How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale ...

How New York State Exaggerated Potential
Job Creation from Shale Gas Development

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IMAGE © DHALUZA / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job
Creation from Shale Gas Development
Executive Summary . ................................................................... 2
Introduction . ......................................................................... 3
New York’s shale gas job projection . ...................................................... 3
Shale gas development would bring few opportunities to current residents . ...................... 7
Additional failures of New York’s analysis of socioeconomic impacts . ............................ 8
Conclusion . ......................................................................... 10

Executive Summary
High-volume hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, combined with new drilling techniques, has made it costeffective
for the oil and gas industry to extract natural gas from underground rock formations called
shales. 1 However, the costs of the practice to public health, public infrastructure and the environment,
conflicting against the oil and gas industry’s promises of wealth for landowners and jobs for rural communities,
make modern shale gas development controversial.
New York State, much of which sits atop the Marcellus
Shale and the Utica Shale, is at the center of
this public controversy. The Cuomo administration
is currently considering regulations that would allow
widespread drilling and fracking for shale gas in New
York. The regulations being considered are based on
the state’s 1,537-page environmental impact analysis,
which included a socioeconomic impact analysis with
job and revenue projections for several different shale
gas development scenarios in the state. 2
Food & Water Watch closely examined New York’s
socioeconomic impact analysis and found that it does
the people of New York a disservice. The New York
analysis concluded that an “average” shale gas development
scenario would bring 53,969 jobs, but only in
the fine print of a footnote of the widely read factsheet
is it mentioned that this is a 30-year projection. 3
Moreover, Food & Water Watch found that the analysis:
• counts many jobs that would be filled by outof-state
workers, or by workers with shale gas
industry experience who relocate to New York
permanently;
Based on the New York analysis, Food & Water Watch
estimates that in the first year of the “average” shale
gas development scenario, current New York residents
can expect only 195 new oil and gas industry job
opportunities. This would grow steadily to over 600
new jobs for current New York residents in the tenth
year of development, but after this tenth year, there
would be next-to-no new jobs for established New York
residents.
For perspective, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimated that 755,892 New Yorkers were unemployed
in August of 2011, 4 and thus the impact of 195 new
oil and gas industry jobs would be about one-fortieth
of 1 percent (i.e., 0.026 percent). This is far from the
number of jobs that New York residents have been led
to expect from shale gas development. Such minimal
economic benefits do not justify the near-term and
long-term public costs that would accompany drilling
and fracking for shale gas.
• assumes a rapid pace of shale gas drilling and
fracking under the “average” scenario that would
result in more than 20,000 wells being drilled in
just three counties of the state (Broome, Chemung
and Tioga);
• fails to account for the negative impacts that drilling
and fracking would have on employment in
other industries, such as tourism and agriculture;
• overestimates production jobs by assuming that
shale gas wells will produce for 30 years; and
• misapplies an economic multiplier to estimate the
economic spillover effect of gas industry jobs.
2 Food & Water Watch • www.foodandwaterwatch.org

