
ISHAN, TAJIK 1 480 80 8 10% 0.06 0.002%<br />
Grand Total 2,008 2,217,369 327,936 71,466 22% 3,415 100.0%<br />
Source: UNDCP, 1994 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey database.<br />
In Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), 85% of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun villages,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) the respective proporti<strong>on</strong> was 92% and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
the proporti<strong>on</strong> was 95%. Pashtun villages also dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Kunar (76%),<br />
Nimroz (81%), Uruzgan (96%) and Zabul (100%). Only <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan, not a s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle Pashtun village produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1994 survey. 62% of all producti<strong>on</strong> of Badakshan took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajik villages and 22%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbek villages.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se results are not particularly surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g as they reflected, more or less, the overall ethnic distributi<strong>on</strong><br />
patterns <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. However, the 1994 survey also found some unexpected results:<br />
<br />
Though Badakshan is the traditi<strong>on</strong>al centre of Tajiks liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and 82% of all Tajik poppy<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages were located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan, <strong>on</strong>ly 28% of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced by Tajik villages<br />
50
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
actually came from Badakshan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> bulk (68%) was produced by Tajik villages located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar<br />
(eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). In additi<strong>on</strong>, the survey also found Tajik villages produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kunar and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce. e<br />
<br />
<br />
Similarly, Uzbek villages produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were not <strong>on</strong>ly found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
areas of Uzbek settlement, but also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar.<br />
Hazara villages (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ethnically mixed villages with a Hazara populati<strong>on</strong>) produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were<br />
found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan and to a lesser extent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and Uruzgan.<br />
After 1994 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> gradually expanded from the core areas of Helmand/Kandahar,<br />
Nangarhar and Badakshan to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts and prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. A number of pockets of producti<strong>on</strong> also<br />
emerged across northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> which began to expand quickly. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased from 2008 to 6645 villages over the 1994-2000 period. In 1994, Pashtun villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traditi<strong>on</strong>al ‘Pashtun<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces’ (Helmand, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul) accounted for 93% of all the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these areas.<br />
Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the village data of the 1994 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy survey and the village data of UNDCP’s 2000 Opium<br />
Poppy Survey and assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
(i) that the proporti<strong>on</strong> of Pashtun <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly Pashtun populated<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed largely unchanged and that<br />
(ii) the districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pashtun prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces (Laghman, Logar, Kapisa, Kabul, and Farah)<br />
which started cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years had, <strong>on</strong> average, a similar proporti<strong>on</strong> of Pashtun<br />
villages (93%), the overall number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pashtun villages is likely to have tripled<br />
over the 1994-2000 period.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of ‘ethnically mixed and n<strong>on</strong>-Pashtun villages’ - us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the same approach - are likely to have<br />
qu<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tupled over the same period. This reflected growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> across all of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly populated by ethnic Tajik, Uzbek and mixed populati<strong>on</strong>s and have<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly a small Pashtun populati<strong>on</strong> (see Map 12). As there is a c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan,<br />
which has a high proporti<strong>on</strong> of Tajik villages, it can be assumed that Tajik villages accounted for most of the n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Pashtun <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. f Based <strong>on</strong> the growth rates derived above, the proporti<strong>on</strong> of n<strong>on</strong>-<br />
Pashtun and ethnically mixed villages rose from 16% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 to about 25% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 while the proporti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
Pashtun villages is likely to have fallen from 84% to about 75% over the same period.<br />
A significant change occurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ban. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban affected<br />
Pashtun villages disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately. A tentative estimate, based <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong>s made above g suggests that<br />
about 95% of Pashtun villages were forced to give up <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. As a result, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
was – for the first time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decades – c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> n<strong>on</strong>-Pashtun villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for almost three<br />
quarters of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly Tajik villages (more than 40% of all poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages) h and,<br />
to a lesser extent, Uzbek villages (some 20%) i . Pashtun villages made up about a quarter of all poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Most of the rest was accounted for by ethnically mixed villages.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> changed aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> dramatically with the large-scale resumpti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002.<br />
Pashtun villages accounted, <strong>on</strong>ce aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, for the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the 2002 survey<br />
e If <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes ethnically mixed villages with a Tajik populati<strong>on</strong>, Tajik <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> could be also identified <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uruzgan (southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g such villages data suggest that most ‘Tajik <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ producti<strong>on</strong> might actually have taken place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, followed by Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) ranked <strong>on</strong>ly third.<br />
f A tentative estimate suggests that the proporti<strong>on</strong> of Tajik villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased from 9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 to 12% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000,<br />
and the proporti<strong>on</strong> of Uzbek villages from 2% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 to around 5 percent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000.<br />
g Assumpti<strong>on</strong>s: 93% of all poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traditi<strong>on</strong>al ‘Pashtun prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces’ be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g actually Pashtun villages, with no or <strong>on</strong>ly negligible<br />
amounts be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g produced by Pashtun villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
h This is based <strong>on</strong> 2001 cultivati<strong>on</strong> data and the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that – as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 – 2% of all villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Pashtun prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces were Tajik, 70%<br />
of all villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan were Tajik, and that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces not covered by the 1994 survey, about 40% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other<br />
parts of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were Tajik. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> figure thus calculated was 400 villages or 44% of all poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
i<br />
This is based <strong>on</strong> 2001 cultivati<strong>on</strong> data the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that – as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 – 0.1% of all villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Pashtun prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces were Uzbek, 19%<br />
of all villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan were Uzbek , and that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces not covered by the 1994 survey, about 40% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
other parts of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were Uzbek. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> figure thus calculated was 164 villages or 18% of all poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
51
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
did not collect village-by-village census data, the method used for estimat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ethnic compositi<strong>on</strong> of poppy<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g villages could not be used. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> alternative method was to determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e the area of cultivati<strong>on</strong> of each<br />
ethnic group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1994 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey; determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e the proporti<strong>on</strong> of each ethnic group cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce; and extrapolate these proporti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> to the more recent cultivati<strong>on</strong> data. This method would give a<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of about 80% to Pashtun villages <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (see Figure 18) rather than the 75% shown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Figure 16. In<br />
2002 the proporti<strong>on</strong> of Pashtun villages cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased from the low <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 to 76%, but is still lower<br />
than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle group am<strong>on</strong>g the ethnically mixed and n<strong>on</strong>-Pashtun villages were Tajik villages,<br />
estimated to account for about 10% of the total area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Tentative estimate of distributi<strong>on</strong> of poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> by ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(N = 82,200 hectares)<br />
Tentative estimate of distributi<strong>on</strong> of poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> by ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
(N = 74,000 hectares)<br />
Pashtun<br />
villages<br />
80%<br />
Ethnically<br />
mixed and<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-pashtun<br />
villages<br />
20%<br />
Pashtun<br />
villages<br />
76%<br />
Ethnically<br />
mixed and n<strong>on</strong>pashtun<br />
villages<br />
24%<br />
Figure 20<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2000 and<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 1994 database.<br />
Figure 21<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 and<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 1994 database.<br />
While the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and the resumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 were largely due to<br />
political decisi<strong>on</strong>s - Pashtun villages were disproporti<strong>on</strong>ately affected simply because most of them were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> areas<br />
under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol - much of the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy over the 1994-2000 period was more directly<br />
associated with ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks.<br />
UNDCP research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, the largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late<br />
1990s, showed that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, the year of the largest ever harvest, 70% of the farmers used it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour. 30 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
local labor market was not sufficient to meet this demand. It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers thus often came from adjacent<br />
districts, and from other prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. In the latter cases, ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks played a key role. For <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand,<br />
Pashtun it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant laborers from distant prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces worked primarily <strong>on</strong> fields bel<strong>on</strong>g<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to Pashtun farmers. Similar<br />
patterns of cross-prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce co-operati<strong>on</strong> al<strong>on</strong>g ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es probably existed am<strong>on</strong>g other ethnic groups.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> spread of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> thus largely followed the pattern of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour, which followed ethnic<br />
patterns. Apart from the gradual expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to adjacent districts, poppy emerged <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> pockets<br />
of distant prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, usually the home villages of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers.<br />
Hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g acquired know-how of various aspects of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g established the<br />
necessary c<strong>on</strong>tacts to sell the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> which they usually received as payment, the it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers, <strong>on</strong>ce back<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their home village, started to experiment with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> themselves. In the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial year, cultivati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
poppy tended to be undertaken <strong>on</strong> an experimental basis. Thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was restricted to<br />
a small number of households <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any <strong>on</strong>e locati<strong>on</strong> until they were certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> about the crop’s profitability. In<br />
subsequent years, an even larger proporti<strong>on</strong> of land was dedicated to the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> plots<br />
of poppy also provoked the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest of neighbours, thus c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the rapid spread of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> at<br />
the local level wherever it had been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troduced. 31<br />
Ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks have not <strong>on</strong>ly played an important role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, they have also<br />
been crucial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sett<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up networks for cross-border traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, thus provid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure for the opiate<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry to flourish. Such networks have to rely <strong>on</strong> trust, and be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the same ethnic group provides this. Thus,<br />
irrespective of a general trend towards globalisati<strong>on</strong>, most cross-border smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s – worldwide -<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to be organized al<strong>on</strong>g ethnic l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is no excepti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this regard.<br />
52
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
For years, as shown above, the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun villages.<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
bazaars where the farmers sold their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, were usually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the midst of Pashtun settlements. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g centres<br />
were located around Kandahar for southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and around Jalalabad for eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. A large<br />
Pashtun populati<strong>on</strong> is also found across most of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s eastern border with Pakistan, facilitat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g crossborder<br />
smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g advantage of difficulties faced by Pakistan to effectively c<strong>on</strong>trol their tribal border regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> immediate dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s for opiates trafficked from Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce are Peshawar<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. For traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities from Kandahar the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> immediate dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> is usually Quetta, the capital<br />
of Pakistan’s prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Baluchistan. Cross border traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Pakistan and Iran was<br />
facilitated for years by the existence of Baluchi tribes <strong>on</strong> all sides of the border. Further to the west, Kurdish<br />
groups, located <strong>on</strong> both sides of the border between Iran and Turkey facilitated cross-border traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to Turkey.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> existence of important Turkish/Kurdish m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several West European countries, (e.g. Germany)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased the possibilities to c<strong>on</strong>ceal traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> legal bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess operati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In the 1990s, traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g routes became <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly diversified and a larger number of ethnic groups<br />
participated. Improved border c<strong>on</strong>trol between Pakistan and Iran resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g smuggled from<br />
Pakistan to Europe by air or <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>er, often organized by Pakistani groups liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe (e.g. UK). In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly smuggled directly across the border from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
Iran. With regard to traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between Turkey and Europe a number of other ethnic groups, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g various<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Albanian groups from Albania, Kosovo and Maced<strong>on</strong>ia, ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed important market share <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years,<br />
partly at the expense of Turkish groups which previously dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated this market.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, as of the mid-1990s Central Asia emerged as another important outlet of opiates produced<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Initially Turkmenistan emerged as a transit z<strong>on</strong>e (around 1997), for both shipments to Iran and<br />
shipments to the Caucasus regi<strong>on</strong> for dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkey and western Europe. Subsequently, the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transit<br />
route via Central Asia shifted to the north, to Tajikistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia<br />
the fact that northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> importance as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> site <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d<br />
half of the 1990s. Mostly Tajik and, to a lesser extent, Uzbek villages have been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In additi<strong>on</strong>, as shown above, Tajik villages produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sizeable quantities of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are also found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, thus enabl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a flow of opiates from these areas to<br />
northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to supplement local producti<strong>on</strong>. Moreover, northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> also became an important<br />
locati<strong>on</strong> for stocks of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated by a number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>telligence reports. Price patterns po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this directi<strong>on</strong>. In 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices were temporarily lower <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>s between Badakshan and<br />
Tajikistan than the average prices which farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other parts of Badakshan could obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> for sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their fresh<br />
53
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This can be <strong>on</strong>ly expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by the existence of important stocks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>. In 2001, as<br />
discussed before, Tajik villages emerged as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producers of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the existence<br />
of ethnic Tajiks <strong>on</strong> both sides of the border facilitated cross-border smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s. Once <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan,<br />
opiates are usually trafficked <strong>on</strong> to other central Asian countries as well as to several towns of the Russian<br />
Federati<strong>on</strong> and other C.I.S. countries, often by rail and often organized by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Tajik groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan or<br />
other C.I.S.countries. j<br />
In short, the ethnic diversity of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been a str<strong>on</strong>g enabl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g factor for the expansi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
muggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of all k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> is exacerbated by the fact that many of the<br />
ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic tribes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and the local opiate trade are also found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> basically all of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries. This means that most of the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s opiate exports,<br />
are still <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tra-ethnic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> nature, thus limit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the overall risks of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
1.6. Opium markets and bazaars<br />
Given their de-facto legal status over the last two decades, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> operated like<br />
any other commodity market. Even dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban ban which was <strong>on</strong> cultivati<strong>on</strong>, trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was not<br />
restricted. Opium was sold by farmers to local traders and/or to shop-keepers at the closest bazaar. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se<br />
traders and shop-keepers, also granted credit, and thus fulfilled the role of f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. Large-scale<br />
traders, supply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, or morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stallati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the regi<strong>on</strong>, turned to the bazaars to buy the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets appear to have been rather fragmented. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lack of an adequate transport<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure, due to the destructi<strong>on</strong> of twenty years of war, and the high costs and risks with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
terms of shipments be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g stolen, ransomed or associated with high transit tolls) also meant that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets<br />
developed quite apart from <strong>on</strong>e another. Opium markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were oriented towards Iran and<br />
southern Pakistan (Baluchistan); those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were oriented towards northern Pakistan (North-<br />
West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce), and those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were oriented towards Central Asia, notably<br />
Tajikistan. Even though the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ner-Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years after some of the obstacles for<br />
trade were removed, many of the orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al trade l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks and orientati<strong>on</strong>s of these markets rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tact, so that<br />
it is still not possible to speak of <strong>on</strong>e unified Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were also specific characteristics which dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>guished <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south.<br />
While the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east was rather c<strong>on</strong>centrated, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south was atomistic and<br />
thus highly competitive. This will be discussed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more detailed below.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade is rendered complex by the different qualities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> that are traded. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y are<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>ally different and are thus not fully comparable with <strong>on</strong>e another.<br />
First , there is the difference between wet and dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is, <strong>on</strong> average, some 20-30%<br />
cheaper than dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (based <strong>on</strong> 1998-2001 data), but the actual price differential <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> different locati<strong>on</strong>s can<br />
deviate substantially from this average. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem is that ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ are not always def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same<br />
manner and/or that the actual differences between ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ differ from locati<strong>on</strong> to locati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y depend,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia <strong>on</strong> whether <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is grown <strong>on</strong> irrigated or <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fed land. Opium grown <strong>on</strong> irrigated land tends to have<br />
a higher water c<strong>on</strong>tent than ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fed <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This means that the weight loss between wet and dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is<br />
substantially larger for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> grown <strong>on</strong> irrigated land. Thus, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000, the price difference between dry<br />
and wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Badakshan, which has a high proporti<strong>on</strong> of ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fed cultivati<strong>on</strong>, was substantially<br />
less than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar where virtually all of poppy is grown <strong>on</strong> irrigated land.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, there are different qualities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In Nangarhar, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, there is ‘sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>’, ‘barani’ and<br />
‘sur’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and barani <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are c<strong>on</strong>sidered poor quality, affected by excess ground water (sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) or ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fall<br />
dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g its collecti<strong>on</strong> (barani). ‘Sur’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which has a dark red or brown colour, is regarded to be of high quality<br />
and fetches a price that is twice the price of sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> or barani <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, other qualities are<br />
traded. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is tor (black), sur (red) and jar (yellow) <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> best quality <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is not sur<br />
but tor <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>; the lowest quality is jar. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the highest quality fetches a price that is about twice the price of<br />
the lowest quality. 32<br />
j<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> discussi<strong>on</strong> above is based <strong>on</strong> the reports, which UNDCP receives regularly from members states <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> resp<strong>on</strong>se to UNDCP’s Annual<br />
Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire, as well as from various law enforcement bodies, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Interpol and the World Customs Organizati<strong>on</strong>, and several<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al law enforcement <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe.<br />
54
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Adulterants are often added to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> by both cultivators and traders. This may expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rather low<br />
amounts of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e extracted from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seized by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Islamic Republic of Iran: around 5%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s and 6% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, compared to an average morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 9% at the global level and 10%<br />
reported by developed countries to INCB, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g licitly produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 33 Adulterants of wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude black tea, diamm<strong>on</strong>ium phosphate and sugar boiled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> water; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> locally produced<br />
black sugar, known as gur, rais<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s and rice flour are often added to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the value to weight ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> 34 .<br />
In c<strong>on</strong>trast to other commodities, shifts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> demand are less of a problem. Demand for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g steadily over the last two decades. This was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially fuelled by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g demand for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> western<br />
Europe. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the 1990s, demand for Afghan opiates has been fuelled by grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries al<strong>on</strong>g<br />
the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug transit routes to western Europe, i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially Pakistan, followed by Iran and several East European<br />
countries located al<strong>on</strong>g the Balkan route, and as of the mid 1990s, by the rapid growth of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia and the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>. Short-term price changes, which could be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to the demand for<br />
Afghan opiates, occurred when traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g networks or laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> were dismantled, thus creat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
a temporary glut <strong>on</strong> the Afghan market(s), More important still were large-scale purchases by traders, result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> temporary price hikes.<br />
Most of the price changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years appear to have been supply-determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market<br />
acted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this regard like any other commodity market. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased, prices fell, while prices rose<br />
when producti<strong>on</strong> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. Thus, the 1999 bumper harvest led to str<strong>on</strong>g decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Taliban<br />
ban resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a massive reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>g price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. A temporary price<br />
hike was also reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 at the time of the eradicati<strong>on</strong> campaign. It is also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that prices<br />
– like for other commodities - acted as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for peasants. Thus the first record harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1994 resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prices which, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn, appear to have prompted peasants to grow less <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995. Similarly the rather high<br />
prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 prompted many peasants to expand <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> to an all-time high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
Like <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many other markets, percepti<strong>on</strong>s and expectati<strong>on</strong>s of traders play a role as well, sometimes<br />
lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to exaggerated market reacti<strong>on</strong>s to rumours. Thus, some of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial fears of a very poor <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 due to excessive ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time, did not fully materialize <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the end. Still, the market reacted as<br />
if these fears reflected reality.<br />
Stocks also played a role, usually smooth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the market over a <strong>on</strong>e-year cycle. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> bumper harvest of<br />
1999 and the still above average harvest of 2000 facilitated an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the amounts of stocks at hand and<br />
thus enabled a steady supply of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, despite the ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks,<br />
however, had an opposite effect <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>text of the September 11 events. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y led to a temporary glut <strong>on</strong> the<br />
market and thus to a massive short-term fall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices.<br />
Research undertaken by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s showed that with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the broad picture<br />
outl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed above, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were still quite different from <strong>on</strong>e another. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> operati<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the two ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> areas at the time, were<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated, and the results are summarized below.<br />
Opium markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were found to be largely decentralized, basically operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g like<br />
any other commodity market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In ec<strong>on</strong>omic terms, competiti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> could be<br />
characterized as be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g atomistic. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were a number of bazaars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> where <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> could be sold and<br />
where <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was purchased by Afghan traders as well as by traders from Pakistan, Iran and, less frequently,<br />
by traders from the Central Asian Republics. Each of these bazaars had a number of shops specialized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. In additi<strong>on</strong>, dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time, other shops, which usually traded other goods, diversified to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude<br />
small-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest bazaars at the time were found to be <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, with around 200 shops<br />
sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, followed by Musa Qala. Smaller district bazaars, such as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kajaki, Nowzad, or Maiwand,<br />
where traders from Iran and Pakistan regularly came to purchase <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, also played a role. Opium trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was reported to be competitive at all levels, but not aggressive. As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices were found to vary little from district to district. In 1998 the typical farmgate price across the southern<br />
regi<strong>on</strong> for the highest quality <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> varied by just 3%. Another c<strong>on</strong>sequence of competiti<strong>on</strong> is that profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s<br />
are small. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> majority of traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south claimed that they earned <strong>on</strong>ly $1.2 to $3.2 per kg <strong>on</strong><br />
the buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> post-harvest. This was equivalent to a mark-up rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from 3%-7% based<br />
<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from $32 at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May to $63 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> August 1998 35 , and thus an ‘average’ price<br />
of around $48. Prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south also tended to follow the agricultural cycle, with relatively high prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths prior to harvest (January/February) when stocks beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to deplete, followed by low prices at harvest time<br />
(April/May) and price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent m<strong>on</strong>ths.<br />
55
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall price level, of course, is affected by additi<strong>on</strong>al factors. For example, excess ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 at<br />
the harvest time caused crop damage, and meant that overall yields were some 20% less than expected. This<br />
boosted prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn prompted farmers to cultivate substantially more <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
In eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market was far more c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>e locati<strong>on</strong>, the<br />
bazaar of Ghani Khel <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war district of Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce. Though some other district bazaars existed as<br />
well, Ghani Khel was generally regarded as the centre of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Ghani Khel was<br />
not <strong>on</strong>ly a market for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> but also for acetic anhydride, the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> precursor chemical for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture,<br />
as well as for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (and hashish). In the late 1990s it c<strong>on</strong>sisted of about forty shopkeepers specialized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. By the first quarter of 2002, the number of shopkeepers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani Khel was reported to have<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to about fifty. (<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> market, however, was closed by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April 2002.)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall market structure of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was thus less atomistic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
nature than southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, though the ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g number of participants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the market suggests that it has<br />
started to loose its <strong>on</strong>ce rather oligopolistic structure. Indeed, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the past were significantly higher<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bazaars of Ghani Khel (more than 50%, <strong>on</strong> average, over the 1998-2000 period) than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> quality may expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some, but not all of the differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices. Moreover, price<br />
differences between the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets of eastern and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> became less significant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent<br />
years, with the spread fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to 16% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and just 10% over the first two quarters of 2002.<br />
Price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg<br />
Prices of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar (Ghani Khel) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg<br />
Figure 22 compared to prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar (1997-2000)<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Study #2, Oct. 1998.<br />
160<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00<br />
Nangarhar Kandahar<br />
Figure 22<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
56
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Ghani Khel ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed its reputati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia, from the fact that even large quantities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (often up<br />
to 10 t<strong>on</strong>s) could be purchased there dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle visit, which made this bazaar attractive for many large<br />
traders who supply morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e-base and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong> of Pakistan. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, such<br />
purchases had a temporary impact <strong>on</strong> prices. Thus prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani Khel used to fluctuate far more than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, offered bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess opportunities for small-scale traders, buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
directly from farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts or prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces and then sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani Khel. Interviews with smallscale<br />
traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 revealed that such temporary operati<strong>on</strong>s usually resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> mark-ups of between $3 and<br />
$9 per kg, 36 i.e. between 9% and 26% based <strong>on</strong> prevail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farm-gate prices at the time. Subsequently, however,<br />
many of the smaller bazaars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> started to act as tributaries, channell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g local purchases of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
directly to Ghani Khel.<br />
Prices of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg<br />
compared to prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar (1999-2002)<br />
700<br />
Price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
Nangarhar<br />
Kandahar<br />
average<br />
398<br />
350<br />
100<br />
0<br />
Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02<br />
Jan- Feb- Apr- May-<br />
Jul-99<br />
Aug- Sep- Nov- Dec- Feb- Mar- May- Jun-<br />
Jul-00<br />
Sep- Oct- Dec- Jan- Feb- Apr- May-<br />
Jul-01<br />
Aug- 10- 24-<br />
99 99 99 99<br />
99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00<br />
00 00 00 01 01 01 01<br />
01 Sep Sep<br />
10-<br />
Oct<br />
28-<br />
Oct<br />
01- 05- 15- Jan- Mar- 14-<br />
Nov Nov Dec 02 02 Apr<br />
07- May- 20- Jun- 15-<br />
Jul-02<br />
May 02 May 02<br />
Aug<br />
Figure 23<br />
Source: UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Nangarhar 116 100 80 91 82 62 61 38 39 43 46 42 38 44 76 124 159 173 214 383 398 424 657 700 95 134 210 327 330 316 423 416 583 381 444.3 444.3 513.7 380 398<br />
0<br />
Kandahar 59 60 45 43 37 39 36 31 32 30 29 30 31 35 43 70 101 128 162 260 270 288 446 650 90 150 270 340 350 275 407 343 450 304 375.5 380 435.5 400 350<br />
average 87.25 80.15 62.49 66.76 59.49 50.60 48.53 34.28 35.39 36.68 37.50 36.26 34.50 39.29 59.50 97.08 130.0<br />
0<br />
150.4<br />
7<br />
188.0<br />
2<br />
321.5<br />
0<br />
333.8<br />
7<br />
356.1<br />
2<br />
551.5<br />
0<br />
675.0<br />
0<br />
92.50 142.1<br />
8<br />
240.0<br />
0<br />
333.5<br />
0<br />
340.0<br />
0<br />
295.5<br />
0<br />
415.0<br />
0<br />
379.2<br />
5<br />
516.5<br />
0<br />
342.5<br />
0<br />
409.9<br />
0<br />
412.1<br />
5<br />
474.6<br />
0<br />
390.0<br />
0<br />
374.0<br />
0<br />
Speculative/strategic purchases by large traders tended to play a more important role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Thus, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the lower than expected yields <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 prompted large traders<br />
buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani-Khel to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> speculative <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks, result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a doubl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of prices between July and<br />
December 1998 while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices rose by just 15% over the same period. Thus, as of<br />
December 1998, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani Khel were about 80% higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, creat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g very<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for farmers to expand their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 - which they also did. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s 1999 bumper harvest became known, prices dropped <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar between January 1999 and<br />
December 1999 by two thirds and rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed at these lower levels of around $40/kg until the announcement of<br />
the Taliban ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July 2000.<br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the announcement of the Taliban ban, prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased almost tenfold to some $380/kg until<br />
April 2001 and c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to close to $700 prior to September 11. In the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g two weeks, prices<br />
plummeted to $90/kg as stocks were quickly disposed of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> anticipati<strong>on</strong> of military operati<strong>on</strong>s. Over the next few<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths prices recovered, a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of lower levels of stocks as well as a reacti<strong>on</strong> to the Interim<br />
Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>’s decisi<strong>on</strong> to announce a new ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 2002, which pushed up<br />
prices from levels around $300/kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late December to $400/kg over the January to March period. With the<br />
eradicati<strong>on</strong> campaign <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April 2002 prices temporarily rose to close to $600/kg before fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, after harvest<br />
(and a period of str<strong>on</strong>g fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s), back to levels of around $400/kg by July, about the same level as a year<br />
earlier.<br />
No detailed and systematic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigati<strong>on</strong>s of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> have been<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducted so far. However, a number of price data collected by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faizabad (Badakshan)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mid and late 1990s showed that prices there were systematically higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern or southern<br />
57
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Farm-gates prices of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, systematically collected as a part of UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> surveys from 1994<br />
to 2001, c<strong>on</strong>firm that prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> norther <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> tend to be higher (see Tables 18 and 19). This, however, does<br />
not seem to be the result of less competitive markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, but rather the result of higher<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices paid to farmers. It may well be a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of Badakshan’s reputati<strong>on</strong> of produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g high quality<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, better than the qualities found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> basic orientati<strong>on</strong> of the market<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faizabad to the north, supply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the thriv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g markets of Central Asia and the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>, may have<br />
also played a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> keep<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices relatively high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan throughout the 1990s and the first years<br />
of the 21 st century.<br />
This pattern changed, however, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and Nangarhar, the two ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, exceeded those of Badakshan. This was a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of stocks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from previous years and a number of more or less speculative purchases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a year of near negligible harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the latter two regi<strong>on</strong>s. In c<strong>on</strong>trast to northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, many of the stocks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled areas of southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were moved<br />
to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries after September 11 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to avoid destructi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> air strikes. This created an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
supply shortage for clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories and prompted them to pay premium prices when the new harvest<br />
came <strong>on</strong> to the market. Eradicati<strong>on</strong> efforts by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> also c<strong>on</strong>tributed<br />
to price rises. Moreover, the abundant ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a high water c<strong>on</strong>tent of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
and thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a lower <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> quality, c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the lower prices.<br />
Table 18: Unweighted average price of fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> reported by farmers (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$), 1998-2002<br />
1998** 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 89 84 43 275 207<br />
Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 34 33 27 192 333***<br />
Helmand (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 25 25 22 n/a 385***<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (unweighted average of all<br />
villages report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g)<br />
40 40 29 236 284<br />
Calculati<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g average 37,000<br />
37,000<br />
63,000 73,000 75,000<br />
black-market exchange rates<br />
(70,000)<br />
Number of villages report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 1,275 3,038 3,341 636 98<br />
* unweighted average price of all villages report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
** Data for 1998 expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ based <strong>on</strong> an exchange rate of 37,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 70,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as reported to UNDCP; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years, the differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange rates appear to have become smaller and data were<br />
translated at a uniform exchange rate as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated above.<br />
***prices reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, Opium Poppy Surveys database<br />
Table 19: Unweighted average price* of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> reported by farmers (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$), 1988-2002<br />
1998** 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 100 97 50 347 257<br />
Nangarhar (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 62 68 42 336 397***<br />
Helmand (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) 36 30 25 260 423***<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 54 53 35 291 333<br />
Calculati<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g average blackmarket<br />
37,000 63,000 73,000 75,000 37,000<br />
exchange rates<br />
(70,000)<br />
Number of villages report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 4,063 4,948 5,981 8,367 159<br />
* unweighted average price of all villages report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
** Data for 1998 expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ based <strong>on</strong> an exchange rate of 37,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 70,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as reported to UNDCP; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years, the differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange rates appear to have become smaller and data were<br />
translated at a uniform exchange rate as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated above.<br />
***prices reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP, Opium Poppy Surveys database<br />
Price differences between the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces have, however, decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years. In statistical terms,<br />
the standard deviati<strong>on</strong> of prices across prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces divided by the average price, a simple measure for the spread<br />
of a variable, fell from 0.6 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 to 0.25 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.This suggests that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s many local <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets<br />
are <strong>on</strong> the way towards develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to <strong>on</strong>e s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market.<br />
58
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a complementary explanati<strong>on</strong> for the trends towards c<strong>on</strong>vergence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent<br />
years. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> high <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices of northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, apart from quality and demand arguments, also were<br />
related to the Afghan currencies used and the related exchange rates. In the calculati<strong>on</strong>s above, except for 1998,<br />
uniform exchange rates for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a whole have been applied. However, reports suggest that the black<br />
market exchange rates differed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s from prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce to prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, notably between northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
and the rest of the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> black market exchange rates were, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, significantly less favorable for<br />
northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> than for the Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled areas, k possibly a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the much higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from<br />
the ‘exports’ of opiates from Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled areas to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries l . After 1998 the black market<br />
exchange rates of Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled areas deteriorated as the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly lost the c<strong>on</strong>fidence of the<br />
outside world while the black-market exchange rates of territories under Northern Alliance c<strong>on</strong>trol, though<br />
fluctuat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, did not deteriorate further. m So the overall differences between the value of Taliban and Northern<br />
Alliance Afghani vis a vis the outside world eventually disappeared, which may also have c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>vergence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years.<br />
k <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is an official exchange rate of Afg3000 for 1 US-$. However, drug operators cannot rely <strong>on</strong> the official exchange rate, which is hardly<br />
used at all for bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess transacti<strong>on</strong>s. When the Taliban seized Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1996 they began organiz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their own currency. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> result was two<br />
sets of Afghani, the northern and the Kabul <strong>on</strong>e which had different black-market exchange rates. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul Afghani turned out to be the<br />
str<strong>on</strong>ger currency (EIU Country Profile <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, p. 64).<br />
l<br />
UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices also collected exchange rate data. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y reported that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May 1998 the average black-market exchange<br />
rates were almost identical <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar and Jalalabad (Afg33,443 and Afg35,000 for US$1, respectively), but twice as weak <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faizabad<br />
(Badakshan) (Afg70,000 for US$1). Similarly, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July 1998 the black-market exchange rates were Afg41,180 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar, 40,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Jalalabad<br />
but Afg79,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faizabad.<br />
m<br />
By December 2000, the northern Afghani traded at around Afg 72,000 while the Kabul Afghani fell to Afg79,500 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 2001 follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the implementati<strong>on</strong> of the UN sancti<strong>on</strong>s. (<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul Afghani had traded at around $73,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April 2000). It recovered slightly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ths to about Afg75,000 prior to September 11 2001. (EIU, Country Reports <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Feb. 2001-May 2002 and EIU <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Country Profile 2000 and 2001)<br />
59
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
UNDCP survey data also show that while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the past a number of local price trends co-existed, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the fragmentati<strong>on</strong> of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets, the 1999 bumper harvest led to an almost universal decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000 while the poppy ban led to a general <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> those prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces and<br />
districts that were not affected by the ban. (See map 15) <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
where the poppy ban was most effectively implemented (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces<br />
the price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases were smallest.<br />
In 2002 overall prices c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, but the pattern – as discussed above - was less uniform. Prices<br />
rose significantly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south (Helmand and Kandahar) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east (Nangarhar). But <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most parts of northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> they showed a trend towards stabilizati<strong>on</strong> (Baghlan, Kunduz, Samagan and Sari Pul) or decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
(Badakshan, Jawzjan, Balkh).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were also some regi<strong>on</strong>al particularities. Rather high prices, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, were reported from the<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Badghis, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan (north-western <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y were due to good<br />
access to markets abroad (3 important <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets exist al<strong>on</strong>g the border with Turkmenistan) and the fact<br />
that middlemen or traders were often not needed as farmers themselves and were therefore able to take their<br />
produce to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan where <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, were higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan or<br />
Pakistan. Low prices, <strong>on</strong> the other hand, were reported from Balkh prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Uzbekistan and from the<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Jawzjan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan. Farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces suffered from poor market<br />
access as the Uzbekistan border was heavily patrolled, and a number of local markets were closed down by the<br />
authorities. Also, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast to Badghis prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, there seems to have been no access to the market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Turkmenistan. Thus, farmers reported that the bulk of their produce had to be shipped a l<strong>on</strong>g distance to the<br />
market centres of Takhar and Badakshan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan. 37 All of this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates that c<strong>on</strong>troll<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g borders can<br />
help <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> keep<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prices down, thus reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for farmers to expand <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
60
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
1.7. Income derived from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1.7.1. Income from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come derived from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> can be calculated by multiply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> by<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farm-gate price. As part of its <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy surveys, which usually took place just a few weeks before<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest, UNDCP has regularly collected <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farm-gate prices across the country. Prices at this time<br />
of the year are usually low as traders try to sell the previous year’s stocks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to have sufficient room for the<br />
forthcom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest. Calculati<strong>on</strong>s, based <strong>on</strong> these prices, reveal that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, the year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s bumper<br />
harvest, the potential <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for Afghan farmers from the sale of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to US $183 milli<strong>on</strong> 38 . In 2000,<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come amounted to $91 milli<strong>on</strong> 39 and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come – despite a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> by more than<br />
90% - still amounted to $56 milli<strong>on</strong>, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a more than tenfold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices between 2000 and<br />
2001 40 as a result of the poppy ban. In c<strong>on</strong>trast to previous years, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 was c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, suffered a severe reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come.<br />
Except for the year 2001, the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come calculati<strong>on</strong>s are c<strong>on</strong>servative estimates, represent<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the lower<br />
limit for farmers’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y assume that all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced is sold immediately to traders at the harvest time<br />
when prices are usually at their lowest levels. This is, of course, not always the case. Most farmers tend to stock<br />
some of their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and sell it gradually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent m<strong>on</strong>ths. In the case of a bumper harvest, such as 1999,<br />
the calculated figures are probably an over-estimate. Not all <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is sold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> such a year. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> surplus is saved<br />
and sold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background, the calculati<strong>on</strong> of an average annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come figure is<br />
probably more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formative than any s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle year estimate. Over the 1994-2000 period, such average annual<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> amounted to US$ 95 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, or $475 per farmer based <strong>on</strong> an<br />
UNDCP estimate of around 200,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country n .<br />
n<br />
This estimate was first published <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 1997, p. 12. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey found the<br />
average size of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> field to be around 0.3 hectares. Given a total area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> of 74,000 hectares, there could have been some<br />
247,000 farmers if <strong>on</strong>e assumed that each farmer had <strong>on</strong>e field. But there is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> that some of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers have<br />
more than <strong>on</strong>e field. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background an estimate of 200,000 farmers still seems to be reas<strong>on</strong>able.<br />
61
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Alternatively, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the average annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices reported from the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> bazaars o , the average<br />
annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come could have been almost twice as high, reach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g almost US$ 180 milli<strong>on</strong> per annum over the 1994-<br />
2000 period. This estimate has to be seen as an upper limit for farmers’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. A majority of farmers, notably<br />
dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g years of below average harvests, do not have sufficient f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial resources to wait until <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease prior to the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g year’s harvest. Indeed, many farmers are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debted and have to make use of<br />
salaam, i.e. advance payments from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st later delivery of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which usually reduces their<br />
potential <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> sale by about half. 41 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> actual amounts given as advance payments, however,<br />
usually do not exceed 5% of the overall annual sales of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders. 42 N<strong>on</strong>etheless, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, almost 60%<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders, as revealed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews, provided such cash advances to farmers and more than 70% of<br />
farmers appear to have made use of this and other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit systems <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. 43 All of this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates that<br />
an average annual price is probably higher than the price at which farmers actually sell their harvest.<br />
Even if the $180 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a. menti<strong>on</strong>ed above is probably an over-estimate for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> related <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
of farmers, it still reflects the overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the local <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas. It<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of the farmers as well as the profits made by the local shop-keepers who sell the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average gross profit (mark-up) of local shop-keepers (exclud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from<br />
salaam) was found to be between $3 and $9 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. Extrapolated to the country as a whole<br />
this could have meant profits of $8 to $24 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 or $9 to $27 milli<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong> average, over the 1994-2000<br />
period. If <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from salaam ($22 to $55 per kg), which is received <strong>on</strong> 5% of the total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> sales,<br />
total profits of the shop-keepers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bazaars could have amounted to between $11 and $32 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998<br />
or to between $13 and $36 milli<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong> average, over the 1994-2000 period. This would have left farmers with,<br />
<strong>on</strong> average, some $150 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a over the 1994-2000 period, or $750 per farmer 44 (gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
out of which the farmer had still to buy seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, hire labour etc.). Given an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
of around $1 per day or $360 per year, an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy farmer could expect a gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come that was about twice<br />
the nati<strong>on</strong>al average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of unskilled labour.<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> and estimated value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
236<br />
102<br />
152<br />
112<br />
54 54<br />
199<br />
175<br />
95 88<br />
251<br />
183<br />
128<br />
91<br />
56<br />
56<br />
179<br />
150<br />
0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Avg<br />
1994-<br />
2000<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong><br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> annual prices (maximum)<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at harvest time (m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum)<br />
Series2<br />
95<br />
5000<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Figure 24<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, Annual Opium Poppy Survey, 1994-2000 and UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
o In order to calculate the average annual price, all prices reported from various bazaars across <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were used. As the number<br />
of bazaars, from which the prices were obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed differed between the years, result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g average price data have to be treated with cauti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Some of the changes between the years may reflect changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the specific locati<strong>on</strong>s from which the prices were collected. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this<br />
background, the average price over several years may be a better <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicator than the average price of a specific year.<br />
62
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Asian Development Bank’s GDP estimate of $6.9 billi<strong>on</strong> for the late 1990s ($300 per capita and<br />
assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a populati<strong>on</strong> of 23 milli<strong>on</strong>) 45 as a proxy for the country’s GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
farmers would have been equivalent to about 2% of GDP. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g UNDP’s estimate of a per capita GDP of $250<br />
and a more c<strong>on</strong>servative estimate of 21 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP would have amounted to $5.3<br />
billi<strong>on</strong> (see Chapter 1.1.) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers’ gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come would have been equivalent to about 3% of GDP.<br />
Table 20: Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Average<br />
1994-<br />
2000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s 3,416 2,335 2,248 2,804 2,693 4,565 3,276 185 3,048<br />
Farmgate price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per<br />
kg at harvest time<br />
30.0 23 24 33.7 32.8 40.1 27.8 301.0 30<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
milli<strong>on</strong> US-$ at harvest time<br />
102 54 54 95 88 183 91 56 95<br />
Average annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg reported 69 65 50 71 65 55 39 301 59<br />
from ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> bazaars<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
(maximum) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
236 152 112 199 175 251 128 56 179<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, Annual Opium Poppy Survey, 1994-2001 and UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
This <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come structure changed dramatically <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Opium prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased about ten-fold between the<br />
year 2000 and 2002. Given a producti<strong>on</strong> of 3,422 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price (weighted by<br />
producti<strong>on</strong>) of $350 per kilogram, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of Afghan farmers could have amounted to $1.2 billi<strong>on</strong> or, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, $6000 per farmer. Even allow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for a possible <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of unskilled labour to<br />
about $1.4 per day or $500 per year, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers’ average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come would have been equivalent to about<br />
12 times the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of unskilled labour. This created a very str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive for farmers to c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue<br />
cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Asian Development Bank’s GDP estimate of $6.9 billi<strong>on</strong> for the late 1990s<br />
($300 per capita) as a proxy for the country’s GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers could have been<br />
equivalent to 17% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP or 33% of the value-added of the (legal) agricultural sector.<br />
Estimated value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1994-2002<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
1,200<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
-<br />
236<br />
152<br />
112<br />
1,2 0 0<br />
251<br />
19 9<br />
175<br />
12 8<br />
56<br />
102 54 54 95 88 183 91<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> annual prices (maximum)<br />
Value of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at harvest time (m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum)<br />
56<br />
Figure 25<br />
Sources: UNDCP/ICMP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 and previous years, and UNODC<br />
Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
63
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Given the highly skewed distributi<strong>on</strong> of land-hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, it is clear, however, that an average<br />
gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $6000 does not provide much <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> what a ‘typical’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmer actually earned. As<br />
most farmers have below average land-hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs, they also have below average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g producti<strong>on</strong>weighted<br />
prices skews the nati<strong>on</strong>al average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> areas – Helmand and<br />
Nangarhar. In other parts of the country, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers actually earned less.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> $1.2 billi<strong>on</strong> calculated as gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for 2002 is a hypothetical figure because it assumes that all of<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was sold at the prices of July/August. This was not the case. In <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s devastated <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> form of sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas of the country; farmers stock it and <strong>on</strong>ly sell it as<br />
and when they need to (see Chapter IV below). Given the high prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 and the announcement of the<br />
Government to implement a ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> more vigorously <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2003, it can be assumed that<br />
farmers sold less of their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> immediately. This may also expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rather surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g results that despite a<br />
good harvest, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices did not fall but rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed high. p In other words, it can be assumed that most of the<br />
‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come’ of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d (i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>) but not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cash.<br />
1.7.2. Income from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next issue refers to the amount of m<strong>on</strong>ey generated from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by Afghan groups. This calculati<strong>on</strong><br />
is rather complex. It requires :<br />
(i) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the extent of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of Afghan groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
(ii) estimates of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and<br />
(iii) estimates of the amounts shipped to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
It should be noted, at the outset, that the dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant role played by Afghan opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern<br />
Africa, the countries of the Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe is not reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> data <strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of Afghan<br />
groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s. q Large-scale traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>als is usually limited to the<br />
country’s immediate neighbours.<br />
In Iran, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, 3,768 Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>als were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> pris<strong>on</strong> for drug-related crimes as of December 2000,<br />
account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for 5% of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>mates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iranian pris<strong>on</strong>s for drug-related crimes (80,415), or 94% of all foreign <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>mates<br />
(3,988) for such crimes 46 . Go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g further to the west, the number of Afghan traffickers identified by the Turkish<br />
authorities amounted to 27 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, equivalent to less than 1% of all people arrested for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
activities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000 or 14% of foreign nati<strong>on</strong>als arrested for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 47 . Interpol studies<br />
have repeatedly shown that hardly any Afghans were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the EU and EFTA<br />
countries. This trade appears to be dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated by Turkish groups (often ethnic Kurds) and by Albanians and<br />
Yugoslavs (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ethnic Albanians). 48 Similarly, Afghans are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates to Tajikistan.<br />
However, hardly any reports exist that would suggest that the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <strong>on</strong>ce arrived <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, would be<br />
trafficked by Afghan groups to other Central Asian countries or the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In short, Afghan groups, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, do not appear to participate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> lucrative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of Afghan groups/<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals is basically limited to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, the trade<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the transformati<strong>on</strong> of some of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and to some<br />
extent, the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of opiates (<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan,<br />
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)<br />
If <strong>on</strong>e analyses the opiates seizures of neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia), as a proxy<br />
for the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g capacities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, it can be seen that over the 1994-99 period,<br />
<strong>on</strong> average, 42% of the seizures were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents) r , 37% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form<br />
of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and 21% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1999, however, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures have been <strong>on</strong> the rise,<br />
reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Over the 2000-2001 period hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures<br />
accounted for 38% of all opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures accounted for 31 % each.<br />
p<br />
At the time of writ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (December 2002), there is evidence that prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar and Kandahar c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and were at levels of<br />
around $450 per kilogram. This is apparently happen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g because traders are stockpil<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> anticipati<strong>on</strong> of str<strong>on</strong>ger enforcement<br />
measures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the next grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seas<strong>on</strong>.<br />
q<br />
This is c<strong>on</strong>firmed by hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g analysts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Interpol.<br />
r <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> usual 10:1 transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio was applied for these calculati<strong>on</strong>s. However, given a higher morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
other countries and the existence of recipes which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate a 7:1 or a 6:1 transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio, <strong>on</strong>e cannot exclude the possibility that, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, less than 10 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are needed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to produce <strong>on</strong>e kilogram of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e or hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
64
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the pattern of opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia)<br />
100%<br />
80%<br />
40%<br />
50% 49%<br />
38% 36%<br />
40%<br />
33%<br />
29%<br />
60%<br />
28%<br />
35%<br />
40%<br />
38%<br />
23%<br />
31%<br />
40%<br />
48% 39%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
44%<br />
32%<br />
27%<br />
22%<br />
20% 22%<br />
21%<br />
16%<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents)<br />
Figure 26<br />
Note: a transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio of 10:1 was used to transform <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents, and a<br />
ratio of 1:1 was used to transform morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents.<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next issue c<strong>on</strong>cerns the identificati<strong>on</strong> of the countries which serve as immediate dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s of the<br />
opiates trafficked from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, seizure statistics can shed some light <strong>on</strong> these traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns.<br />
As far as <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is c<strong>on</strong>cerned, the answer is clear. About 90% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures have regularly taken place<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, followed by Pakistan. This suggests that the bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which was not further<br />
processed, is trafficked out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Iran. One key questi<strong>on</strong>, n<strong>on</strong>etheless, is whether seizures are an<br />
accurate reflecti<strong>on</strong> of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>. Given very str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement efforts by the Iranian<br />
authorities, there is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>deed a certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> systematic bias <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of Iran, lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to a possible over-representati<strong>on</strong><br />
of the importance of Iran as an outlet of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Also, some of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
is actually trafficked via Pakistan to Iran. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran – reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement efforts - tend<br />
to be higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan or Tajikistan, the over-representati<strong>on</strong> means that the calculated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for Afghan<br />
groups from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g is probably an over-estimate.<br />
65
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Seizures of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Iran (Islamic Republic of) Pakistan Tajikistan<br />
Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Figure 27<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and previous years.<br />
In the case of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base, traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> is also dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated by Iran. Close to 100% of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
base <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, has been seized by the Iranian authorities. This, however, may be an overestimate.<br />
Authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their reply to UNDCP’s Annual Report Questi<strong>on</strong>naire did not dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>guish<br />
between hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures (until 2001). But, based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizure cases, reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 by<br />
Interpol, the World Customs Organizati<strong>on</strong> and seizures cases that became known to UNDCP, <strong>on</strong>e can assume<br />
that about 40% of ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan may actually be morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures. Comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g reported morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
seizures from Iran and the estimated morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures from Pakistan, 15% of the overall morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 were accounted for by seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and 85% by Iran. s<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Pakistan Iran (Islamic Republic of) Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan<br />
Figure 28<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and previous years.<br />
With regard to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures, the situati<strong>on</strong> is even more complex. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to official statistics, the largest<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures over the 1994-2001 period took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir share <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>al seizures fell from levels<br />
around 85% over the 1994-96 period, to 40% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, before recover<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to around 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 2001.<br />
However, <strong>on</strong>e has to take <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account that morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures reported by the<br />
Pakistani authorities. For the year 2000, as menti<strong>on</strong>ed above, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizure data suggest that about 60% of<br />
s Pakistan seized 9492 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000; 40% of this amount is equivalent to 3,797 kg of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. Iran’s morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures<br />
amounted to 20,764 kg. Together morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures of the two countries amounted to 24,561 kg. Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures of other countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the regi<strong>on</strong> were negligible. Thus Pakistan’s morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> accounted for 15% and Iran’s morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures for 85%. (Source:<br />
UNDCP, 2002 Global Illicit Drug Trends, p. 23.).<br />
66
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
the reported ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ seizures may actually have been true hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures; this would reduce the Pakistan share<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> regi<strong>on</strong>al hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures from 50% to 38% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the shares of the other countries<br />
accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> share of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran – disregard<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan’s likely over-representati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these data<br />
- rose from around 15% over the 1994-96 period to almost half <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 before fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g back to about a quarter <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000/2001. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> share of the Central Asian<br />
countries’ seizures rose from less than 1% over the 1994-96 period to close to 30% of regi<strong>on</strong>al hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures<br />
by the year 2001, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased use of the northern route via Tajikistan as well as improvements <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
c<strong>on</strong>troll<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g borders with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Given such <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong>, wholesale prices reported from neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that the<br />
distributi<strong>on</strong> of seizures basically reflects underly<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns, a tentative estimate for the overall Afghan<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the year 2000 can be calculated (see table 21).<br />
This estimate suggests that Afghan traffickers, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the manufacturers of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, may<br />
have earned some $850 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000 by shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan opiates (from the 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest) to<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries. Deduct<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some $130 milli<strong>on</strong>, which the traffickers had to pay for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
bazaars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, their overall profits were still substantial (close to $720 milli<strong>on</strong>). t<br />
Table 21: Estimate of gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan opiates to<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
Opium Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> TOTAL<br />
Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> 3,276<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> 33% 35% 32%<br />
Available for sale* <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s 1,081 115 105*<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % (based <strong>on</strong><br />
seizure patterns)<br />
Iran 90.2% 85% 40.9%<br />
Pakistan 4.5% 15% 37.7%<br />
Tajikistan 2.4% - 12.5%<br />
Other Central Asia 2.9% - 9.0%<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of producti<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Iran 975 97 43<br />
Pakistan 49 17 40<br />
Tajikistan 26 - 13<br />
Other Central Asia 31 - 9<br />
Wholesale prices<br />
Iran $400 $ 1,600 $ 2,500<br />
Pakistan $110 $ 1,074 $ 1,445<br />
Tajikistan $170 - $ 1,575<br />
Other Central Asia $825 - $ 6,375<br />
Value (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$)** 425 175 245 845<br />
less cost of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (bought<br />
-128<br />
from bazaars) (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong><br />
US-$)<br />
Traffickers’ profits<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$)<br />
717<br />
* Calculati<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> availability: 3276 / 10 *32%; calculati<strong>on</strong> of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e availability: 3276 / 10 *35%<br />
** Calculati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> value: 975,000 kg *$400+ 49,000 kg *$110 +26,000kg *$170+31,000kg *$825 = $425<br />
milli<strong>on</strong><br />
Sources: UNDCP, DELTA and UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
t<br />
If traffickers had bought the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> directly from the farmers they could have <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased their profits to $970 milli<strong>on</strong>.<br />
67
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> profits, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reality, could have been higher. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> profits calculated above for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g are c<strong>on</strong>servative estimates. Results suggest that out of 1 kilogram of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> a gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $394<br />
was generated while out of 1 kilogram of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (0.1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>), the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to $233. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se are paradoxical results. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that either the prices reported to UNDCP are<br />
biased <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of high <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and low hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices (which could be the case if the latter reflected hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at low<br />
purity levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) or that the usual 10:1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio<br />
is not appropriate for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>deed recipes that <strong>on</strong>ly require 7 kilograms of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
produce 1 kilogram of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and thus 1 kilogram of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 49 . Similarly, research from the early 1990s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan suggested that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to produce brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the usual ratio reported by clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratory<br />
operators was <strong>on</strong>ly 6 kilograms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for 1 kilogram hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 50 If the above table were re-calculated us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
7:1 ratio (and revis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all other ratios accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly), then total <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g would amount to $1,059<br />
milli<strong>on</strong>. Deduct<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the cost of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for traffickers ($128 milli<strong>on</strong>) the net profits would amount to $931 milli<strong>on</strong>. As<br />
will be discussed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Chapter V which covers the profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture, efficient laboratories produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at a purity level of around 60% u , could do this with even less <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts (theoretically with as little as<br />
4 kg). Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g such c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s, overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from opiate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries could well have exceeded $1 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 by a significant marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. (Profits of up to $1.7 billi<strong>on</strong> could<br />
have been theoretically possible).<br />
However, not all profits are made by Afghan traders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re have been reports of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of traders<br />
from Pakistan, Iran and of some of the Central Asian countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In general,<br />
they are of the same ethnic orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> as people liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (i.e. Pashtuns from Pakistan, Baluch from Iran<br />
or Pakistan, Tajiks from Tajikistan, etc.). Even more important, the average nati<strong>on</strong>al prices of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the calculati<strong>on</strong> above, tend to be higher than the prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their respective border<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. As l<strong>on</strong>g as Afghan traders are <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates across the border and<br />
not further, the overall profits for them may well be lower.<br />
In short, any reas<strong>on</strong>able estimate of profits from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> by Afghan traders,<br />
tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the various additi<strong>on</strong>al issues <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>, will probably turn out to be close to $1 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re could be a higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come due to a higher laboratory efficiency but Afghan traders are likely to be forced<br />
to share some of the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits with traffickers from neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
