Auto Dealerships - Audit Technique Guide - Uncle Fed's Tax*Board

Auto Dealerships - Audit Technique Guide - Uncle Fed's Tax*Board Auto Dealerships - Audit Technique Guide - Uncle Fed's Tax*Board

19.10.2014 Views

three pronged test for determining whether amounts paid to a captive insurance company are deductible as premium expenses. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sears v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61 (1991), modified, 96 T.C. 671 (1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992). In order for a payment between related entities to be considered a deductible insurance premium the payment must involve: (1) an insurance risk; (2) risk shifting and risk distribution and (3) it must be insurance in the commonly accepted sense. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18 (1991). The first prong of the test, the presence of an insurance risk, was summarized by the Tax Court in Amerco as a situation in which "* * * an insured faces some hazard; an insurer accepts a premium and agrees to perform some act if or when the loss event occurs. * * *" Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 38-39. Factors which may indicate the lack of an insurance risk include an obligation on the part of the related corporations to pay the claims filed with the captive or to make additional contributions to the captive based on loss experience. See Gulf Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987). The second prong, the requirement of risk shifting and risk distribution, has engendered a great deal of debate and confusion. The Tax Court and several appellate courts have found risk shifting to exist where the captive insures substantial amounts of unrelated business. The Tax Court’s rationale for using the amount of unrelated business as the litmus test for risk shifting was expressed in Gulf Oil Corporation, in which the court stated, "If all of the insured are related, the insurance is merely self-insurance because the group’s premium pool is used only to cover the group’s losses. By adding unrelated insured, the pool from which losses are paid no longer is made up of only the affiliated group’s premiums." Gulf Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1026-27. The Tax Court thus concludes that risk shifting cannot occur between related parties without the presence of unrelated business. The Service’s view, as expressed in Rev. Rul. 88-72, is that the absence or presence of third party insured is immaterial to whether the risk has been shifted. The critical inquiry is whether the economic risk of loss has actually shifted from the insured to the insurer. However, because the Tax Court and several appellate courts have placed significant weight on the amount of unrelated business, we recommend that cases raising this issue be coordinated with the Captive Issue Specialist. Although the concept of risk shifting has been discussed by the courts, the risk distribution requirement remains unclear. As expressed in Rev. Rul. 88-72, the Service’s position is that risk distribution requires the underwriting of statistically unrelated risks so that there is a reduced possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set aside for payment of such a claim. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Service’s view of risk distribution in Clougherty Packing Company. However, the Tax Court appears to have blended the concepts of risk shifting and risk distribution, assuming that when an insured shifts its own risk to an insurance company, it agrees to receive some of the risk of other insured. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61 (1991), modified, 96 T.C. 671 (1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992). 13-9

While not all captive situations involve sham corporations or sham transactions, certain fact patterns do lend themselves to this analysis. In Malone & Hyde Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’g T.C. Memo. 1993-585, CCH 49,463(M), the Sixth Circuit concluded that the captive was a sham and thus the payments made by the related corporation were nondeductible. The appellate court stated that the Tax Court should have determined whether the captive was a sham corporation before considering whether risk shifting and risk distribution were present. According to the Sixth Circuit, a taxpayer does not have a bona fide insurance transaction if it uses as its insurer "* * * an undercapitalized foreign insurance captive that is propped-up by guarantees of the parent corporation. The captive in such a case is essentially a sham corporation, and the payments to such a captive that are designated as insurance premiums do not constitute bona fide business expenses, entitling the taxpayer to a deduction under [IRC section] 162(a)." See Malone & Hyde Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 835, 839. In reaching its conclusion that a valid insurance arrangement did not exist, the appellate court distinguished the facts of Malone & Hyde from its decision in Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989), aff’g in part, rev’g in part and rem. in part 88 T.C. 197 (1987). In Humana, the taxpayer’s previous insurance had been canceled and the immediate need for alternative insurance led to the creation of the captive insurance company. In Malone & Hyde, however, the taxpayer had no problem obtaining comparable insurance from an unrelated party but instead organized the captive insurance company despite the ready availability of more conventional alternatives. See Malone & Hyde, 62 F.3d 835. In Humana, the captive was a fully capitalized domestic insurance company organized in Colorado and subject to the regulatory control of that state’s insurance commission. In contrast, the taxpayer in Malone & Hyde organized the captive insurance company with only the thin capitalization required under Bermuda law. The Malone & Hyde court recognized that the Humana decision specifically characterized insurance schemes that involve undercapitalized captive offshore insurance companies to be without the requisite risk shifting element. See Malone & Hyde Inc., 62 F.3d at 840. It is important to note that the sham analysis is a limited concept. Therefore, cases which present fact patterns similar to Malone & Hyde, Inc. should be coordinated with the Captive Issue Specialist. Insurance companies offer retrospective compensation (“retro") as a means of attracting more and better quality business. This form of c compensation is commonly accepted by auto dealers and may be associated with either credit life and disability insurance premiums and/or extended service contracts. In this context, retrospective compensation is an agreement with the insurer for the dealership to share in a portion of the underwriting profit, based on claim experience of the business placed by the dealership. This is a one sided arrangement in which the dealers shares no risk of loss. The retro is generally found in an addendum to the original agreement with the dealership. Agents should take note of two very important elements of a retro. The first is the formula used to calculate the retro and the second is the timing of the payment. 13-10