Introduction
The oil and gas industry, 5 industry-funded academics 6
and ideological think tanks 7 have promoted shale gas
development as a sure-fire job creator in difficult
economic times. Proponents of shale gas development
have benefited from media 8 and U.S. government 9
reports in which the supposed economic benefits have
gone unquestioned. Food & Water Watch recently
analyzed one industry-backed job projection and found
that it overstated shale gas job creation potential in
New York by a factor of 10, or about 900 percent. 10
New York’s job projection follows a similar methodology
and suffers from similar flaws. A topline claim in
the New York socioeconomic impact analysis is that
53,969 jobs could be created assuming an “average”
scenario of shale gas development. 11 But this is a
30-year projection. 12 It assumes that a total of 42,126
shale gas wells would be developed over 30 years,
including 21,067 in just the three counties of Broome,
Chemung and Tioga. 13
Close examination of this job projection shows that
allowing for such extensive shale gas development
in New York would actually have a minimal impact
on employment in the near term, primarily because
most jobs would go to employees from out-of-state.
Shale gas development would not provide the broadbased
economic growth that New York now needs and
that the industry has promised they could deliver.
Instead, shale gas development would primarily benefit
the oil and gas industry while bringing significant
costs to public health, public infrastructure, and
the environment.
New York’s shale gas job projection
The consulting company Ecology and Environment, Inc.
(E&E Inc.) was hired to conduct New York’s analysis of
the impact that shale gas development would have on
employment in the state. 14 E&E Inc. produced a report
describing their methodology and findings that became,
after minor revisions, Section 6.8 of the New York State
Department of Conservation (NYSDEC) “Revised Draft
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement”
(SGEIS). 15 Under New York’s “average” development
scenario, A the analysis concluded that 53,969
jobs would be created from drilling and fracking 42,126
shale gas wells over 30 years, compared to the baseline
of no shale gas development. 16
Jobs before production versus jobs during production
New York’s 30-year projection of 53,969 jobs comes
from three separate projections: a projected 17,634
“construction” jobs from the preparing, drilling and
fracking of 1,652 shale gas wells in year 30; a projected
7,161 “production” jobs that have accumulated over
the 30 years as more and more wells are brought into
production; and a projected 29,174 “indirect” jobs created
by the economic spillover effects of construction
and production jobs. 17
A 2009 study by the Marcellus Shale Education &
Training Center (MSETC) on future education and
training needs in Pennsylvania is the basis, in the
New York study, of this distinction between jobs before
production and jobs during production. 18 However, to
make this distinction, MSETC uses the terms “drilling
phase jobs” and “production phase jobs,” even though
some of the drilling phase jobs are associated with
pre-drilling activities. 19 New York’s use of the term
“construction jobs” obscures the fact that the drilling
(and pre-drilling) phase of well development includes
white-collar jobs, such as lawyers, lobbyists, accountants,
engineers and office assistants, in addition to
jobs directly associated with building access roads,
constructing pipelines, clearing land and drilling and
fracking. 20 A more accurate distinction is used in this
report: pre-production phase jobs versus production
phase jobs.
It takes less than one year to prepare a well site and
conduct the drilling and fracking. 21 As a consequence,
the number of pre-production phase jobs increases
from one year to the next only if the number of new
wells developed each year increases; if the number of
new wells drilled and fracked stays constant, then no
new pre-production phase jobs would be created.
A Three development scenarios were developed based on information
from the Independent Oil & Gas Association of New York (IOGA-NY).
The NYSDEC SGEIS only reports the “low” and “average” development
scenarios.
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale Gas Development • November 2011 3

Table 1. Annual Job Creation from Shale Gas Development Under
New York’s “Average” Development Scenario
Year
# of new wells drilled
and fracked
# of producing wells
(cumulative)
New preproduction
phase jobs
New production
phase jobs
1 165 165 1759 28
2 330 496 1771 56
3 496 991 1757 84
4 661 1652 1771 113
5 826 2478 1759 140
6 991 3469 1759 169
7 1156 4626 1771 196
8 1322 5947 1756 225
9 1487 7434 1771 253
10 1652 9086 1760 281
11 1652 10738 0 280
12 1652 12390 0 281
13 1652 14042 0 281
14 1652 15694 0 281
15 1652 17346 0 281
16 1652 18998 0 281
17 1652 20650 0 281
18 1652 22302 0 280
19 1652 23954 0
281
20 1652 25606 0 281
21 1652 27258 0 281
22 1652 28910 0 281
23 1652 30562 0 281
24 1652 32214 0 280
25 1652 33866 0 281
26 1652
35518 0 281
27 1652
37170 0 281
28 1652 38822 0 281
29 1652 40474 0 281
30 1652 42126 0 280
31 0 41961 -17634 -28
Note: The reason for the variability in the number of new pre-production jobs during the first 10 years is unexplained
in the E&E Inc. report.
Source: Ecology and Environment Inc. 2011, Table 4-7 for new jobs projected, pages 4-2 and 4-3 for wells drilled and
fracked per year
4 Food & Water Watch • www.foodandwaterwatch.org