Such <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come is still small compared to the funds generated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>sumer markets of Western Europe.<br />
In the UK al<strong>on</strong>e expenditure <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s was estimated at 2.3 bn ($3.9bn) 51 . Extrapolat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these<br />
UK data to Western Europe as a whole - the UK accounts for about 20% of West Europe’s hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users - the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g expenditure figures for Western Europe could be around $20 billi<strong>on</strong> for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, 1 billi<strong>on</strong> is substantial by Afghan standards. UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its 1993 rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> plan, estimated<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP to have amounted to just $1.72 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1991/92. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this figure, the value-added of<br />
Afghan traders of $1 bn would have been equivalent to close to 60% of the country’s GDP. Alternatively, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
an estimate of the Asian Development Bank of $200 per <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant (estimate for the year 2001) and multiply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
this with a populati<strong>on</strong> estimate of 23 milli<strong>on</strong>, the country’s GDP would have been around $4.6 billi<strong>on</strong> and the<br />
value-added of Afghan traders would have been equivalent to about 22% of GDP. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the estimate published<br />
by UNDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its 1997 Human Development Report of $250 per <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant (based <strong>on</strong> official data for 1981) and<br />
multiply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this with the highest available populati<strong>on</strong> estimate for the country of 26 milli<strong>on</strong>, as provided by the<br />
World Bank, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP could have reached $6.5 bn. (This is the highest theoretically possible estimate<br />
of GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the year 2000). A value-added figure of around $1 billi<strong>on</strong> out of the opiates trade would<br />
then be equivalent to about 15% of the country’s GDP.<br />
Statistics reported by the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF) v show that average annual legal exports of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to just $136 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a. over the 1990-99 period. Compared to these data opiates exports<br />
were more than seven times larger. Legal imports amounted to, <strong>on</strong> average, $505 milli<strong>on</strong> over the 1990-99<br />
period, equivalent to about half of illegal opiates exports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se data also show that the (legal) trade<br />
deficit of $369 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a. <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s (result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from a level of imports three to four times greater than that of<br />
legal exports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s) could have been easily covered by receipts of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates.<br />
u<br />
For comparis<strong>on</strong>: average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity identified by the UK customs of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> arriv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via Pakistan to the UK was around 64% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000;<br />
average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity, as identified by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkey, was around 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, p.<br />
34.).<br />
v Data as reported from the 1980s to 1995 by the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF) and as of 1996 by the Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, based<br />
<strong>on</strong> import/export statistics of Afghan trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g partners report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their trade statistics to the IMF.<br />
68
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Table 22: Legal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al transacti<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-dollar<br />
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999<br />
Exports 552 512 395 236 235 286 91 180 24 26 128 144 139 111<br />
Imports 1,404 996 900 822 936 634 426 740 142 50 623 558 476 468<br />
Source: IMF, Internati<strong>on</strong>al F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial Statistics, various years.<br />
Another figure to put traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g receipts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to perspective is government expenditure. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s budget for 2002/03 (fiscal year beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g March 21), the government’s total expenditure is planned<br />
to amount to $460 milli<strong>on</strong>, out of which 20% is f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anced from domestic sources and the rest from from foreign<br />
assistance. Illegal opiates exports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 could have been twice this amount. 52<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from the opiates trade was still dwarfed by the funds generated out of the ‘transit<br />
trade’ with Pakistan. A World Bank Study estimated the c<strong>on</strong>traband trade of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> with Pakistan to have<br />
been worth $2.5 bn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1997 53 , i.e. 2½ times illegal opiates exports. (For more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the ‘transit trade’<br />
see Chapter V).<br />
It must be also highlighted that the bulk of the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come was not used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a productive way. This is<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of farmers who used it as a survival strategy. For many years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, this<br />
k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come went <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the coffers of warlords who ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly used it for fund<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their private militias, and for the<br />
purchase of weap<strong>on</strong>s that had to be imported. Thus the multiplier for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flow of external funds, which otherwise<br />
could be important to create ripple effects for ec<strong>on</strong>omic development, is extremely small. w <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come which is<br />
actually go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to be missed if <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> were to come to a halt is the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come which went to the farmers<br />
(some $150 milli<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong> average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s) or about 2% of GDP (based <strong>on</strong> an $6.5 bn estimate).<br />
In 2002, the funds generated from drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by Afghan traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased due to an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of opiate<br />
prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, which more than offset the higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Based <strong>on</strong><br />
the calculati<strong>on</strong>s shown below, Afghan traffickers earned some $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (2.5 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come less<br />
cost of 1.2 billi<strong>on</strong> for purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Traffickers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come was thus almost twice<br />
as much as for the year 2000 ($0.7 billi<strong>on</strong>).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> calculati<strong>on</strong> of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits for 2002 was based <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that Afghan traffickers purchased<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and sold the opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, either <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> or as hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Seizure patterns reported from neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries were used as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong> of the distributi<strong>on</strong> between<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sales and of where Afghan traders were sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their produce. As 2002 seizure data was not<br />
available at the time of writ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, seizures reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 were used as a proxy. Given the rather str<strong>on</strong>g similarity<br />
of opiate prices reported am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, the impact of possibly different trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
patterns for the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al 2002 results is almost negligible. Otherwise, more or less the same model was used for the<br />
2002 estimates as for the 2000 estimates.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, there are some particularities with regard to the 2002 results. While the estimate for the year<br />
2000 was likely to have been an under-estimate, and a more realistic estimate, as argued before, was probably<br />
around $1 billi<strong>on</strong>, the actual profits for 2002 are less likely to exceed the calculated figure of $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
same arguments for de-facto higher profits, as discussed for the 2000 estimate, would also be valid for the 2002<br />
estimate: the validity of a 10:1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ratio and possible reducti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity levels al<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cha<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits due to diluti<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are, however, two other factors that possibly offset<br />
such potential under-estimati<strong>on</strong>. No morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e prices for 2002 were available at the time of writ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this report. By<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sider<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e together it was assumed that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g generate the same<br />
profits which is not necessarily the case. x In additi<strong>on</strong>, the calculati<strong>on</strong> model assumes that whatever is produced<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a year also leaves the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same year, or put differently, it assumes that the overall level of stocks<br />
w<br />
In general, funds flow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a domestic <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> are amplified by the ‘multiplier’. Some of the funds received are usually spent aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, thus<br />
creat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the groups of society receiv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these funds. If farmers receive additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come (e.g. out of the sale of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
and spend it <strong>on</strong> goods and services, the providers of these goods and services obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, which they aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> will use to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
their spend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, and thus create aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, etc.. In each round of spend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g leakages exist, which will reduce the additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come that is generated. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ‘multiplier’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates by how much the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flow of funds creates additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the local <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall multiplier can be regarded as the outcome of a geometric row that can be simply calculated as 1 divided by the leakage. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
‘leakages’ are sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs and imports. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average multiplier (M) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, based <strong>on</strong> 1999 World Bank data (World Bank, 2001<br />
World Development Indicators), was 2.45, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs ratio of 20% (s) and an average import ratio of 26% (q) ( M = 1 /<br />
(1 - (1-s)*(1-q) = 1 / (1 – 0.8 * 0.74 = 2.45 ). In the case of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g funds go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to warlords, the import ratio <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases, however, str<strong>on</strong>gly<br />
as funds are used to purchase weap<strong>on</strong>s which usually have to be imported, thus leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hardly any funds available for the multiplier to work.<br />
x Income from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was assumed to be equivalent to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. If this method had been applied for<br />
the results of the year 2000, traffickers’ gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come would have been some $90 milli<strong>on</strong> or about 10% higher.<br />
69
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
of opiates rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed unchanged between the beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and the end of 2002. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that this<br />
assumpti<strong>on</strong> was more or less valid for the year 2000 but may not have been valid for 2002. Opium prices, despite<br />
a bumper harvest, did not fall but rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that not all of the harvest was sold<br />
immediately. However, for the time be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, there is no basis for mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g any reas<strong>on</strong>able assumpti<strong>on</strong> about the<br />
specific proporti<strong>on</strong> of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 that would have rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Whatever<br />
percentage assumed not to have left the country, reduces the estimates of traffickers’ profits proporti<strong>on</strong>ately.<br />
It can be thus argued that the various factors lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to an over-estimate and an under-estimate are likely<br />
to offset <strong>on</strong>e another, so that a figure of $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong> may, after all, be a reas<strong>on</strong>able estimate of the order of<br />
magnitude of Afghan traffickers’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. Compar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these estimates with the GDP estimates of the Asian<br />
Development Bank ($6.9 billi<strong>on</strong>, based <strong>on</strong> an estimate of $300 per capita), traffickers’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 may have<br />
been equivalent to about 19% of GDP.<br />
Table 23: Seizure patterns of countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (2001)<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 12,669 46.3% 81,061 83.9%<br />
Pakistan 9,492 34.7% 8,867 9.2%<br />
Central Asia, of which: 19.0% 6.9%<br />
Tajikistan 4,239 15.5% 3,664 3.8%<br />
Uzbekistan 467 1.7% 242 0.3%<br />
Kyrgyzstan 171 0.6% 469 0.5%<br />
Kazakhstan 137 0.5% 36 0.0%<br />
Turkmenistan* 200 0.7% 2,300 2.4%<br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries 27,374 100% 96,640 100%<br />
Breakdown, based <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
27,374 9,664<br />
equivalents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
Breakdown, based <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
equivalents<br />
74% 26%<br />
* Data for 2001 not available; data for 2000 used as a proxy.<br />
Table 24: Estimate of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan opiates to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Opium Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e TOTAL<br />
Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s 3,422<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> 26% 74%<br />
Available for sale* <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s 890 253<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % (based <strong>on</strong> 2001 seizure patterns)<br />
Iran 83.9% 46.3%<br />
Pakistan 9.2% 34.7%<br />
Tajikistan 3.8% 15.5%<br />
Other Central Asia 4.0% 3.5%<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> of producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Iran 746 117<br />
Pakistan 82 88<br />
Tajikistan 34 39<br />
Other Central Asia 36 9<br />
Wholesale prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Iran $1,690 $4,990<br />
Pakistan $590 $4,113<br />
Tajikistan $592 $4,541<br />
Other Central Asia* $825 $6,375<br />
70
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Table 24: Estimate of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan opiates to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Opium Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e TOTAL<br />
Value (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$)** $1,359 $1,181 $2,540<br />
less cost of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (bought from bazaars)<br />
-$1,200<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$)<br />
Traffickers’ profits (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$) $1,340<br />
* Data for 2000/2001<br />
** Calculati<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> availability: 3422 / 10 *26%.<br />
*** Calculati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> value: 746,000 kg *$1690+ 82,000 kg *$590 +34,000kg *$592+36,000kg *$825 = $425 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
1.8. Abuse<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al implicati<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
will be dealt with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> chapter VI of this book. This chapter will focus <strong>on</strong> the drug abuse situati<strong>on</strong> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re appears to have been very little opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the past. In the early 1970s Kabul<br />
became a centre for the use of hashish as well as opiates by young people and travelers from Western Europe<br />
and North America. But with the outbreak of the civil war, the foreign drug users disappeared. Local Afghans used<br />
hashish, but there was almost no abuse of opiates. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, little historical evidence of traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use am<strong>on</strong>g the Pashtuns, which form the major ethnic group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, though some traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> was reported from the Tajiks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan and the Turkomans. 54<br />
Afghan hashish has a reputati<strong>on</strong> of be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g very potent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of THC c<strong>on</strong>tent. Peer pressure to use<br />
hashish went so far that some Afghan drug users even reported that their Mujahideen commanders had actually<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troduced them to hashish use while fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the Soviets. 55<br />
Opium use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the past was largely c<strong>on</strong>f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to medical purposes, for compla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts such as diarrhoea, body<br />
pa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s, and respiratory problems. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al purposes for which <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is still used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude<br />
flu, cough, headache, chest problems, respiratory problems and body pa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for medical<br />
purposes often correlates with poor health <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure and poor access to modern medicati<strong>on</strong>, and is thus<br />
particularly widespread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural areas. If used for medical purposes, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is mostly eaten and several different<br />
paste-like <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> preparati<strong>on</strong>s are available from local hakims (traditi<strong>on</strong>al healers). In additi<strong>on</strong>, poppy pods are<br />
also boiled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> water, and the resultant juice is drunk, notably as a medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st coughs and colds, and this<br />
is even given to children.<br />
Opium for n<strong>on</strong>-medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al purposes is ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly smoked, though it is also eaten often together with black<br />
tea. A few users dilute <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> or <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> residue <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> water before <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g; this is known as ‘blackwater <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is no medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al use of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly smoked by the method known as<br />
‘chas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the drag<strong>on</strong>’, where the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is burnt <strong>on</strong> t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> foil and the fumes are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>haled through a tube. Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is still the excepti<strong>on</strong>, but it seems to be spread<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s – such as the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of significant<br />
numbers of hypodermic needles - that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use has been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, notably am<strong>on</strong>g refugees return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
from camps <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, is <strong>on</strong> the rise, possibly a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
manufacture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> over the last couple of years, as shown by the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
laboratories covered.<br />
Abuse of opiates <strong>on</strong>ly emerged as a major problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s though, based up<strong>on</strong> available data, the<br />
problem with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is still comparatively small compared to the situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reas<strong>on</strong>s for the spread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s can be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to<br />
i) the prol<strong>on</strong>ged human deprivati<strong>on</strong> and suffer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong> extremely<br />
vulnerable to a range of mental health problems, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g depressi<strong>on</strong>, anxiety, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>somnia and<br />
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder;<br />
ii) the wide-spread use of opiates by the mujahedeen to treat war <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>juries, as opiates (<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
71
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) were often the <strong>on</strong>ly ‘medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e’ available<br />
iii) the breakdown of social norms and thus the reducti<strong>on</strong> of cultural c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts to drug abuse as<br />
a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the civil war<br />
iv) the high vulnerability of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> refugee camps to drug abuse, and the c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>uati<strong>on</strong> of their<br />
habit up<strong>on</strong> return to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
v) the close to unlimited availability of drugs (opiates) with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
When the Taliban took c<strong>on</strong>trol of much of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as of the mid 1990s, they had – orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally - no<br />
problems with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates, but they were tough <strong>on</strong> drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
use of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>toxicants is forbidden <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Koran (haram ) and thus the use of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>toxicants was banned by the<br />
Taliban authorities under Sharia law. Frequent arrests and severe punishments scared many people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to not<br />
tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs. In Gardez (prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Paktia), for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, it was reported that hashish users were impris<strong>on</strong>ed<br />
for <strong>on</strong>e week for a first offence, 20 days for a sec<strong>on</strong>d offence and <strong>on</strong>e m<strong>on</strong>th for a third offence. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
impris<strong>on</strong>ment for a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> user was six m<strong>on</strong>ths. It was also reported that some of the arrested drug users were<br />
beaten with durra (leather straps) as well as be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g impris<strong>on</strong>ed. 56 N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the use of prohibited drugs<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued and was even ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g as refugees returned to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> from Pakistan and Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ever larger<br />
availability of opiates – and their low price - facilitated the use of these substances <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Overall, drug use took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a much more hidden, private and secretive manner than was the case<br />
before, lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stances to perverse results. Key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants also reported to UNDCP that some hashish<br />
users felt motivated to switch to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> because the smell of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was much less pungent and noticeable than<br />
that of hashish. If they used hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rather than hashish they felt that they were less likely to be traced, arrested<br />
and punished by the Taliban’s Department for the Propagati<strong>on</strong> of Virtue and the Suppressi<strong>on</strong> of Vice. Some users<br />
also shifted from hashish to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the eradicati<strong>on</strong> of cannabis plants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their district. 57 Another sideeffect<br />
of the Taliban’s harsh policy <strong>on</strong> drug use was that people with drug problems became very reluctant to seek<br />
help for fear of persecuti<strong>on</strong> and punishment. Moreover, there were hardly any functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s to which<br />
people could turn for help. 58<br />
Inside <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, a number of reports reached UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g substantial drug problems <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several<br />
urban centres. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were reports of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Herat (western <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), Kandahar (eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and Kabul, as well as polydrug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several locati<strong>on</strong>s across the country. In the first quarter of<br />
1999 59 , 50% of the problem drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul’s Mental Health Hospital were male hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicts.<br />
In 2000, UNDCP undertook an assessment of the number of drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> five rural districts of eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: Hesarak (Nangarhar), Khak-E-Jabar (Kabul), Azro (Logar), Sayed Karam (Paktia) and Gardez<br />
(Paktia). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> five districts covered a populati<strong>on</strong> of about 201,000 people, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 120,000 adults. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se four<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces were chosen because they were the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of three-fourths of all refugees expected to return<br />
from Pakistan as well as the home of thousands of recent returnees and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternally displaced pers<strong>on</strong>s. All five<br />
districts were severely affected by the war that had ravaged the country over the last two decades.<br />
Two approaches were used to arrive at estimates of drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these five districts:<br />
(a) estimates provided by key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants (100 pers<strong>on</strong>s) and<br />
(b) estimates provided by drug users (99 pers<strong>on</strong>s) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the five districts.<br />
Each target district was divided <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to four quadrants or sites. This gave a total of 20 sites. In each site,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews were c<strong>on</strong>ducted with five key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants such as doctors, teachers, government officials or community<br />
leaders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded questi<strong>on</strong>s about the likely number of drug users at the site. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average figure<br />
of these estimates was used as key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants estimate (Estimate A). In additi<strong>on</strong>, about five drug users per site<br />
were identified and asked to provide their estimates of the total number of drug users at the locati<strong>on</strong>. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the<br />
average figure of these estimates was taken as the drug users’ estimates of the extent of drug use (Estimate B).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> two sets of estimates were then used to establish a range while the average of the two sets of estimates has<br />
been used to arrive at an overall estimate of drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the five target districts. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> detailed results are shown<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Table 13.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the five districts was equivalent to 0.5% of the adult populati<strong>on</strong><br />
(range 0.4%-0.6%), and the number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users was equivalent to 0.1% of the adult populati<strong>on</strong>. Given the<br />
rather high number of returned refugees <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, the prevalence rates found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the five districts could<br />
be assumed to overstate <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s drug problem. However, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the background of a repressive<br />
envir<strong>on</strong>ment at the time of the study and thus a certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reluctance by many drug users and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants to talk<br />
openly about drug abuse, estimates could well be under-estimates. Given these oppos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g biases, the results<br />
may be still a fair reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the overall drug abuse situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
72
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
In any case, the prevalence rates found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this rapid assessment <strong>on</strong> the situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
were already significant by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al standards: global use of opiates for the late 1990s was estimated at 0.3%<br />
of the adult populati<strong>on</strong> and thus lower than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use prevalence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Prevalence of opiates use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (0.5% <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 0.1% hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) as compared to estimates<br />
for neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, however, are still rather small: Iran 1.7%-2.8%; Central Asia 0.9% (four-country<br />
average) y , or 0.9% of opiates abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (of which 0.6% chr<strong>on</strong>ic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse). 60 (For more detail <strong>on</strong> the<br />
drug abuse situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> see chapter 6.4).<br />
3.0%<br />
2.5%<br />
Abuse of opiates am<strong>on</strong>g the adult populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> compared to other countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000/2001<br />
2.8%<br />
2.0%<br />
1.5%<br />
1.0%<br />
0.5%<br />
0.0%<br />
East. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1.8%<br />
1%<br />
0.9%<br />
0.6% 0.6%<br />
0.4%<br />
Pakistan<br />
Central Asia<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
Iran<br />
1.7%<br />
0.6%<br />
0.4%<br />
0.3%<br />
Europe<br />
North America<br />
Global average<br />
Figure 29<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #4 An Assessment of Problem Drug Use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Feb. 2001, p. 11, UNDODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002,<br />
UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment<br />
Study, UNODCCP, “Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary results of a Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia”.<br />
If the prevalence rates for eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are calculated <strong>on</strong> the basis of the total populati<strong>on</strong> (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stead<br />
of the adult populati<strong>on</strong>), then the overall number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the five districts was equivalent to 0.3%; the<br />
number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users was equivalent to 0.06% of the total populati<strong>on</strong>. Overall problem drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> affected close to 0.4% of the total populati<strong>on</strong>. For comparis<strong>on</strong>, first results of a UNDCP sp<strong>on</strong>sored<br />
rapid assessment study <strong>on</strong> the drug situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia, c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, show that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> four central Asian<br />
states the comparable estimates for problem drug use (opiates and other drugs) amounted to, <strong>on</strong> average, 0.8%<br />
of the total populati<strong>on</strong>. This would be twice the rate found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan were found<br />
to be at levels similar to those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (0.3%), but prevalence rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan (0.8%),<br />
Kazakhstan (1.2%) and Kyrgyzstan (1.8%) were significantly higher.<br />
y Data refer to first results of a rapid assessment study c<strong>on</strong>ducted by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. So far, results are<br />
available from four countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.<br />
73
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 25: Estimates of the extent of problem drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> selected districts of eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (sorted accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use)<br />
District Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce Populati<strong>on</strong><br />
est.<br />
Hashish Psychotropic substances Opium Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Number of drugs users Number of drugs users Number of drugs users Number of drugs users<br />
Total Est. A* Est. B** Average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % Est. A* Est. B** Average<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
Est. A* Est. B** Average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
Est. A* Est. B** Average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
Hesarak Nangarhar 37,000 1,441 1,754 1,598 4.3% 938 725 832 2.2% 158 199 179 0.48% 21 14 18 0.05%<br />
Sayed Karam Paktia 73,000 3,602 8,110 5,856 8.0% 885 605 745 1.0% 400 202 301 0.41% 111 61 86 0.12%<br />
Azro Logar 18,000 2,132 1,878 2,005 11.1% 425 307 366 2.0% 74 49 62 0.34% 16 12 14 0.08%<br />
Gardez Paktia 62,000 1,306 1,446 1,376 2.2% 307 74 191 0.3% 59 56 58 0.09% 16 10 13 0.02%<br />
Khak-e-Jabar Kabul 11,000 33 85 59 0.5% 1 1 1 0.0% 3 1 2 0.02% 0 0 0<br />
-<br />
Average for five districts 201,000 8,514 13,273 10,894 5.4% 2,556 1,712 2,134 1.1% 694 507 601 0.30% 164 97 131 0.06%<br />
Adults<br />
Average for five districts 120,000 10,894 9.1% 2,134 1.8% 601 0.50% 131 0.11%<br />
Range for five districts 120,000 8,514 13,273<br />
7.1%-<br />
11.1% 2,556 1,712 1.4%-<br />
2.1%<br />
694 507<br />
0.4%-<br />
0.6%<br />
164 97<br />
0.08%-<br />
0.14%<br />
* Estimate A: Average number of estimated drug users as reported by key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants<br />
**Estimate B: Average number of estimated drug users as reported by drug users<br />
Source: UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #4, An Assessment of Problem Drug Use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: the GAI target districts, February 2001<br />
74
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
Higher prevalence rates, like <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most other countries, have been reported for hashish use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(5.4% of total populati<strong>on</strong> or 9.1% of the adult populati<strong>on</strong>) as well as for the misuse of psychotropic substances,<br />
which are bought - usually without prescripti<strong>on</strong> - from pharmacies as pharmaceutical drugs (1.1% of the total<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> or 1.8% of the adult populati<strong>on</strong>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly benzodiazep<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es (mostly diazepam and<br />
lorazepam) and, to a lesser extent, methaqual<strong>on</strong>e, barbiturates (phenobarbit<strong>on</strong>e) and pentazoc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, a pa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>killer,<br />
often <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected by hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicts as a substitute. In this c<strong>on</strong>text it may be also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
adulterated with diazepam and phenobarbit<strong>on</strong>e was identified to be typical for seizures that could be traced back<br />
to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>/Pakistan border regi<strong>on</strong>s, 61 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>directly reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the availability of these substances <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
10.0%<br />
Prevalence of drug abuse<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of adult populati<strong>on</strong><br />
9.1%<br />
8.0%<br />
6.0%<br />
4.0%<br />
2.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
1.8%<br />
0.5%<br />
0.1%<br />
Hashish Psychotropics Opium Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Figure 30<br />
Source: UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #4 An Assessment of Problem Drug Use<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Feb. 2001, p. 11.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> analysis of the district results provides some <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g additi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sights, suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that there<br />
is a l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k between <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and the abuse of opiates.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest level of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use am<strong>on</strong>g the five districts was reported from the district of Hesarak (0.5%<br />
of the total populati<strong>on</strong>), located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar. (This was the sec<strong>on</strong>d largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> until 2001). Hesarak had by far the highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g the five districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated.<br />
In 2000, 541 hectares were cultivated with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 76 villages out of a total of the district’s 97 villages.<br />
This was sufficient to produce some 20 metric t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, equivalent to ½ kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant,<br />
more than the nati<strong>on</strong>al average ( 1 / 8 kg per <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> sec<strong>on</strong>d largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g district am<strong>on</strong>g the five districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated was Azro (Logar<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce). Over 1 metric t<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Azro district <strong>on</strong> 46 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (some 60 grams per<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitant, about half the nati<strong>on</strong>al average). Prevalence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Azro was equivalent to 0.3% of the total<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>, about the same as the five-district average.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lowest rate of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> use was reported from Khak-e-Jabar district (0.02% of the total populati<strong>on</strong>)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce. It was also the <strong>on</strong>ly district where no hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> use was reported. No <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> took place<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this district over the 1994-2000 period.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was no poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the two districts located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Paktia prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, Gardez and Sayed Karam.<br />
While the district of Gardez had very low levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse (0.09% of the total populati<strong>on</strong>), the neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
district of Sayed Karam reported rather high levels (0.4%). This suggests that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> is not the <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant of the extent of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Regard<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse, the Sayed Karam district (Paktia) reported the highest such prevalence rate<br />
across all five districts (0.12% of the total populati<strong>on</strong>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re have been no reports of any particular c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong><br />
of clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the district which could expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rather high levels of abuse. However, Sayed<br />
Karam district was str<strong>on</strong>gly affected by the war, result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g not <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> large-scale destructi<strong>on</strong> but also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> large<br />
numbers of refugees. Three quarters of all families saw themselves forced to leave the district over the last two<br />
75
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
decades; 90% of these refugees, however, had returned to the district by the year 2000. 62<br />
returned refugees appears to be largely resp<strong>on</strong>sible for the rather high levels of abuse.<br />
This high rate of<br />
Overall key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants across the five districts expressed the op<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>i<strong>on</strong> that most of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were refugees who had returned from Pakistan (and to a lesser extent from Iran) where they<br />
had started their hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> habit. This was basically also c<strong>on</strong>firmed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews with drug addicts. In terms of the<br />
locati<strong>on</strong> of first hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> use, 7 out of 8 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users across the five districts reported that they first used hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Pakistan.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same is not the case for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>: 60% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed reported that they started us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> first <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 40% started it abroad, of which two thirds started it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and <strong>on</strong>e third <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran.<br />
For all drugs, the ratios of first use were 61% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 36% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and 3% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. 63<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall ec<strong>on</strong>omic impact of drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – relatively low numbers of users compared to<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and (until recently) low prices – has been rather modest so far, though <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>text of<br />
extreme impoverishment and few job opportunities, any available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come spent <strong>on</strong> drugs severely depletes<br />
already limited household f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ances. Given estimates of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s populati<strong>on</strong>, rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from 21 to 26 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
people, apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prevalence estimates of eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the country as a whole and assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
an average c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of about 1 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per user and per year z , total local c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 may have<br />
ranged from 63 to 78 t<strong>on</strong>s, equivalent to about 2% of total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year. In m<strong>on</strong>etary terms, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices reported from the bazaars ($39 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000), overall domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
would have been worth $2.5-$3 milli<strong>on</strong> which – even for the country’s small <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> - is an almost negligible<br />
amount, equivalent to less than 0.1% of GDP aa Moreover, a significant proporti<strong>on</strong> of the opiates is not purchased<br />
by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bazaars because they produce it themselves. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> an average c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong><br />
of around 1 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per year and given an average yield of 36 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (which due to<br />
the drought was a below-average yield), 0.03 hectares of land, equivalent to 300 m 2 under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> would<br />
have already been sufficient to cover a pers<strong>on</strong>’s annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> requirements. Many <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicted refugees,<br />
even though poor, still have sufficient land at their disposal to be able to dedicate some 300 m 2 for poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> to produce sufficient <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for pers<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall ec<strong>on</strong>omic burden for opiates users<br />
result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from the purchases of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for pers<strong>on</strong>al use could thus have been significantly less than $3 milli<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Given high levels of unemployment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, productivity losses due to drug abuse have not played much<br />
of a role either. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was still more than sufficient labour available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. In short, while the social aspect<br />
of drug abuse is important, the ec<strong>on</strong>omic impact of drug abuse has not yet reached any critical orders of<br />
magnitude.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic impact could, however, become far more serious as refugees return to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNHCR sources more than 1.3 milli<strong>on</strong> Afghan refugees were repatriated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> over the<br />
March-June 2002 period, of which 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> returned from Pakistan, 100,000 from Iran and 10,000 from Central<br />
Asia. 64 It is likely that a significant number of these refugees have a drug problem. Apart from less m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
available for essentials, there will be also less m<strong>on</strong>ey available to take advantage of development opportunities.<br />
A number of cases have already been reported where refugee repatriati<strong>on</strong> grants were simply used to buy drugs.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, like most other countries, has also been c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with the problem of drug users committ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
crime to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance their habit. With refugees return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and with prices of opiates hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g risen tenfold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and<br />
hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed at the higher levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, it is likely that drug-related property crime will c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
for some time. In 2000, a kilogram of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, i.e. the average annual requirement of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> user, could be<br />
bought from the bazaars for around $39 per kg. Given reports of average wages of $1-$2 a day 65 an average<br />
Afghan could reck<strong>on</strong> with an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $365-$730 a year (about $550, <strong>on</strong> average). Thus his <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g habit<br />
(estimated at around 1 kg per year) would have cost him about 7% of his salary, or less if he had direct access<br />
to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. By mid 2002, however, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices fluctuated at around $400 a kg, i.e. about three<br />
quarters of average annual legal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come (and for some Afghans less than their total annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come). It is obvious<br />
that unless such an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g pers<strong>on</strong> either gives up his habit or ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s direct access to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, the<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly short-term “soluti<strong>on</strong>” for him is to commit theft and other illegal activities. If the higher prices are ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed,<br />
this should help to reduce the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cidence rate, i.e. the number of new drug recruits enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the market, and thus<br />
drug related crime as well.<br />
z Estimates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the literature of average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> range from about 0.65 kg to 1.4 kg per year.<br />
aa Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a GDP of $250 per capita (as reported by UNDP) and a populati<strong>on</strong> of 23 milli<strong>on</strong> people, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s GDP would have<br />
amounted to some $5.8 bn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amount of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country would have been equivalent to about 0.05% of GDP.<br />
76
Chapter I. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>: size and shape<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
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Habitat – Agency Coord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Body for Afghan Relief Survey Unit, “Helmand Initiative Socio-Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Survey”, April 2000, quoted<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sarah Forster and Doug Pearce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – CGAP Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Review, May 2002, p. 5.<br />
World Bank, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> World Bank Approach Paper, November 7, 2001<br />
(http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Countries/<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>/7AA687A0D8FE299985256AFB00742B6D?OpenDocument)<br />
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002, Chapter <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>:<br />
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2002/afg.asp<br />
FAO/WFP, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong> To <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, Special Report, 15 August 2002.<br />
Hector Maletta (Senior Food Security Advisor, FAO <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Wages of War: Food prices and labour pay <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
1996-2002”, Kabul, 24 October 2002.<br />
FAO/WFP, “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong> To <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, Special Report, 15 August 2002.<br />
WHO, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> World Health Report 2002, pp. 178-197.<br />
UNDP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – Some Basic Facts”, http://www.undp.org/afghanistan/basicfacts.htm<br />
ibid.<br />
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002, op.cit.<br />
World Bank, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> World Bank Approach Paper, November 7, 2001, op. cit.<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Report, August 2000.<br />
World Bank, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Data Profile,<br />
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=AFG&CCODE=AFG&CNAME=<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>&PTYPE=CP<br />
UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, p. 246.<br />
Cited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Profile, 2002-2003.<br />
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook, op.cit.<br />
Maletta ,op.cit., p. 18.<br />
ibid., p. 8 and p. 19.<br />
Situati<strong>on</strong>sbericht des Deutschen Bauernverbandes (DBV), Situati<strong>on</strong>sbericht 2002, Trends und Fakten zur Landwirtschaft, B<strong>on</strong>n,<br />
December 2001, p. 27.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Report, August 2002, p 5, based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> derived from IMF, Directory of<br />
Trade Statistics.<br />
Most data presented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this secti<strong>on</strong> is extracted from UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
UNDCP, Global Illicit Opiate markets at the crossroads : the impact of changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Opium poppy survey 2002, pre-assessment, February 2002.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #5 An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, November 1999, p. 12.<br />
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban – <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Story of the Afghan Warlords, (Pan Macmillan), L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> 2001.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, p. 20.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs for the Opium Ground Survey of Northern Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, May 2002.<br />
Ibid., p. 12.<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Profile, 2001/2002; p. 58 and Fischer Weltalmanach 2002, p. 51.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategy Study #4, Access to Labour: the Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of<br />
It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, June 1999, p.7.<br />
UNDCP, Strategic Study #1, An Analysis of he Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1998, p. 2.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of<br />
Opium Traders, October 1998, p. 18.<br />
INCB, 2001 Narcotic <strong>Drugs</strong>, New York 2002, p. 164.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of<br />
Opium Traders, October 1998, p. 18.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of<br />
Opium Traders, October 1998, pp. 10-11.<br />
Ibid., p. 11.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs for the Opium Ground Survey of Northern Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, May 2002, p. 11.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 1999.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001.<br />
UNDCP, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999.<br />
UNDCP, Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders,<br />
October 1998.<br />
UNDCP, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 14.<br />
Hector Maletta (Senior Food Security Advisor, FAO <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Wages of War: Food prices and labour pay <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
1996-2002”, Kabul, 24 October 2002.<br />
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002, Chapter <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>:<br />
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2002/afg.asp<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran - Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report – 2000, pp. 34-35.<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Interior (Turkish Nati<strong>on</strong>al Police) Turkish Drug Report 2000, pp. 39-41.<br />
See for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, Interpol European Drug Situati<strong>on</strong> Report 1999, Ly<strong>on</strong>, April 2000.pp. 27-28<br />
Classified <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>telligence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> available to UNDCP.<br />
UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan”, (Draft) Islamabad 1994, p. 31.<br />
Home <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Siz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the UK market for Illicit <strong>Drugs</strong>, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> 2001.<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Country Report, May 2002, p. 36.<br />
Z.F. Naqvi, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>-Pakistan Trade Relati<strong>on</strong>s, World Bank, Islamabad, 1999; also cited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10, 2000, p. 1802.<br />
UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001, p. 40.<br />
77
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #4, An assessment of problem drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: the GAI target districts,<br />
February 2001. p. 19.<br />
ibid., p. 6.<br />
ibid., p.16.<br />
ibid., p. 6.<br />
UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #1, Problem Drug Use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan Communities – an Initial Assessment, Islamabad 1999.<br />
UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, p. 299.<br />
UK Forensic Science Service, Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Intelligence Database, Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Seized from 1 June 2000 to 31 May 2002, July 2002, p. 82.<br />
ACBAR/SU (Agency Coord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Body for Afghan Relief Survey Unit), Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey of Gardez and Sayed Karam<br />
Districts, Paktia Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, May 2000, Peshawar.<br />
UNDCP, Community Drug Profile #4, An assessment of problem drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: the GAI target districts,<br />
February 2001, p. 18.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bi-Weekly Situati<strong>on</strong> Report (15-30 July 2002).<br />
UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary Needs Assessment For Recovery And Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, January 2002, p. 16.<br />
(http://www.undp.org/afghanistan/needsreports/needsreport2.html)<br />
78
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
PART 2: ORIGINS<br />
Chapter II<br />
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE<br />
OPIUM ECONOMY<br />
79
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous chapter described the different dimensi<strong>on</strong>s of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
present chapter provides the historical background for its emergence. Four different factors are basic to<br />
expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the entrenchment and expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>:<br />
(i) the lack of effective central government for a prol<strong>on</strong>ged period of time;<br />
(ii) the degradati<strong>on</strong> of agriculture and most ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure due to more than twenty<br />
years of war;<br />
(iii) the acceptance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> as a livelihood strategy by many rural households; and<br />
(iv) the c<strong>on</strong>sequent development of a thriv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g commodity trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural markets.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first two factors require a historical review which is presented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this chapter. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> latter two factors deal<br />
with micro-level decisi<strong>on</strong>-mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> peasant households and rural markets, and are c<strong>on</strong>sidered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the next<br />
three chapters.<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s (1980-2002)<br />
5,000<br />
4,565<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
450<br />
1,570<br />
3,416<br />
2,804<br />
2,693<br />
2,248<br />
2,335<br />
3,276<br />
3,422<br />
0<br />
200<br />
18 5<br />
'Soviet' period 'Warlord' period 'Taliban' period<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 and 2002 and UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re have been several explanati<strong>on</strong>s for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s massive <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the last two decades. Most of them are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sufficient because they do not, by themselves, expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> why <strong>on</strong>e<br />
particular country, rather than any other, became the world’s biggest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producer <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the short span of two<br />
decades. It has been argued, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, that producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased because climatic c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> are very favourable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Opium poppy, however, can be cultivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many countries of<br />
the world. In some of them, farmers can obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> yields equivalent to those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> fact<br />
that farmers derive more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from illicit narcotic crops than from legitimate <strong>on</strong>es is not peculiar to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> but applies equally to many other countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world. Rural poverty is also not a sufficient<br />
explanati<strong>on</strong> for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: many poor countries which could grow lucrative crops such<br />
as <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> or coca do not, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fact, do so.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> explanati<strong>on</strong>, therefore, must go deeper than such symptomatic descripti<strong>on</strong>s. It can be found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a<br />
number of factors c<strong>on</strong>cern<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the crises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country’s political system, civil society and <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. While<br />
twenty years of war may have been the crucible for distort<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> and civil society, the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
for it were more than two centuries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state was <strong>on</strong>ly created <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
81
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
the middle of the 18 th century. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s which prevented it from be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g created earlier – the geostrategic<br />
importance of the territory of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – prevailed for more than two thousand years. Those<br />
same c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s recurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 19 th and 20 th centuries to ensure that the fledgl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan state could never<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipal result was the collapse of the state, first under foreign occupati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and<br />
then <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> civil war dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the 1990s. It was <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> such c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s that whole sectors of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> and civil<br />
society became perverted. In many parts of the country, cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> became the <strong>on</strong>ly form of survival<br />
for rural communities. Commodity trade was also distorted because, apart from arms and c<strong>on</strong>traband, the<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly other commodity worth trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
It should be noted, at the outset of this chapter, that the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s which rendered the state and the<br />
government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>effective <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> do not prevail any l<strong>on</strong>ger. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is, today, a w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity for<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>-build<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong>, created by the collective force of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community supersed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the particularistic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terests of foreign powers. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g two decades of war and the demise of the Taliban<br />
regime <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late 2001, a number of important steps have been taken towards nati<strong>on</strong>-build<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. After several<br />
rounds of negotiati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g various secti<strong>on</strong>s of Afghan society <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> B<strong>on</strong>n (Germany) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> December 2001, the<br />
parties agreed <strong>on</strong> a comm<strong>on</strong> Interim Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>. In June 2002 the Loya Jirga a (traditi<strong>on</strong>al grand<br />
assembly) was c<strong>on</strong>vened <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul and elected a president who heads the ‘Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Authority’ (TA), the<br />
new government of the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> TA is mandated to run the country for 18 m<strong>on</strong>ths until full-fledged<br />
electi<strong>on</strong>s will be held across the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus has, for the first time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its history, a central<br />
government which has a democratic basis and reflects the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ethnic groups of the country. This could well<br />
form the basis for the development of a truly pan-Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>al identity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the future. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipal<br />
challenges of the TA are to establish the authority of the central government throughout the territory of the<br />
country, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> peace, stability and security and – with the help of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community – rebuild<br />
the devastated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se objectives are not <strong>on</strong>ly important <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> themselves, but are also necessary<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for dismantl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
2.1. State formati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> geo-strategic importance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
…<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ancient world<br />
Ever s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce ancient times, and well <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the present, the territory now known as <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been<br />
a strategic lynchp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>: a battle-ground or buffer z<strong>on</strong>e between three dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct geographical and cultural areas -<br />
the Iranian plateau to its west, the Indian sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent to its east, and Central Asia to its north. Today<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> can still be seen as three dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct areas, at least <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultural, l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>guistic and ethnic terms, though<br />
not of course <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> political <strong>on</strong>es. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Hazaras, who <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habit the central parts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, look westward<br />
towards Iran; the Pashtuns and Baluchis of the east and the south look eastwards towards Pakistan and the<br />
Indian sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent; and the Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks of the north look northwards towards Central<br />
Asia. This situati<strong>on</strong> has been more than two millennia <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. For nearly 2,500 years, these three<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were not <strong>on</strong>ly culturally differentiated, but politically dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct. This made<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the buffer z<strong>on</strong>e between them, ever more important strategically, and each competed with the<br />
others to secure political or military mastery over it. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se circumstances, together with the ethnic mosaic<br />
left by centuries of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vasi<strong>on</strong> and migrati<strong>on</strong>, made it difficult for a viable, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state to emerge <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. When an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state did emerge, dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a brief w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 18 th<br />
century, the same comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of circumstances recurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 19 th and 20 th centuries and prevented that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state from c<strong>on</strong>solidat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Today there is another w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity for the state to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidate because the collective force of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community has superseded the particularist<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terests of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours.<br />
a <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Loya Jirga is based <strong>on</strong> an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>direct system of representati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> system starts at the local and district level where shuras<br />
(councils) choose electors, who later cast ballots for Loya Jirga delegates. Each district chooses a predeterm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed number of electors<br />
based <strong>on</strong> populati<strong>on</strong> size, with the names of those chosen sent to <strong>on</strong>e of eight regi<strong>on</strong>al observati<strong>on</strong> centres. Once the submitted list of<br />
electors are verified, the electors travel to the regi<strong>on</strong>al centres to choose from am<strong>on</strong>gst themselves a smaller number of Loya Jirga<br />
delegates. Thus by May a total of 98 district assemblies had taken place with 4618 delegates chosen <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this first phase of the selecti<strong>on</strong><br />
process. By the end of the selecti<strong>on</strong> process <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> June, 1450 delegates rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 399 which were chosen directly by the<br />
previously set up Loya Jirga commissi<strong>on</strong> with the aim of ensur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that all parts of Afghan society were represented. (Source: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Country Report May 2002, p. 30.)<br />
82
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
In the pre-historic world, probably as far back as 3,500 years ago, the Aryans passed through<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and went <strong>on</strong> to establish the ancient civilizati<strong>on</strong>s of Persia and India. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ancient religi<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
Zoroastrianism, stemm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from the former civilizati<strong>on</strong>, and Buddhism, stemm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from the latter, established<br />
themselves <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In the 4 th century B.C., Alexander the Great c<strong>on</strong>quered <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> from<br />
Achaemenid Persia, and used it as a strategic base for his campaigns aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st Persia and India. Alexander’s<br />
successors, a dynasty of Graeco-Bactrian k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs, were <strong>on</strong>ly able to hold the territories he c<strong>on</strong>quered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the north-west fr<strong>on</strong>tier of the Indian subc<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent for a century after his death, and the areas<br />
were eventually divided between the Maurayan empire of India (which extended westward till the Indus and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded the valley of Gandhara, as Peshawar was then called) and three empires established by nomads<br />
from the fr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ges of Persia: the Sakas and Parthians, who c<strong>on</strong>trolled Persia and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and<br />
the Kushans, who dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated Bactria (<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> north of the H<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>du Kush) as well as Transoxiana (the<br />
lands between the rivers Oxus, now Amu Darya, and Jaxartes, now Syr Darya). By the 3 rd century AD, most<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> had come under the c<strong>on</strong>trol of Sassanid Persia.<br />
…<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the medieval world<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> medieval world saw the establishment of Islam <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 7 th century AD. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> country<br />
aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> became a strategic base, this time for the spread of Islam <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Central Asia and the Indian subc<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent.<br />
Muslim c<strong>on</strong>querors from the pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipalities of Ghazni and Ghor (both <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> present-day <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
created the Delhi Sultanate which dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated northern India from the 11 th to the 15 th centuries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the path of the M<strong>on</strong>gol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vasi<strong>on</strong>s of India and Persia. Genghis Khan destroyed the great medieval<br />
city of Balkh, took Kabul and also destroyed Peshawar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 13 th century. At the end of the same century,<br />
the great Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, traversed the Silk Road which carried trade between Europe and<br />
Ch<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>a, and reported Balkh to be recovered from the M<strong>on</strong>gol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vasi<strong>on</strong>s, and Badakshan produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, as it is still<br />
reputed to, fabulous gemst<strong>on</strong>es 1 . One of Genghis Khan’s successors, Tamerlane, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> devastated<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> en route to raid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g India <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 14 th century. In the same century, the great Arab traveller, Ibn<br />
Batuta, crossed <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> his way to India. He found Balkh <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ru<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s, and noted that he was harassed<br />
by a “…Persian tribe called the Afghans” as he travelled from Kabul to the river Indus 2 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> M<strong>on</strong>gol<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vasi<strong>on</strong>s left permanent settlers – the Hazaras of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
…<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> modern times<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Mughal empire of India was established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 16 th century by Zahir-ud-d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Muhammad<br />
Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, and a former ruler of Ferghana (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> present day<br />
Uzbekistan). Babur made Kabul his first capital, and used <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as his spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gboard for c<strong>on</strong>quer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
India 3 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Mughals c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a strategic pawn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their struggle with the Safawid<br />
empire of Persia. By the 17 th century, western and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ruled by the Safawids,<br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> by the Mughals, and north-western <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> by the Shaibanid Uzbek khanates of<br />
Transoxiana.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first Afghan state <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 18 th century<br />
When, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 18 th century, these three empires began to decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, a w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of<br />
opportunity appeared for the creati<strong>on</strong> of the first Afghan empire. It was established by a former lieutenant of<br />
Nadir Shah of Persia, Ahmed Shah Abdali (also known as Ahmed Shah Durrani, 1747-1772). Ahmad Shah<br />
came from a tribe called the Abdalis, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> around Herat. Together with <strong>on</strong>e of their neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
tribes, and bitter rivals, the Ghilzais of Kandahar, the Abdalis form the core of what later came to be known<br />
as the Pashtuns <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the Pathans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. Nadir Shah took Kabul and Peshawar, and<br />
became yet another c<strong>on</strong>queror to use <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a strategic base to c<strong>on</strong>quer India. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Mughal empire<br />
was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, and their capital, Delhi, fell to Nadir Shah <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1739. He went <strong>on</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>solidate a formidable<br />
empire which covered Persia and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and extended northwards till the Jaxartes and eastwards till<br />
the Indus. When Nadir Shah was murdered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali took the opportunity to establish<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol over <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. He adopted the title, Durr-i-Durran, ‘Pearl of Pearls’, and his dynasty thus came to<br />
be known as the Durrani dynasty. From 1747 to 1978, for all but a few years, the Durranis, or Abdalis, were<br />
the nom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al, if not always real, rulers of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Under Ahmad Shah Abdali, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – or the Durrani empire as it was then called - covered a large<br />
geographical area. It is remembered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan history as a period of great c<strong>on</strong>quests. Ahmad Shah<br />
cobbled together a tribal empire cover<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, much of what is today Pakistan, and parts of north-<br />
83
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
west India. His capital was Kandahar. He c<strong>on</strong>trolled territories till the Oxus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the north and Herat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
west. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Mughal empire ceded to him all the lands west of the Indus, as well as the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d. He too used his base <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to c<strong>on</strong>quer northern India. His armies crossed the Indus and<br />
sacked Amritsar, the holy shr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of the Sikhs, who had established an empire <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the pla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s of the Punjab as<br />
Mughal power c<strong>on</strong>tracted. He defeated a large central Indian c<strong>on</strong>federacy and sacked Delhi <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1761. Unable<br />
to reta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these far-flung dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>i<strong>on</strong>s from Kandahar, he eventually left the central Punjab to the Sikhs, but kept<br />
the northern Punjab, from Peshawar to Lahore.<br />
Shortly after Ahmed Shah’s death <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1773, his empire dis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wars of successi<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> political<br />
scene was set by perpetually chang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g alliances and c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> - similar to what <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> experienced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the 1990s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> limitati<strong>on</strong>s of agriculture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>hospitable climate made the various groups will<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g recruits<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g armies or tribal c<strong>on</strong>federati<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> creati<strong>on</strong> of an Afghan state was thus not sufficient, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> itself,<br />
to create a pan-Afghan nati<strong>on</strong>al identity. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> diverse ethnic populati<strong>on</strong> rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed loyal to several tribal<br />
identities or particularistic nati<strong>on</strong>alities. Government was largely built <strong>on</strong> opportunism, pay<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g off tribesmen<br />
and mercenaries with loot and hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out the prospects for more. This guaranteed the success of Afghan<br />
warlordism over the next two centuries.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Great Game of the 19 th century<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> widow of opportunity with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which the Afghan state had been created was closed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 19 th century.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russian Tsarist empire expanded across the northern landmass of Asia and the British col<strong>on</strong>ial empire<br />
c<strong>on</strong>solidated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> India. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russian need to secure access to a warm water port which could be used<br />
throughout the year eventually came up aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the British resolve to defend their empire <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> India and the<br />
security of their eastern trade routes. In a swathe of territory which ran from the Black Sea and the eastern<br />
Mediterranean to the Pacific, the British and the Russians played, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rudyard Kipl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imitable phrase, a<br />
‘Great Game’ for power and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence. Central Asia, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the middle of this swathe of territory, became the<br />
strategic pressure po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t, and the Great Game was played out, am<strong>on</strong>g other places, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Tibet.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus reverted to its traditi<strong>on</strong>al status of a buffer z<strong>on</strong>e between compet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g powers. In the 19 th<br />
century, however, it was two, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stead of the traditi<strong>on</strong>al three, powers because <strong>on</strong>e of them, Persia, lapsed<br />
from imperial glory and itself become a buffer z<strong>on</strong>e between the British and the Russians.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> nature of the Great Game was for <strong>on</strong>e power to pre-empt the other and secure political <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence<br />
rather than outright annexati<strong>on</strong>. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was strategically important and a buffer z<strong>on</strong>e, it became<br />
c<strong>on</strong>venient to ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> it as a de jure sovereign state. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> questi<strong>on</strong> was which of the two powers would<br />
secure the dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant positi<strong>on</strong>. In the event, from 1839 to 1919, it was the British who succeeded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> keep<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> under their <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y paid a c<strong>on</strong>siderable price, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first Afghan War (1839-<br />
42), what has been called <strong>on</strong>e of the worst disasters <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> British military history. 4 From this war, they learnt the<br />
dangers of try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to occupy <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and subdue it militarily. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir strategy thenceforth became <strong>on</strong>e of<br />
try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a friendly ruler and warlords <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This objective was secured by means of<br />
pay<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out subsidies, secur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g defensible fr<strong>on</strong>tiers between British India and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and <strong>on</strong>ly resort<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
to military acti<strong>on</strong> when they felt that the defence of India was at stake. Because of this, the North-West<br />
fr<strong>on</strong>tier of their Indian empire loomed so large <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the imperial imag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>, 5 and, al<strong>on</strong>g with the Great Game,<br />
shaped the political c<strong>on</strong>sciousness of a generati<strong>on</strong> of British imperial leaders. 6 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> resort to military acti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
however, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> became necessary towards the end of the 19 th century. In the sec<strong>on</strong>d Afghan War (1878-<br />
79), the pattern of the first war, a British military setback followed by an army of retributi<strong>on</strong> which took Kabul,<br />
was repeated. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> annexati<strong>on</strong> of several western Afghan territories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to British India followed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> fr<strong>on</strong>tier<br />
between British India and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was del<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>eated by the Durand Treaty of 1893, the so-called Durand<br />
L<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. It was negotiated between Abdur Rahman, the Amir of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> between 1882 and 1901, and Sir<br />
Mortimer Durand. 7 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> western Afghan territories rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the British Indian prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of the Punjab until<br />
1901, when they were made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a separate prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce called the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
has reta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed this name, and substantially the same territory, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> present-day Pakistan, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to which it was<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>corporated follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the end of British col<strong>on</strong>ial rule <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1947.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Durand fr<strong>on</strong>tier<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Durand L<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e has been a difficult fr<strong>on</strong>tier for over a century. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and its borderlands with<br />
Iran and Pakistan, c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>e of the largest c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong>s of tribal societies <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Durand L<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e,<br />
s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce it still marks the border between <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Pakistan, splits the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic<br />
84
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
group <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> b , and made up of many different tribes, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to two countries. This divisi<strong>on</strong> is reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
verbal usage. In British India, the Pashtuns were known as Pathans; this usage c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>temporary<br />
Pakistan. An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipient nati<strong>on</strong>al movement of the Pashtuns, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of the aspirati<strong>on</strong> for a united state called<br />
Pashtunistan, has sometimes become a c<strong>on</strong>tentious issue <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> relati<strong>on</strong>s between Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
If the people <strong>on</strong> either side of a border are of the same ethnic group or tribe, it becomes notoriously difficult<br />
to police that border. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> degree of success <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the border would depend <strong>on</strong> the extent to which<br />
tribes <strong>on</strong> either side accept the nati<strong>on</strong>al identity of the two nati<strong>on</strong> states <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> questi<strong>on</strong>. This has certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly not<br />
been the case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, where a pan-Afghan identity was never cemented. It has also not been the<br />
case with all the Pathans of Pakistan, particularly the hill tribes am<strong>on</strong>g them 8 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Durand l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e also passes<br />
through the territory of the Baluchis, tribes which are well known for refus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to accept the legitimacy of<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al fr<strong>on</strong>tiers that divide them 9 .<br />
Between 1839 and 1919, as noted above, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the British z<strong>on</strong>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence, and<br />
every Afghan k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g received a British subsidy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> tribes were left to their own devices. Attempts by the<br />
m<strong>on</strong>archs to establish central authority over the whole country were sporadic and abortive. A weak central<br />
state and rampant warlordism ensured the l<strong>on</strong>g-term failure of any k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d of modern development or nati<strong>on</strong>build<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the First World War, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> stayed with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the British z<strong>on</strong>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence, despite<br />
attempts by the Central Powers to pull it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to their camp: a German-Turkish delegati<strong>on</strong> actually visited Kabul<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1915. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> expected Afghan revolt aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st British <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence did materialise, but after the War. Before it<br />
did, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependence was recognised at the Paris Peace C<strong>on</strong>ference <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 1919.<br />
Czarist Russia, now re-c<strong>on</strong>stituted as the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>, was <strong>on</strong>e of the first states to give formal recogniti<strong>on</strong><br />
to the de facto <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Despite this, the Great Game c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued. British imperial planners<br />
still saw <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as crucial to the defence of India, and were even will<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to c<strong>on</strong>sider extend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
defensible fr<strong>on</strong>tier across the Oxus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, and north-east across the Suez<br />
Canal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Palest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, which they had acquired from the Ottoman Empire <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1917. 10<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-war years<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> defeat of the Central Powers and the c<strong>on</strong>sequent dissoluti<strong>on</strong> of the Ottoman empire created an<br />
enormous problem for the British empire <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ottoman Sultan was also the Caliph or Khalifa, the<br />
spiritual and temporal leader of all the Sunni Muslims <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world. As Turkey rec<strong>on</strong>stituted itself as a<br />
republic, the Ottoman Sultan was removed from power. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> holy places of Islam, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Mecca and Jerusalem,<br />
had hitherto been under the suzera<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ty of a Muslim state – the Ottoman empire. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y now fell <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the z<strong>on</strong>e<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence of a n<strong>on</strong>-Muslim state – the British empire. A Pan-Islamic movement, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> support of the sanctity<br />
of the Khalifa and the Muslim holy places, began to grow <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Middle East and British India, which al<strong>on</strong>e<br />
had about 70 milli<strong>on</strong> Muslims. It merged with Indian nati<strong>on</strong>alism, which also began to grow rapidly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
aftermath of the War. H<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dus and Muslims comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a powerful wave of nati<strong>on</strong>alism that came to be<br />
known as the Khilafat (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> support of the Khalifa) Movement. 11 It shook the resolve of the British Raj <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> India,<br />
which began to negotiate devoluti<strong>on</strong> of power to Indian nati<strong>on</strong>alism so<strong>on</strong> after. It had its effect <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as well, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the summer of 1919, there was a rebelli<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st British <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
country. This is sometimes known as the third Afghan War. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> British suppressed it militarily, but this time<br />
with their air force 12 , which proved to be a cheaper and more effective soluti<strong>on</strong> for an empire stretched to the<br />
limit after four years of world war.<br />
In the Treaty of Rawalp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>di, which followed the armistice at the end of 1919, the Afghan state rega<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed<br />
some of the aut<strong>on</strong>omy it had ceded to the British <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 19 th century: the British subsidy ended, the Durand<br />
fr<strong>on</strong>tier between <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and British India was c<strong>on</strong>firmed, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependence was<br />
recognized. In c<strong>on</strong>firmati<strong>on</strong> of recover<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g c<strong>on</strong>trol of its foreign relati<strong>on</strong>s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> signed agreements with<br />
the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>, Turkey and Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ruler, Amir Amanullah (1919-29), began an extensive programme of<br />
modernizati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first Afghan C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was promulgated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1923. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> whole adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrative system<br />
was re-organized and new courts with secular codes of law were established. A powerful drive aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st<br />
traditi<strong>on</strong>al customs, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance the use of the veil, resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a backlash. Tribal upris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the east<br />
allowed a group of rebels led by a Tajik from the north, Habibullah Kalakani, better known as Bacha Saqao<br />
(‘s<strong>on</strong> of a water-carrier’), to take Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1929. He was the first n<strong>on</strong>-Pashtun to rule Kabul s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce 1747, but<br />
he lasted less than a year. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun tribes rallied under Nadir Shah, another Abdali, took Kabul,<br />
b <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtuns/Pathans are generally regarded as syn<strong>on</strong>ymous with Afghans. Though this is not quite correct, the usage has occurred<br />
because a Pashtun tribe, the Abdalis, c<strong>on</strong>trolled the state <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the better part of two centuries. It also occurs because <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
c<strong>on</strong>temporary Pakistan, the Pathans are frequently called Afghans. In c<strong>on</strong>temporary <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the Pushtuns are the biggest ethnic<br />
group, c<strong>on</strong>stitut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g nearly half of the total populati<strong>on</strong> of the country.<br />
85
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
executed Bacha Saqao and drove his Tajik followers out. Nadir Shah was elected Amir of Aghanistan, and<br />
began a programme of c<strong>on</strong>ciliati<strong>on</strong> and cautious reform. A new C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong> was promulgated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1931. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
foreign policy of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was based <strong>on</strong> try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to steer a cautious course between the USSR and the<br />
British Empire. In 1933, Nadir Shah was assass<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a blood feud. His s<strong>on</strong>, Zahir Shah, became Amir<br />
and ruled the country till he was removed by a coup <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1973.<br />
Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-war years, the Pashtunistan issue embroiled <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the nati<strong>on</strong>al movement of<br />
