Jamaica's Trade in Ethnic Foods and Other Niche Products

Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper 18
Cost of Compliance with SPS Standards
The World Bank
Jamaica’s Trade in Ethnic
Foods and Other Niche
Products
The Impact of Food Safety and
Plant Health Standards
Spencer Henson
Steve Jaffee

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About the Authors
Spencer Henson is an associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Business, University of
Guelph, Canada. Steve Jaffee is a senior economist in International Trade Department at The World Bank.

Contents
FOREWORD ..............................................................................................................................................................V
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................. VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... VIII
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................1
2. EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRODUCTS FROM JAMAICA.....................................3
3. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY CAPACITY IN JAMAICA ............................................................8
FOOD SAFETY............................................................................................................................................................9
PLANT HEALTH .......................................................................................................................................................14
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN.............................................................................................................18
4. CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS ..............................................................................................................20
5. IMPACT OF SPS MEASURES ON AGRI-FOOD EXPORTS ...................................................................23
PLANT PESTS AND PHYTOSANITARY CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES .......................24
HOT PEPPERS...........................................................................................................................................................28
HYGIENE CONTROLS FOR FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS ........................................................................................33
PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLES ........................................................................................38
YAMS ......................................................................................................................................................................41
PAPAYA ...................................................................................................................................................................44
SANITARY, PHYTOSANITARY, AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR PROCESSED FOOD PRODUCTS.............................46
FOOD SAFETY CONTROLS FOR THE TOURISM SECTOR.............................................................................................47
6. CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................................................................................................48
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................51
Boxes
BOX 1. UPGRADING THE AMC FRUIT/VEGETABLE PACKING CENTER.......................................................................19
BOX 2. APHIS CONDITIONS TO REMOVE THE FUMIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR HOT PEPPER EXPORTS TO THE
UNITED STATES.......................................................................................................................................................32
BOX 3. REFORM OF FISH HYGIENE CONTROLS BY FIRM A........................................................................................37
BOX 4. REFORM OF HYGIENE CONTROLS BY FIRM B................................................................................................38
Figures
FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN JAMAICA'S MERCHANDISE TRADE, 1990–2003 ........................................................................3
FIGURE 2. VALUE OF JAMAICAN FOOD, AGRICULTURAL, AND BEVERAGE EXPORTS...................................................5
FIGURE 3. EXPORTS OF MAJOR TRADITIONAL COMMODITIES, 1985–2003 (US$ 000) ................................................6
FIGURE 4. VARIED TRENDS IN JAMAICA'S FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND BEVERAGE EXPORTS (US $ 000) .....................6
FIGURE 5. TOTAL US INTERCEPTIONS RELATING TO PHYTOSANITARY CONTROLS ON EXPORTS FROM JAMAICA,
1990–JULY 2003 .....................................................................................................................................................28
FIGURE 6. HOT PEPPER PLANTINGS AND PRODUCTION, 1990–2003..........................................................................29
FIGURE 7. EXPORTS OF HOT PEPPERS, 1994–2003 ...................................................................................................30
FIGURE 8. NUMBER OF US INTERCEPTIONS OF HOT PEPPERS FROM JAMAICA, 1990–JULY 2003..............................31
FIGURE 9. JAMAICAN EXPORTS OF FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1985–2003.........................................................33
FIGURE 10. NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS BY PESTICIDES CONTROL AUTHORITY, 1999–2003......................................40
FIGURE 11. PRODUCTION OF YAMS, 1994–2003 ......................................................................................................42
FIGURE 12. EXPORTS OF YAMS, 1990–2003.............................................................................................................43
FIGURE 13. EXPORTS OF PAPAYA, 1991–2003 .........................................................................................................45
FIGURE 14. NUMBER OF FOREIGN TOURIST ARRIVALS, 1997–2003..........................................................................47
iii

Tables
TABLE 1. TOTAL COMMODITY IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY VALUE, 2000....................................................................4
TABLE 2. LEADING NONTRADITIONAL FRUIT AND VEGETABLE EXPORTS, 2003 .........................................................7
TABLE 3. EXISTING LABORATORIES FOR CHEMICAL ANALYSES IN JAMAICA..............................................................9
TABLE 4. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF FOOD SAFETY CONTROLS IN JAMAICA.................................................12
TABLE 5. MANAGEMENT CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS RELATING TO FOOD SAFETY IN JAMAICA...................................13
TABLE 6. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PLANT HEALTH CONTROLS IN JAMAICA ..............................................16
TABLE 7. MANAGEMENT CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS RELATING TO PLANT HEALTH CONTROLS IN JAMAICA...............17
TABLE 8. COST OF UPGRADING AMC FACILITY TO GAP AND HACCP STANDARDS................................................20
TABLE 9. US BORDER DETENTIONS OF JAMAICAN FOOD PRODUCTS, MARCH 2001–OCTOBER 2004, BY PRODUCT..24
TABLE 10. US BORDER DETENTIONS OF JAMAICAN FOOD PRODUCTS, MARCH 2001–OCTOBER 2004, BY REASON
FOR DETENTION .......................................................................................................................................................24
TABLE 11. INTERCEPTIONS OF FRESH PRODUCE FOR EXPORT TO ALL DESTINATIONS, 1999–2003............................25
TABLE 12. MAJOR FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCT EXPORTS, 1999–2003 (KG)............................................................34
TABLE 13. RATES OF TRAVELER DIARRHEA PER 10,000 GUEST NIGHTS, 2000–02 ...................................................48
iv

FOREWORD
Food and agricultural trade is the vital link in the mutual dependency of the global trade system and
developing countries. Developing countries derive a substantial portion of their income from food and
agricultural trade. The emergence of food safety and agricultural health issues, and the related tightening
of market requirements form challenges to further gains from trade due to the lack of technical and
financial capacities of many developing economies.
As part of a joint program between the World Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development Department
(ARD) and International Trade Department (PRMTR), a survey on the Cost of Compliance of exporting
developing countries was undertaken. The survey was focused on the supply chains of high-value food
products (horticulture, fish, meat, spices, and nuts). The study quantified the costs incurred by both the
public and private sectors; identified the coping strategies employed by the various stakeholders in the
supply chains; determined the constraints that hinder compliance; examined the structural changes in the
supply chain resulting from compliance with the safety standards; and evaluated the impact of these
standards on small-scale enterprises and producers. The survey included Ethiopia (animal products), India
(fish and spices), Jamaica (nontraditional agricultural exports), Kenya (fish and horticulture), Latin
America Southern Cone (animal products), Morocco (fruits and vegetables), Nicaragua (shrimp), Senegal
(fish and groundnuts), and Thailand (shrimp and horticulture).
This working paper is one of a series of such case studies that examined the strategies and costs of
compliance of the various stakeholders in developing countries with international agrofood standards.
This paper was prepared by Spencer Henson (University of Guelph, Canada), and Steven Jaffee
(PRMTR).
A complementary perspective is provided by the companion series of buyer surveys involving
representative importers, brokers, retailers, and distributors in the European Union, Japan, and the United
States. This series, in turn, discusses the buyers’ perception of the strengths and weaknesses of their
suppliers and describes the assistance and/or interventions offered by the buyers to their developing
country suppliers.
The findings and conclusions derived from these country studies are discussed in a synthesis report that
seeks to identify possible points of intervention by the World Bank and other donor agencies and to
determine the types of technical assistance that would be most efficient and appropriate. It is hoped that
the experiences of these exporter and importer countries will provide useful insights to practitioners in the
field, and to national and international policymakers in both the public and private sectors.
Kevin Cleaver, Director, Agriculture and Rural Development Department
Uri Dadush, Director, International Trade Department
v

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACP
AFT
AMC
APHIS
ASSP
CARDI
CCP
CITES
COLEACP
CRSP
EHU
EU
FAO
FDA
FOB
FSPID
GAP
GDP
GMO
HACCP
HPLC
HPPD
IICA
IPM
ISO
JBS
JEA
JMD
JMOA
LOD
MoA
MoH
MOU
MRL
NAHFSCC
NPHL
NTE
PCA
PIP
PQ/PI
RADA
R&D
SPS
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Advanced Farm Technology
Agricultural Marketing Corporation
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services
Agricultural Support Services Project
Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute
Critical Control Point
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna
Committee for Liaison between Europe, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Collaborative Research Support Program
Environmental Health Unit
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Food and Drug Administration (US)
free on board
Food Storage and Prevention of Infestation Division
Good Agricultural Practice
gross domestic product
Genetically Modified Organisms
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
High Performance Liquid Chromatography
Health Promotion and Protection Division
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture
integrated pest management
International Organization for Standardization
Jamaica Bureau of Standards
Jamaica Exporters Association
Jamaican Dollar
Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture
Limit of Determination
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Health
Memorandum of Understanding
Maximum Residue Limit
National Agricultural Health and Food Safety Coordinating Committee
National Public Health Laboratory
nontraditional exports
Pesticides Control Authority
Pesticides Initiative Programme
Plant Quarantine/Produce Inspection
Rural Agricultural Development Authority
Research and Development
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
vi

SRC
SWEDAC
UK
USAID
US
VPHP
VSD
WTO
Scientific Research Council
Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
United Kingdom
United States Agency for International Development
United States
Veterinary Public Health Program
Veterinary Services Division
World Trade Organization
vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Traditionally, export crops have accounted for a very significant proportion of Jamaica’s
agricultural gross domestic product, total cultivated area, use of improved inputs, and
agricultural employment. Sugar has long been Jamaica’s dominant crop, accounting for 30
percent to 40 percent of total harvested area over much of the past three decades. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, bananas emerged as a major export for Jamaica. For both of these
products, Jamaica has enjoyed preferential market access into the United Kingdom and broader
European Union markets. These preferences are being phased out, which is expected to lead to a
major contraction of these industries due to their relatively low productivity and high costs. This
contraction has already begun. Jamaica’s banana exports declined by 50 percent between 1997
and 2003 while its sugar exports declined by 33 percent over that same period.
The decline in Jamaica’s major traditional agricultural exports has been partially offset by
enhanced trade in a more diversified set of agrofood products over the past decade. This trade
has featured a broad array of fruits, vegetables, and tubers traditional to the Jamaican, diet which
are being exported to supply the African, Asian and Caribbean immigrant communities in
Canada, the UK, and the United States. Other Jamaican “nontraditional exports” include fish and
fishery products, notably conch and lobster; and a broad range of processed food products, most
importantly, pepper sauces, soups, juices, and a range of seasonings. Many of these
nontraditional exports involve raw materials or commodities produced by small-holder farmers
or caught by artisanal fishers. In recent years, these “nontraditional” food exports have had an
annual value of some US$80 million, the total which now exceeds Jamaica’s sugar exports.
For many of these nontraditional exports, Jamaican suppliers are encountering significant
competitiveness and market access challenges, the latter relating to concerns about food safety
and/or plant heath risks. In both Europe and North America, a complex set of factors is
contributing to an evolving set of more stringent official food safety and plant health regulations
as well as more rigorous private sector sourcing requirements. Some of these more stringent
standards, or more rigorous enforcement of existing standards, are being applied in the product
areas featured in Jamaica’s nontraditional agrofood exports, namely, fresh fruits and vegetables,
fish products, and canned/processed food products. Jamaican products have experienced
impaired market access due to problems associated with pesticide residues, plant pests, food
facility hygiene, and food additives or contamination.
Jamaica’s system of food safety and plant health management has not sufficiently evolved in
response to changes in international standards, the requirements of Jamaica’s major trading
partners, and the shift in composition of its agricultural and food exports. While the basic
elements of capacity are in place and existing public institutions operate relatively well, enabled
by generally high levels of human capital, they are directed at outdated principles and
procedures. The current level of resource is clearly inadequate to meet the needs of the export
sector. It is also inadequate to direct compliance efforts toward a more “proactive” strategy
viii

directed at foreseeing emerging problems and offsetting their impacts before they arise and/or
turning them to competitive advantage.
Jamaica has addressed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) challenges mostly in a “reactive” mode.
In other words, the country developed plans of action and modified regulations after market
access was cut off or restricted due to SPS problems and/or trade partner concerns. In some
cases, technical and administrative solutions were found, albeit with a delay. In other cases,
either technical solutions remain elusive or the administrative or financial implications of
identified solutions have resulted in their limited or non-adoption. The result has been a very
uneven development of trade, with still frequent product interceptions, by either Jamaican or
trade partner authorities, and much uncertainty among the private sector actors.
The limited public resources made available for SPS management have been compounded by the
lack of a clear and coherent administrative structure relating to food safety and agricultural
health in Jamaica. There are a number of overlaps of responsibilities with little or no
communication and coordination among the agencies involved. Laboratory testing capacity is
also fragmented among multiple laboratories and agencies. While the need to streamline existing
administrative structures, and ideally create a single body with responsibility for food safety and
agricultural health, has been recognized, efforts toward this end have been delayed by inertia and
bureaucratic maneuvers to retain traditional institutional domains. Scarce public resources,
therefore, are not being put to optimal use.
Much of the existing SPS management capacity in Jamaica remains embedded in the public
sector, with the exception of certain subsectors (for example, fish and fishery products) or among
some larger-scale operators (for example, a few food processors and those involved in papaya
exports). While some progressive exporters of nontraditional fruits and vegetables are beginning
to make some changes, overall private investment in improved food safety and plant health
systems has been very limited. This lack of investment in part reflects overall uncertainties about
export growth potential and a perception that overseas standards are either unfair or too complex.
It is also a consequence of the highly fragmented nature of the pertinent export trades and supply
chains, an aging agrarian population, the lack of pressures for change from overseas buyers, and
the still predominant domestic market outlets for the featured commodities, in which few
standards are enforced. These conditions result in inabilities to realize economies of scale and to
induce changes in farmer agronomic and record-keeping practices.
Many of Jamaica’s nontraditional agrofood exports face a broad range of competitiveness
constraints related to inconsistent raw material production, high post-harvest losses, relatively
high cost and limited availability labor, macroeconomic factors, and intensified regional and
other competition. Market access problems related to SPS materials have exacerbated and
reinforced these constraints, reducing the profitability and raising the risks associated with the
conduct of these trades. The resolution of such SPS constraints is necessary, although not
sufficient, to restore and improve the competitiveness of Jamaica’s nontraditional agrofood
exports.
Due to the relatively small and specialized nature of much of the trade in high-value agricultural
products, Jamaica’s trading partners have shown little flexibility and devoted very few resources
to help resolve ongoing problems. However, there are two donor-supported projects being
implemented that seek to strengthen particular quality control and SPS management capacities
and bring about a more coherent, integrated, and strategically focused system in these spheres.
ix