The New York job projection assumes that for the first
10 years there is constant growth in the number of
new wells developed each year, from 165 new wells in
the first year to 1,652 new wells in the tenth year. 22
(See Table 1.) Development is then assumed to level
off for years 11 through 30 at 1,652 new wells a year. 23
This means there would not be any new pre-production
phase jobs after year 10.
Production jobs, in contrast, would accumulate as
more wells are brought into production. The New
York job projection assumes that a shale gas well will
produce for 30 years, so in year 31 the first shale gas
wells would be retired under the development scenario.
However, while production jobs would accumulate,
the pre-production phase of shale gas development
requires many times more workers per well than the
production phase. 24
The New York analysis, relying on the 2009 MSETC
study, estimated that the pre-production phase requires
the equivalent B of about 10.7 full-time workers
per well. C25 In contrast, again based on the MSETC
study, the New York analysis assumed that the production
phase requires the equivalent of 0.17 fulltime
workers per well, or about one full-time worker
to manage the production of six active wells. 26 These
estimates of the full-time equivalent (FTE) workforce
needed per well, combined with the number of new
wells developed and the number of producing wells,
allowed New York to project the number of preproduction
and production jobs each year under each
development scenario. (See Table 1 for annual job
creation under the “average” development scenario.)
Indirect job impacts
New York considers pre-production and production
phase jobs as “direct jobs,” from which there is an
economic spillover effect that creates “indirect jobs.” 27
The New York analysis used the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Regional Input-Output Modeling
System (RIMS II) Type I employment multiplier to
project indirect job impacts under the different development
scenarios. 28 Specifically, the analysis used the
oil and gas industry RIMS II Type I multiplier of
2.1766, estimated for the state of New York. 29
This assumption means that for each direct job created
from shale gas development, an additional 1.1766
“indirect” jobs would be created (i.e., 2.1766 - 1). Thus,
New York projected 29,174 “indirect” jobs by multiplying
1.1766 times the sum of the projected 17,634
“construction” jobs and 7,161 “production” jobs. 30
For reasons detailed below, however, New York’s
projections of direct and indirect job creation from
shale gas development are deeply flawed.
B The MSETC study measures jobs in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE)
workers working 2,080 hours per year. Hundreds of different workers
may work on a given well at a given time, but in many cases only for a
few days.
C The New York analysis assumes that 10 percent of shale gas wells
in New York would be vertical, and 90 percent horizontal. New York
adopted a Marcellus Shale Education & Training Center (MSETC)
estimate of 11.53 full-time workers per horizontal well in Pennsylvania,
then assumed that the 10 percent of wells that would be vertical
were about 70 percent less intensive to drill. To arrive at an adjusted
estimate of full-time workers per well, the calculation is 0.90*11.53 +
0.10*(11.53*0.2777) = 10.7.
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale Gas Development • November 2011 5

Table 2. Minimal Job Creation for Current Residents of New York
Under the “Average” Development Scenario
Year
# of new wells
drilled
and fracked
New
pre-production
phase jobs (total)
New pre-production
jobs for “transient”
workers
New pre-production
jobs for “permanent”
workers
New pre-production
jobs to current
NY residents
1 165 1759 1370 389 194.5
2 330 1771 1,305 466 233
3 496 1757 1,212 545 272.5
4 661 1771 1,134 637 318.5
5 826 1759 1,030 729 364.5
6 991 1759 930 829 414.5
7 1156 1771 833 938 469
8 1322 1756 715 1041 520.5
9 1487 1771 614 1157 578.5
10 1652 1760 496 1264 632
11 1652 0 -523 523 0
12 1652 0 -526 526 0
13 1652 0 -524 524 0
14 1652 0 -518 518 0
15 1652 0 -510 510 0
16 1652 0 -497 497 0
17 165 2 0 -483 483 0
18 1652 0 -465 465 0
19 1652 0 -445 445 0
20 1652 0 -423 423 0
21 1652 0 -401 401 0
22 1652 0 -377 377 0
23 1652 0 -353 353 0
24 1652 0 -329 329 0
25 1652 0 -306 306 0
26 1652 0 -282 282 0
27 1652 0 -259 259 0
28 1652 0 -239 239 0
29 1652 0 -217 217 0
30 1652 0 -199 199 0
31 0 -17634
Note: Instead of distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state workers, the New York analysis chose to describe
pre-production phase workers as either transient or permanent. Although adopted in this table, this is inappropriate
terminology since many out-of-state workers are permanent hires who move from site to site, while some in-state
workers, such as in construction, may be temporary and/or transient workers.
Source: Ecology and Environment Inc. 2011, Table 4-27. Estimate of new pre-production phase jobs to current residents
based on the assumption that half of new “permanent” pre-production phase jobs go to workers who have moved
to New York for shale gas development jobs.
6 Food & Water Watch • www.foodandwaterwatch.org

