Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World

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08-CASSIDY.DOC 1/29/2009 3:29:23 PM 116 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:105 proposed a 20-to-1 ratio, 82 response. and once again Congress provided no IV. THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINES ITS SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE The efficiency and uniformity associated with the Guidelines displaced the historical values of the right to a jury trial, due in large part to the imposition of longer sentences based on facts found by the judge rather than the jury. The Court’s prior Sixth Amendment jurisprudence recognized a criminal defendant’s right to demand that a jury find all factual elements necessary—beyond a reasonable doubt—for conviction of the crime charged. 83 But the constitutional roles of judges and juries became muddled, and the Court began searching for ways to ensure judges retained discretion while also allowing the jury to function in the manner envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 84 the Court began its quest to clarify the constitutional roles of judges and juries in criminal sentencing. A. Apprendi v. New Jersey In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, Charles Apprendi, Jr., “fired several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into” his neighborhood. 85 During questioning by police, Apprendi admitted that he shot at the house because its occupants were “black in color” and, for that reason, he did not “want them in the neighborhood.” 86 Under New Jersey’s hate crime statute, a judge was required to impose a sentence enhancement of “between 10 and 20 years” in prison for a crime committed with racial animus. 87 Under the statute, this relevant conduct determination was a fact for the judge to find rather than the jury. 88 82. Id. at viii. 83. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 84. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 85. Id. at 469. 86. Id. 87. Id. at 468-69. More specifically, New Jersey’s “hate crime” statute requires an enhanced sentence when “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.” Id. 88. Id. at 491.
08-CASSIDY.DOC 1/29/2009 3:29:23 PM 2009] EXAMINING CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING IN A POST-KIMBROUGH WORLD 117 Apprendi pleaded guilty to weapons possession charges, which carried a sentence of between 5 and 10 years in prison. 89 As part of the plea bargain, the prosecution reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence on the basis that the crime was committed with a biased purpose. 90 Such an enhancement would have doubled the sentence otherwise imposed for each of the crimes. 91 The trial judge accepted Apprendi’s plea and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi’s crime was motivated by the race of the victims. 92 He sentenced Apprendi to 12 years in prison, 2 years above the maximum sentence authorized for the weapons charge apart from the race enhancement, and Apprendi appealed. 93 The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed, finding the enhancement was a “sentencing factor” rather than an “element” of the underlying crime, 94 and therefore not subject to the jury-trial and proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements of the Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed and Apprendi filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 95 Prior to Apprendi, the Supreme Court had routinely declined to extend trial phase procedural protections to the post-trial sentencing hearing. 96 Shifting the sentencing law landscape, the Apprendi Court stated, “jury protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’” 97 The Court, beginning its new era of sentencing jurisprudence, held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 89. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. 90. Id. at 470. Apprendi correspondingly reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement as violating the U.S. Constitution. Id. 91. Id. 92. Id. at 471. 93. Id. 94. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2000). 95. Id. at 474. 96. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (“[A] jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995) (“[T]he Due Process Clause did not require ‘that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence.’”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (noting that “there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact”). 97. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post- Kimbrough World

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