Some progress has been made, albeit at a much slower pace than expected. There will be a need
to extend the implementation period for these projects if the desired and necessary levels of
intergovernmental coordination are to be achieved in relation to SPS management.
Capacity weaknesses remain significant in the private sector, and there are questions as to
whether exports can be maintained, let alone increased, on the basis of the current fragmented
system of production among an aging farming population. Selected interventions to develop
more coordinated supply chains and traceability systems for particular commodities could be
pursued through a joint public/donor-private initiative. Yet, it is likely that future export
development will require private investment in (medium-scale) export-dedicated production for
which rising quality, food safety and plant health standards are factored into production, postharvest,
and overall management systems. It is not certain that this activity is sufficiently
profitable to induce such investment, whether by Jamaicans or others with prior experience and
market linkages. Furthermore, Jamaica has a number of notable disadvantages compared with
competing supply sites in Africa, Central America, and elsewhere.
Future export development can also involve efforts to expand sales in sauces, seasonings, and
other value-added processed food products, both increasing market shares among immigrant
communities and extending sales to penetrate the more mainstream market, for which demand
for many such products continues to grow rapidly. Exploiting such export opportunities may
require some modification of product composition and recipes to meet consumer preferences and
increased attention to compliance with regulations related to labeling, additives, and packaging.
Rather than a fragmented, company-specific approach to these challenges, there is scope for a
more coordinated approach involving joint investment in product research and development,
food hygiene training, and market development.
x

1. INTRODUCTION
Jamaica has recorded an impressive record of poverty alleviation since it first began monitoring
living conditions in 1988. From 1989 to 1997, the poverty headcount declined from 30.5 percent
to 19.9 percent, and has since stabilized in the upper teens (World Bank 2002). Financial
transfers from Jamaicans living abroad have played a major role in the growth of the economy
and the recorded decline in poverty. As such, there are concerns that the economy is not selfsustaining
and the observed economic growth has failed to generate sufficient employment.
Indeed, even during the period 1991 to 2001, when Jamaica experienced modest growth,
employment rose less than 0.3 percent per annum. A major factor explaining these trends has
been Jamaica’s relatively poor international competitiveness and productivity, exacerbated by
the costs associated with its high rate of crime.
While the overall rate of poverty in Jamaica has declined significantly, rural poverty remains a
significant problem. In 2001 the poverty headcount in rural areas was 24.1 percent, with
relatively high and persistent rates of extreme poverty. Thus, although the contribution of
agriculture to GDP is relatively small, at 6.6 percent in 2002, it plays an important role in the
livelihood of the rural population and remains a key factor in efforts to alleviate poverty. Indeed,
in 2002 approximately 20 percent of the population was employed in agriculture, with a total
agricultural workforce of 182,000 and the existence of some 188,000 rural households. However,
agriculture is highly fragmented, with an average holding size of only 2.2 hectares (ha) (SIJ
1998), and much is of questionable economic viability. Many of Jamaica’s small-holder farmers
are from older age groups, with few young people interested in pursuing agriculture as their
means of livelihood. 1
Traditionally, export crops have accounted for a significant proportion of Jamaica’s agricultural
GDP, total cultivated area, use of improved inputs, and agricultural employment. Sugar alone has
accounted for between 30 percent–40 percent of the total agricultural area harvested over the past
3 decades. Historically, Jamaica’s agricultural exports have been dominated by sugar and
bananas, for which the country enjoyed preferential market access into the United Kingdom and
subsequently into the European Union. Other long-standing exports have included coffee, cocoa,
pimento, and rum (made from molasses). Impending reforms in EU trade and support policies for
sugar and bananas pose an enormous to Jamaica’s exports of these products given the country’s
lack of cost competitiveness. 2 The contraction of these industries has already begun with
Jamaica’s banana exports declining by half between 1997 and 2003, and those for sugar
declining by 33 percent over the same period. Further major contraction in these industries is
expected in the years ahead.
1 The Census of 1996 found 50% of farmers to be between 50 and 70 years old.
2 For example, the average production cost for sugar in Jamaica is US 0.24/lb., approximately three times the world
market price and approximately double the price which is expected to prevail in Europe following major reforms.
See Mitchell (forthcoming).
1

While the Jamaican government is looking for growth in services, especially tourism, to close the
country’s burgeoning trade deficit, there is also some hope and expectation that the country can
increase its exports in a broadly diversified range of food and agricultural products. Over the past
two decades there have been emergent yet uneven exports in a broad range of fruits and
vegetables, fishery products, and processed foods. The bulk of this “nontraditional” trade has
been targeted toward African, Asian, and Caribbean immigrant communities in North America
and the United Kingdom, or to sales within the Caribbean region itself. Much of this trade
involves fresh and processed foods that are staples of the Jamaican diet. This trade thus
represents part of a wider phenomenon of trade in “ethnic foods,” which has been stimulated
both by international migration as well as the broader travel experiences and quest for food
variety among mainstream populations. The bulk of the commodities/raw materials servicing
Jamaica’s “nontraditional” exports comes from smallholder farmers or artisanal fishers.
While the trade shift toward “ethnic foods” and other nontraditional products offers potentially
lucrative opportunities, it also raises a variety of new challenges. Many of these products and the
markets to which they are supplied have demanding sanitary and/or phytosanitary (SPS)
measures and/or quality requirements. There is therefore a need to develop capacity in both the
Jamaican public and private sectors to enable compliance with these requirements alongside
more general efforts to enhance the level of support provided to agricultural production. This
study examines Jamaica’s recent experiences in addressing the SPS challenges associated with
its nontraditional food exports.
The aims of this study are to examine the efficacy of strategies to comply with emerging
standards, assess the extent to which SPS measures have impeded the development of Jamaica’s
nontraditional exports, and review the prevailing level of SPS management capacities within the
country and ongoing efforts to strengthen these. The study first describes the magnitude and
composition of agricultural and food exports from Jamaica and then assesses the current status of
SPS capacity. On these bases, the potential for SPS measures to impede agricultural and food
product exports is assessed, drawing on a number of specific cases in which problems have
occurred. An overall assessment of the impact of SPS measures is then undertaken, and
recommendations made for future action on the part of both the Jamaican government and
private sector.
2

2. EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRODUCTS
FROM JAMAICA
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Jamaica achieved sustained growth in the value of its
merchandise exports, reaching a peak of US$1.72 billion in 1996 (figure 1). Since that time,
however, the value of merchandise exports has declined, to a low of US$1.1 billion in 2003.
Over this same period, merchandise imports increased significantly from US$1.2 billion in 1980
to more than US$3.5 billion in recent years. Thus, a wide and increasing merchandise trade
deficit has occurred, reflecting an overall lack of international competitiveness on the part of the
Jamaican economy.
Figure 1. Trends in Jamaica's merchandise trade, 1990–2003
Source: FAOSTAT.
Jamaica’s major merchandise exports are crude materials, agricultural/food products, and
miscellaneous manufactured goods, which collectively accounted for over 72 percent of exports
by value in 2000 (table 1). Historically, bananas and sugar were the predominant exports, mainly
directed to the United Kingdom. However, in the 1960s, exports of alumina and bauxite
expanded rapidly, redirecting Jamaica’s trade toward the United States. In the 1980s, apparel
emerged as a major export (produced in dedicated export processing zones), expanding rapidly to
account for approximately 40 percent of Jamaica’s merchandise exports by 1993 (World Bank
2003). Since then, in the face of intensive competition from other Caribbean islands and Costa
Rica, apparel exports have declined and by the late 1990s were negligible. Factors contributing
to the loss of competitiveness in this and other sectors have included the appreciation of the real
3

exchange rate for the Jamaican dollar, rising labor costs and labor activism, and the very
significant costs associated with high rates of crime.
Table 1. Total commodity imports and exports by value, 2000
Imports
Exports
Commodity Value (US$000) % Value (US$000) %
Food 446.6 14.0 227.9 17.6
Beverages and tobacco 28.1 0.9 60.0 4.6
Crude materials 51.9 1.6 737.4 57.0
Mineral fuels 595.2 18.6 3.8 0.3
Animal and vegetable oils 19.6 0.6 0.1 0.0
Chemicals 340.0 10.6 68.5 5.3
Manufactured goods 436.9 13.7 12.4 1.0
Machinery and transport equipment 745.2 23.3 26.9 2.1
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 448.9 14.0 156.2 12.1
Other 87.6 2.7 0.0 0.0
Total commodity exports 3,200 100.0 1,293.2 100.0
Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica.
Alongside these changes in the composition of merchandise trade, there has been a dramatic
increase in the role of services as an export and source of foreign exchange, notably tourism
(World Bank 2003). Thus, services accounted for 33 percent of trade, of which 17 percent was
tourism, in 1980. By 2001 this had increased to 57 percent, of which 37 percent was tourism. At
the same time, remittances from Jamaican’s living and working abroad have become vital to the
Jamaican economy. In 2002 such private transfers amounted to US$920 million, equal to 88
percent of the value of merchandise exports.
Agricultural and food products remain important to merchandise exports from Jamaica,
accounting for approximately 26 percent by value in 2002. Their share of total exports has
actually increased since the mid-1990s, having “achieved” only a modest decline compared with
a more significant decline in Jamaica’s total merchandise trade. Jamaica’s food and agricultural
exports peaked in 1997 at US$329 million and were just under US$302 million in 2003 (figure
2). Traditionally, Jamaica’s agricultural and food exports were dominated by sugar, although
bananas emerged as a major export in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the country has
exported citrus products, coffee, cocoa, pimento, and rum for many years. Figures 3 and 4 show
the varied patterns of Jamaica’s food, agricultural, and beverage exports over the past decade.
The country’s sugar and banana exports have declined sharply, while trade gains have been made
both for coffee and rum. Trade in a broad range of “nontraditional” exports accelerated in the
first half of the 1990s and has remained at essentially the same level since. As a group, the
nontraditional exports now exceed the value of Jamaica’s sugar exports.
4

Figure 2. Value of Jamaican food, agricultural, and beverage exports
Source: FAOSTAT.
Jamaica’s nontraditional food exports consist of a broad range of products in the following
categories:
• Fresh fruits and vegetables that are traditional to the Jamaican diet and are being shipped
to service primarily the African, Asian, and Caribbean immigrant communities in
selected cities of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Commodity
examples include yam, sweet potato, other tubers, hot peppers, mango, papaya, and
ackee.
• Fish and fishery products, including lobster, tilapia, and conch. These exports are
directed primarily to Europe or to European territories within the Caribbean.
• Processed food products, especially pepper sauces, chutneys, soups, juices, and a broad
range of condiments, syrups, and seasonings. These are exported throughout the
Caribbean and to North America and the United Kingdom.
5

Figure 3. Exports of major traditional commodities, 1985–2003 (US$ 000)
Source: FAOSTAT.
Figure 4. Varied trends in Jamaica's food, agriculture, and beverage exports (US $ 000)
Source: FAOSTAT.
As a group, Jamaica’s nontraditional agricultural and food exports increased in value from
US$45 million in 1990 to nearly US$75 million in 1994. Over, the past decade, their aggregate
value has leveled off, to within the range of US$70–85 million per annum, with divergent trends
among individual products. As will be seen below, even the trade levels for individual products
6

have exhibited wide interannual variability, in large part due to difficulties faced in meeting the
food safety and/or plant health requirements of major trading partners. An important dimension
of Jamaica’s nontraditional food trade is its fragmentation among a broad array of products and
the small volumes of trade in most of these (table 2). For only one product, yam, does current
trade exceed US$10 million per year. Trade levels in most of the other products are only a few
million dollars each. These low levels bear significance as the country faces a broad range of
SPS-related and broader competitiveness challenges. In many instances, it is difficult to mobilize
a critical mass of resources or achieve any economies of scale when seeking to address these
challenges.
Jamaica regularly exports approximately 35
varieties of nontraditional fresh fruits and
vegetables, although approximately five
products account for over 40 percent of the
export volume. These products are exported
to well-established markets in major urban
areas of Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, often through family or
other linkages to the Jamaican immigrant
population. Production is done on small
farms that also supply domestic markets,
with procurement normally through
intermediaries. Most producers rely on
rainfall, producing erratic supply that is
highly dependent on the weather. At any
one time an exporter can be sourcing from
Table 2. Leading nontraditional fruit and vegetable
exports, 2003
Product Volume (Kg) Value (US$)
Callaloo 346,753 547,876
Coconut seed 330,984 555,216
Hot pepper 310,117 696,206
Pumpkin 1,230,282 697,409
Mango 453,890 838,150
Breadfruit 772,903 861,216
Dasheen 1,064,282 1,192,341
Uniq 800,344 1,225,944
Sweet potato 1,501,806 1,919,544
Tangelo Ugli 1,287,903 2,094,959
Papaya 2,123,981 3,455,441
Yam 11,183,821 14,991,698
Source: Jamaican Exporters Association.
upwards of 100 farmers, with the entire supply base consisting of between 3,500 and 4,000
producers.
Typically, there is very little integration of the export trade and production, with the major
exception of papaya exports, which are dominated by 3 major producer-exporters. Thus, there is
typically little or no traceability through the supply chain and little production that is dedicated
for export. This lack of traceability not only raises challenges for compliance with SPS
requirements but also inhibits the ability of exporters to take account of lucrative market
opportunities. Typically, production is at its lowest in Jamaica at the very time of the year when
market prices are highest, for example, in the United States. Again, with the exception of papaya,
the structure of export trading is itself fragmented, with some 35 active companies, with perhaps
10 accounting for 60 percent of the trade. Hence, even the largest companies in this industry
have a gross turnover of only a few million dollars, and most have businesses that are
considerably smaller than that.
7

3. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY CAPACITY IN JAMAICA
A number of evaluations have been undertaken of SPS capacity in Jamaica as a whole (Reid
2000, IICA 2000, Focal Point 2004, National Quality Infrastructure Project 2001) as well as
particular sub-elements (see, for example, Canale 2002), so the authors have a relatively clear
picture of the prevailing strengths and weaknesses in the context of emerging food safety and
plant and animal health requirements in international trade. Broadly, the picture is of a SPS
control system in which the core legislation and functional capacities are in place but are in need
of significant updating and modification to reflect evolving international standards and the
requirements of the WTO. At the same time, however, the system suffers from being highly
fragmented, with a lack of clearly defined responsibilities and poor coordination.
Overall responsibility for SPS controls in Jamaica involves a number of government ministries
and agencies and more than 20 different pieces of legislation and attendant regulations (Reid
2000). The key institutions are as follows:
Ministry of Health (in particular, the Health Promotion and Public Health Division,
National Public Health Laboratory and Pesticides Control Authority)
Ministry of Agriculture (in particular, the Plant Quarantine/Produce Inspection Unit and
Veterinary Services Division)
Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology (in particular, the Food Storage and
Prevention of Infestation Division)
Jamaica Bureau of Standards (JBS).
In many cases, there is a direct overlap of responsibilities. Examples include the overlap of the
Pesticides Control Authority and the Food Storage and Prevention of Infestation Division in
relation to the licensing of pest control operators, and the inspection and approval of food
processing operations by both the JBS and Ministry of Health. This duplication of functions
leads both to a waste of resources and the lack of coverage of key areas of capacity. Likewise, it
has fragmented the capacity that does exist, most notably with respect to laboratories. There are a
number of laboratories in Jamaica, all of which have limited capacity themselves and could
benefit from economies of scale and/or scope (table 3).
The Jamaican government has recognized the need for SPS controls to be better coordinated and
for the consolidation of responsibilities. Thus, it has established a National Agricultural Health
and Food Safety Coordinating Committee (NAHFSCC), which has been given the responsibility:
“to establish and maintain a rational and integrated farm-to-table agricultural health and food
safety system in Jamaica that harmonizes inter-agency efforts, minimizes inter-agency conflict
and overlap, and ensures the protection of public health in a manner consistent with WTO and
other international standards.” Some 23 agencies and departments are represented on the
committee.
The NAHSFCC is expected to focus on all aspects of food safety and agricultural health,
formulating a national policy and making recommendations for a food safety agency. A National
Quality Policy for Jamaica was agreed in October 2001, including the establishment of a single
food safety agency charged with all SPS issues. However, this policy has yet to be approved by
Cabinet, and is not expected to be, in the foreseeable future. Memoranda of Understanding have
been agreed among the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Commerce, Science and
8

Technology, but these have not yet been officially signed. The Coordinating Committee itself
has no authority and little coordinating capacity. These developments highlight the considerable
inertia and resistance to change within the established administrative structure for SPS
management in Jamaica and the political sensitivities associated with proposed reforms. Thus,
the way forward looks likely to consist of the reallocation of existing responsibilities rather than
a fundamental change in existing administrative structures, perhaps as part of a gradual and
longer-term move to a single agency.
Table 3. Existing laboratories for chemical analyses in Jamaica
Agency
Veterinary Services Division
National Public Health Laboratory
Government chemist
Food Storage and Prevention of Infestation Division
Jamaican Bureau of Standards
Scientific Research Council
University of the West Indies: ICENS
University of the West Indies: Chemistry Department
Source: Focal Point (2004).
Analysis
Residues
Clinical analyses
Forensic testing
Pesticide residues
Chemical analysis of
processed foods
Chemical analysis of
processed foods
Heavy metals
Residues, contaminants, toxic
pollutants
Next, this study reviews the prevailing levels of capacity with respect to food safety and plant
health. Given that the study’s focus is agricultural and food exports, there is no explicit
assessment of capacity relating to animal health, although veterinary public health is discussed:
FOOD SAFETY
Overall responsibility for food safety in Jamaica lies with the Ministry of Health (MoH) under
the Public Health Act (1975) and Food and Drugs Act (1974). The Health Promotion and
Protection Division (HPPD) is responsible for establishing policy and guidance with respect to
food safety and veterinary public health. For the purposes of enforcement, the Ministry of Health
is decentralized into four Regional Authorities that provide health services in their respective
areas. The Environmental Health Unit (EHU) has 250 inspectors who regulate food handlers,
inspect processing, and retail premises. A comparable Veterinary Public Health Program (VPHP)
undertakes inspection of slaughtering facilities and meat and fish processing facilities. Inspectors
must be present at all times that slaughtering/processing occurs. The MoH operates the National
Public Health Laboratory (NPHL), which undertakes water monitoring; microbiological testing;
and surveillance of meat, fish, and dairy products.
With respect to meat and fishery products for export, the Competent Authority charged with
certification is the Veterinary Services Division (VSD) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). As
such, the VSD has no authority to inspect meat and/or fish processing facilities, which initially
created problems with respect to fish exports to the European Union (see below). Thus, in
February 1999 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the MoA and
MoH whereby the inspection activities of the MoH were recognized for the purposes of export
certification, and much of this function is still undertaken by VPHP inspectors. The need for
such an MOU and the way in which it has operated provide another example of the lack of
9

clarity in the allocation of administrative responsibilities within the food safety and agricultural
health management system in Jamaica. The VSD also operates a residue monitoring program for
meat, fish, and poultry.
The Food Storage and Prevention of Infestation Division (FSPID) of the Ministry of Commerce,
Science and Technology is responsible for controlling the infestation of food entering commerce
and has the power to condemn and destroy infested foods. Its activities include controls on
rodents, residues (including mycotoxins and pesticide residues), microbiological contaminants,
and pests in domestic production, as well as for imports and exports. It is also responsible for the
licensing of private pest control operators and training of farmers on pest control operations with
respect to storage.
The Jamaica Bureau of Standards (JBS) is responsible for inspecting and registering
establishments that manufacture processed foods under the Processed Food Act 1959. The JBS
was established in 1968 as a statutory body reporting to the Ministry of Commerce, Science and
Industry. In the case of milk processing, however, responsibility for sanitation and quality lies
with the MoH once the premises have been approved by the JBS. Furthermore, the Scientific
Research Council (SRC) is responsible for approving the processing of low-acid canned foods
such as ackees and callaloo (most notably, for export to the United States). This highlights the
fragmentation and duplication of the inspection and approval of food processing operations in
Jamaica.
The JBS is also responsible for the development of both mandatory and voluntary standards for
agricultural and food products. In the case of food and food products, it establishes mandatory
standards under the Processed Food Act 1973 and voluntary standards under the Standards Act
1973. However, Jamaica has experienced considerable problems getting its standards accepted
abroad, particularly in cases in which these are not based on international standards (Reid 2000).
In addition, the JBS has traditionally undertaken both certification and accreditation functions, in
contrast with international “good practice,” which involves the separation of these administrative
functions to minimize conflicts of interest.
Control of pesticides in Jamaica is undertaken by the Pesticides Control Authority (PCA), an
autonomous agency of the Ministry of Health. The Authority is responsible for registering and
approving pesticides, controls on imports and domestic production, registration and approval of
pesticide retailers and pest control operators, and residue and quality analysis. Jamaica does not
have national maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides in foodstuffs, although it makes use
of Codex Alimentarius MRLs to control imports and residues monitoring. The PCA has a very
limited monitoring program that involves taking very low numbers of samples of local products
on an annual basis.
Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the current status of food safety control capacity in
Jamaica. While there is basic capacity in most areas, this is generally inadequate given the food
safety requirements in international trade. Furthermore, there is little or no capacity within the
private sector, with the notable exception of the fish processing and papaya sectors (see below)
and a few major food processing operators. Certainly, the vast majority of exporters appear to
have little or no food safety control capacity. Likewise, there is little collective private sector
capacity. The Jamaica Exporters Association (JEA) has been established as part of efforts within
the private sector to coordinate and promote the export of nontraditional agricultural and food
products. The JEA has approximately 200 members and undertakes lobbying and trade show
10

administration, and provides start-up and working capital through a revolving fund. However, it
is not actively involved in the establishment of food safety capacity, for example, through the
development of industry “codes of practice.”
11

Table 4. Strengths and weaknesses of food safety controls in Jamaica
Collective
Element of capacity Public sector Private sector Exporters
Internal surveillance
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Import controls
Legislation and procedures in place
but need to be enhanced
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Emergency quarantine
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Export controls and certification Some capacity in place (such as Fish)
but generally inadequate
Missing
Some capacity in place (such as Fish) but
generally inadequate
Responsiveness to new/emerging Limited monitoring and ability to
Missing
Lack of coordination
issues
respond to emerging issues
Risk analysis Relatively weak capacity Missing Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Analysis and diagnosis
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Controls on inputs
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Pest and disease control
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Hygienic practices in production,
processing, and distribution
Level of inspection and enforcement
needs to be enhanced
Missing
HACCP generally not implemented outside
fish processing sector
Monitoring
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Identification and traceability Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Some capacity but generally inadequate in
most sectors
Source: Authors.
Sector
12

Table 5. Management capacity constraints relating to food safety in Jamaica
Sector
Collective
Element of capacity Public sector Private sector Exporters
Administrative procedures
Overlap and lack of coordination of
responsibilities among government
agencies
Generally missing
Generally a lack of
cooperation/coordination between
exporters and suppliers
Legislation Largely outdated Lack of private sector codes of
practice or guidelines
Generally a lack of written protocols
for suppliers
Enforcement/control
Inadequate inspectors and/or Generally weak
Generally a lack of quality assurance
Physical infrastructure
Human capital
Capacity building/updating
Communication
Source:Authors
.
inspectors inadequately trained
Laboratory facilities in need of
updating
Need for training or retraining of
policymakers, professionals, and
operational staff
Many procedures and facilities
outdated
Lack of communication among
government agencies
Lack of communication among
government and industry
Little or no capacity
Generally weak
Attempts to upgrade capacity in
some sectors (such as fish) but
generally weak
Generally weak
personnel
Most exporters lack laboratory
facilities
Some processing facilities in need of
upgrading
Generally a need for quality
assurance personnel and for hygiene
training among workforce
Lack of cooperation/coordination
among exporters
Lack of training/professional
updating
Lack of communication between
government and industry and within
the export sectors
13

Across the agencies responsible for food safety controls there are limitations in skills and
experience in risk analysis and equivalency (Reid 2000). Furthermore, the implementation of
hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) systems is in its infancy. However, there is
clearly widespread recognition of the need to implement HACCP in food processing operations
and throughout the supply chain. For example, the staff in VSD and FSPID have received
training in this respect. In many cases, the need for HACCP reflects food safety requirements in
Jamaica’s export markets. For instance, both the European Union and the United States require
HACCP in the processing of fish. This is also one area in which there are signs of Jamaican
private sector activity in the provision of consultancy, testing, and training services with respect
to food safety. Two Jamaican private operators are involved in the implementation of HACCP
and ISO 9000 and food safety training. One of these, Technological Solutions Ltd., is responsible
for implementing the approved HACCP procedures for canned ackees as required by the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
It is acknowledged by the Jamaican government and international institutions such as FAO and
IICA that food safety legislation needs to be updated to comply with international standards
and/or the requirements of Jamaica’s major trading partners. Moreover, the existing body of
legislation needs to be consolidated to enhance the effectiveness of enforcement and make
regulatory requirements clearer to the private sector (Reid 2000, IICA 2000). Currently, there are
15 Acts with attendant regulations. Most have strong powers to ensure compliance, although the
penalties are outdated. However, there is no legislative power in many crucial areas, such as the
promulgation of maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides in foods. Indeed, there have
been efforts to update the legislation in certain areas, predominantly in response to the standards
applied in major export markets. For example, the Aquaculture, Inland and Marine Products and
By-products (Inspection, Licensing and Export) Act of 1999 aimed to implement the controls
specifically necessary to satisfy EU requirements. Likewise, plans to implement equivalent
legislation for meat and meat products are aimed at facilitating EU market access.
As discussed above, laboratory capacity in Jamaica is highly fragmented. The overall picture is
of well-established capacity to undertake a range of analyses, although a need for the existing
facilities to be upgraded to perform the range and sensitivity of analysis now required for
compliance with food safety requirements in export markets. For example, facilities at the NPHL
are relatively modern and capable of undertaking a wide range of the analyses required by major
export nations. However, there is a need to upgrade facilities and retraining of staff and for
international accreditation of testing facilities. Furthermore, current capacity is considered
inadequate to undertake high-volume quick-turnaround analyses (IICA 2000, Reid 2000). The
FSPID’s laboratory for residue chemistry is equipped to undertake most of the required tests; yet,
it has limited equipment and backlogs occur when there are sudden surges in testing demand.
Periodic shortages of solvents and other chemicals also inhibit performance. The laboratory of
the VSD is able to undertake analyses for most microorganisms and some antibiotics and
pesticide residues. These facilities were upgraded in 2000 at a cost of JMD10 million, although
are in need of additional investment. However, the lack of staff with appropriate skills and high
rates of staff turnover are recurrent problems.
PLANT HEALTH
Controls on plant pests and diseases under the Agricultural Produce Act 1926 and Plant
Quarantine Act 1993 are the responsibility of the Plant Quarantine/Produce Inspection Unit
14

(PQ/PI) of MoA. The PQ/PI Unit has 18 plant quarantine officers, two entomologists, and two
fumigators based at the central headquarters and at export complexes at the international airports
in Kingston and Montego Bay. These facilities provide a one-stop shop for customs, narcotics,
and plant health controls for exporters of fresh produce. Both sites have fumigation facilities,
although only the complex in Kingston has cold storage. Both facilities operate a pre-clearance
program for exports to the United States (see below).
Tables 6 and 7 provide an overview of the current level of plant health controls in Jamaica,
which draw in part on Canale (2002). Unlike the broad area of food safety, fragmentation is less
of a problem in the case of plant health controls, although there is some overlapping of
jurisdiction with the FSPID regarding stored crops. The broad picture is that, while the basic
public institutional capacity is in place, the effectiveness of phytosanitary controls is
compromised by outdated procedures and limitations in both physical and human capital. In
addition, channels of communication need to be enhanced. This necessity reflects the fact that
the resources provided to support this function have not kept pace with the growth in exports of
nontraditional fruits and vegetables, for which plant health is a more significant issue, nor with
the growth in Jamaica’s agricultural imports and port landings by cruise ships. In turn, this lack
of communication and inspection capacity can cause delays in clearing produce for export,
especially if insects are detected and have to be identified. The PQ/PI Unit does have a high level
of experienced staff, and turnover has been low. However, within the private sector, there is little
or no capacity, and, arguably, it is here that the most effort is required.
15

Table 6. Strengths and weaknesses of plant health controls in Jamaica
Collective
Element of capacity Public sector Private sector Exporters
Internal surveillance
Some capacity but generally
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
inadequate
Import controls
Legislation exists but needs to be
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
updated.
General lack of capacity
Emergency quarantine
Some capacity but generally
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
inadequate
Export controls and certification Well developed, although capacity
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
needs to be enhanced
Responsiveness to new/emerging Lack of monitoring and ability to
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
issues
respond to emerging issues
Risk analysis Relatively weak capacity Missing Weak except in integrated operations
Sector
Analysis and diagnosis
Controls on inputs
Pest and disease control
Hygienic practices in production,
processing, and distribution
Monitoring
Identification and traceability
Basic capacity developed but
generally inadequate
Need better diagnostic capacity
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Advice and support systems in place
but poorly resourced
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Some capacity but generally
inadequate
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Weak except in integrated operations
Weak except in integrated operations
Weak except in integrated operations
Weak except in integrated operations
Weak except in integrated operations
Weak except in integrated operations
Source: Authors.
16