Shale gas development would
bring few opportunities to
current residents
The New York analysis noted that most pre-production
jobs would go to transient, out-of-state workers in
the early years of shale gas development. 31 A 2011
MSETC study estimated that 70 to 80 percent of
employees were out-of-state during the early stages of
Pennsylvania shale gas development. 32 According to
interviews and surveys conducted by MSETC, however,
the out-of-state portion of newly hired workers
was 25–35 percent. 33 This apparent improvement in
in-state hiring may have been due in part to out-ofstate
workers having established in-state residence,
since in the MSETC study an employee that had lived
in Pennsylvania for at least one year and had a valid
PA driver’s license qualified as an in-state worker. 34
This reveals a subtle but crucial problem with the way
the New York job projection has been presented. Many
of the pre-production jobs that New York projected as
“permanent employment” would actually go to workers
who had moved to the state to continue their oil
and gas industry employment, not to current residents
of New York who have been led to believe that
allowing shale gas development would bring new job
opportunities for them.
Table 2 shows the annual pre-production phase job
creation projected by New York, broken down between
new jobs for transient and permanent workers. In the
first year, New York assumed that only 22 percent of
new pre-production phase hires would be permanent,
and that the percentage of permanent new hires
would steadily increase to 72 percent in year 10. 35 The
fifth column of Table 2 lists the number of new production
phase jobs for permanent workers that are
projected by New York under these assumptions: 389
in the first year, an additional 466 in the second year,
and so on. However, as discussed above, many of these
permanent workers do not currently reside in New
York — they would have come from other states, most
likely states that currently allow shale gas development.
To illustrate this effect, Food & Water Watch assumed
that half of the new permanent jobs directly associated
with the pre-production phase of shale gas development
were taken by employees who had moved to
New York State for such work. Under this assumption,
pre-production phase employment of current New
York residents would only grow in the first 10 years,
with 195 new jobs available in the first year increasing
to 632 new jobs available in the tenth year. After
year 10, based on the New York analysis, the only new
permanent pre-production phase hires would be from
the transitioning of the transient workforce.
For perspective, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimated that 755,892 New Yorkers were unemployed
in August 2011. 36 Using this figure, the impact of 195
new oil and gas industry jobs would be about one-fortieth
of 1 percent (i.e., 0.026 percent). This is far from
the number of jobs New York residents have been led
to expect.
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale Gas Development • November 2011 7