the Indian sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent. In the protracted encounter between the British Raj and Indian nati<strong>on</strong>alism, the<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al movement split, and British India was partiti<strong>on</strong>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to India and Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1947. Compelled by<br />
geography, religi<strong>on</strong> and politics, the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce became a part of Pakistan: this was<br />
decided by a referendum organized by the Raj. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the referendum, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual jirgas of the tribes<br />
stated unequivocally that they wanted “exactly the same relati<strong>on</strong>s to subsist between them and Pakistan as<br />
had existed between them and the British government”. 13 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtunistan issue, however, rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed salient<br />
after 1947 because it now found res<strong>on</strong>ance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <strong>on</strong> the other side of the Durand l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
was not will<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to accept the Durand l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e as a valid fr<strong>on</strong>tier: the British had imposed it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1893, and with their<br />
departure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1947, it lost its legitimacy for the Afghans. In the vote <strong>on</strong> the admissi<strong>on</strong> of the newly<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state of Pakistan to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the <strong>on</strong>ly dissent came from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Durand<br />
fr<strong>on</strong>tier, however, was vital for Pakistan. If its legitimacy were questi<strong>on</strong>ed, Pakistan would face the prospect<br />
of loos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g much of the territory of its North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, either to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> or to a new state of<br />
Pashtunistan. Such a prospect became <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tolerable because another Muslim majority area, Kashmir, went to<br />
India <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the partiti<strong>on</strong> of the sub-c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1947. Kashmir caused the first war between India and Pakistan<br />
and has been disputed ever s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Cold War: the 1950s to the 1970s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun/Pathan issue soured relati<strong>on</strong>s between Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the next thirty years.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem was exacerbated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1953 when Daoud Muhammad Khan, a cous<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of K<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Zahir Shah, came to<br />
power <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a bloodless coup. Without actually endors<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent state of Pashtunistan, Daoud<br />
Muhammad Khan espoused the idea of Pathan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependence. 14 If realised, this would have meant the<br />
dismemberment of Pakistan. Relati<strong>on</strong>s between the two countries deteriorated to the po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of a formal<br />
closure of the borders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1961. Eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was, and still is, almost entirely dependent <strong>on</strong> trade and<br />
exchange with Pakistan. Ec<strong>on</strong>omic necessity brought <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> closer to the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
departure of the British was thus quickly followed by an outcome that they had sought to prevent for over a<br />
century. For the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> States, which could have redressed the balance, Central Asia became a sideshow <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the new Great Game, now called the Cold War. American policy c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Soviet power <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Asia by means of support<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a tier of southern states: Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Even though the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
States did provide c<strong>on</strong>siderable aid to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> ($ 533 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic aid from 1955 to 1978), the<br />
Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> provided a lot more ($ 1.27 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic and approximately $ 1.25 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> military aid<br />
over the same period) 15 , and secured greater leverage over the country. c From the 1960s <strong>on</strong>wards,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> came ever closer <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>’s ec<strong>on</strong>omic and political orbit.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was still no real aut<strong>on</strong>omy for the Afghan state. If not c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by external geopolitical realities,<br />
it c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to be hamstrung by its own <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternal tensi<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> traditi<strong>on</strong>al troika of the khan (feudal lord),<br />
malik (tribal chiefta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and mullah (Muslim priest) c<strong>on</strong>trolled the countryside quite effectively, had no need for<br />
a central government, and objected strenuously and violently whenever the central government made any<br />
attempt at reform or change. Kabul was an island, dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct and separated from the countryside. It was<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habited by the Abdali rulers and a small political class which lived off the loaves and fish of power. After<br />
the mid-1960s, the pace of political change became more rapid and the gap between Kabul and the<br />
countryside c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to widen. Daoud Muhammad Khan was pushed to the sidel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es and the K<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, Zahir<br />
Shah, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troduced limited democratic reforms <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1964. In the same year, the country’s first university was<br />
established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul. Soviet <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence grew steadily. Much of the officer corps of the Afghan army was<br />
tra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Moscow. A new political party, the People’s Democratic Party of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (PDPA), espoused a<br />
pro-Moscow political l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. It split <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to two facti<strong>on</strong>s, the Khalq (‘Masses’) and the Parcham (‘Banner’). It has<br />
been argued by some observers that the two facti<strong>on</strong>s each owed allegiance to a different branch of the<br />
Soviet espi<strong>on</strong>age apparatus: the Khalk to the GRU and the Parcham to the KGB. 16 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>ir political strategies<br />
c John Griffith, who traversed Alexander the Great’s route to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1957, noted, <strong>on</strong> another visit <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1966, “the absolute<br />
strangl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g grip the Russians were gett<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> the Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and the futility of western efforts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sofar as c<strong>on</strong>cerned aid. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Americans would give the gra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the Russians would build the silos to store it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and they would end up gett<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all the credit.” Cited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Schofield, op.cit., p.266.<br />
86
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
followed from this, the Khalq c<strong>on</strong>centrat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> build<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g support <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Afghan armed forces and the Parcham<br />
<strong>on</strong> cement<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the political loyalties of teachers and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tellectuals.<br />
In 1973, Daoud Muhammad Khan returned to power <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> another peaceful coup. Zahir Shah accepted<br />
exile <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rome, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> became a Republic. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> leaders of both the Khalq, Nur Muhammad Taraki<br />
and Hafizullah Am<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and the Parcham, Babrak Karmal, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially supported the ‘Red Pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce’, as Daoud was<br />
known because of his close ties to the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1950s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> PDPA leadership thought Daoud had<br />
both the stature and commitment to mordernize <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. But Doaud, <strong>on</strong>ce firmly established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> power,<br />
dropped the PDPA from his government, distanced himself from Moscow, and tried to positi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
foreign policy with the N<strong>on</strong>-Aligned movement. d In 1978, the Khalq facti<strong>on</strong> of the PDPA hit back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> yet<br />
another coup. Daoud and his family were shot. Nur Muhammad Taraki became head of the Revoluti<strong>on</strong>ary<br />
Council of the Democratic Republic of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Parcham leader, Babrak Karmal was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially made<br />
deputy prime m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ister, but then politically neutralized by be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sent off as Afghan Ambassador to<br />
Czechoslovakia.<br />
Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong><br />
More than two centuries of virtually unbroken Abdali rule <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul ended <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1978. Taraki was also a<br />
Pashtun, but from the Ghilzai tribe, who were the traditi<strong>on</strong>al rivals of the Abdalis. Two of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
timeless problems, its ethnic/tribal mosaic and fissiparous regi<strong>on</strong>s, now prevented, yet aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the creati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
a viable pan-Afghan identity and state. Much as the K<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Amanullah had tried to do <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1920s, Takaki tried<br />
to ram through a programme of rapid mordernizati<strong>on</strong>, this time with c<strong>on</strong>siderable brutality and a socialist<br />
slant: redistributi<strong>on</strong> of land, literacy campaigns for women, aboliti<strong>on</strong> of the bride-price, public support for<br />
Marxist doctr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. In an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cident typical of the ast<strong>on</strong>ish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g lack of sensitivity to the traditi<strong>on</strong>al religious fabric of<br />
the country, <strong>on</strong>e government m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ister apparently offered public prayers for the souls of Marx and Len<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 17<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> resp<strong>on</strong>se was similar to that which greeted Amanullah’s reforms half a century earlier: revolt <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
countryside. It began <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Herat – the traditi<strong>on</strong>al homeland of the now dispossessed Abdali tribes - <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 1979. It spread rapidly to other parts of the country, particularly when mullahs began to exhort the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> to choose between the Communist Manifesto and the Koran. In Kabul, a split developed between<br />
Taraki and his deputy prime m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ister, Hafizullah Am<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Taraki apparently secured Soviet support for his<br />
positi<strong>on</strong>, but Am<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> acted quickly and had Taraki assass<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated. Am<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> assumed power but was apparently not<br />
favoured by the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>. In December 1979, Soviet forces entered <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Am<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was killed and<br />
Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham facti<strong>on</strong>, was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stalled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> power. 18<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> war of nati<strong>on</strong>al liberati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and civil war <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s<br />
For the next twenty years, the Afghan state was almost entirely eclipsed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1980s were a decade of<br />
Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong>, the 1990s of civil war 19 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al situati<strong>on</strong> changed completely <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1990s<br />
follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the collapse of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> and the end of the Cold War. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> had been a strategic<br />
lynchp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> two bipolar c<strong>on</strong>flicts for nearly two centuries: the Great Game and the Cold War. After 1990, it<br />
rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed a strategic lynchp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, but the players changed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> collapsed, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> States lost<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s regi<strong>on</strong>al neighbours - from Pakistan, Iran and the new Central Asian states to<br />
Saudi Arabia - now began to back their proxies <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the new struggle for the mastery of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In the<br />
result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g civil war, which spanned the 1990s, state failure was still manifest. Warlordism and particularistic<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>alism, the perennial problems of the country, c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to be part cause and part c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the<br />
failure of a pan-Afghan state and identity. It was precisely <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these two decades that an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
became firmly established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. It flourished <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s of war and anarchy. It then became part<br />
of a vicious circle, c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the perpetuati<strong>on</strong> of war and anarchy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next secti<strong>on</strong> of this chapter tries<br />
to expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> how the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> became entrenched <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and 1990s.<br />
2.2. Opium and the war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
In c<strong>on</strong>trast to India, Iran and other parts of Asia, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was not really a ‘traditi<strong>on</strong>al crop’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It was not cultivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most parts of the country until the 1990s. Unlike many other countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the regi<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> did not have much of an ‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> culture’. Thus, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>, until recently,<br />
d<br />
A movement which began <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mid-1950s, lead by Egypt, India, Ind<strong>on</strong>esia and Yugoslavia, which sought a foreign policy alternative<br />
to alliance with either the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> or the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> States.<br />
87
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed relatively low. Only <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a few parts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, such as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Badakshan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the north<br />
of the country, could <strong>on</strong>e speak of someth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g like an ‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traditi<strong>on</strong>’; but even this does not appear to date<br />
back much l<strong>on</strong>ger than the 18 th century. 20<br />
It was <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 20 th century, notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its last two decades, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> emerged as an<br />
important <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producer. Afghan authorities reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 20 th century though it<br />
was then still very modest. In the 1920s and 1930s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> participated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the meet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of the<br />
Permanent Central Opium Board e under the auspices of the League of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>. At the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Opium<br />
C<strong>on</strong>ference of 1924, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> reported poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Herat (western <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>),<br />
Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and Jalalabad (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounts produced, however,<br />
were still very small compared to other report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries or the amounts produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
1990s. Opium producti<strong>on</strong> was essentially c<strong>on</strong>f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to just three prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
was reported from 22 out of 28 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. No producti<strong>on</strong> was reported, at that time, from the southern<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Helmand and Kandahar, which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 accounted for more than half of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. In 1932, the first year for which quantitative estimates of producti<strong>on</strong><br />
were provided, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced 75 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Ch<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>a, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> comparis<strong>on</strong>, produced about 6,000 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the same year 21 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1932 was reported to be less than 4,000 hectares. For<br />
comparis<strong>on</strong>, 92,000 hectares were under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, 82,000 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, the year<br />
of the Taliban ban, some 7,600 hectares were cultivated produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 185 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, more than twice the<br />
amounts reported back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1932.<br />
In 1945, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> prohibited <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, but some smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g through India c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued. 22<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, producti<strong>on</strong> had fallen to 12 t<strong>on</strong>s by 1956 23 , and another law to prohibit producti<strong>on</strong> was<br />
promulgated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1957. Subsequent reports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated, however, that the country was unable to enforce the<br />
ban. Thus, dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the 1961 Plenipotentiary C<strong>on</strong>ference for the adopti<strong>on</strong> of the S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle C<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Narcotic<br />
<strong>Drugs</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was listed am<strong>on</strong>g the countries “…<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which narcotics c<strong>on</strong>stitute a serious problem”. 24<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to worsen. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> report of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Board <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1970 noted that<br />
while <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was forbidden by the Afghan Government, the outflow of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to adjo<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that the ban was not be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g enforced. 25 In 1971, the view was expressed at the Commissi<strong>on</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong> Narcotic <strong>Drugs</strong> that the attitude of the government of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was perhaps too passive 26 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> resp<strong>on</strong>se<br />
to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s recogniti<strong>on</strong> that illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g place and its stated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ability<br />
to achieve a significant suppressi<strong>on</strong> of producti<strong>on</strong>. As early as 1972 the Board listed <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
those countries which presented the str<strong>on</strong>gest immediate challenge <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of c<strong>on</strong>trol of illicit producti<strong>on</strong><br />
and traffic. Turkey abolished <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1972, and it was already clear that <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> could<br />
become an alternative source of supply. 27 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same year the Board sent representatives to Kabul to review<br />
the situati<strong>on</strong> and c<strong>on</strong>cluded that the capacity of the country to effectively implement drug c<strong>on</strong>trol policies was<br />
limited. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most acute problem was found to be <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakhshan. Representatives of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Food and Agriculture Organisati<strong>on</strong> were also part of the delegati<strong>on</strong> with a view to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itiat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g projects for crop<br />
substituti<strong>on</strong> and community development. 28<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1970s witnessed basic changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market. Between 1972 and the early 1980s<br />
three ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sources of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, were enforc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g bans or severe drug<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol laws, creat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an open<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for other sources of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-West Asia. 29 In <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
meanwhile, the PDPA Government lost c<strong>on</strong>trol of the countryside after resistance to Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong><br />
began <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1979-80. Most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas thus slipped out of the c<strong>on</strong>trol of the government.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> deteriorated as a result of the fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (food producti<strong>on</strong> fell by half to two thirds)<br />
and this meant that grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g urban populati<strong>on</strong>s were more and more dependent <strong>on</strong> government assistance. 30<br />
Both sides of the war relied <strong>on</strong> imports of arms and cash, which resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a rapid m<strong>on</strong>etizati<strong>on</strong> of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 31 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that the mujahideen were us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the producti<strong>on</strong> and sale of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance some weap<strong>on</strong>s needs. An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly structured and formalized ec<strong>on</strong>omic system grew from this<br />
nascent “drugs for arms trade.” Opium was <strong>on</strong>e of the <strong>on</strong>ly commodities which could generate enough<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for large scale arms purchases. In parallel, there was a shift <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> agricultural livelihood strategies as the<br />
collateral damage from years of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tense fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g destroyed other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come generat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities. Shr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
sources of illicit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al market - Iran effectively prohibited poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> after the 1979<br />
e <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> predecessor of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Board (INCB).<br />
88
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
revoluti<strong>on</strong> 32 - made <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to an alternative source of supply. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> trend became clear <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s:<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternal factors were lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to an upsw<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> while external factors were open<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
major markets, ensur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ec<strong>on</strong>omic viability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> importance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at the global level<br />
6000<br />
Opium<br />
5000<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
79%<br />
other countries<br />
4000<br />
70% 74%<br />
3000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of global<br />
52%<br />
2000<br />
42%<br />
1000<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
19% 31%<br />
0<br />
11%<br />
Figure 2<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 and 2002 and UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ant role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> global <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> is essentially a story of the last<br />
two decades. It started with the war <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1979 which, from a war of liberati<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st foreign occupati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
changed its character to a civil war am<strong>on</strong>g various mujahedeen facti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s. From the middle of<br />
1990s, it changed aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, becom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a military c<strong>on</strong>flict between the Taliban (mostly Pashtuns) and a coaliti<strong>on</strong><br />
of various ethnic m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the north of the country.<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> grew at an average rate of 15% per annum over the 1980-2000<br />
period, almost twice as fast as the global <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> growth rate of 8%. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced<br />
about 19% of world <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1980, this proporti<strong>on</strong> grew to 52% by 1995, the year prior to the Taliban takeover,<br />
and rose to 79% by 1999.<br />
By the late 1980s, the almost total breakdown of the central government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a<br />
weaken<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of social and legal c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts <strong>on</strong> the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. Those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the cultivati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g both peasants and landless labourers, had been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> it<br />
for at least a decade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y had developed and expanded know-how and technical expertise and were us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
established markets, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure and trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g systems. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, although labour<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive, had proven to be a susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able alternative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prevail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g circumstances. Opium itself is a<br />
durable commodity and commands higher prices than other agricultural products. Because fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> can<br />
be reta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed and stocked by farmers and sold later as dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the product itself gave farmers crucial<br />
collateral to use for access to credit and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment. Moreover, the stocks of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> play an important<br />
role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the overall price structure of the crop, enabl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers to hedge aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st both oversupply and underproducti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Though a large part of the transport <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure had been destroyed by the fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, the various<br />
facti<strong>on</strong>s had a direct <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g what was necessary for the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade - giv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> a market<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly viability while markets for other crops c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to deteriorate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> had<br />
thus reached a critical mass. It was firmly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> existence, provid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g fund<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for various activities. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g m<strong>on</strong>etizati<strong>on</strong> of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> necessitated by the war had created <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for cash based<br />
activities. Am<strong>on</strong>g these, the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> emerged as <strong>on</strong>e of the most lucrative for a large sector of<br />
the populati<strong>on</strong>. 33<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
1980<br />
1982<br />
1984<br />
1986<br />
1988<br />
1990<br />
1992<br />
1994<br />
1996<br />
1998<br />
2000<br />
2002*<br />
89
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Though the Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong> triggered the development of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the withdrawal of<br />
the Soviet forces, the dissoluti<strong>on</strong> of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> and the end of the Cold War, meant that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> became even more entrenched <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s domestic <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average annual growth<br />
rate for the producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was 14% between 1979 and 1989, but it accelerated to 19%<br />
between 1989 and 1994.<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> accelerated after the Soviet withdrawal for two reas<strong>on</strong>s. First, it provided a viable<br />
source of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for warr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g facti<strong>on</strong>s. Sec<strong>on</strong>dly, it had proven itself to be a viable crop for cultivati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
rural livelihood and, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast to the destroyed licit agricultural sector, had developed systems and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure which actually functi<strong>on</strong>ed. After the Soviet withdrawal and through the mid 1990s, sources of<br />
external support and patr<strong>on</strong>age of the various fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g facti<strong>on</strong>s lessened. 34 This forced facti<strong>on</strong>s which were<br />
still fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to devise new sources of f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Opium was the first and best opti<strong>on</strong> available.<br />
As war raged <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> became an important method of generat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come and thereby,<br />
almost <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sically, developed further the systems of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment and growth which had begun <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s.<br />
In parallel, food prices rose by factors of five or ten and the government f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anced its grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g budget deficits<br />
by pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g m<strong>on</strong>ey. 35 People lost faith <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the currency and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly became a means of sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and<br />
exchange.<br />
It should also be noted that the expansi<strong>on</strong> of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> over the 1980s and 1990s<br />
occurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> tandem with a general degradati<strong>on</strong> of practically all social and ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators. While official<br />
statistics provided by the regime <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>ly showed a fall of the country’s gross<br />
domestic product (GDP) by 16% over the 1980-1990 period (with the agricultural sector fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by 29% over<br />
the same period) 36 , the actual decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es were probably higher. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was c<strong>on</strong>siderable destructi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
country follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Soviet withdrawal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the years from 1990 to 1992. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to another set of statistics,<br />
used by the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Centre for Humanitarian Report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, the gross nati<strong>on</strong>al product (GNP) per capita fell<br />
from an already very low level of $222 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1984 to $164 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1991 37 , a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e by more than a quarter <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seven<br />
years and – compared with published UNDP figures – the third lowest GNP per capita figure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world<br />
after Mozambique and Ethiopia 38 . (Mozambique and Ethiopia also had severe civil wars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1991). If <strong>on</strong>e<br />
takes the 1981 GDP per capita ($250) f as a basis for comparis<strong>on</strong>, the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per capita figures amounted<br />
to more than a third over the decade. But the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s total GDP could have been even<br />
larger because many people fled the country or were killed. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g estimates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> that about<br />
9% of the populati<strong>on</strong> were killed between 1978 and 1989 and a third fled the country 39 , the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of overall<br />
GDP amounted to almost 60% over the 1981-1991 period. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to yet another set of statistics, GDP<br />
was estimated by UNDP - as part of its Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Acti<strong>on</strong> Plan of 1993 -, to have amounted to Af124.7 bn<br />
or $1.72 bn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1991/92 compared to Af117 bn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1978/79 40 or $2.6 bn, i.e. a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e by some 50% based <strong>on</strong><br />
nom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al US-dollar figures. If the calculati<strong>on</strong> is based <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stant US-dollars (i.e. tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
account), the real decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> close to 60%.<br />
In the rural areas, where about 85% of the populati<strong>on</strong> lived before the war, and with agriculture<br />
account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for 68% of all employment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country (estimates for 1998), 41 the situati<strong>on</strong> was not much<br />
better. Between 1979 and 1989 regular agricultural producti<strong>on</strong> was severely disrupted. Between half and two<br />
thirds of all villages were bombed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amount of live-stock fell by 70% 42 Between a quarter and <strong>on</strong>e third of<br />
the country’s irrigati<strong>on</strong> systems were destroyed. 43 About <strong>on</strong>e third of all farms were aband<strong>on</strong>ed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fertilizer availability and affordability lowered crop yields further; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some areas fertilizer use<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 90 percent. 44 Thus, by 1988 total food producti<strong>on</strong> had decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to around 45% of the level<br />
prevail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g before the Soviet <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vasi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1979. 45 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> country had to import 500,000 t<strong>on</strong>s of wheat annually<br />
from the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>. 46 This went hand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hand with a severe depopulati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rural parts of the country:<br />
a third of the populati<strong>on</strong> fled the country between 1978 and 1989 and 11 percent became <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternal refugees,<br />
migrat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the urban centres. 47<br />
All of this also had an impact <strong>on</strong> foreign trade. Both legal exports and imports, as shown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IMF data, fell<br />
over the 1980-1995 period by 94%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> parallel <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> meant that the<br />
two time series, exports and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, showed a very str<strong>on</strong>g negative correlati<strong>on</strong> (R = -0.93),<br />
suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that the more the overall ec<strong>on</strong>omic situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country deteriorated, the more farmers opted –<br />
as a strategy for survival - for grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy.<br />
f<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP’s Human Development Report 1997, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was $250 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1981. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most low <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries, such as <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, GNP and GDP figures tend to be of similar magni1000tudes, it seems<br />
justifiable to use GDP data as a proxy for GNP and vice versa.<br />
90
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and legal exports<br />
5000<br />
1000<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
4000<br />
670<br />
729<br />
567<br />
235<br />
13 0<br />
111<br />
26<br />
3000<br />
600<br />
2000<br />
400<br />
1000<br />
200<br />
0<br />
0<br />
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002<br />
800<br />
Legal exports <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong><br />
Exports<br />
Figure 3<br />
Sources: IMF, Internati<strong>on</strong>al F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial Statistics Yearbook 1998; Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Report May 1991 and May 1992; UNODCCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and<br />
UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002<br />
Through the early 1990s the civil war c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued and all ec<strong>on</strong>omic activity was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly<br />
subord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated to support<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the power struggles between the various facti<strong>on</strong>s. A large <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry had arisen to<br />
provide the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure - transport, communicati<strong>on</strong>s, arms, and protecti<strong>on</strong> - which the warr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g facti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
needed to reta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their z<strong>on</strong>es of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fluence. This was <strong>on</strong>e comp<strong>on</strong>ent of the new war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> which grew up<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>; the other two comp<strong>on</strong>ents were a transit trade l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the regi<strong>on</strong> and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>traband orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) under which goods can be<br />
imported duty-free <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sealed c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Pakistan, for <strong>on</strong>ward transmissi<strong>on</strong> to land-locked <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
This trade gradually developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a reverse directi<strong>on</strong> from the 1980s, with goods orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Persian<br />
Gulf and transit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It is thus known as the transit trade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure of the trade began to<br />
be used for drugs and arms, and came firmly under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol after 1996, when they c<strong>on</strong>solidated their<br />
hold over practically all the country’s roads, cities, airports and customs posts 48 .<br />
By 1994 the Taliban emerged as a major c<strong>on</strong>tender <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the struggle for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y were<br />
supported, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia, by the powerful transport enterprises of Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which did not want<br />
to c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue pay<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g tolls to an ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g number of warlords, which had brought domestic trade with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> almost to a standstill. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Taliban movement grew out of some segments of the Afghan<br />
diaspora of the 1980s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> emigrati<strong>on</strong> or destructi<strong>on</strong> of the elites and the collapse of the state created a<br />
vacuum. Educati<strong>on</strong> was also a factor. No educati<strong>on</strong> was available to young Pashtun refugees, who<br />
c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. A network of madrassas (Islamic<br />
academies) dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated by ulema (Muslim priests) were established to supply the educati<strong>on</strong>. Drawn from the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>servative Deobandi traditi<strong>on</strong> (a movement which began <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 19 th century India to combat modern and<br />
secular traditi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Islam 49 ) these madrassas and ulema were supported by foreign aid from countries which<br />
sought to bolster anti-Soviet movements <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> social capital created <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the madrassas banded<br />
together to create the Taliban movement, whose objective was to resist warlordism and corrupti<strong>on</strong>. 50 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Taliban first took the city of Kandahar and established themselves <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the southern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y seized<br />
Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1996. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> war c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued but was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some of the northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces.<br />
Other parts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, albeit under the c<strong>on</strong>trol of a highly repressive regime, enjoyed at least a sort of<br />
peace.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first years of the Taliban regime were thus not <strong>on</strong>ly characterized by a poor human rights record,<br />
but also by a moderate ec<strong>on</strong>omic recovery <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> areas of the country that had become free of military c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> country’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrial sector was largely destroyed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the battles of the 1980s and the 1990s, but<br />
91
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
agricultural producti<strong>on</strong>, notably wheat producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g fallen throughout the 1980s and<br />
early 1990s (see Figure 4). Livestock herds rose <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> numbers, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g advantage of widely available unutilized<br />
graz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g lands, and horticultural producti<strong>on</strong> also grew based <strong>on</strong> restorati<strong>on</strong> and expansi<strong>on</strong> of orchards and<br />
v<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>eyards. 51<br />
3,500,000<br />
Wheat producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(1975-2002)<br />
3,000,000<br />
2,500,000<br />
2,000,000<br />
1,500,000<br />
1,000,000<br />
500,000<br />
0<br />
1975<br />
1977<br />
1979<br />
1981<br />
1983<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
1985<br />
1987<br />
1989<br />
1991<br />
1993<br />
1995<br />
1997<br />
1999<br />
2001<br />
Figure 4<br />
Source: FAO.<br />
In parallel, trade resumed. Exports and imports also improved, though legal exports as of 1999 were<br />
still 83% less than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1980. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> removal of barriers to trade and restorati<strong>on</strong> of a certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> degree of order also<br />
facilitated the growth of all k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds of unofficial ec<strong>on</strong>omic activities, notably l<strong>on</strong>g-distance trade, the<br />
unc<strong>on</strong>trolled exploitati<strong>on</strong> of natural resources – timber, germs, marble, granite etc. (which resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
extensive deforestati<strong>on</strong> and envir<strong>on</strong>mental degradati<strong>on</strong>) and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry.<br />
Thus, the ec<strong>on</strong>omic recovery <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the mid 1990s did not entail a reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Between 1996, when the Taliban took c<strong>on</strong>trol of most of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and the year 1999, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong><br />
doubled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 27%, almost twice <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s l<strong>on</strong>gterm<br />
growth rate of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> over the 1980-2000 period. While the Taliban orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally had planned to<br />
prohibit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, they gave up <strong>on</strong> this plan <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> power, and restricted the drug prohibiti<strong>on</strong> to<br />
cannabis <strong>on</strong>ly. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> acceptance of the agricultural tax, known as ushr (usually 10%) and the zakat (usually<br />
20%) by the mullahs and the local authorities was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpreted by the farmers and it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers as an<br />
implicit support for the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. 52 In additi<strong>on</strong>, the Taliban also received taxes from the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that some of the local Taliban commanders and mullahs were<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>ally <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. Even more important, a number of warlords, who were already<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, surrendered to the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange for the promise to c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue with their<br />
lucrative <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess. Both the Taliban and various groups fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st them (“Northern Alliance”)<br />
benefited from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and trade. However, as most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas were<br />
under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol, the largest profits out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were also reaped by the Taliban.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al isolati<strong>on</strong> of the Taliban regime over its violati<strong>on</strong>s of human rights, support of<br />
terrorism and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> led to the Security Council impos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sancti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
October 1999. 53 A m<strong>on</strong>th earlier, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> September, the Taliban had tried to prevent such sancti<strong>on</strong>s by issu<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
decree order<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all poppy farmers to reduce their cultivati<strong>on</strong> area by <strong>on</strong>e third. A subsequent UNDCP<br />
survey, undertaken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that the actual reducti<strong>on</strong> achieved by the decree was <strong>on</strong>ly 10%. Total<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> fell by 28% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 but this was ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly due to the added effects of a severe drought.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest was still the third highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s history. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
value of the entire crop of fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, though <strong>on</strong>ly roughly half the value of a year earlier, was US$91<br />
milli<strong>on</strong>. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that the traditi<strong>on</strong>al 10% (ushr) and 20% (zakat) taxes <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> were collected<br />
by the Taliban, tax <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from farmers amounted to some $27 milli<strong>on</strong>. 54 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s share <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> global illicit<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was 70% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year.<br />
92
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ever str<strong>on</strong>ger criticism from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community for the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ability to c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country (as well as for human rights violati<strong>on</strong>s and support for terrorism) and the<br />
threat of even str<strong>on</strong>ger UN sancti<strong>on</strong>s, which would have jeopardized <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s lucrative transit trade, the<br />
Taliban supreme leader issued a decree (27 July 2000) impos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a total ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong><br />
the Islamic Emirate of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Fear of greater <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al isolati<strong>on</strong> and UN advocacy to take steps to<br />
reduce <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> also played role. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was also speculati<strong>on</strong> that some of the traders, back<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
regime, may have pushed this decisi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> anticipati<strong>on</strong> of ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prices and thus an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the value of<br />
their <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks. Early reports from 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that the ban was be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g enforced vigilantly. 55 A<br />
comprehensive UNDCP ground survey c<strong>on</strong>firmed that overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 fell by 94% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, back to the level of the early 1980s. Rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was basically c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
areas not c<strong>on</strong>trolled by the Taliban. Though the Taliban successfully implemented the ban, they had not<br />
offered any alternatives to the farmers. This caused extreme hardship to a significant number of farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a<br />
year <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was experienc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a severe drought and thus very poor yields for other crops.<br />
Overall crop producti<strong>on</strong> was more than halved and livestock herds were heavily depleted, eras<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s<br />
made s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the mid 1990s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> with the <strong>on</strong>go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drought meant that malnutriti<strong>on</strong><br />
worsened and cases of starvati<strong>on</strong> deaths were reported. 56<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> massive re-plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the demise of the Taliban regime showed that the<br />
Taliban ban was not susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able <strong>on</strong>ce the regime had disappeared. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Interim Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> issued a new<br />
ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> 17 January, 2002. By that time, however, farmers had already sown their<br />
fields. UNDCP’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy survey found that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, 74,000 hectares were under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 3,400 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, i.e. about the same level as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000.<br />
Box 1: Chr<strong>on</strong>ology <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – Recent Events<br />
1994: Taliban emerge as a political (ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly Pashtun) force <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> south-eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>; they prohibit<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of drugs but do not prevent producti<strong>on</strong> or trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates. Producti<strong>on</strong> of hashish, by c<strong>on</strong>trast,<br />
is forbidden.<br />
1996: Taliban take c<strong>on</strong>trol of most of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
1996 to 1999: Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> doubles.<br />
1999: Bumper harvest ( 90,583 ha., <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> of 4,565 mt.). Under <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al pressure,<br />
Taliban ordered a reducti<strong>on</strong> of cultivati<strong>on</strong> by <strong>on</strong>e third.<br />
2000: Actual cultivati<strong>on</strong> reducti<strong>on</strong> achieved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 was <strong>on</strong>ly about 10%. Opium producti<strong>on</strong>, however, reduced by<br />
about 30% to 3,276 mt., because of drought. Cultivati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to be c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> south, Helmand<br />
(52%) prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and east, Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (24%).<br />
27 July 2000 Taliban decree impos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a total ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, but not <strong>on</strong> trade. Issued prior to the plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
seas<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> October.<br />
2001 harvest 185 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (91% decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong>; 94% decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>); 83% of cultivati<strong>on</strong> took<br />
place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan (north), which was not under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol. Area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakashan<br />
more than tripled. Sec<strong>on</strong>d largest produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce was Samangan (north; 8% of total) which was also not<br />
fully under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol. Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce ceased to produce; area <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar fell to 3% of total.<br />
Oct. 2001<br />
Start of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al campaign aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st terrorism, led by the USA, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>;<br />
22 Dec. 2001 Interim Government under Hamid Karzai sworn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
17 Jan. 2002 Interim Government imposes a new ban <strong>on</strong> cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy; however, farmers had already sown<br />
their fields.<br />
Feb. 2002<br />
UNODCP Pre-assessment identifies widespread cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
3 April 2002 Interim Government issues decree <strong>on</strong> eradicati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, offer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g compensati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially $250<br />
per jerib ($1250 per ha.); later <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to $300 per jerib ($1750 per ha).<br />
8 April 2002 Eradicati<strong>on</strong> campaign beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s.<br />
June 2002<br />
April-<br />
August 2002<br />
Late Aug. 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Authority (TA), under Hamid Karzai, takes office for 18 m<strong>on</strong>ths till general electi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
UNODCP 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey (published <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> October), c<strong>on</strong>ducted over the April-August period<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds 74,000 ha under cultivati<strong>on</strong>, produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some 3400 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Authority (TA) issues a new ban of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>, process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
93
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
Col<strong>on</strong>el Sir Henry Yule, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Book of Ser Marco Polo (2 vol.s, 3 rd ed, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1903).<br />
H.A.R. Gibb (ed.), <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Travels of Ibn Batuta (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1958).<br />
Babur-nama: Memoirs of Zahir-ud-d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Muhammad Babur (Translated by A.S. Beveridge, 2 vol.s, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1922).<br />
cf. the early account by Sir John William Kaye, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> History of the War <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, (2 vol.s, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1851), passim, and a later<br />
<strong>on</strong>e by Philip Mas<strong>on</strong>, A Matter of H<strong>on</strong>our: An Account of the Indian Army, its <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>rs and Men (Harm<strong>on</strong>dsworth, 1976),<br />
pp.219-225.<br />
Victoria Schofield, Every Rock, Every Hill: A Pla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tale of the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> 1987), passim.<br />
Michael Howard, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> C<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ental Commitment (Harm<strong>on</strong>dsworth, 1974), pp.14-15, and Peter Hopkirk, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Great Game (Oxford,<br />
1990), passim.<br />
For an account of the negotiati<strong>on</strong>s, see Schofield, op.cit., pp. 60-63,105-108.<br />
Of the many studies of the Pashtuns/Pathans, cf. Olaf Caroe, who was British Governor of the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce from<br />
1946 to 1947, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pathans (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1958), and J.W. Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Way of the Pathans (L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 1962).<br />
Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Le Territories de l’Opium (Olizane, Genève, 2002).<br />
Sandeep Chawla, “Middle East or South Russia: C<strong>on</strong>tradicti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> British Imperial Strategy, 1917-1919” <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Proceed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of the Indian<br />
History C<strong>on</strong>gress, 1976 (Calicut, 1976).<br />
On the Khilafat movement, see Gail M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ault, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Khilafat Movement (Oxford University Press, 1982); <strong>on</strong> Pan-Islamic c<strong>on</strong>necti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
between India and the Middle East, see Sandeep Chawla, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Palest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Issue <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Indian Politics”, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> M. Hasan (ed), Communal and<br />
Pan-Islamic Trends <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Col<strong>on</strong>ial India (New Delhi, 1980).<br />
On the role of the British Royal Air Force <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier, see Schofield, op.cit., pp. 152-153, 169-172.<br />
Schofield, op.cit., p. 247.<br />
J.W. Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pathan Borderland (<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Hague, 1963).<br />
Barnett R. Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Fragmentati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: State formati<strong>on</strong> and Collapse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Internati<strong>on</strong>al System ( 2 nd Editi<strong>on</strong>, New<br />
Haven and L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 2002), p. 20.<br />
Anth<strong>on</strong>y Arnold, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Hoover Instituti<strong>on</strong> Press, Stanford, 1983).<br />
Chris Bowers “A Brief History of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Edward Girardet and J<strong>on</strong>athan Walter (eds) , Essential Field Guides to<br />
humanitarian and c<strong>on</strong>flict z<strong>on</strong>es: <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Internati<strong>on</strong>al Centre for Humanitarian Report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g / CROSSLINES Global Report,<br />
Geneva 1998) p. 98.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se events rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>troversial and it will be some time before a comprehensive historical picture can be assembled. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y are<br />
detailed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, op.cit., pp. 107-121, and summarized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Schofield, op.cit., pp. 277-292, and Bowers, op.cit., pp. 100-101.<br />
For a detailed treatment of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this period, see Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, op.cit., pp. 107-280.<br />
UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001, p. 30.<br />
League of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Permanent Central Opium Board, Pre-War Producti<strong>on</strong> and Distributi<strong>on</strong> of Narcotics <strong>Drugs</strong> and their Raw<br />
Materials, Geneva, 1944;O.C./C<strong>on</strong>fidentiel/18 (3); Statistiques relatives Opium brut (1926-1937).;C.124.M.113.1940.XI.<br />
(O.C.1781.(1)), Annual Reports of Governments <strong>on</strong> the Traffic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium and other dangerous <strong>Drugs</strong> for the Year 1938;CCP<br />
Rapports aux c<strong>on</strong>seils pour 1947.<br />
“Opium Producti<strong>on</strong> Throughout the World”, <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics, Vol. I, No.1, October 1949, p. 12.<br />
As <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> endnote 26 above.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics, Vol. XIV, No.1, January - March 1962, p. 41.<br />
Report of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Board, 1970 (E/INCB/9); also see summary <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics,<br />
Vol. XXIII, No. 3, July - September 1971, p. 33.<br />
E/5082, E/CN.7/544, Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Narcotic <strong>Drugs</strong>, Report of the Twenty-Fourth Sessi<strong>on</strong>, para 344; also see summary <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics, Vol X1V, No. 1, January - March 1972.<br />
Report of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Board, 1972 (E/INCB/17) paras 63 - 70; see also summary <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics, Vol XXV, No. 2, April-June 1973.<br />
Report of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Board, 1973 (E/INCB/21); see also summary <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics,<br />
Vol XXVI, No 3, July-September 1974.<br />
UNDCP, World Drug Report 2000 (Oxford University Press, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>), pp.142-43.<br />
Barnett R Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>” , World Development, Vol 28, No 10, 2000, p.1792.<br />
ibid., p. 1792.<br />
UNDCP, World Drug Report 2000, op.cit., p. 142.<br />
Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, op.cit., p. 1793.<br />
ibid., p. 1792.<br />
ibid.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Accounts Statistics: Ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Aggregates and Detailed Tables 1991, Part I, p. 3.<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Centre for Humanitarian Report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, Essential Field guides to humanitarian and c<strong>on</strong>flict z<strong>on</strong>es – <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Geneva,<br />
1998, p. 103.<br />
UNDP, Human Development Report 1994.<br />
Marek Sliw<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ski, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Decimati<strong>on</strong> of a People, Orbis, W<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter 1989, p53.<br />
IMF, Internati<strong>on</strong>al F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial Statistics Yearbook 1988, p. 181.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Strategy, Volume IV, p. 51.<br />
ibid., pp. 9-33.<br />
Ibid., pp. 78-87.<br />
ibid., p. 41.<br />
Ibid., p. 73.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> Strategy, Volume IV, p. 41.<br />
Sliw<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ski, op.cit., p. 53.<br />
For a detailed analysis of the transit trade, see Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”,<br />
op.cit. pp. 1793-95.<br />
Francis Rob<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s<strong>on</strong>, Separatism am<strong>on</strong>g Indian Muslims, Cambridge University Press, 1975<br />
94
Chapter II. Historical roots of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
56<br />
Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”op. cit., pp. 1794,1797, and W. Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn?<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the Taleban, New York, St. Mart<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s Press, 1998.<br />
World Bank, Brief overview of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Ec<strong>on</strong>omy, October 2001, p. 2.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #5, November 1999, p. 4.<br />
S/RES/1267 (1999), 15 October 1999; the sancti<strong>on</strong>s were to come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to effect from 14 November.<br />
This follows the analysis <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, op. cit., p. 1796, which uses UNDCP<br />
data for the 1999 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> crop.<br />
UNDCP, 2001 Opium Poppy Pre-Assessment Survey, February 2001.<br />
World Bank, Brief Overview of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Ec<strong>on</strong>omy, October 2001, p. 2.<br />
95
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Chapter III<br />
POVERTY,<br />
DEVASTATION AND<br />
FARMERS’ MOTIVATIONS<br />
97
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
3. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
This chapter tries to expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> why Afghan farmers got <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous chapter<br />
laid out the macro-level c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s that allowed an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> to develop <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: the l<strong>on</strong>g term failure<br />
of the state as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong> and the degradati<strong>on</strong> of agriculture and most ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure because of more<br />
than twenty years of war. All of this facilitated the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al decisi<strong>on</strong> to<br />
plant <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy and expand its cultivati<strong>on</strong>, however, was still with the farmers. This chapter tries to explore<br />
the micro-level factors that played a key role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se factors are<br />
related to profitability, know-how and employment opportunities, the role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a cash-crop and as a source<br />
of credit a . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first two issues will be dealt with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this chapter, the latter two <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e.<br />
3.1. An expensive crop produced with cheap labour (women and children)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first, and most obvious reas<strong>on</strong> for the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was its higher profitability<br />
compared to other crops. Farmers are known to have reacted to price signals, some of these <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stances are listed<br />
below. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y all suggest that profitability c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s play an important role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the decisi<strong>on</strong> to plant <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
In 1995, a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices and thus a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare by 30% led to a<br />
reducti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> by some 25% from 1994 to 1995.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most significant annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease (about 40%) of the area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s<br />
occurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. In the same year, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy per hectare had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased by<br />
about 20% and was some 40% more than average annual gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come over the 1994-98 period.<br />
In 2000, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices fell by 30% (and gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare fell by as much as 45% as a result<br />
of the drought), and the area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 9%.<br />
In 2001, overall cultivati<strong>on</strong> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by more than 90% as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the Taliban ban.<br />
However, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the areas not affected by the ban, the land used for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> tripled while gross<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare from poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> rose seven-fold as a result of far higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices.<br />
In 2002 estimates show that average gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> was twice<br />
as high as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g better yields as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the use of irrigated land) and<br />
about 15 times higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. At the same time, estimates suggest that the area under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> have <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased about 10-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 as compared to 2001.<br />
Farmers cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy found that the agr<strong>on</strong>omic advantages of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> could<br />
be profitably exploited. As the poppy crop <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some parts of the country (e.g. Azra district <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Logar Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce,<br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), can be harvested several weeks earlier than wheat, it is possible to sow maize and thus<br />
obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a gra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> crop, rather than just a fodder crop for livestock if they had planted wheat. By cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g poppy,<br />
farmers thus achieved a double crop, rais<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g overall profitability 1 . Other advantages cited by farmers were that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is a more reliable and weather resistant crop, with the added advantages of be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g easy to store,<br />
easy to transport and easy to sell, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>directly affect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the crop’s profitability. 2<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is also an important account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g issue which affected profitability calculati<strong>on</strong>s and created a bias<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. Research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s found that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> calculat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits, seed, fertiliser, and hired<br />
labour were usually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded as costs by the farmers. 3 Farmers, however, did not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude the cost of family<br />
labour, despite its crucial role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the cultivati<strong>on</strong> and harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy and related activities b .<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> zero value put <strong>on</strong> family labour cost reflects the fact that there were almost no alternative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
earn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opportunities for women follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban take-over <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s. Speak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic terms, female labour (wives and daughters) can be regarded as fixed costs for the farmers (hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
a<br />
D. Mansfield, “Alternative development: the modern thrust of supply-side policy” UN Bullet<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> Narcotics, Vol. LI, Nos. 1 &2, 1999, pp.<br />
19-44. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 build <strong>on</strong> the work of David Mansfield, who, when he worked for UNDCP, did much of the research published<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Strategic Studies, referenced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the end-notes below.<br />
b<br />
In UNDCP field work <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, both women and children were seen actively <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 and subsequent years. This, however, was not the case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were women were rarely seen work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g outside the<br />
c<strong>on</strong>f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es of the home due to the c<strong>on</strong>servatism of the tribes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the area. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, women there also c<strong>on</strong>tributed actively to the success<br />
of the harvest. Three good quality meals and tea are a standard part of the payment of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters. This is entirely <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the hands of<br />
women and a major task given the size of the hired workforce at harvest time. (See UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #5, An Analysis<br />
of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, November 1999, p. 14.<br />
99
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
to supply them livelihood). Like other fixed assets, their costs hardly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease or fall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e with their utilizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
(More work <strong>on</strong> the field will <strong>on</strong>ly translate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a slightly higher food cost, at most). Female labour c<strong>on</strong>stituted a<br />
fixed cost because it was not redeployable for uses other than work with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the household.<br />
This had implicati<strong>on</strong>s for the relative profitablity of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy vis a vis other crops. Opium poppy is a<br />
highly labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive crop. Estimates suggest that approximately 350 pers<strong>on</strong> days are required to cultivate <strong>on</strong>e<br />
hectare of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy compared to 135 pers<strong>on</strong> days per hectare for black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 41 pers<strong>on</strong> days per<br />
hectare for wheat. Opium harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g al<strong>on</strong>e requires some 200 pers<strong>on</strong> days per hectare. 4 In other words, the<br />
labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity of the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>e hectare of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is 2 to 3 times greater than for black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
8 to 9 times greater than for wheat.<br />
Given the high labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, the zero-cost put <strong>on</strong> family labour shifts the overall<br />
profitability calculati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> favour of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of a poppy farmer was calculated to<br />
amount to 0.5 ha (data for 1999), requir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> total, 175 pers<strong>on</strong> days of work <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a year. Except for the harvest<br />
time, when 100 pers<strong>on</strong> days, <strong>on</strong> average, are needed for 0.5 ha over a rather short period of time (some two<br />
weeks), the rest of the work (75 pers<strong>on</strong> days for 0.5 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a year) can be easily managed by <strong>on</strong>e pers<strong>on</strong><br />
dedicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e fifth of his or her overall work-time to poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> (sow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, weed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g etc.). With 100 pers<strong>on</strong><br />
days required over a two week period, a total of 7 pers<strong>on</strong>s a day, <strong>on</strong> average, have to work <strong>on</strong> the field to harvest<br />
0.5 ha under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Given the fact that family participati<strong>on</strong> plays an important role, the requirement<br />
for external help for 0.5 hectares is probably limited to about 3 pers<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> average, equivalent to 42 pers<strong>on</strong> days<br />
over the harvest period. This means that hired labour is likely to account for just about a quarter of total work<br />
(42 pers<strong>on</strong> days / 175 pers<strong>on</strong> days). Thus three quarters of the total work d<strong>on</strong>e by family members rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s<br />
unaccounted for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitability calculati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
This would <strong>on</strong>ly change if <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come earn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g employment opportunities for family members, notably women,<br />
were to be created <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g z<strong>on</strong>es. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>n female labour would not automatically be ‘free’ thus<br />
reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g – ceteris paribus - the profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> development of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitability over the 1999-2002 period and its ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ants will be<br />
analysed below and c<strong>on</strong>trasted with gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come derived from legal crops. This analysis, partially based <strong>on</strong><br />
qualitative research undertaken by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s, is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tended to provide some <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sight<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the decisi<strong>on</strong> mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g process of Afghan farmers to plant <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy.<br />
3.1.1. High profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the results of UNDCP’s 1999 Opium Poppy Survey and the prices for fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, weighted<br />
by producti<strong>on</strong>, a farmer could earn a gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of, <strong>on</strong> average, about $2000 per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 c , some 20<br />
per cent more than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998.<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> average (unweighted) dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices, a farmer could earn a gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $2700 per<br />
hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 d . About a fifth of this amount was paid to it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers as wages e . Other costs were more<br />
or less negligible. Given the average land hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g village of 1.6 hectares per household, of<br />
which 0.2 hectares (or 1 jerib) were under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per<br />
household <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g village was around $430 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 f . Actual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers was<br />
still higher, simply because not all farmers were produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Based <strong>on</strong> UNDCP estimates of around<br />
200,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers g about 40% of the 487,000 households <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas were produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> per poppy farmer was thus 0.5 hectares and the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from<br />
c<br />
This is the result of a producti<strong>on</strong> of 4565 t<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> 90583 ha (after eradicati<strong>on</strong>), equivalent to an average yield of 50.3 kg per hectare and an<br />
average price (weighted by producti<strong>on</strong>) of $40 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
d This is the result of a yield of 50.3 kg per ha and an unweighted average price of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> of $53.4, equivalent to $2,688 per hectare.<br />
e Research d<strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, showed that it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant<br />
harvesters typically received <strong>on</strong>e fifth to <strong>on</strong>e quarter of the total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> yield. In the years before, they typically received <strong>on</strong>e sixth to <strong>on</strong>e fifth.<br />
(UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study 34, Access to Labour: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant Harvesters Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1999, p. 19.)<br />
f<br />
Calculati<strong>on</strong>: $2688*0.8* 0.2=$430.<br />
g<br />
NDCP, Opium Poppy Survey 1997, p. 12.<br />
100
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was $1075 per <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmer <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to other estimates, the figure could<br />
have been even higher h .<br />
Whatever the precise figure, the net profits were substantial as compared to other crops. Interviews<br />
undertaken by UNDCP researchers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 13 districts across the country, revealed that <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, almost four times more profitable than legal crops <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia the fact that the bulk of<br />
the legal crop was wheat, which, throughout the 1990s, had significantly lower returns than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. High<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices and thus a high profitability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy played a key role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> area under <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> rose by more than 40% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 as compared to a year earlier,<br />
the highest such <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle year over the previous two decades. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> high profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both<br />
absolute and relative terms, resulted from two factors:<br />
<br />
<br />
Opium prices were relatively high, at around $60 per kilogram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and close to<br />
$100 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> over the September 1998 – February 1999 period, compared to prices<br />
of, <strong>on</strong> average, less than $40 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> or $70 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> a year earlier,<br />
thus favour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the decisi<strong>on</strong> to sow poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> late 1998 for the 1999 harvest.<br />
At the same time, there were price decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es for all k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds of licit agricultural products. Prices for<br />
cucumber, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 70% dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the 1998 seas<strong>on</strong>; prices of <strong>on</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s dropped over the<br />
same period, by some 65%. Pakistani traders dump<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g surplus agricultural products <strong>on</strong> the Afghan<br />
market were blamed for the low prices. Str<strong>on</strong>g price decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es were also reported for timber and other<br />
forest products. 5 Wheat prices fell as well by, <strong>on</strong> average, some 10% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. 6<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, otherwise attractive crops such as black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which requires three years before provid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
a return, were heavily damaged due to heavy hail and ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. Farmers po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ted out that this was another<br />
reas<strong>on</strong> to switch to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, which – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their eyes - c<strong>on</strong>stituted a ‘lower risk’ annual crop.<br />
Farmers, notably return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g refugees, also blamed the high cost of build<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g materials and the lack of<br />
outside support for the rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of their houses, as <strong>on</strong>e of the key reas<strong>on</strong>s why they decided to opt for<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. 7<br />
Another reas<strong>on</strong> was traditi<strong>on</strong>al rivalry and peer pressure. Traditi<strong>on</strong>al competiti<strong>on</strong> for socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
stand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between peers, particularly am<strong>on</strong>g cous<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s - which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtun culture is known as tarboorwali –<br />
prompted several resp<strong>on</strong>dents to experiment with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. 8<br />
F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally, resp<strong>on</strong>dents used social-religious arguments. Almost half of the 9000 Afghan pilgrims who make<br />
the pilgrimage Haj to Mecca, which every Muslim is enjo<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to do, were from Helmand, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s largest<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s. 9 Profits from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> were judged by farmers<br />
as the <strong>on</strong>ly possibility to acquire the funds necessary.<br />
3.1.2. Decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
In 2000, UNDCP undertook, an evaluati<strong>on</strong> of its Alternative Development Pilot Project, which was<br />
implemented between 1997 and 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> three target districts (Ghorak, Khakrez and Maiwand) of Kandahar<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Data provided <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the annual poppy survey showed that the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> fell to<br />
about $1100 per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e by 45% compared to a year earlier ($2000 per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999), due<br />
to lower yields per hectare as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the drought, and lower <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices after the 1999 bumper<br />
harvest. i<br />
h Based <strong>on</strong> a FAO/WFP estimate, which put the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers at just 80,000, <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e out of six farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas would have been produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This would have raised average area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> to 1.2 hectares and average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmer to about $2,580 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> FAO/WFP figure, however, is possibly an underestimate of the total number of poppy<br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers, as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purpose of the FAO/WFP Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong>, c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May 2001, was not to identify this<br />
number but the number of farmers at ec<strong>on</strong>omic risk as a result of the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ban. (FAO/WFP Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong><br />
to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, May 2001, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, p. 41).<br />
i <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> precise figure calculated was $1071 per hectare, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average annual yield of 39.9 kg/ha and an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of $26.9<br />
kg. (See UNDCP, Alternative Development Report #1, On-Farm Income Opportunities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Maiwand, Khakrez and Ghorak, October 2000, p.<br />
6.)<br />
101
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> evaluati<strong>on</strong> found that the use of better seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, better cultivati<strong>on</strong> techniques and<br />
other k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds of assistance provided by UNDCP as part of its Alternative Development Project <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the three districts,<br />
were able to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the yield of licit crops substantially. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> project found that the traditi<strong>on</strong>al ways of cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
agricultural products <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were often not very efficient, leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g much room for improvement. Thus, the<br />
yield of maize was raised per hectare by 125%, wheat by 95%, white cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> by 86%, beans by 67%, <strong>on</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s by<br />
60% and black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> by 50%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> yields of fruits were raised substantially as well (apples 39%, apricots 63%,<br />
alm<strong>on</strong>ds 64%, grapes 100%, pomegranate 140%). In additi<strong>on</strong>, prices of the crops, which had plummeted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1998, recovered aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. Prices of <strong>on</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, which had fallen by 64% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 tripled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of wheat, which had fallen by 10% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased by a quarter.<br />
As a c<strong>on</strong>sequence, a number of legal crops showed higher returns than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. While the gross<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy reached some $1100 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from alm<strong>on</strong>ds was has high as $14,800 per<br />
hectare, gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from grapes reached $6000, from black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> $4800, various fruits (apples, apricots,<br />
pomegranates) between $4300 and $4600, and <strong>on</strong>i<strong>on</strong>s $3600 per hectare. Income from wheat, beans and maize<br />
improved c<strong>on</strong>siderably but rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed below <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy.<br />
Table 1: Profitability of legal crops versus <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> three target districts of UNDCP’s<br />
alternative development project Kandahar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
Area Yield: t<strong>on</strong> / ha Price Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Income per hectare<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ha<br />
before after<br />
before<br />
after <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventioventioventi<strong>on</strong><br />
before <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-<br />
after <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventioventioventi<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-<br />
US$ / t<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter-<br />
Change<br />
W<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter crop<br />
Wheat 1,216.0 1.8 3.5 240 525,120 1,021,440 95% 432 840<br />
Black Cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 120.0 0.9 1.35 3539 382,212 573,318 50% 3,185 4,778<br />
White cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 120.0 0.7 1.3 1000 84,000 156,000 86% 700 1,300<br />
Oni<strong>on</strong> 48.0 15.0 24.0 148 106,560 170,496 60% 2,220 3,552<br />
Summer crop<br />
Maize 2,266.0 2.0 4.5 138 625,554 1,407,186 125% 276 621<br />
Bean 920.0 1.35 2.25 296 367,632 612,720 67% 400 666<br />
Orchards<br />
Grape 29.6 10 20 300 88,800 177,600 100% 3,000 6,000<br />
Pomegranate<br />
37,453<br />
20.3 7.5 18 246<br />
89,888 140% 1,845 4,428<br />
Apple 6.0 18 25 185 19,980 27,750 39% 3,330 4,625<br />
Alm<strong>on</strong>d 2.6 11 18 823 23,537 38,516 64% 9,053 14,814<br />
Apricot 2.5 8 13 329 6,580 10,692 62% 2,632 4,277<br />
INCOME FROM<br />
LEGAL CROPS<br />
4,751 2,267,428 4,285,606 89% 477 902<br />
Area<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ha<br />
Yield:<br />
t<strong>on</strong> / ha<br />
Price<br />
US-$ /<br />
t<strong>on</strong><br />
Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Income per hectare<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
INCOME FROM<br />
1,889 0.0301 26,228 1,492,651 790<br />
OPIUM POPPY<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Alternative Development Report #1, On-Farm Income Opportunities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Maiwand, Khakrez and Ghorak,<br />
October 2000, and UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
As a result of all of the alternative development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s, the average yield of legal crops could be<br />
raised by some 90%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of legal crops thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to $902 per<br />
hectare, and exceeded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ($790 per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the three target districts).<br />
Parallel to higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from legal crops, the area under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the three target districts<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, a significantly higher reducti<strong>on</strong> than the overall decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of 9% reported for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
as a whole. Without improved yields, the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy per hectare would still have been 66%<br />
higher than the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from legal crops <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the target districts.<br />
102
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> three target districts<br />
for alternative development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
alm<strong>on</strong>d<br />
$9,053<br />
$14,814<br />
grape<br />
$3,000<br />
$6,000<br />
black cum <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
$3,185<br />
$4,778<br />
apple<br />
pomegranate<br />
$1,845<br />
$3,330<br />
$4,625<br />
$4,428<br />
after <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong><br />
before <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong><br />
apricot<br />
$2,632<br />
$4,277<br />
<strong>on</strong>i<strong>on</strong><br />
$2,220<br />
$3,552<br />
white cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
$700<br />
$1,300<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
wheat<br />
bean<br />
maize<br />
$1,071<br />
$840<br />
$432<br />
$666<br />
$400<br />
$621<br />
$276<br />
$0 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 $8,000 $9,000<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – Alternative Development Report #1, On-Farm Income<br />
Opportunities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Maiwand, Khakrez and Ghorak, October 2000.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> data also show that for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a whole the improvements reported from the three districts<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar would not have been sufficient to make legal crops more profitable than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy (see Figure<br />
2). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> nati<strong>on</strong>al average gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was $1071 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, thus still above the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
from legal crops <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the three target districts of Kandahar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce ($902). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lower returns reflect the fact that<br />
most of the legal crops <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the three districts (and the same would probably be true if such projects were extended<br />
to other districts) were wheat as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter crop and maize as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> summer crop. Although both staple<br />
crops have lower returns than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, the gap - over a four year period – was, follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g alternative<br />
development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s, reduced to less than 20% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000.<br />
Gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
versus legal crop <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> three districts of Kandahar<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
$1,200<br />
$1,071<br />