Table 7. Management capacity constraints relating to plant health controls in Jamaica
Sector
Collective
Element of capacity Public sector Private sector Exporters
Administrative procedures
Need for documented procedures
Need for computerization
Need for better coordination of quarantine and
Missing Lack of cooperation/coordination
between exporters
Lack of documented procedures
extension services
Legislation
Outdated
Missing Generally a lack of written
Enforcement/control
Physical infrastructure
Human capital
Capacity building/updating
Communication
Source:Authors.
Draft available but stalled
Export controls generally good
Need for enhanced import controls
Need enhanced operational manuals
Need for upgrading of laboratory, inspection and
incineration facilities
Need for training or retraining of inspection
personnel
Many procedures and facilities outdated with little or
no attempt to build capacity and keep up to date
Channels of communication established but need to
work better
Need for better coordination of quarantine and
extension services
Need for policymakers to be sensitized
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
Missing
procedures for suppliers
Lack of personnel with required
training
Most exporter facilities in need of
upgrading to ensure effective
controls
Need for training of producers and
exporters
Lack of cooperation/coordination
among exporters
Lack of training of farmers
Lack of communication between
government and industry and within
the export and production sectors
17

In general, legislation and documented procedures have not been updated in line with
international standards, although there is awareness of the need to do so among senior
administrators. The need for legislation to be updated is recognized within the PQ/PI Unit, and a
new plant quarantine act has been drafted with the assistance of the FAO. This process has been
delayed, however, by the ongoing debate regarding the establishment of a single authority to
govern food safety and agricultural health controls, as discussed above. The draft legislation
addresses the inherent weaknesses in the Plant Quarantine Act of 1993, which was considered
outdated even at the time it was implemented, for example, in providing for the implementation
of import permits, and the application of various penalties and fees.
Jamaica is free of the majority of plant pests and diseases that are of importance to international
trade. However, certain species of fruit fly are present and prevent exports of some products,
such as mangoes to the United States. Furthermore, some indigenous and/or imported pests are
of significance to particular products, for example, the gall midge in the case of hot pepper (see
below). However, capacity to undertake pest risk assessments is limited, and Jamaica’s status
with respect to certain pests and diseases is not confirmed. This creates major problems in
negotiating plant health controls with the phytosanitary authorities in major export markets, most
notably with Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) in the United States.
Currently, there are no dedicated inspection facilities for imports, despite the fact that volumes
increased significantly through the 1990s. Indeed, the PQ/PI has struggled to maintain an
adequate level of inspection to prevent the importation of exotic pests, for example, from other
parts of the Caribbean.
The PQ/PI Unit works closely with the Rural Agricultural Development Authority (RADA) to
implement controls on plant pests and diseases in domestic production. RADA has extension
officers stationed across the island. Each parish office has a computer terminal in which data can
be stored and downloaded. Currently, surveillance programs are operational for fruit fly, scale
insects, papaya ring spot virus, papaya mealy bug, pink mealy bug and the gall midge. RADA is
informed when export consignments are rejected and is supposed to investigate, although it is
evident that this system could be improved. Inspectors from the PQ/PI unit also undertake farm
visits periodically, especially when a problem has been identified.
Jamaica has certain weaknesses in controls of plant pests and diseases. First, current legislation
requires updating and is not compliant with international standards. Second, there are insufficient
inspectors to provide adequate surveillance coverage, both for domestic production and at air and
shipping terminals. Third, there is lack of expertise and diagnostic laboratory capacity in
pathology and pest identification. As a result of these weaknesses, the Jamaican government has
found it difficult to defend its position in disputes over phytosanitary controls on exports, in
particular, to the United States.
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the lack of food safety and plant health control capacity
within the private sector in Jamaica. However, the notable exceptions are discussed in further
detail in section 5. To maintain access to EU markets, the fish processing sector has been
required to implement enhanced hygiene controls, including HACCP. Some fresh produce
exporters have made efforts to implement enhanced hygiene controls, most notably within the
papaya sector, which is dominated by three major exporters, two of which source a proportion of
18

their produce through a system of out-growers (producers growing on their own land under
contract). Some more sophisticated exporters of Jamaican vegetables have also made efforts to
upgrade their standards, seeing the emergence of stricter standards on the horizon, although these
exporters remain very much the exception rather than the rule. Major food processing
companies, for example, Grace Kennedy, have also implemented HACCP and other hygiene
controls. These more progressive companies are keeping in view the growing importance of
exports, both within the region and to Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The broader picture, in contrast, is of a highly fragmented supply chain that supplies both the
domestic and export markets and has rather rudimentary systems of food safety and/or plant
health control. Furthermore, in many cases, there is little or no evidence that these systems have
been upgraded as the volume and composition of agricultural and food exports from Jamaica
have changed over time and the SPS requirements in major export markets have evolved. In this
context, the SPS-related requirements discussed in section 5 below should be reviewed. It is
evident, however, that the need to upgrade prevailing food safety and plant health controls has
been recognized by the Jamaican government. The government is investing in these areas, for
example, through the Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP) (section 4), which is
providing support to upgrade the facilities of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC)
(box 1). In addition, the foregoing discussion indicates that some exporters are making efforts to
upgrade their own controls. Do they perhaps represent the tip of the iceberg of more private
sector investing in upgrades?
Box 1. Upgrading the AMC fruit/vegetable packing center
Indicative of the need to upgrade sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) controls through the supply chain and
the recognition of this within the Jamaican government is the case of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation
(AMC). This statutory body was established in 1963 to stimulate and promote local agriculture by providing a
guaranteed market for farmers’ crops. The AMC operates from a facility in Kingston that was converted to an agroexport
center in the mid-1980s. Historically, the AMC also operated a series of branches around the country through
which produce was procured. Although these are no longer functional, they still form the basis of the supply chain to
the center. Currently, the agro-export complex has 14 residents, although not all of these are involved in exports of
agricultural and food products. Exporters operating at the complex assemble products and perform cleaning and
basic processing operations prior to dispatch to the export complex at Kingston airport.
In December 2002 a Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) audit was undertaken of the AMC facility that examined the
modifications that would be required to implement GAP and HACCP. This audit identified a wide range of hygiene
problems that prevented effective food safety and plant pest controls being implemented. These included the need
for upgrades to flooring, walls, and ceilings to facilitate effective cleaning; rigorous cleaning regimes; effective pest
control measures; enhanced maintenance; water treatment facility (including chlorination); removal of debris and
obsolete equipment; enhanced bathroom and changing facilities; better drainage; and changes to layout and process
flow. The cost of the overall upgrade of the facility was estimated to be US$1.35 million (table 8).
19

Table 8. Cost of upgrading AMC facility to GAP and HACCP standards
Building Suitability Cost (US$)
3 2-3 pack-houses/processing operations 124,271
4 Processing operation 55,576
2 Pack-houses 118,271
5 Pack-houses/processing operations 244,131
Main 12 pack-houses 804,766
Total 1,347,016
Source: Technological Solutions 2002.
The overall picture in Jamaica is of a system of food safety and plant health management that has
not evolved in response to changes in international standards, the requirements of Jamaica’s
major trading partners, and the shift in composition of agricultural and food exports toward
nontraditional products for which SPS issues are a more important issue. While the basic
elements of capacity are in place and existing institutions operate relatively well, enabled by
generally high levels of human capital, these institutions are directed at outdated principles and
procedures. Furthermore, the current level of resources is clearly inadequate to meet the needs of
the export sector and to direct compliance efforts toward a proactive strategy. This proactive
strategy must be to foresee emerging problems and offset their impacts before they arise and/or
turn them to competitive advantage. 3
The limited resources made available for SPS management is compounded by Jamaica’s lack of
a clear and coherent administrative structure relating to food safety and agricultural health. In a
number of cases, there is a clear overlap of responsibilities with little or no communication and
coordination among the agencies involved. Moreover, the allocation of responsibilities to certain
agencies does not conform to international norms, as in the case of the JBS. While the necessity
to streamline existing administrative structures and, ideally, create a single body with
responsibility for food safety and agricultural health has been recognized, efforts toward this end
have been delayed through inertia and political debate.
4. CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS
The Jamaican government has recognized the need to enhance SPS management capacity as part
of more general efforts to improve national quality infrastructure. The government has pursued
two programs of technical assistance and investment in recent years to address capacity
weaknesses and facilitate more effective participation in international standards-setting
processes. These are briefly discussed here.
The Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP) is a four-year, US$31.5 million project,
supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The project aims to enhance the
competitiveness of Jamaican agriculture in domestic and global markets, thereby advancing the
goal of increasing the incomes of Jamaican agricultural producers. The project has three
3 For a discussion of strategy related to SPS issues in international trade, see Jaffee and Henson 2004.
20

components: (1) strengthening the delivery of agricultural support services; (2) strengthening and
consolidating agricultural health and food safety services; and (3) financing selected activities in
high pay-off productive projects. The project started in February 2001 and ends in 2005; yet, it is
expected to be extended for 2 additional years.
The second component of the project is most pertinent to the focus of this study. 4 Up to US$10
million has been allocated to strengthen and consolidate food safety and agricultural health and
services in Jamaica. This component aims to improve the effectiveness of SPS management
capacity to protect domestic consumers from illness and domestic production from disease and
contamination, while ensuring that Jamaica’s exports meet international standards. The main
outputs are to be:
Developing an appropriate policy, updating and enacting legislation, and strengthening
coordination mechanisms
Hiring/training personnel in food safety, animal health, and plant health
Acquiring relevant equipment and supplies
Strengthening and upgrading pertinent infrastructure
Implementing a public awareness campaign
Developing databases and strengthening record-keeping systems
Updating methodologies
Implementing surveillance programs.
The project is looking to restructure administrative controls for food safety and agricultural
health. It has already funded a status report and assessment of the existing systems in Jamaica
that focus on legislation and the distribution of administrative responsibilities (see Focal Point
2004). The aim is to create a single agency for all SPS matters that builds on the existing
NAHFSCC, which meets monthly and has representatives from MoA, MoH, FSPID, JBS, and
JEA. However, an intermediate step toward a single body is likely to be the better definition of
administrative responsibilities and enhanced communication and coordination. This single body
is likely to be based on the existing NAHFSCC, augmented with a secretariat and legislative
powers.
An initial assessment was undertaken of the needs for infrastructural development related to food
safety and agricultural health including upgrading buildings, purchasing computers, and training.
More recently, an assessment has been completed that confirms whether these identified needs
still exist. Two priorities are to upgrade the export complex at Kingston airport and to install
fumigation facilities at the complex in Montego Bay. The former includes an expansion of the
facility, including extended warehousing area. This expansion is expected to begin in the first
half of 2005. Funding has also been provided to upgrade laboratory facilities, for example, at the
VSD.
4 Some aspects of the other two components have also been pertinent. For example, under the first component, the
previously mentioned audit of the AMC facility was undertaken plus there are efforts to secure loans for HACCP
implementation. Under the third component, various product competitiveness studies have been undertaken and
specific investments financed within the private sector.
21

Alongside the ASSP, the National Quality Infrastructure Project aims to support the development
of national quality policy and infrastructure in Jamaica to enhance international competitiveness.
This support takes the form of a technical cooperation project between the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce and Technology and the Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity
Assessment (SWEDAC) with funding from the Swedish International Development Agency
(SIDA). The project started in October 2001 and initially was intended to last for 30 months.
However, it was extended for two years, and a second extension is expected to be granted in
2005.
The aims of the National Quality Infrastructure Project are:
Developing an overall policy for the organization of national quality infrastructure in
Jamaica
Adapting one important product sector to the new principles for technical regulation and
conformity assessment
Establishing a national accreditation body
Preparing of selected laboratories for accreditation
Enhancing the activities of the Packaging Department in the JBS.
Specifically related to food and agricultural products, the project aims to develop new legislation
consistent with international requirements by reviewing existing legislation and enhancing
cooperation among relevant agencies. Furthermore, the project aims to develop proposals for the
reorganization of administrative responsibilities for food safety. The scope of the project in this
area clearly overlaps with the ASSP, as has been recognized by the Jamaican government.
Efforts have been made to coordinate the activities funded by the two projects and prevent
duplication of effort. 5
The project has funded an assessment of national laboratory capacity to identify the need for
assistance to upgrade to achieve international accreditation. In total, this assessment has covered
25 laboratories including those operated by the MoA, MoH, JBS, and FSPID. The project itself
funds the establishment of laboratory procedures but not capital investments. In certain cases,
funding has been provided by the ASSP, while, in others funding is still to be allocated. In many
cases, the sums of money involved are considerable, especially for required major equipment
upgrades. Likewise, the establishment of a national accreditation body has been delayed through
lack of funding. The national accreditation body will likely not be fully operational until 2006.
The ongoing investments by the Jamaican government both within and outside of the context of
the ASSP and National Quality Infrastructure Project clearly highlight the priority that it gives to
the development of the country’s capacity to manage food safety and agricultural health, as well
as national quality infrastructure more generally. However, the slow progress of many of these
efforts reflects the enormity of the task. On the one hand, major administrative reforms are
5 Initially, the National Quality Infrastructure Project was based at the JBS but subsequently moved to the MoH. The
repositioning of the project was deemed necessary because of the standards-setting and certification activities of
the JBS that were not conducive to the establishment of the JBS as the national accreditation body. The
repositioning created some delays in the project, hence the need for the initial extension to the lifetime of the
project. Furthermore, some of the initial activities defined in the work plan took longer than anticipated to
complete. In particular, the definition of a national quality policy and associated legislation originally was
scheduled to take six months; in practice, it alone took two years to complete.
22

equired to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of even existing capacity. On the other,
considerable investments need to be made in public sector SPS capacity to prevent existing
controls from falling further behind the standards-related requirements of international trade. The
fact that the Jamaican government has recognized these needs is positive, although it clearly
needs to find more effective ways in which to convert its intentions into action.
5. IMPACT OF SPS MEASURES ON AGRI-FOOD EXPORTS
This section examines in some depth the problems that food safety and/or agricultural health
standards have imposed on Jamaica’s nontraditional food exports. It focuses on:
Plant pests and health controls on exports of fresh fruit and vegetables, most notably in
relation to trade with the United States
Hygiene controls on exports of fish and fishery products, especially for trade to the
European Union
Limits on pesticide residues and exports of fresh and processed fruits and vegetables
Food safety and labeling requirements for processed and packaged foods
Food safety controls and the tourism sector.
Like all countries, Jamaica faces routine problems exporting agricultural and food products.
While some of these problems are sporadic and reflect the problems experienced by individual
exporters, others are continuous and reflect constraints in SPS management capacity. Some
indication of the magnitude and nature of the problems that Jamaica faces in regard to
agricultural and food exports is provided by data on import detentions, which is available for the
United States and European Union. Tables 9 and 10 provide a summary of import detentions in
the United States from March 2001 to October 2004. These data were recorded by the US Food
and Drug Administration. There were no detentions within the European Union from June 2002
to June 2004, for which data are available.
For Jamaica, problems occur most frequently for fresh and processed vegetables and a range of
processed and packaged foods including pepper sauces, seasonings and drinks/juices. With
respect to fresh and processed vegetables, these problems relate mainly to residues of pesticides,
most notably for callaloo, for which there have been persistent detections of residues that exceed
US MRLs. Processed and packaged foods are subject to a wide range of food-safety-related
problems, including the failure to have products (and the processes by which they are
manufactured) prior approved by the FDA, the use of approved colorants, and labeling
infractions. Examining these data more closely, it is evident that even the largest exporters of
processed foods are subject to these detentions.
23

