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Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World

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08-CASSIDY.DOC<br />

1/29/2009 3:29:23 PM<br />

122 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:105<br />

f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g.” 142 Booker created a host of problems for crack coca<strong>in</strong>e cases <strong>in</strong><br />

particular, where courts struggled with the disparate crack/powder<br />

sentenc<strong>in</strong>g scheme juxtaposed with the “effectively advisory” 143<br />

Guidel<strong>in</strong>es. A number of district court judges had assailed the<br />

crack/powder disparity and sentenced offenders under a different ratio—<br />

i.e., 10-to-1 or 20-to-1—rationaliz<strong>in</strong>g that, after Booker, sentenc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

judges could impose a sentence outside the advisory Guidel<strong>in</strong>es range. 144<br />

The appellate courts ran roughshod over these district court decisions,<br />

and often held that a departure from the 100-to-1 ratio was “per se<br />

unreasonable.” 145<br />

In the 2006-2007 term, the Court began to clarify “reasonableness.”<br />

In Rita v. United States, the Court was asked to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether a<br />

sentence with<strong>in</strong> the Guidel<strong>in</strong>es range may be presumed reasonable. 146<br />

Rita was decided by an 8-1 vote, and held that courts of appeals may—<br />

but are not required to—apply a presumption that a sentence with<strong>in</strong> the<br />

Guidel<strong>in</strong>es range is reasonable, although such a presumption is not<br />

b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g. 147 After Rita, appellate courts are to treat a judge’s choice of<br />

sentence with<strong>in</strong> the range with deference. 148 But Rita only began to<br />

clarify reasonableness, and many questions rema<strong>in</strong>ed unanswered.<br />

Moreover, district court judges were still grappl<strong>in</strong>g with Booker and its<br />

application to the 100-to-1 ratio. 149 In 2007, the Court took on two cases<br />

address<strong>in</strong>g these issues. In <strong>Kimbrough</strong> v. United States, the issue was<br />

whether a sentence outside the Guidel<strong>in</strong>es range was unreasonable when<br />

it was based on a policy disagreement with the crack/powder sentenc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

disparity. 150 In the second case, Gall v. United States, 151 the Court was<br />

asked whether a below-Guidel<strong>in</strong>es sentence was unlawful absent<br />

“extraord<strong>in</strong>ary circumstances.”<br />

142. Id.<br />

143. Id.<br />

144. See <strong>in</strong>fra notes 205-206 and accompany<strong>in</strong>g text.<br />

145. See <strong>in</strong>fra notes 210-212 and accompany<strong>in</strong>g text.<br />

146. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).<br />

147. Id. at 2462-63.<br />

148. Id. at 2463.<br />

149. See <strong>in</strong>fra notes 205-206 and accompany<strong>in</strong>g text.<br />

150. 174 F. App’x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007)<br />

(No. 06-6330).<br />

151. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-<br />

7949). Initially, the Court granted certiorari <strong>in</strong> a different case <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g a below Guidel<strong>in</strong>es range<br />

sentence, Claiborne v. U.S. Petitioner Mario Claiborne, however, died before the Court could<br />

answer the question <strong>in</strong> his case. Claiborne’s case was removed from the docket and replaced with<br />

Gall. 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007).

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