$1,000<br />
$902<br />
US-$ per ha<br />
$800<br />
$600<br />
$400<br />
$200<br />
$477<br />
Three districts average<br />
$790<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
average<br />
$0<br />
prior to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong><br />
after<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong><br />
Opium Opium<br />
Legal crops<br />
Opium poppy<br />
Figure 2<br />
Sources: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Alternative Development Report #1, On-Farm<br />
Income Opportunities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Maiwand, Khakrez and Ghorak, October 2000 and<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000.<br />
103
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
3.1.3. Enormous profitability <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and 2002<br />
Given the massive rise of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (a result of the poppy ban) profitability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased dramatically <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year. Despite fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g yields (a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the drought and the<br />
prohibiti<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> which affected primarily the irrigated land of southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>),<br />
average gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come per hectare rose from about $1100 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to $7400 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, a seven-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> just<br />
<strong>on</strong>e year.<br />
Such profits acted as a major <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive for farmers across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to resume <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>ce<br />
the Taliban regime collapsed by the end of 2001. While legal crops had a realistic chance to compete with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy at prices reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000, this was no l<strong>on</strong>ger the case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 <strong>on</strong>ce modern producti<strong>on</strong><br />
techniques were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troduced.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> became even worse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002. Based <strong>on</strong> an average yield of 46 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per hectare and<br />
an average price of $350 per kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (weighted by producti<strong>on</strong>) 10 , calculati<strong>on</strong>s of the likely gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from<br />
poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> suggest that a hectare yielded, <strong>on</strong> average, some $16,100 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 ($17,980 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar,<br />
$17,330 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and $7450 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan: $6620 <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land and $8900 <strong>on</strong> irrigated land j . Gross<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come thus doubled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 as compared to 2001 and was more than ten times higher than the average annual<br />
gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come over the 1994-2000 period (close to $1500 per hectare).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 was ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly due to higher yields, which<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased by more than 80% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the shift back to cultivati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> irrigated land. Opium poppy prices<br />
rose by 10% as compared to a year earlier. At these gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come levels no other crop which could be planted<br />
<strong>on</strong> a large scale would be competitive vis á vis <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Average gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
per hectare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (1994-2002)<br />
$18,000<br />
$16,000<br />
$16,100<br />
$14,000<br />
$12,000<br />
$10,000<br />
$8,000<br />
$7,363<br />
$6,000<br />
$4,000<br />
$2,000<br />
$1,456<br />
$1,016<br />
$1,356<br />
$1,619 $1,649<br />
$2,012<br />
$1,107<br />
$0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*<br />
* Estimate based <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvested w as sold at prices prevalent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July/August 2002.<br />
Figure 3<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 and previous years.<br />
A reducti<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a scenario of such high profits - can <strong>on</strong>ly be achieved with a strategy<br />
that has two elements: (a) rigorous implementati<strong>on</strong> of the ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> across the country and<br />
(b) the creati<strong>on</strong> of a security belt around <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> close co-operati<strong>on</strong> with the Afghan authorities, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order<br />
to reduce the outflow of opiates from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, thus lower<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the demand for opiates with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. Once<br />
j<br />
Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce: $333 * 54 kg/ha = gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $17,982 per ha; Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce: $385 * 45 kg/ha = gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $17,325<br />
per ha; Badakshan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce: $207 * 36 kg/ha = gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $7,452 per ha, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-fed land: $207 * 32 kg/ha = gross<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $6624 per ha; irrigated land: $207 * 43 kg/ha = gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $,8901 per hectare).<br />
104
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
demand is reduced, prices will fall automatically, reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for farmers to opt for poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Alternative development is necessary to reduce the negative c<strong>on</strong>sequences and enable susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able<br />
development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> when farmers cease plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. But alternative development efforts<br />
al<strong>on</strong>e, though important for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s medium and l<strong>on</strong>g-term future, cannot provide sufficiently str<strong>on</strong>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for farmers to give up plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g poppy. Profitability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is simply too high, at least for the<br />
time be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
400<br />
Average labor <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> compared to other crops<br />
350<br />
pers<strong>on</strong> days per year<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
135<br />
41<br />
0<br />
Opium poppy Black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Wheat<br />
Figure 4<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #4, June 1999.<br />
3.2. Diffusi<strong>on</strong> of know-how by it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers<br />
High profits were a key reas<strong>on</strong>, but not the <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e to expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
1990s. Know-how was also important. In <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> know-how is needed for obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the appropriate<br />
seeds, for sow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, for the identify<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the best time to harvest, for lanc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and collecti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as well as for<br />
sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> identificati<strong>on</strong> of mature <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy capsules and the proper <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the capsule requires<br />
experience if the maximum yield is to be obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. Lanc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> capsules prior to full maturati<strong>on</strong>, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance,<br />
will significantly affect the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al yield. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> depth of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cisi<strong>on</strong> also affects the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al yield significantly. If the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cisi<strong>on</strong><br />
is too deep the sk<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of the capsule will be cut and the latex will oxidise <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the capsule; if the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cisi<strong>on</strong> is too shallow,<br />
the flow of the latex will be c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. 11<br />
Opium poppy has been grown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some locati<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for many decades, but its spread across<br />
the country has been a phenomen<strong>on</strong> of the 1990s. How has the necessary know-how spread? Research<br />
undertaken by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s found typical patterns for the spread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which ethnic and family l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks,<br />
commercial trade l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks and, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> particular, the labour market played an important role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the establishment of poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> new areas.<br />
Opium poppy is a highly labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive crop. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity of the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>e<br />
hectare of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy was found to be two to three times larger than the labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity for black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
eight to n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e times larger than the labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensity for the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>e hectare of wheat. About 350 pers<strong>on</strong><br />
days are required for 1 hectare under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> of which 200 pers<strong>on</strong> days are required at harvest time,<br />
usually a period of two to three weeks.<br />
105
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the year does not c<strong>on</strong>stitute much of a problem. Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a bumper<br />
crop year (1999) it requires the work of less than 90,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s k , but the situati<strong>on</strong> becomes critical at harvest<br />
time. One can assume that about 14 people a day over a two week period (200 pers<strong>on</strong> days) are required to<br />
harvest <strong>on</strong>e hectare of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. In 1999, the peak year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, some 91,000<br />
hectares of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy were harvested. This requires a force of almost 1.28 milli<strong>on</strong> people l , up from 750,000<br />
people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995 (calculated <strong>on</strong> the basis of the labour requirements for the harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 53,800 hectares<br />
cultivated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that year).<br />
Tentative estimate of (maximum) labour requirements<br />
dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time<br />
1,400,000<br />
1,200,000<br />
Number of pers<strong>on</strong>s<br />
1,000,000<br />
800,000<br />
600,000<br />
400,000<br />
480,000<br />
600,000<br />
It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour<br />
Family members*<br />
Part-time poppy farmer<br />
Full-time poppy farmer<br />
200,000<br />
-<br />
120,000<br />
80,000<br />
Labour requirement dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time<br />
* <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total number of family members is likely to be higher (up to 800,000) as it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant<br />
w orkers also assist their ow n families.<br />
Figure 5<br />
Sources: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Surveys 1997 and 1999, UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Strategic Study #4, June 1999 and FAO/WFP Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong>, May 2001.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se estimates could be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as ‘maximum estimates’ because not all harvests take place at<br />
the same time. This provides labour with some flexibility to shift between districts and prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
actual number of people needed for any total number of pers<strong>on</strong> days required for harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (8.2<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong> days <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 = 91,000 ha *200 pers<strong>on</strong> days per hectare). On the other hand, farmers with less than<br />
0.07 hectares (1 ha /14 pers<strong>on</strong>s = 700 m 2 ) under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> are less than fully employed dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy harvest. Research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some districts of eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> showed that 40% of the farmers produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy had <strong>on</strong>ly 0.05 hectares or less under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 m . Similarly, family members, notably<br />
women, usually do not work full-time <strong>on</strong> the fields at harvest times as they also have household duties. All of this<br />
means that labour resources do not all work at full capacity for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. This <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases the overall<br />
number of pers<strong>on</strong>s needed for any total number of pers<strong>on</strong> days required for the poppy harvest (calculated <strong>on</strong> the<br />
basis of full-time work). Given these oppos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g biases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the calculati<strong>on</strong>s, the overall ‘estimate’ of 1.28 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
pers<strong>on</strong>s for 1999 probably does not deviate too much from the actual number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
harvest.<br />
UNDCP estimates the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s to have been around 200,000,<br />
suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that a farmer needed, <strong>on</strong> average assistance from another five pers<strong>on</strong>s dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
If FAO’s estimate of around 80,000 professi<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy farmers is used, a large-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmer would<br />
have needed the assistance of around 15 additi<strong>on</strong>al pers<strong>on</strong>s dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time.<br />
k<br />
(91,000 ha *350/360) (Source: UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002, October 2002.)<br />
l This is a maximum estimate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> actual number of people at harvest time is probably lower as there are staggered harvests enabl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant<br />
workers to travel from village to village. Moreover, if the durati<strong>on</strong> of the harvest is extended to three weeks (21 days), the requirements would<br />
fall from almost 1.28 milli<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s to 0.91 milli<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
m<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> districts (prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces) were Azra (Logar), Tagab (Kapisa), Sarobi (Kabul), K.Jab'r (Kabul), M.Agha (Logar): Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Strategic Study #8, December 1998, p. 53.<br />
106
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
Labour is therefore a key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. Farmers would not be able to cope with the<br />
workload <strong>on</strong> their own. UNDCP research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s found that availability of labour was actually <strong>on</strong>e of the<br />
key factors for determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the extent of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. In other words, availability of labour was a major<br />
limit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g factor with regard to the expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. In many parts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itially tried<br />
to restrict the amount of hectares devoted to poppy to the size that they could handle with family and extended<br />
family labour. Another strategy adopted by farmers was to grow two different varities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy: sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gule<br />
(white flower) and surgule (p<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k flower). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> difference <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the maturati<strong>on</strong> rates of the two varieties allowed<br />
households a 20 day period <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which to harvest the sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gule before beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the harvest of the surgule. 12<br />
With the expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas, the use of different poppy<br />
varieties and of the family as a pool of labour was not enough. A demand for it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour at harvest time<br />
emerged. UNDCP research c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar and Nagarhar (districts of Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand and<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war) found that 70% of the farmers required it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour. 13 FAO estimated that the total number of<br />
it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers amounted to about 480,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first years of the 21 st century, about 6 pers<strong>on</strong>s for<br />
each full-time poppy farmer. 14<br />
It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers were, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, paid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d, usually <strong>on</strong>e sixth to <strong>on</strong>e fifth of the harvest. In the<br />
bumper harvest of 1999, labour shortages meant that it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers could reck<strong>on</strong> with <strong>on</strong>e fifth to <strong>on</strong>e quarter<br />
of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest. 15 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y subsequently sold this <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> bazaars en route.<br />
Requirement of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce* for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvests<br />
No. of<br />
farmers<br />
manag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
with family<br />
labour<br />
30%<br />
No. of<br />
farmers<br />
requir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labor<br />
70%<br />
* districts of Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiw and and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>w ar.<br />
Figure 6<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #4, Access to Labour: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role<br />
of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant Harvesters Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1999. p. 15.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g need for it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvesters c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the rapid spread of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s. It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers often orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated from adjacent districts, though there were also<br />
it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers from other prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> spread of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> largely followed the pattern of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant<br />
labour. Poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> usually expanded to adjacent districts, but pockets of cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> distant prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces,<br />
usually the homes of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers, were also found (also see Chapter 1.5).<br />
Only a m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ority of the it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 were landless (<strong>on</strong>e<br />
third) while a majority (two thirds) actually had landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 16 , though these hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs were sometimes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sufficient<br />
to satisfy their subsistence requirements. Landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs am<strong>on</strong>g the it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed ranged from<br />
less than <strong>on</strong>e sixth of a hectare to four hectares. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average was four fifths of a hectare. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of<br />
the it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers were thus, <strong>on</strong> average, half the size of the average landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of farmers (1.6 ha per<br />
household <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs showed that it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers<br />
could make use of their acquired know-how <strong>on</strong> their own land.<br />
107
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed experience with various aspects of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> and hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g established the<br />
necessary c<strong>on</strong>tacts to sell the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the same it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labourers, <strong>on</strong>ce back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their village, began to experiment<br />
with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> themselves. In the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial year, cultivati<strong>on</strong> would have been undertaken <strong>on</strong> an experimental<br />
basis because of uncerta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ty about the crop’s f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al profitability. In subsequent years, however, an ever larger<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of land was dedicated to poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> with the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> limit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g factor hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g been access to labour<br />
at harvest time. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> small plots of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy also exposed other families to the crop, thus c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the<br />
spread of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the locality. 17 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> existence of an agricultural tax (ushr) levied <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> by the<br />
mullas and local authorities, farmers assumed as an implicit support for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Many better-off<br />
farmers then started grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as well. 18<br />
In the absence of other employment opportunities, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> also represented a viable<br />
cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g strategy for refugees <strong>on</strong> their return to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> n . Some refugees actually had worked as it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant<br />
labourers <strong>on</strong> poppy farms <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, while others crossed the border to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and worked there <strong>on</strong> poppy<br />
fields, before return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the refugee camps after the harvest seas<strong>on</strong>. Hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g thus ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed experience <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong>, the refugees, <strong>on</strong> their ‘official’ return to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and their home villages, transformed their knowhow<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to practice.<br />
To sum up the discussi<strong>on</strong> so far, it can be c<strong>on</strong>cluded that access to labour and to know-how are two key<br />
factors <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. Both were widely available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the spread of poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> know-how required for poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> is now widely diffused across the<br />
country, and any future policy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong> must take this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong>, however, is different with regard to access to labour. Availability of labour is critical to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> at harvest time. Thus <strong>on</strong>e major aim of policy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s could be to reduce the level of<br />
available labour dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest time. Labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive public works (rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of roads, irrigati<strong>on</strong> systems,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>ally f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anced projects to improve the storage and preservati<strong>on</strong> of perishable crops. etc), for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance,<br />
should be timed to take place dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest time. Even if such public works do not absorb all the labour<br />
surplus, labour costs would rise, reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, ceteris paribus, the profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s for poppy farmers.<br />
Care, however, would have to be taken to prevent other groups from fill<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g possible labour shortages.<br />
In 1998, there were reports, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, of Afghans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> refugee camps <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for a couple of weeks<br />
to participate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the poppy harvest as it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers before return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the camps. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re were also reports<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that large numbers of students were found am<strong>on</strong>g it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant workers and that whole colleges <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g border regi<strong>on</strong>s of Pakistan) de-facto stopped functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest<br />
time.<br />
Opium poppy harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g usually beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> early April <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> low altitude areas and c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to the end of<br />
May and early June <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> medium altitude areas. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> bulk of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy is planted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> low and medium altitude<br />
areas (Helmand, Nangarhar etc.). It is over the April-May period that labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive public work programs and<br />
c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of exams would have the greatest impact. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is also harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy beg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
early July (e.g. Badakshan) which can c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue until late September <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> high altitude areas (e.g. Zebak). However,<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these areas is limited and thus labour, at least for the time be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, would not really c<strong>on</strong>stitute the<br />
ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> limit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g factor.<br />
n<br />
Another UNDCP study found that the return of refugees and displaced populati<strong>on</strong> and the expansi<strong>on</strong> of poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> did not have a<br />
general direct correlati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey could not discern dist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ct differences between the relative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of recently returned families and<br />
l<strong>on</strong>ger established families to adopt <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> as a livelihood opti<strong>on</strong> . N<strong>on</strong>etheless, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some districts the the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flux of refugees<br />
co-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cided with the start of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. (See UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #8, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a livelihood<br />
Strategy for Returnees, December 2000, p. 13, p. 16 and p. 24.).<br />
108
Chapter III. Poverty, devastati<strong>on</strong> and farmers’ motivati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #8, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Livelihood Strategy for Returnees, December 2000, p. 26<br />
ibid., p. 30.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #1, An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1998, p. 12.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategy Study #4, Access to Labour: the Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters<br />
Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, June 1999, p.2.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #5 An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
November 1999, p. 14.<br />
UNDCP, Opium Poppy Survey data, 1998 and 1999.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #5 An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
November 1999, p. 14.<br />
ibid., p. 16.<br />
ibid., p. 14.<br />
UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002, October 2002.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategy Study #4, Access to Labour: the Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters<br />
Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, June 1999, p. 15.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #1, An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1998, p. 10.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategy Study #4, Access to Labour: the Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of It<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant harvesters<br />
Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, June 1999, p. 7.<br />
FAO/WFP Food Supply Assessment Missi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends<br />
2002, p. 41.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #4, Access to Labour: the Role of Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Livelihood Strategies of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant Harvesters<br />
Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, p. 19.<br />
ibid.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #1, An Analysis of he Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy Cultivati<strong>on</strong> to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, June 1998, p. 2.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #5 An Analysis of the Process of Expansi<strong>on</strong> of Opium Poppy to New Districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
November 1999, p. 4.<br />
109
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
Chapter IV<br />
BAZAARS, FINANCE AND<br />
NARCO-USURERS<br />
111
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
4. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> use of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of credit is closely l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to the lack of a functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system. Opium<br />
traders usually offered credit to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers and thus began to play the additi<strong>on</strong>al role of m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders. Given<br />
the result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders, farmers’ access to credit became<br />
limited to those who were able to provide future <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvests as collateral. This chapter analyses how these<br />
m<strong>on</strong>ey lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s were organised; their profitability; and how <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> became an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegral part of the<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
4.1. Opium as a source of credit<br />
In c<strong>on</strong>trast to most other crops grown by Afghan farmers, which are cultivated to meet subsistence<br />
requirements, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy emerged as the country’s ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cash crop. C<strong>on</strong>sumer goods such as clothes and<br />
household equipment as well as c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> work are usually paid out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. However, the role of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> goes further. Reliable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s to deposit funds <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> have been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> short supply over the last<br />
decade, notably s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the Taliban came to power and prohibited the charg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest. No formal banks<br />
existed for people to deposit their sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs a . Sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs were thus either <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vested <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses of relatives and/or<br />
handed over to m<strong>on</strong>ey traders/lenders who would <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vest the sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs and then share the profit or loss with the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestors. 1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se possibilities are rather risky forms of sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for ord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary citizens. Informal sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g groups exist,<br />
often promoted or set-up by NGOs, but their role is limited. Thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas, people usually turned<br />
to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as the typical form of household sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Opium is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, n<strong>on</strong>-perishable (can be easily stored for<br />
8 years or more), and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general it has had a more stable value than the Afghan currency. Opium can immediately<br />
be c<strong>on</strong>verted to cash, either to meet an emergency need, or to arbitrage aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st favourable market prices. Over<br />
the mid 2000 to mid 2002 period, holders of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> could ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>siderable w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dfall profits as a result of the tenfold<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices (expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the US$).<br />
From an ec<strong>on</strong>omic po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view, the role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of credit has been even more important.<br />
UNDCP fieldwork c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar and Kandahar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s, which will be discussed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more detail below b , revealed that loans were an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegral part of household livelihood strategies. In many cases,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> represented the <strong>on</strong>ly form of credit available, given the absence of a functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g formal credit system <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector was already very weak by the late 1970s, but it suffered<br />
damage <strong>on</strong> an unprecedented scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, notably after the Taliban had taken c<strong>on</strong>trol over <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
and implemented a narrow <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpretati<strong>on</strong> of Islamic bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. This led to the de-facto bankruptcy of the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
system and provided the country’s impetus for the emergence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> source of credit <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many rural<br />
areas <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s. A brief review of the evoluti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector and its crisis is found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Box<br />
1.<br />
Box 1. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> evoluti<strong>on</strong> of the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sector <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s first modern banks were established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1930s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first bank was the Banke Millie<br />
Afghan, also known as Afghan Nati<strong>on</strong>al Bank, founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1933. It was a basically private bank (with some state<br />
hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g) operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g under a government m<strong>on</strong>opoly c<strong>on</strong>cessi<strong>on</strong> (sherkat). In additi<strong>on</strong> to its commercial operati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
it was also given the right to issue the Afghan currency and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>troduced paper m<strong>on</strong>ey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1939. In order to<br />
circumvent the Koranic prohibiti<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the charg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest, it developed a system of so-called ‘m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
tickets’. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> bank granted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest free loans, but borrowers were obliged to pay for a stamp that had to be<br />
attached to each repayment receipt, thereby giv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the bank a fee <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stead of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. It<br />
opened overseas branch offices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi, Hamburg, Berl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> and New York, thus help<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Afghan<br />
entrepreneurs to develop <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al trade relati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
a Prior to the Taliban take-over, more than half of the country’s private deposits were held by Da <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bank, the country’s central bank.<br />
(Source: IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002, p. 33 and p. 47.)<br />
b <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> discussi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of credit will draw heavily <strong>on</strong> the results of UNDCP field work <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> the subject <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #4, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal Credit, January 1999<br />
113
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
In 1939, the Afghan government set up the Da <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bank. It took over all of the central bank’s<br />
functi<strong>on</strong>s from Banke Millie and held <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s foreign reserves. In additi<strong>on</strong>, it became the country’s lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
commercial bank, hold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g most of the country’s private deposits. A few specialised banks were founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
1950s and some more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1970s*.<br />
In the mid 1970s, prior to the communist take-over, the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sector was nati<strong>on</strong>alised (1975/76). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rates were fixed, typically earn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between 9% and 11% and thus less than the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flati<strong>on</strong> rate. Little<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive was thus created to place m<strong>on</strong>ey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Afghan banks (At the time, loans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal m<strong>on</strong>ey bazaars<br />
started at 24% p.a.).<br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the communist coup d’etat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1978 the formal bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sector deteriorated further. Interest rates<br />
set by the central bank rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed below <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flati<strong>on</strong>. As a result sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs were often not channelled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
sector and companies faced credit rati<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g throughout the 1980s. Large-scale nati<strong>on</strong>alized enterprises were,<br />
de-facto, given priority <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the process. Most of these enterprises were subsequently destroyed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the war. Hardly<br />
any m<strong>on</strong>ey was left for small and medium sized companies or for the credit requirements of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals. Bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
operati<strong>on</strong>s and thus decisi<strong>on</strong> mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g were centralised <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul. This meant that prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cial areas were largely<br />
ignored. In additi<strong>on</strong>, security issues became a c<strong>on</strong>cern and were another factor beh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d low levels of deposittak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
and lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1990s, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally, were a time of complete chaos. Except for the central bank, all of the others failed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the war-ravaged ec<strong>on</strong>omic envir<strong>on</strong>ment of the 1990s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Taliban made lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g practically impossible by<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> a narrow-m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpretati<strong>on</strong> of Islamic bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, dismiss<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g qualified staff, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all female staff,<br />
while lack<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the experience to operate the banks themselves. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall staff employed by Afghan banks<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by four fifths dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban era to just 700 pers<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> management staff of the country’s banks<br />
were replaced by Taliban. Most of them were graduates of the madrasas, the rural Islamic academies, and some<br />
of them were mullahs. In general, most had no background or experience <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omics, commerce or f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance.<br />
When they left follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the demise of the Taliban regime, the banks had been plundered <strong>on</strong> a vast scale with<br />
almost no assets left. Before the Taliban left Kabul they also took with them the entire stock of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g foreign reserves, c<strong>on</strong>sist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of $6 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> U.S. dollar bills and $1 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistani rupees. One<br />
private Islamic bank emerged temporarily dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Taliban era, which ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly served to receive capital from<br />
foreign countries to support the militia. But it subsequently disappeared aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, leav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g noth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g but a name plate<br />
beh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial system today c<strong>on</strong>sists of the central bank, the Da <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bank, which<br />
(<strong>on</strong> paper) also functi<strong>on</strong>s as a commercial bank, another two universal commercial banks and four sectoral<br />
lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s. Although all of them are 100% state-owned, they, as of early 2002, were little more than<br />
empty shells and hardly operati<strong>on</strong>al.<br />
*) Pashtany Tejaraty Bank (commercial bank for foreign trade), founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1954; C<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> & Mortgage Bank, founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1955,<br />
Agricultural Development Bank, founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1959; Industrial Development Bank, founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1973 and Export Promoti<strong>on</strong> Bank (specialised<br />
for export-oriented SMEs), founded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1978.<br />
(Source: IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: the Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro-Small and Medium Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002.)<br />
Assessments of the situati<strong>on</strong> with regard to the availability of micro-f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g undertaken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002,<br />
c<strong>on</strong>firmed that the situati<strong>on</strong> rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed extremely difficult. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> collapse of the formal f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial sector <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the overall lack of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. Lack of funds was <strong>on</strong>e of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts to<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2 . Re-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment c of profits was not sufficient to cover <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment<br />
requirements, and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit system that had developed over the last two decades could not fulfil this<br />
role. Indeed, 74% of bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> February 2002 (N = 204 micro- and small-scale<br />
enterprises) cited lack of funds as a major obstacle to bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess development and growth. About the same<br />
percentage of bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses also cited the country’s lack of a functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g m<strong>on</strong>etary policy d , c<strong>on</strong>comitant high<br />
c Almost half of all resp<strong>on</strong>dents reported that they regularly re<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vested less than 10% of their profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess; <strong>on</strong>e third re-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vested<br />
between 1 and 25% of the profits while just 5% of the mirco-enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed re<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vested more than 25% of their profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess.<br />
(Source: IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002, p. 30.<br />
d In fact, the country was faced with a situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which at least three different Afghan currencies have been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cirulati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002:<br />
the official Afghani issued by the central bank <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul, an Afghani issued by the Northern Alliance and a third <strong>on</strong>e issued by Mr. Dostum <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the territories under his c<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
114
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flati<strong>on</strong> and the volatility of the local currency as major problems. For comparis<strong>on</strong>, political <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stability was<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered by 45% as a major problem, followed by poor <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure, crime and corrupti<strong>on</strong>. Lack of qualified<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>nel was seen by 3% as a major obstacle, 3 even though - accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to a UNICEF survey c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
– the literacy rate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was extremely low: 53% am<strong>on</strong>g men (age 15 and above) and 6% am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
females 4 . This highlights the fact that the extreme scarcity of funds made most of the other serious problems<br />
appear as sec<strong>on</strong>dary.<br />
Major c<strong>on</strong>stra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts to entrepreneurial<br />
activity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(February 2002; N = 204 micro-enterprises)<br />
lack of funds (credit)<br />
74%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flati<strong>on</strong>, volatility of currency<br />
74%<br />
political <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stability<br />
45%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure<br />
27%<br />
crime<br />
15%<br />
corrupti<strong>on</strong><br />
11%<br />
lack of qualified pers<strong>on</strong>nel<br />
3%<br />
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium<br />
Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank,<br />
March 2002, p. 29.<br />
A Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey c<strong>on</strong>ducted by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> February/March 1998 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> various <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
districts across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> found that 85% of the households <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed (N=600) needed and obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed loans<br />
dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the previous twelve m<strong>on</strong>ths. A more <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>-depth study, though more limited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of number of households<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed (N=108), c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> June-July 1998 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> four target districts of UNDCP’s Poppy Crop Reducti<strong>on</strong><br />
Project <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war), found that 95% of those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed<br />
claimed that they had obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed loans dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the previous twelve m<strong>on</strong>ths.<br />
Importance of credit<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(N = 600 households <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed)<br />
15%<br />
85%<br />
Households hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g taken out a<br />
loan dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g last twelve m<strong>on</strong>ths<br />
No loan taken out<br />
Figure 2<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey, 1998<br />
115
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> need for loans is a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of significant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>equality am<strong>on</strong>g farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, a result<br />
of heavily skewed land distributi<strong>on</strong>. Investigati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> five districts of eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Azra, Tagab, Sarobi,<br />
K.Jab’r and M.Agha) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Logar, Kapisa and Kabul prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces found, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, that 15% of the famers had<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly 0.3 hectare or less, 50% had 0.5 hectares or less and 85% of the farmers had 1 hectare or less at their<br />
disposal for cultivati<strong>on</strong>. 5 Across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> the average size of land under cultivati<strong>on</strong> was 2 hectares <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. 6 Such differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs have a major impact <strong>on</strong> the distributi<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a basically agricultural society. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y help to expla<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> why even people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the relatively rich poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were still so dependent <strong>on</strong> loans.<br />
Land distributi<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g farmers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>*<br />
40.0%<br />
35.0%<br />
34.5%<br />
percent of all land<br />
30.0%<br />
25.0%<br />
20.0%<br />
15.0%<br />
15 .0%<br />
14.2% 15.0% 6.2%<br />
10.0%<br />
5.0%<br />
2.7% 1.8%<br />
3.5%<br />
1.8% 1.8% 0.9%<br />
1.8% 0.9%<br />
0.0%<br />
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 4 10<br />
hectares under cultivati<strong>on</strong> per farmer<br />
* Districts of Azra (Logar), Tagab (Kapisa), Sarobi (Kabul), K.Jab'r (Kabul), M.Agha (Logar)<br />
Figure 3<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #8, December 2000, p. 52.<br />
A socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic survey c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the UN agency Habitat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April 2000 found that <strong>on</strong>ly about <strong>on</strong>e third of the loans (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of number of loans) was<br />
for producti<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment needs; over two thirds of the loans were taken out to cover basic needs, such as<br />
food, cloth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, medical costs and marriages. 7<br />
About three quarters of all loans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural, poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas are provided by shop-keepers and traders;<br />
the rest are provided by family members and friends. 8 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> study of micro-enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul (February 2002)<br />
referred to earlier found that the orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of the loans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> urban areas was quite different. Only <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> four of the<br />
micro-enterprises turned to m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders. Urban m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders usually operate with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the structures of the<br />
bazaar. Roughly 13% borrowed from “other sources” <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that a certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> percentage of the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g probably<br />
came from illegal sources, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g arms and drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. A small number received f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance from NGOs<br />
(3%). About 25% reported that they had never obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed credit from external sources. 9 This is a higher<br />
percentage than found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts (15%) 10 , <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>directly c<strong>on</strong>firm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k between<br />
the availability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and access to credit. Similarly, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas just a quarter of all<br />
loans came from family members, while micro-enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul (which did not have access to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a<br />
source of credit) had to rely far more <strong>on</strong> familiy members: 43% of their loans came from family members.<br />
116
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey revealed that demand for credit <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas was often<br />
seas<strong>on</strong>al: 72% of resp<strong>on</strong>dents obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed their loans between mid September and mid March. In other words, prior<br />
to the 1999 record <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest and the price hike <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, for the bulk of households’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
harvest (tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April) was sufficient to keep farmers go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up to September. In the subsequent m<strong>on</strong>ths<br />
of Maizan and Aqrab, i.e. the mid September to mid-November period, cultivati<strong>on</strong> of the w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter crop began and<br />
households required loans for the purchase of agricultural <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts, such as seeds, fertilizers and power. In<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>, this period is frequently used for marriage cerem<strong>on</strong>ies, which require significant amounts of m<strong>on</strong>ey.<br />
Thus 30% of all resp<strong>on</strong>dents reported that they obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed their <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial loan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these two m<strong>on</strong>ths. A further 42% took<br />
out a loan dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the m<strong>on</strong>ths of Jadee, Dalwa and Hood, represent<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the period from 20 November to 19<br />
February. Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this period, a number of households reported that they experienced food shortages and<br />
obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed the loans to purchase wheat, as well as fertilisers and other agricultural <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts, for the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g year’s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy harvest.<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
M<strong>on</strong>ths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which loans are obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(N = 600 households)<br />
Survey results<br />
Trend-pattern<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
Figure 4<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey, 1998<br />
4.2. Credit available to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> types of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit available to farmers were<br />
the advance sale of a fixed amount of agricultural producti<strong>on</strong> (usually <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>), known as salaam;<br />
the delayed payment for commodities from shopkeepers or traders, and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest free loans from immediate or extended family members<br />
4.2.1. Salaam (advance payments)<br />
By far the most comm<strong>on</strong> form of credit were advances <strong>on</strong> a fixed amount of expected future agricultural<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> (salaam). In four <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts (Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war), located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Nangarhar and Kandahar, close to 80% of all loans taken out by farmers were such advances. This form of credit<br />
was traditi<strong>on</strong>ally given for wheat. Over the last two decades it evolved to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude other cash crops, such as black<br />
cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy. In the late 1990s, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several districts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was de-facto the <strong>on</strong>ly crop<br />
eligible for such advance payments. UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts showed that almost three<br />
quarters of all salaam arrangements were based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Advance sales based <strong>on</strong> the future <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
crop accounted for about 60% of all loans taken out.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> importance of salaam was also c<strong>on</strong>firmed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a study c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 <strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
study <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed 38 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar, Kandahar and Helmand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> June 1998. Over 60% of the traders<br />
provided cash advances to farmers <strong>on</strong> their future <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>. 11<br />
117
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Importance of Salaam arrangements based<br />
<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of credit <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts* of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(N = 103 households who took out a loan)<br />
21%<br />
20%<br />
59%<br />
Salaam<br />
arrangements based<br />
<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Salaam<br />
arrangements based<br />
<strong>on</strong> other crops<br />
Other form of credit<br />
* Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war.<br />
Figure 5<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a<br />
Source of Informal Credit, 1999, p. 9.<br />
While salaam based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is very comm<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the actual amounts lent still seem to be<br />
limited. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same study of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders found that <strong>on</strong>ly about 5% of the total trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was d<strong>on</strong>e<br />
through salaam payments <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 because traders were cautious about the advances they offered. Only <strong>on</strong>e<br />
trader, who was reported to be <strong>on</strong>e of the largest <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Musa Qala (Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce), provided<br />
advance payments <strong>on</strong> approximately 15% of his total trade. Based <strong>on</strong> the estimate of the total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade at<br />
bazaar level of $175 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, the funds channelled through the salaam system can be estimated to be<br />
about US$9 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998.<br />
Tentative estimate of the importance of salaam for<br />
the overall trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
(total <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade at bazaar level:<br />
US$175 milli<strong>on</strong>* <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998)<br />
Cash payments<br />
(95%)<br />
$166 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
Salaam payments<br />
(5%)<br />
$9 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
* based <strong>on</strong> a producti<strong>on</strong> of 2693 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 and a price of $65 per kg<br />
Figure 6<br />
Sources: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> - <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the<br />
Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders, October 1998, p. 14, UNDCP, 1998 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Annual Poppy Survey, UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Given estimates of some 200,000 farmers of which 85% or 170,000 used some type of loan, with 60%<br />
of the latter hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g used salaam <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the average salaam loan to a farmer <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> appears to have been<br />
just $90 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average amounts could have been even smaller as salaam arrangements are not <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
118
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
entered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy farmers but also, to some extent, by sharecroppers. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 UNDCP study <strong>on</strong><br />
the role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a source of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit found that the total amount of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> sold by each household<br />
through salaam <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the four target districts (Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war) ranged from 1 kg to 90 kg<br />
at prices of $10 to $36/kg. This meant that the size of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual loans ranged from just $10 to $3000; based <strong>on</strong><br />
the average price paid to farmers ($17.9), the loans ranged from $18 to $1600. 12<br />
It is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that these were smaller amounts than were given by m<strong>on</strong>ey lenders ($130-$270; average<br />
$200) 13 and significantly lower than the loans taken out by micro- and medium scale enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> latter ranged from less than $100 to more than $5000 with the average loan size of around $2000, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
loans taken from family members 14 .<br />
Overall more salaam arrangements were reported than there were resp<strong>on</strong>dents, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>dents had obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed advances more than <strong>on</strong>ce. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of salaam<br />
arrangements from Maizan (mid-September to mid-October) to Hamal (mid March to mid-April). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> explanati<strong>on</strong><br />
for this phenomen<strong>on</strong> is that the terms of salaam improve with the proximity of the approach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g harvest. Thus<br />
households try to delay the sale of their future produce until it is absolutely essential for them to get cash. In order<br />
to limit the costs, they often sell <strong>on</strong>ly small amounts of their future produce when they are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> urgent need for cash.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>sequently, resp<strong>on</strong>dents reported multiple salaam arrangements. One quarter of all such arrangements takes<br />
place just prior to the time of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy harvest.<br />
35<br />
M<strong>on</strong>ths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which 'Salaam' arrangements were made<br />
(N = 108 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews)<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
survey results<br />
trend pattern<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Figure 7<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal<br />
Credit, January 1999, p. 9.<br />
Costs of such loan arrangements were, extremely high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> payments received as part of the<br />
salaam arrangements for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> turned out to be, <strong>on</strong> average, just 42% of the value of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> at harvest time.<br />
In other words, if a farmer received $42 as an advance, he actually lost $58. This is equivalent to an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate<br />
of 138% for a loan obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for just a few m<strong>on</strong>ths. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average length of a salaam c<strong>on</strong>tract was 3.2 m<strong>on</strong>ths. This<br />
means that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate, <strong>on</strong> an annual basis, amounted to 517% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. Salaam paid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> advance for wheat<br />
and for black cum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turned out to be less costly (with farmers’ receiv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 48% and 54% of the value at harvest<br />
time, respectively). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rates, calculated <strong>on</strong> an annual basis, were n<strong>on</strong>etheless still substantial: 406%<br />
and 319%, respectively.<br />
119
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 1. Cost of salaam for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> four districts* of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Average price at harvest time per kg $ 42.60 100%<br />
Average advance price received per kg $ 17.90 42%<br />
Cost per kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> $ 24.70 58%<br />
Cost <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of advance price 138%<br />
Average length of loan<br />
3.2 m<strong>on</strong>ths<br />
Interest rate <strong>on</strong> an annual basis 517%<br />
Ghorak, Khakrez, Maiwand (Kandahar) and Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war (Nangarhar).<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #4, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 10.<br />
A study c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same year am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce reported that the average<br />
advance <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ranged from $20.8 for farmers who were c<strong>on</strong>sidered a risk, to $26/kg to farmers who were<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered trustworthy. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same traders reported subsequently that they sold the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> at rates rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from<br />
$47.8/kg to $76/kg as prices were ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> mark-up thus ranged from $21.8 to $55.2/kg compared to a mark<br />
up of <strong>on</strong>ly 3 to 9/kg for those traders who were not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a positi<strong>on</strong> to provide advances. Thus, the ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s from act<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
as a f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancier amounted to between $18.8 and $46.2/kg. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts for the further calculati<strong>on</strong>, the<br />
average f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s out of a salaam c<strong>on</strong>tract amounted to 139% e , which is almost identical to the outcome<br />
of the calculati<strong>on</strong>s shown above. 15<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same study am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south (Kandahar and Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce) found that they<br />
provided salaam at a rate of $12.7 to $19/kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 1998, less than the salaam <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Given<br />
a post harvest price of $60.3 to $62.2/kg the traders earned about $45/kg 16 , and thus more than the traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. However, this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes profits. It would therefore be wr<strong>on</strong>g to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpret this figure as the<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cost of the farmers. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the actual farmgate prices reported by farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP’s annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy survey for the year 1998, and the same exchange rate as applied <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the study <strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade (Afg<br />
35000 to 1 US$), the average farmgate price for fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to $26/kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and $30/kg<br />
Kandahar at harvest time. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts for the calculati<strong>on</strong>, the farmers received about 57% f of the<br />
farmgate price as salaam which was actually a higher percentage than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average cost<br />
for a farmer <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south was about $12/kg or 75% ($12/$15.9) for a period of about 3 m<strong>on</strong>ths. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average<br />
annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate for salaam <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus amounted to about 300% (75% / 3*12).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> calculati<strong>on</strong>s above highlight variati<strong>on</strong>s found across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It must also be noted that, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998,<br />
heavy ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the harvest time destroyed some 20% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy harvest across the country and thus<br />
caused <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices to rise. In some areas of Kandahar and Helmand the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> yield fell by half <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. This<br />
de-facto <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased lend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g costs.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> became difficult for those farmers whose crop was damaged and thus could not deliver the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as promised. Some four weeks after the 1998 harvest of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar (districts of Ghorak,<br />
Khakrez, Maiwand) and Nangarhar (district of Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war) about 60% of the resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed reported that<br />
they had failed to repay seas<strong>on</strong>al debts which they had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>curred dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter cropp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seas<strong>on</strong> due to the<br />
poor harvest follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g extensive ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 17<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms for reschedul<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g debt, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, were quite unfavourable. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amount of the loan doubled<br />
or tripled when repayment was delayed over a twelve-m<strong>on</strong>th period. Opium traders expected at least twice the<br />
amount of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 from those households which could not repay the agreed amount <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. 18 As a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequence, some 25% of resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war district (Nangarhar), for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, stated that they were<br />
forced to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the share of land dedicated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1998/99 grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seas<strong>on</strong> to repay their current<br />
debt. 19 Indeed, the area dedicated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> rose by some 20% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 as compared to 1998.<br />
Though <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> spread around the country it is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to note that 86% of the overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> districts which had already been cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy prior to 1998. Only 14 percent of the total<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease was accounted for by the cultivati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> new districts. Almost 70% of the total <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> areas under poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> occurred <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Helmand and Nangarhar. 20 In these prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces,<br />
e<br />
(= (($18.8+$46.2)/2)/($20.8+$26)/2)<br />
f<br />
(($12.7+$19)/2) / (($26+$30)/2)<br />
120
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> already played a key role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local ec<strong>on</strong>omies throughout the 1990s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998<br />
destroyed significant proporti<strong>on</strong>s of the poppy crop and thus left many farmers with unsettled salaam c<strong>on</strong>tracts<br />
which they <strong>on</strong>ly could settle by grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g more <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999.<br />
Change <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cultivati<strong>on</strong> over the 1998-99 period<br />
100,000<br />
91,583<br />
hectares<br />
80,000<br />
60,000<br />
40,000<br />
20,000<br />
63,674<br />
81<br />
63,593<br />
3,895<br />
87,688<br />
New areas under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
1998<br />
Areas under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> prior to<br />
1998<br />
Total area under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong><br />
-<br />
1998 1999*<br />
*prior to eradicati<strong>on</strong> of 400 ha <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999<br />
Figure 8<br />
Sources: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 1999 and 1998.<br />
Change of area under cultivati<strong>on</strong> over<br />
the 1998-1999 period<br />
(27,909 ha)<br />
30,000<br />
25,000<br />
3,814<br />
14%<br />
20,000<br />
hectares<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
24,095 86%<br />
New areas under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
1998<br />
5,000<br />
Areas under<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> prior<br />
to 1998<br />
-<br />
Figure 9<br />
Sources: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 1999 and 1998.<br />
Some farmers reported that they purchased <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from other farmers or traders, thus caus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the m<strong>on</strong>ths follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the harvest. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> higher prices, which rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half<br />
of 1998, also acted as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive for many more farmers to sow poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter of 1998 for the harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the spr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of 1999. Farmers who repaid their salaam debts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> June, buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from the open market, paid<br />
121
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
four times the value of the orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al advance which they had received 21 . Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that they held the loan, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, for about half a year, their <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate, calculated <strong>on</strong> an annual basis, was about 600% g .<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> forego<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g discussi<strong>on</strong> dem<strong>on</strong>strates that f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g costs based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit, without a proper<br />
bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g system <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> place, have been extremely high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and have clearly c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the spread of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country.<br />
4.2.2. Purchase of commodities <strong>on</strong> credit<br />
Alternative sources of f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g were not cheap either and c<strong>on</strong>tributed to ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debtedness.<br />
Resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the four target districts reported that purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g commodities from shopkeepers or other traders<br />
<strong>on</strong> credit was possible. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> commodities obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed through this system ranged from food, medic<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and other<br />
household goods, to agricultural <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>puts, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seeds, tools and fertilisers. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> data <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey<br />
revealed that famers often obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed fertilisers from shopkeepers us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit system. For both urea<br />
and diamm<strong>on</strong>ium phosphate, the price of obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g fertilisers <strong>on</strong> credit was some 40% higher than purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
it with cash. 22<br />
Another system, known as anawat <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kandahar and hila <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar, also facilitates the purchase of<br />
commodities <strong>on</strong> credit. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> anawat system is usually used for items such as <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as well as for livestock and<br />
luxury items such as vehicles. It is <strong>on</strong>e of the few systems of credit which is not seas<strong>on</strong>al. Anawat requires<br />
commodities to be obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed at an agreed price that is c<strong>on</strong>siderably higher than the cash price. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> commodities<br />
obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, but not paid for immediately, are then sold back to the seller with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a short period of time, often <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stantly,<br />
at a sigfnificantly lower price (often at just half the price at which the goods were purchased). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> anawat system<br />
allows households to obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cash loans whilst bypass<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Islamic strictures <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest. For example <strong>on</strong>e<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>dent had taken anawat to raise m<strong>on</strong>ey for cover<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some of the costs related to the c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of his<br />
house; he purchased 16 kg of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and immediately resold the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the lender for the equivalent<br />
amount of $700 (i.e. $43.8/kg) which he received <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cash. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average price of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> at the time was $65/<br />
kg. This meant that the borrower had to repay $1040 for the loan of $700, equivalent to an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest rate of about<br />
50% ($340/$700) <strong>on</strong> this loan. As the pers<strong>on</strong> was not able to repay this loan out of his <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, and subsequently<br />
had to resort to further loans, he entered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a spiral of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debtedness which resulted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sale of all of his<br />
household assets, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g his livestock. 23 Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the background of such a scenario, not uncomm<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> many<br />
of the rural areas of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, even farmers who orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally had no <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tenti<strong>on</strong> of grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> often began to<br />
cultivate.<br />
4.2.3. Interest free loans<br />
Farmers preferred credit arrangement which was an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest-free loan known as qarze hasana. This<br />
type of loan was typically obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from member of the immediate or extended family, often to pay for the high<br />
costs of a marriage. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> costs associated with a marriage are c<strong>on</strong>siderable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, because the groom<br />
has to pay a bride price or walwar, typically rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from $1400 to $5550, a fortune for most Afghans.<br />
A number of resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that a c<strong>on</strong>siderable proporti<strong>on</strong> of their exist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g debts actually could<br />
be attributed to qarze hasana loans obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to pay for the bride. A few <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants suggested that they<br />
actually had to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease their poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to pay for the high costs associated with their marriages<br />
and/or to repay the loans which they had taken out to pay for the marriage. 24<br />
4.2.4. Indebtedness and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cidence of default<br />
Overall, rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> appears to suffer from relatively high levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debtedness. Am<strong>on</strong>g the 108<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the four target districts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> mid 1998, the average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debtedness for landlords was equivalent<br />
to 22% of their average annual net <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come; the proporti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g the owner cultivators was 39% and am<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
landless was 53%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average amount of debt held per household was $695 am<strong>on</strong>g the landless, $1245<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g owner-cultivators and $1668 am<strong>on</strong>g landlords. 25 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey, c<strong>on</strong>ducted am<strong>on</strong>g 600 households<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> early 1998 came to almost identical results (average debt per household am<strong>on</strong>g landless: $709, ownercultivators:<br />
$1052, and landlords $1502).<br />
g<br />
(300% / 6 *12)<br />
122
Chapter IV. Bazaars, f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance and narco-usurers<br />
Despite the relatively high levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>debtedness, resp<strong>on</strong>dents and key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants claimed that there<br />
were very few defaulters under the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit arrangements. 26 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> frequent soluti<strong>on</strong> to a household’s debt<br />
problem was to expand <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong>. While expand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was more or less accepted,<br />
a significant number of resp<strong>on</strong>dents reported that fail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to repay exist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g debts was viewed with disda<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> by both<br />
the authorities and the general populati<strong>on</strong>. Thus a somewhat paradoxical situati<strong>on</strong> existed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Although the vast majority of resp<strong>on</strong>dents believed that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade was un-Islamic, they accepted<br />
participati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>e way or another. When it came to h<strong>on</strong>our<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial obligati<strong>on</strong>s, however, social mores<br />
prevented them from simply default<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
This chapter has tried to document the extent to which <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy became an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated part of the<br />
livelihood strategies of many rural communities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit<br />
system makes it much more than simply an agricultural crop that can be easily exchanged by another <strong>on</strong>e.<br />
If the role of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is to be elim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able way, new sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs and credit systems will have<br />
to be developed to cater for the micro-f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g requirements of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g districts. As the forego<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
discussi<strong>on</strong> has shown, the exist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g sav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs systems are rather risky while the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formal credit systems are very<br />
expensive for the farmers. Further expansi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> will c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to be driven by this microec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
eng<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e unless cheaper and safer credit systems are established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas.<br />
123
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
Sarah Forster and Doug Pearce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – CGAP Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Review, F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Draft, May 2002.<br />
ibid., p. 5.<br />
IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g micro-Small and Medium Sized Entrprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002, p. 29.<br />
UNICEF, “2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey”, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> M<strong>on</strong>itor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and Evaluati<strong>on</strong> Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Paper Series No. 1,<br />
September 2001, p.12.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #8, December 2000, p. 52.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000 data.<br />
Agency Coord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Body for Afghan Relief Survey Unit, Helmand Initiative Socio-Ec<strong>on</strong>omic Survey, Habitat, April 2000.<br />
Sarah Foster and Doug Pearce, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> CGAP Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Review, (F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Draft) May 2002, p. 5.<br />
IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank”, March 2002, p. 30.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey 1998 data.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study 2, the Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders,<br />
Oct. 1998, p. 13.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 9.<br />
Sarah Forster and Doug Pearce, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> CGAP Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Review”, (F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Draft), May 2002, p. 28.<br />
IPC, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Scope for Promot<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Micro, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Private Sector by Establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a<br />
Microf<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance Bank, March 2002, p. 31.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study 2, the Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders,<br />
Oct. 1998, p. 14.<br />
ibid.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 15.<br />
ibid.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 16.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Annual Opium Poppy Survey 1998 and 1999 data.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 16.<br />
Basel<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Survey 1999, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit,<br />
January 1999, p. 10.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #3, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, January 1999, p. 10.<br />
ibid., p. 11.<br />
ibid., pp. 12-14.<br />
ibid., p. 17.<br />
124
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Chapter V<br />
GREED, WARLORDS<br />
AND THE OPIUM TRADE<br />
125
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
5. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous chapter analysed credit markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s and highlighted the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these activities. This chapter will focus <strong>on</strong> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders as such, and<br />
exam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e the development of the thriv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g commodity trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> rural markets with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the socio-political<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text of the country’s war <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It should be noted at the outset that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast to all other countries, trade<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates was not perceived to be an illegal activity with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This changes fundamentally the overall<br />
c<strong>on</strong>text of this trade and has to be borne <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d while try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to answer the key questi<strong>on</strong> posed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this chapter,<br />
i.e. why Afghan traders actually entered the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade.<br />
5.1. Socio-political c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> would be virtually worthless if it could not be sold abroad. Low prices would have<br />
prompted Afghan farmers to give up <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and look for alternative crops. Thus, a l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k was needed<br />
between domestic producti<strong>on</strong> and demand for opiates abroad. This l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k exists due to traders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y have played<br />
a crucial role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the growth of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market, l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> with Pakistan, southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> with Pakistan and Iran, and western and northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> with neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries of Central Asia. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y identified <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as <strong>on</strong>e out of a few commodities,<br />
which could be produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> excess of local demand and for which a str<strong>on</strong>g demand existed outside <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
(Other Afghan goods for which a market existed abroad were natural gas, gem st<strong>on</strong>es such as emeralds and<br />
lapis lazuli, marble, granite and timber; however most of these products were c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a few places <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> while <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be grown across the country). In return, traders provided the rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s with all the goods - i.e. ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly food, other c<strong>on</strong>sumer goods as well as arms – they<br />
required. As a result <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the global <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, though based <strong>on</strong> the export of a rather<br />
peculiar raw material.<br />
Before the war, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> had been largely self-sufficient <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of its food requirements and was<br />
at times even a small exporter of wheat. But traditi<strong>on</strong>al subsistence agriculture, and its irrigati<strong>on</strong> system, was<br />
largely destroyed by the war. This led to a massive decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> food output. For several m<strong>on</strong>ths of the year<br />
Afghans had to rely <strong>on</strong> food imports and/or <strong>on</strong> food aid. Farmers, for the first time, had to acquire food aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st<br />
cash. This meant the end of a rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> that was largely based <strong>on</strong> subsistence farm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and barter. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> was forced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a rapid and extensive process of m<strong>on</strong>etisati<strong>on</strong>. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Soviet<br />
aid after 1987 the Government started to pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t m<strong>on</strong>ey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to pay for its war efforts. As a result, food prices<br />
rose by factors of five to ten. Such a situati<strong>on</strong> created tremendous <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for cash-produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities. 1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<strong>on</strong>ly possibility to acquire cash <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> sufficient quantities was to produce <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> that was then marketed by Afghan<br />
trader’s abroad.<br />
Other factors played a role as well. Large segments of the rural populati<strong>on</strong> left the country, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly as a<br />
result of <strong>on</strong>go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g war, but also as a result of the food shortages. In the refugee camps <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Iran and other<br />
countries, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al humanitarian aid programmes provided food. But some of the camps as well as some<br />
of the madrassas (religious schools) set up <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan also served as a basis for recruit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g troops to fight the<br />
Soviet occupati<strong>on</strong> and the distributi<strong>on</strong> of arms shipments. Some of the groups resp<strong>on</strong>sible for handl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and<br />
distribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the arms exploited the situati<strong>on</strong> by smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the weap<strong>on</strong>s not <strong>on</strong>ly to the regi<strong>on</strong>s and dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
where they were supposed to go, but also by divert<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a porti<strong>on</strong> of the arms and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g them <strong>on</strong> the arms markets<br />
across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2 . Arms were bought by local warlords as well as by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to defend their farms<br />
and property. Opium often served as a means to pay for these arms. Thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and arms were often smuggled<br />
al<strong>on</strong>g the same routes – arms <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
From the 1980s local commanders themselves became <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terested <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the operati<strong>on</strong>s of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry, push<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g local people to cultivate <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, as well as participat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g - to various degrees - <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the opiate<br />
trade themselves. In later years some of them also became <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Whether directly<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved or not they were reluctant to take acti<strong>on</strong> to prevent such activities as l<strong>on</strong>g as taxes could be levied, both<br />
<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se taxes were part of the general tolls and tributes traders had<br />
to pay for transit. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> expansi<strong>on</strong> of cultivati<strong>on</strong> and the trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates strengthened the aut<strong>on</strong>omy of the<br />
commanders vis a vis both the Government and the various Islamic parties. But there were limits: “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> war<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, like the political structure, rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed largely fragmented am<strong>on</strong>g small, largely predatory actors, each<br />
of whom ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the chaos that permitted his predati<strong>on</strong>. At the same time, the overall<br />
lack of security of both pers<strong>on</strong> and property blocked the expansi<strong>on</strong> of even this crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>alized <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.” 3<br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the defeat of the communist regime <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kabul, predati<strong>on</strong> was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly seen to pose a collective<br />
127