While these data provide a broad picture of the
range of food safety problems faced by
exporters of agricultural and food products, in
themselves they do little to identify the specific
nature of these problems and the extent to
which they relate to weaknesses in SPS
management capacity. Thus, the authors now
turn to certain specific case studies, which
represent the major SPS-related problems
related to food exports in recent years.
PLANT PESTS AND PHYTOSANITARY
CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF FRESH FRUITS
AND VEGETABLES
As described in section 2, Jamaica has been
successful at developing exports of a range of
nontraditional fruits and vegetables to Canada,
the European Union, and the United States,
directed predominantly to markets that serve the
African, Asian, and Caribbean immigrant
communities in these countries. In the case of
exports to the United States, however, there are
a number of challenges associated with
compliance with phytosanitary controls. Exports
of some products is prohibited altogether. In
other cases, products can be exported only to
certain ports in the United States and/or must be
fumigated.
One product that cannot be exported to the
United States is mango because both the West
Indian Fruit Fly and Caribbean Fruit Fly are
present in Jamaica. Furthermore, currently,
comprehensive surveillance has not been
undertaken to identify the prevalence of these
Table 9. US border detentions of Jamaican food
products, March 2001–October 2004, by
product
Commodity
Frequency
Vegetables 61
Callaloo 35
Ackees 13
Yam 6
Dasheen 4
Breadfruit 1
Aubergine 1
Beans 1
Drinks/juices 30
Sauces 29
Seasonings/flavorings 19
Confectionery 9
Fish 7
Dairy products 18
Tea/coffee 5
Baked goods 3
Source: USFDA.
Table 10. US border detentions of Jamaican
food products, March 2001–October 2004, by
reason for detention
Reason
Frequency
No process 85
Low-acid canned food 66
Labeling 27
Pesticide residues 24
Unsafe additives/colors 18
Filthy 11
Poisonous 9
Salmonella 4
Can leak/swell 2
Unapproved 1
Source: USFDA.
pests and the existence, or not, of any pest-free areas. Exports could be undertaken if mangoes
were first subjected to hot water treatment. However, no such facility currently, exists in
Jamaica. It is estimated that the cost of constructing such a facility in an existing building would
be approximately US$175,000, rising to US$250,000 if a new building were to be constructed.
Such a facility could handle 1,000 tons of products per month. It is doubtful whether there is
sufficient export-quality Jamaican production and market demand in the United States to support
even one such facility. Indeed, no private investor has made such a commitment. 6
6 It has been argued that there has been little reason for such investment, given (1) that Jamaican exporters can still
supply to the Canadian and UK markets, (2) that Jamaica does not have any particular seasonal niche in the US
market, and (3) competition from much stronger suppliers—including Brazil, Haiti, and Mexico—in which there
has been widespread investment in hot water treatment systems and the realization of economies of scale. Jamaica
24

As described in section 3, responsibility for the inspection, treatment, and certification of fresh
fruit and vegetables with respect to plant pests lies with the PQ/PI Unit, which has an annual
budget of US$1.4 million. This unit operates two one-stop facilities at the international airports
in Kingston and Montego Bay. The Kingston facility was developed through a World Bank loan
provided in 1989 and then extensively upgraded in the late 1990s with a government investment
of over JMD30 million. The facility in Montego Bay was acquired from the Airports Authority
by the MoA, which refurbished a section of the old charter terminal in 1996. This facility does
not have cold storage. Both facilities are being further upgraded through the ASSP.
Table 11 details the interceptions of plant pests and diseases by the PQ/PI from 1999 to 2003.
Certain products have persistent problems with particular pests or diseases, for example,
callaloo, papaya, and jack fruit. Where problems are identified, the PQ/PI Unit undertakes
inspections of farms and pack-houses to identify the sources of the problems and potential
solutions. However, the unit is hampered by the lack of active surveillance for many pests, which
weakens its position in negotiations with trading partners. Furthermore, the fragmented nature of
the supply chain–with sourcing through middlemen and lack of effective controls in packhouses–means
it is difficult to implement effective control measures. Furthermore, although the
trade is dominated by 35 regular exporters, there are many more that enter and leave the market
from month to month. These sporadic exporters have little economic incentive to implement
more effective plant pest controls. A notable exception, however, is papaya, exports of which are
in the hands of three integrated producer-exporters (discussed below).
Table 11. Interceptions of fresh produce for export to all destinations, 1999–2003
Product 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Assorted roots 2 3 4 1
Avocado 2 1 2 2
Banana/plantain 1 1 1 1
Basil 1 1
Breadfruit 35 20 5 26 15
Callaloo 17 13 32 24 18
Cerasse 1
Coco 1 1 1
Coconut 1
Dasheen 12 6 12 8 9
Egg plant 1
Escallion 1 4 2 1
Flowers 9 15 9 10 1
Guinep 1 3 5 3 3
Ginger 1
Jack fruit 15 20 17 25 12
Gungo peas 11
Mango 1 1 2 1
thus faces something of a “chicken and egg” situation, in which investment in this phytosanitary treatment would
be worthwhile only if parallel investments were being made in plantings/orchards of improved mango varieties.
25

Table 11. Interceptions of fresh produce for export to all destinations, 1999–2003
Product 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Papaya 25 1 8 2
Pineapple 2 1
Pepper 10 2 16 9
Pumpkin 2 5 4 4 1
Sorrel 3 7 28 4 7
Sorrel leaf 1
Sugar cane 1 1
Sweet potato 1 1 1 1
Star apple 1
Tindora 1
Thyme 1 4 1
Tobacco 1 1
Tumeric 1
Yam 7 8 6 6 1
Source: Plant Quarantine and Product Inspection Division, Ministry of Agriculture.
To facilitate exports of nontraditional fruits and vegetables to the United States, a preclearance
program was established in 1984 with support from USAID. The preclearance program operates
at the one-stop export complexes in Kingston and Montego Bay. It is operated by an APHIS
resident officer and three Foreign Service Nationals who provide oversight of the inspections by
PQ/PI officials to preclear exports to the United States. Currently, 49 products and cut flowers
are approved for preclearance in Jamaica. Exports to other destinations are inspected and
certified separately from the preclearance program.
It is evident that the Jamaican government has guarded the preclearance program against
problems that might jeopardize its integrity in the eyes of APHIS. For example, the government
requires a 10 percent level of inspection of all produce, whereas the APHIS requirement is only 2
percent. Where problems occur, the government is quick to act, even going so far as to suspend
products from the program. For example, there have been persistent interventions of plant pests
during preclearance on callaloo, as a result of which the MoA voluntarily removed the option of
preclearance so as not to devalue the program as a whole and to prevent the imposition of a
fumigation requirement by the US authorities. In such cases, the APHIS officials in Jamaica also
work closely with the MoA. In the callaloo case, for example, they suggested that farmers be
certified following surveillance by RADA, with exporters demonstrating their sources of supply
through some form of traceability system. Likewise, detections of mealy bugs in jack fruit have
been recorded at the 20 percent–25 percent level. To prevent the suspension of this product from
the program, both PQ/PI Unit and APHIS officials undertook inspections of pack-houses and
demonstrated the checks needed to detect this insect. Since that time, detections have declined.
Since 1996, the preclearance program has been self-supporting. 7 Initially, it was operated by the
JEA, but in 2001 control of the program was assumed by the MoA with funding from a 20
percent cost recovery inspection fee. In principle, the cost of the scheme should be covered by
7 Before that, it was supported by USAID.
26

this fee. However, since the late 1990s, the scheme has run into arrears. Indeed, the MoA
considers the program to be rather costly to operate; the budget for 2003–04 was US$390,000
representing 25 percent of the total budget for the PQ/PI Unit. Much of this cost is associated
with the resident APHIS official. The PQ/PI Unit would like to operate the preclearance program
itself without a resident APHIS official, given that the unit already undertakes the vast majority
of inspections and the official is present only to provide oversight. This change would allow a
savings of some US$150,000 per annum. However, there is no example of this elsewhere, and it
is highly unlikely that the US government would agree to such a proposal. 8
The preclearance program confers a potentially significant competitive advantage on Jamaica
over its regional competitors. Moreover, Jamaica is a rather special case in that it is the only
country in which in-country fumigation is accepted by APHIS. Once a consignment has been
precleared, exporters can be confident that it will be admitted at the US border. APHIS officials
at the border generally undertake only periodic integrative checks unless persistent problems are
identified. This program significantly reduces the risks associated with fresh produce exports to
the United States. If a consignment is rejected at the border, the cost in terms of freight and the
value of the rejected product is typically very high. Indeed, some exporters in the region do not
export to the United States because of the risk of possible rejection at the border. At the same
time, exporters can choose whether to preclear their consignments, and absorb the cost involved,
or take the risk of US border inspection. Exporters of products that are not precleared lose the
option to divert their consignments to other destinations if the products are rejected, because the
latter are automatically destroyed at the point of entry. In the case of yam, for example, only 50
percent of exporters are fumigated and precleared in Jamaica. Conversely, almost all hot peppers
and breadfruit are precleared.
To some extent, the use of the preclearance program along with other elements of phytosanitary
controls can be regarded as a public good. If rates of detection of plant pests and diseases are
low, all exporters will face reduced rates of inspection at the US border, diminishing their costs,
reducing delays, and, in turn, enhancing product quality and shelf-life. Thus, some government
officials and industry representatives have argued that there should be a regulatory requirement
for all exporters to use the preclearance program. Indeed, it is evident that rates of interception of
plant pests and diseases in Jamaican agricultural and food exports have declined since the early
1990s, although with a major surge during 1997 and 1998 related to the specific problem of hot
peppers (see below) (figure 5). These data suggest that there may be a major pay-off from more
effective phytosanitary controls.
8 During the past four years, the volume of produce going through the preclearance program has actually declined as
some exporters have opted to save money and take their chances with potential border detentions at US entry
points. In other countries, including Chile and Haiti, export associations have made it mandatory to use such
preclearance programs. While Jamaican exporters are concerned with the fees charged, they generally amount to
only approximately 1 percent of the FOB value of produce.
27

Figure 5. Total US interceptions relating to phytosanitary controls on exports from Jamaica, 1990–July 2003
Source: APHIS.
Jamaica’s experiences with the preclearance program illustrate the considerable benefits that can
be achieved from being proactive in implementing and managing phytosanitary controls. It also
highlights the potential advantages to be gained from establishing an active relationship built on
trust and cooperation with the regulatory authorities in a major export market. At the same time,
however, Jamaica is still experiencing considerable problems with exports of certain products to
the United States, which reflect prevailing capacity problems through the supply chain and with
respect to public phytosanitary controls. A case in point is hot pepper, discussed in detail below.
HOT PEPPERS
Hot peppers have been identified as a priority crop by the Jamaican government, aimed at both
local markets and exports to Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
government also promotes hot peppers as a suitable crop for small producers to enhance income.
In 2000 a plot size of only 0.005 hectares (ha), which can support approximately 1,000 plants,
was estimated to produce a weekly income of JMD10,000 at current market prices. An
assessment in 1998 also identified hot peppers as having significant potential as an export crop
for the Caribbean region as a whole (FAO/IICA 1998). Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the
MoA and regional organizations such as the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in
Agriculture (IICA) and the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute
(CARDI), the planted area of hot peppers since the mid-1990s has been in decline. Overall
production has also fallen, despite some productivity gains (figure 6). Jamaica is recognized as
28

an important producer of the Scotch Bonnet cultivar, a yellow hot pepper with a fruit shape that
has traditionally been grown for local consumption. 9
Figure 6. Hot pepper plantings and production, 1990–2003
Source: Ministry of Agriculture.
Jamaica has managed to sustain a certain level of exports of fresh hot peppers, although the
current trade is below what it was a decade ago (figure 7). In the hot peppers trade, Scotch
Bonnet is the most notable, even though it exhibited little or no growth through the 1990s
(figures 10 and 11). In 2003, only 310 tons of hot peppers were exported, valued at US$696,000.
Exports of hot peppers have suffered from a number of marketing and production problems
(Dormer 2003, McDonald 2001, Stewart and Fletcher 2000). Most production is rain-fed and
highly variable according to the weather, making it impossible to synchronize supply with
market demand. Furthermore, productivity in Jamaica is significantly lower than in certain other
parts of the Caribbean, most notably Trinidad and Tobago (McDonald 2001). This low
productivity is exacerbated by ad hoc and weak procurement and distribution systems. Product
quality is also highly variable, due in part to the insufficient availability of high quality seed.
Perhaps the greatest impediment to Jamaican fresh hot pepper exports is the domestic market.
Jamaica is actually a net importer of hot peppers, and there is a healthy demand from both local
9 However, this cultivar is more prone to certain pests and diseases than the West Indian Red, which is widely grown
elsewhere in the Caribbean. CARDI, in collaboration with the Jamaican government, has worked on establishing
sustainable hot pepper production in Jamaica through the introduction of a high-yielding cultivar of the West
Indian Red pepper and adoption of improved technologies validated in the Eastern Caribbean, including efficient
use of fertilizer and effective pest management practices. This cultivar has been demonstrated to be more
resistance to the major pests and diseases found in the Caribbean. Moreover, using current production practices, its
marketable yields are 34%–122% greater than those of the Scotch Bonnet cultivar. Simultaneously, the Jamaican
government has worked on improving the Scotch Bonnet cultivar in terms of tolerance to the most prevalent pests
and diseases.
29