Additional failures of New York’s
analysis of socioeconomic impacts
The “average” development scenario would rapidly
expand drilling and fracking
The “average” scenario assumed that 165 new wells
would be drilled and fracked in the first year of development,
increasing gradually to 1,652 new wells
in the tenth year of development (see Table 1), after
which point the annual number of new wells would
stay at 1,652. For comparison, in Pennsylvania in
2010 there were 1,405 new wells developed, and 2,459
new wells have been projected for development in year
2015. 38 New York’s rapid pace of shale gas development
would be concentrated in certain counties, 39 and
it is far from certain that such development could be
sustained for 30 years.
The New York analysis assumes that 50 percent of
the wells would be located in just three counties:
Broome, Chemung and Tioga. 40 Under the “average”
development scenario, the number of new wells would
increase gradually until reaching 826 new wells per
year in years 10 through 30 in these three counties. 41
In total, 21,067 wells would be developed in these
three counties. 42
With such extensive shale gas development, significant
negative impacts on other parts of the economy,
such as agriculture and tourism, would likely result,
but the New York analysis fails to account for such
negative impacts.
Negative impacts on employment in agriculture and
tourism from shale gas development are dismissed
with a spurious argument
Although the New York analysis acknowledges that
shale gas development could have negative impacts on
employment in other industries, these potential negative
impacts are not included in the job projections. 43
Instead, the New York analysis dismisses the significance
of such negative impacts with the simple argument
that “Cattaraugus and Chautauqua Counties
still have healthy tourism sectors despite having more
than 3,900 active natural gas wells in the region.” 44
But the fact that tourism and agriculture exist as industries
in Chautauqua and Cattaraugus counties is
not a serious argument. It is quite possible that tourism
would have been greater in these counties were
it not for the past and current gas drilling. Moreover,
modern shale gas development is far more intensive
than conventional natural gas development: much longer
boreholes drilled, much more fracking fluid used,
much more wastewater created and much more heavyduty
truck traffic. 45
The cumulative impacts that such development would
have on other parts of rural economies may be difficult
to quantify, but they must not be dismissed.
Thirty years of shale gas production per well is optimistic,
meaning production jobs are likely overstated
In projecting production phase jobs, the New York
analysis assumed that each new well produces shale
gas for 30 years, and further assumed that the estimate
of 0.17 FTE production phase workers per well
would hold for all 30 years. 46 But this estimate, taken
from the 2009 MSETC report, is based on only a few
years of shale gas production in Pennsylvania. 47 This
introduces significant uncertainty into New York’s
production phase job projection. New York assumes
that production of a typical horizontal well will fall by
75 percent from year 1 to year 4, and by 90 percent
by year 15. 48 But if production falls more rapidly than
expected, then there would be fewer production phase
jobs over the long term. Indeed, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission is investigating whether
shale gas companies have overstated the productivity
of shale gas wells. 49
Rapidly changing estimates of the amount of recoverable
shale gas also raise questions about future well
productivity, 50 suggesting that the amount of gas that
can be recovered from a given location of the shale
may vary significantly from well to well.
8 Food & Water Watch • www.foodandwaterwatch.org

Incorrect use of employment multipliers exaggerated
indirect job impacts
Finally, New York misused employment multipliers in
a way that exaggerated the potential economic spillover
effect from pre-production and production phase
jobs. New York went on to misuse economic multipliers
in a way that exaggerated the potential economic
spillover effect from these jobs.
Indirect jobs are those that would be created down
supply chains due to demand created by pre-production
and production phase jobs, i.e., from “direct” jobs.
The New York analysis used the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Regional Input-Output Modeling
System (RIMS II) Type I employment multiplier to
project indirect job impacts that would stem from preproduction
and production phase jobs. 51 Specifically,
the New York analysis adopted the oil and gas industry
RIMS II Type I multiplier of 2.1766 for the state
of New York. 52 Under this assumption, each direct job
created from shale gas development would lead to an
additional 1.1766 “indirect” jobs (i.e., 2.1766 - 1).
However, input-output modeling is well suited only for
analyzing the economic impact of clearly defined projects
for which the interdependencies between relevant
economic sectors, over the course of the project, are
well understood and quantifiable. 53 For example, when
a bridge is to be built, there is a record of understanding
of how direct spending on the project leads to indirect
spending down supply chains within the regional
economy, in part because such projects are not typically
new to a region. In contrast, shale gas development
would be a new industry in New York. This means the
estimate of 1.1766 indirect jobs from each direct job is
highly uncertain.
development in the state. Yet the New York oil and
gas industry multiplier is derived from conventional
oil and gas development. Shale gas development,
being a fundamentally new industry for the state,
would likely have less of a regional multiplier effect
because of extensive out-of-state sourcing.
Finally, the New York analysis implicitly assumed
that all of the pre-production and production phase
jobs were in the oil and gas industry when it used the
oil and gas industry multiplier. But, according to the
MSETC report, shale gas development challenges the
traditional notion of oil and gas industry jobs, and
jobs would go to a “wide array of subcontractors.” 55
Because the employment multiplier for the oil and gas
industry is larger than it is for most other industries,
New York overestimated the number of indirect jobs
by using only the oil and gas industry multiplier. 56
These flaws reflect the fact that New York projected
indirect job impacts using input-output models despite
the explicit warning in the 2011 MSETC study,
which stated, “Since the analysis focuses on the specific
jobs required for drilling and production without
regard to formal industry sectors, it would be illogical
to apply workforce or economic multipliers to it, which
typically are based upon specific industry sectors”
(emphasis added). 57 The New York analysis ignored
this logic and produced an exaggerated projection of
the job creation potential of shale gas development.
Another flaw is exposed by the fact that the New York
analysis assumed that more than 77 percent of workers
are out-of-state initially. 54 (See Table 2.) The fact
that out-of-state workers hired by out-of-state companies
would make up the majority of the workforce for
the first 11 years of drilling suggests that there would
be greater out-of-state sourcing of supplies and
materials than occurs for conventional oil and gas
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale Gas Development • November 2011 9

