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28 May 45 sv.00 CUD: The reason for this lies in our peculiar evaluation of defensive strengith, which is indicative of our strategy during the last year of this war. It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE). Our system of fortifications was arranged along a number of lines. First the WESTWALL, which was only one line for all practicall purposes. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIK- WALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested to assemble our armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of where it may come from,we were told: 'No, they would be too late, everything will have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main proponent of this strategy. IO: How is it, that POMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned his lesson in North Africa. CUD: ROMMEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. Later on KLUGE followed suit. And it was im p ossible for me to do anything against it. A fortress such as ANTWERP, for example, was not utilized. It had neither ammunition or armament worth mentioning. That was the worst blunder we could possibly have made. And we did not fortify PARIS! Nor did we repair the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL, BELFORT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. Vie simply had two lines: the ATLANTIKWALL--which was expected to fail like any other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and then the WESTV;ALL-eanother line which was expected to succumb wherever the enemy would concentrate all his efforts. H: ROMMEL and I were at odds about this for many months. Then General GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to back me up. But unfortunately it was impossible to achieve anything. GUD: I was sent to ROI.LEL for that particular purpose, But HITLER told me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshal ,in command how to run his business." H: We knew exactly, even before the invasion started, that the ratio of allied arLored recn cars (PANLERSPAEHWAGEN) to Ours was 15 to 1; tanks, 10 to and planes, 30 or 50 to 1. And in view of this situation our only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare. GEYR: RCEidEL was a fairly good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest idea about strategy. GUI): ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a first rate divisional commander, because . he was courageous, went to the front, and participated in everything. But later, when he commanded an army, using the same technique, he lacked the vision which is essential for such a task. You know, it takes time to learn to lead large and fast armored units. And ROi.MEL was not a tank expert. After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition. ROLMEL lost some of his nerve in Africa. IO: What do you think of our General PATTON? GUD: General PATTON did what we would have liked to have done and what we used to do. He was very fast, which could already be seen in NOR- MANDY. I was with the FUEHRER when PATTON's drive started. He said: 411 4, 6
i'Mzty. 45! thing but the ehathk-6,pox . could have .6rie';tkigtV, ' Ilei/Th -through French MaginOt4insf) 'proceeded in the . same 4' Manner.:,:oktpt our i ZIE " of theiRtithsiariT,ibtfeit'T,40414., 1 ci pje,t. tank commander 'suCCeethfUl l Fate gives''hiM:''jniiiNeite,Orla'a /1',whiCh 4 t 6 do his stuff (qt • D;;T. The dOOrdiziat iozi of yelir aii lif4y u Lorraine - campaign was 'so bli tS x. ti:gLy:,.:it41,;(t. 7,1; ., these' American tactics intoth the ' Cir! !Ischbar ri.0 'iViffi.i'' at ' BERGEN. ' ),A,!'4‹."-q,'.A'!.. 01 • GM/ V .;)Eveni earlier . than that ; "in'4101RIVI .. ' . Coq '.--,4-•2tii6 . ilithei.i can:spearheads '.. by • the ,,. q.,..L i .,ua ly , : . in . ,order .. ,, I. - 'tilaile.s.A.054,6 ,. to clear, the :, via ..y,, ,... t4-erialtyr. , ,.; ha. , , 0 ,e ....,,,34#Oi101ei',"/Plpid':y81,i,,knoi0hitt it,i0' .,Trkt4M6fia. - •`,.4.i.l'eilas ' t 6 (- the length of time:441{114C,A84ril, would not be liable: to attacki -..,"I:Tia. :.-deriSOr 'missed it, and I also 'W/thePiX,'' : , 1C.rieW r.thei.TILS-:'veiy , shOwe&i'lit:.;;':,f60 , , :td. we ll, and ,..th érigOi*I'geskir 'IV ' Y oiS1:1": 'ItriOw ,the7:British : well, ' 'Sr oix-9.1,;`kii:eiktatt the first or second ,:paiie . of .,tbegin ,„ . !S with ' t h e ' f lliii dd le :' ' • • 'Siri reading sa e :,-' 1 ':, Eiiii .3i .e`iHqiiiisalil l,2 ', z ' :niat t e r ,s,:,,.',.;',..,',,. I t.:diSC a iieli.'k .:-...1;4O'i6'6'!ot..,-Oii4Oi'li.,'markee-i'lie4i5AiliOrdi .ċfSn'tOie. AlttRtit' ''a ilieetiig _.i. b'tvie enr6pi^esent4iiii6s1-i3V4i0i.e.c. N.-ttriCCi‘,.ali.d.',:,iàiLdhordei.O.i. d " 'ar ;::0' -' eas'for' -c1.60414,- American ‘'armor kei".0 ed 4:54,:, ,,,.. -tih'e d iVi Si Ciiii;;:lcbpeehVO qiindowrir:à-1.6hat :tkiey;vidtfild-t,,,libSf,*3.4*qi ., ':)../Ah .d .e"J"taiiliahet iVers'ei-46:b4.4ii.ii'441e0I4 4, v4'WLiffia;p14 irit ea in '.-.the .