consumers and manufacturers of hot pepper sauces. In the late 1990s, exports typically
accounted for only approximately 5 percent of total production. Indeed, the domestic market
price frequently exceeds the export price. Combined with the additional risks and problems, this
higher domestic price frequently makes exports an unattractive proposition. The phytosanitary
problems experienced with exports to the United States that are described below have made
matters worse, largely explaining the decline in exports since the high of the mid-1990s.
Figure 7. Exports of hot peppers, 1994–2003
Sources: Jamaican Exporters Association and FAOSTAT.
In 1997 the United States detected an infestation of gall midge on hot peppers from Jamaica, a
pest that is not normally a problem with peppers. The gall midge is widely established in the
region and is not a quarantine pest under international protocols. In fact, Jamaican research has
shown the presence of the gall midge in Florida. However, as a result of this infestation, the
United States implemented a mandatory requirement for fumigation with methyl bromide. This
mandatory fumigation applied to all peppers exported from Jamaica, including bell and chili
peppers, although gall midge had been detected only in hot peppers.
The Jamaican government was proactive in addressing this problem, quickly establishing a
National Pepper Task Force to identify the source and potential corrective actions. For example,
the PI/PQ Unit began inspections of shipments prior to fumigation at the two export complexes.
These inspections confirmed that gall midge is found on hot peppers at very high rates,
especially during rainy months, with over 70 percent of shipments being infected in certain
months. However, at the same time, the MoA questioned the justification for the action taken by
APHIS and requested documentary evidence. Repeated requests for such documentary evidence
have been made since 1998, to no avail.
The fumigation requirement for hot peppers has had a significant impact on the competitiveness
of Jamaican exports in terms of both price and quality. Most Jamaican peppers can be sold in the
United States only for processing rather than the fresh market. Fumigation with methyl bromide
30

increases the cost of exporting hot peppers in comparison with competitors in the Caribbean that
do not face a similar requirement. 10 Furthermore, it causes physical damage to the product,
including loss of sheen, and reduces the shelf life. As a result, exports to the United States have
virtually collapsed. 11
Figure 8. Number of US interceptions of hot peppers from Jamaica, 1990–July 2003
Source: APHIS.
In response to the concerns raised by the Jamaican government (and also by the US ambassador
to Jamaica), in 2002 APHIS and the National Hot Pepper Task Force developed a set of
guidelines to facilitate the removal of the fumigation requirement. The result was a 10-point
system based on sourcing product from areas identified to be free of gall midge and on rigorous
controls through the supply chain to the point of export (box 2). This system concurred with the
task force’s own perspective that the means to resolve the problem was to reduce the incidence
of the pest in the field. The system also built on research on integrated pest management (IPM)
in Jamaica done under a Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP) funded by USAID
(Norton 2003).
10 This fumigation cost is equal to approximately 8% of the FOB value of hot peppers (APHIS estimate). Jamaica
already operates at a cost disadvantage with other competitors. While unit costs of production average between
$0.14 and 0.22/lb.in Belize, Dominica, Grenada, and Trinidad, Jamaica’s Hot Pepper Focus Group found the
average production costs for Jamaican Scott Bonnet peppers to equal $0.32/lb.
11 Hot pepper exports to the United States fell from over 200 tons in 1997 to only 25 tons in 2002 and 2003.
31

Box 2. APHIS conditions to remove the fumigation requirements for hot pepper exports to the United States
This 10-point system was arrived at collaboratively by the Jamaican National Hot Pepper Task Force and the US
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) in 2002. The system is based on sourcing hot peppers from
areas identified to be free of gall midge and on rigorous controls through the supply chain to the point of export.
1. Only precleared peppers would be eligible for entry without fumigation.
2. Shipments would be pre-inspected by the Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture (JMOA) and be accompanied by
a phytosanitary certificate stating, “Shipment free of cedidomyiid midge based on field controls and
inspection.”
3. APHIS preclearance personnel must participate directly in each of these preclearance inspections.
4. Only growers participating in the field control program will be allowed to ship without fumigation. These
growers need to be listed by JMOA or the Rural Agricultural Development Authority (RADA) and certified
as participating in the “non-Treatment Program” and the “trace-Back Program”.
5. All growers and packing facilities will display colored posters indicating midge symptoms. Both growers and
packers will be instructed to cull fruits with such symptoms.
6. Fruits found with the midge or eggs will be rejected or fumigated. Reconditioning will not be allowed. The
stems of 29 fruits will be cut and inspected for the midge. The stem cutting should be aimed toward any fruit
showing the symptoms. Cutting will not be required for “de-stemmed” shipments. Inspections for “stem-less”
peppers should be conducted on double-bottomed tables.
7. If the rejection rate for all quarantine pests reaches 15 percent, all peppers will require fumigation.
8. Pepper shipments can also be precleared with treatment or shipped without preclearance for treatment in the
United States. Shipments inspected in Jamaica and found infested cannot be shipped for treatment to the
United States.
9. Growers with shipments rejected once for the midge will be removed from the program. These growers can
apply for re-admittance by applying for a RADA/JMOA field inspection. If compliance with the program can
be assured, the grower could be reinstated. Growers with a second rejected shipment will not be allowed in
the “Non-treatment Program” for the remainder of the season. After a full review by RADA/MOA has been
undertaken and corrective mitigations have been implemented, the grower may apply for reinstatement for the
next year.
10. Each inspection site should have at least one inspection table that has slats or mesh bottoms, which allows
hitchhikers or midges to be shaken through and captured on a solid secondary bottom. At a minimum, sorrel
and stem-less peppers should be inspected on these tables.
To date, the 10-point protocol has not been implemented by the Jamaican government, and all
shipments remain subject to compulsory fumigation. Surveillance by RADA has indicated that
there are no areas of economic significance in Jamaica that would produce levels of infestation
that could be controlled at pack-houses. The lack of implementation of the protocol reflects the
fact that most exporters do not consider the required changes and efforts to be worth the
inconvenience nor the requisite staff time to be cost-effective. Indeed, many have chosen to
cease exports to the United States to avoid exposure to the risk of rejection at the point of entry.
More generally, the supply chains remain highly fragmented, making it difficult to achieve
effective traceability. Although some progressive exporters have made efforts to improve the
coordination of their supply chain, they have faced resistance from producers, many of which are
32

small and owned by older age groups, who see little reason to change when the domestic market
remains lucrative. Finally, even the progressive exporters are concerned that their efforts will be
in vain. The 15 percent detection level for all actionable pests specified in the 10-point protocol
means that these farmers run a significant risk that a fumigation requirement will be re-imposed
This case illustrates the very considerable problems that phytosanitary controls in the United
States can and have caused Jamaican exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables. While the
Jamaican government was proactive in responding to the emergence of gall midge as an issue for
hot pepper exports, the pay-offs from these efforts have been minimal. The requirements remain
in place. Whether they are justified scientifically remains an open question. The nature of the hot
pepper supply chain renders most system-based controls ineffective. Clearly, there is a need for
enhanced integration and consolidation of production. Indeed, the 10-point plan defined by
APHIS is a potential source of considerable competitive advantage to an integrated producerexporter.
However, at the same time, such an entrepreneur would be reliant on more general
efforts to control the pest more widely, highlighting the public good nature of phytosanitary
controls.
HYGIENE CONTROLS FOR FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS
Through the 1990s, Jamaica established a small but lucrative trade in fish and fishery products,
valued at US$16–19 million in the late 1990s (figure 9). Exports consist predominantly of conch,
tilapia (from aquaculture production), and lobster. Indeed, Jamaica has been a major player in the
international market for conch, with most exports destined for the French Caribbean territories of
Guadalupe and Martinique, and smaller quantities exported to the United States and other parts
of the European Union. Overall, fish and fishery products accounted for 1.2 percent of total
merchandise exports in 1999.
Figure 9. Jamaican exports of fish and fishery products, 1985–2003
Sources: FAOSTAT and COMTRADE.
33

In mid-2004, the export supply chain consisted of 8 processing plants, of which 5 or 6 handle
predominantly conch. Some processing plants operate their own boats that collect the landed
conch from small vessels. Others purchase from boat owners who have quota (see below) and/or
process for them under contract. One processor produces its own tilapia using aquaculture as
well as contracting production from other aquaculture operators. Overall, the Jamaican fishery
industry employs 20,000 fishers along 184 landing beaches and 3 off-shore keys. However,
many of these fishers are not involved in the export supply chain, and indeed have been excluded
from it due to stricter hygiene requirements (see below).
Through the late 1990s, exports of fish and fishery products, and conch in particular, were
compromised by two major issues. First were the hygiene requirements imposed by the European
Union on fish and fishery products. Although promulgated in 1991, these requirements were not
fully implemented until the end of the 1990s. 12 The second issue was the controls on landed
volumes of conch due to the CITES convention on endangered species. Each issue is described
below.
Historically, the fish processing sector in Jamaica was largely unregulated with respect to the
approval and certification of products for export. While the Veterinary Public Health division of
the MoH was responsible for inspecting processing facilities, there was no effective mechanism
through which compliance with food safety requirements in export markets could be assessed.
This latter function fell under the responsibility of the VSD, which lacked the inspection capacity
and arguably had no legislative power to undertake such inspections and certify products. As a
result, the controls in place fell far short of the hygiene standards required to be in place for
exports to the EU.
The European Union had established a deadline of June 31, 1998 for countries to have
implemented hygiene controls that were at least equivalent to its own requirements for bivalve
mollusks, echinoderms, tunicates, and marine gastropods. 13 Countries that had not achieved this
were prohibited from exporting to the European Union. The latter included Jamaica, which
overnight lost its main markets for conch. Jamaica was, however, permitted to export other fish
and fishery products on a provisional basis and was included in Part II of the list of approved
countries.
Table 12. Major fish and fishery product exports, 1999–2003 (kg)
Year Conch Tilapia Lobster Other
1999 43,636 306,975 1,796
2000 0 250,193 56,280 1,457
2001 1,065,024 358,747 25,645 0
2002 265,670 282,182 28,482 45
2003 363,038 183,827 116,100 53,933
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Kingston.
In response to these restrictions, the Jamaican government implemented the necessary legislative
reforms and promulgated the Aquaculture, Inland, Marine Products and By-products (Inspection,
12 For a discussion of the nature of the EU’s hygiene requirements for fish and fishery products, see Henson and
Mitullah 2004.
13 These are shellfish that filter feed off of plankton and other small creatures. In circumstances in which their living
environment includes contaminated water, it is ingested into these creatures. Other common examples of such
species include oysters and clams.
34

Licensing and Export) Act in 1999. This Act was broadly based on the respective EU legislation,
namely, Directives 91/492/EC and 91/493/EC. The Act identified the VSD as the Competent
Authority. However, when the European Commission undertook inspections in April 1999, it
found a number of remaining violations: 14
Although the relevant national legislation was broadly equivalent to EU legislation, it had
not been entirely implemented. Furthermore, monitoring of production conditions were
not considered adequate and were not fully documented.
The majority of processing establishments did not comply with EU requirements, for
example, regarding water control, pest and vermin control, and general conditions of
maintenance and production.
Although the implementation of HACCP had commenced in many processing plants, in
most cases, Critical Control Points had only been identified and were not being
implemented, monitored, or verified.
Laboratory facilities for certain microbiological analyses and residue testing were
considered inadequate.
The EC made a second inspection visit in April 2000, which identified limited continued
discrepancies. 15 The Jamaican government subsequently provided written assurances that these
discrepancies had been rectified. Consequently, in December 2000 the EC established special
import conditions for Jamaica, and it was added to List I of the list of approved countries. These
conditions included the defined area from which conch exported to the EU could be derived,
namely, Pedro Bank. Thus, as of February 2001, Jamaica was able to recommence its conch
exports. Initially, 3 plants were approved to export to the European Union, although this number
now stands at 6, with an additional 6 freezer vessels also approved.
The Jamaican government’s response to the EU’s hygiene requirements was delayed, and the
reforms took a considerable period to implement. These delays in part reflect the fact that exports
of other fishery products were permitted to continue during this period, while there was no
capture of conch during 2000 (see below). However, the delays also resulted from the
considerable investments that had to be made, estimated at US$1.25 million. For example,
coherent mechanisms to approve processing plants, issue export health certificates, and monitor
water and fish for environmental contaminants had to be put in place. The VSD did not have the
number of inspectors required to undertake these tasks and signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the MoH to gain access to its inspectors who were already present in
fish processing plants. Laboratories needed to be upgraded to perform the required analyses,
including investment in HPLC equipment. Most of these expenses were directly funded by the
Jamaican government.
The government is facing considerable ongoing costs associated with further upgrades in
capacity and operational expenditures. It is acknowledged that current capacity represents the
“bare bones” of what is required and that further investments will be needed, especially in
laboratory testing capacity. For example, the VSD laboratory is not accredited by an approved
accreditation agency, although certification is scheduled to be rectified under the National
Quality Infrastructure Project and is planned for early in 2005. Furthermore, the VSD laboratory
14 Report XXIV/1985/99-ME Final.
15 Report DG (SANCO)/1166/2000-MR Final.
35

does not have the equipment to tests for dioxins or steroids and cannot perform quantitative
analyses of antibiotics. There is also concern at the magnitude of the costs to maintain this
capacity. Although fees are levied for laboratory analysis equal to 50 percent of the total cost, the
government makes no equivalent charge to inspect processing facilities. Although the
government acknowledges that some form of cost recovery is required, currently, doing so is
considered politically unacceptable.
Considerable investments and changes in procedures were also required by fish processing
facilities (boxes 3 and 4). It is acknowledged that most plants started from a situation in which
hygiene controls were largely absent. Thus, the estimated average cost per plant is US$750,000,
suggesting an industry-wide cost of US$4.5 million. Although all of the plants that have been
approved have made very significant improvements, they still remain reliant on external
capacity. For example, none of these facilities has laboratory capacity and utilize the VSD to
undertake the required tests. As described above, 50 percent of the cost of these tests is
subsidized by the Jamaican government.
The Jamaican government has expressed concern, although not formally to the European
Commission, that the European Union’s requirements are inappropriate for a deep water fishery
such as Pedro Bank. Specifically, Jamaica claims that the maximum levels and monitoring
requirements for coliforms and biotoxins are more applicable to the in-shore and shallower
waters in which bivalve mollusks, echinoderms, tunicates, and marine gastropods are typically
produced in Europe. However, there are also claims from the fish processing sector that the
Jamaican government has interpreted some aspects of the European Union’s requirements too
strictly, in particular, the requirement for fishing boats to have toilets, which effectively excludes
small artisanal boats.
Because conch is a recognized endangered species, harvesting it is restricted under the CITES
Convention. Conch was added to CITES in 1992. Subsequently, a survey was undertaken by the
Jamaican government and the conch population monitored to assess the maximum sustainable
harvest in any one year from Jamaican waters. The controls take the form of an export quota set
under the CITES Convention. Currently, the sustainable harvest from Jamaican waters is
estimated at approximately 900 tons. However, there is significant poaching by neighboring
countries, especially in Central America, so the actual quota is generally significantly below this
level. The United States banned imports of conch from some of these countries, notably the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Honduras for 6 months in 2003 because they did not have an
established quota system. In 2003 the total allowable harvest in Jamaica was 500 tons, although
this increased to 550 tons in 2004.
Within Jamaica, an annually renewable quota is distributed by the Jamaican government to
named individuals to harvest conch in fulfillment of the export quota set by CITES. Historically,
the quota to harvest conch was distributed by the Jamaican Government under a conch
management plan based on a “gentleman’s agreement.” Currently, however, the quota is based
on a formula that takes account of historical involvement in conch harvesting, ownership of a
motorized vessel, and use of artisanal fishers. These revised criteria led to a significant
redistribution of quota, which in 1999 motivated one quota-holder to legally dispute the authority
of the MoA to allocate quota. Although the dispute was eventually settled out of court, it
prevented any quota being distributed, and therefore any harvesting, in 1999 and 2000. Thus,
36