Conclusion
The New York socioeconomic impact analysis, conducted
by E&E Inc., fails to provide an accurate
projection of the potential benefits of opening up the
state to drilling and fracking for shale gas. By exaggerating
the potential benefits, New York has failed
to serve the public interest. In reality, current residents
of New York can only expect intensive shale gas
development to create several hundred new shale gas
industry jobs for each of the first 10 years, followed by
far fewer production jobs created for the next 20 years.
Specifically, Food & Water Watch estimates that in
the first year of “average” shale gas development,
current New York residents can expect only 195 new
oil and gas industry job opportunities. For perspective,
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated
that 755,892 New Yorkers were unemployed in August
2011, 58 and thus the impact of 195 new oil and gas
industry jobs would be about one-fortieth of 1 percent
(i.e., 0.026 percent).
This is far from the 53,969 jobs that New York residents
have been led to expect from opening up their
state to shale gas development. The reality that allowing
shale gas development is likely to only create several
hundred new jobs annually for current residents
of New York puts the risks of drilling and fracking for
shale gas in proper perspective. Decision makers in
New York should see that such minimal job gains do
not justify the certain costs to public health, public
infrastructure, and the environment that come with
shale gas development.
Endnotes
1 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy. “Modern Shale
Gas Development in the United States: A Primer.” April 2009 at ES-3.
2 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Revised
draft supplemental generic environmental impact statement
on the oil, gas and solution mining regulatory program: well permit
issuance for horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing
to develop the Marcellus Shale and other low-permeability gas
reservoirs.” September 7, 2011.
3 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. “Fact
sheet: economic impacts of high-volume hydraulic fracturing in
New York State.” September 2011
4 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local area unemployment statistics,
New York. November 17, 2011.
5 Wood MacKenzie. American Petroleum Institute. “U.S. Supply
Forecast and Potential Jobs and Economic Impacts (2012-2030).”
September 7, 2011 at 12 and 28.
6 Considine, Timothy J. et al. “The Pennsylvania Marcellus natural gas
industry: status, economic impact and future potential.” Pennsylvania
State University, Department of Energy and Mineral Engineering.
July 20, 2011 at ii, v, 31 to 32; Considine, Timothy J. et al. “The
Economic Impacts of the Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale Natural Gas
Play: An Update.” Pennsylvania State University, Department of
Energy and Mineral Engineering. May 24, 2010 at ii, 18 and 19.
7 Public Policy Institute of New York State (PPINYS). “Drilling for Jobs:
What the Marcellus Shale Could Mean for New York.” July 2011 at
17 to 18.
8 Gold, Russell and Ryan Dezember. “It’s official: ‘Age of Shale’ has
arrived.” The Wall Street Journal. October 18, 2011; Hargreaves,
Steve. “Gas boom mints instant millionaires.” CNN Money. November
2, 2010.
9 U.S. Department of Energy, Shale Gas Subcommittee of the Secretary
of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB). “The SEAB Shale Gas Production
Subcommittee: Ninety-Day Report.” August 11, 2011 at 7.
10 Food & Water Watch. “Exposing the oil and gas industry’s false
jobs promise for shale gas development: how methodological flaws
grossly exaggerate job projections.” November 2011.
11 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
2011.
12 Ibid.
13 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-209 and 6-218.
14 Ibid. at 6-207.
15 Ecology and Environment, Inc. “Economic assessment report for
the supplemental generic environmental impact statement on
New York State’s oil, gas, and solution mining regulatory program.”
Prepared for New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.
August 2011 at 4-1 through 4-138; New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation. September 7, 2011 at 6-207
through 6-263.
16 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-209 and 6-213.
17 Ibid. at 6-213.
10 Food & Water Watch • www.foodandwaterwatch.org