• TXIIIES ; . as.:Welp;as.!:!:, 0-1004 iiiiive ..: befOre .:'15 We',,'Co'il - tê.li 't.;-1:f*Ie'ilfetit6, ld' i:de'cluce from that, ,:*'' 1 a Vi ' 0 'iOneAl'failia% theiouldn'tmake ';fi'lüe of the Navy and't 4.1rEISCELLANY ,. *GE.k :. tvie:s ' ",: deeply' 'grieved vitA fit n:,.rr‘,/:1,*ariii ..a. i .ALACN 4reskj, .t.1.4. .,., d. Oificio ,- -. n'thch. --:ALSACE fs' 4 , op ing .:th Ge'rriiKn*-4.1:42LOilitkl .gi.q& l ,Alt 'there was the pose?.. . . ' 'tSr 1.. , i:li . si c if ,,, 'ea'itroiii ,: , ohii `.1:4:i.iiiintermediary , and .. ..,, that ' 4iiiieY being. .-A the deci siOn-: mighttl'teloci 4Cii . 1, fter all , no trile':'G4iinin'.Ctiii'141i.4110r:.e. Gerniay. 130:4nagain -.eat treated 'ea ,the V this . . time . ' ' Th'd '.11thati.a.ris'''aw'kwieeialT.:ttlilet it ii:!'ALS ACa . . into Germany, ' It would . la.ciint':a.t.:Iiiresetit .., .s.f%OtV v4,' if -sti . Atiiiens ';'.: would have a neural' ad .;te, a' P.:be tt.:_e: , ipr:: „, i h,,,,, . L., zi l e w niniStratOn .1.4e :years,. and vi pretil ' te'..... . Therefore it was i...670.i6n-:giv.ght.4'qr myi.;;It ' .-;;';.."k• considered 'IpOiWneWs!,,,4 SE
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Uttl I 11/1L IN I LLLILatIlL.C. HUC
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yellow colored cards were for Germa
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Appendix Name SECRET GESTAPO PERSON
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Appendix Cont Name 1.2TZGER, (1 4 7
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Lppendix. ••Y'' ‘-•••
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- „ - , .. .. . : - 1. ::- r.r..-
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Lppendix Cont l d) • Civilian- Na
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: • . FrI STZ eepe.-O4al,ly .shoc
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SEORET x) OBSTLT GRAF VON KIELMANNS
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twitzj WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT ^
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.3 E. C R. E T • xii) COSSMAN, OB
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DECL
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! .SECRET xii) COSSMAN, OBST time 0
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRA
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY . CENT
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SECRET Appendix V-2 AUTOMATIC RANG-
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SECRET IV, POSSIBLE BW EXPERIMENTAL
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• contained in this report is req
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M: SEIDOWSKI (?) was fat and blond
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SECRE1-••• 1. Bacteriologd.ca
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SECRET — L: (Talking about his da
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- AUGSBliRCI ,NA4 WAR CRIMES DISCLO
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t 4
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,i) GiNARZT. .(Medical Corti° , Ge
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SECRET W: . . I have given all my e
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• Tho *origami conducted thomsolv
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send as our representative? A Germa
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p rominent .r -Ntizis'whoM It wae e
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DECLA SSIFIED AND RELEASED-,Oh CENT
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•.; e, ,.„ Av lop° z;:!,•, ,
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• 1-)aso -7,7,.e;.• .:±,,, ,,N
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Jr I, :ttiotigh0041IisTil 'openly '
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•• Ref . SAIC/14 19 May 45 Snir
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If the information contained in thi
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-JRET : Could he have =egally? L: N
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in tho realm of possibility, in tha
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00 '1 --tt 'Or iii . CI ' h 'Eion
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•••• Ree No SAIO/16 23 MEky
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_. ZI\oli,.;rg R3f No SAI0/16 25 Ma
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. • SECRET soos_,:s...0 1 4'07 01
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SE CRE .1 Rel. No SAIC/17 24 May 45
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• Ref N: SAIC/18 24 Ma: r 45 -s-
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• NAZI WAR CRIMES MṀOSUREACT 20
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7. FiCTORIES BOLEN: STANICH: V1PITE
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Page 134 and 135: , 5. FJNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENTS
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