three pronged test for determining whether amounts paid to a captive insurance company are<br />

deductible as premium expenses. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18 (1991), aff’d, 979<br />

F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d<br />

1341 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sears v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61 (1991), modified, 96 T.C. 671<br />

(1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992).<br />

In order for a payment between related entities to be considered a deductible insurance premium<br />

the payment must involve: (1) an insurance risk; (2) risk shifting and risk distribution and (3) it<br />

must be insurance in the commonly accepted sense. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18<br />

(1991).<br />

The first prong of the test, the presence of an insurance risk, was summarized by the Tax Court in<br />

Amerco as a situation in which "* * * an insured faces some hazard; an insurer accepts a premium<br />

and agrees to perform some act if or when the loss event occurs. * * *" Amerco v.<br />

Commissioner, 96 T.C. at 38-39. Factors which may indicate the lack of an insurance risk include<br />

an obligation on the part of the related corporations to pay the claims filed with the captive or to<br />

make additional contributions to the captive based on loss experience. See Gulf Oil Corporation<br />

v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).<br />

The second prong, the requirement of risk shifting and risk distribution, has engendered a great<br />

deal of debate and confusion. The Tax Court and several appellate courts have found risk shifting<br />

to exist where the captive insures substantial amounts of unrelated business. The Tax Court’s<br />

rationale for using the amount of unrelated business as the litmus test for risk shifting was<br />

expressed in Gulf Oil Corporation, in which the court stated, "If all of the insured are related, the<br />

insurance is merely self-insurance because the group’s premium pool is used only to cover the<br />

group’s losses. By adding unrelated insured, the pool from which losses are paid no longer is<br />

made up of only the affiliated group’s premiums." Gulf Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 89<br />

T.C. 1010, 1026-27. The Tax Court thus concludes that risk shifting cannot occur between<br />

related parties without the presence of unrelated business. The Service’s view, as expressed in<br />

Rev. Rul. 88-72, is that the absence or presence of third party insured is immaterial to whether the<br />

risk has been shifted. The critical inquiry is whether the economic risk of loss has actually shifted<br />

from the insured to the insurer. However, because the Tax Court and several appellate courts<br />

have placed significant weight on the amount of unrelated business, we recommend that cases<br />

raising this issue be coordinated with the Captive Issue Specialist.<br />

Although the concept of risk shifting has been discussed by the courts, the risk distribution<br />

requirement remains unclear. As expressed in Rev. Rul. 88-72, the Service’s position is that risk<br />

distribution requires the underwriting of statistically unrelated risks so that there is a reduced<br />

possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the amount taken in as a premium and set aside<br />

for payment of such a claim. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Service’s view of risk distribution in<br />

Clougherty Packing Company. However, the Tax Court appears to have blended the concepts of<br />

risk shifting and risk distribution, assuming that when an insured shifts its own risk to an insurance<br />

company, it agrees to receive some of the risk of other insured. See Amerco v. Commissioner, 96<br />

T.C. 18 (1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992); Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45<br />

(1991), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992), and Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Commissioner, 96<br />

T.C. 61 (1991), modified, 96 T.C. 671 (1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th<br />

Cir. 1992).<br />

13-9

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