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
problem. Each predatory actor benefited, but a large though diffuse mass of people began to feel exploited and<br />
trade came virtually to a standstill. Predati<strong>on</strong> by commanders imposed heavy costs <strong>on</strong> commerce, blocked<br />
Pakistan’s access to Central Asia and prevented c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of an Islamic order. Eventually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993/94 a<br />
coaliti<strong>on</strong> started to emerge between some secti<strong>on</strong>s of the Pakistani authorities, Afghan and Pakistani traders<br />
(sometimes called the transport mafia) 4 , and ultra-c<strong>on</strong>servative Afghan and Pakistan religious leaders and their<br />
students from the various madrassas <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Pakistan. This movement, which became known<br />
as the Taliban (students), was to overcome this divide of the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Taliban succeeded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> secur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g “a<br />
transiti<strong>on</strong> from localised predatory warlordism to weak rentier state power based <strong>on</strong> a crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>alized open<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>” 5 . Though prohibit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the cultivati<strong>on</strong> and use of cannabis and the use of opiates immediately after<br />
hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g risen to power, the Taliban did not really dare to touch the opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itial phase of c<strong>on</strong>quer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the country, the Taliban promised a number of local commanders, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange<br />
for loyalty, the right to c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue with their opiate bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess. Even after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g issued a ban <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy<br />
cultivati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> July 2000, the Taliban did not forbid the trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates, probably reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the fact that the traders<br />
c<strong>on</strong>stituted an important backb<strong>on</strong>e for the regime. a<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s “smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>” already had str<strong>on</strong>g foundati<strong>on</strong>s prior to the Taliban takeover, partly<br />
result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) between Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, dat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g back to<br />
1950 6 . This agreement enabled <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a land-locked country, to import goods duty-free via the port<br />
of Karachi <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. From the 1980s <strong>on</strong>wards this trade gradually developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a reverse directi<strong>on</strong>. Goods<br />
often orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Persian Gulf, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly duty-free Dubai, transited Pakistan to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and were<br />
subsequently smuggled back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to circumvent Pakistan’s high import duties. In subsequent<br />
years, some of the goods were also directly flown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Pakistan, or transported<br />
via Iran or other neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g states to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. A World Bank study<br />
estimated that this c<strong>on</strong>traband trade was worth around $2.5 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1997, equivalent to nearly half of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s estimated GDP and significantly more than the overall trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates (about $1 bn). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same<br />
study estimated that the Taliban derived at least $75 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a. from taxes <strong>on</strong> this trade. 7 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure thus created also served the trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, arms and stolen goods, and came largely under<br />
Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol after 1996, when they c<strong>on</strong>solidated their hold over most of the country’s roads, cities, airports and<br />
customs posts. With much of the country under Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trol, not <strong>on</strong>ly trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, but also c<strong>on</strong>traband<br />
of otherwise legal goods, and trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased. In other words, the greater security provided by the<br />
Taliban also improved the c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s for the trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s.<br />
5.2. Why traders engage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Profit is obviously the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> motivati<strong>on</strong> for traders to enter the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> market. This topic will be<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more detail below. But profits are <strong>on</strong>ly part of the explanati<strong>on</strong>. A number of other factors deriv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
from Afghan society also play a role.<br />
Religi<strong>on</strong> plays an important role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> people’s lives <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. One of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> goals <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the life of a<br />
Muslim is to perform the Haj to Mecca <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Saudi Arabia. Most ord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary Afghan citizens simply cannot afford this.<br />
However, participati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Haj seems to be widespread am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders. UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 revealed that 85% of them (22 out of 25 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed) had actually<br />
performed the Haj; two of them were even mullahs. 8<br />
Another reas<strong>on</strong> for traders to enter the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> was access to power, reputati<strong>on</strong> and respect<br />
with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local community. Opium allowed relatively young pers<strong>on</strong>s to climb the social ladder <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local<br />
community. Often <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders saw themselves as local heroes as they secured <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the local<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>, prevent<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g them from starvati<strong>on</strong> by smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g locally produced opiates abroad and risk<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their lives<br />
for the community. Some research undertaken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (which would be probably true for other<br />
parts of the country as well) also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that there was a l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k between local commanders and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders.<br />
While the positi<strong>on</strong> as a local commander was often acquired through prowess <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> battle and entailed status and<br />
respect, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trader secured respect by mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>s to the locality.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic profiles of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> also revealed some<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g features. While most Afghan farmers can <strong>on</strong>ly afford to have <strong>on</strong>e wife, half of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed (N = 38) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 had two wives and some even had married a third wife. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of wives a man<br />
can afford is apparently a status symbol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, primarily because of the high walwar (bride price) which<br />
a Some regulati<strong>on</strong>s forbidd<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates existed <strong>on</strong> paper but were never implemented. (INCB missi<strong>on</strong> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Summer<br />
2001).<br />
128
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
has to be paid by the groom. Similarly, all of those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south owned at least a car, a motorcycle<br />
or a tractor, which c<strong>on</strong>stituted clear status symbols. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y also had, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, larger than average landhold<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs<br />
with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their particular area. 9<br />
While the aspirati<strong>on</strong> for status symbols is not unique to Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders, their relatively high<br />
educati<strong>on</strong>al background is surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Over half of the traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south had been educated up to 16 years<br />
of age (compared to just a quarter <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the general populati<strong>on</strong> 10 ), whilst a number of resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both eastern<br />
and southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were former teachers and government workers. With the breakdown of the civil<br />
adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>, many resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the south argued that there were very few alternative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come earn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
opportunities available to those who had received an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>termediate level of educati<strong>on</strong>. Trad<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was<br />
regarded as a natural choice for those who had received educati<strong>on</strong> while cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was the obvious<br />
livelihood strategy for those without a formal educati<strong>on</strong>. 11<br />
5.3. Profitability of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Profit was the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> reas<strong>on</strong> for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. Given the de-facto legal nature of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, however, profits with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were rather modest.<br />
UNDCP research c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 showed that the mark-up <strong>on</strong> the rapid turnover trade, where traders<br />
purchased <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from farmers to sell it quickly aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the various bazaars tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g advantage of local price<br />
differentials, ranged from $3 to $9 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Given a price of around $34 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> June 1998, the<br />
mark up ranged from 9% to 26%. Approximately 60% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
traded less than 100 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per annum; 40% traded between 200 and 500 kg per annum 12 . Extrapolat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
these results to the country as a whole, <strong>on</strong>e could estimate that there may have been some 15,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g at various scales, equivalent to 1 trader per 13 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g farmers.<br />
Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average profit of $6 per kg, an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trader <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rapid turnover trade could expect<br />
an annual profit of about $1000 per year; those sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 500 kg would have made a profit of around $3000 a year.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se profits are rather small compared to those made by opiates traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transit countries or by hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
traffickers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>sumer countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> did not have a risk premium, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the fact that the authorities were not even try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to prevent this trade.<br />
Profitability<br />
30%<br />
25%<br />
20%<br />
15%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
0%<br />
Mark-up <strong>on</strong> rapid turnover trade<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
26%<br />
9%<br />
Eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
7%<br />
3%<br />
Southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate<br />
Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders, October 1998, pp. 10-<br />
12.<br />
In southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> the profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s <strong>on</strong> the rapid turnover trade were even smaller. Opium traders<br />
reported earn<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>ly between $1.2 to $3.2 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> which – given an average price of $47 per kg (range:<br />
$32 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May to $62 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> August 1998) was equivalent to a mark-up of 3% to 7%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounts which <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders<br />
claimed to have purchased and sold ranged from 270 kg to <strong>on</strong>e trader report<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g about 20<br />
metric t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> a year. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of $2 per kg, the annual profits ranged from slightly more than<br />
$500 to $40,000.<br />
129
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
In the latter case, however, it can be assumed that a trader buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some 20 t<strong>on</strong>s was not<br />
really <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local rapid turnover trade, but ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the border areas and/or<br />
smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it across the border to either Iran or Pakistan. Indeed, a quarter of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the border areas. Shipments to the border areas<br />
ranged from relatively small amounts to large amounts of up 3 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle shipment. 13 (Seizures reported<br />
by the Iranian authorities basically c<strong>on</strong>firmed these orders of magnitude. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures ranged from less<br />
than 1 kg to 2.5 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, 3.4 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, 5 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 4 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001). Traders transport<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
to the border ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, <strong>on</strong> average, about $11 per kg for wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and $12.5 for dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> b. Transport costs<br />
ranged between $1.2 and $1.8 per kg. Average net profits thus amounted to slightly more than $10 per kg of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> transported to the border regi<strong>on</strong>s. (Most <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was transported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its dried form to the border, as this was<br />
easier to transport and had less odour than wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>). If the net profits are expressed as a percentage of the<br />
farmgate prices, traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the border regi<strong>on</strong> could expect a<br />
profitability ratio of around 12%, more than twice the rate which they could expect to earn <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local rapidturnover<br />
trade. On a per kg basis, profits were about five times as much <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transport<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the border<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the local rapid-turnover trade. A bulk trader, buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some 20 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
border regi<strong>on</strong>s, could reck<strong>on</strong> with profits of around $200,000.<br />
Average profitability of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(based <strong>on</strong> farmgate prices)<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
5%<br />
12%<br />
0%<br />
Rapid turnover trade Shipments to border<br />
regi<strong>on</strong><br />
Smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g across<br />
the borders<br />
Figure 2<br />
Source: UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate<br />
Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium Traders, October 1998.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most sizeable profits were made <strong>on</strong>ce the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was smuggled across the border. While the price<br />
for best quality dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to $82.5 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> August 1998, the price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
border regi<strong>on</strong> was $95 and the price across the border <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan amounted to $126 per kg. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g transport<br />
costs of about $2 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>, traders who bought the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from the farmers and smuggled it<br />
across the border could reck<strong>on</strong> with profits of $41.5 per kg, equivalent to a profitability ratio of 50%. Just cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the border would <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the price by some $30 per kg ($31 less transport costs), equivalent to about 32% of<br />
the wholesale price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>. However, cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the border was a risky endeavour. Thus many of<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed Pashtun traders from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s left this risky task of cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
southern border to specialised Baluchi traders who had Afghan, Iranian or Pakistan nati<strong>on</strong>alities.<br />
Profits could be <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased if opiates were not <strong>on</strong>ly smuggled across the border to Pakistan, but were<br />
moved further. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> smuggled with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan from Quetta (close to southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) to the<br />
seaport of Karachi would rise by some 30% 14 . However, throughout the 1990s there were well-armed caravans<br />
b<br />
Farmgate prices for best quality wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> August 1998 were about $62 while <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices for best quality wet <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
amounted to $73; farmgate prices for best quality dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were $82.5 while wholesale prices for best quality dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to $95<br />
per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>. (UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies<br />
of Opium Traders, October 1998, pp. 12-17.<br />
130
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
of Afghan smugglers cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan and then Iran because prices of opiates were still significantly higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Iran. Opium prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Teheran wholesale market amounted to $827 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, a 6 1 / 2 fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease from<br />
the prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan’s border regi<strong>on</strong> with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> or a 10-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease for traders buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from<br />
farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. However, these profits had to be earned<br />
at a high price. Drug dealers caught by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran face the death penalty. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, trade <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
opiates flourished <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s up until the year 2000. As a result of ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
an apparently grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g number of traders, prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran started to fall from around $1200 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1996/97 to<br />
$400 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of about two thirds. But, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, as a result of the Taliban ban, prices qu<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tupled to more<br />
than $2000 pr kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> November and December of that year. As poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> resumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002,<br />
the market reacted and prices fell by more than 40% between January 2002 and May 2002. As of June, however,<br />
the downward trend suddenly reversed follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a price hike <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In August 2002 Iranian prices<br />
reached a temporary peak of more than $2000 per kg, follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the announcement by the Afghan authorities of<br />
a more rigorous <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban for the 2003 harvest seas<strong>on</strong>. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce then they started fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e with first<br />
reports of re-plant<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Opium wholesale prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> current US$ per kilogram, 1996-2002<br />
2000<br />
1500<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
1227<br />
1166<br />
827<br />
515<br />
400<br />
2,0252,0152,015<br />
1900<br />
1,550 1,550<br />
1,450 1,5251,575 1,550<br />
1,300<br />
1,300<br />
1250<br />
1158<br />
700<br />
2050<br />
1650<br />
0<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
Jan-01<br />
May-01<br />
Jun-01<br />
Price per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Jul-01<br />
Aug-01<br />
Sep-01<br />
Oct-01<br />
Nov-01<br />
Dec-01<br />
Jan-02<br />
Feb-02<br />
Mar-02<br />
Apr-02<br />
May-02<br />
Jun-02<br />
Jul-02<br />
Aug-02<br />
Sep-02<br />
Oct-02<br />
Figure 3<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran.<br />
But did changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the underly<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g price levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> also change traffickers’<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>comes? <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> analysis of price data over the 1998-2000 period suggests that this was not the case. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are<br />
no <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices over this period entailed a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitability for drug traffickers. In<br />
1998 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran (some $830) were about ten times as high as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> ($83 for dry<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s 1999 bumper harvest, prices started fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. In 2000, the farmgate price of dry<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was $25 per kg at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand and Kandahar. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average price for the year as a whole was<br />
around $40 and was aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalent to <strong>on</strong>e tenth of the price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran (around $400). This provides some<br />
empirical evidence for the thesis that prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> are multiplicative rather than additive. c<br />
c An ‘additive’ price structure would mean that a 10 dollar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of farmgate prices of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per kg – assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a 10:1 ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> - would result <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a 1 dollar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices per kg all al<strong>on</strong>g the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cha<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> up to the retail markets of the end c<strong>on</strong>sumers.<br />
This theory predicts that irrespective of the price of a drug, all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>termediaries charge fixed prices for their services. A multiplicative price<br />
structure means that a 10% price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease paid to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> farmers would result <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a 10% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease all al<strong>on</strong>g the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cha<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> up to the retail<br />
markets of the end c<strong>on</strong>sumers. This theory predicts, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>termediaries charge their services accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the value of the drugs they<br />
transport/handle. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> assumpti<strong>on</strong>s of the price structure of the drug markets have important policy implicati<strong>on</strong>s. If the price structure of drug<br />
markets were ‘additive’, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s at source, driv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up prices, would be close to mean<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gless as a 1 dollar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of a kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the c<strong>on</strong>sumer markets would be hardly noticed. Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to this model, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s would be <strong>on</strong>ly effective close to the c<strong>on</strong>sumers (e.g.<br />
by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensify<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g police presence <strong>on</strong> the streets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumer countries). If, <strong>on</strong> the other hand, the price structure is ‘multiplicative’, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
at source are an efficient way to drive-up prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both source and c<strong>on</strong>sumer countries, thus c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to a stabilizati<strong>on</strong>/decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of drug<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>. In reality, the price structure of drug markets is neither purely ‘additive’ nor ‘multiplicative’, but someth<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> between. It may,<br />
131
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same, however, could not be said for 2001. Opium prices with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> rose ten-fold. Dry<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, rose from $25 per kg at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to $260 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Tehran market over the same period was less than four-fold, from $400 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to $1520<br />
per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (twelve m<strong>on</strong>ths average). In 2002, dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand amounted to about $420 per kg<br />
at harvest time <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same m<strong>on</strong>th <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran stood at $1250 per kg. This meant that as<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> rose, the overall gross profitability of shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from the producti<strong>on</strong> areas of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Iran decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from a ten-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 to a six-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and a three-fold<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002.<br />
One explanati<strong>on</strong> for this decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitability was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased competiti<strong>on</strong>. Iranian authorities reported<br />
that the number of small-scale Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> smugglers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, though the overall quantities<br />
smuggled to Iran decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, 30% of all significant <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure cases reported by the Iranian<br />
authorities c<strong>on</strong>cerned seizures of more than 100 kg, this ratio fell to 16% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 8% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that<br />
larger numbers of small-scale traders got <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, lead<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of competiti<strong>on</strong>. As<br />
a result, the average size of a seizure case of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran amounted to 142 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, the year of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s bumper harvest, but fell to 76 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, 50 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and to 46 kg over the first two quarters of<br />
2002, signall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of average seizure cases by more than 70% over the 1999-2002 period. 15<br />
But, why would competiti<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease when profitability was actually fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g? Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, there are<br />
sound ec<strong>on</strong>omic reas<strong>on</strong>s for this. A trader made a gross profit of $360 per kg ($400 less farmgate price of $40)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from the farmers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Tehran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2001 meant that a trader could reck<strong>on</strong> with a gross profit of $1260 per kg ($1520 less farmgate price of $260),<br />
signall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a 3 1 / 2 fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of profits per unit trafficked between 2000 and 2001, even though profitability as<br />
such (def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed as the ratio between sales and purchase prices) decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. This apparently prompted many smallscale<br />
traders to enter the bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess and try their luck.<br />
5.4. Profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture<br />
Another strategy pursued <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the value-added by shift<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was <strong>on</strong>ly a producer of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. As<br />
of the mid-1990s, however, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture began to take place with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Most of the early<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories were located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g shifted across the border from<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan. In subsequent years, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories could be found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>s of most<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas, i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern, southern and northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In particular <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> the bulk of opiates are now already smuggled out of the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (see discussi<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Chapter 1.2.7). Profitability c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s played a role. However, data also suggest that it was not so much<br />
profitability as such, but the possibility of tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g more profits per unit trafficked which led to the shift.<br />
Calculati<strong>on</strong>s of profits to be made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transform<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> are rather complex. Generally, it is<br />
assumed that 10 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are needed to produce 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 16 . However, this is a general ratio which does<br />
not take <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account the different qualities of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Typical c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> processes of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base, applied <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, use <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, calcium<br />
carb<strong>on</strong>ate (lime) as oxide and amm<strong>on</strong>ium chloride. UNDCP and DEA research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Southwest Asia suggested that<br />
out of 6 to 7 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 kg of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base (usually around 60% purity) is obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. By add<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a few more<br />
chemicals (acetic anhydride, acet<strong>on</strong>e etc.), the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base can be transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Out of 1 kg of<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base about 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed 17 with more or less the same purity as the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base.<br />
In other words, 6 to 7 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> will yield 1 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (60% pure). An overview of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> processes<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved is provided <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> box 1.<br />
however, lean more towards <strong>on</strong>e or the other model <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> specific circumstances.<br />
132
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Box 1: From Opium to Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> C<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> Process<br />
Opium process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g is a multi-phase process c<strong>on</strong>sist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g steps:<br />
Opium<br />
Extracti<strong>on</strong> step: In Southwest Asia, water, dried <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and lime are heated. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
fire is ext<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>guished, the c<strong>on</strong>tents allowed to settle, and then filtered through coarse<br />
jute sacks. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> precipitate is discarded.<br />
Crude morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base<br />
Precipitati<strong>on</strong> step: Amm<strong>on</strong>ium chloride is added to the fluid, which is then allowed<br />
to stand. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base precipitates, and the soluti<strong>on</strong> is filtered aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
residue is crude morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base.<br />
Partially purified morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base (opti<strong>on</strong>al)<br />
Purificati<strong>on</strong> step: To purify the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base, the precipitate is washed with<br />
acet<strong>on</strong>e. A further purificati<strong>on</strong> step may be performed us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a tartrate salt<br />
formati<strong>on</strong>, and charcoal absorpti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> base<br />
Acetylati<strong>on</strong> step: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> dried morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base (crude or purified) is heated with an<br />
acetylat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g agent - usually acetic anhydride - mixed with water and the result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
soluti<strong>on</strong> filtered. Water and sodium carb<strong>on</strong>ate are added, and a coarse precipitate<br />
is formed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> soluti<strong>on</strong> is filtered aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the residue is hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> base.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hydrochloride<br />
C<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> step: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> base is dissolved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> acet<strong>on</strong>e (or ethanol or ether), and<br />
activated charcoal is added to the soluti<strong>on</strong>. After gentle heat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, the soluti<strong>on</strong> is<br />
filtered and hydrochloric acid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> acet<strong>on</strong>e (or ether) is added to the liquid. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
crystall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e precipitate that is formed is hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hydrochloride.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> product purity at each level of the process can differ substantially,<br />
depend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> the skills of the chemists and the quality of materials used.<br />
Most of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for export purposes is still brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It has a brown<br />
colour and a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity of 40%-85%, typically around 60%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is also some manufacture of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
which sells at a higher price. Uncut samples of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> can have purity levels of more than 90%. 18 If white<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is to be obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, the brown morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base is first transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a white morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base, often us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
methanol (methyl alcohol), sulphuric acid, charcoal, and amm<strong>on</strong>ium hydroxide. Out of 1 kg of brown morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
base <strong>on</strong>e can obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 0.55 kg of white morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base. This means that for <strong>on</strong>e kg of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>e would need<br />
11-13 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (=6/0.55 to 7/0.55), though the 10:1 ratio c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to be used as well.<br />
As part of UNDCP’s project activities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, opiates prices were regularly collected<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Jalalabad (Nangarhar) and Kandahar over the 1997-1999 period. Four hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> categories were used to account<br />
for different hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> qualities traded. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of the best hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the market was put <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to category 4 while the<br />
lowest quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was labelled as hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1. Categories 3 and 4 were usually dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for export while the<br />
categories of 1 and 2 were for the local or the regi<strong>on</strong>al market. d<br />
d<br />
It should be noted that this categorizati<strong>on</strong> is not the same as the <strong>on</strong>e used for South-East Asian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to which ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4 is def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed<br />
as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectable white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3’ as smokable brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2’ as hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> base, and ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1’ as crude morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e (Source: ODCCP,<br />
Term<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ology and Informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong>, New York 1999, p. 25.).<br />
133
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 1 shows that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 the average wholesale price of top quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per kg (‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’) with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (average of Nangarhar, Faizabad and Jalalabad) was some 22 times higher than the bazaar price<br />
of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per kg. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> bazaar price of the sec<strong>on</strong>d best quality was 17 times higher than the dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price.<br />
This left sufficient room for profits, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent of laboratory efficiency (see below).<br />
Table 1 also shows that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 the ratio of ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’ prices to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices was the highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Kandahar (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), and the lowest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Faizabad (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), followed by Jalalabad<br />
(eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>direct reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the widespread existence of laboratories produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g top quality<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern and eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. High profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> may have been a<br />
reflecti<strong>on</strong> of a lack of competiti<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g the relatively small number of laboratories operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this part of the<br />
country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s.<br />
Table 1: Ratio of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998:<br />
Ratio<br />
Dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4<br />
Kandahar $51 6.6 6.9 11.4 20.1 36.4<br />
Faizabad $81 22.7 20.0<br />
Jalalbad $76 3.5 3.6 6.8 12.3 17.6<br />
Average<br />
5.1 5.3 9.1 18.3 24.7<br />
of ratios<br />
above<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
average<br />
$69 4.1 4.5 8.0 17.3 22.4<br />
Source: UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Table 2 shows that the ratio of ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’ prices to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices fell significantly over the 1997-99<br />
period, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g capacities for top quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> emerged across the country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
late 1990s. In southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> not <strong>on</strong>ly ratios for ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’ but also ratios of ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3’ and ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2’<br />
qualities to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, was grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (though start<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from<br />
low levels) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that part of the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> pattern was more mixed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Table 2: Ratio of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Jalalabad and Kandahar<br />
Jalalabad (Nangarhar)<br />
Year Dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4<br />
1997 $95 2.4 4.8 5.3 8.9 21.1<br />
1998 $76 3.5 3.6 6.8 12.3 17.6<br />
1999 $74 n.a. 2.6 9.8 12.6 16.0<br />
Kandahar<br />
Year Dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3 Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4<br />
1997 $33 7.6 9.2 22.2 48.7 84.2<br />
1998 $51 6.6 6.9 11.4 20.1 36.4<br />
1999 $42 8.1 9.0 12.6 22.3 28.8<br />
Source: UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
134
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Return<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the questi<strong>on</strong> of profitability, the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g picture emerges:<br />
If 10 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were required to produce top quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’, usually white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) e <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
costs would have amounted to $690 ($69*10) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average price of top quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was $1548 per<br />
kg (average of Faizabad ($1650), Jalalabad ($1389) and Kandahar ($1605)) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. Thus gross profits of<br />
manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, exclud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g other costs, would have been $858 per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> ($1548 less $690). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
mark-up (=gross profits) would have amounted to more than 120% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices.<br />
In the case of the sec<strong>on</strong>d best hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> quality (‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3’), the typical brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 6 to 7 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were usually reported to be required for the producti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>on</strong>e kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to recipes reported to UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> field research <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-West Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1990s 19 as well as<br />
accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to slightly different recipes c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more recent classified DEA reports. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a 7:1 ratio, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
costs for <strong>on</strong>e kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to $483 ($69*7). One kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> could be sold at $1199 (average of<br />
Faizabad ($1700), Kandahar ($1003) and Jalalabad (894)) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. Thus gross profits of manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
exclud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g other costs, were $716 ($1199 less $483) per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross mark-up from manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was close to 150% of the orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price, i.e. a similar order of magnitude as the mark-up for topquality<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4) f .<br />
If actual profits are to be calculated, other costs, notably precursor costs, labour costs and various fixed<br />
costs have to be taken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account as well. Informati<strong>on</strong> obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a previous UNDCP study <strong>on</strong> Pakistan’s Illicit<br />
Opiate Industry (referr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the year 1993) suggested that all of these costs are rather small. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest<br />
comp<strong>on</strong>ent of n<strong>on</strong>-<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> costs were found to be precursor chemicals, account<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for some 80% of the cost<br />
exclud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>; 95% of the precursor costs were related to just <strong>on</strong>e substance: acetic anhydride 20 . Depend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<strong>on</strong> the purity of the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base between 1 and 4 litres of acetic anhydride are required to produce 1 kg of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 21 . For the producti<strong>on</strong> of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which is usually produced from purified morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base, the lower<br />
range of the estimate may be sufficient, but for brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which is a less pure product, around 4 litres of<br />
acetic anhydride may be required.<br />
Prices for acetic anhydride across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> ranged from $13 to $34 per litre <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
UNDCP research g . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average price of acetic anhydride was $24. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> cost of acetic anhydride for the<br />
manufacture of 1 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus fluctuated around $96 ($24*4). Includ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g other chemicals needed, <strong>on</strong>e<br />
can assume that overall precursor costs amounted to about $100 per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced. Other cost items<br />
referr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to labour, fuel, packag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, and other miscellaneous costs as well as fixed costs such as rents and<br />
depreciati<strong>on</strong> are not available for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g data from Pakistan as proxies, they can be estimated to<br />
amount to about $12 per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced. (Given differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the price structures of Pakistan and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, this cost estimate is likely to be <strong>on</strong> the high side). Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all these cost items <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>,<br />
total producti<strong>on</strong> cost <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for <strong>on</strong>e kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be estimated at around $600. As the<br />
wholesale price for 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was close to $1200 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, profits amounted to some $600<br />
per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average profitability of manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus appears to have been around<br />
100% and a str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive for Afghan groups to get <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this activity.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> price structure of the late 1990s changed substantially <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and 2002 as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban and str<strong>on</strong>gly ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices. As <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased more str<strong>on</strong>gly than hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices<br />
profitability of manufactur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. In 1998 and 1999 first quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fetched prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce that were 17 times higher than dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and sec<strong>on</strong>d quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices that were 13 times higher<br />
than the dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. By March 2002 prices for white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (based <strong>on</strong> DEA data) were <strong>on</strong>ly 10 times higher and<br />
prices for first quality brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> were <strong>on</strong>ly 7 times higher than dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce.<br />
Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the transformati<strong>on</strong> ratios used above (10:1 for white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 7:1 for brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>), Afghan hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
manufacturers would have ceased to make profits. But, it is unlikely that this was the case. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re have been<br />
reports of <strong>on</strong>go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <strong>on</strong>e can discount the possibility that clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at a loss h .<br />
e For <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, a UNDCP study <strong>on</strong> the illicit opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry of Pakistan, c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1992/93, found a ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of<br />
10:1 and a 6:1 ratio for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. (UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan” (Draft Report), December 1994, p. 31.)<br />
f<br />
Differences between the two figures should not be over-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpreted. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y may well be the result of some differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>iti<strong>on</strong>s rather<br />
than underly<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g structural differences.<br />
g<br />
Most acetic anhydride prices were reported from Jalalabad (eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), and to a lesser extent from Faizabad (northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and Mazar el Sharif (western <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>), no prices, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, were reported from southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, possibly<br />
reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the still less widespread hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this part of the country back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998.<br />
h<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re have been reports of some closures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001; however these closures apparently had<br />
more to do with a physical shortage of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> than with a lack of profitability.<br />
135
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 3: Estimated return <strong>on</strong> brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998<br />
Units required for<br />
Revenue<br />
Price per unit<br />
Costs<br />
1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
less costs<br />
Brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
$1,199 kg 1 $1,199.00<br />
Opium $69 kg 7 $483.00<br />
Acetic anhydride $24 litres 4 $96.00<br />
Other chemicals b lump sum a $3.00<br />
Labour c $4.2 man days a 1.2 $5.00<br />
Fuel, packag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, miscl a . lump sum a $5.00<br />
Rent a lump sum a $2.00<br />
Depreciati<strong>on</strong> d lump sum a $0.50<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong> costs -$594.50<br />
Profits per kg<br />
(process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
$605.00<br />
Profitability 102%<br />
Notes:<br />
a/ Data taken from study <strong>on</strong> the illicit opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (data refer to 1993), as proxies for similar cost categories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>:<br />
b/ Other chemicals <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly amm<strong>on</strong>ium chloride and soda ash.<br />
c/ Labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put per kg was calculated for a medium-sized laboratory, divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the daily labour requirement of 12 pers<strong>on</strong>s by the daily<br />
output of 10 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
d/ Fixed costs were calculated by divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g total annual costs by total output. Estimates assume that a laboratory produces <strong>on</strong> average 10<br />
kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day for 120 days per year, i.e. 1.2 t<strong>on</strong>s per year. (If producti<strong>on</strong> of a laboratory is larger, fixed costs per unit<br />
produced become smaller and vice versa)<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan” (Draft Report), December 1994, p. 31.<br />
Table 4: Ratio of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ghani Khel drug market (Nangarhar)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> March 2002<br />
Opium Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
Brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2nd quality 1st quality<br />
White Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Prices i $375 $2,933 $1,404 $2,559 $3,867<br />
Ratio to dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> 7.8 3.7 6.8 10.3<br />
Source: DEA.<br />
One possible explanati<strong>on</strong> could be the existence of a higher morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> than was<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered so far, comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed with higher laboratory efficiency. Indeed, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> samples (n=24) collected and<br />
analysed by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 2001 from several parts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Badakshan, Nangarhar, Helmand)<br />
showed an average morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 17% (range: 10.5% to 23.5%) of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. j<br />
For comparis<strong>on</strong>, a similar study c<strong>on</strong>ducted by UNDCP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Myanmar revealed an average morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent<br />
of just 11.4% (range 8.6%-15.2%). k A previous study, which collected <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> samples from all of the known poppy<br />
grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s, though with a str<strong>on</strong>g bias of samples from Southeast Asia l , also found a morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of<br />
i Informati<strong>on</strong> received from missi<strong>on</strong> reports to Nangarhar and from UNDCP’s office <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Jalalabad <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> May 2002 revealed similar prices: <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices of around $370 and first quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices of $3750 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> price to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price ratio of 10:1<br />
(UNODCCP Country <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Sitrep 5, Bi-Weekly Situati<strong>on</strong> Report (20 May – 2 June 2002).<br />
j<br />
Unweighted average based <strong>on</strong> the analysis of the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 24 samples collected from fields across <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(Source: UNDCP, “Technical Report <strong>on</strong> Limited Opium Yield Surveys- 2000-2001” (Draft report), Nov. 2001 “).<br />
k<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 27 samples was analyzed for the Myanmar figure. (Source: UNDCP, “Technical Report <strong>on</strong> Limited Opium Yield<br />
Surveys- 2000-2001” (Draft report), Nov. 2001 ) Source: UNDCP, “Limited Opium Yield Surveys - <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000-01 and Myanmar 2000”<br />
(Draft report).<br />
l<br />
Simple average of 1414 samples collected globally <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all producti<strong>on</strong> regi<strong>on</strong>s of South-East Asia, South-West Asia as well as South- Central-<br />
136
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
<strong>on</strong> average 11.4% (range 3.1% - 19.2%) 22 . Such a morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>directly c<strong>on</strong>firmed the generally used 10:1<br />
ratio for the transformati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> South-East Asia, though data for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> suggest that that<br />
a better ratio could be possible <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that country (6:1; for details see below).<br />
In l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e with traders’ percepti<strong>on</strong>s that the ‘lowest quality’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the ‘best quality’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Badakshan (northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). UNDCP’s yield study <strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> found that the highest morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> from Badakshan (18.2% <strong>on</strong> average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000)<br />
while <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> with the lowest morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent was found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (14%, <strong>on</strong> average, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Helmand).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was close to the nati<strong>on</strong>al average (16.6%, <strong>on</strong> average,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar). N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the study also showed that yield differences between fields even with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same<br />
regi<strong>on</strong> could be substantial.<br />
Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Myanmar <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000/2001<br />
20.0%<br />
17%<br />
15.0%<br />
11.4%<br />
10.0%<br />
5.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>**<br />
Myanmar**<br />
* Error-bars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum and maximum morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent found<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the samples that were analyzed.<br />
** Simple averages based <strong>on</strong> 24 samples collected from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
and 27 samples collected from Myanmar.<br />
Figure 4<br />
Sources: UNDCP, “Technical Report <strong>on</strong> Limited Opium Yield Surveys- 2000-2001” (Draft<br />
report), Nov. 2001.<br />
In any case, the high morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> leaves ample room for efficiency ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s. One<br />
simple way to improve laboratory efficiency without requir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g additi<strong>on</strong>al equipment and better know-how is to use<br />
the residues from the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> extracti<strong>on</strong> for re-extracti<strong>on</strong> purposes (‘recycl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g’ of residues). This may not have<br />
been necessary as l<strong>on</strong>g as <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was as cheap as it was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, but it is a simple soluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased tenfold as they did <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Thus, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stead of dispos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the extracti<strong>on</strong> residues, they can be<br />
used aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> for extract<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. By apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g such a method repeatedly, almost all of the<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e can be extracted. This may lead to higher labour, precursor and fuel costs per kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
manufactured, but all of these costs are, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> any case, sec<strong>on</strong>dary. Prices for acetic anhydride, the most important<br />
cost comp<strong>on</strong>ent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the manufacture of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> after <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, actually fell by two thirds <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> between the<br />
late 1990s and 2002.<br />
and North America; the bulk of the samples (1100 or 78% of the total) orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern Thailand. (Source: UNDCP, Recommended<br />
Methods for Test<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Opium, Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, New York 1998.)<br />
137
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Significant efficiency ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s can be achieved even if <strong>on</strong>e takes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account that what is traded as ‘dry<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> that has a moisture c<strong>on</strong>tent of around 12% (typical range 10%-15%). m<br />
An average morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 17% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> fully dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> would thus be equivalent to a morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of about<br />
15% n <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> so-called ‘dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’, i.e. 0.15 kg morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> that has a moisture c<strong>on</strong>tent of 12%. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
a typical quality of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of 60% (as found recently <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> imported directly from Pakistan to the UK),<br />
clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories, which improved their efficiency levels, could reduce their <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put for the manufacture of<br />
1 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> from 7 kg (reported so far) to 4 kg of so-called ‘dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ (=1/0.15kg*60%). Similarly,<br />
clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories could m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imise their required <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put for the producti<strong>on</strong> of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at 90% purity from<br />
10 kg to 6 kg of so-called ‘dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’ (=1/0.15kg*90%).<br />
In other words, clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g at 50-60% efficiency levels would not have been<br />
profitable any l<strong>on</strong>ger <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (unless they had <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks from previous harvests when <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices were still<br />
low). However, by improv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g efficiency levels and thus m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put, laboratories could still reap<br />
significant profits, as will be shown below.<br />
A tentative estimate for brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> suggests that based <strong>on</strong> improved laboratory efficiency (100%<br />
efficiency) up to $1000 per kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> could still have been earned <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> March 2002, equivalent to an<br />
overall profitability of around 65% of funds <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vested. A similar estimate for white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> suggests that based <strong>on</strong><br />
improved laboratory efficiency (100% efficiency) up to $1550 per kg of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> could still be earned,<br />
equivalent to an overall profitability of around 67%.<br />
Table 5: Tentative estimate of the maximum profits of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Units required<br />
Revenue<br />
Price per unit<br />
Costs<br />
for 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
less costs<br />
Brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
$2,559 kg 1 $2,559<br />
Opium $375 kg 4 $1,500.00<br />
Acetic anhydride $8 litres 4 $32.00<br />
Other chemicals* lump sum* $4.00<br />
Labour* $4 man days* 2 $8.00<br />
Fuel, packag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, miscl*. lump sum* $7.50<br />
Rent* lump sum* $2.00<br />
Depreciati<strong>on</strong>* lump sum* $0.50<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong> costs -$1,554<br />
Profits per kg<br />
(process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
$1,005<br />
Profitability 65%<br />
*Notes:<br />
Data taken from study <strong>on</strong> the illicit opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (data refer to 1993), as proxies for similar cost categories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
and adjusted to take account of recycl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of residues:<br />
Other chemicals <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly amm<strong>on</strong>ium chloride and soda ash.<br />
Labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put per kg was calculated for a medium-sized laboratory, divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the daily labour requirement of 20 pers<strong>on</strong>s by the daily output<br />
of 10 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Fixed costs were calculated by divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g total annual costs by total output. Estimates assume that a laboratory produces <strong>on</strong> average 10<br />
kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day for 120 days per year, i.e. 1.2 t<strong>on</strong>s per year. (If producti<strong>on</strong> of a laboratory is larger, fixed costs per unit<br />
produced become smaller and vice versa)<br />
Sources: UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, DEA and UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan” (Draft Report), December 1994, p. 31.<br />
m Fresh <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traditi<strong>on</strong>ally was found to have had a water c<strong>on</strong>tent of around 40%. (Range: 30%-50%); the moisture c<strong>on</strong>tent of <strong>on</strong>e-year-old<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was found to between 10-12%. (UNDCP, Informati<strong>on</strong> from Scientific Secti<strong>on</strong>. August 2002.)<br />
n Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 17% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 100 % dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is equivalent to a 15% morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a kg of so-called dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> that c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s 12%<br />
of water. Explanati<strong>on</strong>: a kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> which c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s 12% water c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s <strong>on</strong>ly 0.88 kg of fully dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 17% of this <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (0.88 kg *<br />
0.17) equals 0.1496 kg. Thus, 1 kg of so-called dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> which has water c<strong>on</strong>tent of 12% c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s 0.15 kgs of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, equivalent to<br />
a morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of 15%. In mathematical terms, the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent can be simply calculated as follows: mc*(1-wc), with mc be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent, and wc the water c<strong>on</strong>tent, i.e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the specific case: 17% * (1-12%) = 15%.<br />
138
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Table 6: Tentative estimate of the maximum profits of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002<br />
Units required<br />
Revenue<br />
Price per unit<br />
Costs<br />
for 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
less costs<br />
White hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
$3,867 kg 1 $3,867<br />
Opium $375 kg 6 $2,250.00<br />
Acetic anhydride $8 litres 2.5 $20.00<br />
Other chemicals* lump sum* $15.00<br />
Labour* $4 man days* 4 $16.00<br />
Fuel, packag<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, miscl*. lump sum* $8.00<br />
Rent* lump sum* $4.00<br />
Depreciati<strong>on</strong>* lump sum* $1.00<br />
Producti<strong>on</strong> costs -$2,314<br />
Profits per kg<br />
(process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
$1,553<br />
Profitability 67%<br />
* Notes<br />
Data taken from study <strong>on</strong> the illicit opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustry <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (data refer to 1993), as proxies for similar cost categories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
and adjusted to take account of recycl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of residues:<br />
Other chemicals <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly amm<strong>on</strong>ium chloride and soda ash.<br />
Labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put per kg was calculated for a medium-sized laboratory, divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the daily labour requirement of 20 pers<strong>on</strong>s by the daily<br />
output of 5 kg of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Fixed costs were calculated by divid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g total annual costs by total output. Estimates assume that a laboratory produces <strong>on</strong> average 5<br />
kg of white hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day for 120 days per year, i.e. 0.6 t<strong>on</strong>s per year. (If producti<strong>on</strong> of a laboratory is larger, fixed costs per unit<br />
produced become smaller and vice versa)<br />
Sources: UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, DEA and UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan” (Draft Report), December 1994, p. 31.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture is thus likely to have rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed a lucrative bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess activity <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> for those<br />
clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories which<br />
(i) had acquired sufficient <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks when the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> price was still low, or<br />
(ii) were not limited to sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to traders with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> but had a direct access to foreign<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets, or<br />
(iii) were able to adapt to fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g their efficiency levels.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>deed ample room for such efficiency ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s given the high morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent of Afghan<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. But data also suggest that a certa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> know-how (or <strong>on</strong>e of the other two factors menti<strong>on</strong>ed above) would<br />
be needed to make hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture a profitable activity. Calculati<strong>on</strong>s have shown that the critical factors for<br />
the ‘success’ of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture from an ec<strong>on</strong>omic po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view are (i) the price of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, (ii) the price of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and (iii) the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> required which is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn, a functi<strong>on</strong> of the morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e c<strong>on</strong>tent and laboratory<br />
efficiency. All other cost items are sec<strong>on</strong>dary.<br />
Even if a hundred percent laboratory efficiency may not have been achieved by clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Afghan<br />
laboratories and higher calculated maximum profits for March 2002 are halved (reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 75%-80% laboratory<br />
efficiency), the overall profits from hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture by some of the large laboratories could have still been<br />
huge.<br />
UNDCP is aware of a number of small-to medium scale laboratories operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern and southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Such laboratories, which earlier had been<br />
set up <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and were later moved across the border to eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, produce, <strong>on</strong> average, some<br />
10 kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day; they often produce <strong>on</strong>ly dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a limited period (some 4 m<strong>on</strong>ths), follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest 23 . In northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> many of the newly set up laboratories are also small <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> size, often family<br />
run, produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between 5 and 10 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a day. 24 In additi<strong>on</strong>, classified <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> suggests that there are<br />
also a number of large morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern, eastern and northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> which have<br />
139
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
been produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up to 150 kg of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base a day. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y produce morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, without<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terrupti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average producti<strong>on</strong> capacity of n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e large laboratories of which UNDCP is aware, is close to<br />
90 kg of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base per day (average: 87 kg; range: 50 to150 kg), employ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> average 23 pers<strong>on</strong>s (range:<br />
18-30). Total producti<strong>on</strong> capacity of these n<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e laboratories amounted to about 285 t<strong>on</strong>s of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e per annum<br />
or, <strong>on</strong> average, 32 t<strong>on</strong>s per laboratory. Even if <strong>on</strong>e deducts 25% (as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated by available data <strong>on</strong> daily<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and daily hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> output) for the additi<strong>on</strong>al time required to manufacture hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> out of morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e base,<br />
the average annual hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g capacity of such laboratories is still around 24 t<strong>on</strong>s. If such a laboratory<br />
makes <strong>on</strong>ly $500 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> profits per kg of brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> produced, annual profits could amount to $12 milli<strong>on</strong>. Profits<br />
may go up to $24 milli<strong>on</strong> (24,000 kg * $1000 per kg) as laboratory efficiency approaches 100%.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> pers<strong>on</strong>s operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g such laboratories (frequently local warlords/commanders) have huge ec<strong>on</strong>omic<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terests that these activities c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y would do whatever they may deem necessary to prevent the<br />
authorities from destroy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the laboratories. Thus the equipment of such laboratories is not <strong>on</strong>ly traditi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
laboratory equipment, water tanks and power generators, but also sophisticated communicati<strong>on</strong> equipment and<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s of all k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds.<br />
5.5. Profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
Once the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been manufactured, it still needs to be shipped abroad. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> difference between<br />
the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> price abroad c<strong>on</strong>stitutes the gross profits that could be made.<br />
Profitability calculati<strong>on</strong>s are, however, rendered difficult, as it is not always clear how the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> qualities found<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> relate to the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> qualities abroad.<br />
In Teheran, for example, the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 was reported to have amounted to $2510<br />
per kg 25 while the various hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> qualities sold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Kandahar market (southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) ranged from $366<br />
to $1111 per kg. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that <strong>on</strong>ly the better quality hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3’ and ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’) was dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for exports,<br />
<strong>on</strong>e could assume an average bazaar price of $1085 per kg ($1058 for ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 3’ and $1111 for ‘hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4’). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
gross profits may have thus been $1425 per kg, equivalent to a gross profitability of 130%, a rather small<br />
percentage compared to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> profitability. One critical factor <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these calculati<strong>on</strong>s, however, is the level of<br />
purity. One study <strong>on</strong> the Iranian drug market, based <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> samples exam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by the authorities, argued that<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity was 20-22%, <strong>on</strong> average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the late 1990s 26 . If average purity of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for<br />
exports was 50% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s (and closer to 60% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more recent years) the price of Iranian hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> would have<br />
to be multiplied - at least - by two ($2510 *2 = $5020 per kg) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to arrive at hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of comparable quality.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> profits would then have been close to $4000 per kg; the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices between <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Iran would<br />
have risen 3 1 / 2 times. But, there are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that the actual purity levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> could have been even<br />
higher. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average purity of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g arrived <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK directly via Pakistan, seized by UK customs,was<br />
64% over the period from June 2000 to May 2001. Most of this hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> appears to have been manufactured with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background, an average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity of around 60% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999<br />
and an average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity of 20% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran, a price of $2510 for 1 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at 20% purity would have been<br />
equivalent to a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> price of around $7530 at 60% purity (= $2510 / 20% * 60%). Based <strong>on</strong> these assumpti<strong>on</strong>s,<br />
the pure hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices may have risen seven-fold between southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Iran.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profitability rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed below the profitability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Opium<br />
shipments could reck<strong>on</strong> with a ten-fold price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease between southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the Tehran market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the late 1990s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lower profitability of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g compared to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran was c<strong>on</strong>firmed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> another UNDCP/UNICRI sp<strong>on</strong>sored review of narcotic ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. While hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices per kg at the<br />
po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of entry <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Iran (eastern Iran) were five times larger than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran were <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
slightly more than 3 times higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a difference <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> perceived risk, and thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the risk<br />
premium charged by drug traffickers. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, perceived to be less of a risk than<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, given <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s bulky nature and its <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive odour, which makes detecti<strong>on</strong> more likely.<br />
140
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale prices<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kilogram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, Pakistan and Iran<br />
6000<br />
5000<br />
5150<br />
5480<br />
US-$ per kg<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
2625<br />
1575<br />
2051<br />
2590<br />
2140<br />
170 9<br />
2392<br />
2700<br />
2510<br />
2435<br />
3881<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
Tajikistan Pakistan Iran<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Figure 5<br />
Source: UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>s.<br />
If profitability of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade was apparently larger, why did traders engage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g?<br />
Differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> risk are a possible explanati<strong>on</strong>, but they are not the <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>on</strong>e. Profit c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s play a role as<br />
well. Though the profit marg<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are larger than for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the reverse is true for the actual<br />
profits per kg. While <strong>on</strong>e kg of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipped from southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Tehran brought traffickers gross<br />
profits of $745 per kg (data for 1998), gross profits amounted to $1425 (data for 1999) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the case of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se basic patterns have not really changed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years. In March 2002 brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> at around $1980 per kg ($2560 for first quality and $1400 for sec<strong>on</strong>d quality brown hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>). In the<br />
Teheran market the reported wholesale price for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was between $5000 and $5250 per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> April of the<br />
same year (up to 50% purity). Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices were thus some 2 1 / 2 times higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g – with prices be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g some 3 times higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to<br />
be more lucrative than hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. But gross profits of some $3150 per smuggled kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> were about<br />
twice as high as gross profits per kg of smuggled <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ($1670).<br />
Given the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come situati<strong>on</strong> of ord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary Afghans, such profits are enormous. A Needs Assessment<br />
Report prepared by UNDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> January 2002 reported that wages amounted to $1 to $2 per day. This would be<br />
equivalent to an annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of $365-$730 per year 27 . Even if <strong>on</strong>e takes the higher end of this range, available<br />
data suggest that smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Tehran was equivalent to 2 years of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> while<br />
smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was equivalent to 4 years of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average size of a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran (based <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizure cases reported to UNDCP,<br />
Interpol and the World Customs Organisati<strong>on</strong>) fell from 22.4 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 (range 0.1 kg to 1.9 t<strong>on</strong>s) to 20.8 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 (range: 0.1 kg to 865 kg) and 5.7 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (range: 0.1 kg to 100 kg), but rose aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> over the first two<br />
quarters of 2002 to 7 kg (range: 0.1 kg to 100 kg). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> size of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure case was thus <strong>on</strong> average 6<br />
times larger <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> weight than a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure case over the 1999-2002 period (3 ½ times <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, 6 times <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999<br />
as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, and 9 times <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001) o , suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that, <strong>on</strong> average, higher profits were made per shipment<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> than per shipment of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits were substantial. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 7 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
Tehran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 yielded some $22,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross profits, equivalent to 30 years of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of an ord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary Afghan<br />
citizen as reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. It goes without say<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that such profit prospects are str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives to engage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities even if traffickers risk the death penalty <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran.<br />
Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Pakistan or the countries of Central Asia is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, a less<br />
lucrative bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess from a narrow ec<strong>on</strong>omic po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view. In 2001 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran were more than<br />
o <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average size of a seizure case of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran amounted to 142 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, the year of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s bumper harvest, but fell to<br />
76 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, 50 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 and to 46 kg over the first two quarters of 2002.<br />
141
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
60% higher than those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and almost 90% higher than those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, which translates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to less<br />
profits to be made by Afghan traders. However, smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan or Tajikistan is still<br />
attractive because the risks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved are less significant. Though Iran is not the <strong>on</strong>ly country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> which<br />
has a death penalty for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g p , the other countries have limited resources available to fight drug<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the chances of opiates traders to sell their hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> without be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g caught by the authorities.<br />
Indeed, there are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that a grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g number of Afghan drug traffickers have been renounc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the large<br />
profits to be made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Iran and opted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stead for the lower but less risky profits to be made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Central Asia.<br />
Informati<strong>on</strong> obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from the Tajik authorities suggested that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> could be bought at around $790<br />
per kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> q <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (Khatl<strong>on</strong> directi<strong>on</strong>: $650-$700, directi<strong>on</strong> Gorniy-Badakshan: $800-<br />
$1000) prior to September 11. r<br />
Table 7: Gross profits out of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale prices<br />
per kilogram<br />
m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum maximum average<br />
Northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Khatl<strong>on</strong> directi<strong>on</strong> $650 $700 $680<br />
Gorny-Badakhshan directi<strong>on</strong> $800 $1,000 $900<br />
Average northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> $790<br />
Gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
profits per<br />
kilogram<br />
Profitability<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of prices<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tajikistan<br />
Mokovski (border with<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
$1,500 $1,600 $1,550 $760 96%<br />
Pyanj (border with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) $1,800 $2,000 $1,900 $1,110 141%<br />
Dushanbe $3,000 $4,000 $3,500 $2,710 343%<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Osh and Batken (south of the<br />
country)<br />
$3,000 $4,000 $3,500 $2,710 343%<br />
Bishkek $5,000 $7,000 $6,000 $5,210 659%<br />
Karakol $6,000 $8,000 $7,000 $6,210 786%<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Almaty $7,000 $8,000 $7,500 $6,710 849%<br />
Northern Kazakhstan $8,000 $9,000 $8,500 $7,710 976%<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
border with<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>/Tajikistan<br />
$800 $4,000 $2,400 $1,610 204%<br />
Tashkent $8,000 $1,000 $4,500 $3,710 470%<br />
Pakistan<br />
Peshawar* $514 $4,303 $1,625 $835 106%<br />
p<br />
A death penalty for large-scale drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g is possible <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan and existed – until recently (August 2001) – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkmenistan. See<br />
also the annex <strong>on</strong> sancti<strong>on</strong>s and penalties for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries.<br />
q<br />
In 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> was c<strong>on</strong>centrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (> 80%) and <strong>on</strong>e can also assume that most of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufactured<br />
with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
r Overall price levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the central Asian countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased after September 11.<br />
142
Chapter V. Greed, warlords and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade<br />
Table 7: Gross profits out of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale prices<br />
per kilogram<br />
m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum maximum average<br />
Gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
profits per<br />
kilogram<br />
Profitability<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of prices<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Quetta* $1,648 $2,674 $2,119 $1,329 168%<br />
Karachi* $2,312 $5,335 $3,433 $2,643 335%<br />
Iran<br />
Tehran* $1,500 $5,550 $3,881 $3,091 391%<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Ashgabad $7,500 $8,000 $7,750 $6,960 881%<br />
northern Turkmenistan $7,500 $8,500 $8,000 $7,210 913%<br />
* m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum and maximum data for Pakistan and Iran refer to m<strong>on</strong>thly averages.<br />
Source: UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>s.<br />
Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this figure as a basis, Afghan traders could make profits of around 100% by smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> just<br />
across the border to Tajikistan or Pakistan. This was less than traders could ga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> from smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> across<br />
the border to Iran. However, if traders did not stop at the border but smuggled the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> to Kazakhstan (via<br />
Kyrgyzstan, or via Uzbekistan) or to northern Turkmenistan (via Uzbekistan or via Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>),<br />
they could expect a gross profitability of more than 900% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, clearly exceed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the profitability of smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Iran (around 400%). Even less ambitious dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s for Afghan traders such as Kyrgyzstan or<br />
Uzbekistan could yield profitability ratios that were slightly above those of Iran while profitability ratios that could<br />
be obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by send<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Karachi (Pakistan) for further shipment to Europe (by sea or by air) were <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
slightly smaller than those encountered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
In other words, the Central Asian countries as well as Pakistan emerged as lucrative alternative outlets<br />
for Afghan hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 offer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g – from a trafficker’s po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t of view - better profit/risk ratios than those exist<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. Available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> actual hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities c<strong>on</strong>firms that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffickers took these<br />
market signals seriously and acted accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly. In particular, there are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that larger-scale hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
traffickers shifted their smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities to Central Asia, notably Tajikistan. Whereas the average size of a<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran amounted to just 5.7 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (down from 22.4 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999), the average hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizure case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan was 8.3 kg and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan 23.4 kg <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, i.e. three times the size <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and<br />
four times the size <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. s<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong><br />
Though a number of factors played a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the engagement of Afghan traders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, the<br />
overrid<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g factor is the large profit to be made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Given<br />
the magnitude of these profits, it is also clear that legitimate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come alternatives created as part of the<br />
rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> cannot replace them. Thus, the authorities will face c<strong>on</strong>siderable oppositi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
curtail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g as significant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for a not negligible number of Afghan people, who <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stances are even part of the local elite, is at stake. Notably warlords and local commanders, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the drug<br />
trade, can be expected to defend their lucrative bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess operati<strong>on</strong>s by all means.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> narcotics traders c<strong>on</strong>stitute the crucial l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k between demand for opiates outside <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy farmers with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. As l<strong>on</strong>g as these traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g networks operate, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives will exist for<br />
farmers to grow <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy, and as l<strong>on</strong>g as farmers grow <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy traders will c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to sell this<br />
commodity abroad and feed global opiates markets.<br />
s<br />
Informati<strong>on</strong> based <strong>on</strong> UNDCP/Interpol/WCO <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizure data.<br />
143
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
27<br />
Barnett R. Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, World Development, Vol. 28, No. 20, 2000, p. 1793.<br />
IPC, op.cit., pp.5-6.<br />
Barnett Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Council <strong>on</strong> Foreign Relati<strong>on</strong>s, New York<br />
1999, www.eurasianet.org, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IPC, op.cit., p. 7.<br />
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Story of the Afghan Warlords, [Pan Books], Sept. 2001, p. 20 and p. 22.<br />
Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, op.cit, p. 1793.<br />
Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Story of the Afghan Warlords, [Pan Books], Sept. 2001, p. 190.<br />