18 Ibid. at 6-211 and 6-212; Marcellus Shale Education & Training
Center. “Marcellus Shale Workforce Needs Assessment.” June 2009
at 19.
19 Marcellus Shale Education & Training Center. June 2009 at 11.
20 Ibid. at 33 to 34.
21 Ibid. at 19.
22 Ecology and Environment, Inc. August 2011 at 4-3; New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation. September 7, 2011 at
6-209.
23 Ecology and Environment, Inc. August 2011 at 4-3; New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation. September 7, 2011 at
6-209.
24 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-211 and 6-212; Marcellus Shale Education &
Training Center. June 2009 at 19.
25 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-208, 6-211 and 6-212; Marcellus Shale Education
& Training Center. June 2009 at 13 and 19.
26 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.
September 7, 2011 at 6-212; Marcellus Shale Education & Training
Center. June 2009 at 19.
27 National Marine Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office. “2009
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-213.
28 Ibid. at 6-213.
29 Ibid. at 6-224.
30 Ibid. at 6-213.
31 Ecology and Environment, Inc. August 2011 at 4-60 and 4-61.
32 Marcellus Shale Education and Training Center. “Pennsylvania Marcellus
Shale Workforce Needs Assessment.” June 2011 at 8.
33 Ibid.
34 Marcellus Shale Education and Training Center. June 2011 at 20.
35 Ecology and Environment, Inc. August 2011 at 4-63 and 4-64; New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-233 and 6-234.
36 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. November 17, 2011.
37 Ecology and Environment, Inc. August 2011 at 4-59 to 4-64.
38 Considine, et al. July 20, 2011 at iv.
39 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 2-35, 2-37, 6-210, 6-217 and 6-218.
40 Ibid. at 6-217
41 Ibid. at 6-218.
42 Ibid. at 6-218.
43 Ibid. at 6-230 and 6-231.
44 Ibid. at 6-231
45 Ibid. at ES -13, 5-11, 6-15, 6-65, 6-301 and 7-129.
46 Ibid. at 6-212
47 Marcellus Shale Education & Training Center. June 2009 at 19.
48 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-259.
49 Fowler, Tom. “SEC subpoenas records on shale gas production.”
Houston Chronicle. August 9, 2011; Hargreaves, Steve. “A warning
for shale gas investors.” CNN Money. August 3, 2011.
50 U.S. Geological Survey. (Press release). “USGS Releases New Assessment
of Gas Resources in the Marcellus Shale, Appalachian
Basin.” August 23, 2011; U.S. Energy Information Administration.
“Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil
Plays.” July 2011 at 5 to 7.
51 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-213 to 6-215.
52 Ibid. at 6-224.
53 Barth, Jannette M. J.M. Barth & Associates, Inc. “Unanswered
Questions About the Economic Impact of Drilling in the Marcellus
Shale: Don’t Jump to Conclusions.” March 22, 2010 at 1.
54 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. September
7, 2011 at 6-233 and 6-234.
55 Marcellus Shale Education & Training Center. June 2011 at 20.
56 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Input-Output Modeling
System (RIMS) II Multipliers (2008/2008), Table 2.5. “Total multipliers
for output, earnings, employment, and value added by industry
aggregation New York State (type I).”
57 Marcellus Shale Education & Training Center. June 2011 at 30.
58 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. November 17, 2011.
How New York State Exaggerated Potential Job Creation from Shale Gas Development • November 2011 11

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