there were no exports in these years irrespective of the restrictions on exports to the European
Union. 16
Box 3. Reform of fish hygiene controls by Firm A
This company started as a small exporter of fresh fish to New York in 1983. It started harvesting and processing
conch in 1984–85. Its major export market for conch is the European Union, although it has exported to the United
States when the EU market has been closed. Their current quota is 81.8 tons per annum, which is harvested with
their own vessel. Currently, all exports of conch are to the EU, namely, Guadalupe and Martinique. The company
also exports lobster, although supply problems have limited their ability to fully develop this trade.
The company saw the need to upgrade its facilities and started construction of a new processing plant in 1996.
Operations started in the new facility in 1998. However, when the processing plant was inspected by the European
Commission in 1999, a number of major violations were identified, and significant additional investment was
required. The company was visited again as part of the second round of inspections by the European Commission in
2000. It achieved approval to export to the EU as part of the first cohort of companies in 2001.
The upgrades required to comply with the EU’s hygiene standards included record-keeping, pest control, water
monitoring, sanitation, microbiological and chemical contaminant analyses, and enhanced plant maintenance.
Freezer capacity had to be increased to enable product to be stored until the results of laboratory analyses were
available. On-site ice-making facilities were also installed; previously, ice had been purchased. Although HACCP
was nominally in place as a response to US requirements, major changes were needed to ensure effective monitoring
of CCPs and verification. The vessel also needs to be upgraded, including installation of stainless steel storage
containers, toilet facilities based on the number of crew, and a freezing system. Most of the resources used to make
these improvements were borrowed, and the company is still repaying this debt.
The combined impact of the various restrictions and dislocations are apparent in the recent
pattern of Jamaica’s fishery product exports. Nevertheless, the country should now be in a
position to better compete, particularly for conch. Most other countries that hold CITES quotas
to harvest conch, including the Bahamas, Belize, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Honduras, and Puerto Rico, are not approved to export to the European Union. Thus, Jamaica
should be virtually a monopoly supplier of conch, a position entirely created by the EU’s hygiene
standards for fish and fishery products with which only Jamaica has achieved compliance.
16 Currently, 9 individuals hold quotas to harvest conch in Jamaica, of whom 6 operate processing plants and 3 have
a fishing boat but no plant. Of these processing plants, five are approved to export to the EU. However, one of
these plants accounts for a significant proportion of the total volume of conch being processed. Two plants have
ceased operating due to the costs of complying with stricter hygiene requirements.
37

Box 4. Reform of hygiene controls by Firm B
This Jamaican company started as a shrimp farm in 1983 but switched to farming fin fish in 1987–88. Its emphasis
is now almost entirely on red tilapia. Historically, the company has supplied both domestic and export markets,
although the latter have declined in the face of new and intense competition from Ecuador. Ecuador started
exporting tilapia after the collapse of its own shrimp aquaculture due to disease. That country is now the world’s
largest exporter of tilapia and dominates the US market. Currently, exports of Firm B account for approximately 15
percent of sales, most of which are directed at the European Union. Frozen prepared products are sold to local and
regional markets, including major fast food chains and hotels.
The company has its own production covering 205 acres and also contracts 11 farmers. It supplies fingerlings and
feed to these contractors under credit. VSD inspects these farms on a regular basis, at considerable cost to itself. In
all cases, the company stocks and harvests the fish itself. Fish are brought live from the production sites to the
factory for slaughter and processing.
The processing facility has been upgraded extensively to comply with EU hygiene requirements at a total cost of
approximately US$2 million. HACCP and ISO 9000 were implemented in 1998, in part to comply with US
requirements. However, additional upgrades were required including documentation, pest control, monitoring of
water, and microbiological and chemical analyses. The facility was inspected as part of the two European
Commission inspections.
Production costs have increased as a result of these enhanced hygiene controls, although the company considers that
the benefits outweigh the costs. It also claims to have gained a competitive edge over other Jamaican and Caribbean
companies, in that the enhanced controls exclude companies with lower standards and erect barriers to entry. Indeed,
the company has been visited by all its European customers, which include some major UK retailers, and uses this
fact to emphasize the efficacy of the hygiene standards with which it now complies. Other issues loom, however.
Economical feed supplies come from the US, but the company cannot certify that this feed is GMO-free, as some of
its buyers require.
Jamaica’s effort to address stricter hygiene requirements for fish and fishery products in the
European Union can be categorized as reactive compliance. Initially, investments were made to
comply with US food safety regulations, including the implementation of HACCP, although
standards generally remained lax. However, it was not until the loss of access to EU markets,
mainly the French Caribbean territories, that concerted efforts were made across the industry by
both the public and private sectors to upgrade hygiene controls. Broadly, these efforts were
predominantly driven by the public sector. Indeed, the continued compliance by most fish
processing plants remains dependent on the laboratory testing services provided by the MoA,
given that it is not considered economically viable for individual processors to make investments
in such facilities. Some processing plants have exited from the sector altogether, while others
have not achieved approval to export to the EU and focus instead on the United States and
regional markets. An additional irony is that, while Jamaica lost access to the EU for 17 months,
the fact that its major competitors in the market for conch have not yet achieved compliance is a
major competitive advantage.
PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLES
An ongoing issue in the export of nontraditional fruits and vegetables to Canada, the European
Union, and the United States is Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for pesticides. On the one
hand, the specter of seemingly ever stricter limits hangs over the industry and is seen as a
potentially major threat to the future development of trade in these products. On the other hand,
38

specific problems have been experienced with residues of agrochemicals, most notably with
yams (see below) and callaloo.
In Jamaica, responsibility for control of pesticides lies with the Pesticides Control Authority
(PCA), a semi-autonomous agency of the MoH. The PCA is responsible for registering
pesticides, licensing imports, and registering/licensing pesticide retailers and pest controls
operators. In the case of pest control operators, the responsibility for licensing is shared with the
FSPID regarding stored commodities. Broadly, these controls provide a comprehensive
framework for the regulation of pesticides. It also is evident that controls have been enhanced in
recent years, at least in relation to retailer distributors (figure 10).
The major weakness in the use and control of pesticides lie in agricultural production. 17 As
described above, Jamaican agriculture is characterized by small holdings operated predominantly
by farmers from older age groups. Overall, there is a lack of awareness and training in the
appropriate use of pesticides including GAP, application procedures, and preharvest intervals.
Efforts have been made by RADA to train farmers in the appropriate use of pesticides, although
these efforts have not been extensive due to resource limitations. In many cases, such training
has been sponsored by the agrochemical companies and essentially has addressed how to address
particular pests using their products rather than limiting the use of pesticides overall. There is
also a lack of crop-specific approval of pesticides in Jamaica with many chemicals being
approved for agricultural use in general. More generally, there is chronic misuse of pesticides in
Jamaica, with application of chemicals that are available, often at the wrong concentration,
frequency, and/or interval before harvest (Reid 2000). 18
17 As an example, one crop that has been subject to repeated detentions and rejection at the US border is callaloo,
including both the fresh and canned product. The MoA has acknowledged that there are problems with pesticide
use in the production of this crop, and efforts have been made to introduce alternative agronomic practices. For
example, callaloo is one of the focus crops of the CRSP (IPM) Program in Jamaica being coordinated by CARDI.
In practice, however, efforts to introduce IPM methods have met with resistance from farmers. Indeed, there is
little incentive to change established practices when the domestic market predominates. At the same time,
pesticides are generally packaged in quantities that are inappropriate for small-scale production and have dilution
instructions that are for inordinately large volumes. These instructions confuse farmers and can lead to excessive
concentrations being applied. To address these issues, action is required on the part of the PCA.
18 To a certain extent, and ironically, pesticide misuse may have been exacerbated by the preclearance program for
exports of fresh produce to the United States, because producers have responded by increasing pesticide use to
prevent detection of pests.
39

Figure 10. Number of inspections by Pesticides Control Authority, 1999–2003
Source: PCA 2003.
A great concern for Jamaica is that MRLs have not been established, either internationally
through the Codex Alimentarius or by its major trading partners, for many of its nontraditional
fruit and vegetable exports. As discussed above, Jamaica’s trade in this area consists of a large
number of local varieties, all of which are minor in world trade. For this reason, there is little or
no motivation for agrochemical companies to furnish the data on which an MRL might be
established. The result is that a limit at the level of determination (LOD) is applied during border
inspections in the European Union and the United States. Combined with the lack of effective
controls on pesticide use, this lack of established MRLs is perceived to present a serious threat to
the trade in such products.
Since 1993, the European Union has been implementing a program to establish harmonized
MRLs for foodstuffs (Jaffee 2003). This program aims to overcome inconsistencies in the
national limits of Member States. 19 Alongside the establishment of MRLs, there has been an
ongoing review of pesticides approved for use in the EU. Under this program, all active
ingredients approved before July 1993 are being reviewed. It is anticipated that a significant
proportion of currently approved active ingredients will be withdrawn. In the case of importers,
19 MRLs have been established where sufficient data are available for specific crop/active ingredient combinations.
Where data is unavailable or insufficient, the MRL position has been left in an “open position” for a limited
period of time, during which data (collected in accordance with strict procedures defined by the EU) can be
submitted. Once this period has expired, the MRL is set at the Limit of Determination (LOD). While data can be
submitted to defend the establishment of an MRL after this period, in practice it can take a considerable period,
extending into years, to gather the required data.
40

however, tolerances may be granted subject to the submission of approved data on the hazards to
consumers.
The Committee for Liaison among Europe, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (COLEACP),
has recognized the problems faced by exporters of fruit and vegetables from the ACP States and
has implemented a Pesticides Initiative Programme (PIP). As part of this program, information
has been gathered on pesticides used in ACP countries and an action plan launched for the
collection and collation of data to support the establishment of MRLs for crops of interest to
ACP countries. Furthermore, advice has been provided on immediate measures that should be
adopted by producers and exporters, including harvest intervals, choice of pesticides, and use of
post-harvest pesticides. In the case of Jamaica, relations with the PIP started in 2000. One of the
areas being addressed is the possibility of the established MRL for sweet potatoes being
recognized for yams. However, to date, Jamaica had not seen results from these efforts.
YAMS
The one crop that has suffered from persistent problems due to pesticide residues is yams.
Jamaica grows a combination of both yellow and other yams that are supplied to both domestic
and export markets. Major export markets are Canada, the United Kingdom and the United
States, predominantly directed at the African and Caribbean immigrant communities. More than
5 percent of the agricultural area in Jamaica is dedicated to yam production, although both the
planted area and production declined through the 1990s. In recent years, national yam production
has been approximately 150,000 tons, of which approximately 10,000–12,000 tons are exported.
Jamaica accounts for approximately 50 percent of world exports of yams, the other important
suppliers including Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ghana.
Yams are grown predominantly by small farmers in Jamaica and are an important source of
income. 20 Producers sell their yams to middlemen who supply both domestic markets and
exporters. Yams are selected in the field with the aim of minimizing rejects at the exporter’s
pack-house. The key quality characteristics examined by exporters include cleanliness; similar
varietal characteristics; shape; maturity; and the absence of nematodes, physical damage, and
disease. A typical exporter may routinely source from 200 producers, with whom s/he has no
direct relation, and there is little or no traceability through the supply chain. During recent years,
there has been considerable consolidation of the export trade due to the increase in the market
price of yams. A number of exporters have been unable to assemble a complete order of product
due to the subsequent increase in their procurement costs and have shifted to other products or
ceased exporting altogether.
20 Upwards of 50,000 farmers are thought to produce yams for consumption and sale.
41

Figure 11. Production of yams, 1994–2003
Source: Ministry of Agriculture.
Exports of yam are now dominated by a relatively small number of traders. Several of them have
made efforts to improve hygiene and pest controls, especially within the pack-house but also
through better coordination of their supply chains. For example, some exporters provide field
crates and require a record to be kept of the lots supplied by each farmer. They have also
improved the washing of the product, for example, installing stainless steel basins, and have
attempted to ensure proper drying to prevent growth of mold. Broadly, however, traditional
practices throughout the supply chain have not changed, and there is little distinction between the
products sold on domestic and export markets. In recent years, exports of yam have shown a
sustained increase, rising from approximately US$8 million in 1990 to nearly US$15 million in
2003. 21 (figure 12).
21 The 2000 dip in the volume of trade was due to drought-induced reductions in production.
42

Figure 12. Exports of yams, 1990–2003
Sources: Jamaican Exporters Association and FAOSTAT.
Exports of yam to the United States have been subject to mandatory fumigation since the 1940s
to eradicate the yam weevil. This requirement is applied to most other importers to the United
States. However, a survey of yam production in Jamaica by the MoA identified pest-free areas.
Subsequently, the Jamaican government requested that a pest risk assessment be undertaken by
APHIS with the aim of lifting the requirement for fumigation of exports from these areas. To
date, this issue has not been resolved.
However, the most serious problem with exports to the United States relates to limits on
fungicide residues. Fungicide is routinely applied to the cut ends of yams to prevent the growth
of blue mold, in particular, during sea shipments. Jamaica is almost unique in exporting large
yams that are cut into sections; thus, blue mold is not an issue for its competitors. The fungicide
most widely used (Imazilil) is not registered for such use by the FDA and, as a consequence, the
MRL is at the analytical LOD. In 2000 border inspection by the FDA detected residues of
Imazilil; as a result, several large exporters lost consignments. The FDA required subsequent
consignments to be certified as residue-free by an approved laboratory.
In response, the Jamaican government established a Yam Task Force. It requested permission
from the FDA to use two fungicides, Deccosol and Botran, which Jamaica was using on sweet
potato and for which MRLs have been established. In the interim, the task force recommended
that calcium hypochlorite be used instead of Imazilil, although the former provided less
protection against mold growth. The Yam Task Force also recommended that farmers switch to
production of the smaller Miniset yam, which does not need to be cut prior to export. It also
recommended that more careful drying procedures be used at pack-houses, because a properly
dried yam can create its own natural protection against mold.
43