Z.F. Naqvi, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>-Pakistan Trade Relati<strong>on</strong>s, World Bank, Islamabad 1999, also cited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Barnett R. Rub<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Political<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omy of War and Peace <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>”, World Development, Vol. 28, No. 20, 2000, p. 1802.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium<br />
Traders, October 1998, p. 22<br />
ibid., p. 8.<br />
UNICEF, 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS2) Situati<strong>on</strong> Analysis of Children and Women <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the East of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> , Vol. 1, M<strong>on</strong>itor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g & Evaluati<strong>on</strong> Work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Paper Series No. 1, p. 6.<br />
UNDCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Strategic Study #2, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Dynamics of the Farmgate Opium Trade and the Cop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Strategies of Opium<br />
Traders, October 1998, p. 8.<br />
ibid., p. 11.<br />
ibid., p. 17.<br />
UNDCP, Pakistan Country Profile 2001.<br />
UNDCP/Interpol/WCO, Individual seizure database.<br />
UNDCP, Recommended Methods for Test<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Opium, Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Manual for Use by Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug Test<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Laboratories,<br />
New York 1998, p 8.<br />
ibid.<br />
ibid., p 10.<br />
UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan”, (Draft Report), December 1994, p. 31.<br />
ibid., p. 31.<br />
INCB, 2001 Precursors and chemicals frequently used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, New<br />
York 2001, p. 69.<br />
ibid., p 4.<br />
UNDCP, “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan” (Draft Report) , December 1994.<br />
UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, May 2002.<br />
UNDCP, Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
UNDCP/UNICRI, Illicit Drug Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran, (Draft Report), pp. 81-82.<br />
UNDP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>:Prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary Needs Assessment For Recovery And Rec<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, January 2002, p. 16.<br />
(http:/www.undp.org/afghanistan/needsreports/needsreport2.html)<br />
144
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
PART III:<br />
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES<br />
Chapter VI<br />
DEVASTATION IN<br />
NEIGHBOURING COUNRIES<br />
145
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> has also had c<strong>on</strong>sequences for neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, spread of abuse and spread of drug related HIV. This will be documented below. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> impact of<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, however, reaches bey<strong>on</strong>d these immediate c<strong>on</strong>sequences. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that<br />
some of the funds generated out of drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g were used by <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>surgency groups, thus destabilis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the<br />
state, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> and civil society at large.<br />
For the purpose of this study <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries have been def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clude<br />
Pakistan, Iran and all of the Central Asian states, i.e. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and<br />
Kazakhstan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> latter two countries do not share a comm<strong>on</strong> border with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y have been<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the analysis because (i) border c<strong>on</strong>trols am<strong>on</strong>g all of the Central Asian countries tend to be weak,<br />
facilitat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g across the regi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>ce opiates cross the border from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, (ii) ethnically the<br />
Central Asian countries share many of the same characteristics, facilitat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g across the regi<strong>on</strong><br />
and (iii) all Central Asian countries, whether or not they share a comm<strong>on</strong> border with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, have been<br />
found to be str<strong>on</strong>gly affected by traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of Afghan opiates.<br />
6.1. Socio-ec<strong>on</strong>omic c<strong>on</strong>text<br />
6.1.1. Populati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest country neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> terms of populati<strong>on</strong>, is Pakistan (141 milli<strong>on</strong> people),<br />
followed by Iran (70 milli<strong>on</strong>). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries, together, have a populati<strong>on</strong> of close to 60 milli<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest central Asian country is Uzbekistan, followed by Kazakhstan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total populati<strong>on</strong> of all of the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is thus close to 270 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants, twelve times the populati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Pakistan accounts for more than half of the total, Iran for a quarter and Central Asia for a fifth.<br />
Table 1: Populati<strong>on</strong> of countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (2000)<br />
Pakistan Iran Central Asia<br />
TOTAL<br />
Uzbeki<br />
-stan<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Central<br />
Asia<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> milli<strong>on</strong> 141.3 70.3 24.9 16.2 6.1 4.9 4.7 56.8 268.4<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of<br />
'neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries'<br />
52.6% 26.2% 9.3% 6.0% 2.3% 1.8% 1.8% 21.2% 100.0%<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002. pp. 163-164.<br />
In ethnic terms, the regi<strong>on</strong> is very mixed: a<br />
In Pakistan 15% of the populati<strong>on</strong> (some 20 milli<strong>on</strong> people) are Pashtuns, most of whom live <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce al<strong>on</strong>g the border with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pashtuns also form the majority of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (8 to 10 milli<strong>on</strong> people or some 40% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s total populati<strong>on</strong>).<br />
Five percent of Pakistan’s populati<strong>on</strong> (7 milli<strong>on</strong>) are Baluch, who live al<strong>on</strong>g the south-western border<br />
with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Baluch also live <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran al<strong>on</strong>g the border<br />
with Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. About 1% of Iran’s populati<strong>on</strong> speak Baluch (some 700,000 people).<br />
Iran’s Kurdish populati<strong>on</strong> (estimated at 8% of the country’s total populati<strong>on</strong>) is c<strong>on</strong>centrated <strong>on</strong> the<br />
western borders. A Kurdish populati<strong>on</strong> is also found across the border <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkey.<br />
Close to the border with Turkmenistan, an ethnic Turkmen populati<strong>on</strong> is found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran (some 1.5,<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> or 2% of the populati<strong>on</strong>) as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border areas of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Turkmenistan. Many of the<br />
Turkmens (and the Uzbeks) liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> today actually moved to the country follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Russian<br />
Revoluti<strong>on</strong> of 1917.<br />
a<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g data are <strong>on</strong>ly tentative, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from various nati<strong>on</strong>al statistics, to illustrate this po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t. (Data have been taken from the<br />
2002 editi<strong>on</strong> of the Fischer Weltalmanach).<br />
147
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Almost half the populati<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> speaks Dari, a Persian dialect, which facilitates direct l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks<br />
with Iran as well as with Tajikistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest Dari speak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g community <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are the Tajiks (5 to 6<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> people, 25% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s populati<strong>on</strong>), liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the northern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. This facilitates trade<br />
and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g with neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan, which <strong>on</strong>ly has a populati<strong>on</strong> of slightly more than 6 milli<strong>on</strong><br />
people. An important Tajik m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ority of more than 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> pers<strong>on</strong>s is also found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan, where it<br />
forms approximately 5% of the populati<strong>on</strong>, and a smaller <strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan.<br />
Uzbeks are even more wide-spread across Central Asia. About 5% of the Afghan populati<strong>on</strong> are<br />
Uzbeks (more than 1 milli<strong>on</strong> people). In additi<strong>on</strong> to Uzbekistan, there are important Uzbek m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tajikistan (23.5% of the populati<strong>on</strong>), <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkmenistan (9% of the populati<strong>on</strong>) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kasakhstan (2.2% of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>).<br />
Most people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e of the Turkic related languages - Uzbek, Turmen, Kyrgyz or<br />
Kazakh - can more or less understand each other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their mother t<strong>on</strong>gue. In additi<strong>on</strong>, Russian is widely<br />
spoken and serves as l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gua franca across Central Asia.<br />
Important, though dim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, Russian m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities are found across all of Central Asia. In Kazakhstan<br />
they form 35.8% of the total populati<strong>on</strong> or 5.8 milli<strong>on</strong> people, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan 18.8% (0.9 milli<strong>on</strong>), <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Turkmenistan 9.8% (0.5 milli<strong>on</strong>), <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan 7.6% (0.5 milli<strong>on</strong>) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan 5.5% (1.4 milli<strong>on</strong>). 1<br />
C<strong>on</strong>siderable numbers of people of Central Asian ancestry (Tajiks as well as others) are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
several of the larger towns of the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Moscow, while multiple l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks also exist<br />
between the local Russian m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities and Russians <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Some of the Central Asian countries, notably Kazakhstan, also had m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>orities of ethnic Germans <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
some pockets of the country. Dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g World War II these ethnic Germans were resettled by Stal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> from the<br />
Volga regi<strong>on</strong> to Central Asia. 2 Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the break-up of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> many such families, moved to<br />
Germany, though they hardly spoke German any l<strong>on</strong>ger. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y thus faced problems of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrati<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a<br />
number of cases ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed str<strong>on</strong>ger l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks with their former country of residence than with their new home<br />
country.<br />
All of the ethnic patterns and l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks described here could facilitate drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g across borders.<br />
6.1.2. Size of ec<strong>on</strong>omies<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall size of all of the ec<strong>on</strong>omies of the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, measured by the<br />
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) b , c<strong>on</strong>verted by the official exchange rates of the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary<br />
Fund (IMF), amounted to some $200 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. This corresp<strong>on</strong>ds to the size of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> of Austria,<br />
Belgium, Sweden or Switzerland, and is equivalent to less than 1% of the aggregated GDP of all OECD<br />
countries.<br />
More than half of the aggregated GDP of the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> is accounted for by<br />
Iran and more than 30% by Pakistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries account for less than 20% of the<br />
comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed GDP of the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Am<strong>on</strong>g the Central Asian countries the rank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
between the country hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the largest and the sec<strong>on</strong>d largest populati<strong>on</strong> is reversed: the largest Central<br />
Asian <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> is clearly Kazakhstan, followed by Uzbekistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> smallest <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> is Tajikistan (GDP of<br />
$1 billi<strong>on</strong>), followed by Kyrgyzstan (GDP of $1.4 billi<strong>on</strong>). Small ec<strong>on</strong>omies, such as the latter two, are<br />
particularly vulnerable to be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g destabilized by the huge flow of funds result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
b <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> plus any product taxes<br />
and m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>us any subsidies not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the value of the products. It is calculated without mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g deducti<strong>on</strong>s for depreciati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
fabricated assets or for depleti<strong>on</strong> and degradati<strong>on</strong> of natural resources. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> difference between the GDP and the Gross Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Product (GNP) is that net receipts of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from abroad are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the GNP figures but not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the GDP figures. Parallel, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
made by n<strong>on</strong>-residents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country under <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigati<strong>on</strong> reduce the GNP but would not affect the calculati<strong>on</strong> of the GDP. (World Bank,<br />
2002 World Development Indicators and UNDP, Human Development Report 2002).<br />
148
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.1.3. Level of development<br />
In terms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come and ec<strong>on</strong>omic development, there are significant differences am<strong>on</strong>g the countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Gross Nati<strong>on</strong>al Product (GNP) c per capita c<strong>on</strong>verted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to US-dollars by<br />
the Atlas method, the two richest countries am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours are Iran and Kazakhstan,<br />
followed by Turkmenistan. All three countries benefit from natural resources, notably oil and gas. Tajikistan<br />
has the lowest GNP per capita figures am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours. It is <strong>on</strong>ly 1/9 th of Iran’s per capita<br />
GNP or 15% of the average per capita GNP of low & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next lowest per capita<br />
GNP rates were reported from Kyrgyzstan, which has less than 1/4 th of the average GNP per capita of low &<br />
middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries. Except Iran and Kazakhstan, all of the other countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
have a GNP per capita figure that is below the average GNP per capita of low & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries.<br />
Table 2: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), c<strong>on</strong>verted at the official average exchange rate<br />
for the year 2000 reported by the Internati<strong>on</strong>al M<strong>on</strong>etary Fund (IMF), <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
of countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Iran Pakistan Central Asia<br />
TOTAL<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Tajikistan Central<br />
Asia<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ 104.9 61.6 18.2 7.7 4.4 1.3 1.0 32.6 199.1<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of<br />
'neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 52.7% 30.9% 9.1% 3.9% 2.2% 0.7% 0.5% 16.4% 100.0%<br />
countries'<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002. pp. 191-192.<br />
Table 3 : Gross Nati<strong>on</strong>al Product (GNP) per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$*<br />
Iran Kazakhstan<br />
Turkmeni<br />
stan<br />
Pakistan Uzbekistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Low and<br />
middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
countries<br />
GNP per capita<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ 1,680 1,260 750 440 360 270 180 1,230<br />
Index: 137 102 61 36 29 22 15 100<br />
* based <strong>on</strong> the Atlas c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> method; this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volves us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a three-year average of exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory<br />
exchange rate fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Note: red is used to highlight countries which are below the low & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries’ average.<br />
Source: 2002 World Bank, World Development Indicators.<br />
In terms of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come and ec<strong>on</strong>omic development, measured by the per capita Gross Domestic Product<br />
(GDP) adjusted by Purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Power Parities (PPP), which is a better <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicator for actual levels of standard<br />
of liv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, there are significant differences am<strong>on</strong>g the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates that<br />
the differences are not just due to distorted exchange rates. While GDP per capita, expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> PPP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
and Kazakhstan was more than 50% above the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average, the poorest country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
regi<strong>on</strong> (apart from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to be Tajikistan. Its PPP adjusted per capita GDP was aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>ly<br />
1/9 th of the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g figure for Iran and 70% less than the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d poorest country am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours is, however, not Kyrgyzstan but Pakistan.<br />
Pakistan’s PPP adjusted GDP was some 50% below the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average. Uzbekistan’s GDP<br />
was 35% below and Kyrgyzstan’s PPP adjusted GDP was 28% below the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000.<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes not <strong>on</strong>ly PPP adjusted GDP<br />
per capita, but also a measurement for the overall health situati<strong>on</strong> (‘life-expectancy’) and a measurement for<br />
the educati<strong>on</strong>al level (adult literacy and gross enrolment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the school/university system), the highest level of<br />
human development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours was calculated for Kazakhstan (rank 79 out of<br />
c <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Gross Nati<strong>on</strong>al Product (GNP), also known by the World Bank as Gross Nati<strong>on</strong>al Income (GNI), is the sum of gross value added<br />
by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) that are not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the valuati<strong>on</strong> of output plus net receipts of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from abroad. It is calculated without mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g deducti<strong>on</strong>s for depreciati<strong>on</strong> of fabricated assets or for depleti<strong>on</strong> and degradati<strong>on</strong> of<br />
natural resources.<br />
(World Bank, 2002 World Development Indicators).<br />
149
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
173 countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated).<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> two countries which faced the most severe problems am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g states were Tajikistan (rank 112) and Pakistan (rank 138). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> positi<strong>on</strong> of the latter two<br />
countries was below the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average.<br />
6.1.4. Ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth<br />
In terms of ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth all countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> performed below the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries’ average (3.1%) over the 1990-2000 period. Iran (1.9% p.a.) and Pakistan (1.2% p.a.) were the<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly to show positive growth rates. All of the central Asian states suffered decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es seem to<br />
have been primarily l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to the break up of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> and the transiti<strong>on</strong> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dependent statehood,<br />
and the c<strong>on</strong>sequent <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ability to rely <strong>on</strong> the huge market of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> or <strong>on</strong> subsidies from Moscow.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most severe decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es over the 1990-2000 period were reported by Tajikistan (-11.8% p.a) also suffer<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
from the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of a civil war (1992-97).<br />
Though drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cannot be p<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ted as the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> cause of poor ec<strong>on</strong>omic performance, the<br />
data presented above <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Afghan opiates did not foster ec<strong>on</strong>omic development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>. Poor ec<strong>on</strong>omic development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several of the countries, notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some of the Central Asian states,<br />
appears to have c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g attracti<strong>on</strong> of crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al activities over the last couple of years. It may<br />
be also noted that Iran, which spent the most aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, had the highest per capita growth rate<br />
am<strong>on</strong>g the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Iran<br />
Table 5: GDP per capita growth 1990-2000<br />
Pakistan Uzbeki<br />
-stan<br />
Kazakh<br />
-stan<br />
Table 4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Power Parities dollars (PPP$) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 and Human Development Index (HDI) 2000<br />
Iran<br />
Develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
Kazakhstamenistan<br />
Turk-<br />
Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Pakistan Tajikistan countries<br />
average<br />
GDP per capita<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US$ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> PPP<br />
5,884 5,871 3,956 2,711 2,441 1,928 1,152 3,783<br />
Index<br />
Develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 156 155 105 72 65 51 30 100<br />
countries = 100<br />
HDI 0.721 0.750 0.741 0.712 0.727 0.499 0.667 0.654<br />
Rank <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> HDI<br />
(out of 173 98 79 87 102 95 138 112 -<br />
countries)<br />
Note: red is used to highlight countries which are below the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average.<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002. pp. 151-152.<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries<br />
average<br />
Source<br />
GDP per capita<br />
growth (p.a.) 1.9% 1.2% -2.4% -3.1% -5.1% -8.0% -11.8% 3.1% UNDP<br />
1990-2000<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002. pp. 151-152 and World bank, 2002 World Development Indicators<br />
6.1.5. Foreign trade<br />
Another set of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators can be used to establish the level of vulnerability to drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g: the<br />
foreign trade orientati<strong>on</strong> of the countries c<strong>on</strong>cerned. Whenever there is large-scale licit import/export trade,<br />
drug traffickers f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d it easy to piggyback their illicit trade <strong>on</strong> to the legal activities. As much of the exports of<br />
the countries c<strong>on</strong>cerned are determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by raw material exports, notably oil and gas which are irrelevant for<br />
drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g purposes, the level of imports c<strong>on</strong>stitutes a better <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong> of the extent to which foreign<br />
trade could be exploited by drug traffickers.<br />
150
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Overall imports of merchandise goods amounted to $37 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. Forty percent of this amount were imports of Iran, 30% imports of Pakistan<br />
and the rest imports of the countries of Central Asia. If traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns followed licit trade, the highest<br />
levels of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> would be expected for Iran, followed by Pakistan.<br />
Though Iran and Pakistan, be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the largest countries, also have the highest levels of imports, <strong>on</strong>ce<br />
imports are expressed as a percentage of GDP, the highest import ratios are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan. This<br />
represents a pattern frequently found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> smaller countries where foreign trade plays – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> relative terms - a<br />
greater importance than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> larger countries. Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the analogy of traffickers piggyback<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
exports <strong>on</strong> to the legitimate trade, <strong>on</strong>e might expect that traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of opiates via Tajikistan is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> relative<br />
terms (i.e. compared to the populati<strong>on</strong> or the size of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>), more important than to Iran or Pakistan.<br />
Table 7 : Imports and exports of goods and services of countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as % of GDP<br />
Iran<br />
Pakistan<br />
Develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries<br />
Imports 85 55 53 47 39 21 19 32<br />
Exports: 81 43 63 59 44 35 16 34<br />
Note: red is used to highlight countries which have a ratio above the develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ average.<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, New York, 2002, pp. 199-201..<br />
Indeed, if hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizure data for the year 2001 are analyzed, most seizures am<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were reported from Iran (48%), followed by Pakistan (33%), more or less<br />
follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the importance of these countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> foreign trade. However, <strong>on</strong>ce the seizures are expressed per<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants or per billi<strong>on</strong> GDP, by far the largest seizures took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan.<br />
Table 8: Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
Iran<br />
Pakistan<br />
Table 6: Imports of countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$<br />
Iran Pakistan Central Asia<br />
TOTAL<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Central<br />
Asia<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ 15,220 11,048 5,050 2,810 1,400 675 555 10,490 36,758<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of<br />
'neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 41.4% 30.1% 13.7% 7.6% 3.8% 1.8% 1.5% 28.5% 100.0%<br />
countries'<br />
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, pp. 224-226.<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Turkmenistan*<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures<br />
12,669 8,755 4,239 467 200 184 137 26,651<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % 48% 33% 16% 2% 1% 1% 1% 100%<br />
* data for 2000.<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Total<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg per milli<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants<br />
Table 9: Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e per milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Tajikistan Iran Pakistan Turkmenistan* Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan<br />
695 180 62 43 38 19 8<br />
* data for 2000.<br />
Sources: UNDCP, DELTA and UNDP, Human Development Report .<br />
151
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 10: Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e per billi<strong>on</strong> GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Tajikistan Pakistan Kyrgyzstan Iran Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
4,239 142 141 121 61 45 8<br />
per billi<strong>on</strong> GDP<br />
* data for 2000.<br />
Sources: UNDCP, DELTA and UNDP, Human Development Report .<br />
6.2. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g patterns, as reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizure data, will be analysed here <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> more detail. A first obvious<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g c<strong>on</strong>cerns the massive extent to which countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Iran, Pakistan and the<br />
countries of Central Asia) are affected by drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities. In 2000 the ‘neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> were resp<strong>on</strong>sible for 61% of global seizures of opiates. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all the opiate seizures of the<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s that are str<strong>on</strong>gly affected by <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, i.e. Europe, the Near & Middle East<br />
and Central Asia, the ‘neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> accounted for 71% of the opiate seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
these three regi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. By comparis<strong>on</strong>, the ‘neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries’ accounted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 for 22% of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> of the three regi<strong>on</strong>s or just 1% of the aggregated GDP of these three regi<strong>on</strong>s, clearly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the ec<strong>on</strong>omic burden put <strong>on</strong> these countries by drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
At the same time, available data suggest that more so than other countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> successfully stepped up enforcement efforts over the last decade. In 1990, neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> accounted for 65% of the comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed opiates seizures of the three regi<strong>on</strong>s menti<strong>on</strong>ed<br />
above. This ratio <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to 71% by the year 2000.<br />
In almost all neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g states, opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased over the last two decades. This was a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequence of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g law enforcement efforts as well as of higher levels of Afghan <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> doubled over the 1990-2000 period; seizures of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and<br />
the Central Asian countries, almost quadrupled over the same period (us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents and apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
a transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio of 10:1 for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and a 1:1 for morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>). In 1990 the ‘neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries’ seized 10% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s estimated <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents. This<br />
ratio <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to 18% by 2000. One third was seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> while two thirds were seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the form of either hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> or morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> process<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g capacities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
100%<br />
90%<br />
80%<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries as compared to overall opiates<br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, Near & Middle East and Central Asia, 1985-2000<br />
33% 33% 32% 32% 31% 35% 32% 33%<br />
67% 67% 68% 68% 69% 65% 68% 67%<br />
24% 26%<br />
76% 74%<br />
20%<br />
80%<br />
29%<br />
71%<br />
20% 23% 20%<br />
80% 77% 80%<br />
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
29%<br />
71%<br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia)<br />
Other countries<br />
Figure 1<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
152
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Seizures of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia,<br />
expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents* (1980-2001),<br />
and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents (left scale)<br />
Opium seizures (left scale)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>'s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (right scale)<br />
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
5000<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
* apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a 10 : 1 ratio for transform<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Figure 2<br />
Source: UNDCP, 2002 Global Illicit <strong>Drugs</strong> Trends and UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
In 2001, follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the large decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>, opiates seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> showed a marked decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e of about 40%. Given the existence of huge<br />
stocks follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the bumper harvests of 1999 and 2000 – seizures of opiates orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from these stocks,<br />
were almost twice as high as <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s 2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Seizure data show that throughout the last two decades Iran was affected most by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Iranian <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures showed a 9-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease between 1990 and 2000. In some years Pakistan’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures were also sizeable. In 2001, however, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 55% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries. Decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es were reported from all neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries.<br />
Seizures of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia (1980-2001)<br />
300,000<br />
250,000<br />
Central Asia<br />
Pakistan<br />
kilogram<br />
200,000<br />
150,000<br />
100,000<br />
50,000<br />
Figure 3<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
0<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
Iran<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
153
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
154
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
A str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease over the last two decades was also reported for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures. In<br />
2001 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, but the reducti<strong>on</strong> (33%) was less significant than for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures. If <strong>on</strong>ly hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures are c<strong>on</strong>sidered, the year 2001 showed an even further <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the existence of huge hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks as well as the expansi<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
bulk of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures over the last two decades were made by the Iranian authorities, but the<br />
dom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance of Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e & hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures is less significant than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures. If <strong>on</strong>ly hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures are c<strong>on</strong>sidered, Central Asia, Pakistan and Iran seem to be equally important as outlets of Afghan<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
kilogram<br />
45,000<br />
40,000<br />
35,000<br />
30,000<br />
25,000<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
-<br />
Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia (1980-2001)<br />
Central Asia<br />
Pakistan<br />
Iran<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
Figure 4<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia (1980-2001)<br />
25,000<br />
Central Asia<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
-<br />
Pakistan<br />
Iran<br />
Figure 5<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
1980<br />
1981<br />
1982<br />
1983<br />
1984<br />
1985<br />
1986<br />
1987<br />
1988<br />
1989<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
155
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
6.2.1. Iran<br />
More than half of total Iranian drug seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous years) took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
three eastern prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Khorassan (border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Turkmenistan), Sistan & Baluchistan<br />
(border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and Kerman prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of both Sistan &<br />
Baluchistan and Khorassan). Smaller amounts of narcotics also enter Iran from Pakistan by sea via the<br />
prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Hormozgan. 3 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iranian authorities identified some 90 po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts of entry of opiates from<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Khorassan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and some 50 po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts of entry between <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>/Pakistan and the<br />
Iranian prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Sistan & Baluchistan. Out of all drugs seized by the Iranian authorities, 20% were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Khorassan and 14% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sistan & Baluchistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000, though <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 Iranian authorities reported a shift of<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g towards the comm<strong>on</strong> Pakistan-Iranian border, affect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly Sistan & Baluchistan 4 . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
exit po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts are border cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs al<strong>on</strong>g the Turkish border and, to a lesser extent, Iran’s southern coast, the<br />
border with Azerbaijan and the border with Turkmenistan.<br />
Iran has paid a high price for drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terdicti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> human terms. More than 3000 Iranian law<br />
enforcement pers<strong>on</strong>nel were killed over the last two decades d , <strong>on</strong> average more than 150 pers<strong>on</strong>s per year,<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> try<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to prevent drug traffickers from us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Iranian territory to smuggle narcotics. In 2000, about half of all<br />
Iranian law enforcement pers<strong>on</strong>nel were killed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Khorassan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce al<strong>on</strong>g the border with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
a third killed were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sistan & Baluchistan al<strong>on</strong>g the borders with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Pakistan 5 . A third of all<br />
Iranian drug seizures were made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> armed clashes and ambushes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. 6<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to an estimate produced by the Bureau for Social Studies of Teheran, direct costs by<br />
government agencies to fight the drug problem amounted to 1,136 billi<strong>on</strong> rials <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1988. C<strong>on</strong>verted at the<br />
official UN exchange rate for 1998 (Rials 4300 for US$1), drug c<strong>on</strong>trol costs would have amounted to<br />
US$264 milli<strong>on</strong>. More than half of the funds were spent <strong>on</strong> supply c<strong>on</strong>trol measures. C<strong>on</strong>verted at the official<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>al exchange rate (Rials 3500 for US$1) the drug c<strong>on</strong>trol expenditure would have amounted to $325<br />
milli<strong>on</strong>. This was equivalent to 0.3% of Iran’s GDP. In comparis<strong>on</strong>, the UK, which has <strong>on</strong>e of the highest<br />
drug c<strong>on</strong>trol budgets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, spent 0.16% of GDP <strong>on</strong> drug c<strong>on</strong>trol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1997/98 (₤1.4 billi<strong>on</strong>, up from ₤0.5<br />
billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993/94; 62% of the 1997/98 drug c<strong>on</strong>trol budget went <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to supply c<strong>on</strong>trol) 7 . Expenditure <strong>on</strong> supply<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran from 0.2% of GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998 to 0.4% of GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
Headquarters total expenditures for the year 2000 were reported to be $250-$300 milli<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Table 11: Direct Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998<br />
Milli<strong>on</strong> rials <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
Milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
N<strong>on</strong>-oil export UN<br />
exchange rate exchange<br />
rate<br />
Official<br />
exchange<br />
rate<br />
Exchange rate: Rials to<br />
US-$ 5,395 4,305 3,500<br />
Supply reducti<strong>on</strong> 605,738 53% 112 141 173<br />
Treatment and legal<br />
expenditures<br />
385,820 34% 72 90 110<br />
Preventi<strong>on</strong> and<br />
awareness campaign<br />
115,171 10% 21 27 33<br />
Other<br />
29,699 3% 6 7 8<br />
Total drug c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
expenditure<br />
1,136,428 100% 211 264 325<br />
Gross domestic<br />
product (GDP)<br />
324,800,000 60,200 75,400 92,800<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of GDP 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%<br />
Sources: Cultural Research Bureau, “Illicit Drug Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran – Review of Narcotic Ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran”, (Draft),<br />
Tehran 2001; <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Profile, 2002.<br />
d <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> precise figure provided by the Iranian authorities was 3078 by the end of 2000 (Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2000, 25.<br />
156
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
From a global perspective, government expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seiz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong>e kilogram of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is<br />
comparatively low <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, the supply c<strong>on</strong>trol budget was US$1.45 billi<strong>on</strong> (₤870<br />
milli<strong>on</strong>) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, the supply c<strong>on</strong>trol budget of Iran, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the official UN exchange rate, was $141 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the same year. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> available supply c<strong>on</strong>trol budget enabled the UK authorities to take 1,346 kg hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> out of<br />
the market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. In the same year, the Iranian authorities seized 2,895 kg of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 22,291 kg of<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and 154,454 kg of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iranian authorities thus took <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> total 40.6 t<strong>on</strong>s of opiates (expressed<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents) out of the market, 30 times more than the UK with 1/10 th of the UK budget at their<br />
disposal.<br />
Drug c<strong>on</strong>trol expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran goes bey<strong>on</strong>d the budget of the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug c<strong>on</strong>trol <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
country. Includ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> and ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tenance of fortificati<strong>on</strong>s erected at the country’s eastern border, and<br />
various other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>direct costs, the Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters estimate that overall costs of fight<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the drug<br />
problem have been as high as US$ 1 billi<strong>on</strong> per year, which would have been equivalent to about 1½% of<br />
the country’s GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years.<br />
Table 12: Direct Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran 1998-2000 - suppy c<strong>on</strong>trol<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
1998 1999 2000<br />
Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters expenditure n.a. 116 275<br />
Strengthen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g eastern border n.a. 25 n.a.<br />
Supply c<strong>on</strong>trol expenditure 112 141 275<br />
GDP 60,200 54,200 70,300<br />
Supply c<strong>on</strong>trol expenditure as a percentage of<br />
GDP<br />
0.2% 0.3% 0.4%<br />
Sources: Cultural Research Bureau, “Illicit Drug Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran – Review of Narcotic Ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran”, (Draft), Tehran 2001;<br />
UNODCCP, Iran Country Profile 2002, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Profile, 2002.<br />
6.2.2. Pakistan<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> sec<strong>on</strong>d largest seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s were reported by Pakistan. For a<br />
couple of years <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s, Pakistan’s hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures even exceeded those of Iran. Most<br />
Pakistan seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Pakistan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Baluchistan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Iran. Baluchistan was resp<strong>on</strong>sible for 81% of Pakistan’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 77% of its hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g cha<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> goes from southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Baluchistan and then<br />
across the border to the Iranian prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Sistan & Baluchistan. Opiates, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> particular <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
are also smuggled from eastern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via the North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce to the rest of the country.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> NWFP accounted for 7% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 5% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures. On average c<strong>on</strong>signments <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tercepted<br />
al<strong>on</strong>g this traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g route are smaller. However, about three times as many arrests for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g are made<br />
12,000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan<br />
1980-2002<br />
10,000<br />
kilograms<br />
8,000<br />
6,000<br />
4,000<br />
2,000<br />
0<br />
1980<br />
1982<br />
1984<br />
1986<br />
1988<br />
1990<br />
1992<br />
1994<br />
1996<br />
1998<br />
2000<br />
Seizures Trend 1980:2001<br />
Figure 6<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002.<br />
157
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> NWFP (1117 cases) than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Baluchistan (343 cases). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> sea coast area of Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
ports of Karachi, Port Qasim and the smaller fish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ports and open areas of the Makran coast are also<br />
vulnerable to drug smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. 8 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se shipments are often dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for the Gulf States and bey<strong>on</strong>d, though<br />
some shipments also go by ship to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Iran.<br />
Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trends <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan went clearly upwards <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s, but were characterised by rather<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures fell <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1990s before <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995,<br />
follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s 1994 bumper harvest. Similarly, after a downward trend <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased str<strong>on</strong>gly aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s 1999 bumper harvest. In 2001, the year of<br />
the Taliban <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy ban, seizures fell aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Disregard<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these cyclical fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s, the overall trend of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures showed a moderate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s.<br />
Informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse seems to c<strong>on</strong>firm these trends. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s was rather modest, which was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> clear c<strong>on</strong>trast to rapidly ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels<br />
of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian states.<br />
6.2.3. Central Asia<br />
Countries of Central Asia <strong>on</strong>ly started to report significant seizures as of the late 1990s. Parallel,<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of precursor chemicals via Central Asia to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> was reported.<br />
A str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease and a clear c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of seizures am<strong>on</strong>g the countries of Central Asia is found<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to the north, as well as improvements of the<br />
enforcement capacity of Tajikistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years. Some 60% of all Afghan drugs enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Tajikistan are<br />
trafficked across the flat terra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> of the Afghan-Tajik border (via Pynaj, Moskowsky, Nizhni Pyanj, Shuruabad,<br />
Parhar). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 40% of the drugs are trafficked via the mounta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ous Gorno-Badakshan Aut<strong>on</strong>omous<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong> (through Ishkashim, Khorog, Roushan and Kalay Khumb). Tajikistan was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years particularly<br />
affected by traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the establishment of a number of repositories and clandest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> close to the Tajik border. A reverse traffic of precursor chemicals<br />
apparently runs from other Central Asian countries and/or the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> for the manufature of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<strong>Drugs</strong> c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trafficked from Tajikistan via the border near Khojand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the Syrdarya Oblast<br />
or via the southern route <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the Sukhandarya Oblast <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan. Significant traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was also reported<br />
<strong>on</strong> the Dushanbe-Moscow tra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 9 . Another major route goes from Gorno-Badakshan regi<strong>on</strong> of Tajikistan,<br />
through Osh <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan, and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley. (Indeed, most seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan<br />
c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to take place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Batken and Osh prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces) 10 . Prior to 1998 and the clos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the border between<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Uzbekistan opiates were also directly trafficked from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Uzbekistan. As this<br />
border (“Friendship Bridge” <strong>on</strong> the Amudarya river) was opened aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> after the fall of the Taliban regime,<br />
<strong>on</strong>e might expect traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g al<strong>on</strong>g this route as well.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia (1993-2001)<br />
kilogram<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
Turkmenistan<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Figure 7<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
158
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Railways l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Kazakhstan with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
are c<strong>on</strong>sidered to be the most important traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g channels via Kazakhstan. Important entry po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
Kazakhstan are the rail cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts of Rays (<strong>on</strong> the border with Uzbekistan) and B<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ey (<strong>on</strong> the border<br />
with Turkmenistan). Drug traffic via motor vehicles enters Kazakhstan mostly by cross<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the border <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Chimkent, Jambil or Almaty prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces. Most of the drugs go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to Russia by rail or by vehicles cross the<br />
Russian border <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the directi<strong>on</strong> of Astrakhan, Orenburg, Chelyab<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sk, Omsk and Novosibirsk. 11<br />
While hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures showed an upward trend over the last two decades, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
seizures <strong>on</strong>ly started to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease str<strong>on</strong>gly as of the late 1990s, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
manufacture with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In 2001, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly due to fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. Improved hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> manufacture capacity meant that morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly<br />
transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Thus hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re was,<br />
however, a shift <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g routes. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via Central Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased while traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via Iran<br />
lost <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> importance. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, but rose aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g year. This was<br />
a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s large <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest growth rates - by far - <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years were reported from the Central<br />
Asian countries, notably from Tajikistan. Tajikistan was the <strong>on</strong>ly country <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> which showed ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
levels of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g shifts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g routes towards northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and thus<br />
further <strong>on</strong> to Tajikistan, and improved enforcement efforts by the authorities of Tajikistan.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan<br />
(1995-2001)<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan<br />
(1995-2001)<br />
4,500<br />
800<br />
kilogram<br />
4,000<br />
3,500<br />
3,000<br />
2,500<br />
2,000<br />
1,500<br />
1,000<br />
500<br />
Seizures<br />
Trend 1995-2001<br />
kilogram<br />
700<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Seizures<br />
Trend 1995-2000<br />
0<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
0<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Figure 8<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
Figure 9<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan<br />
(1995-2001)<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan<br />
(1995-2001)<br />
kilogram<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
Seizures<br />
Trend 1995-2001<br />
kilogram<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
Seizures<br />
Trend 1995-2000<br />
0<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
0<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Figure 10<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
Figure 11<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA<br />
159
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>ly Central Asian country show<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a downward trend <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
recent years was Turkmenistan. Given the fact that Turkmenistan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Iran, was the<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly Central Asian country that had political relati<strong>on</strong>s with both the official Afghan government and the<br />
Taliban regime, and also ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed commercial relati<strong>on</strong>s with Taliban c<strong>on</strong>trolled regi<strong>on</strong>s, it seems<br />
surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that drug traffickers were not mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g more use of these l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g route via<br />
Turkmenistan, based <strong>on</strong> seizures made outside the regi<strong>on</strong>, went from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Turkmenistan to the<br />
Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 12 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re seems to be a reverse trade of precursor chemicals,<br />
orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe or the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>, go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via Turkmenistan to <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. 13<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkemenistan<br />
(1997-2000)<br />
kilogram<br />
2,000<br />
1,800<br />
1,600<br />
1,400<br />
1,200<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
0<br />
Seizures<br />
Trend 1997-2000<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
Figure 12<br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
6.3. Mega-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come and profits<br />
In this secti<strong>on</strong> an attempt will be made to quantify the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities described above <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
m<strong>on</strong>etary terms. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> calculati<strong>on</strong>s made below are based <strong>on</strong> limited empirical data and available qualitative<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g estimates can <strong>on</strong>ly provide some basic orders of magnitude. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y should not be<br />
mis-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpreted as precise figures of the funds generated from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities.<br />
6.3.1. Methodology<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> likely amounts of opiate trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> are determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from the latest year available<br />
producti<strong>on</strong> and seizure statistics, 2002 and 2001 respectively. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first questi<strong>on</strong> is how much of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
produced is likely to be transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e/hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and how much is trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Seizure statistics of neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries are used to shed some light <strong>on</strong> this questi<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next questi<strong>on</strong><br />
is what are the directi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> which opiates actually leave <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, seizure statistics are used to<br />
identify likely distributi<strong>on</strong> patterns. Multiply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> with the distributi<strong>on</strong> pattern of<br />
seizures gives an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong> of the amounts likely to be trafficked across various routes. This approach relies<br />
<strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that seizures are a functi<strong>on</strong> of the amount of drugs trafficked, i.e. the higher the quantities<br />
of drugs trafficked the higher the amount seized. This assumpti<strong>on</strong>, however, is unlikely to reflect reality for all<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>refore, adjustments are made to account for differences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
enforcement activities. In c<strong>on</strong>crete terms, the likely traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g volumes for Iran, a country known to have<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement activities, will have to be reduced while those of other countries (i.e. all other countries<br />
except Tajikistan) will have to be <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased.<br />
Thus determ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed, the quantities trafficked, expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kilograms, will then be multiplied with the<br />
“typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” per kilogram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to arrive at the gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits per country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
c<strong>on</strong>cept of “typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” is based <strong>on</strong> arrest statistics and other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>telligence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong>, where<br />
patterns over time can be identified:<br />
160
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> “typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” for Pakistani groups, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, accrue from buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the border regi<strong>on</strong>s with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the opiates across the border to Iranian groups<br />
operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>s of eastern Iran. Some amounts of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> are also shipped from<br />
Pakistan to the UK (directly or via countries of the Arabian pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula) for supply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the local UK<br />
market.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> “typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” accru<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Iranian groups are from buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
eastern border prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Pakistan and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Tehran<br />
market (or other Iranian towns) and the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e to crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
Turkey.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> “typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” generated by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups from Central Asia accrue from<br />
purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong> with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (e.g. at the border between<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and Tajikistan) and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Central Asian countries (e.g.<br />
Kyrgyzstan) and smuggl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Moscow and other Russian towns. Russian arrest<br />
statistics show that Tajik <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals are heavily <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> these traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities, far more<br />
than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividuals from other Central Asian countries.<br />
6.3.2. Results<br />
6.3.2.1. Quantities trafficked<br />
UNDCP’s annual <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy survey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> found that 3,400 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> were produced<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, about the same quantity as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seizures made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year before (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Turkmenistan’s seizures made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 as a proxy for not as yet<br />
available seizure data of this country for the year 2001), and transform<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents<br />
(us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the traditi<strong>on</strong>al 10:1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio), 74% of the opiates were seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form<br />
of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and 26% were seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the form of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This suggests that 884 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(3400*26%) and 252 t<strong>on</strong>s hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e (3400*74%/10) were available for shipment to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries. As was discussed earlier <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book, the actual transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio could be far better (7:1, 6:1<br />
or – theoretically- as low as 4:1). But, there is also a significant local c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of opiates, affect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g more<br />
than 2 milli<strong>on</strong> people (0.8-1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, 0.9 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and 0.3 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia) and<br />
significant amounts of the opiates are also seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Thus, it could<br />
be argued that the c<strong>on</strong>servative 10:1 transformati<strong>on</strong> ratio already takes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account some of the leakages to<br />
be expected from local c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next set of estimates relates to the likely quantities trafficked via the various countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the distributi<strong>on</strong> of seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicator for the relative<br />
importance of countries as an outlet of Afghan opiates, the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g pattern emerges:<br />
<br />
<br />
84% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, 9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, 4% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan and the rest (3%) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other<br />
Central Asian countries.<br />
46% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e were seized <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, 35% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, almost 16% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tajikistan and the rest (3.5 %) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other Central Asian countries.<br />
Calculated <strong>on</strong> the basis of opiates produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 (3,400 t<strong>on</strong>s), and subtract<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>, the likely amounts available for shipment out of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> appear to be: 685 t<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 212 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> similarity of amounts produced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 and 2000, allowed<br />
us to use seizure data for 2000 as a proxy for 2002.<br />
161
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Table 13: Pattern of opiate seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % opiates** <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
equivalents<br />
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 12,669 46.3% 81,061 83.9% 20,775 56.1%<br />
Pakistan 9,492 34.7% 8,867 9.2% 10,379 28.0%<br />
Central Asia, of which: 19.0% 6.9% 15.9%<br />
Tajikistan 4,239 15.5% 3,664 3.8% 4,605 12.4%<br />
Uzbekistan 467 1.7% 242 0.3% 491 1.3%<br />
Kyrgyzstan 171 0.6% 469 0.5% 218 0.6%<br />
Kazakhstan 137 0.5% 36 0.0% 140 0.4%<br />
Turkmenistan* 200 0.7% 2,300 2.4% 430 1.2%<br />
Neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries 27,374 100% 96,640 100% 37,038 100%<br />
Breakdown 74% 26% 100%<br />
* data for Turkmenistan refer to the year 2000.<br />
** hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> expressed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> equivalents, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a 10:1 c<strong>on</strong>versi<strong>on</strong> ratio of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Source: UNDCP, DELTA.<br />
Distribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these amounts accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the seizure pattern shown above, some 576 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
and 97 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e could have transited Iran, 62 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 74 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e could have transited Pakistan and 27 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 33 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> could have transited<br />
Tajikistan. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Central Asia as a whole, 48 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 40 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> may have transited<br />
Central Asia. However, this ‘raw distributi<strong>on</strong> pattern’ is subject to a number of adjustments. Enforcement<br />
efforts, and thus the likelihood of drugs be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seized, are not identical <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all of the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Also, not all drugs were directly shipped from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se<br />
factors complicate the calculati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
As menti<strong>on</strong>ed earlier, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seizures as a proxy for the actual distributi<strong>on</strong> patterns of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
activities implicitly assumes that the likelihood of drugs be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seized is the same across all countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are, however, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicati<strong>on</strong>s that this is not the case. For <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, the risks of drugs be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tercepted appear to be higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all other countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This means that<br />
the proporti<strong>on</strong>s shown for Iran, and thus the calculated amounts are probably too high. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g seizures<br />
made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2001 reveals a relatively low proporti<strong>on</strong> of Iranian seizures and a relatively high proporti<strong>on</strong><br />
of seizures made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia, notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> latter reflected <strong>on</strong>go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> and<br />
ref<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. In other words, there are two oppos<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g biases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
calculati<strong>on</strong>s which, at least partly, can be expected to offset <strong>on</strong>e another. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, some bias towards<br />
under-estimat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates transit<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the countries of Central Asia and over-estimat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs smuggled via Iran<br />
rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> likely.<br />
Iranian researchers have used a slightly different approach <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> review<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the narcotic ec<strong>on</strong>omics of<br />
Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y came to the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> – based <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> statistics - that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran amounted to 812 t<strong>on</strong>s e , equivalent to 528 t<strong>on</strong>s of pure <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
purity of 65%. As most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> directed to Iran is for domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased efficiency of law<br />
enforcement <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran is likely to lower the Iran estimate of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by some 10% to 528 t<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
However, <strong>on</strong>e cannot apply the same logic to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> as most of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e trafficked via Iran is<br />
not for domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>, but is smuggled via Turkey to various West European markets. N<strong>on</strong>etheless,<br />
given the str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement efforts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, it seems reas<strong>on</strong>able to deduct for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> some 10%<br />
of the seizures based estimate to reduce the ‘enforcement bias’ <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Iranian estimate. This would give a<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g volume of around 87 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e.<br />
Less opiate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran means, however, that more opiates are smuggled via other countries.<br />
Accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly, the estimated amounts for other countries must be raised. For the purposes of these<br />
calculati<strong>on</strong>s, the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease is distributed proporti<strong>on</strong>ately between Pakistan and Central Asia. However, given<br />
the str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement efforts of Tajikistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, the share of Tajik seizures seems to be a fair<br />
e This estimate was based <strong>on</strong> 800,000 hard-core addicts, c<strong>on</strong>sum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 2.5 grams of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day, 600,000 recreati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users with<br />
a daily c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of 0.35 grams of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 100,000 occasi<strong>on</strong>al users, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> average 0.15 grams of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> per day. (Source:<br />
Cultural Research Bureau, “Illicit Drug Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran – Review of Narcotic Ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran”, Draft, Tehran 2001).<br />
162
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
reflecti<strong>on</strong> of actual traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g flows. By c<strong>on</strong>trast, enforcement capacities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> other central Asian countries are<br />
limited. Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background it appears more appropriate to assume that traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via other central<br />
Asian countries is more important than estimates based <strong>on</strong> seizure statistics suggest, and to adjust these<br />
estimates accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly (see Table 14).<br />
Table 14. Quantities of opiates trafficked via countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(estimates for 2002 based <strong>on</strong> 2001 seizure data)<br />
Unadjusted estimates<br />
Adjusted estimates – tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the Iranian<br />
“enforcement bias” <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account<br />
Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg %<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
%<br />
kg<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
%<br />
Iran 575,779 84% 97,482 46% Iran 528,000 77% 87,700 41%<br />
Pakistan 61,691 9% 74,171 35% Pakistan 88,567 13% 80,512 38%<br />
Tajikistan 27,418 4% 32,847 16% Tajikistan 27418 4% 32,847 16%<br />
other central<br />
Asia<br />
20,564 3% 7,417 3% other<br />
central Asia<br />
adjusted<br />
41,467 6% 10,859 5%<br />
TOTAL<br />
Source: Study estimates.<br />
685,452 100% 211,918 100% TOTAL 685,452 100% 211,918 100%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are some additi<strong>on</strong>al discrepancies requir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g adjustments with regard to Pakistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Iranian authorities reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report, that the direct entry of drugs from<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the Iranian prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Khorassan decreased significantly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 f (by two thirds as<br />
compared to 1999). Thus drugs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly entered Iran - as they had d<strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1990s - via the<br />
Iranian prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Sistan & Baluchistan, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan. This suggests that a significant proporti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
drugs smuggled via Iran is likely not to have been shipped directly from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Iran but to have<br />
transited Pakistan territory before. If this is the case, the calculated traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g flows of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Pakistan,<br />
extrapolated from seizure statistics, would not be sufficient to meet such Iranian “requirements” for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> analysis of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizures, collected by UNDCP, Interpol and the World Customs Organisati<strong>on</strong><br />
suggests that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> additi<strong>on</strong> to opiates dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for the Pakistan market and for direct overseas<br />
shipments, 53% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 66% of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e trafficked via Iran were smuggled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
Iran via Pakistan. g <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> estimate of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> trafficked via Pakistan to Iran had thus to be raised from 200 t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
to 280 t<strong>on</strong>s (528 t<strong>on</strong>s * 53%). In additi<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> is also used for domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>. Based <strong>on</strong> an<br />
estimate of around 200,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, and a similar c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> pattern as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, some 70<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> may be c<strong>on</strong>sumed locally. Thus, some 350 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> (280 + 70) could actually be<br />
trafficked via Pakistan territory.<br />
However, <strong>on</strong>ce it is assumed that a significant proporti<strong>on</strong> of opiates enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Pakistan do not leave<br />
the country directly to overseas dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s, but are trafficked <strong>on</strong> to Iran, the whole distributi<strong>on</strong> pattern for<br />
the calculati<strong>on</strong> must be re-adjusted. Otherwise, 18 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 39 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e (i.e. almost<br />
half of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e trafficked via Iran) would rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> unaccounted for (see Table 15). Thus a<br />
further round of re-adjustment of estimates was necessary. Given no special reas<strong>on</strong>s to do otherwise, the readjustment<br />
was d<strong>on</strong>e proporti<strong>on</strong>ately.<br />
f Seizures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Khorassan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce, border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, were as follows:<br />
1999 2000 2001<br />
Opium: 63566 43148 20229<br />
Morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e: 3008 4890 1844<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2154 980 717<br />
Source: Islamic Republic of Iran, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2001, p. 10.<br />
g <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se percentages were derived as follows: seizures made al<strong>on</strong>g the border regi<strong>on</strong>s with <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, i.e. Khorassan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and<br />
around the town of Zabul (located <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sistan & Baluchistan but border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) were c<strong>on</strong>sidered to reflect primarily opiates<br />
smuggled directly from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Iran. Seizures made further south, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border regi<strong>on</strong>s with Pakistan, i.e. the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of<br />
Sistan & Baluchistan (except for the town of Zabul), and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the two adjacent prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces of Kerman and Homozgan, were c<strong>on</strong>sidered to<br />
reflect primarily opiates trafficked via Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the Islamic Republic of Iran.<br />
163
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this re-adjustment, it is estimated that 107 t<strong>on</strong>s transit Pakistan, equivalent to 50% of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 107 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e trafficked via Pakistan<br />
would be sufficient to supply the local market, direct overseas exports as well as the Iranian market. (108<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s * 66% = 71 t<strong>on</strong>s). Domestic demand, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> patterns identified by Iranian researchers,<br />
would amount to some 55 t<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (500,000 hard-core hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicts *0.3 grams per day * 365<br />
days), which – assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an average purity of 20% of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> retail markets- would be<br />
equivalent to 11 t<strong>on</strong>s of pure hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. If 107 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> are trafficked from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Pakistan, 11<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>sumed locally and 71 t<strong>on</strong>s used for shipments to Iran, a total of 25 t<strong>on</strong>s would be available for direct<br />
shipments to Europe (of which 8 t<strong>on</strong>s would go to the UK) h and other dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong>s (India, Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula,<br />
eastern and southern Africa, etc.).<br />
In the case of Iran, it is estimated that 108 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e transit the country, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
71 t<strong>on</strong>s (66%) via Pakistan and 37 t<strong>on</strong>s (34% ) directly via <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Calculati<strong>on</strong>s for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran c<strong>on</strong>cluded an annual domestic c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of 29.2 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (1999). Based <strong>on</strong> an<br />
average purity of 20% it was estimated that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran was 5.8 t<strong>on</strong>s of pure hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. i<br />
This would still leave slightly more than 100 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> available for shipment to Western Europe. This<br />
estimate c<strong>on</strong>forms with previous UNDCP estimates that put hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe at 80-<br />
100 t<strong>on</strong>s j<br />
In the case of Tajikistan, the estimate would amount to 48 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, less than half the amounts<br />
of Iran or Pakistan, but equivalent to about 70% of all hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trafficked via Central Asia (69 t<strong>on</strong>s).<br />
Table 15. Quantities trafficked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> –<br />
readjustments for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> (estimates for 2002)<br />
Opium <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg<br />
Estimates<br />
Enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
Enter<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g via Re-adjusted<br />
Re-adjusted<br />
countries via<br />
countries via<br />
Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
account<br />
Iran 528,000 542,570 87,700.0 107,702<br />
from<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
248,160 255,008 37% 29,818.0 36,619 17%<br />
from Pakistan 279,840 287,562 57,882.0 71,084<br />
Pakistan 350,000 359,658 52% 86,798.6 106,596 50%<br />
Tajikistan 27,418 28,175 4% 38,998.0 47,893 23%<br />
other central Asia<br />
adjusted<br />
41,467 42,611 6% 16,946.0 20,811 10%<br />
Opiates available<br />
for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and 685,452 100% 211,918 100%<br />
local c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong><br />
Calculated totals 667,045 685,452 100% 172,561 211,918 100%<br />
Under-estimati<strong>on</strong> 18,407 39,357<br />
h UK Customs found that 27% of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> samples analyzed over the June-December 2001 period were known (or are likely) to have<br />
been shipped to the UK via Pakistan. (Source: Forensic Science Service, Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Intelligence Database: Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seized from 1 June 2000<br />
to 10 December 2001,January 2002, p. 5 and p. 41.).<br />
i<br />
This estimate was based <strong>on</strong> 250,000 hard-core hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicts us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 0.3 grams a day, 100,000 recreati<strong>on</strong>al hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users c<strong>on</strong>sum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 50<br />
milligrams per day and 10,000 occasi<strong>on</strong>al hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 10 milligrams a day. (Source: Cultural Research Bureau, “Illicit Drug<br />
Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran – Review of Narcotic Ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran”, Draft, Tehran 2001).<br />
j<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trafficked via other routes arrives <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe. Though the bulk of the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> for Western Europe arrives via<br />
the Balkan route, and thus via Iran, smaller amounts are also directly shipped from Pakistan to Western Europe, or from Pakistan via<br />
the Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula or from Pakistan via Africa, or they are shipped from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> via Central Asia to Western Europe. In additi<strong>on</strong>,<br />
small amounts of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the West European markets are from the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand).<br />
164
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.3.2.2. Traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next questi<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cerns the “typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits” generated by traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Data used for the calculati<strong>on</strong> of the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits refer to prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
mid 2001. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se prices had to be used as proxies because at the time of writ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g no comprehensive prices<br />
for the year 2002 were available. As there was a general – though not dramatic - <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002, actual<br />
profits may have been higher than shown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the opiate prices calculati<strong>on</strong>s above.<br />
Estimates assume that 543 t<strong>on</strong>s of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 108 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e are smuggled via<br />
Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> typical profits made from purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sistan and Baluchistan prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it at the<br />
retail level <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Teheran market, were some $1900 per kilogram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. Overall gross profits to be made<br />
from such wholesale and retail activities related to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus amounted to close to $1 billi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. If <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
case of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <strong>on</strong>ly the wholesale level is c<strong>on</strong>sidered, buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Khorassan and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern Turkey, could yield almost $2900 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> gross profits per kilogram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, equivalent to more than<br />
$0.3 billi<strong>on</strong>. Total profits made by Iranian groups may have thus amounted to about $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to<br />
1.3% of GDP. Profits could be smaller, however, because not all drug shipments via Iran are actually<br />
organized by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Iranian groups but by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups from neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries (see below).<br />
In the case of Pakistan, calculati<strong>on</strong>s are more complicated. Two k<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ds of typical profit profiles have<br />
been used: (i) wholesale prices for purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Peshawar (North-West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce) and<br />
wholesale prices for sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern Iran (Sistan and Baluchistan), which yields a profit of around $900<br />
per kilogram, and (ii) buy<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Peshawar and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it directly at the wholesale level <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK, which<br />
yields a gross profit of around $25,000 per kilogram. Based <strong>on</strong> forensic analysis, the UK authorities estimate<br />
that 27% or 8 t<strong>on</strong>s of the UK’s overall domestic demand for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (some 30 t<strong>on</strong>s) 14 could be supplied by<br />
laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Afghan/Pakistan border regi<strong>on</strong>. Most of the rest was found to be shipped to the UK via<br />
Turkey. Given that three quarters of all seizures of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>at<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, took<br />
place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK, it was assumed for the purposes of the calculati<strong>on</strong>s below, that 10 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> are be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
shipped by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups directly to Western Europe. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> rest (97 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e)<br />
is either shipped from Pakistan via Iran and Turkey to Europe (71 t<strong>on</strong>s), or is c<strong>on</strong>sumed locally (11 t<strong>on</strong>s of<br />
pure hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, as discussed before). 15 t<strong>on</strong>s are shipped to other regi<strong>on</strong>s (India, Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula, Eastern<br />
Africa etc.). This distributi<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trafficked via Pakistan is approximate and could well be subject to<br />
adjustments <strong>on</strong>ce better <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> becomes available. However, as the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> retail prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan are<br />
of similar magnitude to the wholesale prices of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern Iran, no detailed differentiati<strong>on</strong> for the<br />
purposes of identify<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g orders of magnitude of funds generated from opiate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g are actually necessary.<br />
Aggregat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the various profits from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, calculati<strong>on</strong>s suggest that<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups earn some $400 milli<strong>on</strong> a year from opiate traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities, equivalent to 0.7%<br />
of GDP.<br />
This is a c<strong>on</strong>servative estimate. An earlier UNDCP study <strong>on</strong> the Illicit Opiate Industry of Pakistan,<br />
estimated that export profits amounted to some $1.5 billi<strong>on</strong> (range: $0.8-$1.8 bn), based <strong>on</strong> exports of 50-80<br />
t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per year, which at the time (1992/93) was equivalent to 4% of Pakistan’s GDP. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lower<br />
figure of the range was based <strong>on</strong> the assumpti<strong>on</strong> that 50 t<strong>on</strong>s of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> were exported via Pakistan and that<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups were able to reap 50% of the prevalent hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> upper range was calculated assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 75 t<strong>on</strong>s of annual hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> exports and Pakistani groups reap<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
75% of the preval<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale price <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe. Though much of the research d<strong>on</strong>e for that<br />
study is still valid today, the specific assumpti<strong>on</strong>s made <strong>on</strong> export patterns do not appear realistic. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> jo<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
UNDCP/Interpol/WCO database <strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual seizures shows that <strong>on</strong>ly 1% of overall hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> seizures made<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe over the last few years could be traced back to direct shipments from Pakistan to<br />
Western Europe while 40% could be traced back to Turkey. (Most of the rest could <strong>on</strong>ly be traced back to<br />
some neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries). Significant hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipments from Pakistan to Europe have <strong>on</strong>ly been<br />
reported from the UK. Three quarters of all direct shipments from Pakistan to Western Europe over the last<br />
few years were dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for the UK. k In most other European countries crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups do not<br />
seem to play much of a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> trade. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is evidence of some direct shipments – by air - from<br />
Pakistan to Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Germany, France, Italy as well as to the Scand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>avian countries (Norway and Sweden),<br />
but it is not always clear from the seizure statistics whether Pakistani, West-African or crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al West-<br />
European groups were beh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d these shipments, and who was thus reap<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial benefits.<br />
k In this c<strong>on</strong>text, it may be noted that the UK is a country of f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> but not a transit country so that shipments from<br />
Pakistan to the UK are dest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed for the local market and not for other European countries.<br />
165
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> current estimate for Pakistan ($400 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits, equivalent to 0.7% of GDP)<br />
assumes that crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> organis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g shipments of opiates to neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Iran<br />
and to the UK but it does not take <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipments from Pakistan to several countries al<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
Arabian Pen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>sula (notably Oman and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> Arab Emirates), Eastern and southern Africa (South Africa,<br />
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia), Western Africa (Nigeria, Cote d’Ívoire, Togo etc.) or to Turkey and a<br />
number of other West-European countries menti<strong>on</strong>ed above. Moreover, it does not take <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account that<br />
many of the shipements via Iran to Turkey are organized by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups from Pakistan. If <strong>on</strong>e assumes<br />
that the average export price of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Pakistani groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to countries<br />
other than the UK is not the low wholesale prices of eastern Iran but a price of around $5000, equivalent to<br />
the average wholesale price reported from Turkey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (which is less than the wholesale prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> eastern<br />
or southern Africa), the gross profits of Pakistani groups could rise to some $800 milli<strong>on</strong> or 1.3% of GDP.<br />
Thus, any overall estimate between $400 and $800 milli<strong>on</strong> or 0.7%-1.3% of GDP seems reas<strong>on</strong>able. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
possibility of greater <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for Pakistani groups would mean that the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Iranian groups<br />
could fall. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g this possibility <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>, reas<strong>on</strong>able estimates suggest that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute terms the<br />
potential gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of Iranian traffickers would still exceed those of Pakistani traffickers, but expressed as<br />
a percentage of GDP the gross <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of drug traffickers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and Iran are similar.<br />
With regard to Central Asia the ‘typical traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits’ are derived from purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the border areas with northern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia<br />
and the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>. While the profits made from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g are m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imal, gross<br />
profits made by shipp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to Moscow and sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g it there are huge. Intelligence <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> as well as<br />
arrest statistics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>deed show a very str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volvement of crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups of Central Asian orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this<br />
trade: 92% of drug smugglers arrested at Russia’s borders <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 had a Central Asian background; 75%<br />
were Tajiks, 9% Uzbeks, 4% Kazakhs, 3% from Kyrgyzstan and 1% were from Turkmenistan. 15 Based <strong>on</strong><br />
an average price of more than $33,000 per kilogram, the gross profits to be made by crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Central Asia are likely to exceed $2 billi<strong>on</strong> a year, and are thus higher than the gross profits made by<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al Iranian or Pakistani groups, even though the latter two ship far larger quantities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> total. (See Table<br />
16). Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the calculati<strong>on</strong>s suggest that the gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Central Asia are equivalent to 7% of the regi<strong>on</strong>’s aggregate GDP, and c<strong>on</strong>stitute an even significantly higher<br />
percentage for countries with a small GDP, such as Tajikistan.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be<br />
estimated at around US$ 4 billi<strong>on</strong>. This is equivalent to 2% of the aggregated GDP of the countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (see Table 16).<br />
Table 16: Estimates of gross profits derived from Afghan opiates trafficked by<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Opium Comments<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
TOTAL<br />
Opium producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
kilograms<br />
3,400,000<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>: hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e 26% 74%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kilograms 884,000 251,600<br />
less seizures ( of neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000)<br />
-198,548 -39,682<br />
Opiates available for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 685,452 211,918<br />
Distributi<strong>on</strong> (seizures 2001)<br />
Iran 84% 46%<br />
Pakistan 9% 35%<br />
Tajikistan 4% 15.5%<br />
Other central Asia 3% 3.5%<br />
Sum 100% 100%<br />
Likely quantities trafficked<br />
Iran unadjusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 575,779 97,482<br />
Iran adjusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 542,570 87,700<br />
Pakistan unadjusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 61,691 74,171<br />
Pakistan adjusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 359,658 79,775<br />
166
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Table 16: Estimates of gross profits derived from Afghan opiates trafficked by<br />
crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al groups <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/<br />
Opium Comments<br />
TOTAL<br />
morph<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
Central Asia undajusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 47,982 40,264<br />
Central Asia adjusted (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> kg) 70,786 68,704<br />
Iran<br />
Price at entry po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran (2001) $540<br />
Sistan &<br />
Baluchistan<br />
$1,630 Khorassan<br />
Price at exit po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t $2,405<br />
Tehran - retail<br />
price<br />
$4,500 Turkey (m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>)<br />
Difference $1,865 $2,870<br />
Gross profits by Iranian groups<br />
unadjusted<br />
$1,073,828,654 $279,773,961 $1,353,602,615<br />
Gross profits by Iranian groups<br />
adjusted<br />
$1,011,893,050 $309,106,159 $1,320,999,209<br />
Gross profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ $ 1.01 $0.31 $1.32<br />
GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> $104.9<br />
as a percentage of GDP 1.3%<br />
Pakistan<br />
Price at entry po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (2001) $363 Quetta $738 Peshawar<br />
Price at exit po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t $540<br />
Sistan &<br />
Baluchistan<br />
$1,645<br />
Difference I $177 $907<br />
Price at exit po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t II $540<br />
Sistan &<br />
Baluchistan<br />
$25,974<br />
Sistan &<br />
Baluchistan<br />
UK wholesale<br />
price<br />
Difference II $177 $25,236<br />
Gross profits by Pakistan groups<br />
unadjusted<br />
$10,919,246 $310,563,585 $321,482,831<br />
Gross profits by Pakistan groups<br />
adjusted<br />
$63,659,462 $339,972,398 $403,631,860<br />
Gross profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ $ 0.06 $0.34 $0.40<br />
GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> $ 59.7<br />
as a percentage of GDP 0.7%<br />
CENTRAL ASIA<br />
Price at entry po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan (2001) 80<br />
Moskovskiy-<br />
Shurobad<br />
$760<br />
Moskovskiy-<br />
Shurobad<br />
Price at exit po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t 550 Bishkek $33,300 Moscow<br />
Difference $470 $32,540<br />
Gross profits by Central Asian groups<br />
unadjusted<br />
$22,551,361 $1,310,203,374 $1,332,754,735<br />
Gross profits by Central Asian groups<br />
adjusted<br />
$33,269,399 $2,235,616,120 $2,268,885,519<br />
In billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ $0.03 $2.24 $2.27<br />
GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> $32.6<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of GDP 7.0%<br />
TOTAL<br />
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES<br />
Gross profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> billi<strong>on</strong> US-$ $1.11 $ 2.88 $3.99<br />
GDP $197.2<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of GDP 2.0%<br />
* assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 1/3 or 10 t<strong>on</strong>s of West European hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> to come directly via Pakistan to Western Europe (mostly UK)<br />
and the rest be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g shipped via Iran to Western Europe.<br />
Sources: UNDCP, DELTA, Government reports, UNDP Human Development Report 2002, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist<br />
Intelligence Unit, Country Reports<br />
167
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
6.4. Abuse and treatment<br />
In recent years, all of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries have suffered from ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of opiate<br />
abuse as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g producti<strong>on</strong>, traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and spill-overs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to local markets. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest levels<br />
of opiate addicti<strong>on</strong> were reported from Iran where authorities estimate that there are 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> chr<strong>on</strong>ic<br />
opiates (majority <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>) users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, equivalent to 2.8% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above. A<br />
more c<strong>on</strong>servative estimate, based <strong>on</strong> a Rapid Assessment Study, c<strong>on</strong>ducted by the Iranian M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of<br />
Health and UNDCP, arrived at a figure of around 710,000 abusers of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, or 1.7% of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se are am<strong>on</strong>g the highest levels of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the world, and<br />
significantly higher than opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe. Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the largest hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets of western<br />
Europe, Italy and the UK, opiate abuse is less than half as important (0.7% and 0.8%, respectively of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> age 15-64) 16 . Iranian authorities report that abuse c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease.<br />
Abuse of opiates am<strong>on</strong>g the adult<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000/2001<br />
3.0%<br />
2.5%<br />
2.8%<br />
2.0%<br />
1.8%<br />
1.5%<br />
1.7%<br />
1.0%<br />
0.9%<br />
1%<br />
0.5%<br />
0.8%<br />
0.6%<br />
0.4%<br />
0.3%<br />
0.0%<br />
Pakistan<br />
Central Asia<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
Iran<br />
Europe<br />
North America<br />
Global average<br />
Figure 13<br />
Sources: UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002 and UNODCCP<br />
Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessments <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, however, took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of<br />
Central Asia, and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease appears to have c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000/2001. First results of an <strong>on</strong>go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g UNODC<br />
study assess<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the level of drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of Central Asia suggest that problem drug users<br />
account for 1.1% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> prevalence rates of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> is<br />
equivalent to 0.9% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above, and is similar to figures reported from Pakistan.<br />
Some 400,000 people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia are problem drug users, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g more than 300,000 people addicted<br />
to opiates.<br />
168
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
169
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Abuse of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan was reported to be show<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g signs of stabilisati<strong>on</strong>, and – based <strong>on</strong> a<br />
recent nati<strong>on</strong>al assessment study - now seems to be lower than abuse levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Kazakhstan,<br />
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan (though higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>). Opiate abuse, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, is<br />
estimated to affect some 700,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, or 0.9% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, Pakistan’s prevalence rate for chr<strong>on</strong>ic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse, 0.6% am<strong>on</strong>g those age 15 and above<br />
(some 500,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s), is about twice as high as the West European average (1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> or 0.3% of those<br />
age 15 and above) and some 50% higher than hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> North America.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> situati<strong>on</strong> is even more difficult for the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> because they are<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ted with levels of drug abuse which exceed those of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized countries, without the similar<br />
levels of resources to deal with the problem. Indeed, the overall health budgets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> – as shown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the table below – are hardly sufficient to deal with ord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary health problems, let<br />
al<strong>on</strong>e to provide the additi<strong>on</strong>al expenses necessary for deal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g with drug addicti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Overall expenditure <strong>on</strong> health <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to, <strong>on</strong> average,<br />
4.8% of GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998, which was <strong>on</strong>ly half the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g average reported from <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized countries.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> largest health expenditure am<strong>on</strong>g the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> has been reported from Iran:<br />
$128 per capita (PPP adjusted). Funds available for health services <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized countries are, <strong>on</strong><br />
average, some 20 times larger, but even there drug addicts sometimes wait to get <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a treatment slot. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
situati<strong>on</strong> is even more difficult <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some of the smaller Central Asian Republics. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,<br />
the funds available for health services amounted to just $13 and $11 per capita, per year, respectively. This<br />
is less than <strong>on</strong>e tenth of funds for health services available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. Expenditures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized<br />
countries <strong>on</strong> health are more than 200 times larger. In terms of the amount of public sector funds dedicated<br />
to health services, the lowest levels are Pakistan ($3 per capita), compared to $52 per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran and<br />
close to $1,800 per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized countries.<br />
Table 17. Overall health expenditure per capita and as % of GDP<br />
Countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Iran b Kazakhstan<br />
menistan b<br />
b Pakistana<br />
Turk-<br />
Uzbekistastan<br />
stan a average<br />
Tajiki-<br />
Kyrgyz-<br />
Un-weighted<br />
Health expenditure<br />
per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> PPP US$<br />
$128 $62 $30 $25 $18 $13 $11 $41<br />
of which public<br />
sector<br />
$52 $30 $24 $21 $3 $11 $6 $21<br />
Health expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
% of GDP<br />
Public expenditure 1.7% 2.7% 4.1% 3.4% 0.7% 5.2% 2.2% 2.9%<br />
Private expenditure 2.5% 2.9% 1.1% 0.6% 3.1% 0.9% 2.2% 1.9%<br />
Total health<br />
expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of 4.2% 5.6% 5.2% 4.0% 3.8% 6.1% 4.4% 4.8%<br />
GDP<br />
Selected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrialized countries<br />
USA a Switzerland<br />
France a Netherlands<br />
UK a Un-weighted<br />
average<br />
Health expenditure<br />
per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> PPP US$ $4,271<br />
$3,857 $2,697 $2,288 $2,173 $1,676 $1,675 $2,662<br />
of which public<br />
sector $1,902<br />
$2,819 $2,029 $1,796 $1,482 $1,145 $1,388 $1,794<br />
Health expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
% of GDP<br />
Public expenditure 5.7% 7.6% 7.9% 7.3% 6.0% 5.6% 5.8% 6.6%<br />
Private expenditure 7.1% 2.8% 2.6% 2.0% 2.8% 2.6% 1.2% 3.0%<br />
Total health<br />
expenditure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of 12.8% 10.4% 10.5% 9.3% 8.8% 8.2% 7.0% 9.6%<br />
GDP<br />
a Data refer to 1999<br />
b<br />
Data refer to 1998<br />
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, pp. 166-169.<br />
170
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.4.1. Pakistan<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first country to suffer from large-scale hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong> was Pakistan. Surveys <strong>on</strong><br />
the size of the drug abus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g populati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> drug abuse trends have been c<strong>on</strong>ducted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
the early 1980s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y show a serious <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse over the last two decades. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> surveys<br />
provide the <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> available <strong>on</strong> many aspects of the drug problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and served to alert<br />
the country of the need to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> demand reducti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Though the surveys fulfilled important policy functi<strong>on</strong>s, doubts have been raised about the adequacy<br />
of the methodology which was used for calculat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g nati<strong>on</strong>al estimates. Follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a first survey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1982, all<br />
subsequent surveys used qualitative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> (i.e. percepti<strong>on</strong>s of community leaders and other key<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants) to establish growth rates. l Informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> the current proporti<strong>on</strong>s of drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sample,<br />
previous survey results, and growth rates derived from qualitative <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> were then used to estimate the<br />
total number of current drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. Over time, the estimates formed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this way were likely to<br />
drift away from the actual number of drug abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. In particular, the approach appears to<br />
have overstated the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, the surveys should not simply be dismissed.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> valuable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> basic trends of drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, and establish that Pakistan<br />
suffered from a str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> over the last two decades.<br />
Trends of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s and 1990s (re-adjusted for results <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000)*<br />
Estimated No. of drug users<br />
(re-adjusted for results <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000:<br />
500,000 chr<strong>on</strong>ic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users)<br />
600,000<br />
400,000<br />
200,000<br />
0<br />
+116% p.a.<br />
(72% p.a.)*<br />
1982-86<br />
314000<br />
30,000<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
+28% p.a<br />
(17% p.a)*<br />
1986-88<br />
7% p.a<br />
(4 1 / 2<br />
%<br />
p.a)*<br />
171000<br />
2 1 / 2<br />
% p.a.<br />
(1 1 / 2<br />
% p.a.)*<br />
1993-2000<br />
500,000*<br />
2,000,000<br />
1,500,000<br />
1,000,000<br />
500,000<br />
-<br />
Unadjusted estimates<br />
1980<br />
1982<br />
1984<br />
1986<br />
1988<br />
1990<br />
1992<br />
1994<br />
1996<br />
1998<br />
2000<br />
* <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> re-adjusted grow th rates for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> based <strong>on</strong> the 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study are given <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> brackets;<br />
the overall compound grow th rate over the 1982-2000 period w as 16.9% p.a. (30,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1982 and 500,000<br />
chr<strong>on</strong>ic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000)<br />
Figure 14<br />
Sources: Study estimates based <strong>on</strong> UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan – Results from the Year 2000<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment, New York 2002 and Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Divisi<strong>on</strong>, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Survey <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Pakistan 1993, Islamabad 1994.<br />
In order to obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a verifiable basis for calculat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the extent of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country which<br />
would be comparable to approaches developed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe over the last decade, UNODC c<strong>on</strong>ducted a<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> approach was based <strong>on</strong> identificati<strong>on</strong><br />
of the total number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse and estimati<strong>on</strong> of the proporti<strong>on</strong> of those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
l<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> surveys asked the op<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>i<strong>on</strong> of community leaders <strong>on</strong> the growth of the number of drug users. Whenever a community leader<br />
expressed the op<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>i<strong>on</strong> that c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of a drug had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased somewhat, or <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased drastically, s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the time of the previous<br />
survey, an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of 10%, or 25%, respectively was assumed. If they reported a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e or a drastic decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, it was assumed that this<br />
meant a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e by 10% or 25%, respectively. (See Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Divisi<strong>on</strong>, “Nati<strong>on</strong>al Survey <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan 1993”, p.<br />
19). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g growth rates, as well as the calculated number of abusers, are unlikely to be realistic. However, changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the growth<br />
rates are still likely to reflect the trend because the same methodology was used <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> various subsequent studies,. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Assessment Study <strong>on</strong> drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan followed a different approach. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall number of problematic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan,<br />
is now estimated to be around 500,000 people, which is less than previous estimates, though this does not mean a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. Data<br />
suggest that there has still been some <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> use over the last couple of years, though less than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous years. (UNODCCP,<br />
Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study, Vienna 2002). In the present study, an attempt was<br />
made to comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e data from the new study with data from the previous studies to project the previous results forward, as well as to readjust<br />
the figures to the two anchor po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts of 1982 and 2000.<br />
171
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
treatment compared to the overall addict populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> proporti<strong>on</strong>s were derived from<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews with drug addicts and key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants. Based <strong>on</strong> this approach, an estimate of up to 500,000<br />
chr<strong>on</strong>ic male hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors) was calculated for Pakistan. Compar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the results of<br />
the 1982 survey (30,000 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users) with the results of the 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study, the average<br />
annual growth rate amounted to 17% p.a. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease, however, has not been l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ear. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> reported trend<br />
data, based <strong>on</strong> the percepti<strong>on</strong>s of key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants and community leaders (re-adjusted for the overall growth<br />
rate between 1982 and 2000), suggest that growth rates decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from double digit growth rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s<br />
to s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gle digits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s m .<br />
Tentative estimates of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan<br />
1982-2000:<br />
(unadjusted <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> figures; hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> figures re-adjusted for the "Results from<br />
the 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study")<br />
Number of chr<strong>on</strong>ic opiates users<br />
800,000<br />
700,000<br />
600,000<br />
500,000<br />
400,000<br />
300,000<br />
200,000<br />
100,000<br />
-<br />
Opium<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
1982<br />
1984<br />
1986<br />
1988<br />
1990<br />
1992<br />
1994<br />
1996<br />
1998<br />
2000<br />
Figure 15<br />
Sources: Study estimates based <strong>on</strong> UNODC, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan – Results from the Year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment,<br />
New York 2002 and Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Divisi<strong>on</strong>, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Survey <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan 1993, Islamabad 1994.<br />
This decelerati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the growth of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicti<strong>on</strong> appears to have become even more pr<strong>on</strong>ounced<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years. For the year 2001, the Pakistan authorities reported first signs of a stabilisati<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country.<br />
Community leaders and key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants saw a gradual decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e over the 1982-1993 period of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abuse, followed by a stabilizati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1982 there were more than 300,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, this figure was reported to have fallen to less than 200,000 by 1993. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number<br />
probably rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed at these levels <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years. All available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicates that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
m In order to calculate the growth rates, the orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al estimates from 1982 to 1993 were used. Estimates of the number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users<br />
were available for 1982, 1986, 1988 and 1993. Data gaps were filled (as d<strong>on</strong>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1993 survey) by assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ear growth between<br />
the reference po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts. For the period from 1993 to 2000, growth rates were calculated us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a similar methodology to the previous<br />
surveys: key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants’ percepti<strong>on</strong>s of ‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased a little’ and ‘<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased a lot’ were transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a 10% and 25% growth rate,<br />
respectively, while percepti<strong>on</strong>s of ‘decreased a little’ and ‘decreased a lot’ were transformed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to a 10% and 25% rate of decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e. This<br />
gave a growth rate of 6.5%. In additi<strong>on</strong>, as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> previous surveys, populati<strong>on</strong> growth was taken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account (12.2% over the 1993-2000<br />
period). Overall growth over the 1993-2000 period was calculated as follows: 1.065*1.122-1 = 0.195, equivalent to an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of about<br />
20%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average annual growth over the period was thus 1.195^(1/7)-1 = 0.0258 or about 2 ½ %. However, the overall growth rate<br />
over the 1982-2000 period, tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g all of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dividual growth rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account (i.e. 116.3% p.a. over 1982-86; 28.2% p.a. over 1986-<br />
1988; 7.1% p.a. over 1988-1993 and 2.6% p.a. over 1993-2000) would have amounted to 25.6% p.a, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an over-estimate. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
actual average annual growth based <strong>on</strong> 30,000 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1982 and 500,000 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 was “just” 16.9% p.a.<br />
=((500,000/30,000)^(1/18)-1), i.e. <strong>on</strong>e third less than the ‘unadjusted growth rate’. In order to take account of this, all previously<br />
calculated growth rates were lowered by a third. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ‘adjusted growth’ rates (rounded) were thus: 72% p.a. for the 1982-86 period, 17%<br />
p.a for the 1986-88 period, 4 1 / 2% p.a. for the 1988-93 period and 1 1 / 2% for the 1993-2000 period, which, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> total, is equivalent to an<br />
average growth rate of 16.9% p.a. over the 1982-2000 period.<br />
172
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
abusers now clearly outnumber <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers by factors rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from two to four. Back <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1982 there were<br />
still 10 times more <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> than hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country.<br />
If <strong>on</strong>e comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es the re-adjusted figures for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse (based <strong>on</strong> the 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment<br />
Study) n and the (unadjusted) estimates for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse, it appears that overall abuse of opiates doubled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Pakistan between 1982 and 2000. Most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease took place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1980s. Between 1990 and 2000,<br />
abuse of opiates appears to have <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased by less than a quarter.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study did not look at the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers, but <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong><br />
from key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants seems to c<strong>on</strong>firm that today hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse is far more widespread than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse.<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is abused throughout Pakistan. It is less comm<strong>on</strong> than cannabis, but more comm<strong>on</strong>ly abused than<br />
any other substance, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g alcohol. Forty six per cent of the key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants reported that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was<br />
comm<strong>on</strong>ly abused, while <strong>on</strong>ly 10% of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants expressed such a view with regard to <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Only 8% of<br />
key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants reported that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse was rare <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their locality, whereas 45% of them reported that<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> was rarely used.<br />
Hashish<br />
Key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants'* percepti<strong>on</strong>s of the scale of drug abuse<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 36 localities across Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Alcohol<br />
Psychotropics<br />
Opium<br />
Other opiates<br />
Cough syrups<br />
Solvents<br />
drugs abused<br />
drugs comm<strong>on</strong>ly<br />
abused<br />
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%<br />
* A total of 283 key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded medical doctors, policemen, community leaders,<br />
representatives of NGOs, of welfare organisati<strong>on</strong>s, of local government, of local bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess, teachers, religious leaders<br />
and ex-addicts.<br />
Figure 16<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study, p. 14.<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al distributi<strong>on</strong>s based <strong>on</strong> key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants’ resp<strong>on</strong>ses also c<strong>on</strong>firm that hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse is now<br />
more comm<strong>on</strong> than <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> across Pakistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest spread of both hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abuse are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Baluchistan, al<strong>on</strong>g the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g route of opiates from southern<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (Helmand and Kandahar prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces) to Iran. Relatively high levels are also found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Punjab, the<br />
most populous prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of Pakistan, as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce where the port of Karachi, a pr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipal<br />
trans-shipment po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t for Afghan opiates, is located. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse is apparently less comm<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the North-<br />
West Fr<strong>on</strong>tier prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (NWFP) though <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> there is about the nati<strong>on</strong>al average.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total number of new admissi<strong>on</strong>s for drug abuse to 73 treatment centers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 18 towns amounted to<br />
17,425 cases over the August 1999-July 2000 period. 17 From this total, 45% of the patients were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi<br />
divisi<strong>on</strong>, 15% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Lahore district, 12% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Peshawar district and 6% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Quetta district. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se four areas<br />
accounted for the bulk (77%) of all substance abuse treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan.<br />
n In order to arrive at the ‘adjusted estimates’ for the 1982-2000 period, a l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ear regressi<strong>on</strong> was calculated us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the adjusted figures<br />
for 1982 and 2000 (30,000 and 500,000 as anchor po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts).<br />
173
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
174
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Scale of opiate abuse* <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(overall rat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g by key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants)<br />
Pakistan<br />
Baluchistan<br />
Punjab<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh<br />
NWFP<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20<br />
overall rat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g*<br />
* Note: higher values <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that use is more commm<strong>on</strong><br />
Figure 17<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study.<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> extrapolati<strong>on</strong>s from treatment data, us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g city-specific multipliers and tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the size of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account, the highest levels of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse by far are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Quetta, the capital of<br />
Baluchistan, located al<strong>on</strong>g the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g route of Afghan opiates to Iran or to Karachi. About 5% of<br />
Quetta’s male <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the age group of 15 to 45 c<strong>on</strong>sume hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next highest level of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abuse is found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi (S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce), another major trans-shipment po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t. Overall 0.7 – 2% of the<br />
male populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 to 45 are estimated to be chr<strong>on</strong>ic hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, which is a high ratio<br />
global standards.<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the results of key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse grew most str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Baluchistan<br />
and S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh over the 1995-2000 period. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> two prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces were most affected by ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiate producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
southern <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> and thus ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s. Baluchistan was the<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce where <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> has c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued grow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years; <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all other prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces it<br />
either stagnated or fell. In Punjab, which accounts for more than half of the country’s total populati<strong>on</strong>, both<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse stabilised over the 1995-2000 period.<br />
Prevalence of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
(m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>imum and maximum estimates)<br />
Prevalence rate am<strong>on</strong>g males age 15-45<br />
6.0%<br />
5.0%<br />
4.0%<br />
3.0%<br />
2.0%<br />
1.0%<br />
0.0%<br />
2.0%<br />
0.7%<br />
PAKISTAN<br />
5.3%<br />
5.1% 4.6%<br />
Quetta<br />
(Baluchistan)<br />
1.8%<br />
Karrachi<br />
(S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh)<br />
2.3%<br />
0.9%<br />
Peshawar<br />
(NWFP)<br />
2.2%<br />
0.2%<br />
Lahore<br />
(Punjab)<br />
0.1%<br />
0.7%<br />
Other locals<br />
Figure 18<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study, p. 64.<br />
175
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
176
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Changes <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan<br />
over the 1995-2000 period<br />
(percepti<strong>on</strong> of key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants <strong>on</strong> trends)<br />
PAKISTAN<br />
0.3<br />
5.3<br />
Baluchistan<br />
9.2<br />
18.3<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh<br />
-1.1<br />
10.2<br />
NWFP<br />
Punjab<br />
-1.3<br />
0<br />
0<br />
1.7<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Opium<br />
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20<br />
decrease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
Figure 19<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Assessment Study<br />
Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> route of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993<br />
Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> route of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
Smok<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g/<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>hal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
98%<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
2%<br />
Smok<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g/<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>hal<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
85%<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
15%<br />
Figure 20<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan,<br />
Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment<br />
Study<br />
Figure 21<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan,<br />
Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment<br />
Study<br />
An issue of particular c<strong>on</strong>cern is the rise <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use, notably of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1988<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was virtually unknown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, by 1993 the survey found that 2% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users were<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. By the year 2000, 15% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users reported that they were usually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, while 73%<br />
smoked it and 11% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>haled it. If asked whether they had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected drugs at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last 12 m<strong>on</strong>ths,<br />
the proporti<strong>on</strong> went up to 27%. When the questi<strong>on</strong> was modified, and users were asked whether they had<br />
ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, as many as 31% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users reported to have d<strong>on</strong>e so. Thus for each current<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> user there is another user who has already tried <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and could thus easily shift to this<br />
more efficient form of adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>, particularly if hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> becomes more expensive. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest levels of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g were found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi (55% ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected), while the lowest levels were found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Peshawar<br />
(12% ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected) and Quetta (14% ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected). This ties <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices which, over<br />
the last couple of years, have been highest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi and lowest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>s border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
177
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Quetta and Peshawar. Given these correlati<strong>on</strong>s, it is likely that the significantly higher hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices observed throughout Pakistan s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the last quarter of 2001 could prompt a further shift towards<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>cern about drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g is the risk of the transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV and other blood borne<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s through the shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of c<strong>on</strong>tam<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ated equipment. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is c<strong>on</strong>siderable reas<strong>on</strong> for c<strong>on</strong>cern. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment found that 53% of the drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed had used syr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ges from another<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jector while 72% admitted to have passed their equipment <strong>on</strong> to other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors. In Karachi, where <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> is most widespread, as many as 80% of the abusers did not use new needles every time they<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected.<br />
60%<br />
Proporti<strong>on</strong> of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 who ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
55%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
31%<br />
20%<br />
14%<br />
12%<br />
0%<br />
Karachi (S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dh) Lahore (Punjab)<br />
Quetta<br />
(Baluchistan)<br />
Peshawar<br />
(NWFP)<br />
PAKISTAN<br />
Figure 22<br />
UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Assessment Study<br />
6.4.2. Iran<br />
Iran reported significant <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiate abuse throughout the 1990s. Official estimates for the<br />
1990s were 450,000 opiate abusers. By 1993, the authorities had raised the estimate to 500,000, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
350,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers ( 1% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above) and 150,000 hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers (0.4% of the<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above). Estimates for subsequent years differed, depend<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up<strong>on</strong> the methodology<br />
used. All estimates, however, showed an upward trend compared to the early 1990s.<br />
Estimates of 1997/1998 based <strong>on</strong> government data from compulsory drug screen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g before<br />
marriage, obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a government job, a licence for start<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a trade or a driv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g licence, showed rates of<br />
opiate abuse rang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g from 1.2% to 3.3% of the populati<strong>on</strong> tested (average 1.8%). If these results are<br />
extrapolated to the Iranian populati<strong>on</strong> aged 15 and above, the total number of opiates abusers could be<br />
estimated at around 710,000 for 1997 (range: 470,000 to 1.3 milli<strong>on</strong> people). o<br />
In 1999, a Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran was c<strong>on</strong>ducted <strong>on</strong> behalf of the Iranian<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health and UNDCP. It arrived at an estimate of 710,000 users p of opiates, equivalent to 1.7% of<br />
o <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> estimate of 710,000 people may have been an over-estimate at the time as most people apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for licences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran are men, and<br />
males have a higher tendency to use drugs than females. Indeed, if <strong>on</strong>ly data <strong>on</strong> marriages and government jobs are analyzed, the<br />
ratio falls to 1.3%, equivalent to about 510,000 people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1997. By 2000 this ratio rose to 1.5%. However, <strong>on</strong>e has to assume that those<br />
who are screened , are, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general, aware of the implicati<strong>on</strong>s of a positive test. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is thus a str<strong>on</strong>g likelihood that many people who<br />
are tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs, would not apply for a government job or would avoid apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g for a licence. This would partly offset the male bias <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the sample.<br />
p<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey found that 24.2% of drug users had been <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment and rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> centers at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their lifetime, i.e. <strong>on</strong>e out<br />
of four. Over the past 11 years 197,109 people had been treated, most of them <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years. About 10% of admissi<strong>on</strong>s were readmissi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Thus the actual number of pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>tact with the treatment system was about 177,398. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the number of pers<strong>on</strong>s<br />
178
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999, which is a higher percentage than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (0.9%) or the<br />
average of the Central Asian regi<strong>on</strong> (1.1%). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey also found that – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>trast to Pakistan – <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
is still the most widely used opiate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. Growth rates, however, were apparently str<strong>on</strong>ger for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> than<br />
for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey also showed that there is an important overlap as drug users tend to c<strong>on</strong>sume more<br />
than <strong>on</strong>e drug: 73% of the sample of drug abusers analysed were tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 22% were us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
residue and 39% were tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Hashish was c<strong>on</strong>sumed by 13% of the problem drug users<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated. Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these proporti<strong>on</strong>s to the estimate menti<strong>on</strong>ed above, the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers can<br />
be estimated at around 520,000 (1.2% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers<br />
can be estimated at around 280,000 (0.7% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se figures <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate an<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers of 50% between 1992 and 1999 and an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers of close to 90%.<br />
Estimated number of opiates abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
and as a % of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above<br />
800,000<br />
700,000<br />
600,000<br />
500,000<br />
400,000<br />
1.4%<br />
0.4%<br />
1.7%<br />
0.7%<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> & <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
users<br />
Opium<br />
300,000<br />
200,000<br />
1%<br />
1.2%<br />
100,000<br />
0<br />
1993 1999<br />
Figure 23<br />
Sources: Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, “Workshop of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Focal Po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts<br />
<strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse 1993, Drug Abuse Situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> I.R. of Iran and Current<br />
Organizati<strong>on</strong>s for Demand Reducti<strong>on</strong>, Iran’s Country Report”, M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of<br />
Health and UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran,<br />
Tehran 2000.<br />
Similar orders of magnitude can be also obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed if estimates are based <strong>on</strong> the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug users identified by the authorities (140,277) and the f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gs of the 1999 Rapid Assessment, which<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated that 16% of the problem drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected drugs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the m<strong>on</strong>th prior to the study, and 21.9% had<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected at least <strong>on</strong>ce. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of drug abusers could then be estimated to range between 640,000<br />
(140,277/0.219) and 877,000 (140,277/0.16), equivalent to a mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t estimate of around 760,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s<br />
or 1.8% of those aged 15 and above <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999. Us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the same approach based <strong>on</strong> the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug users identified by the authorities as of March 2001 (147,077), the estimate of drug users would have<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to a range from between 670,000 and 920,000 with a mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t estimate of 795,000. Given a<br />
parallel <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the overall populati<strong>on</strong> aged 15 and above, the prevalence rate would have amounted to<br />
1.8%. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce <strong>on</strong>e cannot assume that the authorities identified all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users, the actual number of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g users and thus the overall estimate may well have been larger.<br />
treated corresp<strong>on</strong>ded to about <strong>on</strong>e-fourth of all drug addicts, the estimated number of drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran was calculated to amount to<br />
about 710,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s (=177398*4).<br />
179
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Estimated number of opiates abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
and as a % of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above<br />
1,400,000<br />
1,200,000<br />
2.8%<br />
0.3%<br />
1,000,000<br />
800,000<br />
600,000<br />
1.4%<br />
0.8%<br />
Other opiates<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Opium<br />
400,000<br />
200,000<br />
0.4% 1.7%<br />
1%<br />
0<br />
1993 2000<br />
Figure 24<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, “Workshop of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Focal<br />
Po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse 1993, Drug Abuse Situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> I.R. of Iran and Current<br />
Organizati<strong>on</strong>s for Demand Reducti<strong>on</strong>, Iran’s Country Report, UNDCP, Annual<br />
Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire 2001 data and Anti-Narcotics Headquarters quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the I.R. of Iran, Country Profile 2002.<br />
Indeed, based <strong>on</strong> the estimati<strong>on</strong> technique used by the Iranian Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters, the<br />
result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g estimates were significantly higher. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> prevalence figure for drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, based <strong>on</strong> the socalled<br />
‘case enumerati<strong>on</strong> technique’, was estimated at 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> people (2000) q , equivalent to about 2% of<br />
the total populati<strong>on</strong> or almost 2.8% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iranian authorities (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their reply<br />
to the 2001 Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire), provide the follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g breakdown of opiate abuse: 64% of the<br />
opiate abusers c<strong>on</strong>sume <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>, 29% hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> and 7% other opiates. Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g these proporti<strong>on</strong>s to the overall<br />
estimate of 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong>, the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> users may have reached 770,000 (1.7% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age<br />
15 and above) while the hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g populati<strong>on</strong> could number 350,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s (0.8% of the populati<strong>on</strong><br />
age 15 and above). In additi<strong>on</strong> to the 1.2 milli<strong>on</strong> chr<strong>on</strong>ic opiate users, authorities estimate that there may be<br />
some 800,000 recreati<strong>on</strong>al opiate users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total number of opiate c<strong>on</strong>sumers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran would thus<br />
amount to 2 milli<strong>on</strong> people.<br />
While there is thus a broad range of estimates of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, there is little doubt that opiate<br />
abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased significantly over the last decade. A number of other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicators po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this directi<strong>on</strong> as<br />
well. A marked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease was also reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of referrals to the country’s rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> centres<br />
for drug abuse by the State Welfare Organizati<strong>on</strong>. This went hand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hand with an expansi<strong>on</strong> of treatment<br />
facilities over the last decade. While the overall number of treatment facilities amounted to just 17<br />
rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> centres <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early 1990s 18 , between 1997 and 1999 the State Welfare Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
q<br />
This is now the most frequently quoted figure <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran.<br />
180
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
established 65 new outpatient centres <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran’s prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cial capitals 19 . Rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> centres <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased to a<br />
total of 100 by the year 2000 20 . More than 30,000 drug abusers per year were detoxified at these centres <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the late 1990s and 2000-2001. In additi<strong>on</strong>, work was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>itiated for sett<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g up 9 residential therapeutic<br />
communities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. 21 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall number of people treated for substance abuse tripled between 1992 and<br />
2001.<br />
35000<br />
30000<br />
25000<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
Number of referrals to rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> centres<br />
by Iran's State Welfare Organizati<strong>on</strong><br />
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998<br />
35000<br />
30000<br />
25000<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
Number of people treated<br />
for drug abuse (mostly opiates)<br />
12,151<br />
32,033<br />
1992 2001<br />
Figure 25<br />
Source: UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> of the I.R. of Iran, Country<br />
Profile 2002.<br />
Figure 26<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire data<br />
1992 and 2001.<br />
A breakdown of the overall drug c<strong>on</strong>trol budget of Iran for 1998, i.e. prior to the latest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment, showed that about $90 milli<strong>on</strong> (us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the UN exchange rate), or more than a third<br />
of the total drug c<strong>on</strong>trol budget, was dedicated to substance abuse treatment. Another 10% of the drug<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trol budget was used for preventi<strong>on</strong> activities. Substance abuse treatment accounted for about 3% of<br />
total health expenditure (private and state) of the country. With some 30,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g been treated<br />
each year, the Iranian authorities spent about $3000 per drug addict <strong>on</strong> treatment. This is equivalent to twice<br />
the average GDP per capita <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. r<br />
Table 18. Direct Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Expenditure* <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran<br />
Milli<strong>on</strong> rials<br />
Milli<strong>on</strong> US-$<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
UN<br />
N<strong>on</strong>-oil export<br />
exchange<br />
exchange rate<br />
rate<br />
Official<br />
exchange<br />
rate<br />
Exchange rate: Rials to US-$ 5,395 4,305 3,500<br />
Supply reducti<strong>on</strong> 605,738 53% 112 141 173<br />
Treatment and legal<br />
expenditures<br />
385,820 34% 72 90 110<br />
Preventi<strong>on</strong> and awareness<br />
campaign<br />
115,171 10% 21 27 33<br />
Other 29,699 3% 6 7 8<br />
Total drug c<strong>on</strong>trol expenditure 1,136,428 100% 211 264 325<br />
Gross domestic product (GDP) 324,800,000 60,200 75,400 92,800<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of GDP 0.3%<br />
* Data refer to the year 1998.<br />
Sources: Cultural Research Bureau, “Illicit Drug Market <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tehran – Review of Narcotic Ec<strong>on</strong>omics <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran”, (Draft),<br />
Tehran 2001; <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ec<strong>on</strong>omist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country Profile, 2002.<br />
r $1492 GDP per capita (Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002).<br />
181
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Despite improved treatment facilities, drug related deaths more than tripled <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran between 2000<br />
and 2001. Some of this <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease was related to the shift from <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>. This was due to<br />
the comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> of an <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> shortage (the c<strong>on</strong>sequence of 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> ban <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>) and a hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
glut <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran’s drug markets <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (because of large hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> stocks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>). As the demand for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased, hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> purity decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed. Some of the death cases seem to have been l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to adulterati<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
‘cut’ hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Lower purity also appears to have prompted some users to switch from smok<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased the risks of serious illness as well as death.<br />
Drug related deaths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran<br />
2500<br />
2000<br />
2106<br />
1500<br />
Drug related death<br />
cases<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
0<br />
632<br />
2000 2001<br />
Figure 27<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Country Profile 2000, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the I.R.<br />
of Iran.<br />
Outpatient treatment centre records for 1998 showed that 10% of drug addicts treated had a history<br />
of drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Though the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users rose <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> absolute terms <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years, the<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users am<strong>on</strong>g addicts who were referred to outpatient treatment centres rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed<br />
basically stable (9% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001). 22 However, people undergo<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g treatment do not seem to be fully<br />
representative of Iran’s drug addict populati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 Rapid Assessment found that 11.6% of the drug<br />
addicts surveyed from treatment centres had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected drugs (which was similar to the nati<strong>on</strong>al proporti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
10%); but am<strong>on</strong>g all problem drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated, which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> pris<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> the<br />
streets, the proporti<strong>on</strong> of addicts who had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the m<strong>on</strong>th prior to the survey was 16%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> proporti<strong>on</strong><br />
of those who had ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected a drug at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their lifetime was 22%. 23<br />
Modes of adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong> of drugs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
m<strong>on</strong>th prior to the survey <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran (1999)<br />
Other forms<br />
of<br />
adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong><br />
84%<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
16%<br />
Figure 28<br />
Source: Iranian M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health and UNDCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong><br />
Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Tehran 2000.<br />
182
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was comm<strong>on</strong> for hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, but less so for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> or <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> residue. As <strong>on</strong>ly about 40% of<br />
the sample of chr<strong>on</strong>ic drug users actually c<strong>on</strong>sumed hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (most of the chr<strong>on</strong>ic drug users were still us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g>), the proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors am<strong>on</strong>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> users may well have been twice as high as the figures<br />
menti<strong>on</strong>ed above. About half of those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g said they shared syr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ges. Am<strong>on</strong>g drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors surveyed <strong>on</strong><br />
the streets, the proporti<strong>on</strong> shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g equipment was as high as 70%.<br />
Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background, it is not surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that 67% of HIV/AIDS cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran were related to drug<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g (1032 out of 1533 identified up to March 2001). Zero po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t seven per cent of drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors tested<br />
positive for HIV/AIDS (1032 out of 147,077 drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors tested) while overall <strong>on</strong>ly 0.02% of all people<br />
tested <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran were found to be <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected by HIV/AIDS, suggest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that the risk of HIV/AIDS is more than 30<br />
times higher for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users than for the populati<strong>on</strong> at large. In additi<strong>on</strong>, chr<strong>on</strong>ic drug users faced a<br />
number of additi<strong>on</strong>al health problems: 27.3% of them reported sexually transmitted diseases and 17.7% of<br />
them reported diseases such as hepatitis and tuberculosis.<br />
Police arrest data suggest that most drug addicts (145,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s were arrested for drug<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000) are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Teheran (18% of all arrests), followed by the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce of<br />
Khorassan (15%), which borders <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overwhelm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g majority of people were arrested for abuse<br />
of opiates (75% for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> al<strong>on</strong>e). Teheran and Khorassan were resp<strong>on</strong>sible for a third of all identified cases<br />
of drug addicti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> same two prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces also led the list of people arrested for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
the significance of spill-overs from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to supply the local market. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> two prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces accounted for<br />
more than half of all people arrested for drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. In total 125,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s were<br />
arrested for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 24 , a more than five-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease compared to the early 1990s 25<br />
Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g data for possessi<strong>on</strong> and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g together, about 270,000 s pers<strong>on</strong>s were arrested <strong>on</strong> drugrelated<br />
charges <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and 306,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 t . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se are very large numbers compared to<br />
other countries. In the UK and Italy, which have am<strong>on</strong>g the most severe drug problems of western Europe 26<br />
and populati<strong>on</strong>s roughly the size of Iran u , the number of people arrested for drug related charges was<br />
104,000 (UK) and 34,000 (Italy) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the year 2000. 27 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug related arrests made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK were thus some<br />
60% less than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran and those <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Italy were almost 90% less than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran. In Italy all of the 34,000 people<br />
were arrested for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. In the UK 15,000 people were arrested for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and 93,000 for<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong>. 28 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of people arrested for possessi<strong>on</strong> was thus about a third less <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Iran. If the analysis focuses <strong>on</strong> opiate users, the difference between Iran and the UK becomes even more<br />
pr<strong>on</strong>ounced. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total number of people arrested for opiate (ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>) related charges (traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and<br />
possessi<strong>on</strong>) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK was 12,300 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 while <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran 109,000 pers<strong>on</strong>s were arrested for <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> abuse.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> total number of people arrested for opiate abuse was some 90% less <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, reflect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
both the severity of the drug abuse problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran as well as the str<strong>on</strong>g enforcement efforts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country.<br />
s <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> precise figure was 269,259 pers<strong>on</strong>s arrested <strong>on</strong> drug related charges. Of these, 121,742 Iranians and 2,939 foreigners were<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicted for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of people arrested for c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>-related crimes was 144,578. Of these, 75% were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>volved <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> related crimes. Three per cent of the total were women. (Source: Government statistics cited <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP, Country <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the<br />
I.R. of Iran, Country profile – 2002).<br />
t UNDCP Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> from Deputy Police Chief for Intelligence, 8 October 2002.<br />
u <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> populati<strong>on</strong> of the UK was 59.4 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 and the populati<strong>on</strong> of Italy was 57.5 milli<strong>on</strong> people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UN<br />
estimates. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> populati<strong>on</strong> of Iran – accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to the Human Development Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1999, was 60.1 milli<strong>on</strong>,<br />
and thus almost identical with the size of the populati<strong>on</strong> of the UK, though based <strong>on</strong> UN estimates, Iran’s populati<strong>on</strong> reached 69.4<br />
milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 and 70.3 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000.<br />
183
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
184
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.4.3. Central Asia<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> opiate abuse have, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, taken place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of<br />
Central Asia v . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases can be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to the northern route for traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates from <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to<br />
the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>, and other countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of drug users registered with the health authorities<br />
showed an exp<strong>on</strong>ential growth, more than tripl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g between 1992 and 2000. If the 1990-2000 period is<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sidered, available data show a six-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease. In c<strong>on</strong>trast to Iran, drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asia is, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
general (except Kyrgyzstan) 29 largely l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked to abuse of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In the four Central Asian countries studied,<br />
opiate use, mostly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>travenously adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istered hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, appears to be even more widespread than cannabis<br />
use 30 , the traditi<strong>on</strong>al drug of choice <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Registered drug users per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong><br />
140.0<br />
120.0<br />
100.0<br />
80.0<br />
60.0<br />
40.0<br />
20.0<br />
0.0<br />
Drug abusers registered per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia*<br />
38 40<br />
47<br />
55<br />
67<br />
80<br />
97<br />
113<br />
129<br />
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
*Based <strong>on</strong> data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan<br />
Figure 29<br />
Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Drug and Drug<br />
Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess Preventi<strong>on</strong>, 2000; Agency for Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the President of the Republic of<br />
Tajikistan; State Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the Government of the Kyrgyz<br />
Republic; Government of Uzbekistan, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> and Analytical Centre <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the number of registered drug abusers, Tajikistan showed a seven-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease of drug<br />
abuse over the 1992-2000 period (28% per year). This went <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> parallel with dramatically <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> other central Asian countries reported a tripl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of registered drug abusers over<br />
the same period, equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 16% to 17%. If the numbers of registered<br />
drug abusers per 100,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants are compared, data show the highest rates for Kazakhstan, followed<br />
by Kyrgyzstan. Rates for Kazakhstan are more than twice as high as the Central Asian average and even<br />
exceed those reported from the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
v <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g discussi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Central Asia is based <strong>on</strong> data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Data <strong>on</strong><br />
Turkmenistan were not available at the time of writ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
185
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Average annual growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of registered drug<br />
abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia over the 1992 to 2000 period<br />
Tajikistan<br />
27.7%<br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
16.9%<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
16.8%<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
16.1%<br />
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%<br />
Figure 30<br />
Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Drug and Drug<br />
Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess Preventi<strong>on</strong>, 2000; Agency for Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the President of the Republic of<br />
Tajikistan; State Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic;<br />
Government of Uzbekistan, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> and Analytical Centre <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol;<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health of the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Number of patients<br />
registered<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Number of patients registered for<br />
substance abuse treatment<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
5000<br />
4500<br />
4000<br />
3500<br />
3000<br />
2500<br />
2000<br />
1500<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
0<br />
Index: 1990 = 100<br />
Number of patients<br />
registered<br />
Kyrgyzstan:<br />
Number of patients registered for substance<br />
abuse treatment<br />
6,000<br />
5,000<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
2,000<br />
1,000<br />
0<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
400<br />
350<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Index: 1991 = 100<br />
Figure 31<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Figure 32<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Number of patients<br />
registered<br />
Kazakhstan:<br />
Number of patients registered for substance<br />
abuse treatment<br />
50,000<br />
1000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
200<br />
Index: 1990 = 100<br />
Number of patients<br />
registered<br />
20,000<br />
15,000<br />
10,000<br />
5,000<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Number of patients registered for<br />
substance abuse treatment<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
Index: 1992 = 100<br />
0<br />
1990<br />
1991<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
0<br />
0<br />
1992<br />
1993<br />
1994<br />
1995<br />
1996<br />
1997<br />
1998<br />
1999<br />
2000<br />
2001<br />
0<br />
Figure 33<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Figure 34<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong><br />
Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
186
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Registered drug users per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong><br />
Drug abusers registered per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia<br />
and the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
300.0<br />
250.0<br />
200.0<br />
150.0<br />
100.0<br />
50.0<br />
0.0<br />
71<br />
105<br />
51<br />
279<br />
186<br />
106<br />
33<br />
29 58<br />
21<br />
11<br />
16<br />
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Kazakhstan 70.6 77.5 87.8 104.7 133.5 169.6 213.1 247.1 278.6<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> 22.0 26.1 32.3 44.0 60.2 82.6 109.9 143.7 185.8<br />
Kyrgyzstan 33.1 34.7 41.1 50.9 66.9 80.6 89.6 104.0 106.5<br />
Tajikistan 10.7 1.2 11.4 15.6 16.2 10.2 25.2 44.3 68.5<br />
Uzbekistan 20.5 22.6 25.9 29.3 33.2 37.5 41.5 48.8 57.9<br />
69<br />
Kazakhstan<br />
Russian<br />
Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
Kyrgyzstan<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Figure 35<br />
Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Drug and Drug Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess Preventi<strong>on</strong>, 2000; Agency for<br />
Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan; State Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the Government of the<br />
Kyrgyz Republic; Government of Uzbekistan, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> and Analytical Centre <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol; M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health of the<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
300<br />
Number of registered drug abusers per 100,000<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000<br />
279<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
58<br />
69<br />
106<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan<br />
Figure 36<br />
Sources: Annual Report of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Drug and Drug<br />
Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ess Preventi<strong>on</strong>, 2000; Agency for Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the President of the Republic of<br />
Tajikistan; State Commissi<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol under the Government of the Kyrgyz<br />
Republic; Government of Uzbekistan, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Informati<strong>on</strong> and Analytical Centre <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
C<strong>on</strong>trol.<br />
187
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of registered drug abusers identified by the authorities <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Turkmenistan also <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased<br />
str<strong>on</strong>gly, from 13 per 100,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995 to 53 per 100,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1998. This was less than the<br />
corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g figure for Kazakhstan but (slightly) more than the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ratios <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the other Central<br />
Asian countries. Between 1998 and 2000, the total number of registered drug abusers more than doubled,<br />
from around 5,800 to 13,000.<br />
Number of registered drug users<br />
3000<br />
2500<br />
2000<br />
1500<br />
1000<br />
500<br />
Turkmenistan: Newly registered drug abusers<br />
53<br />
13<br />
6<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
per 100,000 populati<strong>on</strong><br />
14000<br />
12000<br />
10000<br />
8000<br />
6000<br />
4000<br />
2000<br />
Tukmenistan:<br />
Total number of<br />
registered drug<br />
abusers<br />
13000<br />
3524<br />
5809<br />
0<br />
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998<br />
0<br />
0<br />
1995 1998 2000<br />
Figure 37<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Turkmenistan – Country Profile 2002.<br />
Figure 38<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Turkmenistan<br />
Country Profile 2002.<br />
Some work has been d<strong>on</strong>e <strong>on</strong> estimat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the size of the drug abus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g populati<strong>on</strong>. First results of an<br />
<strong>on</strong>-go<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, c<strong>on</strong>ducted by teams<br />
work<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> nati<strong>on</strong>al <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s, tra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed and equipped by UNODC, found that the largest numbers of<br />
problem drug users are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan. When the size of the populati<strong>on</strong> is taken <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account, the highest<br />
prevalence rates are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan. With<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that country, the c<strong>on</strong>centrati<strong>on</strong> of drug abuse is particularly<br />
str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bishkek, Osh and the Chuy regi<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> next highest prevalence rates are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan,<br />
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall rate of problem drug use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia is 0.8% of the total<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> or 1.1% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> estimates for the four Central Asian countries<br />
suggest that slightly less than 400,000 people are addicted to drugs, ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Assum<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that<br />
Turkmenistan, which was not <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cluded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the calculati<strong>on</strong>s, has an addicti<strong>on</strong> level comparable to that of<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Uzbekistan, the total number of problem drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia could amount to some<br />
410,000 people (+/- 50,000).<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se estimates are based <strong>on</strong> the total number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment and the establishment of<br />
‘multipliers’ w for each country, which was d<strong>on</strong>e as part of the study. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> multiplier provides a measure of the<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ship between the number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment to the total addict populati<strong>on</strong> x . <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lower the<br />
multiplier, the better equipped the health system is equipped to deal with the problem of drug addicti<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
average multiplier for Central Asia as a whole was found to be 6. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lowest multipliers were identified for<br />
Kazakhstan (4) and Uzbekistan (5½); the highest for Tajikistan (12) and Kyrgyzstan (17). This suggests that<br />
the latter two countries will have to expand their treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure over the next few years.<br />
w If, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a particular locati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong>e out of five drug addicts has underg<strong>on</strong>e treatment, then the multiplier for the locati<strong>on</strong> is 5.<br />
x<br />
A special approach was developed for the countries of Central Asia. For each country multipliers were established for two locati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
(cities). With the help of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> obta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed from drug users, identified through the ‘snow-ball’ technique, the total number of drug<br />
users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a specific locati<strong>on</strong> was estimated (‘nom<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> method’). This, together with the number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment locally, enabled<br />
establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the proporti<strong>on</strong> of people treated as a percentage of the total number of drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a specific locati<strong>on</strong>. Two locati<strong>on</strong>s per<br />
country were <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestigated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>–depth. This formed the basis for an estimate of the nati<strong>on</strong>al multiplier. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> multiplier was then applied to<br />
the overall number of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> that country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> follow<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g locati<strong>on</strong>s were selected (the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews with<br />
drug addicts are <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> parentheses): Kazakhstan: Almaty (43) and Pavlodar (50); Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek (52) and Jaylil of Chuiy Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
(47); Tajikistan: Dushanbe (53) and Kurgantubeh (42); Uzbekistan: Tashkent (50) and Urgut City of Samarkand Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (50).<br />
188
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Table 19. Assessment of drug abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries (2001)<br />
Total numbers<br />
As a percentage of total populati<strong>on</strong><br />
m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> max<br />
mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
estimate<br />
m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> max mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
Kazakhstan 165,000 186,000 175,500 1.1% 1.3% 1.2%<br />
Kyrgyzstan 80,000 100,000 90,000 1.6% 2.1% 1.8%<br />
Tajikistan 45,000 55,000 50,000 0.7% 0.9% 0.8%<br />
Uzbekistan 66,000 91,000 78,500 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%<br />
Sub-total 356,000 432,000 394,000 0.7% 0.9% 0.8%<br />
Source: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report<br />
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Provisi<strong>on</strong>al Executive Summary.<br />
All Central Asian countries suffered from <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use (IDU), and thus<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g risk of blood borne diseases. In Kyrgyzstan, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug addicts<br />
registered with treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s rose from 14% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993 to 65% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001.<br />
Kyrgzystan: registered drug abusers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993<br />
Kyrgzystan: registered drug abusers<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Other<br />
86%<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug users<br />
14%<br />
Other<br />
35%<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug users<br />
65%<br />
Figure 39<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Figure 40<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
In 2000, 41,400 pers<strong>on</strong>s were treated for substance abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan (more than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran or<br />
Pakistan), 14,300 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan, 5,200 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan and 4,200 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan. 31 Data for both Kyrgyzstan<br />
and Tajikistan show that more than 80% of drug treatment is related to abuse of opiates, a higher<br />
percentage than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan (75%). While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan the bulk of opiate treatment is<br />
related to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the opposite is true for Kyrgyzstan. This probably reflects the fact that Kyrgyzstan used to<br />
be the largest licit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g area of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>. Until producti<strong>on</strong> stopped <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1973 32 Kyrgyzstan<br />
was resp<strong>on</strong>sible for about 85% of the total licit <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> of the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> and 16% of world<br />
producti<strong>on</strong>. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>, by c<strong>on</strong>trast, is a relatively new drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> first case of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> addicti<strong>on</strong> was<br />
officially registered <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1988 33 .<br />
189
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Tajikistan: drug treatment accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
primary drug of abuse (2000)<br />
Kyrgyzstan: drug treatment accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
primary drug of abuse (2000)<br />
Others<br />
3%<br />
Cannabis<br />
6%<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
74%<br />
Others<br />
18%<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
15%<br />
Opium<br />
17%<br />
Opium<br />
67%<br />
Figure 41<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Figure 42<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, 2002.<br />
Kazakhstan: drug treatment accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to<br />
primary drug of abuse (2000)<br />
Other drugs<br />
5%<br />
Stimulants<br />
0.1%<br />
Opiates<br />
75%<br />
Cannabis<br />
20%<br />
Figure 43<br />
UNDOCCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
the Central Asian Countries, Tashkent, 2002.<br />
C<strong>on</strong>sider<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the proporti<strong>on</strong>s of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> treatment for opiate abuse it can be estimated that about<br />
0.6% of the total populati<strong>on</strong> or 0.9% of the populati<strong>on</strong> age 15 and above <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia c<strong>on</strong>sume opiates.<br />
This is three times the corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g ratio for western Europe. Includ<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g estimates for Turkmenistan, the<br />
total number of people tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia is likely to be around 325,000 people (+/- 50,000). Most<br />
opiate users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries are found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan, followed by Kyrgyzstan. Tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
differences of the size of the populati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to account, Kyrgyzstan has the highest opiate prevalence rate,<br />
followed by Kazakhstan. However, if the prevalence estimates are compared to the size of the populati<strong>on</strong><br />
age 15 and above – the usual measure of comparis<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>ally - the sec<strong>on</strong>d highest rate am<strong>on</strong>g the<br />
Central Asian countries is <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan (1.2%), ahead of Kazakhstan (1.1%). This reversal <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the rank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g is a<br />
reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the higher proporti<strong>on</strong> of the populati<strong>on</strong> under the age of 15 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan as compared to<br />
Kazaksthan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> highest rate is still found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan (2.3%) and the lowest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan.<br />
190
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Table 20. Assessment of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asian countries (2001)<br />
Drug abuse<br />
mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
estimate<br />
Total numbers<br />
% opiates<br />
Opiate abuse<br />
estimate<br />
as a percentage of populati<strong>on</strong><br />
total<br />
age 15 and above<br />
Kazakhstan 175,500 75% 131,600 0.9% 1.1%<br />
Kyrgyzstan 90,000 82% 73,800 1.5% 2.3%<br />
Tajikistan 50,000 91% 45,500 0.7% 1.2%<br />
Uzbekistan 78,500 80%* 62,800 0.3% 0.4%<br />
Sub-total 394,000 80% 313,700 0.6% 0.9%<br />
* assumed proporti<strong>on</strong> (estimates provided <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviews <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan ranged from 68% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Margelan to 90% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tashkent and 95% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Samarkand and Urgut ).<br />
Source: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report (Kazakhstan,<br />
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Provisi<strong>on</strong>al Executive Summary.<br />
191
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Ec<strong>on</strong>omic factors have played a role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the massive spread of opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia. As a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>sequence of ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g use of the Central<br />
Asian traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g route, opiate prices dropped significantly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the sec<strong>on</strong>d half of the 1990s.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> lower prices made opiates affordable to ever larger secti<strong>on</strong>s of society. In Tajikistan, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance,<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices were reported to have decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed to such an extent that the price for a shot of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was about<br />
the same as a bottle of beer. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> reacti<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>sumers to fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug prices, measured <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia<br />
through official registrati<strong>on</strong> systems (usually based <strong>on</strong> treatment) tend to show abuse trends with some<br />
delay. Thus the str<strong>on</strong>g decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es of prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, <strong>on</strong>ly led to a rapid rise <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of<br />
registered drug abusers two years later. Moreover, the rapid <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of registered drug<br />
abusers c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ued even though the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices became less pr<strong>on</strong>ounced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> subsequent years.<br />
Similarly, the first signs of a stabilizati<strong>on</strong> of opiate retail prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan were reported from 1998. This<br />
resulted, two years later, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> some decelerati<strong>on</strong> of the upward trend <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of registered drug abusers.<br />
Thus, it is likely that the ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiate prices across Central Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001/2002 will not immediately lead to a<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug abuse, but <strong>on</strong>ly to a gradual stabilisati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s large harvest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2002 means that<br />
prices are aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> likely to fall, which will, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Kyrgyzstan:<br />
Index of registered drug abusers (1992=100) and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dex of drug prices (1998=100)<br />
Tajikistan<br />
Index of registered drug users (1992=100) and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dex of drug prices (2000=100)<br />
500<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> wholesale<br />
prices<br />
800<br />
400<br />
Opium wholesale<br />
prices<br />
600<br />
Index<br />
300<br />
200<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> retail prices<br />
Opium retail prices<br />
Index<br />
400<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Registered drug users<br />
0<br />
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> retail prices<br />
Registered drug users<br />
Figure 44<br />
Source: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries”, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report,<br />
Draft.<br />
Figure 45<br />
Source: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug<br />
Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries”, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report, Draft.<br />
Index<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
Index of registered drug abusers<br />
(1996=100) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dex of drug prices (2000=100)<br />
1997 1998 1999 2000<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> retail prices<br />
Registered drug users<br />
Figure 46<br />
Source: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
Central Asian countries”, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report, Draft.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>refore, countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> will suffer some time to come<br />
from the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> bumper harvests. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> reacti<strong>on</strong> to<br />
ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug prices is slower than to fall<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug prices, because <strong>on</strong>ce a drug epidemic<br />
has started, it tends to fuel itself for a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>siderable period of time. Drug users, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
order to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance their habit, become<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly engaged <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> local drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
activities, over time c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to a further<br />
spread of drug abuse, even though drug<br />
prices may already have started to rise.<br />
Tajikistan, which showed the<br />
str<strong>on</strong>gest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the abuse rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
recent years, is particularly vulnerable to<br />
further rises <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug abuse. Treatment could<br />
help to break the vicious circle. However,<br />
treatment is rather expensive for countries<br />
which have <strong>on</strong>ly very limited funds at their<br />
disposal.<br />
192
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
One estimate made for Tajikistan suggests that a basic three-week treatment episode for a drug<br />
addict <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a ‘narcological’ hospital costs, <strong>on</strong> average, US-$380 per client 34 . Though this may seem to be a<br />
rather small amount by western standards, it is a significant amount for a country which has a per capita<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come of just $164 (unadjusted for purchas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g power parities) y . In other words, the most basic treatment of<br />
a drug addict <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan costs more than twice the average annual GDP per capita.<br />
Given the scarcity of funds available <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan, the government was <strong>on</strong>ly able to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance 1.2% of<br />
this amount or $4.5 per patient. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> rest had to be f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>anced from private sources. But this limited both the<br />
availability and the demand for such services, and – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>directly – c<strong>on</strong>tributed to the further rise of the country’s<br />
drug epidemic.<br />
Based <strong>on</strong> the above menti<strong>on</strong>ed estimate, the 4200 people treated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 costs around<br />
$1.6 milli<strong>on</strong>, ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to about $2.2 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 (based <strong>on</strong> 5700 people treated). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> actual treatment<br />
requirements, as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicated by the ‘multiplier’ would be substantially larger. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> multiplier for Tajikistan, as<br />
noted above, was found to be around 12. If the target were to reduce the multiplier to that found <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Kazakhstan (multiplier of close to 4), treatment services <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan would have to triple. If the objective<br />
were to stabilize substance abuse at current levels, an even lower multiplier would have to be aimed at. In<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trast to rapid growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia, opiate abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed basically stable over the<br />
last couple of years, notably <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries which had a multiplier close to or below the West European<br />
average of 2½ z . If such a multiplier were aimed at, costs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan for basic detoxificati<strong>on</strong> and<br />
rudimentary treatment would have to qu<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tuple from current levels to around $11 milli<strong>on</strong> p.a. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> already<br />
very tight health budget of the country (public and private) amounted to just $61 milli<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000 (6.1% of<br />
GDP) aa .<br />
Apply<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the same logic to Kyrgyzstan, treatment of drug addicts – <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to reach the multiplier of<br />