The FDA approved the use of calcium hypochlorite, Botran, and Deccosol to treat the cut ends of
yams. Currently, however, Deccosol is not approved for use in Jamaica, and the PCA has had
problems getting the manufacturer to furnish the required data. This chemical’s primary use is to
fumigate greenhouses rather than as a post-harvest treatment. Subsequently, the MoA approved
the use of calcium hypochlorite and Botran for the treatment of yams for export. Both of these
approved treatments are acknowledged to be less effective at abating mold growth, and a number
of exporters have reported problems, especially with sea shipments. At the same time, the MoA
has worked with exporters to improve handling practices, for example, proper and timely
disposal of waste materials and appropriate washing procedures. The MoA suspects that Imazilil
is still being widely used. 22
As with many of the issues highlighted above, the problems that Jamaica has experienced with
yams and other vegetables due to residues of agrochemicals reflect weaknesses in prevailing
control measures alongside highly fragmented supply chains that do not differentiate between
production for local and export markets and have remained largely unchanged despite the
enhancement of food safety controls in major markets. Together with the problems experienced
with hot peppers, however, the yam problem does illustrate the ability and willingness of the
Jamaican government to pursue SPS-related problems that impede agricultural and food exports,
especially where these requirements are considered questionable. The MoA sought to influence
the measures adopted by a trading partner and to negotiate alternative remedies. Furthermore,
although the government took action only when a problem arose in a major export market––that
is, reactively rather than proactively––the response was quick and decisive. These experiences
suggest that the SPS management system is able to act when it needs to. At the same time, it is
not evident that the government and private sector are interpreting such product-specific events,
individually and/or collectively, as indicators that broader reforms are required urgently.
PAPAYA
Jamaica was one of the pioneering countries in the development of trade in papayas. The country
accounted for a large share of European imports of this tropical fruit when the market there
began to take off in the early 1990s. Since then, the Jamaican industry encountered major plant
disease problems (in the mid-1990s there was an outbreak of Mosaic, a disease related to ring
spot virus) and was overtaken by several competing countries. 23 Recently, though, several
companies have made investments to upgrade the quality of Jamaican-grown papaya, to address
pesticide-residue and other concerns, and to modernize their pack-houses, including through the
application of HACCP principles. Three exporters have emerged to dominate this trade. They
have integrated production and/or contract satellite producers while maintaining effective control
of the supply chain.
22 Jamaica has not experienced any rejections of yams by the European Union, although surveillance has been
undertaken (for example, in the United Kingdom) and a warning has been issued. Regardless, it is expected that
Imazilil will soon be delisted for approved use, not only in the European Union but also in the United States,
necessitating the shift to an alternative treatment anyway.
23 For example, Mexico and Brazil have emerged as the market leaders. In 1990 Mexico’s papaya exports were
similar to those of Jamaica at just under $1 million. By 2003, Mexico’s grew to $44 million. Over that same
period, Brazil’s papaya exports increased from $2 to $29 million. Belize, which had no papaya trade in the early
1990s, had exports of approximately $10 million by 2003.
44

Figure 13. Exports of papaya, 1991–2003
Note: The 2001 figure is questionable. FAOSTAT places trade in that year at US$3.3 million.
Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica and FAOSTAT.
For example, Advanced Farm Technology (AFT), a subsidiary of a US-owned firm, was
established in 1982. The firm purchased a bankrupt winter vegetable project and, after some
time, converted it to papaya production. The initial five acres for papaya has expanded to 300
acres, of which 150 is being used at any one time. New management was introduced in the last
24 months, after which significant improvements have been made to food safety and agricultural
health controls and quality management. AFT is now a dedicated papaya exporter that focuses on
the United Kingdom and the United States, mainly aimed at wholesalers that supply African,
Asian and Caribbean immigrant markets.
Alongside its own production, AFT contracts two farmers to produce papaya, each of which has
his own satellite producers. These two farmers operate their own pack-houses from which
produce is delivered to the central pack-house of AFT. However, their pack-houses are inspected
on a regular basis and must operate to specified standards to ensure food safety and plant health
controls and compliance with quality standards. All crates have a code for each farmer,
facilitating traceability back to the place of production. AFT has been sourcing in this way for
four years and has established a reliable supply chain that provides the required level of control
and accountability. The aim is for fruit to be at the final market 48 hours after harvesting.
Currently, Advanced Farm Technology has almost fully implemented HACCP, which builds on
already established GAP procedures. Its pack-house has been upgraded gradually over a six-year
period, for example, with the repair of floors; installation of light covers, screens, fans and water
chlorination; and reorganization of production to ensure correct product flow. All staff are
provided with uniforms and must have food handler permits. Record-keeping has also been
extensively upgraded. Although some buyers have asked about HACCP certification, none has
required it. However, the firm has seen how requirements are changing and wants to be ahead of
the game to maintain market access and enhance competitiveness.
45

Exports of papaya are aided by the fact that MRLs have been established for many of the major
pesticides used in production. However, residues are still an issue, with respect to both
regulatory requirements and the standards laid down by private buyers. For example, AFT has
had a number of consignments detained by the FDA in the United States, although all eventually
passed and were released. However, it can sometimes take up to three days for samples to be
taken, reducing shelf-life and thus the value of the consignment. The company has made efforts
to address some of these problems, for example, through application of biopesticides, although
these are typically more expensive.
There are also quite regular detentions related to phytosanitary controls. One of the frustrations
that exporters face here is that the US authorities do not provide feedback on the code in boxes in
which problems are identified, making it difficult to trace back the source and take corrective
action. To overcome this problem, Advanced Farm Technology has employed pack-house
workers who are dedicated to the inspection of individual fruit for pests. AFT does not use the
preclearance program prior to export because of high rates of re-inspection in the United States.
To reduce the risk of detentions for whatever reason, AFT has reduced the size of each
consignment to a maximum of 500 boxes.
SANITARY, PHYTOSANITARY, AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS FOR PROCESSED FOOD PRODUCTS
Alongside exports of fruits and vegetables and fish, which are subject to only limited levels of
processing, Jamaica has established a trade in a wide range of processed and packaged foods,
including pepper sauces, soups, seasonings, and juices. Historically, these processed foods
served Caribbean immigrant markets in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
However, the exporters of these foods have progressively shifted to a wider consumer base,
reflecting increased demand for spicier and “ethnic” foods. Such products are subject to a far
wider range of food safety, quality, and labeling requirements that require more sophisticated
systems of SPS controls, especially on the part of the manufacturer/exporter. In the case of
Jamaica, it is evident that levels of such capacity vary widely, and even well-established and
sophisticated manufacturers, for example, Grace Kennedy, face regular problems, as illustrated
by the rates of border detention in the United States.
One product that has had very particular problems is ackee. Ackee are a traditional fruit widely
consumed by Jamaicans and for which there is a lucrative market among the diaspora. Exports of
canned ackee were valued at US$5.6 million in 2001 and increased to US$7.2 million in 2002.
The ackee processing and canning sector is estimated to employ approximately 3,700 people, of
whom over 65 percent are women (Reid 2000). An additional approximately 50,000 people are
estimated to derive their livelihood through ackee production.
In 1973, because of concerns about hypoglycin, a toxin present in unripe ackee, the United States
imposed an import alert on canned ackee. The alert resulted in an effective US market ban on the
product, although there apparently emerged a vibrant smuggling trade through the Canadian
border. Jamaica’s trade in this product continued with Canada and the United Kingdom. In the
mid-to-late 1990s a series of discussions took place between Jamaican and US authorities on
how the import alert might be lifted. To regain access to US markets, the Jamaican authorities
were required to implement a HACCP-based system of prior approval and regulation of ackee
processors. The country prepared a Jamaican Standard for Canned Ackee in Brine. Exports to the
United States of canned ackee restarted in 2001, although trade in fresh ackee is prohibited.
46

Export earnings expanded considerably due to the comparatively higher prices for this product in
the US market (Gordon 2002).
More generally, exporters of packaged food products to the United States are required to file
details of their production process with the FDA before they are permitted access. Producers of
low-acid and acidified canned food also are required to obtain prior approval of their products
and production processes. The Scientific Research Council provides a service to companies
wishing to export processed food products to the United States. For a fee, the council will gather
the required information and complete the required registration and/or prior approval
documentation. However, a significant number of product consignments have been rejected by
the FDA because they have not complied with these requirements and/or the importer has failed
to submit the required documentation.
Exporters of processed foods have also encountered problems related to labeling requirements,
especially nutrition labeling, and the use of additives, especially colorants, that are not permitted
in the United States. The JBS provides advice on label design and content and undertakes
nutrient analysis for nutritional labeling. However, exporters have complained about the amount
of extra time required to obtain approval for a label and the costs associated with border
rejections because a label is judged to be noncompliant.
FOOD SAFETY CONTROLS FOR THE TOURISM SECTOR
Although not related to agricultural and food exports per se, a major SPS issue affecting trade in
services and earnings of foreign exchange is the impact of food safety on tourism. In 2003
Jamaica had approximately 1.3 million foreign tourists and a similar number of stopover cruise
ship passengers, with these numbers increasing over time (figure 14).
Figure 14. Number of foreign tourist arrivals, 1997–2003
Source: Planning Institute of Jamaica.
47

Since 1993, when a major outbreak of food-borne disease occurred in the tourist population, a
program of hotel surveillance has been in place covering the popular destination sites of
Montego Bay, Negril, and Ocho Rios. In 1999 the Kingston and St Andrews region were added
to this program. While this system provides valuable monitoring data, it has been recognized that
there are weaknesses in recording at the parish level, and some caution should be used in
interpretation. In 1996 one study indicated that approximately 25 percent of tourists suffered
from diarrhea during their stay in Jamaica (Ashley 2002). By December 1998, however, there
had been a significant reduction in the recorded incidences of traveler diarrhea, and low rates are
being sustained (table 13). At the same time, rates vary significantly among hotels, with some
having persistently high levels of traveler diarrhea. Major outbreaks, however, are a relatively
rare occurrence.
Table 13. Rates of traveler diarrhea per 10,000 guest nights, 2000–02
Region 2000 2001 2002
Ocho Rios 12.74 7.75 4.84
Montego Bay 4.72 5.12 3.78
Negril 6.3 5.6 5.7
Kingston & St Andrews -

as exports of nontraditional products have grown alongside the evolution of stricter international
food safety and plant health controls, SPS issues have come to play a prominent role in
determining market access and Jamaica’s competitiveness in its major export markets. A number
of specific problems have emerged that have compromised a potentially lucrative trade in niche
products. In this sense, Jamaica is probably indicative of many smaller developing countries.
Currently, it is evident that the core SPS management framework is in place, and in
particular, there is well-developed human capital, although it has not developed and
evolved in line with the food safety and plant health control needs of its exports. A
number of assessments have highlighted the need for administrative reform to avoid
wasting limited resources and better coordination of SPS controls to ensure that emerging
issues are addressed in an effective and timely manner. While the need for reform of SPS
controls is widely recognized and two broad programs of capacity development have
been implemented in Jamaica, progress has been slow due to political inertia. There is
clearly a need for renewed urgency in this respect. Recent efforts to enhance
coordination across agencies provide some positive signs, and these efforts need to be
extended, building on progress step by step.
Jamaica has addressed SPS challenges primarily in a reactive mode, developing plans of
action and modified regulations after market access has been cut off or restricted due to
SPS problems or trade partner concerns. In some cases, technical and administrative
solutions have been found, albeit with some delay. In other cases, either technical
solutions remain elusive or the administrative or financial implications of identified
solutions have resulted in their limited adoption. These patterns have contributed to a
very uneven development of Jamaica’s NTE trade, with still-frequent product
interceptions, by either Jamaican or trade partner authorities, and much uncertainty
within the private sector. What is recommended is that Jamaica take a proactive attitude
and steps toward meeting international standards for the products that the country can
profitably export.
Much of the existing SPS management capacity in Jamaica remains embedded in the
public sector, with the exception of certain subsectors (for example, fish and fishery
products) or among some larger-scale operators (for example, a few food processors and
those involved in papaya exports). While some progressive exporters of nontraditional
fruits and vegetables are beginning to make some changes, overall private investment in
improved food safety and plant health systems has been very limited. This slowness to
change in part reflects overall uncertainties about export growth potential and a
perception that overseas standards are either unfair or too complex. It also reflects the
highly fragmented nature of the pertinent export trades and supply chains, aging agrarian
population, lack of pressures for change from overseas buyers, and still-predominant
domestic market outlets for the featured commodities (for which few standards are
enforced). These conditions result in inabilities to realize economies of scale and to
induce changes in farmer agronomic and record-keeping practices. Clearly, efforts need
to be made to enhance the coordination and integration of supply chains for products for
which there is real long-term potential for export competitiveness, building on the
experiences of, for example, the papaya sector.
Many of Jamaica’s nontraditional agrofood exports face a broad range of competitiveness
constraints, related to inconsistent raw material production, high post-harvest losses,
49

elatively high-cost and limited-availability labor, macroeconomic factors, and intensified
regional and other competition. Market access problems related to SPS materials have
exacerbated and reinforced these constraints, reducing the profitability and raising the
risks associated with the conduct of these trades. The resolution of such SPS constraints
is necessary, although not sufficient, for restoring and improving the competitiveness of
Jamaica’s nontraditional agrofood exports. In addition, efforts must be made to enhance
overall export competitiveness, for example, through enhanced productivity and/or
product quality.
Capacity weaknesses remain significant in the private sector, and there are questions as
to whether exports can be maintained, let alone increased, on the basis of the current
fragmented system of production among an aging farming population. Selected
interventions to develop more coordinated supply chains and traceability systems for
particular commodities could be pursued, perhaps through a joint public/donor-private
initiative. Nevertheless, it is likely that future export development will require private
investment in (medium-scale) export-dedicated production for which rising quality, food
safety, and plant health standards are factored into production, post-harvest, and overall
management systems. It is not certain that this activity is sufficiently profitable to induce
such investment, whether by Jamaicans or others with prior experience and market
linkages. Furthermore, Jamaica has a number of notable disadvantages compared with
competing supply sites in Africa, Central America, and elsewhere, including the
availability and cost of freight, low and fluctuating yields, and fragmented supply chains.
These disadvantages raise questions about the likely economic benefits of enhanced
trade-related SPS controls unless broader efforts to enhance export competitiveness are
undertaken. Thus, it seems clear that the development of SPS capacity needs to be
undertaken within the context of broader developments in the supply chain for high-value
agricultural and food exports.
Future export development can also involve efforts to expand sales in sauces, seasonings,
and other value-added processed food products, both increasing market shares among
immigrant communities and extending sales to penetrate the more mainstream market, for
which demand for many such products continues to grow rapidly. These efforts may
require some modification of product composition and recipes to meet consumer
preferences and increased attention to compliance with regulations related to labeling,
additives, and packaging. Rather than a fragmented, company-specific approach to these
challenges, there is scope for a more coordinated approach involving joint investment in
product R&D, food hygiene training, and market development.
50

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