Kazakhstan – would have to quadruple. If the West European average were the ultimate target, treatment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Kyrgyzstan would even have to rise 7-fold.<br />
Table 21. Problem drug use, treatment and opiate abuse trends (2000/2001)<br />
Number of People Multiplier<br />
problem drug treated:<br />
users<br />
(mid-po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>t<br />
estimates)<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong> Countries Problem drug<br />
use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> %<br />
of populati<strong>on</strong><br />
age 15-64<br />
Reported abuse<br />
trends of opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2000 and 2001<br />
CENTRAL Kazakhstan 1.6 175,500 41,356 4.2 str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
ASIAN Uzbekistan 0.5 78,000 14,279 5.5 str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
COUNTRIES Tajikistan 1.5 50,000 4,200 11.9 very str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 90,000 5,183 17.4 str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
SUBTOTAL 1.2 393,500 65,018 6.1 str<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease<br />
WEST<br />
EUROPEAN<br />
AVERAGE* SUBTOTAL 0.5 1,255,000 513,406 2.4 stable<br />
* Data for West Europe refer to 14 EU countries. Def<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>iti<strong>on</strong> of ‘people treated’ differs am<strong>on</strong>g countries. Results must therefore be<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terpreted with cauti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Sources: UNODCDP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA), EMCDDA, statistical annex to its ‘2002 Annual Report <strong>on</strong> the State of the<br />
<strong>Drugs</strong> Problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the European Uni<strong>on</strong> and Norway’ , Lisb<strong>on</strong> 2002 as well as Nati<strong>on</strong>al Reports, UNDCP, Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire<br />
Data.<br />
y Based <strong>on</strong> a GDP – accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP – of $1 billi<strong>on</strong> and a populati<strong>on</strong> – accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP - of 6.1 milli<strong>on</strong>. (Source: UNDP, Human<br />
Development Report 2002, pp. 162 and 192.).<br />
z Calculated <strong>on</strong> the basis of estimates of the number of problem drug users and the total number of people treated. (Source: EMCDDA,<br />
statistical annex to its ‘2002 Annual Report <strong>on</strong> the State of the <strong>Drugs</strong> Problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the European Uni<strong>on</strong> and Norway’ , Lisb<strong>on</strong> 2002 as well<br />
as Nati<strong>on</strong>al Reports).<br />
aa Based <strong>on</strong> a GDP of 1 billi<strong>on</strong> and a health budget reported to amount to 6.1% of GDP accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to UNDP (Source: UNDP, Human<br />
Development Report 2002, p. 168 and 192).<br />
193
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
6.5. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> spread of HIV/AIDS<br />
Apart from drug abuse as such, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> has also caused a number of<br />
related problems. One of the most serious of these, entail<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g l<strong>on</strong>g-term c<strong>on</strong>sequences that go bey<strong>on</strong>d drug<br />
abusers, is the spread of HIV/AIDS. Based <strong>on</strong> estimates made by UNAIDS, more than 100,000 people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are already <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected by the HIV virus, and the number is ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rapidly.<br />
Most of the spread was, and c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues to be, related to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g needles.<br />
Am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours, the country most affected by HIV/AIDS is Pakistan, followed, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
absolute numbers, by Iran. If a rate of HIV/AIDS cases per 100,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants is c<strong>on</strong>sidered, Pakistan has<br />
the highest rate, followed by Kazakhstan, Iran and Kyrgyzstan. Significantly higher rates of HIV/AIDS<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s have been calculated for the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se high figures are also largely due to the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jecti<strong>on</strong> of opiates of Afghan orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. About 40 of every 100,000 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>habitants <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are affected by HIV/AIDS. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> corresp<strong>on</strong>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rate for the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> exceeded 480 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
2001. In recent years, however, several of the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> have shown even<br />
str<strong>on</strong>ger growth rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the spread of HIV/AIDS than the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Table 22. Number of people with HIV/AIDS <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> as of the end of 2001, based <strong>on</strong> UNAIDS estimates<br />
Estimated numbers<br />
per 100,000 people<br />
Pakistan 78,000 55<br />
Iran 20,000 28<br />
Kazakhstan 6,000 37<br />
Uzbekistan 740 3<br />
Kyrgyzstan 500 10<br />
Tajikistan 200 3<br />
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a.<br />
Total 105,440 40<br />
Source: UNAIDS, Report <strong>on</strong> the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002 (Table of country-specific HIV/AIDS<br />
estimates and data, end 2001), pp. 189 207.<br />
194
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.5.1 Pakistan<br />
Pakistan c<strong>on</strong>ta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>s nearly three-quarters of all people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected by HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This reflects Pakistan’s l<strong>on</strong>g-term exposure to hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. UNAIDS estimates that out of 78,000<br />
people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected by the HIV/AIDS virus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, about 4,500 people died of AIDS <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001 35 . This is more<br />
than the total number of AIDS related deaths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the whole of Western Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same year (2,651 people<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 21 countries) bb .<br />
5000<br />
4000<br />
3000<br />
2000<br />
1000<br />
0<br />
Estimated number of people who died of<br />
AIDS <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan and reported AIDS related<br />
deaths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
4500<br />
Pakistan*<br />
2651<br />
Western Europe**<br />
* UNAIDS estimate for Pakistan<br />
* AIDS deaths reported by 21 countries of Western Europe to EuroHIV.<br />
Figure 47<br />
Sources: UNAIDS, Epidemiological Fact Sheets <strong>on</strong> HIV/AIDS and Sexually<br />
Transmitted Infecti<strong>on</strong>s – Pakistan, 2002 Update and EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS<br />
Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, June 2002.<br />
UNAIDS, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its 2002 update <strong>on</strong> HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s, notes: “<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> vast<br />
majority of all detected HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan have been found am<strong>on</strong>g IDUs (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug<br />
users)….<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re are no data to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that, aside from IDU (<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use) transmissi<strong>on</strong>, there is any<br />
other significant transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV occurr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan at the present time." N<strong>on</strong>etheless, it is probably<br />
<strong>on</strong>ly a matter of time before HIV spreads from drug abusers to the populati<strong>on</strong> at large. Given the small<br />
health budget <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country (see secti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> Abuse above), this will pose a serious challenge <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the near<br />
future.<br />
Most of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> HIV/AIDS appears to have taken place <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the early to mid 1990s. A survey<br />
c<strong>on</strong>ducted am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug abusers outside major urban areas found an HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong> rate of 5.4% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995, up from 0.3% <strong>on</strong>ly two years earlier. For comparis<strong>on</strong>, the HIV prevalence rate am<strong>on</strong>g sex<br />
workers was 0.7% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the same year. By the end of 2001, the overall HIV prevalence rate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the general<br />
populati<strong>on</strong> (age 15-49 years) was estimated to have amounted to 0.1% 36 . This suggests that HIV/AIDS is<br />
still c<strong>on</strong>centrated am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users.<br />
While <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> was practically unknown <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1988, the proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
abusers rose to 1.8% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993 37 . By 2000, 15% of hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers reported that they usually <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected; 31%<br />
had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected at some stage <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their drug careers. This rate was particularly high <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Karachi where 55% of the<br />
hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> abusers had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> at least <strong>on</strong>ce. Most <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors (68%) reported that they usually used drugs<br />
with other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors; 53% of them reported us<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a needle after some<strong>on</strong>e else had used it; and 72% of them<br />
reported pass<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> a syr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ge after hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g used it. Of all <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors, 23% said they had used other users<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g equipment more than 20 times and 42% reported pass<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>on</strong> their <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g equipment to other<br />
users more than 20 times. 38<br />
bb Compar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g AIDS deaths estimates for Pakistan with AIDS deaths reported from Western Europe it should be noted that the number of<br />
AIDS deaths <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe has decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed str<strong>on</strong>gly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, from 18,658 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1995 to 2,651 pers<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. (Sources:<br />
EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End-year Report 2001, June 2002, p. 23 and EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe,<br />
End-year Report 1999, June 2000, p. 20.) This decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was the result of the development and applicati<strong>on</strong> of modern medicati<strong>on</strong> that<br />
helped to delay the outbreak of AIDS am<strong>on</strong>g HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected pers<strong>on</strong>s as well as death <strong>on</strong>ce a pers<strong>on</strong> acquired AIDS and a decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IDU<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use) related HIV cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the 1990s, c<strong>on</strong>tribut<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to an overall stabilisati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of new HIV<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
195
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
6.5.2 Iran<br />
UNAIDS estimates Iran to have about 20,000 people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected by HIV. In 2001, 290 pers<strong>on</strong>s died<br />
from AIDS <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran 39 . For comparis<strong>on</strong>, this is more than the officially reported numbers of AIDS related deaths<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the UK (201) or Germany (177), though less than those reported from Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> (559), France (520) or Italy<br />
(458) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. 40<br />
Iran: newly registered AIDS cases (1985-2001)<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
AIDS cases 1 3 5.00 10 25 16 32 19 16 27 40 21 27 67 60<br />
IDU related 10 9 24 37<br />
Figure 48<br />
Source: UNAIDS.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> number of officially reported AIDS cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran has shown an upward trend over the last<br />
decade. This is even more pr<strong>on</strong>ounced with regard to newly diagnosed HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s. Though a ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g trend<br />
of HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s is observed throughout the 1990s, a massive <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease was <strong>on</strong>ly reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years. In<br />
2001 UNAIDS reported 1159 newly identified HIV cases, a three-fold <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease compared to 2000 or 1999. 41<br />
For comparis<strong>on</strong>, till 1997 the accumulated number of HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s, reported by the Iranian Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Committee <strong>on</strong> AIDS was just 1473 cases. In over two thirds of the cases, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use was cited as the<br />
likely route of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>. Data <strong>on</strong> recorded cases of HIV/AIDS and the mode of transmissi<strong>on</strong>, up to March,<br />
2001 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dicate that 67% of all transmissi<strong>on</strong>s were caused by drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. Out of 147,077 <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug<br />
users tested by March 2001, 0.7% tested positive for HIV. This proporti<strong>on</strong> is still higher than the 0.02% of the<br />
general populati<strong>on</strong> which tested positive for HIV. Thus, as noted by UNAIDS, Iran’s HIV/AIDS epidemic is<br />
driven by its drug problem. 42<br />
Iran: Transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV/AIDS<br />
(N = 7,149,070 tests result<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1533 HIVpositive<br />
test results up to March 2001)<br />
other<br />
33%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drug users<br />
67%<br />
Figure 49<br />
Source: UNODCCP, Iran Country Profile 2002.<br />
HIV sent<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>el surveillance data also c<strong>on</strong>firm this. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>ly group which had a sizeable number of HIV<br />
positive cases over the last decade was <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users. In 1996, 5.7% of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
pris<strong>on</strong>s tested HIV positive. By 1998, this proporti<strong>on</strong> had g<strong>on</strong>e down to 0.5%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was not due to a<br />
decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the absolute number of those test<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g positive but to an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the number of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors.<br />
196
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1999 Rapid Assessment of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran revealed that over 16% of the resp<strong>on</strong>dents<br />
(problem drug users) had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the previous m<strong>on</strong>th, a far higher proporti<strong>on</strong> than had been reported<br />
before. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> figures were particularly high for Mazandaran (31%), the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce to the north of Tehran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tehran prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce (27%) and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Khorasan (20%) the prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce border<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Twenty two per cent of<br />
the resp<strong>on</strong>dents reported <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their life-time. More than half of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g users<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected 2-3 times a day. Typically syr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ges were used more than <strong>on</strong>ce and about half of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors shared<br />
needles. 43<br />
6.5.3 Central Asia<br />
Data for 2001 suggest that 88% of all newly recorded HIV cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia were related to<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug use (IDU). Transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV by IDU is thus by far the most important route of HIV<br />
transmissi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> IDU related HIV transmissi<strong>on</strong> expressed as a proporti<strong>on</strong> of total HIV<br />
transmissi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia (88% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001) is significantly higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran (67%), the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
(54%) or Western Europe.<br />
Central Asia*:<br />
Transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV/AIDS<br />
(N = 1,311 newly identified HIV- cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001)<br />
other<br />
12%<br />
IDU<br />
88%<br />
* Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan<br />
Figure 50<br />
Source: UNODC, Calculati<strong>on</strong>s based <strong>on</strong> Euro-HIV data.<br />
Proporti<strong>on</strong> of IDU related HIV transmissi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
all newly registered HIV cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
100%<br />
88%<br />
80%<br />
60%<br />
53%<br />
40%<br />
33%<br />
20%<br />
0%<br />
Central Asia<br />
Russian<br />
Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
Western Europe*<br />
* Data for Western Europe give the proporti<strong>on</strong> of IDU related AIDS cases as<br />
a proporti<strong>on</strong> of all new ly registered AIDS cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, cover<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 22<br />
countries. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> proporti<strong>on</strong> of IDU cases am<strong>on</strong>g all new ly registered HIV<br />
cases is even smaller <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe.<br />
Figure 51<br />
Source: EuroHIV HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End Year<br />
Report 2001, June 2002<br />
197
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
Except for Kazakhstan, the number of HIV/AIDS cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia is still relatively modest.<br />
However, the growth rates of HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong> are alarm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g. In the four countries for which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> is<br />
available – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong> rates have shown dramatic<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years.<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
0<br />
Uzbekistan<br />
newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001*<br />
All new HIV cases 0 0 0 7 3 28 154 549<br />
IDU related* 0 1 15 134 490<br />
* IDU related HIV cases f or 2001 are an UNDCP estimate.<br />
Kyrgyzstan: newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994-2001<br />
140<br />
120<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
All new HIV cases 0 2 2 2 6 10 16 149<br />
ID U related 1 1 2 8 14 143<br />
Figure 52<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End Year<br />
Report 2001, June 2002<br />
Figure 53<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End Year<br />
Report 2001, June 2002<br />
Tajikistan: newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994-2001<br />
35<br />
30<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
Kazakhstan: newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994-2001<br />
600<br />
500<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
5<br />
0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999* 2000* 2001*<br />
0<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
All new HIV cases 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 34<br />
IDU related 1 1 0 6 31<br />
Figure 54<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End Year<br />
Report 2001, June 2002<br />
All new HIV cases 2 5 48 437 299 185 347 579<br />
ID U relat ed * 2 38 389 270 163.7 309.9 519.3<br />
* IDU related data reported from 1995-1998; data show n for 1999-2001<br />
are UNDCP estimates.<br />
Figure 55<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End Year<br />
Report 2001, June 2002<br />
198
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> results of the Rapid Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries show that the<br />
massive spread of HIV am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users is predictable. Ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of opiate abuse went hand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
hand with ever larger proporti<strong>on</strong>s of drug users switch<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g opiates, thus <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the risk of HIV<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>. Comb<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g data <strong>on</strong> problem drug use and IDU from the Central Asian countries, 66% of the drug<br />
users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the subregi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject drugs. This proporti<strong>on</strong> is significantly higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran or Pakistan. Moreover,<br />
many drug users reported unprotected sex with multiple partners, a further risk factor for the spread of<br />
HIV/AIDS from <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users to the general populati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
70%<br />
60%<br />
50%<br />
40%<br />
30%<br />
20%<br />
10%<br />
0%<br />
Proporti<strong>on</strong> of drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs<br />
66%<br />
15% 16%<br />
9%<br />
Central Asia Pakistan Iran<br />
Figure 56<br />
Source: UNODC, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment studies <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, Iran and<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries.<br />
In Kazkahstan, a majority of key resp<strong>on</strong>dents c<strong>on</strong>firmed that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was widely practiced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
country. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> study found that 70%-80% of drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject their drug. Am<strong>on</strong>g drug <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors, 73% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Almaty and 60% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pavlodar shared needles at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> their lives. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> overall proporti<strong>on</strong> of drug<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g needles falls with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the range of 60%-70%. More than half of the IDUs practiced<br />
unprotected sex; about 60% of them had had sexual c<strong>on</strong>tact with people other than their permanent partners<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last 12 m<strong>on</strong>ths. 44 Drug abusers <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan thus have the most risky behaviour am<strong>on</strong>g Central<br />
Asian countries. Kazakhstan also happens to have, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> both absolute and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> per capita terms, the highest IDU<br />
related HIV cases am<strong>on</strong>g all central Asian countries.<br />
In Kyrgyzstan, 65% of drug addicts registered by the “narcological” <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of the country were<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001, up from 14% <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1993. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> study additi<strong>on</strong>ally found that 80% of the drug addicts<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected drugs. Am<strong>on</strong>g current <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bishkek, 40% regularly shared needles without<br />
dis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fect<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g them. In other parts of the country, the proporti<strong>on</strong>s were lower. In Jaylil district, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, the<br />
proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g needles was 21%. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a particularly dangerous and<br />
widespread traditi<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kyrgyzstan: add<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g blood to powdered hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>/<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> when prepar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a drug soluti<strong>on</strong>,<br />
so as to '‘purify” it. 45 In the country as a whole, the proporti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g needles falls<br />
with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the range of 20%-40% and is thus lower than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, however, still has the<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d highest per capita rate of IDU related HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia.<br />
Uzbekistan has the third highest per capita rate of HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> study found that am<strong>on</strong>g<br />
the drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed, 88% had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected drugs at least <strong>on</strong>ce. In Tashkent, 82% of the drug addicts<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terviewed had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last 30 days. Key <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formants (91%) also reported a massive <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> IDU<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tashkent over the last couple of years, exceed<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease at the nati<strong>on</strong>al level. In other parts of the<br />
country, however, the proporti<strong>on</strong>s are significantly lower. In the Urgut area, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, the proporti<strong>on</strong> of<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>dents <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs was half of that reported from Tashkent. Am<strong>on</strong>g the resp<strong>on</strong>dents who <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected<br />
drugs <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan, 71% admitted to hav<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g shared needles dur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the previous m<strong>on</strong>ths. In short, the risk<br />
behaviour of shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g needles is already very widespread <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Uzbekistan, but, except for Tashkent, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
drugs is still less comm<strong>on</strong> than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kazakstan or Kyrgyzstan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> risks of sexual transmissi<strong>on</strong> of HIV from<br />
IDUs to the general populati<strong>on</strong> are significant. 46<br />
199
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
In Tajikistan more than half of the resp<strong>on</strong>dent drug addicts said they had <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jected at least <strong>on</strong>ce <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
their lives; 44% of the resp<strong>on</strong>dents were currently <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users and the overwhelm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g majority of<br />
them shared needles. 47 <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> proporti<strong>on</strong> of people <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drugs am<strong>on</strong>g drug addicts is thus higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
Tajkistan than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan (15%) or Iran (16%), but lower than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> most other Central Asian countries, possibly<br />
a reflecti<strong>on</strong> of lower hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tajikistan. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> trend, however, is towards <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased risk tak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and is<br />
thus a matter of c<strong>on</strong>cern. Tajikistan still has the lowest IDU related HIV rates am<strong>on</strong>g the Central Asian<br />
countries, but the numbers are ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rapidly. Moreover, the risk of sexual transmissi<strong>on</strong> is significant. More<br />
than half of the resp<strong>on</strong>dent drug addicts said that they had sex with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users; 29% of them had<br />
unprotected sex with ‘occasi<strong>on</strong>al’ partners and 58% with their regular partners.<br />
Table 23. Risk behavior am<strong>on</strong>g drug addicts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> counties neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
(rounded proporti<strong>on</strong>s)<br />
Central Asia<br />
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzekistan Tajikistan<br />
Pakistan Iran<br />
Inject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g 70%-80% 65% 40%-80% 45% 15% 9%-16%<br />
Needles & syr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ges<br />
shar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g am<strong>on</strong>g 60%-70% 53%-72% 70% 30% 53%-72% 50%<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>jectors:<br />
Sources: UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries”, (draft), 2002, p. 63, Islamic<br />
Republic of Iran, M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health, and UNDCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Tehran 2000, . Islamic Republic of<br />
Iran, Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters , Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2001, and UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan – Results from the year<br />
2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment Study, Islamabad 2002.<br />
Aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st this background it is not surpris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that accord<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g to IDU related HIV registry data, several<br />
Central Asian countries already have per capita rates that exceed those of many Central and West European<br />
countries. This is particularly the case for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian countries which<br />
were also found to have the highest opiate abuse levels.<br />
IDU related HIV rates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> and some other countries of the former Soviet<br />
Uni<strong>on</strong>, notably the Baltic states and the Ukra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e, are still substantially higher than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries of Central<br />
Asia (see Map 10). Nearly 100,000 newly registered HIV cases were reported from the countries of the<br />
former Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001. This is equivalent to the total number of HIV/AIDS cases estimated for all of the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Data for the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> and for all of the countries of the former Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong> also show that<br />
the HIV epidemic, which began am<strong>on</strong>gst <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users, c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ues expand<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g dramatically <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the overall<br />
populati<strong>on</strong>. In 1996, 67% of all new HIV cases were IDU related; by 2001 the rate fell to 54%, though <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
absolute terms the number of IDU related HIV cases <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creased 25-fold over the 1996-2001 period.<br />
90,000<br />
80,000<br />
70,000<br />
60,000<br />
50,000<br />
40,000<br />
30,000<br />
20,000<br />
10,000<br />
0<br />
Russian Federati<strong>on</strong><br />
newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
All new HIV cases 162 197 1524 4377 4062 19851 59281 87177<br />
IDU related 5 1021 2536 1816 10830 37151 46837<br />
Figure 57<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End-year<br />
report 2001, June 2002 (and previous years).<br />
100,000<br />
80,000<br />
60,000<br />
40,000<br />
20,000<br />
0<br />
HIV cases<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries of the former Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong><br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
All new HIV cases 234 1752 8110 14927 14231 26937 67813 98903<br />
IDU related cases 1030 6405 11357 9657 15350 42595 53752<br />
Figure 58<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End-year<br />
report 2001, June 2002 (and previous years).<br />
200
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
Even <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Western Europe, where government policies <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several countries succeeded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> stabilis<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g or<br />
reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the number of new IDU related HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fecti<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> recent years, the number of newly registered HIV<br />
cases has started ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This has important policy implicati<strong>on</strong>s. While the spread of HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central<br />
Asia is still c<strong>on</strong>centrated am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ject<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g drug users there could still be a chance to arrest the HIV epidemic.<br />
This opportunity will not last for l<strong>on</strong>g. At a later stage, even if <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s were to succeed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> levell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g off or<br />
reduc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the IDU related spread of HIV, the likelihood that the HIV epidemic would spread to other secti<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of society will rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Today there is medicati<strong>on</strong> available to delay the <strong>on</strong>set of AIDS am<strong>on</strong>g HIV <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fected pers<strong>on</strong>s. It has<br />
already shown positive results <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> North America and Western Europe. Such medicati<strong>on</strong> and the attendant<br />
treatment costs, however, will be difficult to f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian countries.<br />
8,000<br />
6,000<br />
4,000<br />
2,000<br />
0<br />
14 West European countries:<br />
newly diagnosed HIV cases<br />
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />
All new HIV cases 8068 7976 7785 7913 8074 8073 8459 8905<br />
IDU related cases 1067 805 617 596 651 565 476<br />
* Denmark, F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>land, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, UK,<br />
Iceland, Malta, Norway, San Mar<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>o, Switzerland<br />
Figure 59<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, Endyear<br />
report 2001, June 2002 (and previous years).<br />
AIDS/deaths cases<br />
Western Europe (22 countries):<br />
Newly registered AIDS cases and AIDS related death cases<br />
30000<br />
25000<br />
20000<br />
15000<br />
10000<br />
5000<br />
0<br />
AIDS cases<br />
AIDS related deaths<br />
1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001<br />
AIDS cases 20658 22475 24908 21589 14772 11422 9500 8473<br />
AIDS related deaths 7509 4423 3136 2651<br />
Figure 60<br />
Source: EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe,<br />
End-year report 2001, June 2002 (and previous years).<br />
201
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
202
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
6.6. Ec<strong>on</strong>omic vulnerability<br />
Thus far the discussi<strong>on</strong> has noted the vulnerability of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, abuse and HIV/AIDS. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sequences of be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g an opiate transit country, however, go well<br />
bey<strong>on</strong>d these obvious implicati<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> funds generated from drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g have an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>herent potential to<br />
destabilize the state, civil society and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
Estimati<strong>on</strong> of the likely magnitudes of funds generated from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g revealed that the largest<br />
profits am<strong>on</strong>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours are apparently be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g made <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia: $2.2 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to<br />
7% of GDP. Gross traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g profits <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran were estimated to range from $1 to $1.3 billi<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to 1%<br />
to 1.3% of GDP. Gross profits for Pakistan were c<strong>on</strong>servatively estimated at $400 milli<strong>on</strong>, equivalent to 0.7%<br />
of GDP, but could go up to 800 milli<strong>on</strong> or 1.3% of GDP. In total about $4 billi<strong>on</strong> is generated from drug<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. In c<strong>on</strong>trast to the popular percepti<strong>on</strong> that an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flow of such<br />
funds must be positive for an <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the opposite seems to be true. Funds as large as these, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al<br />
hands, obviously destabilize the state, civil society as well as the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> smaller countries of Central<br />
Asia are particularly vulnerable <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this regard. Corrupti<strong>on</strong>, violence and ‘dirty m<strong>on</strong>ey’, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial<br />
support for terrorist organisati<strong>on</strong>s, have negative repercussi<strong>on</strong>s for legitimate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment and thus<br />
compromise ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the l<strong>on</strong>g run.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> destabilizati<strong>on</strong> of the state is usually the most serious potential c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the existence of<br />
large drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g networks <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a country. While funds generated from traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g may not be large enough<br />
to create an ec<strong>on</strong>omic boom, they are usually enough to corrupt the political system, particularly at the local<br />
level. This can start with bribes to local politicians, often disguised as electoral d<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s. Unless a firm<br />
stand is taken (which is still the case <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> all of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours) this could lead to full-scale electoral<br />
fraud perpetrated to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stall adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>s that are acceptable to major traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g networks. Another danger<br />
of the availability of such large funds is that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>surgency groups or <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cipient political movements could try and<br />
take command of the activities that generate them. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is no better example of this than <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
itself.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug problem destabilizes civil society by erod<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g social capital and community cohesi<strong>on</strong>. It<br />
leads to widespread corrupti<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of crime, and a compromised rule of law. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> most basic<br />
fabric of a society is weakened when illegal activities become the norm. In additi<strong>on</strong>, the quick <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come to be<br />
made from drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g creates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for young people to deviate from the laborious path of<br />
educati<strong>on</strong> and legitimate employment. Drug-related crime does not end with traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g activities per se, but<br />
also takes the form of acquisitive crime, gang warfare, extorti<strong>on</strong> and kidnapp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g and the funds generated by it can also destabilize the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> directly. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> direct<br />
impact can be felt <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> several ways. Governments, particularly of small countries, may f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d it <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gly<br />
difficult to pursue sound macro-ec<strong>on</strong>omic policies when large funds of crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al orig<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> enter the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is a c<strong>on</strong>stant problem that macro-ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s will not lead to the desired effects if<br />
important secti<strong>on</strong>s of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> have alternative sources of f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ance at their disposal. Under such<br />
c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s, the result of any restrictive m<strong>on</strong>etary policy, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, may be simply a crowd<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g out of<br />
legitimate bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses.<br />
Crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al enterprises, when they operate <strong>on</strong> a larger scale, usually require a legal shell to camouflage<br />
the illegal activities. For example, transport companies as well as companies operat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dustrial sectors<br />
that need chemicals may be used to camouflage drug manufacture and traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g operati<strong>on</strong>s. Bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses<br />
that have large cash transacti<strong>on</strong>s may be chosen because they allow crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al m<strong>on</strong>ey to be laundered easily.<br />
S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the ‘fr<strong>on</strong>t’ bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses do not really have to earn m<strong>on</strong>ey, they can crowd out legitimate bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses from<br />
the market by sell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g below cost, and/or use <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>timidati<strong>on</strong> aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st competitors. Moreover, such bus<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>esses do<br />
not generally undertake productive <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestments that would be beneficial to the community at large. Allocative<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>efficiencies thus become the rule rather than the excepti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>spicuous c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> of crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>al entrepreneurs also causes an ec<strong>on</strong>omic problem. In<br />
develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, c<strong>on</strong>spicuous c<strong>on</strong>sumpti<strong>on</strong> often translates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to high imports, which can endanger the<br />
trade balance. Once a large trade deficit develops, foreign <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestors and f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ancial <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s lower the credit<br />
rat<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the country. Higher <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest <strong>on</strong> loans, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> turn, weakens <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment and thus ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. Even<br />
more serious, drug-related <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come is often used to purchase arms and weap<strong>on</strong>s. This c<strong>on</strong>tributes to a further<br />
spread of violence and <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>security <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country, and the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment climate deteriorates even further.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re is some empirical evidence which seems to support the arguments covered so far. Gross<br />
capital formati<strong>on</strong> data from the Asian Development Bank show, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment activities,<br />
203
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
expressed as a percentage of GDP, decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed substantially over the 1990-2000 period <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> practically all of the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. World Bank data for the year 2001 show that capital formati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> amounted to, <strong>on</strong> average, 15% of GDP. This is significantly less than the<br />
global average (22%) and less than capital formati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g low & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries (25%). Similarly,<br />
gross private capital flows (i.e. direct, portfolio and other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>flows recorded <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the balance of<br />
payments) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> cc amounted to, <strong>on</strong> average, 7% of GDP <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2000. This<br />
was relatively low compared to, <strong>on</strong> average, 11% of GDP for low & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries and 34% for<br />
high-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries. In terms of direct foreign <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours were also worse off<br />
than develop<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> general.<br />
Table 24: Gross capital formati<strong>on</strong> (gross domestic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> % of GDP<br />
Asian Development Bank data World Bank data<br />
1990 2000 2001<br />
Iran n.a. 18.4%* 19.8%<br />
Pakistan 18.9% 14.7% 15.6%<br />
Kyrzystan 24.3% 16.4% 15.5%<br />
Kazakhstan 35.0% 25.8% 12.8%<br />
Uzbekistan 32.2% 20.2% 11.1%<br />
Tajikistan n.a. 11.6% n.a.<br />
Unweighted average of countries<br />
neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>**<br />
27.6% 17.7% 14.9%<br />
Lower & middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come<br />
Countries **<br />
25.4%<br />
World** 22.2%<br />
* based <strong>on</strong> World Bank<br />
** year 2000.<br />
Sources: Asian Development Bank and World Bank Indicators.<br />
Lower <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>vestment usually means lower ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> average growth rate of GDP per<br />
capita (unweighted) decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ed by 4% p.a. over the 1990-2000 period <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. This result was ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ly due to str<strong>on</strong>g decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>es reported from Central Asian countries. GDP per<br />
capita fell <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia (unweighted average) by 6.3% p.a. over the 1990-2000 period. Most of the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e<br />
had to do with the difficult transformati<strong>on</strong> from a centrally planned to a market <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>. N<strong>on</strong>etheless, it is<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g that the decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e was str<strong>on</strong>ger <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Central Asia than <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Russian Federati<strong>on</strong> (-4.6% p.a.) or the<br />
average (unweighted) of all former Soviet republics (-5.5% p.a.). <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> str<strong>on</strong>gest decl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> GDP per capita<br />
over the 1990-2000 period was reported from Tajikistan, a country seriously affected by civil war and drug<br />
traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g.<br />
Table 25: Annual growth of GDP per capita<br />
over the 1990-2000 period<br />
Iran 1.9%<br />
Pakistan 1.2%<br />
Uzbekistan -2.4%<br />
Kazakhstan -4.1%<br />
Kyrzystan -5.1%<br />
Turkmenistan -8.0%<br />
Tajikistan -11.8%<br />
Unweighted average -4.0%<br />
Low <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries 1.2%<br />
Middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries 2.4%<br />
High <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries 1.7%<br />
Source: World Bank, quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> UNDCP,<br />
Human Development Report 2002, pp. 190-193.<br />
GDP per capita showed positive growth rates over the<br />
1990-2000 period <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, which has undertaken the<br />
str<strong>on</strong>gest drug c<strong>on</strong>trol efforts <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the last decade, as well<br />
as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan. In both these countries, however,<br />
growth was still less than the average growth of 2.4%<br />
p.a. reported from middle <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come countries. Many<br />
factors other than drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g played a role here.<br />
N<strong>on</strong>etheless, it is likely that drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<br />
compromised ec<strong>on</strong>omic development.<br />
cc<br />
World Bank data were available for these calculati<strong>on</strong>s from Iran , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. (World Bank, World<br />
Development Indicators 2002).<br />
204
Chapter VI. Devastati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries<br />
ENDNOTES<br />
1<br />
Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2002.<br />
2<br />
Jean Sellier and André Sellier, Atlas des peuples d’Orient – Moyen-Orient, Caucase, Asie Centrale, Paris 1993, p. 158.<br />
3<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2000, pp. 16-18.<br />
4<br />
UNDCP, Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire Data.<br />
5<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2000, p. 25..<br />
6<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2000, p. 23.<br />
7<br />
UK Government, Tackl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>Drugs</strong> to Build a Better Brita<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> - <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Government's Ten-Year Strategy for Tackl<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <strong>Drugs</strong> Misuse,<br />
L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong> 1998.<br />
8<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Pakistan, 2002, p. 13.<br />
9<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Uzbekistan, 2001, p. 7.<br />
10<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Kyrgyzstan, 2001, p. 18.<br />
11<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Kazakhstan, 2002, p. 9.<br />
. 12 UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Turkmenistan, 2002, p. 7.<br />
13<br />
ibid., p. 7.<br />
14<br />
E. Bramley-Harker, (UK Home <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>), Siz<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the UK Market for Illicit <strong>Drugs</strong>, L<strong>on</strong>d<strong>on</strong>, 2001.<br />
15<br />
Russian M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Internal Affairs (M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>isterstvo vnutrennykh del – MVD)), quoted <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise (HMC&E),<br />
“<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Market for Illicit <strong>Drugs</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russia and its Potential Impact <strong>on</strong> Europe” , p. 9.<br />
16<br />
EMCDDA, 2002 Annual Report <strong>on</strong> the State of the <strong>Drugs</strong> Problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the European Uni<strong>on</strong> and Norway, Lisb<strong>on</strong> 2002, p. 15.<br />
17<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime – Pakistan, 2002, p. 17.<br />
18<br />
Anti-Narcotics Headquarters, “Drug Abuse Situati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> I.R. of Iran and Current Organizati<strong>on</strong>s for demand Reducti<strong>on</strong>”, Iran’s Country<br />
Report, presented at the Workshop of Nati<strong>on</strong>al Focal Po<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ts <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse, 1993.<br />
19<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report, 1999, p. 30.<br />
20<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report, 2000, p. 43.<br />
21<br />
UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the I.R. of Iran, Country Profile- 2002.<br />
22<br />
Islamic Republic of Iran, Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Headquarters (DCHQ), Nati<strong>on</strong>al Drug C<strong>on</strong>trol Report 2001, p. 41.<br />
23<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health and UNDCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Tehran 2000.<br />
24<br />
UNODCCP, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> for the I.R. of Iran, Country Profile- 2002.<br />
25<br />
Iran, Plan and Budget Organizati<strong>on</strong> and <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Human Development report of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1999, p. 129.<br />
26<br />
EMCDDA, 2002 Annual Report <strong>on</strong> the State of the <strong>Drugs</strong> Problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the European Uni<strong>on</strong> and Norway, , Lisb<strong>on</strong> 2002, p. 15.<br />
27<br />
EMCDDA, “Number of arrests for drug law offences <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> EU countries and Norway, 1985-2000”, annexed Statistical Tables to<br />
EMCDDA, 2002 Annual Report On the State of the <strong>Drugs</strong> Problem <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the European Uni<strong>on</strong> and Norway, Lisb<strong>on</strong> 2002.<br />
28<br />
UK Home <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, Drug Seizure and Offender Statistics, 17 May 2002, p. 48.<br />
29<br />
UNODCCP, Preparatory Assistance <strong>on</strong> Demand Reducti<strong>on</strong>: Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian<br />
countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report (Draft), p. 23.<br />
30<br />
UNODCCP,”Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA), <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report (Kazakhstan,<br />
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan)”, Provisi<strong>on</strong>al Executive Summary.<br />
31<br />
UNODCCP,”Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA), <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report (Kazakhstan,<br />
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan)”, Provisi<strong>on</strong>al Executive Summary.<br />
32<br />
U. S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Adm<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istrati<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> Newly Independent States, November 1994, p. 23.<br />
33<br />
UNODCCP, Preparatory Assistance <strong>on</strong> Demand Reducti<strong>on</strong>: Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian<br />
countries, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report (Draft), p. 22.<br />
34<br />
UNODCCP, Country Profile Tajikistan, 2002, p. 13.<br />
35<br />
UNAIDS, Epidemiological Fact Sheets <strong>on</strong> HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infecti<strong>on</strong>s, Pakistan, 2002 Update, p. 2.<br />
36<br />
Ibid.<br />
37<br />
Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Divisi<strong>on</strong>, Nati<strong>on</strong>al Survey <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan, December 1994, p. 41.<br />
38<br />
UNODCCP, Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Pakistan – Results from the year 2000 Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assessment. (New York, 2002), pp. 37-41.<br />
39<br />
UNAIDS, Epidemiological Fact Sheets <strong>on</strong> HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infecti<strong>on</strong>s, Iran, 2002 Update, p. 2.<br />
40<br />
EuroHIV, HIV/AIDS Surveillance <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Europe, End-year Report 2001, June 2002, p. 23<br />
41<br />
UNAIDS, Epidemiological Fact Sheets <strong>on</strong> HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infecti<strong>on</strong>s, Iran, 2002 Update, p. 2.<br />
42<br />
Ibid.<br />
43<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>istry of Health, I.R. of Iran and UNDCP, Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) of Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Iran, Tehran 2000.<br />
44<br />
UNODCCP, “Rapid Situati<strong>on</strong> Assessment (RSA) <strong>on</strong> Drug Abuse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Central Asian Countries”, Regi<strong>on</strong>al Report, (Draft), 2002, pp.<br />
17-19.<br />
45<br />
ibid., pp. 29-30.<br />
46<br />
ibid., pp. 48-50.<br />
47<br />
ibid., pp. 39-41.<br />
205
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way forward<br />
CONCLUSION:<br />
THE WAY FOWARD<br />
207
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way forward<br />
C<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong>: <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> way forward<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> grew as a c<strong>on</strong>sequence of the degradati<strong>on</strong> of agricultural and<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omic <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure due to more than twenty years of war, the acceptance of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> as a livelihood<br />
strategy by many rural households, and the failure of the state. For more than two hundred years, the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al geo-political situati<strong>on</strong> has worked aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the c<strong>on</strong>solidati<strong>on</strong> of an effective central government <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, because it has exacerbated the country’s endemic problems of regi<strong>on</strong>al warlordism and<br />
particularistic nati<strong>on</strong>alism. Today, there is a w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow of opportunity for the state to c<strong>on</strong>solidate because the<br />
collective force of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al community has superseded the particularist <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terests of major powers and<br />
of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours. That w<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dow must be kept open by means of c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>uous <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support<br />
for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Government.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> has also affected its neighbours. Despite ever <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>creas<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g efforts to<br />
fight drug traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g, the territories of these countries c<strong>on</strong>t<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ue to be exploited to traffic Afghan opiates to the<br />
lucrative markets of Europe and the CIS. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> c<strong>on</strong>sequences have been ris<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g levels of abuse, a dramatic<br />
spread of HIV/AIDS and compromised ec<strong>on</strong>omic growth. As l<strong>on</strong>g as large-scale <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> exists <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, the threat to the security of neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries will rema<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Thus, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s neighbours,<br />
the European countries which c<strong>on</strong>sume Afghan opiates, and, of course, <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> itself, all have a<br />
comm<strong>on</strong> and shared <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terest <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> solv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> problem.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al support will have to be targeted at solv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the problems, documented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book,<br />
which created the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the first place. Support<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the central <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stituti<strong>on</strong>s of the state with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> to establish effective government c<strong>on</strong>trol over the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g areas appears as a prerequisite<br />
for any drug elim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ati<strong>on</strong> strategy. Other <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s should aim at re-establish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g a susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able<br />
rural <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>, particularly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g regi<strong>on</strong>s of the country, based <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ter alia <strong>on</strong> the existence of<br />
credit schemes for farmers; sources of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come for the land-less labour; macro-ec<strong>on</strong>omic structures with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
which commodity markets can grow free from the perverse <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives provided by <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> and other forms of<br />
c<strong>on</strong>traband; a functi<strong>on</strong><str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g bank<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g system and a stable currency; and effective law enforcement aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> markets with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country and aga<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>st the traffick<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of opiates outwith.<br />
Given the large-scale destructi<strong>on</strong> of agricultural <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure, even small efforts can dramatically<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease the yields of legal crops. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>frastructure necessary to transport legal crops to markets will have<br />
to be restored. Emergency food programmes, which were needed to avoid large-scale starvati<strong>on</strong>, will have<br />
to be gradually reduced <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>crease <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives for farmers to grow legal crops. Currently, for<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, farmers have little <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive to grow wheat because wheat prices are relatively low.<br />
Efforts to assist farmers will have to go hand <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> hand with the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tenance and strengthen<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> m<strong>on</strong>itor<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g system established <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country over the last few years. This not <strong>on</strong>ly <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>cludes<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>formati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> areas under cultivati<strong>on</strong> and <strong>on</strong> yields, but also <strong>on</strong> developments <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> local opiate markets<br />
(<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g development of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices) <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> order to be able to measure the effectiveness of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
In parallel, there is a particular need to strengthen efforts to <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terdict illegal hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> laboratories <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the<br />
country. This can <strong>on</strong>ly be accomplished with str<strong>on</strong>g public support because the laboratories are carefully<br />
guarded and often exist under the patr<strong>on</strong>age of former commanders and/or warlords.<br />
F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ally, there is also a need to change the image of <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> traders. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>y cannot be perceived any<br />
l<strong>on</strong>ger as local heroes who supply their villages with <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come, but as crim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>als who cause misery to many<br />
people across the world and prevent the village from secur<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g rehabilitati<strong>on</strong> and development assistance.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> analysis presented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book has also shown that the tim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s is crucial. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>re<br />
is, for <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stance, a need to syph<strong>on</strong>-off it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labour at the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest time. Thus, public works should be<br />
timed <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> a way that the most labour <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive operati<strong>on</strong>s take part at harvest time. Quite apart from the issue<br />
of it<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>erant labor, there is a need for women be<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g re-<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to Afghan society, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>clud<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the labour<br />
market. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> work of women <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> harvest<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g was not costed as an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>put because women were not<br />
allowed to work outside the household. Once this is changed some of the structural advantages of labour<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tensive <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> will disappear.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> improvement of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terdicti<strong>on</strong> capacities al<strong>on</strong>g the Afghan borders, and where ever possible<br />
around the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> drug produc<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces, can play an essential role <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> br<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices down <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, so that <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives of farmers to grow <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> are reduced. This may be crucial as otherwise the<br />
209
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>: An <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al problem<br />
deterrence effect <strong>on</strong> farmers created by the risk of eradicati<strong>on</strong> can be c<strong>on</strong>siderably reduced if high <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices create a powerful <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centive to defy the cultivati<strong>on</strong> ban and expand cultivati<strong>on</strong>. Given the current <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
prices with<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, it is also clear that no other crop can compete with <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy as a source of<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>come. This c<strong>on</strong>siderably hampers alternative development <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s, mak<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the establishment of<br />
successful <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terdicti<strong>on</strong> capacities a s<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e-qua-n<strong>on</strong> for successful alternative development efforts. Although<br />
f<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>d<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g the right mix of measures and implement<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g them <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the right sequence presents a c<strong>on</strong>ceptual and<br />
technical challenge to policy makers, it is essential to understand that the illegal <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g> is an<br />
evolv<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g system. Its various dimensi<strong>on</strong>s and dynamics must be tackled through a carefully crafted approach<br />
which <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrates and l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ks key factors such as risks, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>centives and feedback effects.<br />
This approach must extend far bey<strong>on</strong>d the borders of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Demand is an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegral part of the<br />
illegal opiate market. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> effectiveness of <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>terventi<strong>on</strong>s to reduce the supply push is largely dependent <strong>on</strong><br />
the impact of measures to reduce the demand pull. In other words, there is a compell<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g need to reduce<br />
demand for opiates <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> its neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries, as well as <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> overseas markets.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g>se measures translate <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the mix of what the <str<strong>on</strong>g>United</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nati<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Drugs</strong> and Crime<br />
advocates as the balanced approach. At the <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ternati<strong>on</strong>al level, it is also reflected <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> the c<strong>on</strong>cept of shared<br />
resp<strong>on</strong>sibility. S<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce the problems faced by <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> are more than those created by the <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>ec<strong>on</strong>omy</str<strong>on</strong>g>,<br />
an <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>tegrated drug c<strong>on</strong>trol approach will have to be l<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ked <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>to the ma<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>stream of all the other development<br />
efforts to re-build <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>. It is equally clear, and documented <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> this book, that unless the drug problem<br />
is solved, there will be no susta<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>able development for <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>.<br />
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Annex 3 (Page 1 of 3)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> estimates (ha), 2002<br />
Previous UNDCP survey estimates 2002<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce District<br />
Former district<br />
reference 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Low Avg High<br />
Badakhshan Baharak Baharak 111 64 116 9 202 23 86 345 170 180 190<br />
Fayzabad Faizabad 77 2,344 1,592 1,634 1,282 906 1,073 868 2,070 2,370 2,660<br />
Ishkashim Eshkashem 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - -<br />
Jurm Jurm 433 555 1,326 1,051 1,198 1,249 773 2,897 2,300 2,690 3,070<br />
Khwahan Khvahan 0 - - -<br />
Kishim Keshem 1,093 3 177 62 62 385 507 2,191 2,570 2,840 3,120<br />
Ragh Ragh 0 0 8 31 2 8 0 0 - - -<br />
Shahri Buzurg Shahr-e-Bozorg 0 0 0 0 71 113 19 41 160 170 180<br />
Zebak Zebak 0 4 8 115 0 0 0 -<br />
Badakhshan Total 1,714 2,970 3,230 2,902 2,817 2,684 2,458 6,342 7,270 8,250 9,220<br />
Badghis Ghormach Ghowrmach 20 0 3 4 5<br />
Murghab Morghab 21 0 21 22 23<br />
Badghis Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 25 26 28<br />
Baghlan Andarab Anderab 81 30 31 31<br />
Baghlan Baghlan 152 0 115 120 124<br />
Dahana-I- Ghori Dahaneh-e-Ghowri 328 929 967 27 0 0 0 0<br />
Nahr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nahr<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 1 - - -<br />
Puli Khumri Pul-e-Khumri 38 20 0 1 1 2<br />
Baghlan Total 0 0 0 328 929 1,005 199 82 147 152 157<br />
Balkh Balkh Balkh 13 29 29 82 1 21 22 23<br />
Chahar Bolak Char Bulaq 165 530 2,600 53 0 0 0 0<br />
Chimtal Chemtal 1,065 532 485 1,428 2,451 0 152 153 154<br />
Dawlat Abad Dowlatabad 3 - - -<br />
Dihdadi Dehdadi 22 0 7 8 8<br />
Nahri Shahi Naher Shahi 33 0 14 14 15<br />
Sholgara Shulgarah 28 0 19 19 20<br />
Balkh Total 0 0 1,065 710 1,044 4,057 2,669 4 214 217 219<br />
Farah Anar Dara Anar Darreh 0 - - -<br />
Bakwa Bakwah 1 13 129 31 129 259 0 - - -<br />
Bala Buluk Bala Balok 8 19 169 36 186 183 0 - - -<br />
Farah Farah 18 18 10 44 73 0 - - -<br />
Gulistan Gulestan 581 252 94 428 849 0 - - -<br />
Khaki Safed Khak-e Safid 0 0 - - -<br />
Lash Wa Juwayn Lash-e Joveyn 0 - - -<br />
Pur Chaman Purchaman 0 - - -<br />
Qalay-I-Kah Qalae Koh 0 - - -<br />
Farah Total 0 9 631 568 171 787 1,364 0 300 500 700<br />
Faryab Bilchiragh Belcheragh 6 0 19 26 33<br />
Maymana Meymaneh 1 0 0 0 0<br />
Pashtun Kot Pashtun Kowt 11 0 1 1 2<br />
Qaysar Qeysar 16 0 - - -<br />
Shir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tagab Shir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tagab 3 0 - - -<br />
Faryab Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 20 28 35<br />
Ghazni Ajristan Ajristan 313 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - -<br />
Ghazni Total 313 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0<br />
Ghor Chaghcharan 630 700 770<br />
Pasaband 630 700 770<br />
Shahrak 270 300 330<br />
Taywara 450 500 550<br />
Ghor Total 1,980 2,200 2,420<br />
Helmand Baghran Baghran 2,519 1,267 2,754 2,910 2,794 2,653 0 1,660 1,800 1,930<br />
Dishu Deh Shu 0 -<br />
Garmser Garmser 786 725 942 1,993 1,205 2,643 2,765 0 1,900 2,020 2,140<br />
Kajaki Kajaki 979 4,087 2,814 3,904 3,959 5,746 4,625 0 2,500 2,640 2,780<br />
Lashkar Gah Bust 2,256 885 1,054 1,325 1,869 2,528 3,145 0 1,070 1,140 1,220<br />
Musa Qala Musa Qala 1,154 5,137 3,924 4,360 5,574 7,013 5,686 0 3,500 3,690 3,890<br />
Nad-e-Ali Nad-e-Ali 12,529 5,983 4,035 5,102 5,156 8,667 8,323 0 5,690 5,880 6,080<br />
Nahri Sarraj Nahr-e-Saraj 590 4,716 4,309 4,807 2,426 4,041 4,378 0 1,720 1,850 1,980<br />
Naw Zad Naw Zad 2,345 2,799 3,596 1,585 3,605 4,424 5,085 0 2,550 2,650 2,780<br />
Naway Barakzayi Nawa Barakzai 6,074 1,254 505 722 1,150 2,581 3,246 0 2,540 2,730 2,910<br />
Reg Khan Nesh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 222 0 1,810 1,940 2,070<br />
Sang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sarban Qala 2,866 973 1,909 1,971 1,734 2,646 1,711 0 2,650 2,810 2,960<br />
Washer Washir 676 555 877 1,084 1,469 1,014 0 780 800 820<br />
Helmand Total 29,579 29,754 24,910 29,400 30,672 44,552 42,853 0 28,370 29,950 31,560<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002 213
Annex 3 (Page 2 of 3)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> estimates (ha), 2002<br />
Previous UNDCP survey estimates 2002<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce District<br />
Former district<br />
reference 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Low Avg High<br />
Herat Obe Obey 0 - - -<br />
Pashtun Zarghun Pashtun Zarghun 0 0 0 38 0 0 38 0 - - -<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dand Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dand 146 0 - - -<br />
Z<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>da Jan Zendeh Jan 0 - - -<br />
Herat Total 0 0 0 38 0 0 184 0 30 50 70<br />
Jawzjan Aqcha Aqchah 532 208 0 46 47 47<br />
Faysabad Faizabad 43 105 0 23 24 25<br />
Khamyab Khamyab 6 29 30 31<br />
Mardyan Mardian 43 111 0 4 4 4<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gajik Manga Jek 1,789 141 0 7 7 7<br />
Qarq<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Qarq<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 186 10 0 24 24 24<br />
Shibirghan Sheberghan 19 0 1 1 1<br />
Jawzjan Total 0 0 0 0 0 2,593 600 0 134 137 139<br />
Kabul Surobi Sarobi 132 340 29 57 58 59<br />
Kabul Total 0 0 0 0 0 132 340 29 57 58 59<br />
Kandahar Arghandab Arghandab 211 87 331 561 399 750 459 0 320 330 340<br />
Arghistan Arghistan 38 13 0 70 80 90<br />
Daman Daman 110 50 0 170 190 210<br />
Ghorak Ghorak 347 803 692 1,503 1,126 1,109 574 0 270 380 320<br />
Kandahar Qandahar+Dand 320 53 234 21 73 227 156 0 480 640 810<br />
Khakrez Khakrez 362 274 627 286 518 632 320 0 520 560 610<br />
Maruf Maruf 30 16 1 0 3 5 17 0 - - -<br />
Maywand Maiwand 256 333 618 1,278 2,497 2,022 995 0 950 1,090 1,240<br />
Panjwayi Panjwai 250 357 266 255 134 132 184 0 140 150 170<br />
Shah Wali Kot Shah Wali Kot 678 97 94 127 162 236 238 0 240 260 290<br />
Sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Boldak Sp<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Boldak 1,170 107 194 91 317 261 26 0 260 290 320<br />
Kandahar Total 3,624 2,127 3,057 4,122 5,229 5,522 3,034 0 3,420 3,970 4,400<br />
Kapisa Tagab Tagab 5 104 0 206 207 208<br />
Kapisa Total 0 0 0 0 0 5 104 0 206 207 208<br />
Khost Spera Speyrah 0 - - -<br />
Tani Tani 6 - - -<br />
Khost Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0<br />
Kunar Asad Abad Asadabad 73 239 1 120 140 150<br />
Bar Kunar Bar Kunar 47 72 31 40 40 50<br />
Chawkay Chawki 13 11 0 0 8 9 50 8 120 140 160<br />
Dangam Dangam 4 46 49 52<br />
Khas Kunar Khas Kunar 75 82 10 0 12 50 173 0 60 70 80<br />
Narang Narang 15 1 0 13 27 84 10 90 100 120<br />
Nari Naray 1 -<br />
Nurgal Mazar (Nur Gul) 27 19 5 0 8 28 98 9 60 70 80<br />
Pech Peche 11 260 263 266<br />
Sirkanay Sarkani 25 2 0 34 54 71 8 90 100 110<br />
Kunar Total 115 152 18 0 75 288 786 82 886 972 1,068<br />
Kunduz Ali Abad Aliabad 5 51 0 2 3 3<br />
Chahar Dara Chahar Darreh 8 30 0 6 6 7<br />
Imam Sahib Emam Saheb 3 0 -<br />
Khan Abad Khanabad 2 36 0 -<br />
Kunduz Kunduz 9 51 0 3 3 3<br />
Qalay-I- Zal Qala-e Zal 11 321 0 4 5 5<br />
Kunduz Total 0 0 0 0 0 38 489 0 16 16 17<br />
Laghman Al<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gar Al<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gar 0 0 0 0 2 71 131 3 142 146 150<br />
Alish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Alishang 0 0 0 0 3 26 88 0 101 104 107<br />
Dawlat Shah Dowlat Shah 12 -<br />
Mihtarlam Metarlam 0 0 0 0 14 72 190 0 190 240 290<br />
Qarghayi Qarghai 0 0 0 0 58 128 298 0 300 460 610<br />
Laghman Total 0 0 0 0 77 297 707 15 733 950 1,157<br />
Nangarhar Ach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 5,354 2,187 2,315 1,640 1,693 2,209 1,317 1 920 940 960<br />
Bati Kot Bati Kot 3,797 529 392 1,013 2,034 603 535 0 2,210 2,390 2,570<br />
Chaparhar Chaparhar 1,089 1,377 1,750 1,234 1,365 977 832 2 970 990 1,010<br />
Dara-I-Nur Darae Noor 1,302 392 199 73 199 734 421 0 370 380 400<br />
Dih Bala Deh Bala 307 646 354 569 511 468 439 11 640 650 660<br />
Dur Baba Durbaba 29 78 38 39 56 50 33 0 40 40 40<br />
Goshta Goshta 1,249 467 116 77 122 240 238 99 150 150 160<br />
Hisarak Hesarak 202 453 253 370 436 741 541 2 600 620 650<br />
214
Annex 3 (Page 3 of 3)<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> poppy cultivati<strong>on</strong> estimates (ha), 2002<br />
Previous UNDCP survey estimates 2002<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce District<br />
Former district<br />
reference 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Low Avg High<br />
Jalalabad Behsud+Jalalabad 458 31 51 123 397 979 1,021 0 89 90 90<br />
Kama Kama 0 18 0 0 198 389 589 0 1,080 1,120 1,170<br />
Khogyani Khogiani 4,347 2,577 2,628 3,385 3,808 5,338 4,913 3 2,630 2,640 2,650<br />
Kuz Kunar Kuz Kunar 293 233 115 15 105 236 399 0 490 500 520<br />
Lal Pur La'lpur 302 267 79 66 137 270 248 95 240 250 260<br />
Muhmand Dara Mohmand Dara 1,630 0 156 83 125 290 255 0 690 720 750<br />
Nazyan Nazian 343 138 251 111 252 184 177 0 150 150 150<br />
Pachir Wa Agam Pachier wa Agam 768 571 681 400 488 731 630 3 400 420 430<br />
Rodat Rodat 1,026 2,038 1,959 1,583 2,147 3,649 2,302 0 2,760 2,760 2,760<br />
Sherzad Sherzad 1,954 2,351 1,646 1,689 1,302 1,741 1,719 2 1,470 1,470 1,470<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war 3,884 1,265 2,075 1,478 1,374 1,559 1,300 0 2,060 2,060 2,060<br />
Surkh Rod Sorkh Rod 747 106 587 619 1,072 1,602 1,840 0 1,340 1,440 1,540<br />
Nangarhar Total 29,081 15,724 15,645 14,567 17,821 22,990 19,747 218 19,299 19,780 20,300<br />
Nimroz Chahar Burjak Char Borjak 0 - - -<br />
Kang Kang 10 2 1 107 5 2 0 0 - - -<br />
Khash Rod Khash Rud 672 117 135 535 6 201 219 0 - - -<br />
Nimroz Total 682 119 136 642 11 203 219 0 180 300 420<br />
Paktya Azra Azro 4 29 46 1 37 38 39<br />
Chamkani Chamkani 0 -<br />
Jaji Jaji 0 -<br />
Lija Mangal Hasan Kheyl 0 -<br />
Sayid Karam Seyed Karam 0 -<br />
Paktya Total 0 0 0 0 4 29 46 1 37 38 39<br />
Samangan Dara-I- Suf Darae Souf 614 - - -<br />
Khuram Wa Sarbagh Khuram+Samangan 54 0 - - -<br />
Samangan Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 614 60 100 140<br />
Sari Pul Sangcharak Sar-e Pol 146 0 57 57 57<br />
Sari Pul Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 146 0 57 57 57<br />
Takhar Bangi Bangi 8 0 -<br />
Chah Ab Chah Ab 17 45 19 -<br />
Chal Chal 8 17 20 -<br />
Farkhar Farkhar 6 6 26 -<br />
Ishkamish Eshkamesh 10 19 -<br />
Kalafgan Kalafgan 101 93 27 -<br />
Khwaja Ghar Khvajeh Ghar 9 57 32 -<br />
Rustaq Rostaq 10 151 24 -<br />
Taluqan Taloqan 16 97 16 -<br />
Warsaj Warsaj 12 9 10 -<br />
Yangi Qala Yangi Qala 22 154 20 -<br />
Takhar Total 0 0 0 0 0 201 647 211 782 788 794<br />
Uruzgan Chora Chora 694 424 1,574 233 652 932 1,179 0 1,220 1,330 1,330<br />
Day Kundi Dai Kundi 0 -<br />
Dihrawud Dehrawud 909 938 2,923 1,870 1,033 1,243 726 0 1,250 1,340 1,420<br />
Gizab Gezab 1,476 16 8 0 0 0 0 0 -<br />
Khas Uruzgan Khas Oruzgan 0 4 0 0 0 0 130 0 -<br />
Kijran Kajran 0 -<br />
Nesh Nesh 410 334 104 399 373 510 394 0 460 490 520<br />
Shahidi Hassas Char Chashma 1,337 12 0 0 1,158 1,110 802 0 1,130 1,190 1,240<br />
Shahristan Shahrestan 1 -<br />
Tir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kot Tir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kot 1,428 1,180 3,271 2,484 1,445 1,194 1,494 0 680 750 830<br />
Uruzgan Total 6,254 2,908 7,880 4,986 4,661 4,989 4,725 1 4,740 5,100 5,340<br />
Zabul Arghandab Arghandab 0 0 0 0 0 74 139 0 - - -<br />
Daychopan Dai Chopan 0 0 0 0 0 41 114 0 - - -<br />
Mizan Mizan 54 0 255 154 160 373 383 0 - - -<br />
Qalat Qalat 0 0 0 0 1 46 40 0 - - -<br />
Shahjoy Shah Juy 0 - - -<br />
Tarnak Wa Jaldak Jaldak 0 0 0 0 0 77 48 1 - - -<br />
Zabul Total 54 0 255 154 161 611 725 1 120 200 280<br />
TOTAL 71,416 53,763 56,827 58,417 63,672 90,983 82,172 7,606 69,082 74,045 78,827<br />
ROUNDED TOTAL 71,000 54,000 57,000 58,000 64,000 91,000 82,000 8,000 69,000 74,000 79,000<br />
215
Annex 4<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> estimates, 2002<br />
SAMPLE YIELD AVERAGE CULTIVATION PRODUCTION<br />
PROVINCE DISTRICT IRRIGATED RAINFED Irrigated Ra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>fed Total Lower Average Higher<br />
Avg<br />
kg/ha +/- n<br />
Avg<br />
kg/ha +/- n Avg ha +/- Avg ha +/- ha kg kg kg<br />
Badakhshan Baharak 34 5 10 0 180 10 180 5,780 6,120 6,460<br />
Faizabad 51 6 11 32 3 11 430 60 1,940 240 2,370 73,270 84,010 104,160<br />
Jurm 43 8 10 29 4 10 2450 350 240 40 2,690 96,100 112,310 128,230<br />
Kishim 39 4 5 32 2 9 180 20 2,660 250 2,840 83,360 92,140 101,240<br />
Shahri Buzurg 0 0 No yield data n.a.<br />
Badakhshan surveyed Total 3,240 440 4,840 530 8,080 258,510 294,600 340,090<br />
Helmand Baghran 34 3 20 1,800 140 1,800 56,440 61,200 65,620<br />
Garmser 43 5 10 2,020 120 2,020 81,700 86,860 92,020<br />
Lashkar Gah 33 9 6 1,140 70 1,140 35,310 37,620 40,260<br />
Kajaki 64 12 10 2,640 140 2,640 160,000 168,960 177,920<br />
Khan Nesh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 48 5 10 1,940 130 1,940 86,880 93,120 99,360<br />
Musa Qala 53 6 10 3,690 190 3,690 185,500 195,570 206,170<br />
Nad-e-Ali 41 8 10 5,880 190 5,880 233,290 241,080 249,280<br />
Nahr-e-Seraj 29 6 10 1,850 130 1,850 49,880 53,650 57,420<br />
Naw Zad 37 4 10 2,650 100 2,650 94,350 98,050 102,860<br />
Nawa Barakzai 52 6 10 2,730 190 2,730 132,080 141,960 151,320<br />
Sarban Qala 49 10 10 2,810 160 2,810 129,850 137,690 145,040<br />
Washir 36 5 10 800 20 800 28,080 28,800 29,520<br />
Helmand surveyed Total 29,950 1,580 29,950 1,273,360 1,344,560 1,416,790<br />
Nangarhar Ach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 72 4 10 940 20 940 66,240 67,680 69,120<br />
Bati Kot 69 8 20 2,390 180 2,390 152,490 164,910 177,330<br />
Jalalabad 13 2 10 90 1 90 1,157 1,170 1,170<br />
Chaparhar 29 28 10 990 20 990 28,130 28,710 29,290<br />
Darae Noor 25 4 7 380 10 380 9,250 9,500 10,000<br />
Deh Bala 49 8 10 650 10 650 31,360 31,850 32,340<br />
Durbaba 49 12 8 40 0 40 1,960 1,960 1,960<br />
Goshta 22 5 9 150 10 150 3,080 3,300 3,520<br />
Hisarak 2 No yield data n.a.<br />
Kama 14 2 10 1,120 40 1,120 15,120 15,680 16,380<br />
Khogiani 49 12 10 2,640 10 2,640 128,870 129,360 129,850<br />
Kuz Kunar 13 2 10 500 10 500 6,370 6,500 6,760<br />
Lal Pur 0 No yield data n.a.<br />
Mohmand Dara 54 10 10 720 30 720 37,260 38,880 40,500<br />
Nazian 56 7 10 150 0 150 8,400 8,400 8,400<br />
Pachier Wa Agam 46 8 10 420 320 420 4,600 19,320 19,780<br />
Rodat 72 4 9 2,760 0 2,760 198,720 198,720 198,720<br />
Sherzad 0 No yield data n.a.<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war 64 8 10 2,060 0 2,060 131,840 131,840 131,840<br />
Surkh Rod 2 No yield data n.a<br />
Nangarhar surveyedTotal 16,000 661 16,000 824,847 857,780 876,960<br />
Total surveyed areas 329 30 49,190 2,681 4,840 530 54,030 2,356,717 2,496,940 2,633,840<br />
Opium Yield (kg/ha, 3 prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ces)<br />
44 46 49<br />
Estimated <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (kg)<br />
Other areas 20,015 873,028 924,972 975,686<br />
Country Total 74,045 3,229,745 3,421,912 3,609,526<br />
Estimated <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> producti<strong>on</strong> (t<strong>on</strong>s)<br />
ROUNDED COUNTRY TOTAL OPIUM PRODUCTION (t<strong>on</strong>s) 3,200 3,400 3,600<br />
216
Annex 5<br />
700<br />
Prices of dry <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Nangarhar and Kandahar<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US-$ per kg (March 1997 - December 2002)<br />
700<br />
600<br />
Nangarhar<br />
500<br />
Kandahar<br />
average<br />
400<br />
300<br />
200<br />
100<br />
31<br />
-<br />
Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02<br />
Jan- Feb- Apr- May- Jun-<br />
Jul-97 Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Feb- Mar- Apr- Jun-<br />
Jul-98 Aug- Sep- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Apr- May- Jun- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- Jun-<br />
Jul-00 Aug- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Aug- 10- 15- 10- 15- 28- 01- 19- 15- Jan- Feb- 14- 25- 07- 20- 09- Jun-<br />
Jul-02 09- 23- 01- Nov- Dec-<br />
97 97 97 97 97<br />
97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98<br />
98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 00<br />
00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 Sep Sep Oct Oct Oct Nov Nov Dec 02 02 Apr Apr May May Jun 02 Sep- Sep- Oct 02 02<br />
Nangarhar 102 108 114 91 97 86 83 66 76 95 70 83 54 55 63 96 101 116 100 80 91 86 62 61 40 38 41 43 46 44 38 44 87 124 107 159 173 367 383 398 368 657 700 194 134 190 210 327 343 316 423 409 583 361 381 444 514 514 380 418 434 450 481 524<br />
Kandahar 33 33 30 34 53 41 38 44 49 67 54 54 56 59 60 45 43 41 39 36 33 31 31 30 29 30 31 35 78 70 61 101 128 205 260 270 250 446 650 180 150 327 270 340 364 275 407 395 450 385 304 380 480 436 422 370 414 430 538 556<br />
average 68 71 74 62 65 60 57 50 65 68 54 64 51 61 59 75 79 87 80 62 67 63 51 49 37 34 36 37 38 37 35 39 82 97 84 130 150 286 322 334 309 551 675 187 142 259 240 334 354 296 415 402 517 373 343 412 497 475 401 394 424 440 510 540<br />
Sources: UNODC Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>, ICMP.<br />
540<br />
217
Annex 6 (Page 1 of 3)<br />
2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices (US$/kg)<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
District<br />
Former district<br />
reference<br />
2001<br />
Dry<br />
2001<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
218<br />
May July-August<br />
Badakhshan Baharak Baharak 397 238 274 250 200<br />
Fayzabad Faizabad 353 281 230 260 210<br />
Ishkashim Eshkashem 220 190<br />
Jurm Jurm 398 327 207 80 297 228<br />
Kishim Keshem 392 326 275<br />
Shahri Buzurg Shahr-e-Bozorg 286 339 270<br />
Badakhshan average 365 302 238 80 257 207<br />
Badghis Ghormach Ghowrmach 174 514<br />
Murghab Morghab 174 649 431<br />
Badghis average 174 595 431<br />
Baghlan Andarab Anderab 242 201 327<br />
Baghlan Baghlan 206 202<br />
Dahana-I- Ghori Dahaneh-e-Ghowri 197<br />
Puli Khumri Pul-e-Khumri 205 274 215<br />
Baghlan average 212 201 312 208<br />
Balkh Balkh Balkh 237 201 137 103<br />
Chahar Bolak Char Bulaq 235 172<br />
Chimtal Chemtal 239 158 98<br />
Dihdadi Dehdadi 236 176<br />
Nahri Shahi Naher Shahi 250 210 145<br />
Sholgara Shulgarah 213 200 151<br />
Balkh average 235 201 179 123<br />
Faryab Bilchiragh Belcheragh 180 346<br />
Maymana Meymaneh 175<br />
Pashtun Kot Pashtun Kowt 186<br />
Qaysar Qeysar 161<br />
Shir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tagab Shir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Tagab 164<br />
Faryab average 173<br />
Ghazni Ajristan Ajristan 360<br />
Ghazni average 360<br />
Ghor Chaghcharan 349 331<br />
Pasaband 352 331<br />
Shahrak 353 332<br />
Taywara 346 321<br />
Ghor average 349 328<br />
Helmand Baghran Baghran 237 394 370<br />
Dishu<br />
Deh Shu<br />
Garmser Garmser 259 437 396<br />
Kajaki Kajaki 257 407 370<br />
Lashkar Gah Bust 234 426 389<br />
Musa Qala Musa Qala 236 437 400<br />
Nad-e-Ali Nad-e-Ali 268 426 389<br />
Nahri Sarraj Nahr-e-Saraj 242 426 389<br />
Naw Zad Naw Zad 265 433 385<br />
Naway Barakzayi Nawa Barakzai 277 437 396<br />
Reg Khan Nesh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 437 396<br />
Sang<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Sarban Qala 247 407 370<br />
Washer Washir 407 370<br />
Helmand average 252 423 385<br />
Herat Obe Obey 335<br />
Pashtun Zarghun Pashtun Zarghun 331<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dand Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>dand 342<br />
Z<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>da Jan Zendeh Jan 314<br />
Herat average 327<br />
Jawzjan Aqcha Aqchah 169 88 68<br />
Faysabad Faizabad 230 152 108<br />
Khamyab Khamyab 194 56 44<br />
Mardyan Mardian 217 42 43<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gajik Manga Jek 198 92 66<br />
Qarq<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Qarq<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 195 76 46<br />
Source: UNDCP/ICMP <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> Opium Survey 2002
Annex 6 (Page 2 of 3)<br />
2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices (US$/kg)<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
District<br />
Former district<br />
reference<br />
2001<br />
Dry<br />
2001<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
May July-August<br />
Shibirghan Sheberghan 176 41 41<br />
Jawzjan average 194 100 61<br />
Kabul Surobi Sarobi 362<br />
Kabul average 362<br />
Kandahar Arghandab Arghandab 316<br />
Ghorak Ghorak 234<br />
Kandahar Qandahar+Dand 245<br />
Khakrez Khakrez 262<br />
Maywand Maiwand 288<br />
Panjwayi Panjwai 257<br />
Kandahar average 270<br />
Kapisa Tagab Tagab 403<br />
Kapisa average 403<br />
Khost Tani Tani 325 291<br />
Khost average 291<br />
Kunar Bar Kunar Bar Kunar 302 155<br />
Chawkay Chawki 370 200<br />
Narang Narang 301 187<br />
Nurgal Mazar (Nur Gul) 354 188<br />
Pech Peche 373 268<br />
Kunar average 339 200<br />
Kunduz Ali Abad Aliabad 210 243 118<br />
Chahar Dara Chahar Darreh 234 250 107<br />
Kunduz Kunduz 219 263 149<br />
Qalay-I- Zal Qala-e Zal 236 225 112<br />
Kunduz average 229 247 125<br />
Laghman Al<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gar Al<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>gar 404<br />
Alish<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g Alishang 318<br />
Dawlat Shah Dowlat Shah 365<br />
Mihtarlam Metarlam 336<br />
Qarghayi Qarghai 350<br />
Laghman average 354<br />
Nangarhar Ach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Ach<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 330 388 341<br />
Bati Kot Bati Kot 331 410 336<br />
Chaparhar Chaparhar 317 385 344<br />
Dara-I-Nur Darae Noor 282 378 334<br />
Dih Bala Deh Bala 335 378 332<br />
Dur Baba Durbaba 329 388 340<br />
Goshta Goshta 350 391 343<br />
Hisarak Hesarak 297 340 240<br />
Jalalabad Behsud+Jalalabad 355 385 344<br />
Kama Kama 348 385 338<br />
Khogyani Khogiani 301 490 350<br />
Kuz Kunar Kuz Kunar 303 378 334<br />
Lal Pur La'lpur 346 188<br />
Muhmand Dara Mohmand Dara 379 422 337<br />
Nazyan Nazian 396 378 341<br />
Pachir Wa Agam Pachier wa Agam 315 398 344<br />
Rodat Rodat 347 385 337<br />
Sherzad Sherzad 304<br />
Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war Sh<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>war 321 478 351<br />
Surkh Rod Sorkh Rod 312 390 310<br />
Nangarhar average 330 188 397 333<br />
Nimroz Chahar Burjak Char Borjak<br />
Kang<br />
Kang<br />
Khash Rod Khash Rud 378<br />
Nimroz average 378<br />
Paktya Azra Azro 389 292<br />
Paktya average 389 292<br />
Samangan Dara-I- Suf Darae Souf 240 207 386<br />
219
Annex 6 (Page 3 of 3)<br />
2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices (US$/kg)<br />
Prov<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ce<br />
District<br />
Former district<br />
reference<br />
2001<br />
Dry<br />
2001<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
2002<br />
Dry<br />
2002<br />
Fresh<br />
Khuram Wa Sarbagh Khuram+Samangan 339 299<br />
Samangan average 290 207 328<br />
Sari Pul Sangcharak Sar-e Pol 175 169 125<br />
Sari Pul average 175 169 125<br />
Takhar Bangi Bangi 235<br />
Chah Ab Chah Ab 246 100<br />
Chal Chal 223 151<br />
Farkhar Farkhar 251 113<br />
Ishkamish Eshkamesh 222 73<br />
May<br />
Kalafgan Kalafgan 232 141 223 171<br />
Khwaja Ghar Khvajeh Ghar 233 110 202 185<br />
Rustaq Rostaq 253 141<br />
Taluqan Taloqan 235 90<br />
Warsaj Warsaj 238 100<br />
Yangi Qala Yangi Qala 251 111<br />
Takhar average 238 113 216 176<br />
Uruzgan Chora Chora 307<br />
Day Kundi<br />
Dai Kundi<br />
Dihrawud Dehrawud 259<br />
Gizab Gezab 292<br />
Khas Uruzgan Khas Oruzgan 254<br />
Kijran Kajran 269<br />
Nesh Nesh 291<br />
Shahidi Hassas Char Chashma 262<br />
Shahristan Shahrestan 271<br />
Tir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kot Tir<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Kot 248<br />
Uruzgan average 280<br />
Zabul Arghandab Arghandab 276<br />
Daychopan Dai Chopan 274<br />
Mizan Mizan 253<br />
Qalat Qalat 258<br />
Shahjoy Shah Juy 264<br />
Tarnak Wa Jaldak Jaldak 255<br />
Zabul average 264<br />
July-August<br />
220
Annex 7<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> prices per gram <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g>, neigbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g countries and Europe <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> US dollars <str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2001<br />
Retail Level Wholesale Level<br />
M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Max Ave. Price P.m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> P.max. Ave. Purity M<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Max Ave. Price P.m<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> P.max. Ave. Purity<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> ( 2001-Field office) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (2002) brown 1.4 2.6 2.0 2.0<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (2002) white 3.9 3.9<br />
Pakistan Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 3 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.0<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.5 3.9 4.7 4.3 2.7<br />
Iran (ARQ/Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2.3 2.3 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 2.9 3.8 3.3 3.3 60.0 70.0 65.0 65.0<br />
India (R2000-W2001) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 2.7 7.3 5.0 5.0 2.2 8.6 5.4 5.4<br />
Tajikistan Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 5.0 9.0 7.0 7.0 1.0 5.0 3.0 3.0<br />
Uzbekistan (2000) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 5.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 1.5 5.0 3.3 3.3<br />
Kyrgyzstan Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 4.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 3.2 4.5 3.9 3.9<br />
Turkmenistan (Field office) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 9.0 18.0 13.5 13.5 9.0 18.0 13.5 13.5<br />
Kazakhstan (R.UN source/W. Field office) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 17.0 20.0 18.5 18.5 8.0 8.0<br />
Countries neighbour<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>g <str<strong>on</strong>g>Afghanistan</str<strong>on</strong>g> (average) 5.7 9.2 7.5 4.5 8.0 6.3 3.1 6.3 5.4 60.0 70.0 65.0<br />
Turkey Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 15.0 20.0 17.5 17.5 4.5 7.0 5.8 5.8<br />
Bulgaria Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 9.2 9.2 12.0 18.0 15.0 15.0 5.5 6.9 6.2 6.2 55.0 72.0 63.5 63.5<br />
Romania Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 14.0 14.0 8.0 8.0 15.0 50.0 32.5 32.5<br />
Yugoslavia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 24.7 44.8 34.8 34.8 5.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 16.1 30.5 23.3 23.3<br />
Croatia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 41.5 53.3 47.4 47.4 10.0 15.0 12.5 12.5 16.0 17.8 16.9 16.9 50.0 80.0 65.0 65.0<br />
Slovenia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 44.0 44.0 12.6 12.6<br />
Hungary Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 20.5 30.7 25.6 25.6 0.4 60.0 30.2 30.2 8.5 11.9 10.2 10.2 7.0 75.0 60.0 60.0<br />
Slovak Rep. (R2000-W2001) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 17.3 26.2 21.8 21.8 5.0 12.0 8.5 8.5 8.3 12.5 10.4 10.4 20.0 90.0 55.0 55.0<br />
Czech Rep. Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 20.7 25.9 23.3 23.3 10.0 40.0 25.0 25.0 15.5 20.7 18.1 18.1 45.0 75.0 60.0 60.0<br />
Balkan-route countries (average) 23.3 33.5 26.4 7.1 26.7 16.9 10.6 15.3 12.4 32.0 73.7 56.0<br />
Russia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 25.0 30.0 27.5 27.5 6.0 12.0 9.0 9.0 20.0 25.0 22.5 22.5<br />
Belarus (2000) Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 30.0 40.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 20.0 25.0 22.5 22.5<br />
Est<strong>on</strong>ia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 45.6 85.6 65.6 65.6 3.0 100.0 12.5 12.5 4.6 8.6 6.6 6.6 3.0 100.0 51.5 51.5<br />
Latvia Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 32.1 80.4 56.2 56.2 3.2 8.0 5.6 5.6<br />
Lithuania Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 35.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 0.1 10.0 4.0 4.0 20.0 35.0 27.5 27.5 40.0 89.0 60.0 60.0<br />
Poland Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 50.4 75.6 63.0 63.0 25.2 30.3 27.7 27.7<br />
Moldova Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 30.0 30.0 80.0 80.0 30.0 30.0 60.0 60.0<br />
Ukra<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>e Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 60.0 100.0 80.0 80.0 3.0 75.0 12.5 12.5 32.0 152.0 92.0 92.0 3.0 75.0 39.0 39.0<br />
Other East European countries (average) 39.7 65.2 49.7 8.4 51.4 27.2 17.9 40.5 29.3 15.3 88.0 52.6<br />
Italy Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 3 54.7 68.3 61.5 25.2 29.6 27.4 35.0 35.0<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 70.4 80.1 75.3 68.4 36.4 40.7 38.5 33.0<br />
UK Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 57.6 115.2 86.4 86.4 43.0 51.8 47.4 47.4 23.0 28.8 25.9 25.9 38.2 53.8 46.0 46.0<br />
Germany Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 21.4 54.8 38.1 38.1 19.0 19.0 11.9 23.8 17.8 17.8<br />
Austria Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 38.6 52.0 45.3 45.3 1.0 55.0 20.0 20.0 13.0 26.1 19.6 19.6 20.0 83.0 51.5 51.5<br />
Switzerland Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 17.5 128.7 73.1 73.1 3.0 52.0 27.5 27.5 11.7 20.5 16.1 16.1 11.0 65.0 38.0 38.0<br />
France Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 26.9 40.4 33.6 33.6 21.0 21.0 13.5 40.4 26.9 26.9<br />
Belgium Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 19.0 35.7 27.3 27.3 2.0 65.0 21.9 21.9 16.7 23.9 20.3 20.3<br />
Denmark Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 3 35.9 119.6 77.7 17.9 47.8 32.9<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 95.7 191.4 143.5 110.6 59.8 95.7 77.7 55.3 10.0 82.0 48.5 48.5<br />
Sweden Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 3 99.1 148.7 123.9 19.8 29.7 24.8<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 99.1 198.2 148.7 136.3 59.5 79.3 69.4 47.1<br />
F<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>land Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 89.7 152.5 121.1 121.1 20.0 20.0 44.8 44.8<br />
Norway Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 89.7 224.2 157.0 157.0 10.0 80.0 45.0 45.0 26.9 44.8 35.9 35.9 10.0 80.0 45.0 45.0<br />
Spa<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 56.7 56.7 34.0 34.0 32.0 32.0 71.0 71.0<br />
Portugal Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 45.1 45.1 10.3 63.7 37.0 37.0 31.3 31.3<br />
Greece Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 3 10.8 18.8 14.8<br />
Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> No. 4 39.5 67.3 53.4 53.4 8.0 35.0 21.5 21.5 13.5 23.3 18.4 16.6 65.0 81.0 73.0 73.0<br />
Cyprus Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 92.9 154.9 123.9 123.9 31.0 38.7 34.9 34.9<br />
Malta Hero<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g> 67.8 67.8 20.0 20.0 45.2 45.2 60.0 60.0<br />
West European countries (average) 59.2 114.5 77.8 11.0 57.5 27.9 24.4 38.2 31.4 25.7 74.1 52.0<br />
Sources: UNDCP, Annual Reports Questi<strong>on</strong>naire, UNODC Field <str<strong>on</strong>g>Office</str<strong>on</strong>g>s, Govt. Reports.<br />
221
Annex 8<br />
GLOBAL ILLICIT OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION 1990-2002<br />
(estimate for 2002 is prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary)<br />
300,000<br />
281,560<br />
REST OF THE<br />
WORLD<br />
250,000<br />
LAO PDR<br />
221,952<br />
200,000<br />
183,000<br />
hectares<br />
150,000<br />
MYANMAR<br />
144,294<br />
100,000<br />
50,000<br />
-<br />
AFGHANISTAN<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, for years 1990-2001; Lao/UNDCP 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey report for 2002 data <strong>on</strong> Lao<br />
PDR, Myanmar/UNDCP 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey report for data <strong>on</strong> Myanmar. Data for the rest of the World is based <strong>on</strong> 2001 estimates as<br />
2002 estimates are not yet available.<br />
7,000<br />
GLOBAL ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION 1990-2002<br />
(estimate for 2002 is prelim<str<strong>on</strong>g>in</str<strong>on</strong>g>ary)<br />
6,000<br />
REST OF THE WORLD<br />
5,620<br />
5,764<br />
5,000<br />
LAO PDR<br />
4,691<br />
4,600<br />
metric t<strong>on</strong>s<br />
4,000<br />
3,000<br />
MYANMAR<br />
2,000<br />
1,626<br />
1,000<br />
AFGHANISTAN<br />
-<br />
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002<br />
Source: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, for years 1990-2001; Lao/UNDCP 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey report for 2002 data <strong>on</strong> Lao<br />
PDR, Myanmar/UNDCP 2002 <str<strong>on</strong>g>opium</str<strong>on</strong>g> survey report for data <strong>on</strong> Myanmar. Data for the rest of the World is based <strong>on</strong> 2001 estimates as<br />
2002 estimates are not yet available.<br />
222